Food Regimes, Capital, State, and Class: Friedmann and McMichael Revisited
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Abstract
Friedmann and McMichael’s work, through their concept of the ‘food regime’, has been foundational to our thinking about the relation between capitalism, the state, and agriculture. Given the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of their seminal 1989 paper in this journal (Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present) it seems very appropriate to commemorate this event by undertaking a reassessment of that paper. This paper undertakes such a reassessment by examining and critiquing: the theoretical assumptions underlying the paper, particularly in relation to capitalism, class, and the state. This directs attention particularly to: the authors’ (implicit) definition of capitalism; the relation between capitalism and the modern state; their treatment of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’; and their periodization of food regimes and the dynamics underlying them, these being premised on their theoretical assumptions. The second, third, and, fourth sections occupy the bulk of the paper. The second section develops a significantly revised theoretical foundation for thinking about the dynamics underlying food regimes, while the third section deploys this as the basis for a new periodization of food regimes. This periodization includes a proposed Fifth, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime, and the final section examines this in detail.

Introduction
Friedmann and McMichael’s work, through their concept of the ‘food regime’, has been pivotal to our thinking about the relation between capitalism, the state, and agriculture. Given the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of their seminal 1989 paper in this journal (Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present) it seems very appropriate to commemorate this event by undertaking a reassessment of that paper. We propose to undertake such a reassessment by, first, examining and critiquing the theoretical bases of food regimes as presented by Friedmann and McMichael, together with their periodization of these regimes. Arising from this critique, we go on to develop a significantly revised theoretical foundation for thinking about the dynamics underlying food regimes, and to deploy this as the basis for proposing a new periodization of food regimes.

It is perhaps useful to remind ourselves at the outset what we mean by food regimes. Food Regime Theory (FRT) represents an attempt to ground understanding of the organization of food production, distribution, and consumption on a world scale in political economy – in other words, to understand how capitalism and the modern state generate and structure this organization. As defined by Friedmann and McMichael (1989), the co-originators of the theory, FRT describes three global food regimes: the First (1870s-1930s); the Second (1950s-1970s); and the Third (from 1980s-present), the latter described as the ‘corporate’ food
regime by McMichael (2013) and as the ‘corporate-environmental’ regime by Friedmann
(2005). Friedmann and McMichael articulated the food regime as an historically significant
cluster of global-scale food relationships which contributed to stabilizing and underwriting a
period of growth in global capitalism. A food regime comprised a series of key relationships,
often enshrined in rule-making and enforcing institutions. Following, in part, a Regulation
Theor(ical (RT) interpretation of capitalist history\textsuperscript{11}, these relationships coalesced to form a
relatively stable pattern of accumulation (historical conjuncture) over a period of time,
before then destabilizing and moving into disjuncture and crisis (Campbell and Dixon 2009,
263).

In contrast to much of the criticism that was directed against it in the 1990s from then
ascendant thinking in post-structuralism and actor-network theory particularly (thinking that
McMichael (2013, 12) describes as ‘abstract localism’), our critique seeks, in this paper, both
to uphold the tradition of radical political economy that informed Friedmann and
McMichael’s paper, and the value of the concept of the food regime itself. Our critique,
therefore, takes place from within that tradition. That tradition, however, is diverse and may
be said to comprise, not one, but rather several main strands of thought which, at risk of over-
simplification, may be grouped into three schools:

The first school, which may be termed the ‘market-relations model’, is one in which capitalism
is seen to arise through an increase in trade and the rise of an international division of labour\textsuperscript{12}. This line of thinking is represented particularly well by Wallerstein (1974, 1976) in his World
Systems Theory (WST), and, it is important to note, WST has constituted one of the two main
intellectual influences on the development of FRT (McMichael 2013) (the other, as noted,
being RT, which, we argue, Friedmann and McMichael employ only in part, to the detriment
of their formulation of FRT). We will present a critique of this approach, which, rightly in our
view, has been accused of ‘structuralism’ and ‘abstract globalism’, not least by McMichael
himself (2013) in his recent ‘retrospective’ on FRT. We will argue, however, that, despite his
auto-critique, it is difficult to discern McMichael’s rejection of ‘structuralism’ being translated
into his substantive and contemporary analysis of the ‘corporate’ food regime, which
polarizes precisely into the abstract globalization of capital and the abstract localization of
resistance, the latter occurring, for McMichael, essentially ‘outside’ the dynamics of what we
will term the ‘state-capital nexus’. Such charges of ‘structuralism’ are perhaps ironic, since it
was Friedmann and McMichael’s intent, by means of FRT, to break out of the determinism
and linearity of ‘structural Marxism’ (the ‘second school’, see below), an impulse, as implied
above, that has only increased, if not always been realized, since 1989 (see Campbell and
Dixon 2009). Indeed, these authors suggest that ‘it is only possible...to understand the
significance of these new perspectives by understanding food regimes as a key historical and
theoretical pivot that moved debates in rural sociology from a rather narrow, structural and
orthodox political economy of agriculture to a more contingent, historically contextual
understanding of the many configurations...of agri-food capitalism’ (Campbell and Dixon
2009, 261).

We argue, however, and as implied above, that, in the case of McMichael, theoretical
provision for such ‘contingency’ has not been realized other than ‘outside’ the regime (see
Tilzey 2017), while, in the case of Friedmann, her theoretical shift to engage ‘contingency’ has
been undertaken through her partial embrace of post-structural and post-modern frames,
which fail, however, to afford a rigorous basis for conceptualizing ‘contingency’. We argue
that this unresolved tension between ‘structure’ and ‘contingency’ in FRT, as presented by Friedmann and McMichael, arises through their failure to embrace RT in its entirety, together with their apparent lack of awareness of other important and related developments in ‘post-structuralist’ (but not ‘post-structural’) Marxian theory – notably, ‘Political Marxism’, Poulantzian state-capital theory, and neo-Gramscian theory. Indeed, it may be argued that this unresolved tension and the failure to find a theoretical basis for theorizing the dialectic between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, underlies, to a considerable degree, the great schism that emerged in the 1990s, within rural geography and sociology, between the ‘structuralism’ of ‘abstract globalism’ and the ‘post-structural’ frame of ‘abstract localism’. Further, it was this ‘abstract globalism’ which mandated, and continues to mandate, its mirror image ‘abstract localism’. Below, and through the development of ‘Political Marxian’ and related approaches, we will attempt to vitiate this dualism of the two ‘abstractions’ by means of revised conceptions of capitalism, class\textsuperscript{v}, agency, and state\textsuperscript{vi}.

The second school of radical political economy may be termed the ‘relations of production’ approach, one that has often been equated with ‘structural Marxism’, and one whose inadequacies helped to propel the rise of ‘post-modernism’ and ‘post-structural’ approaches during the 1980s and 1990s (indeed, in the minds of many of the latter, ‘structural Marxism’ is Marxism). Indeed, Friedman and McMichael’s embrace of WST (and of RT) itself represented a reaction against the reductionism of the ‘relations of production’ approach. This is not the place to undertake a detailed discussion of this school (see useful summary in Campbell and Dixon (2009) in relation to rural sociology) – suffice to say that, for it, ‘modes of production’ are defined by the direct relationship between exploiter and exploited at the level of the enterprise. This fails, however, to understand that the direct exploitation of labour is but a ‘moment’ in the production process as capital is forced beyond the immediate labour process in order to reproduce itself. That is why Marx was, himself, careful to avoid any reduction of his definition of capitalism to this immediate relation itself. Rather, ‘the relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and specifically at a definite stage of historical development’ (Marx 1973, 90). In other words, we need to address the totality of dialectical relations between capital, class, and the state (the state-capital nexus) if we are to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of capitalism and the state system, and the place of food regimes within these.

This we attempt to do in this paper by building on the third school of radical political economy, which, we argue, represents a resolution to the problems of the first two schools, and which takes as its starting point Marx’s desire, non-reductively, to understand capitalism in terms of the totality of social relations. This third school, we suggest, may be said to comprise elements of Political Marxism, Neo-Gramscian theory, Poulantzian state-theory, and RT in its entirety.

The paper has the following structure. First, we assess and critique the theoretical assumptions underlying Friedmann and McMichael’s 1989 paper, particularly in relation to capitalism, class, and the state. This directs attention particularly to: the authors’ (implicit) definition of capitalism; the relation between capitalism and the modern state; their treatment of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’. In this section we also assess and critique their periodization of food regimes and the dynamics underlying them, these being premised on the theoretical assumptions discussed beforehand. In the next section, we attempt a synthesis of the elements of the ‘third school’ of radical political economy to develop a theory of the ‘state-capital nexus’ in preference to WST and the dismembered RT deployed by
Friedmann and McMichael (see below), and as a key explanatory tool for understanding and defining food regimes. In the third section, we use this theory, in conjunction with a re-assessment of historical source material, to propose a revised periodization of, and rather more complex dynamic underlying, food regimes. As part of this new periodization, we propose, inter alia, a Fifth, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime, and the final section explores the rationale underlying this proposed, and current, regime.

**Problems with Friedmann and McMichael’s Theorization, and Periodization of Food Regimes**

In their 1989 paper, Friedmann and McMichael sought to explore, as a key objective, ‘the role of agriculture in the development of the capitalist world economy, and in the trajectory of the state system’ (1989, 93). A re-assessment of their paper would reasonably be expected to ask, therefore, how these authors understand and define capitalism and the state, the relation between capitalism and the state, and the relation between states. We undertake this task below. Also fundamental to food regime dynamics, and to those of capitalism and the state, we argue, are class relations. These relations do not, however, receive prominence in Friedmann and McMichael’s paper.

First, we address Friedmann and McMichael’s treatment of capitalism. Interestingly, they provide no explicit definition of this concept, but do refer to Aglietta (1979), a key figure in RT. Here, however, they reference only his discussion of capital accumulation (theorized as a ‘Regime of Accumulation’ from which we assume the term ‘food regime’ derives) and fail to address the ‘Mode of Regulation’, a category of equal significance. Shorn of the ‘Mode of Regulation’, it is difficult to comprehend capitalism as a class-defined and contradiction-ridden mode of exploitation that exists in an ‘internal’ relation to the modern state, the latter performing vital support and legitimacy functions for capital without which it would be in jeopardy (van Apeldoorn et al. 2012).

Second, and conjoined to the above, their conceptualization of the relation between capitalism and the modern state is seriously under-theorized. This concerns their neglect of the twin aspects of this relation that enable us to make sense of both entities in their dialectical co-constitution: the ‘separation in unity’ of the institutional spheres of the ‘economy’ and ‘polity’, and the complementary accumulation and legitimation functions of the state in relation to capital as defined by RT (Boyer and Saillard 2002). Friedmann and McMichael, however, deploy a dichotomous, rather than dialectical, understanding of the state-capital relation, with both entities reified and de-historicized. Their modern state seems to be nothing more than the contingent outcome of a sectoral articulation between agriculture and industry. We suggest that an understanding of the state-capital relation needs to go far deeper than this, however. Following Poulantzas (1978), it is more helpful to see the state, given the lack of ‘extra-economic’ influence that individual capitals can exert, as providing the essential institutional space for various fractions of the capitalist class, in addition possibly to other classes, to come together to form longer-term strategies and alliances whilst, simultaneously, the state disorganizes non-capitalist classes through various means of co-optation and division. The state, also for reasons of legitimation, must, additionally, be ‘relatively autonomous’ from the interests and demands of particular
fractions of capital, and even from capital ‘in general’. So, as Poulantzas (1978) suggests, the
state represents the condensation of the balance of class forces in society. For Friedmann and
McMichael, by contrast, capital is a unitary entity, bereft of specific class and class fractional
content, and is counter-posed to a ‘state’, a content-less abstraction which apparently
represents, without mediation, the position of a generalized counter-movement. This aligns
with a Polyanian, indeed neoclassical, conception of the state and capital as essentialized and
opposed entities. McMichael’s later conceptualization of the ‘corporate’ food regime seems
to be a direct outgrowth of this view, neglecting the enduring importance of divergent
fractions of capital in current dynamics and the pervasive significance of the territorial form,
and potentially imperialist character, of the state. We suggest, by contrast, that the modern
state is better conceptualized itself as a social relation. That is, an arena or container (the
state-capital nexus) (Taylor 1994; van Apeldoorn et al. 2012), within which class contestation
and compromise is played out, principally to secure the material and ideological reproduction
of the hegemonic fractions of capital, even where these may be transnational in orientation.

Third, Friedmann and McMichael either neglect, or deploy a deficient, class analysis,
especially concerning inter-class ‘struggle’. From this derives serious shortcomings in their
presentation of state/capital dynamics involving class contestation and compromise. In this,
their stance has affinities with Polanyi’s avoidance of class and class contestation as causal
factors in political economic dynamics (Tilzey 2017). By contrast, we suggest here, in line with
the schools of Political Marxism (Brenner 1985; Mooers 1991; Wood 2002) and Neo-
Gramscian IPE (Bieler and Morton 2004), that the prime mover in the formation and
reproduction of food regimes is the social-property relations in the hegemonic state (in the
world system) and the international articulation of these relations with receptive and
complementary class interests in other states. This points to the pivotal importance of class,
class struggle, and ‘hegemony’ in the birth and subsequent nurturing within the state-capital
nexus as ‘national policy’, and then projection beyond the hegemon, of a specific regime of
accumulation and, within it, a food regime. ‘National policy’, stated otherwise, is the outcome
of coalitions within the state-capital nexus, arising in turn from class contestation and
compromise between hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, and oppositional interest groups.

Should this ‘national policy’ successfully augment, through expanded capital accumulation,
the power of the state, this state may then, through international projection of its regime of
accumulation, aspire to the status of hegemon in the inter-state system. This process is
exemplified by the emergence of the British ‘free trade’ food regime (1840s-1870s) as the
first international capitalist regime of this kind, denoted by Tilzey (2018), consequently, as
the ‘first’ or ‘Liberal’ Food Regime. It is cross-national class coalitions and international
alliances which act as conduits for the dissemination of a food regime. Such a class agential
process obtains even in relations between a hegemon and a subordinate state, as between
‘core’ imperial states and those of the ‘periphery’, for example, in which case peripheral
extroverted class fractions and imperial transnational class interests may fabricate
symbioses. Thus, food regimes comprise specific forms of capital accumulation, and these
forms comprise the favoured interests of a class fraction or coalition of class fractions within
the hegemonic state, interests which may then be projected politically, via conscious class
agency, into the international arena. Given that the intention is to augment the power of the
state-capital nexus, this may generate relations of ‘combined and uneven development’ with
other states (see next section).
Fourthly, Friedmann and McMichael fail to articulate a theory of agency that might conjoin the categories of capital, state, and class by means of political action. Thus, while failing to identify the internal relations between capital and state, and the crucial understanding of both as class relations, they also fail, consequently, to grasp the role of class as a ‘bridging’ concept, one that encapsulates both structure and agency, or class position and positionality (Potter and Tilzey 2005). This concept, as ‘structured agency’, makes it possible to identify the class fractional interests that comprise capitalist social relations and directs attention to strategies and understandings deployed by political agents in the defence or promotion of their interests. Elsewhere, this has been termed the ‘strategic relational approach’ (Jessop 2005), relating structure that defines positions to social practices/discourses (positionalities) of agents.

We now turn to an assessment of the framing of the relations between capitalism, the state, and class that appear to guide Friedmann and McMichael’s substantive depiction of specific food regimes and, deriving from this, their periodization of these regimes.

The first major problem with Friedmann and McMichael’s substantive characterization of food regimes relates to the causal dynamics they identify as underlying their so-called ‘first’ food regime. They assert that the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (one might add Argentina and Uruguay), as independent settler states: 1) supplied cheap wage foods to the new European working class. While they certainly provisioned Britain, by contrast Germany and France, in their desire to foment articulated economies, erected protectionist barriers against such imports (Koning 1994; Tilzey 2018); 2) ushered in a novel form of trade, ordered internationally for the first time, and concurrent with a colonial relation. This is questionable, since the preceding free trade era (denoted the ‘first’ or ‘Liberal’ food regime by Tilzey (2018)) was likewise international but did not, with the exception of Britain, entail colonialism. The succeeding ‘Imperial’ regime (Tilzey 2018) was characterized by protectionism in Europe, permitting Germany and France to industrialize. They assert, very dubiously, that this new order operated on the basis of comparative advantage ‘as an apparent automatic mechanism of specialization’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 93). In actuality, protectionism was the antithesis of comparative advantage, with the previous ‘Liberal’ food regime embodying this latter principle (Tilzey 2018).

The second problem concerns their assumption of direct continuity from the late 19th century system to that of the 20th century US hegemony, in which this state, through grain exports/food aid, guaranteed completion of the state system in the global South. Despite the truth of the latter, there is a tenuous connection between the 19th century export regime and the 20th century Keynesian surplus disposal regime (Tilzey 2018). Imperialism characterized US relations with the global South during the ‘Imperial’ food regime and these were inimical to completion of the state system (Koning 1994). The latter project was disjunctural with the ‘Imperial’ regime and arose from a singular confluence of Keynesian policies and cold war politics following the Second World War.

The third problem concerns Friedmann and McMichael’s temporal delimitation of their international regimes: ‘We organize our argument around the concept of the food regime, which links international relations of food production and consumption to forms of capital accumulation, broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation since 1870’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95). This starting point appears to stem from Aglietta
(1979), but why 1870? It might have made more sense to start in the 1840s when the ‘Liberal’
food regime began (Tilzey 2018). Or, indeed, given their intellectual debt to WST, one might
reasonably ask why the ‘first’ food regime did not emerge some five hundred years ago (see
below for critique of this assertion of the generalized appearance of capitalism at this early
date). The reason appears to be that ‘it allows us to characterize late 19th century capitalism
as an extensive form, constructing capitalist production through the quantitative growth of
wage labour; and mid-20th century capitalism as an intensive form, reconstructing
consumption relations as part of the process of capital accumulation’ (Friedmann and
McMichael 1989, 95). It is contentious, however, to assert that the core economies of the
‘age of empire’ (Hobsbawm 1987) were constructed around the quantitative growth of
labour, or absolute surplus value. As Amin (1977) demonstrates, the hallmark of the ‘Imperial’
regime was the emergence of qualitative growth, or relative surplus value, as the foundation
of autocentrism and of the nation-state, Germany being exemplary (Mooers 1991; Koning
1994; Byres 1996).

Lastly, Friedmann and McMichael (1989, 95) assert, dubiously, that ‘settler agriculture was
the centrepiece of the formation of metropolitan nation-states’. While causally embroiled in
the genesis of the European state-capital nexus, it did not itself engender nation-state
formation. The emergence of sectorally and socially articulated development was premised,
rather, on the erection of tariffs against cheap imports and in favour of national agricultures
(Koning 1994; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Had comparative advantage held sway, as in the
preceding ‘Liberal’ era, autocentrism would have proven impossible. In contrast to Germany
and France, Britain did continue to rely on cheap imports to underwrite industrial
competitiveness but at the expense of its national agriculture, which continued its decline
(Koning 1994).

Proposing a Revised Causal Basis for Food Regimes

In defining a basis for FRT that has greater explanatory power than that offered by Friedmann
and McMichael in their reliance on WST and partial rendering of RT, we propose here the use
of ‘Political Marxism’, in alliance with neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (Cox
1987; Bieler 2004; Morton 2007) and a full rendering of RT (as specified above). The first
necessity is to develop an understanding of modern capitalism as opposed to ‘merchant’ or
‘commercial capitalism’, terms conflated by WST. Following Marx (1981) there is a need to
specify modern capitalism in terms of class relations, composed of owners of the means of
production counter-posed to an expropriated class ‘free’ to sell its labour power, in which,
for the first time, power over production is exerted ‘economically’, not ‘politically’. As long as
means of production are owned by capitalists and denied to labourers, the ‘dull compulsion
of the economic’ obliges the latter to sell their labour power to the former. Modern capitalism
is thus a ‘qualitatively new phenomenon, a new mode of mobilizing social labour in the
transformation of nature’ (Wolf 1982, 85). This contrasts markedly with the WST tradition
where, following Weber and Braudel, capitalism is seen simply as an expansion of processes
already at work within feudalism.

If WST has no specific theory of capitalism, then, equally, it has no specific theory of the
modern state. This is so because the newly constituted and institutionally separated spheres
of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are dialectically cognate and implied, with their very ‘separation in unity’ a consequence of the commodification of labour power and the establishment of absolute property rights in the means of production. At the same time, the modern state acquires a strategic ‘political’ role which the individual capitalist cannot fulfil. The state was instrumental in effecting the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ which created a proletariat ‘free’ to sell its labour power to the capitalist (Perelman 2000). Once capitalism was installed, the state deployed its power further to maintain and guarantee absolute property rights by the capitalist class, and to institute and support regimes of work discipline required by this new mode (Wolf 1982, 100). The modern state also assumed the essential role of arbitrating and managing contestation between fractions of capital (and between capitalists and its labour force) and of representing their interests in the inter-national arena.

This Marxian understanding of capitalism enables us to see that this new ‘mode of production’ emerged first, in mature form, only in England in the 18th century (Wolf 1982), although its origins may be traced back to the 15th century, again only in England (Brenner 1989; Wood 2002; Teschke 2003; Lacher 2006; Dimmock 2014). Contra WST (including Arrighi (1994)), capitalism was not, therefore, a Europe-wide phenomenon prior to the 19th century, nor can the imperial dynamics of Portugal, Spain, and France be attributed to its logic – rather these dynamics were of mercantile capitalism as an adjunct to the absolutist state variant of feudalism (or the ‘tributary mode of production’ according to Wolf (1982)).

Our qualitative view, presented first in modern times by Robert Brenner (1977, 1985) and pivoting around his concept of ‘social-property relations’, is now referred to as ‘Political Marxism’. Drawing inspiration from Marx’s mature works, notably Grundrisse and Capital, Brenner accords priority to the dynamics of class contestation in a strategic relational sense. Key to understanding modern capitalism for Marx and Brenner is ‘primitive accumulation’. Like Marx, Brenner rejects Adam Smith’s understanding of this concept, in which it is the accumulated wealth from mercantile capital that is seen as pivotal in the transition to modern capitalism, a view replicated in WST and described as ‘neo-Smithian Marxism’ by Brenner (1977). By contrast, Marx and Brenner see primitive accumulation as predicated on the separation of the peasantry from their means of production.

Brenner, rather than employing the term ‘social relations of production’, prefers that of ‘social-property relations’, principally because the former ‘is sometimes taken to convey the idea that the social structural framework in which production takes place is somehow determined by production itself, that is, the form of cooperation or organization of the labour process’ (Brenner 2007, 58). Brenner sees ‘disastrous consequences’ for specifying social system dynamics arising from the usual restrictive use of the ‘social relations of production’ concept (as with the ‘second’ school of radical political economy). First, the importance of property relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers is missed; and second, power relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers that are actually pivotal to specifying class dynamics are relegated to the ‘political superstructure’. Thus, while surplus in pre-capitalist societies cannot be appropriated other than by political means, even in capitalism the ‘political superstructure’ of the state is actually infrastructural with respect to the accumulation and legitimation needs of capital.
Brenner, therefore, does not restrict attention to inter-class relations between capitalists and proletarian, for example. Intra-class contestation between capital fractions and between nation-states is considered of equal significance in capitalist dynamics. The ‘social-property relations’ formulation thus enables the traditionally ‘reified’ regions of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ to be strongly re-integrated. It also enables the state to be re-configured as a causally and theoretically meaningful entity in social system dynamics.

This conceptualization suggests the primacy of ‘political’ dynamics, or ‘class struggle’ around the key issues of ‘who owns what, who does what, who gets what, and what do they do with it?’ (Bernstein 2010, 22), mediated by discourse and the cultural politics of positionality, framed within the social formation, or ‘state’, comprising a distinct constellation of social-property relations and given coherence by a singular jurisdictional authority – within capitalism typically the nation-state. In contrast to the ‘externalist’ or ‘functionalist’ approach of WST, Political Marxism considers social formations to be co-conditioning – in other words, ‘external’ relations are mediated, refracted, and distilled out by the social-property relations of each social formation to constitute an ‘internal’ dynamic which co-develops, with varying degrees of asymmetry, with other social formations.

This conceptualization helps us to understand the co-evolution of capitalism and the modern state in 17th and 18th century England. The competitive edge afforded to the British state-capital nexus by first agrarian and then industrial capitalism led to the adoption, in modified form, of these social-property relations by other ‘core’ states in Europe and North America during the course of the 19th century. The constitution of capitalist food regimes was a key element of this process. Sooner or later, however, the constraints on the level of surplus value which could be generated within the confines of the nation-state began to be encountered, and capital, still grounded in the enabling and protective structure of the state, embarked on programmes of ‘combined and uneven development’24, or imperialism (Trotsky 2008). This meant, and means, that capitalist growth in ‘core’ states occurs through ‘combined and uneven development’ with a consequent ‘periphery’, the latter’s development distorted to the benefit of the ‘core’ and peripheral comprador classes. Again, contra WST, this should not be understood in ‘functionalist’ terms according to the abstract logic of the ‘world system’, but rather as predicated on class and class fractional agency within the context of the state-capital nexus, and on power relations between the latter. Thus, ‘the pressures of uneven development are clearly mediated through different forms of state as nodal points of nationally specific configurations of class fractions and struggles over hegemony and/or passive revolution within accumulation conditions on a world scale’ (Morton 2010, 229).

This discussion enables us, following van Apeldoorn et al. (2012, 474), to distil out the key internal relations between capital and state which the state-capital nexus deploys to secure economic growth and political stability, and which frame the form and function of food regimes. These are:

1. Market creation: to engender, if necessary, re-establish, and ensure the effective functioning of markets, including the preconditions for capital accumulation like ‘primitive accumulation’;

2. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function);
3. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function);

4. External representation: to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism and generating ‘combined and uneven development’ as a consequence).

These key relations form, then, the basis for the constitution of food regimes, as subsidiary aspects of the functioning of the political economy of the state-capital nexus within the world capitalist system. With the first a basic premise of capitalist social-property relations, the relative importance of these relations will vary across space and time according to:

1. The class complexion of the state-capital nexus;
2. The ‘spatial’ location of the state-capital nexus (social formation) within the world system, whether ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’, or ‘periphery’;
3. The ‘temporal’ location of the state-capital nexus within the overall trajectory of capitalism in terms of its developmental path dependency, e.g., the shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism.

Capitalism, in intimate conjunction with the state, thus generates food regimes as integral parts of its growth and power dynamic. This has a threefold logic which is tied up with both the accumulation and legitimation aspects of the state-capital nexus: first, to supply food, on a reasonably secure basis, to its expropriated labour force, now largely divorced from its means of production, thereby hopefully securing its quiescence (relations 1 and 2 above); second, to supply this as cheaply and abundantly as possible, vital in exerting downward pressure on the socially average wage and thus in maximising surplus value in the production of competitive commodities, and in ensuring a transfer of surplus from agriculture to nascent industries (relations 3 and 4); and, third, to afford opportunities for profit-making by the various class fractions of agrarian capital (relations 3 and 4). As indicated, the state-capital nexus deploys all the four relations specified above to secure this logic. These relations may be complementary, as in ‘articulated’ economies, or they may be antagonistic, as in ‘disarticulated’ economies.

**Proposing a Revised Periodization of Food Regimes**

With these basic, framing dynamics in mind we can propose the following, revised, typology of capitalist food regimes. (It may be helpful to recall again, for purposes of comparison, Friedmann and McMichael’s own schema of three global food regimes: the First (1870s-1930s); the Second (1950s-1970s); and the Third (from 1980s-present), the latter described as the ‘corporate food regime’ by McMichael (2013) and as the ‘corporate-environmental regime’ by Friedmann (2005)):

1. **The First National Capitalist Food Regime, 1750-1846** – the ‘First’ Agricultural Revolution in England and Scotland from 1750. Whereas, before 1750, increases in production and productivity had come up against the lack of a suitable consumer
market, because a ‘surplus’ population the new proletariat had been unable to secure consistent employment in industry, the progressive boost lent to industrial production by the slavery ‘subsidy’ from the American colonies as the century matured (an example of ‘combined and uneven development), translated into increased employment and an expanded market. The opportunities for profit-making that followed stimulated changes in agricultural yields and productivity. The capitalist structure of agricultural production and competitive rental agreements with yeoman tenants enforced high yields and productivity to meet this new demand. Landlords under these conditions could see clear opportunities for rent increases, and the age of agricultural ‘improvement’ that accompanied this was ushered in after 1750. Agricultural prices remained relatively buoyant as urban population and consumption, with ‘real subsumption’ of labour, proceeded apace. Sustained war with France from 1793 saw wheat prices skyrocket, and they remained high until the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Thus, once the industrial revolution had been ‘pump-primed’ by the confluence of a growing wage-dependent proletariat and ‘artificially’ cheap calories and raw materials for manufacture, a virtuous articulation could be established between increased yields in agriculture, increased domestic consumption, and increased profits. This halcyon period for capitalist agriculture in Britain, comprising the age of ‘improvement’ or the ‘first’ agricultural revolution (Overton 1996), was to continue until the middle of the nineteenth century with the repeal of the Corn Laws and the introduction of free trade;

2. The First International, or ‘Liberal’, Food Regime 1846-1870. The British ‘Liberal’ or ‘Free Trade’ Food Regime that arose during the middle of the nineteenth century may be said to represent the first capitalist food regime founded on the integration of ‘core’ states (notably Germany and France) as, for the first time, predominantly capitalist economies. This arose because, in Britain, the cost of cereals, the main item in the working-class diet, became too high due to protectionism and due to the inability of the ‘organic’ four-course rotation system to sustain output increases (Overton 1996). This was leading to a squeeze on profits and, consequently, to pressure by industrial capitalists to look for cheaper supplies. These pressures could be eased by ‘spatio-temporal’ fixes in the form of bilateral trade agreements with complementary class fractional interests overseas, and, in so doing, drawing on a ‘frontier’ of extraction where labour and/or the conditions of production were cheaper. Britain thus began to invoke the principle of ‘comparative advantage’, whereby wage foods should be sourced from wherever they could be produced most ‘cheaply’ (in this case mainland Europe and, later, North America), supplying in turn a competitive boost to Britain’s preeminent industrial status.

3. The Second International, or ‘Imperial’, Food Regime 1870-1930. Increasingly cheap imports, based on the ‘soil subsidy’ through the exploitation of previously uncultivated soils in the USA particularly, began to compromise the profits of the Prussian Junkers, the most powerful class in Germany, as a result of loss of grain sales to Britain. At the same time, these cheap food imports undermined agricultural production more generally in Europe, threatening considerable social unrest. At the same time, German industrialists were constrained in their ability to accumulate as a result of continuing competition from Britain. Thus, there developed a new confluence of interest between the agricultural and industrial class fractions of German capital. Protectionist, rather than free trade, policies began to be favoured, and the German
state was, at the same time (from 1871), consolidated. These developments coincided with an over-accumulation crisis, a cyclical tendency that capital could overcome in two possible ways: first, by moving away from an extensive and quantitative mode of growth (absolute surplus value) towards an intensive or qualitative (relative surplus value) one, which implied that the working classes needed to be integrated increasingly in a virtuous circle of enlarged production and expanded consumption. This imbricated nicely with sectoral articulation and new nationhood (social articulation), so that both accumulation and legitimation needs could be satisfied in the states of the core. The second means of overcoming over-accumulation was by supplementing and underwriting qualitative growth through the importation of super-cheap primary commodities from the periphery (primary means) and by securing captive markets in those regions (secondary means). Under conditions of rival, rather than complementary capitalisms, these means were secured through imperialism. Competitive, protectionist, and nationalistic economies, bolstered by racialized ideologies of ‘social imperialism’, generated an underlying dynamic of mutual aggression that was to erupt eventually in the First World War. In the aftermath Germany was effectively destroyed, for a while, as a competitor capitalist nation, and caused a temporary trend, following the war, away from autocentrism and towards ‘free trade’ policies until over-accumulation struck again with a vengeance towards the end of the 1920s, with the Great Depression as the outcome. This stimulated a return to autocentrism and protectionism during the 1930s.

4. The Third International, or ‘Political Productivist’, Food Regime 1930-1980. The need to build ‘articulated’ economies from the 1930s and, particularly, in the post-Second World War era in the face of the communist ‘threat’, to defuse socialist movements whilst securing capital accumulation, and to address agricultural commodity oversupply in the USA, led to intensified ‘state-centred’ accumulation of ‘political productivism’ or Fordism, classically in the ‘core’ states. Wage increases were balanced by productivity increases through the realization of relative surplus value, while increased output was absorbed by increased consumption. These developments were mirrored in the agri-food sector, where massive increases productivity and absolute increases in yields, produced ‘cheap’ wage foods from within the nation for the industrial proletariat. Labour within agriculture was simultaneously shed, but could be absorbed without contradiction by the industrial sector. Restructuring was undertaken deliberately to favour the capitalist family farm, however, with the state engineering a ‘farmer road’ to capitalism. Peasant agriculture (that is, self-subsistent farming) largely disappeared from Western Europe and North America. Productivism led, over time, to over-supply (over-production) of agri-food commodities, leading to downward pressure on prices, an increased subsidy burden in what was a state-supported system, and, thereby, to increased pressure to export surpluses, principally to the global South. At the same time, productivism’s ecological contradictions led to increasing calls for constraints on production and the diversion of funds to support agri-environmental schemes and wider rural diversification measures. The concentration of capital in the agri-food sector and beyond led to calls for increasing liberalization of trade and trans-nationalization of production, so that profitability could be restored through the exploitation of cheaper sources of supply in the global South. However, this advocacy of globalization and reduction in subsidy in the global North by transnational capital fractions was contested by neo-mercantilist and social
welfare constituencies, leading to the retention of certain ‘market constraining’
features in the core states to mitigate the impacts of full liberalization. By contrast,
the global South was ‘opened up’ following the subsidized destruction of its staple
food producers by means of dumping. This engendered pressure for neoliberalization,
instantiated in the founding of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) as the
outcome of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.

relations between imperial transnational capital and the agro-exporting oligarchy in
the periphery led to the exploitation of ever larger areas in the latter for export of
agricultural commodities to the North. The North, however, refused itself to embrace
fully ‘free market’ norms, retaining, primarily for reasons of political legitimacy,
generous, although increasingly ‘decoupled’, supports for its farmers (see Tilzey 2006,
2018). This accorded with the continuing imperial role of the North vis-à-vis the South,
the latter constrained to adopt in full the norms of neoliberalism. Simultaneously,
there was increased migration of industrial manufacturing from the North to the
South, subsidized by super-exploitation of labour and the ‘functional dualism’ of semi-
proletarianization. This, together with the resurgence of extractivism, led to the
further erosion of the self-subsistent peasantry which became formally subsumed, as
a semi-proletariat, within capitalist relations of production. This peasantry did,
however, retain crucial links to land, but this land was generally insufficient to secure
full ‘autonomy’ from capitalism. In this way, continuing poverty, ecological
degradation, and loss of productive land to capital led to an upwelling of agrarian-
based, and anti-neoliberal, protest during the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in
Latin America. Food sovereignty claims within both a national developmentalist and a
post-developmentalist discourse began to be articulated.

6. The Fifth International, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’, Food Regime. As the new millennium
progressed, neoliberalism began to encounter increasing contradiction: in terms of
capital accumulation, whereby greatly increased wealth disparities generated a crisis
of commodity under-consumption (over-accumulation) (the financial crisis of 2007
was symptomatic of this trend); in terms, relatedly, of greatly increased precarity for
the global majority, located particularly in the global South, and induced by
heightened processes of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession,
leading to inability of the precariat to access even basic necessities (the 2008 global
food crisis was symptomatic of this trend); and in terms of a progressive deterioration
in the biophysical fabric of the planet and its ability to continue to supply resources
to, and absorb waste from, an ever more profligate capitalism. In order to manage
and mitigate (but not resolve) these contradictions, states re-emerged ‘from the
shadows’ to take again more interventionist roles in securing accumulation and
legitimation functions for capital. These roles are manifested in a number of different
ways: through greater market intervention, or neo-mercantilism, to secure food and
energy supplies both domestically and overseas (the latter in part through ‘land-
grabbing’); through the adoption of neo-developmental and redistributive policies to
alleviate poverty, as in the ‘pink tide’ states of Latin America; and through efforts by
right-wing governments to legitimate and obscure the impacts of capital accumulation
through authoritarian populism (Trumpism being an exemplar) and neo-imperialism.
These developments suggest the fragmentation of neoliberal hegemony, if not as yet
its supersession, and a return to heightened inter-state competition and antagonism reminiscent of the ‘Imperial’ Food Regime.

The justification for, and detailed characterization of, the first four of the above food regimes is presented in ... (reference withheld for peer review purposes). It is the proposed fifth regime that we will focus on in the remainder of this paper. This is both because it exemplifies well the way in which our revised theoretical base enables us to define anew food regimes, arising from our dialectical understanding of capital, state, and class, and the dynamics of ‘combined and uneven development’; and because the existence of a ‘post-neoliberal’ food regime has not been seriously or systematically broached hitherto (although see Belesky and Lawrence (2018) for tentative moves in this direction). Indeed, some still dispute the existence of a truly ‘neoliberal’ food regime (see, for example, Pritchard 2009) precisely because of the retention of mercantilist and protectionist elements in agricultural policy by the global North, which Pritchard interprets as a ‘hangover’ from the previous regime. But, as suggested above, such asymmetrical retention of protections and supports by the global North vis-à-vis the global South is something to be expected and understood if we see unmitigated neoliberalism to be a manifestation of neo-imperialism in the latter, and mitigated, or ‘embedded’, neoliberalism to be a feature of the former, the imperium (see Tilzey 2006, 2016). Below we will examine the key features and dynamics of the ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime, these manifest most particularly in: a) the appearance of ‘land-grabbing’ and neo-extractivism in the peripheries; b) the emergence of China, particularly, as a sub-imperium; and c) the rise of the Latin American ‘pink tide’ states as a response to neoliberalism, and within the favourable international conjuncture defined by China’s ascendance.

The ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime: Land-Grabbing and Neo-extractivism, the emergence of China as a sub-imperium, and the dynamics of the ‘pink tide’ states in Latin America

We suggested above that neoliberal hegemony is now fragmenting, if not as yet subject to complete supersession, and we are in a conjuncture characterized by a return to heightened inter-state competition and antagonism reminiscent of the ‘Imperial’ Food Regime. We seem, therefore, to be currently in the throes of an immanent, epochal, crisis of neoliberalism, if not yet of capitalism in general. Imperial monopoly-finance capital has escalated its accumulation of land and natural resources in the peripheries. Money alone, however, is becoming no longer adequate to ensure continuing, and cheap, supply of food and energy to these consumption heartlands of neoliberalism. The imperative of the imperium, together and in competition with the ‘BRICS’ states, to secure such supply is reflected in the tendential turn to ‘neo-productivism’ at home, and to ‘land-grabbing’ in the periphery, with increasing recourse to overt state/imperial intervention to realize this end. Thus, while it appeared, as recently as 2006, that the neoliberal food regime had resolved the agrarian question in its favour through the global allocation of ‘comparative advantages’ in the quest for enhanced rates of profit (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009) and the ‘secure’ supply of food according to market norms, the subsequent global food crisis has revealed the spectre of food insecurity stalking even the imperium and the inadequacy of money alone to assure the continuing flow
of cheap and abundant food. Land-grabbing, particularly, reveals the ‘invisible hand’ of neoliberal market rules to be little more than a thin ideological veil concealing the ‘visible boot’ of core-periphery class exploitative relations (Araghi 2009), as the immanent dependence of transnational capital upon state imperial power (in alliance with peripheral ‘extroverted’ classes) to secure surplus value from the extractive frontier is realized as ‘agro-security mercantilism’ (see McMichael 2010, 2013. McMichael does not seem to have absorbed the implications of this for his ‘corporate’ food regime, however.). We might well refer to this changed relation as ‘formal imperialism’ in all but name.

Thus, since 2007, an estimated 220 million hectares has been acquired by foreign investors in the global South (Borras et al. 2010; Veltmeyer 2017). This global land grab has been stimulated in part by crises in food and oil markets since 2007, and in part by the opportunity to make super-profits through ‘accumulation by dispossession’, by extracting and exporting primary commodities. Additionally, the financialization of these markets has provided lucrative new investment opportunities for sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and global agri-business (Veltmeyer 2017). But, importantly, these dynamics exhibit trends away from pure neoliberalism and a modest, if significant, shift in the centre of gravity of global power towards the sub-imperium. Thus, while imperial agencies, both corporations and governments, dominate as investors and ‘land grabbers’, the BRICS states and food-insecure Middle Eastern oil states in certain regional contexts, are also active competitors. China and Malaysia, for example, dominate investments in land acquisition in Asia, South Africa exhibits potential dominance in Africa, while China and Brazil are emerging as major sub-imperial powers in Latin America within the context of neo-extractivism (see below). The rationale behind land grabbing for these states is not principally the accumulation of capital in a direct sense, but rather the satisfaction of domestic food and energy security, and therefore legitimacy, needs, thereby bypassing unreliable and expensive international food/energy markets.

The Northern imperium, attempting to uphold the ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey 2002) of neoliberalism in the global South, faces three political challenges here. The first two represent sub-hegemonic class challenges, within the semi-peripheral and peripheral state-capital nexus, to the hegemony of neoliberalism: firstly, the national sovereignty regime established in the twentieth century, although attenuated, is nonetheless still exercised even by the small states, often in the form of neo-developmentalism, supported by means of neo-extractivism (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014); secondly, the emerging semi-peripheries (the sub-imperium), the unintended consequence of globalization, have created new spaces and opportunities for manoeuvre by peripheral states, notably the ‘pink tide’ states of Latin America. Monopolistic firms are springing up in the sub-imperium, notably the BRICS states (China, India, Brazil, South Africa) and scrambling themselves for natural resources, land, and food supplies. These often maintain a higher commitment to the sovereignty regime and to national development, as is the case with China particularly, than the global Northern imperium. The third challenge arises from counter-hegemonic groups (middle and lower peasants, semi-proletarians, indigenous groups particularly) propounding a post-capitalist way of ‘good living’ akin to eco-socialism (Lowy 2013).

The first form of ‘sub-hegemonic’, peripheral, resistance to neoliberalism derives in important respects from ‘internal’ state-level dynamics that can be understood only from the class
analytical and state-capital nexus perspective invoked in this paper. This has been facilitated, but not caused, ‘externally’ by the rise of the sub-imperium, notably China. Neither of these phenomena can be understood from a perspective of a monolithic or fully trans-nationalised capitalism such as advocated by Robinson (2017) or McMichael (2013) (see Tilzey 2016). China, in particular, and representing the second form of ‘sub-hegemonic’, or semi-peripheral resistance to neoliberalism, has deployed neoliberal globalization as a strategic means of strengthening the industrial and military infrastructure of the state as a counterweight to the northern imperium, particularly the USA. China’s emergence as a key site of capital accumulation has, as noted, opened up a space for other states in the global South to re-assert more nationally-based capitalist development or, at least, for national class fractions of capital to selectively displace global Northern dominance. This has coincided with neoliberalism’s widespread loss of legitimacy in the global South, and in Latin America particularly. The boom in primary commodity prices stimulated by China’s growth has enabled sub-hegemonic fractions of national capital to ally with non-capitalist class (counter-hegemonic) forces to install a wave of populist, centre-left (‘pink tide’) regimes in Latin America (Spronk and Webber 2015). Here, therefore, there is an asymmetrical symbiosis between the sub-imperium, supporting national development through neo-mercantilism, and the ‘pink tide’ states of the periphery, seeking to pursue redistributive national-popular programmes on the proceeds of neo-extractivism.

China itself faces the ineluctable contradictions of capitalism, however. With the rural semi-proletariat no longer subsidizing the cost of industrial labour due the process of progressive full proletarianization (see Tilzey 2018), wage demands have been increasing, and China faces the prospect of losing its ‘comparative advantage’ in low labour power costs. This would potentially entail the migration of industry overseas to still cheaper areas of production such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the suppression of wage demands, or the increased replacement of labour through mechanization. China thus confronts the ‘political’ contradiction of attempting to sustain high rates of growth in the face of rising labour costs, due to increasing full proletarianization of its labour force, and in the face of stagnating global demand, due to over-production/under-consumption crisis (see Tilzey 2018). Meanwhile, it attempts to maintain downward pressure on costs of production through the increasing import of energy, minerals, and indeed food, as ‘cheaps’ (Moore 2015), from overseas, undertaken by means of extractivism and ‘land-grabbing’ as a form of neo-mercantilism. Looming scarcity of ‘cheaps’ has stimulated China to seek access and control of petroleum, mineral, and agri-food resources on a global scale, bringing it, of course, into increasing competition with the other major centres of manufacturing and consumption, principally the states of the imperium. Soya production has been prominent in Chinese stimulated agro-extractivism in Latin America, with Bolivia playing an important role among the ‘pink tide’ states (McKay 2017). Through increasing political resistance in the zones of extractivism, through the inevitable secular depletion of resources, and through the unavoidable need to address unsustainable levels of pollution at home, rising costs will also constitute an ‘ecological’ contradiction for Chinese capital accumulation.

These dynamics we can understand through our revised causal basis for defining food regimes, these comprising a sub-set of politico-economic relations within and between different state-capital nexus. These are the key relations between capital and state which the state-capital nexus deploys to secure economic growth and political stability, and which
frame the form and function of food regimes. In the case of China these are principally and in order of priority:

1. **Market direction:** to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national development’;

2. **External representation:** to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism). This takes the form of neo-mercantilism (incorporating ‘land-grabbing’ and agro-extractivism), when accumulation demands grow beyond the capacity of the national territory to supply primary commodities in quantity and cheapness sufficient to secure continued competitive accumulation and the quiescence of the workforce;

3. **Market correction:** to mitigate the destructive social and ecological impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function).

In the case of the ‘pink tide’ states, these are principally, and in order of priority:

1. **Market correction:** to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function). This assumes the form of social support and welfarism, through which subaltern classes may purchase food at reasonable cost. Such food is increasingly imported, however, although Ecuador has paid some attention to expanding the production of traditional food staples by the small farm commercial sector (upper peasantry);

2. **Market direction:** to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national development’, largely in the form of the state syphoning off an increased share of extractivism’s proceeds via ground rent. However, little in the way of ‘national capitalism’ has eventuated, with most funds being directed to infrastructure construction as employment generation schemes. There has been little attempt to improve the national production of food staples (other than Ecuador above) and the primary focus remains upon agro-extractivism within the sector.

Here, populism, as a national-popular programme of development, pursues a form of redistributive capitalism, focusing on the accumulation needs of its core sub-hegemonic class constituency, while using the proceeds of neo-extractivism (generated largely by the agrarian oligarchy and transnational capital) to placate counter-hegemonic classes through welfarism. This enables the structural bases of inequality and poverty to be temporarily by-passed or mitigated, but only at the cost of deepening the political and ecological contradictions of extractive capitalism. As these contradictions deepen, exacerbated by ‘jobless’ growth and high dependency on external markets, so does social unrest grow commensurately. The response of the ruling bloc in the ‘pink tide’ states is a turn to increasing authoritarianism to...
push through its programme of accelerated commodification and destruction of the biophysical foundations for sustainable living (buen vivir) in the name of short-lived growth and consumerism. Under these conditions, a de-legitimation of ‘left’ populism threatens, and a resurgent right, ‘flying the flag of nationalism’ (Malamud 2017) is poised to take over the baton of authoritarian populism (Herrera 2017). As ‘left’ populism moves to the right and the right itself invokes national populism, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the two variants of authoritarian populism, both premised on a programme of neo-extractivism.

These profound and deepening contradictions, both ‘political’ and ‘ecological’, of the ‘Post-Neoliberal’ food regime across the inter-related dynamics of imperium, sub-imperium, and periphery, imply that it is inherently unstable. While all capitalist food regimes are unstable, achieving at best only provisional equilibrium, the present regime may prove unprecedentedly so. Indeed, this regime may mark the endgame of capitalism in general, as it encounters an epochal crisis defined by spiralling political and ecological turmoil. We may speculate, perhaps hoping against hope, that the ‘capitalogenic’ apocalypse which threatens to engulf our planet over the next century may foment an unprecedented resurgence of the third anti-imperial challenge identified earlier, arising from counter-hegemonic groups propounding a post-capitalist way of ‘good living’, ushering in a non-capitalist food regime as ‘radical’ food sovereignty (see Tilzey 2017, 2018).

Conclusion

This paper has sought to undertake a reassessment and critique of Friedmann and McMichael’s seminal 1989 paper. Our critique has sought both to uphold the tradition of radical political economy that informed Friedmann and McMichael’s paper, and the value of the concept of the food regime itself. Our critique, therefore, has taken place from within that tradition. That tradition is a broad church, however, and there is much controversy within it. Friedmann and McMichael’s work exhibits the clear influence of the Braudel-Wallerstein-Arrighi line of thinking, complemented by that of Polanyi, together with, detrimentally, only a partial incorporation of RT. We have suggested that the influence of WST and the failure to embrace RT in plenary, together with the neglect of a rich vein of non-reductive Marxian theory in the form of ‘Political Marxism’ and neo-Gramscian thinking, have been both pervasive and detrimental to Friedmann and McMichael’s formulation of FRT in terms of their understanding of capitalism, the state, and class dynamics, with clear adverse implications for the way in which they conceive causality underlying food regimes and the periodization of those food regimes. Indeed, we have suggested that this limited incorporation of RT and the neglect of more agential and ‘political’ currents in Marxian theory, were significant factors in the ‘turn’ to post-structural approaches in critical rural geography and sociology in the 1990s.

Consequently, we have attempted remedy these asserted deficiencies in Friedmann and McMichael’s presentation of FRT, by delineating a revised causal basis for understanding capitalist food regimes and their dynamics on the basis of a novel fusion of Political Marxism, neo-Gramscian IPE, RT, and Poulantzian state-capital theory. This body of thought throws a significantly different light on the categories of, and relations between, capital, state, class, structure and agency than the WST and an accumulation-biased RT deployed by Friedmann
and McMichael. It has also enabled us, on this different causal basis, to present a revised and more comprehensive periodization of capitalist food regimes, extending from the birth of the first capital-state nexus in England in the late eighteenth century through to the current re-emergence of overt state management of, and inter-state competition around, flows of food and resources in what we have chosen to call the ‘Post-Neoliberal’ regime.

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1 McMichael (2013) prefers the term ‘Food Regime Analysis’.
2 Although FRT owed an equal or greater debt to World Systems Theory.
3 These assigning each region of the world economy to a specific zone: core, periphery, or semi-periphery. Similarly, each zone was assigned a specific form of labour control which corresponded to the specific form of economic activity in which the particular region had come to specialize. Thus, class structure is determined primarily by the form of economic activity in which the specific region specializes and the mode of labour control which ‘corresponds’ to that form of production. In turn, political forms or states arise out of the needs of the dominant classes in the three zones.
4 ‘Class’ is deployed here in a non-reductive sense whereby power relations and exploitation may be expressed and take place through class, ethnic, racial, gender, religious, etc. categories. It is also to recognize that ‘objective’ class position may not translate into ‘subjective’ class positionality, and that the latter can only be understood through the ways that exploitation and discrimination are actually experienced and understood by actors, as expressed in terms of ‘cultural politics’. Such a non-reductive understanding of class follows in the political and cultural traditions of Marxian thinking exemplified by, for example, Gramsci and E.P. Thompson.
5 At risk of anticipating our argument, we will suggest that the nature and balance of class interest within, and at the level of, the state appear to be vital determinants of the character of food regimes. The deployment of the concept of ‘class’ here seeks to capture the structural character of interests in society and their reproduction through agency. Class, as ‘structured agency’, is thus operational at all spatial scales, vitiating the dichotomy between supposedly ‘behaviourally’ grounded explanation at local level, and those putatively grounded in ‘structure’ at higher and wider scalar levels (see Potter and Tilzey 2005, Tilzey and Potter 2008 for further discussion).
6 Constraints of space forbid discussion here of the ecological dimension of food regimes, but this important dimension is addressed by the author at length elsewhere (reference withheld for peer review purposes).
7 McMichael (2013, 11) makes reference to the ‘mode of regulation’ as expressing a policy environment conducive to an ‘accumulation regime’ and its normalization, but the full implications of this concept in terms of class, state, capital relations and dynamics are never really explored.
8 Thus, while they do suggest that ‘it is possible to see a mutual conditioning of the state system and capital’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 112) this is clearly conceptualized as an external relation, as is indicated by the following: ‘In both movements agriculture became incorporated within accumulation itself, and states and national economies became increasingly subordinated to capital. We conclude that the growing power of capital to organize and re-organize agriculture undercuts state policies directing agriculture to national ends, such as food security, articulated development, and the preservation of rural/peasant communities’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95).
9 Friedmann (2005) later takes her development of food regime theory a certain way in this direction through her notion of ‘implicit rules’ governing each regime, but this, in our view, is never systematically delineated.
10 There may, of course, not be a confluence of interest between dominant class fractions in different states, in which case the would-be hegemon will be resisted, and divergent food regimes may then run concurrently, as in the case of the ‘Imperial Food Regime’ as defined by Tilzey (2018).
11 It is unfortunate that the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the 1989 paper in Agriculture and Human Values (2009) failed to mention the important work of Potter and Tilzey (2005). In our view, this ‘retrospective’ did not really advance the discussion of food regimes significantly, and certainly brought no resolution to the global/local/structure/agency issue. Friedmann unsystematically brings into dialogue, but does not resolve, debates between FRT and ‘post-structural’ approaches such as Actor-Network Theory, her ‘synthesis’ comprising little more than eclecticism. McMichael repeats the well-worn theoretical categories delineated in 1989. Campbell and Dixon suggest, correctly, that Friedmann and McMichael, through reference to RT, ‘held open the latent potential to create a non-linear narrative of capitalist food history and politics’ (2009, 263).
But, we argue, this is a potential that remains latent in Friedmann and McMichael's work because of the failure properly to ground a mode of regulation as a legitimation device, to ground ‘history and politics’ in ‘class struggle’ (conjoining ‘structure’ and ‘agency’), and, therefore to theorize contingency as, for example, ‘structured agency’. By contrast, the work of Potter and Tilzey did achieve precisely this, in our view. Incidentally, the paper by Campbell in this commemorative issue proposes, questionably, that mainstream ‘productivism’ and more locally/ecologically-based ‘post-productivism’ be treated as discrete ‘food regimes’. Again, however, reference to the work of Potter and Tilzey might have been of some help here, since they suggest that ‘post-productivism’ operates essentially as ‘flanking’, legitimation device (as part of a mode of regulation) ancillary and subordinate to an emergent ‘market productivism’ (see Potter and Tilzey 2005; Tilzey 2006; Tilzey and Potter 2007, 2008).

Absolute surplus value refers to an extension of the working day, or intensification of labour, essentially without the introduction of labour-saving machinery; relative surplus value refers to an increase in labour productivity due to the introduction of labour-saving machinery, thus potentially reducing the length of the working day.

xii The term is deliberately reversed here because it is the combination of a core with a super-exploited periphery that generates uneven development.

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