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Happiness as a Measurement and Goal of Peacebuilding

Abstract

The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures how ‘peaceful’ countries are, while the World Happiness Report (WHR) index measures how ‘happy’ their citizens are. But when compared side by side, the two sets of findings conspicuously do not match – apparently indicating that people who live in peace do not always live in happiness. To grapple with this interesting dissonance, let us assume that happiness is the ultimate goal in life – as proposed by the Benthamite philosophy – and that peace is therefore an instrumental good, much like health, freedom and autonomy. Once this is taken on principle, it follows that peacebuilding’s overall goal should be to make sure conflict-affected communities are happy. This paper investigates what the results of peacebuilding would look like if they were measured using the GPI and WHR at the same time. Using the former Yugoslavia countries as a case study, it asks whether these countries’ post-conflict experiences of peacebuilding can help explain their WHR and GPI results. The intention is to start a meaningful debate on what peacebuilding’s overall objective should be – and to examine whether the measurement of happiness could be a useful starting point.

1. Introduction

UN Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. To construct a measure of progress towards this goal, its framers established 23 indicators for its 12 target areas. In fact, the ongoing UN-level conversation about how to measure peace and related complex concepts encompasses a number of regional and global initiatives, among them the Strategic
Harmonization of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA) as well as various household surveys on conflict, social cohesion, displacement and so on, many of which have been undertaken by humanitarian and development NGOs for decades. Yet there is still no consensus on how to measure such complex conditions as peace, development and happiness; the search for these measures has been not only difficult, but also contentious.

One of the key initiatives that aims to measure peace is the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks countries according to their ‘peacefulness’. The index has come in for plenty of criticism, with some saying it fails to understand or to accurately present how peace is experienced by different populations across the world. Mac Ginty also gives a critique of the international community’s preferred peace indicators; he criticises them for using unclear measures, restricting themselves to the narrow scope of peacebuilding projects, excluding conflict-affected communities’ own inputs, missing subtle differences within and between communities, and for mounting top-down projects originated from the global north.

However fair these criticisms might be, any attempt to measure any social phenomenon will to some extent be similarly afflicted. For the purposes of this paper, it could be broadly accepted that when it comes to achieving sustainable peace in conflict-affected environments, the GPI’s indices offer fair representations of contemporary peacebuilding’s main objectives. That said, conceiving of ‘peacefulness’ as measured by the GPI leaves a big question unanswered: what is the ultimate goal of building a sustainable peace?

This paper proposes that that ultimate goal is happiness. From a utilitarian perspective, happiness is the ultimate goal of life; it follows that successful peacebuilding can be measured
by the same standard. To that end, this paper adopts the principle of Bentham and Mill’s The Greatest Happiness, which will be discussed in the greater detail later in the paper.

Before going any further, it is important to note that this paper does not necessarily advocate the utilitarian perspective is the only better way to measure peacebuilding’s success. There are other options. Where utilitarianism measures subjective well-being, Amartya Sen’s ‘Capability Approach’ takes as its main criterion individuals’ capability to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value.⁵ Michael Ignatieff has recently developed what he calls an ‘Ordinary Virtues’ approach, which explains that the moral language of everyday virtues – trust, forgiveness, tolerance, resilience – resonates with most people far more deeply than the legal lexicon of human rights.⁶ These are only two of many competing philosophical perspectives, all of which could contribute to the debate over peacebuilding’s teleology. This paper is therefore purely an interrogation of happiness as a useful measure of peacebuilding’s ultimate success.

To do this, the paper questions whether the World Happiness Report (WHR) index could be used alongside the GPI to measure post-conflict achievements. In other words, the overall aim here is to explore how the results of peacebuilding efforts look when evaluated using the GPI and WHR simultaneously. Where do the two indices’ findings match and differ, and why? Might such similarities and differences say anything meaningful about the way peacebuilding is practiced today? To put it another way: if a given post-conflict country sees its happiness gradually improve, might that be attributed to the achievements of peacebuilding – and conversely, if its level of happiness gradually decreases, where might the peacebuilding process be going wrong?
Obviously, all these questions come with a major caveat: concepts such as peace and happiness are highly complex, and establishing a simple correlation between them may not be possible. For example, there will always be an attribution gap on whether a particular input such as peacebuilding intervention leads to a particular outcome such as peace or happiness. Exogenous factors such as the global economy or geo-political issues might also be playing a role on the population’s happiness, or it may be linked to the political mood in that country – all things that have little to do with peacebuilding. This paper does not try to present such correlations so. Instead, its main goal is simply to start a meaningful debate on what we should take as peacebuilding’s ultimate goal, and whether a measurement of happiness – no matter how imperfect and difficult to pin down – could be a useful starting point for the discussion.

The paper starts by briefly exploring the key terminology of peace, peacebuilding and happiness. It then introduces the GPI and WHR, explaining what they measure and how; using the countries of the former Yugoslavia as a case study, it then analyses how the GPI and WHR compare with each other as measures of peacebuilding. It goes on to ask whether these countries’ WHR and GPI results can be explained with reference to their post-conflict peacebuilding experiences. Finally, the paper’s conclusions examine the implications of measuring peacebuilding outcomes using the WHR alongside the GPI, and ask whether or not its indices could and should inform the work of building peace in conflict-affected environments.

2. Peace and Happiness

Peace is not just the absence of armed conflict. It is a broad and elusive concept, and is understood differently by different cultures, actors and political tendencies. It is often used with reference to a range of other concepts, among them harmony, stability, security, truce, order, justice, repose, friendship, trust, truth, love, beauty, serenity, contentment, rights, and freedom.
It is also used at different levels: inner peace at the individual level, harmonious relationships at family and societal levels, and peace among communities and between states. When it comes to political violence, peace can also be conceptualised in all sorts of different ways. Miller pictures it as a ‘ladder’ of stages: frozen, cold, normal and warm. At the ‘frozen’ level, the main issues of conflict remain unresolved, and different conflict actors seldom if ever communicate or collaborate. At the ‘warm’ level, by contrast, conflict issues have been resolved and transcended; communities share highly developed ties and actively collaborate, and the possibility of returning to war is unthinkable. Ultimately, the ‘ladder’ model conceptualises peace as a process of transformation, not a static end goal.

Other authors have also used models that revolve around transformative processes; Galtung uses the concepts of ‘negative’ peace, which he defines as ‘the absence of organised collective forms of violence’, and ‘positive’ peace, which does not have an agreed definition. Barash and Webel define it as ‘a social condition in which exploitation is minimised or eliminated and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence’. Reardon takes it to be ‘the absence of violence in all its forms’, including physical-psychological, direct-indirect, explicit-implicit and individual-structural. Galtung’s own typology of violence as direct, cultural and structural, meanwhile, offers a clearer way to explain transitions from negative to positive peace; positive peace implies safety from violence, positive relationships between social actors, fair and equal treatment of all social constituents, harmonious coexistence between humanity and the environment, and people’s awareness of their interdependency. According to this definition, the process of transforming a conflict would mean promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties and building nonviolent patterns of behaviour through empathetic understanding.
Peacebuilding can be conceptualised as the pursuit of durable peace via peace-supporting activities that address the root causes of armed conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, this has become one of the main approaches to peace interventions. In peacebuilding, the main referent of security is people and not solely states; it aims to change not only institutional and social structures, but also people’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, the peacebuilding approach can be employed not only in the aftermath of armed conflict, but as a preventative intervention to make sure armed conflict does not break out in the first place. Contemporary post-settlement peacebuilding entails a wide range of relief, reconstruction and reconciliation activities. Humanitarian assistance is provided to vulnerable groups; governance structures are re-established; security apparatuses are reformed; infrastructure, housing and services are rebuilt; the economy is salvaged; the rule of law and justice is secured; and an environment of dialogue and reconciliation for harmonious societal relations is fostered.

But if we think of peacebuilding as a list of discrete technocratic interventions, we risk missing the bigger picture of peacebuilding and what it tries to achieve. Instead, while bearing in mind these myriad activities and actors, it is important to remember that successful peacebuilding begins with a central aim: the transformation of the factors that underpinned a conflict in the first place. As Lederach puts it, conflict transformation is an attempt ‘to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change’. To realise these life-giving opportunities, conflict transformation works in four main dimensions: the actor-related, the relational, the structural and the cultural.

Thinking in terms of these four dimensions makes it easier to articulate what peacebuilding aims to achieve. First of all, actor-related transformation aims to change people’s perceptions of key things that motivate them to act, things such as sense of identity, emotions and life goals.
Transformation on this level can help facilitate psychosocial programmes, heal the societal wounds of armed conflict, and resolve disputes over resources, politics and local conflicts. Relational transformation, meanwhile, addresses affectivity, power and interdependence of human relationships. This can entail efforts from peace education to inter-faith dialogue to gender-focused micro-credit income generation programmes.

The third dimension, structural transformation, recognises that relationships do not exist in a vacuum. In any group, conflict is fomented and resolved with reference to dominant patterns of discourses, norms, rules, regulations, distribution systems, social interaction parameters, treatment of demographic characteristics, and so on. Structural peacebuilding efforts, then, focus on institutions, political, social, economic and cultural arrangements, and the overall political economy of relations. Finally, cultural transformation forms the overall context for peacebuilding; in any conflict, initiation, mobilisation, deterrence and resolution will all be influenced by the cultural characteristics of the surrounding environment.22

With such a multi-dimensional transformation process in mind, how should we measure the peace that results? Some authors argue that many peacebuilding responses have been informed by the international community’s standardisation and professionalisation efforts, and have focused too narrowly on institutions and infrastructure rather than the social needs of communities. In response to this ‘technocratic turn’, there has been debate on the merits of a ‘local turn’ as an alternative way of building peace.23

Mac Ginty recommends some ‘everyday peace’ indicators to measure peace, arguing that they ‘could more accurately reflect the on-the-ground situation in a textured way that is meaningful to local communities’.24 He has developed his ‘everyday peace’ argument by pointing to the
fluidity of the social world, the heterogeneity of conflict-affected communities, and the importance of context and the way it informs the emergence and sustainability of peace. He defines everyday peace as ‘the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and minimize conflict and awkward situations at both inter- and intra-group levels’. Other authors have critiqued technocratic intervention too; in her seminal book Reclaiming Everyday Peace, Firchow explores the effectiveness of ‘bottom-up’ interventions by the international community, and concludes that there is in fact, no direct correlation between the number of external interventions and the peacefulness of post-conflict communities. She argues that this is largely because contemporary post-conflict interventions primarily target governance, security and development, rather than focusing on healing community relations.

But it is also important not to romanticise ‘local’ agency. Many of the root causes of conflicts might be found in societal injustices, with certain gender, age, ethnic, religious and other socio-demographic and economic groups excluded from local decision-making systems. Efforts to open up local participation, as advocated by Firchow, would also require a deliberate strategy to build the capacities of disadvantaged and marginalised groups in order for them to get their voices heard – and subsequently, to make sure that external interventions are undertaken with their voices included. And to take the point further, peacebuilding does not end with the termination of formal peacebuilding projects and programmes. Conflict-affected communities can employ their own responses to avoid conflict and maintain the environment of peace through transformation for years after formal interventions come to an end.

While it is certainly important to question what transformative peacebuilding should aim to address in a society torn apart by conflict, it is also important to ask what the resulting ‘peaceful’
society should look like and how its condition should be assessed. These are not easy questions to answer. Because the transformation approach is about a dynamic and continuous process rather than a static end, it is hard to identify a result to measure. This is where Jeremy Bentham’s The Greatest Happiness principle can be introduced.

The principle states that ‘happiness is as a matter of fact the ultimate aim at which all human actions are directed and that it is therefore the ultimate standard by which to judge the rightness or wrongness of actions’. As a lawyer, Bentham wanted to establish the theoretical foundations of a perfect system of law and government, and for this he needed a value for such perfection. His principle of utility or The Greatest Happiness holds that ‘happiness’ is the predominance of ‘pleasure’ over ‘pain’. As he writes in The Principles of Morals and Legislation:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think.

The ‘fundamental axiom’ of Bentham’s philosophy, then, is that ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’. Deepening the Benthamite understanding of happiness in On Liberty, John Stuart Mill writes that ‘the ultimate end, for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people) is an existence as free as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments’. Mill argues that happiness is about not only quantity, but also the quality of pleasures; he draws a distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures, between the
intellectual and moral on one hand and the physical on the other. In Utilitarianism, Mill states that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, making a judgment over how people could come to a deeper understanding of happiness through education and experience.32

But what of other goods such as freedom, health, autonomy and accomplishment? According to Layard, ‘Happiness is the ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently good. If we are asked why happiness matters, we can give no further, external reason…So goods like health, autonomy, and freedom are “instrumental” goods - we can give further, more ultimate reasons for valuing them’.33 Layard advocates that we adopt Bentham’s idea of Greatest Happiness in our lives ‘fearlessly’, though some have objected to this based on the arguments around the qualities of happiness, its consequentialism, fairness, adaptation, expediency, and so on.

Overall, the Benthamite philosophy offers us a useful framework in which happiness is the ultimate goal; with that in mind, this paper can begin to question how well the contemporary understanding of peacebuilding and its practice contributes to achieving it. But to investigate whether peacebuilding serves the ultimate goal of happiness in societies affected by armed conflict, we first have to interrogate the means by which peace and happiness can be measured. Also, it is important to note that as explained in our conceptual exploration, happiness is clearly in the realm of positive peace, and it should not be seen as a luxury or somehow superfluous in a conflict-affected society where people deserve the bare minimum assistance for them to survive, but they do not deserve ‘luxuries’ like happiness.

3. The Global Peace Index (GPI) and the World Happiness Report (WHR)
On the measurement of happiness, Layard writes that although happiness is about ‘feeling good - enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be maintained’, it can also be measured by asking people about their happiness in a long-term sense; as he puts it\textsuperscript{34}, ‘we accept the ups and downs and care mainly about our average happiness over a longish period of time. But that average is made up from a whole series of moments’\textsuperscript{35}. The ‘feeling’ aspect as underlined by Layard is particularly important. It is subjective and difficult to measure, which brings us into the immaterial sphere. Humans are affective and emotional beings who operate in a social environment. With such understanding that this section focuses on the GPI and WHR as measurements of peace and happiness, respectively.

The GPI has been produced by the Institute for Economic and Peace (IEP) since 2007, and ranks countries according to their peacefulness. In its 2018 report, 163 countries were included in the survey, using 23 indicators\textsuperscript{36}. The index takes measurements across three domains; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict (indices 1-6); the level of Societal Safety and Security (7-16); and the degree of Militarisation (18-23). Among its various sources of data are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the UN Survey of Criminal Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised on a scale of 1-5; qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings, while quantitative ones are either banded into ten groupings or rounded to the first decimal point.\textsuperscript{37} The 10 most peaceful and 10 least peaceful countries in 2018 are presented in Table 1\textsuperscript{38}:

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Table 1 in here

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The WHR, meanwhile has been published by the UN since 2012 (with the exception of 2014), and presents a ranking of national happiness. It was initiated after the UN High Level Meeting: Well-being and Happiness, which outlined the state of world happiness, causes of happiness and misery, and policy implications. The annual report draws its data primarily from the Gallup World Poll and World Values Survey. For its 2018 happiness ranking, it used the following variables: GDP per capita, healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom to make life choices, generosity, and corruption. These combined variables generate a population-weighted average score on a scale from 0 to 10; this score is tracked over time and compared against other countries. Each country is also compared against a hypothetical nation called Dystopia. Dystopia represents the lowest national averages for each key variable, and is (along with residual error) used as a regression benchmark.

In 2018, the WHR ranked 156 countries by their happiness levels, and the 10 happiest and 10 unhappiest countries are presented in Table 2:

Before looking specifically at the countries of the former Yugoslavia, let us briefly compare the top and bottom 10 countries in both indices. First of all, there are a number of similarities at the higher end; Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark and Canada appear in the top 10 of both indices. But there are also some interesting anomalies. Singapore, for example, ranks at 8th place in the GPI, but 34th place in the WHR; Japan is 9th in the GPI but 54th in the WHR, while Portugal is 4th on the GPI but 77th in the WHR. As for the bottom 10, once again, four countries appear at the end of both lists: the Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Syria. But again, there are anomalies: Libya (GPI:157, WHR:70), Somalia (GPI:159, WHR:98), and Tanzania (GPI:51,
Looking outside the top and bottom 10, there are other surprising differences. Botswana, which is ranked at 29th place on the GPI, occupies the 146th place in the WHR, just below Afghanistan. Several countries that rank relatively high on the WHR, such as Israel (11th), the US (19th), Colombia (37th) and Russia (59th), fare markedly worse in the GPI (146th, 121st, 145th and 154th, respectively). Bhutan, on the other hand, which ranks a very respectable 19th in the GPI, scores the 97th place in the WHR – particularly interesting since it famously adopted gross national happiness instead of gross domestic product as its main development indicator.

It is with these sorts of anomalies in mind that this paper makes case studies of former Yugoslavia countries, examining their experiences of peacefulness and happiness in a post-conflict context. These countries were chosen principally for four reasons. First, given that this paper is an inquiry into the long-term outcomes of peacebuilding efforts, the post-conflict experience in former Yugoslavia countries offers an ideal opportunity to compare peacefulness and happiness trajectories in a meaningful way. Second, these countries were initially all part of the same state, making them a highly distinctive set of post-conflict contexts. Third, in comparison to many other conflict-affected environments, the former Yugoslavia countries ranked relatively high in the human development index before the armed conflicts of the 1990s broke out; again, this provides a very useful baseline for exploring the impact of peacebuilding interventions. Finally, since the mid-1990s, the former Yugoslavia countries have received a significant level of international assistance and intervention for their reconstruction and peacebuilding needs, meaning there are plenty of concrete efforts whose impact can be assessed.

4. Measuring Peace and Happiness in Former Yugoslavia Countries
Before its breakup, Yugoslavia consisted of six federal republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. It was a diverse country, with five nations (Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins; the Muslim population was also recognised as a nation in Tito’s 1974 constitution), four languages (Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, Slovene and Albanian), three religions (Catholicism, Christian Orthodox, Islam) and two scripts (Cyrillic and Latin).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was triggered by the international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states in mid-December 1991. The result was bloody ethno-religious conflict in several areas, though the civil war and its impact varied a great deal across the different former Yugoslavia republics; in Slovenia it lasted a mere ten days, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the conflict lasted years and claimed more than 200,000 lives. The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 could be considered the end of the war in all republics, though there were further armed conflicts in Serbia’s Kosovo province in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001. While Serbia and Montenegro remained a united country for a while, all six former Yugoslavia republics are now independent countries. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008; for the purposes of this paper, it will be considered as a standalone former Yugoslavia country.

Since the Dayton Agreement is usually considered the start of a war-to-peace transition process for most of the former Yugoslavia countries, this study will focus on peace and happiness indicators since then. This is suitable for the purpose of this study, which aims to focus on the long-term outcomes of peace processes. The WHR is available for the dates of 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018; this paper’s comparative analysis therefore uses both indices’ results from those years.
The GPI results (Table 3)\(^{43}\) present an interesting narrative about how successful respective peace processes have been in former Yugoslavia countries since the mid-1990s and how they rank in the WHR (Table 4)\(^{44}\):

\[\text{Table III in here}\]

\[\text{Table IV in here}\]

Whether or not there are any significant correlations to draw here, the preliminary observations from these two tables can be summarised as follows:

1. According to GPI, Slovenia is one of the most peaceful countries in the world today, but this is not necessarily reflected in the country’s WHR ranking.

2. Similarly, Croatia seems to have achieved a good ranking in the GPI, but its population is apparently similarly unhappy as its counterparts in Montenegro and Serbia, and not too much happier than the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina – all countries that scored much worse on the GPI.

3. Comparing the WHR results for 2013 and 2018, Croatia and Slovenia have seen their scores decline. As for the other former Yugoslavia countries, while there are some improvements, they are quite small. The greatest improvement can be observed in Serbia, which moved from 106th to 78th.

4. According to the 2018 WHR, after Slovenia, the second happiest country of the former Yugoslavia was Kosovo. This is an interesting result considering that the peacebuilding
process there started only in the early 2000s, and that the province is still going through the turbulent political process of establishing independence from Serbia.

With those observations in mind, questions abound. Why have Slovenia and Croatia achieved peace without becoming happier, and why has Serbia become happier while slipping backwards on peace measures? Why is Kosovo much happier than most of other countries in the former Yugoslavia, even though it is still in a turbulent peacebuilding environment? To find answers and deepen our discussions, we must also consider to what extent each country’s score across the different WHR indicators affected its 2018 result. To that end, Table 5 presents the relative global ranking of each former Yugoslavia country for each of the index’s six indicators:45

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GDP and Life Expectancy: The WHR 2018 rankings for GDP do not reveal any major differences or unexpected anomalies. Amongst the seven former Yugoslavian countries, Slovenia and Croatia are the richest while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are the poorest, but their GDP rankings are quite similar overall. All seven countries have similar rankings for life expectancy except Kosovo, which ranks considerably lower than the others.

Social Support: Based on their population’s answers to the question of ‘If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?’, Slovenia ranks high, with Serbia not too far behind. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia rank quite low. This might reflect the divisive impact of the long and bloody ethno-
religious conflicts both countries experienced; without making sweeping generalisations about the different wars, it might even be possible to say that the smaller impact of a country’s civil war, the higher it ranks on social support, with Bosnia and Herzegovina lowest and Slovenia highest. It must also be noted that the seven highest-ranking countries for this indicator (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland) were also in the top 10 of the 2018 WHR.

**Freedom to Make Life Choices:** To get the results for this indicator, surveyed people are asked ‘Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?’, and a national average of their binary answers is given. Apart from Slovenia, which achieved a very high ranking at 19th, all six of the other countries in the region ranked very low. The result for Croatia (112th) is particularly puzzling; having scored high on the GPI while being more economically developed and a member of the European Union (EU), we might reasonably have expected a much higher ranking. It’s worth noting that the overall results this indicator produces have puzzled researchers the world over. Without wanting to jump to conclusions, it is striking to note that its top 10 countries include Uzbekistan (1), Cambodia (2), and Somalia (7). Considering that Uzbekistan is an autocratic country and Somalia a war-torn one, these results are somewhat surprising. It is also surprising to see democratic Greece in the bottom 10. However, the investigation of each indicator’s construction does not fall within this paper’s scope; all this discussion asks is that we consider the rankings for former Yugoslavia countries while bearing the indicator’s apparent quirks in mind.

**Generosity:** This ranking is produced by regressing the national average of responses to the question of ‘Have you donated money to a charity in the past month?’ against GDP per capita. The results are very interesting. It seems that some countries that score relatively low on the
GDP indicator are in fact very generous; among the top 10 such countries as Myanmar (1), Indonesia (2), Haiti (3), Syria (5) and Bhutan (8). Meanwhile, the bottom 5 countries for this indicator were Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Lithuania and Greece. There are plenty of potential reasons for such results – whether or not there is a cultural tradition of donating money to charities, for instance, or whether any religious obligations around almsgiving apply. But to take the results at face value, it is notable that amongst the seven former Yugoslavia countries, the most generous one for charity seems to be Kosovo (26) and then Bosnia and Herzegovina (48). The other five all score relatively low on this indicator.

Perception of Corruption: The highest scorer on this ranking (i.e. the country whose citizens are most assured of their government’s integrity) is Singapore, and the others in top 10 are also more and less the same countries that top the index’s overall ranking. But there are some puzzles too. Rwanda ranks second on this indicator, even though it ranks 151st in the overall index, and Somalia ranks 15th – even though it ranked last among 180 surveyed countries in Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index. Meanwhile, some EU member countries, including Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, find themselves in the bottom 10. The gap between these two indices might raise some questions about the WHR’s accuracy on this indicator, but to put that to one side, the results for this paper’s case study countries all indicate that in all seven former Yugoslavia countries, the perception of corruption is very high and plays a significant role in their overall unhappiness.

Finally, before moving to the analysis section, Table 6 presents the rankings for the case study countries (except Kosovo) on the GPI and WHR against their rankings on the UNDP’s 2017 Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI).
The HDI is a composite measure of life expectancy, education and income per capita indicators. By including ‘education’ as an indicator, it goes further than the WHR.\(^4\)

\[\text{(Table VI in here)}\]

The HDI and IHDI rankings show that the former Yugoslavia countries concerned have achieved either ‘Very High Human Development’ (Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro) or ‘High Human Development’ (Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Moreover, all of them score even better on the IHDI, particularly Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This confirms that when testing correlations between the GPI and WHR rankings, these countries’ overall human development indicators would not need to be considered as variables.

5. Analysis

The above review of WHR rankings for each of former Yugoslavia countries shows that the indices of Social Support, Freedom to Make Life Choices, Generosity and Perception of Corruption are certainly worth investigating. But in order to do so, it is important to dig deeper into each country’s GPI score across the index’s three categories: Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict (Indices 1-6), Societal Safety and Security (Indices 7-16), and Militarisation (Indices 18-23). These are presented in Table 7.\(^4\)

\[\text{(Table VII in here)}\]

As far as the Militarisation indices are concerned, it seems the case study countries are quite peaceful; Slovenia, for one, is ranked as one of the most peaceful places in the world. Yet as the
Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict indices show, several of those countries are clearly still dealing with the legacy of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing civil wars. This is particularly the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Macedonia, meanwhile, long faced an added challenge over a dispute with neighbouring Greece over its name, which was resolved only in June 2018. Even Croatia and Slovenia still seem to be facing challenges even though they have already joined the EU, with ongoing conflict issues supposedly resolved before their accession. Yet on the Societal Safety and Security category, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia all score well.

It is therefore worth focusing on these indices in particular. Based on the preceding review of peacefulness for the seven case study countries, the question that really matters for this paper is whether peacefulness has brought happiness to these countries’ populations – and whether the way peacefulness is measured by the GPI is sufficient to draw any conclusions about happiness from it at all.

To start with the latter point, as has already been established, no such correlation is immediately visible. According to GPI 2018, amongst 36 European countries, the seven case study countries ranked as follows: Slovenia (7th), Croatia (19th), Serbia (27th), Montenegro (29th), Macedonia (33rd), Bosnia and Herzegovina (34th) and Kosovo (35th). Furthermore, three of the world’s eight largest improvements on GPI were achieved by Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia. All of them recorded improvements in Safety and Security; both Macedonia and Croatia experienced a decline in external conflict. On the other hand, the population of Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro became unhappier between 2013 and 2018, while the other four countries saw no significant improvement. This is particularly puzzling considering that the aforementioned three countries are the most developed of the seven according to the HDI 2017. Moreover, as shown
in Table 6, all seven countries score even better in the Inequality-Adjusted HDI. It therefore seems that low scores on the WHR do not necessarily have any relationship to income and its distribution.

Next, let us turn to the WHR’s societal indices – Social Support, Freedom to Make Life Choices, Generosity, and Perception of Corruption. Some of the indices used for the Societal Safety and Security category of the GPI (such as Level of Perceived Criminality, Political Instability, Level of Violent Crime, Number of Police) appear to be related to the WHR’s social indices. But comparing the two also highlights that the GPI does not include many social matters, a crucial dimension of peacefulness. Given that four of the WHR’s six indices are on social matters, and that they help provide an overall picture of happiness, it could be argued that those involved in planning post-conflict responses should pay a particular attention to their findings.

This assertion should be considered alongside the work of Denskus who warned that peacebuilding does not always build peace because of its ‘non-space’ characteristic – that is, that it often is not grounded in historical and socio-cultural contexts. The things the WHR’s indices include genuinely matter, and greatly so – whether conflict-affected people have family, friends and neighbours whom they can actually ask for help, whether they live in an environment where people help each other by donating to charities, whether they feel that they have freedom of making life choices as they would like, whether or not they are exposed to corruption really matter for their happiness.

So if a post-conflict peacebuilding process aims to develop not only ‘peaceful’ but also ‘happy’ populations, then current practice – an overall statebuilding strategy dominated by security and
institutional reforms – must be adjusted accordingly. It seems particularly important to focus not
only on politics, security and economics, but also on social reconstruction.

A matter of social reconstruction?

Improvements in GDP, security and physical wellbeing after an armed conflict might well make a
positive impact on happiness in the short to mid-term, but once such improvements have been
internalised by populations in the long-term, their impact on overall happiness will likely prove
limited. It is clear that once a population has been freed from poverty and threats to security,
relative prosperity and safety will become the everyday norms of post-conflict life; people’s
norms will adjust ‘rapidly to their actual living standards’, as they would become ‘habitual’ for
populations. In other words, these breakthroughs will contribute less and less towards
happiness over time. This can be observed by the changes in the seven countries’ happiness
ranking between 2005-2006 and 2014-2016. The relatively poorer and politically less stable
countries of former Yugoslavia made much greater strides in their happiness results –
Macedonia (13), Serbia (14), Bosnia and Herzegovina (40) and Kosovo (51) – than the wealthier
ones. For Montenegro, the improvement was quite small (64); both Slovenia (76) and Croatia
(108) saw their scores drop.

It could be argued that what is more decisive in the long term are the ‘big seven’ factors
affecting happiness in peaceful societies: family relationships, community and friends, work
environment, personal freedom, and personal values, as well as financial situation and health.

According to Clark et al., the main determinants of happiness and misery are income, education,
unemployment, partnership (marriage), physical health and mental health. Layard similarly
points to six factors that ‘can explain 80% of the variation in happiness. The factors are the
divorce rate, unemployment rate, level of trust, membership in non-religious organisations,
quality of government and fraction believing in God'. It is important to note that to a large extent, this is what WHR’s six indices set out to measure – particularly those related to social context.

A matter of trust?
The WHR 2017 is particularly useful for shedding further light on this issue, as it explored the issues around social foundations of happiness. In a chapter written by Helliwell et al in this report, trust was taken as one of the key issues within the social foundations of happiness; the authors state that ‘high-trust communities and societies are happier places to live, even after allowing for the effects of higher incomes and better health’. All the social and political factors mentioned above help determine whether or not communities trust each other (horizontal trust) and their governance (vertical trust). Helliwell et al offer an insightful observation on social foundations and how they are affected by external calamities and economic crises, and their observations apply particularly well to post-conflict environments:

...economic crises and natural disasters can, if the underlying institutions are of sufficient quality, lead to improvements rather than damage to the social fabric. These improvements not only ensure better responses to the crisis, but also have substantial additional happiness returns, since people place real value on feeling that they belong to a caring and effective community.

Armed conflict and violence do not just kill and maim, destroy infrastructure and services, or wipe out opportunities for generations to come. They also divide societies and leave deep societal wounds, not least resentment, suspicion, fear and hatred. That means that in terms of a country’s overall happiness, it really matters how this social harm is alleviated, including by whom and to what end.
It can be taken as a given that local societal context is one of the main determinants of such outcomes, meaning it is difficult to come up with anything truly generalisable across even the former Yugoslavia countries. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, the most badly war-affected of the seven, the social problems of the post-conflict context are all too clear. On almost all the WHR’s four social criteria, Croatia ranks relatively low, as does Bosnia and Herzegovina. The only significant difference between them is in generosity; this might be due to the varying size of their Muslim populations, since charity and almsgiving is a key element of Islamic religious practice. This hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that another Muslim majority country, Kosovo, also has a high generosity score. However, when it comes to the perception of corruption, all three countries rank very poorly, as do all the other former Yugoslavia countries. This might be because of the way these seven countries still struggle to transform their governance structures to tackle different types of corruption in their societies. With that in mind, the seven countries clearly share problems of trust both within social life and towards governance.

A matter of social support?
On the issue of social support, it seems that both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina still suffer damaged societal relations. Largely thanks to the mass displacement that communities in both countries experienced because of wartime ethnic cleansing, it seems many people are still bereft of strong social support structures. On the other hand, out of the four social WHR indices, one of the most interesting results relates to freedom to make life choices. Apart from Slovenia, which scores high, the case study countries score very low. Croatia and Montenegro are particularly puzzling examples, since both of them are relatively rich countries with good rule of law and human rights records. Croatia is a member of the EU; as a further research question, it would be
worth investigating how a country like this can score so low on this ranking. But for the purposes of this paper, the key concern is whether such trajectories indicated by the WHR indices have anything to do with the way the reconstruction of the Western Balkans has been pursued over the last 20 years.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Bojicic-Dzelilovic analyses the legacy of the country’s double transition from war and communism to peace and democracy. She concludes that ‘the political settlement around the three-way ethnic division of the country, in which ethnic criteria permeate every aspect of life, shapes distribution of power and resources within society’.\(^{57}\) In this context, the peacebuilding process has to a large extent failed to foster cohesive societal relations. Ethno-religious politics still dictate the way the three main communities of Croats, Muslims and Serbs relate to each other. According to Mocnik, the Western Balkans countries are confronting the dissolution of their traditional structures: ‘their networks of social solidarity are faltering – not only the institutions of the Welfare State, but also other more long-term social mechanisms like those of the extended family, neighbourhood, different types of communities, from local to professional to age groups’.\(^{58}\) The external interventionist approach to the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia countries prioritised building institutions over repairing community relations, and excluded ordinary people from the rebuilding of their own lives; it seems this may have helped allow social problems to fester. People in the conflict-affected communities of the Western Balkans have long since lost their beloveds, friends, neighbours and community members to both death and displacement, and the peacebuilding process has done little to heal their wounds in the years and decades since.\(^{59}\)

A matter of governance and economics?
As to the harmonisation of societal relations and reconciliation of divided communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastmond argues that the wider economic and governance issues are also critical. According to her, as far as everyday life is concerned, ‘reconciliation with former enemies is not always the foremost preoccupation for people trying to make a new start after a devastating war’. While it’s important to recognise that the peacebuilding process in Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved a lot – eradicating major political violence, reconstructing infrastructure, and assisting in the return of displaced populations – ‘many insecurities about the future remain’. Kappler describes ‘the legitimacy deficit’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s public sphere, ‘resulting from the distance between the governing political elites and international community on the one hand, and the population on the other’. In other words, peacebuilding in the former Yugoslavia countries has primarily been a matter of statebuilding, nation-building, governance capacity, institution-building, compliance with policies introduced by external actors, the use of conditionality to drive through change, and so on. The process has not necessarily concerned itself with building bridges between conflicting families, neighbours and communities. It is this latter view of peacebuilding’s social and transformational aspects – that is, the discourse of ‘everyday peace(building)’ – that is useful here.

Much has been written on the questionable value of local participation, which is often prescribed as a remedy for all the ills of international peacebuilding responses. To romanticise local participation in post-conflict efforts is often to ignore the realities of local power hierarchies, discrimination, partisanship and violence, all of which could easily negate the sustainability of peace. But on the other hand, it is still imperative to engage with conflict-affected communities, particularly women and young people. They must be included to ensure that everyday peace is relevant to all segments of society; formal peacebuilding programmes must create opportunities for their voices to be heard in the planning and implementation of
such efforts. Brewer et al. argue that building peace should be about removing ‘the negative impact of a victim identity on victims’ agency as everyday life peacebuilders and the factors that sustain or undercut the transition to a survivor identity’. It is through this particular kind of post-conflict transformation that everyday life and social processes – particularly trust, solidarity, altruism, cohesion, integration and volunteerism – might have a more realistic chance of improving in the long term.

6. Conclusion

If happiness is considered the ultimate goal in life, the corollary is that peace is as much an instrumental good as health, freedom and autonomy. This then implies that the contemporary practice of peacebuilding is due for an overhaul. If it were reframed with happiness in mind, the goal of peacebuilding would no longer be simply creating a political, economic, and cultural environment that can stave off a return to armed conflict; instead, the goal would be to make sure the post-conflict population live in happiness. Whether this would be a helpful framework for policy and practice is obviously open to debate, but to start the discussions here, the Bentham and Mill’s Greatest Happiness principle makes for a useful bottom line. The debate could be further enriched by taking the WHR's indices into account, using it to explore what contemporary peacebuilding strategies and programmes might look like with happiness as their focal point.

At a first glance, this might seem just a tangle with the semantics of ‘peace’ and ‘happiness’; the latter might seem simply too confusing or nebulous a goal for complex peacebuilding responses. However, it is important to remember that beyond the absence of violence, peace is nebulous too. Moreover, looking at the former Yugoslavia countries and their achievements, it
seems that there are legitimate grounds to start this debate. The discussions in this paper presented a number of important points to start setting some parameters.

First of all, the GPI's measurement of peacefulness and its import for everyday life has a number of significant gaps, especially in relation to societal relations and governance. The WHR's indices show potential as complementary indicators, offering a more insightful understanding of peacefulness. In fact, the evidence it points to suggests that happiness could even be a good measure to fundamentally assess ‘positive’ peace.

Second, the findings in this paper underline the importance of measuring what peacebuilding achieves in a mid-to-long term perspective as far as the ultimate goal of happiness is concerned. It is likely that the things peacebuilding can achieve in the short-to-mid term – improvements in security, income, general living standards and governance – will become ‘habitual’ for populations, meaning their expectations will adjust rapidly to their improved post-conflict circumstances, in turn influencing their perception of happiness. This could make a useful point of inquiry for researchers setting out to investigate the peace and happiness nexus more thoroughly.

Third, the analysis in this paper indicates that the focus on the ‘hardware’ of peacebuilding – institutions, infrastructure, services, systems, etc – rather than ‘software’, i.e. societal relations, might also be due for reconsideration. While failed efforts to improve governance can help foment unhappiness, as per the challenge of corruption in the former Yugoslavia, the WHR's indices show that matters of societal trust (both horizontal and vertical) – economic liberalism-induced changes in state-civil society relations, solidarity, social support, justice and reconciliation, and freedom to make life choices – all play a significant role in the way post-
conflict societies perceive their happiness in the mid-to-long term. If happiness were taken as the ultimate goal, contemporary peacebuilding approaches and methods would need to rethink their technocratic perspectives and pay a lot more attention to the way their implementations are aligned with social needs. That means attending to the work of repairing, supporting and enabling relationships in deeply divided environments.

Finally, this paper contributes to the ‘everyday peace’ literature by exploring the nexus of peace and happiness. To understand how communities deal with the challenges of maintaining peace as part of their everyday lives, we must also examine what inter- and intra-group activities achieve beyond avoiding and minimising conflict. The discussion here showed that everyday peace can contribute to overall happiness when it is inclusive; this would open up opportunities to activate the agency of conflict-affected communities more comprehensively and effectively. Another contributing factor appears to be the extent to which everyday peace activity is connected and merged with its own socio-cultural, economic and political environment. A deep understanding of this process would be highly significant for any effort to address the needs of post-conflict communities in the long term – and therefore to contribute to their happiness.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Prof Roger Mac Ginty for his comments and inputs in the finalization of this article.


21 Lederach, ‘The Little Book of Conflict Transformation’

22 Özerdem and Lee, ‘International Peacebuilding’.


26 Ibid, 553.


28 Ibid.


1. Number and duration of internal conflicts; 2. Number of deaths from external organized conflict; 3. Number of deaths from internal organised conflict; 4. Number, duration, and role in external conflicts; 5. Intensity of organised internal conflict; 6. Relations with neighbouring countries; 7. Level of perceived criminality in society; 8. Number of refugees and displaced persons as percentage of population; 9. Political instability; 10. Political Terror; 11. Impact of terrorism; 12. Number of homicides per 100,000 people; 13. Level of violent crime; 14. Likelihood of violent demonstrations; 15. Number of jailed persons per 100,000 people; 16. Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people; 17. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; 18. Number of armed-services personnel per 100,000; 19. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people; 20. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people; 21. Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions; 22. Nuclear and heavy weapons capability; 23. Ease of access to small arms and light weapons.


39 GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011 international dollars, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) released by the World Bank in September 2017. The time series of healthy life expectancy at birth are constructed based on data from the World Health Organization (WHO) and WDI. Social support is the national average of the binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the Gallup World Poll (GWP) question “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?” Freedom to make life choices is the national average of binary responses to the GWP question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” Generosity is the residual of regressing the national average of GWP responses to the question “Have you donated money to a charity in the past month?” on GDP per capita. Perceptions of corruption are the average of binary answers to two GWP questions: “Is corruption widespread throughout the government or not?” and “Is corruption widespread within businesses or not?”


41 Ibid.


43 Global Peace Index 2013.


47 The IHDI combines a country’s average achievements in health, education and income with how those achievements are distributed among country’s population by “discounting” each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality (UNDP, Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index, (2017a)  http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/IHDI (accessed 21 September, 2018).

48 Global Peace Index 2018.


50 Richard Layard, ‘Happiness’, 42.

51 WHR 2017 provides this ranking separately in terms of measuring changes in happiness, based on figures available from the Gallup World Poll.


54 Richard Layard, ‘Happiness’, 71.

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