Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad

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ABSTRACT

Expansion in state-diaspora relations in recent decades has led to academic research questioning when, why and how sending states develop diaspora policies in order to reconnect with their citizens abroad. Turkey, which has one of the highest rates of emigration in the world, is a particularly important case study in terms of illustrating a turn in the way it perceives its citizens abroad as a diaspora. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, it attempted to develop a number of diaspora policies to maintain, cultivate and deepen relations with its emigrants with an aim of creating a mobilized transnational community. This article explains the transformation in this newly emerging engagement policy by putting an emphasis on Turkey’s foreign policy aspirations and the diffusion of Turkey’s domestic policies abroad.

Key Words: diaspora, diaspora policy, emigrant states, foreign policy, Turkey.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, sending states have developed various strategies and practices for consciously and proactively engaging with their emigrant communities in order to maintain

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ties and develop diaspora policies. There has been a growing interest in emigrants in discourses, and the introduction of a wide range of related policies and institutions. Although the disagreement exists regarding the precise meaning of the concept of diaspora in the general literature, some sociologists and political scientists studying sending state relations with emigrants have started to use the concepts of diaspora or diasporic policies.¹ In a broad sense, diaspora policies refer to an entire range of policies, programs and institutions developed by sending states regarding emigrant affairs, particularly those aiming to produce legal, socio-cultural, economic, and political links.

This expansion in states’ diaspora engagement attempts has led to academic research questioning when, why and how sending states develop diaspora policies and the conditions under which they experience an interest in engaging with their diaspora. Studies demonstrate that, firstly, sending states’ driving motives range from securing the flow of remittances to directing economic investments, meeting the needs and demands of emigrants, and forging loyalty and attachment among dispersed populations.² Secondly, the literature has begun to analyse how diaspora policies are influenced by the characteristics of bilateral relationships between sending and receiving states, by state membership of regional or international organizations as well as the diffusion of international norms.³ Existing literature has recently started to unravel (1) the centrality of diaspora policies for the state’s national and international agenda and, (2) how the possibility of enacting these policies is linked to the state’s international position. Overall, however, the links between diaspora policies and the state’s international standing (either real or prospective) remains under-theorised and under-researched. The underestimation of foreign policy goals and the reflection of domestic politics with regards to diaspora formation can be explained by the fact that formal state policies towards diasporas fall into the grey area between Comparative Politics and International
Relations they have therefore been relatively overlooked by both fields.\(^4\) It has to be acknowledged that we need a more comprehensive framework that captures both domestic dynamics and international relations concerns of the sending state before we analyse its diaspora formation policies.\(^5\)

This article aims to fill a gap in exploring diaspora policies from the international politics perspective, suggesting that the international standing and foreign policy goals of sending states should be included within the explanatory frameworks because it may be central for understanding policy changes and their framing in certain countries. Also, explanations related to lobbying in the extant literature can be further elaborated by referring to the broader foreign policy context. Relying on Liza Mügge\(^6\) we also consider that ideologies of nationhood that the sending-state bears- as opposed to solely focusing on the sending-state capacity- economic benefits or the perks of globalization could be useful to capture the full picture. Therefore, we draw on previous literature that has dealt with the homeland-diaspora nexus and we adopt these conceptual frameworks and use them to systematically present the longitudinal changes in Turkish diaspora policy. Then, drawing on theoretical and comparative literature, we move on to analyze possible explanations for these changes.

**Why Study Turkey as a Sending State?**

The case of Turkey is particularly important in terms of analysing home states’ sudden interest in mobilizing their diaspora and exploring factors influencing their diaspora policies. Turkey is among the top ten emigration countries in the world with more than five million citizens living abroad and almost four million concentrated in Western European countries, constituting between 5-7 percent of the homeland population.\(^7\) This emigration largely began with the arrival of nearly 800,000 labourers in Germany, the Netherlands and France between
1961 and 1974. However, this is not Turkey’s first participation in international migration movements.\textsuperscript{8}

Migration from Turkey is highly internally diversified. Since the late 1970s, traditionally regulated labour migration has intertwined with illegal entries and overstays, as well as with family reunification. From the 1980s and 1990s growing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly Kurds, have considerably increased the number of migrants from Turkey. Against this background, Turkey has historically shown a limited and selective engagement with emigrants. They were not prioritized in the national agenda, and there were relatively few institutional arrangements. Most of Turkey’s political engagement in diaspora politics was about hindering the activism of the opposition groups outside its borders rather than creating a diaspora that it deemed to be ‘acceptable’ to the ideologies of the state and that is fully embedded in its own understanding of citizenship and nation.\textsuperscript{9} However, the 2000s marked a turning point in terms of Turkey’s growing interest towards emigrants and their organizations as it started actively implementing a consistent policy on engaging with its diaspora. Important transformations in diaspora policies have been observed in many areas, ranging from granting political rights, to socio-economic provisions and new institutional engagements. A series of legislative initiatives have been launched. The Turkish state also understood that diaspora formation could not be achieved by solely making institutional changes. Based on this, one can also observe a dense and increasing relationship between diaspora/civil society organizations and state actors.

For instance, emigrants, particularly Turks residing in Western Europe, have been approached and presented as ‘ambassadors of Turkey’ and catalysts in the EU accession process, up until around 2007. Second, especially in later years and in the context of growing foreign policy assertiveness, the government has promoted diaspora policies aimed at
enhancing Turkey’s image as a regional and, potentially, global power. As a part of this, the government has identified (with questionable results) a potential role for emigrants and their organizations in lobbying for public diplomacy and for increasing Turkey’s soft power. It should also be considered that the state approached certain segments of migrants from Turkey, for instance it almost completely sidelined the Kurds, Alevites or non-Muslims such as the Assyrians. In this way, diaspora formation policies projected the state’s internal understanding of ‘acceptable citizens’ to its citizens abroad. Although, it is too early to fully analyse the impact of these recent changes, this article nonetheless aims to reveal the driving factors behind these new developments and how they are perceived by various actors in the transnational field.

Before moving to the discussion, a note on data collection is necessary. Data for this study was gathered using documentary sources; newspaper and online reporting; published reports; scholarly work and ethnography. The first author conducted interviews with three public officers who work for a new state agency dealing with diaspora policies: the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities (PTAKC). The research extended to Germany, which hosts the highest number of Turkish emigrants and is the main target for Turkey’s diaspora policies. In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with two Turkish consulate generals, five Turkish association leaders, two journalists, two politicians in German parties, two scholars, and a number of activists to gauge their understanding of diaspora policies and to document actual policy implementation, improvements and shortcomings in the summer of 2014. The author also administered a pilot survey in the United Kingdom. Survey sample size is 252 including polling station surveys that were conducted with Turkish voters face-to-face on August the 2nd and the 3rd 2014 at the Kensington Olympia. Post election surveys were also conducted with journalists, representatives of emigrant associations and of parties in the UK via telephone and email in
the two weeks following the elections.\textsuperscript{10} The second author conducted over a hundred interviews with members of the Turkish and Kurdish diasporas, particularly with the leaders of migrant associations since 2008 in various European countries. These were conducted in order to examine the factors that have an impact on diaspora mobilization among these groups. The sample included both diaspora elite and constituents from Turkish and Kurdish associations in these countries. The arguments in this paper will reflect both authors’ fieldwork observations.

Conceptualizing Diaspora Policies and Scrutinizing the Homestate’s Reach to Its Diaspora

Diasporas have become one of the hottest topics for academic and political discussion over the last few decades. Once considered as victims or groups who cannot be integrated, nowadays they are referred to as one of the most prominent non-state actors that affect policy-making both in home and host countries. This is because most diaspora groups have started acting similarly to other interest or lobby groups and civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{11} Some studies depict diasporas as (1) ambiguous actors who support armed groups in their homelands and (2) as transnational actors who sustain terrorist networks globally.\textsuperscript{12} Others depict diasporas as peacemakers in conflict situations. Consequently, diasporas are said to have an impact on either the prolongation or the ending of homeland conflicts. They are said to contribute to development projects in post-war societies and peacebuilding mechanisms in their homelands.\textsuperscript{13}

There is a triadic relationship among diasporas, the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and the homeland states and the contexts where they or their forbears come from. Diaspora theory has been structured around the multi-faceted relationships between these three actors. Diaspora, by definition, takes its \textit{raison d’être} from a sense of belonging to the
homeland. As the homeland becomes the main core that holds a community with a self-ascribed identity together, it becomes the target of this community’s attention and future projects. They influence their homeland’s policies through their support of or opposition to governments, and provide financial and other support to political parties, social movements, and civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{14} There is also an asymmetrical relationship between the homeland and the diaspora, meaning that one is more dominant than the other depending on the political, economic and social situations in the home country. The strength of relations between the homeland and the diaspora is one of the main determinants of diaspora (or diasporic) mobilization. This mobilization refers to a diaspora’s engagement with homeland politics from afar while at the same time engaging with hostland actors to pursue a certain agenda in relation to their homeland. On the other hand, homelands also may perceive an interest in maintaining ties with diasporas and may act in favour of the creation of a diaspora abroad by launching pertinent diaspora policies and establishing institutions. The emergence of diaspora mobilization is a preferred strategy of both state elites and non-state political entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, ‘importing the concept of diaspora into International Relations discipline is a useful way of analysing these processes, since it provides a means of examining how identity constructs can be deployed to sustain collective identities across territorial borders’.\textsuperscript{16}

Recently, extensive academic studies have sought to compare and theorize diaspora policies by focusing on home state positions and the rationale of their policies.\textsuperscript{17} Traditional approaches that emphasize economic causes, argue that remittances and development are often the main intended goal of state’s diaspora policies because undeveloped sending states need migrant remittances or need a safety valve for unemployment.\textsuperscript{18} Developing countries seek to benefit from foreign direct investment, emigrants’ presence in multinational corporations or international lending agencies as well as brain gain and circulation. In these case, the homeland
goes along with diaspora policies because the homeland is in a weaker position and depends upon diaspora funds, investments and remittances for its development. The impact of the Armenian diaspora on the policies and development strategies of the Republic of Armenia is a good illustration of this latter example. Nevertheless, economic explanations are not fully sufficient to understand all the reasons behind diaspora policies. In her comparative study, Laurie Brand identifies four non-economic sets of explanations: macro-historical, domestic political, security/stability explanations, and international politics. Each of these will be briefly reviewed below and integrated with similar findings from other scholarly works.

First, in macro-historical explanations the state’s interest in diasporas is shown to be related to particular stages of emigrant community development. When emigrants become economically and politically successful in host countries, if there is the possibility of their assimilation, sending states become more interested in maintaining ties with them. Second, domestic political system explanations focus on the characteristics of sending states as well as the actors involved in diaspora policies. Movement towards more open or participatory political systems after years of authoritarianism may urge sending states to approach emigrants as potential resources. Furthermore, certain elites in the home country might engage in mobilizing different sub-groups in the diaspora community to expand their interests and ideologies abroad. Third, sending-states engage in activities to hinder opposition groups’ diasporic activities rather than creating opportunities for them in the host country context, due to her security concerns and ideologies of nationhood. Authoritarian states may use their extra-territorial bureaucracies to keep emigrants under surveillance and political control. Embassies/consulates have at times served to organize and host individuals or institutions whose primary functions are to monitor communities of nationals abroad. This took place in many Magrebi states during the 1960s and 70s.
Lastly, the characteristics of international and regional politics matter, including sending states’ international position, power differentiations and bilateral relations between sending and receiving states, the role of international and regional organizations and the presence of specific international norms. Less powerful sending states prefer to develop less coherent diaspora policies, even leaving their nationals abroad in vulnerable positions, because these countries recognize that intervention will not be welcomed by the authorities of host states. When sending states improve their international positions and enhance their negotiation and lobbying power in the international arena, they are more likely to consolidate their engagement attempts. For instance, Brazil used its improved international position as an emerging power as a platform for intervention in its diaspora in Portugal. In 2007, during the Portuguese European Union (EU) Council presidency, the Brazilian diaspora in Portugal was mobilized to work for the realization of the EU Strategic Partnership with Brazil. Similarly, sending states’ foreign policy interests and discourses have an impact on engagement policies. As observed in the cases of Mexico-United States, Morocco-Spain, Argentina-Spain, sending states may use emigrants as a way of highlighting their importance in bilateral, regional, and multilateral relationships. For example, the Mexican government pursued lobbying activities that directly involved the Mexican American community in support of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area. Moreover, changes in policies can be the result of policy diffusion, transfer or adaptation, as observed in Latin American countries using the model of Mexico’s engagement policies in the US. Keeping the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks in mind, we will analyze the Turkish state-diaspora nexus in the following sections.

**From a Lack of Diaspora Policies to Selective, Unsuccessful Engagement Attempts**

Turkey’s policy framework concerning emigration has evolved through time. It has reflected different state policies under different governments as well as diverging host state approaches
to the Turkish migrant population abroad. Turkey’s diaspora policies can be examined in three periods: the 1960s-1970s, 1982-1990s, and 2000-present. In the early years of labor migration (1960-1970), the Turkish state labelled emigrants as *Turkish Nationals Working Abroad* or *Workers Abroad*, and it anticipated their return in the short run. In Francesco Ragazzi’s state typology, Turkey at this point fell into the *managed labor state* category, which refers to states that have “a large emigrant population, but have not really developed policies toward them and have mostly focused on labor and circulation migration”.

Turkey had almost no concrete diaspora policy and no dedicated state institutions to conduct relations with emigrants except the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which has been sending imams and other religious representatives in the name of the Turkish state since 1971. The few other ad-hoc arrangements that did exist were mainly aimed at facilitating remittance flow. The main state office in charge was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its consulates were responsible for dealing with emigrants’ passports and their civil status. However, consulates often served citizens abroad poorly, as was reported and even discussed in the Turkish Parliament. Officers humiliated migrants, behaved badly and rarely helped them in solving their official problems. An emigrant living in Essen, Germany who represents a Turkish association there stated: “there were cases where people gave up Turkish citizenship just because they wanted to be rid of bad treatment in consulates and very long waiting hours.” In addition to consulates abroad, within Turkey there was a fragmented institutional structure in which seven ministries, three permanent under-secretaries and many other state offices were responsible for carrying out various emigrant-related services and none of them were particularly effective in meeting emigrants’ needs.

In the second period, starting in 1982, the Turkish state attempted to build closer relations with emigrants in order to satisfy their needs and build institutions. Mügge, citing
Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), accurately identifies Turkey as a “strategically selective state, which encourages certain forms of transnational participation while trying to selectively manage what migrants can and cannot do”.32 State policies in this period remained ineffective, while institutional services were limited and bad treatment of emigrants in Turkish state offices like consulates continued. An important formal step was taken with the introduction of a new article on emigrant affairs in the 1982 constitution. Article 62 stipulated the state can take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, and can also take the necessary measures to reinforce their ties with the home country in addition to assisting them on their return home. Accordingly, the Diyanet intensified its activities through the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs [DITIB] in 1984 in order to coordinate religious associations, in fact to prevent cultural assimilation among emigrants and maintain links within it.33

Throughout the 1990s, Turkey showed some signs of institutional engagement with its diaspora but these either failed or remained limited in scope. They included establishing advisory boards and special parliamentary commissions.34 In their 1992 report, the special parliamentary commission indicated 110 key problems and proposed for the introduction of ten legislative changes, twelve bylaws and eighty-seven regulations.35 It showed that problems had accumulated and had become increasingly complex. However, due to the political and economic crisis unfolding at the same time, emigrant affairs were not prioritized and the report failed to trigger a public discussion.

Turkey’s limited but growing interest in emigrants and its failures in institutionalization in this second period can be explained by three of the explanatory frameworks already introduced above: *macro-historical, domestic politics and international politics*. The Turkish
authorities’ security and stability concerns were aggravated at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s due to political instability and the 1980 military coup. These triggered a wave of mass emigration, encompassing the different opposition groups including leftist-communists, Alevi and Kurdish nationalists who mainly arrived in Europe as exiles or asylum seekers. They experienced cultural revivalism and invested in developing identity politics abroad and sought active diasporic formation. It is no coincidence that the first attempts to form ethnic and religious organisations began at the same time. Some movements which were banned, oppressed or stigmatized in Turkey diffused their activities to Europe and found civil society organizations as well as underground groups that were operating under the title of migrant organizations. The Turkish state sought ways to reduce and control their political activities and intentionally failed to deliver services to them that had previously been enjoyed by ‘mainstream’ apolitical migrant communities such as religiously conservative labor migrants. Security concerns urged the Turkish state to control politicized groups for intelligence purposes and to ‘design’ apolitical groups abroad in order to gain support. Nevertheless, the dramatic security and economic situation within Turkey throughout the 1990s substantially affected the state’s ability to control and influence its citizens abroad. The attention that the state could give to its citizens abroad also diminished. It simply did not have the capacity or tools it needed to fully succeed in its goals. These were the first signs that Turkish domestic policies had diffused to the transnational space and that homeland security had become dominant in the state’s approach to its interactions with migrants abroad.

Macro-historical factors also impacted on Turkey’s limited engagement methods. After 20 years of labor migration, Turkey started to become aware of the permanent settlement of its citizens in host countries, and of a need to develop diasporic policies to maintain ties and allegiances. As highlighted in the literature, the host country context
determines the sending state’s incentives and capacity to implement specific policies. Germany was the main determining host state that influenced Turkey’s relations with emigrants due to its economic superiority and its importance within the EU. For example, when dual citizenship became an issue between Turkey and Germany, the latter determined the options of the former. Turkey accepted dual and multiple citizenships in 1981 (Law Number 403) with an amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law of 1964, Article 2383. But Germany rejected dual citizenship in principle and required emigrants to renounce Turkish citizenship before they could become naturalized German citizens. As a compromise, Turkey introduced a new regulation in 1995 in which emigrants who gave up Turkish citizenship in order to get German citizenship were granted an identification card called a ‘pink card’. The card certified the holder’s national origin and allowed the former Turkish citizen the same residence, travel and work rights as Turkish citizens. Political rights and the right to work in the public sector, however, were excluded. Some interviewees in Cologne, Germany noted that these cards made emigrants feel that they were ‘step-citizens’ or ‘quasi’ citizens, or even ‘illegal dual citizens’, but not real citizens either in Turkey or Germany. Thus, in contrast to its intention, Turkey’s policy made Turkish immigrants feel like they were in limbo.

Factors related to domestic politics, macro-historical issues and international politics started to change in the 2000s, paving the way for Turkey to launch a concerted set of diaspora policies. Turkey’s experience of its interest in establishing an interactive relation with its diaspora will be on elaborated below.

**Intense Engagement and Institutionalization After 2003**

Turkey’s active engagement process started with the report prepared by a Parliamentary Investigation Commission in 2003. This addressed the problems of citizens abroad by examining all related state agencies’ services and suggested possible legislative and institutional changes. It also suggested the establishment of a separate directorate responsible
for emigrant affairs. Institutional changes, as well as the formation of a directorate specifically concerned with diaspora affairs were introduced by, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, hereafter the AKP). These initiatives were quite similar to what Latha Varadarajan found about the Mexican example. In Mexico in the early 2000s, a distinct change from earlier rhetoric occurred and political parties finally began to acknowledge the importance of the diaspora. In line with this, homestates started implementing ‘transnationally informed policy-making’.

Transnational links were surely present even before the AKP started formulating diaspora specific policies. More recently, however, a more overtly neo-liberal state restructuring has been evident. This has included the transformation of dormant diasporas into influential ones.

The conservative center-right AKP has held parliamentary majority and controlled most local governments since the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 2004 local elections. Adopting neo-liberal economic policies, the AKP-led government succeeded in bringing about profound economic transformation in Turkey, including a remarkable GDP growth rate and increase in per capita income. The AKP government also pursued political transformation, focusing particularly on democratization and the consolidation of stability with the influence of the EU which, officially recognized Turkey as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. It launched various political reforms to guarantee fundamental rights, improve minority rights, and change the perceptions of formal national security. Although since 2011, it has curbed the processes of reform. These political transformations accompanied a new rhetoric of inclusiveness in domestic politics as well as a new geographical imagination and outreach in foreign policy. In the ideational realm of foreign policy, the government emphasized the importance of Ottoman heritage, Turkish values and Muslim unity. It sought novel ways of reaching out to all citizens abroad, including co-
ethnics, kin communities and communities with historical ties to Turkey as a result of a common Ottoman history. Many defined this strategy as neo-Ottomanist in nature and critically approached these newly developing engagement policies with the diaspora and kin communities. Reference to the Ottoman Empire and ‘Ottoman world’ became apparent various economic and cultural of diasporic activites. Seeing itself as responsible for the wellbeing of all these communities, the government opted to play the self-appointed role of the defender of Turkish Muslim communities; protecting migrants against the threat of Islamophobia and cultural assimilation.

Given this background, and regarding its diaspora policies, Turkey moved from being a managed labor state to a global-nation state that adopts many diaspora policies and provide emigrant populations with a greater number of rights. Various dimensions of the diaspora policies adopted by Turkey after 2003 can be systematically examined by using a revised version of Ragazzi’s diaspora policy taxonomy. This consists of religious/cultural policies; social/economic policies; citizenship policies; bureaucratic control policies; symbolic policies; and lastly, institutional policies.

In terms of cultural policies, state established Turkish cultural centers and language courses abroad as well as organized summer schools in and trips to Turkey. Main priority was to develop strong ties with second and third generation emigrants abroad. Such initiatives aimed to promote Turkey and Turkish language, culture, art and history to foreigners and Turkish citizens abroad. In summer schools and during trips, the programs’ content covered leadership, Turkish language, culture and history, Turkey’s domestic and international politics and human rights. To this end, the Turkish state also granted emigrant children the right to free education at public universities, introduced scholarship programs, particularly in the medical sciences, education, Turkish language, Islamic Studies and Ottoman history.
With regards to social and economic policies, Turkey is interested in the entrepreneurial activities of Turks abroad, their contribution to building trade relations, furthering economic growth, and strenghtening bilateral relations/export ties. In 2008, a semi-autonomous state agency, the Foreign Economic Relations Committee, established the World Turk Labor Council to collaborate economically with Turks abroad. The Council prepared a detailed paper in 2011 about which types of ‘diaspora strategies’ should be followed to increase the economic contribution of citizens abroad, and stated the goal of transforming the Turkish diaspora into one of the most influential diasporas on the world stage. Meanwhile, state agencies supported and consulted with Turkish migrant entrepreneurs via a range of associations.

In terms of citizenship policies, Turkey expanded access to citizenship by granting more rights to former citizens. In 2004, a new ‘blue card’ certifying national origin replaced the pink card that was previously given to migrants who renounced Turkish citizenship and became naturalized host country citizens. In 2009, the rights guaranteed by the blue card were extended. Social security rights were added and the children of emigrants born outside Turkey were also given the same rights as Turkish citizens (except the right to vote and to be employed as a state officer). In 2014, blue card rights were added, relating to the pension system. However, emigrants interviewed in Cologne and Frankfurt reported that legal rights often fail to turn into actual practices.

Extending the franchise to migrants is another crucial issue and a way of strenghtening ties with citizens abroad. The Turkish parliament passed new legislation organizing the procedures for extraterritorial voting in May 2012. For the presidential election in August 2014, the June 2015 and the snap November 2015 Parliamentary Elections, citizens abroad were able to cast their votes at ballot boxes placed in 54 different countries where more than
500 citizens reside. In parliamentary elections, the turnout of diaspora voters reached to the 45 per cent. Furthermore, there are ongoing discussions about whether some parliamentary seats should be reserved for diaspora representatives and political parties added some names from the diaspora to their candidates list.50

Regarding symbolic policies, Turkey financed many activities to celebrate 50 years of emigration in 2011, including conferences, panels, photograph exhibitions and documentaries. However, it is observed that even for the 50th anniversary events, there were cleavages among various groups and state funding was not given to migrant organizations that were not pro-government (Second author’s fieldwork observations, January-April 2015). For instance in Sweden, 50th anniversary events were organized separately despite the fact that there was some level of cooperation by the “50 year committee” and the other state-linked actors.

In terms of institutional policies, consulates have been continuing as the main reference for emigrants. Consulate services have improved since the AKP came into power and in general consulates have started to become more involved in Turkish communities.51 In Sweden too, interviewees from Turkish associations confirmed that there is more interaction between migrants’ associations and the embassies since the AKP came to power.52 Furthermore, in a pilot survey of Turkish citizens residing in the United Kingdom conducted in August 2014, 230 out of 252 respondents said that they had seen service improvements.53 Turkish officers working in the consulates have begun to treat emigrants better: they are more polite and cordial towards emigrants, and they no longer humiliate or look down on citizens. Two Turkish Consulate Generals serving in Cologne and Düsseldorf, Germany, stated that the Foreign Ministry has ordered consulates to develop close relations with emigrants, listen to them, facilitate bureaucratic procedures and connect with all types of emigrant-established associations.54 According to one migration expert and a vice president of an association in Germany, the substantive change is explicit because “instead of citizens going to the
consulates, right now consuls visit the citizens, visit associations, and participate in their activities.” These developments stated above were aimed at benefiting all Turkish citizens despite their religious or ethnic background. However, when it came to designing diasporas as political tools within host countries, we see that the AKP government pursued a not so overarching strategy.

In response to the long-standing need for an emigrant institution the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities (PTAKC), a new state agency allied with the Vice Presidency, was established in 2010 to function as a reference point for emigrant-related affairs. This is not something that is unique to Turkey. Today, increasingly, states such as Serbia, Canada, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ireland adopt these policies and even form ministries that are responsible for diasporas. A high-level PTAKC officer in Turkey told us that the institution utilizes ‘a broader diaspora definition,’ aiming to create broad diasporic membership. PTAKC is responsible for building social, cultural, and economic relations with three categories: (former) citizens abroad; kin and co-ethnic communities and foreign students. PTAKC was established with the motto of “wherever we have kin, we [the Turkish state] are there”. PTAKC reflects Turkey’s ethnic/religious conceptions of nationhood. Turkey’s conception of nationhood regards “the polity not as a territorial state and its inhabitants, but as a community that may be dispersed over several states”.

It is important to note that although the interviewees of both the first and the second author appreciated such an initiative, both in Germany and Sweden, some criticized the general stance and the particular activities of the PTAKC on many grounds. While discussion of these critiques is beyond the scope of this article, a general criticism raised about all these policies is that they embrace a selective approach and neglect cultural and political differences among emigrants. Groups like Alevi, Kurds and political opponents view these programs as part of a state effort to strengthen ties with religiously conservative Turks, or even only with
supporters of the current government. In Germany, representatives of Kurdish associations stated that they were isolated from events that they themselves had organized by the embassy and the consulates. Many interviewees suggested that the onset of new diaspora mobilization efforts were indeed a part of the Turkish state’s strategy to alienate Kurdish diaspora activism in Europe and counter-balance Kurdish claims that are delivered to political circles in Europe. So, although these initiatives can be perceived as positive developments regarding Turkey’s embrace of its wider population, a closer look at these policies actually reveal the ideologies of nationhood behind the process of diaspora creation.

Why Has Turkey Designed New Diaspora Policies?

Scholarship on recent changes in Turkey’s diaspora policies, with the exception of a few studies, have mainly provided general descriptive analysis that have failed to place the question of these policies within wider theoretical consideration. According to two recent studies, the state’s main motivations in creating concerted diaspora policies are: 1) to defend the rights of emigrants, and particularly to prevent them from experiencing discrimination, racism and Islamophobia within the EU; 2) to provide opportunities to strengthen emigrant capabilities; 3) to maintain emigrants’ ties with the homeland, and increase their contribution to politics, foreign policy and the economy; 4) to reflect the potential widening of Turkey’s conceptions of citizenship, belonging and identity. Also, drawing from transnationalism scholarship, Mügge (2012) argues that changes in Turkey’s policies over time can be explained by three factors: the shift from guestworkers to immigrants (the recognition of permanent stay), changing political climates in the home and the host state, and one-off political events that trigger ad-hoc government action.

Mügge’s argument about the recognition of permanent stay is essential. Bekir Bozdağ, the former State Minister responsible for migrant affairs stated at the 50 year anniversary
celebrations that “we need to re-evaluate our policies, because those who emigrated did not go to return, they went to stay”. Nevertheless, there were other factors that also urged the state to translate this recognition into a wide range of diaspora policies. These factors, which will be discussed further below, are associated with changes in domestic and international politics, specifically Turkey’s EU bid and its growing interest in adopting an assertive foreign policy stance.

The starting point for the increasing interest in emigrants was consistent with the AKP government’s foreign policy priority of EU accession, which now seems to have been abandoned. The period between gaining candidate status (December 1999) and the opening of accession negotiations (December 2005) was critical for Turkey. The government greatly emphasized reforms designed to fulfil political membership criteria. During this period, Turkey asked migrants in Europe to lobby in favour of EU membership, because they would influence Europe culturally and would serve as a catalyst in the accession process. This led to the emergence of a new label for emigrants: ‘Euro-Turks’. The government tried to encourage them to work as ‘ambassadors’ for the EU bid, as evinced in the speeches of the Turkish President Abdullah Gül (2007-2014), Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan (2002-2014) and Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014), all of whom addressed the diaspora on various occasions. For instance, during his visit to the Netherlands in June 2004, former President Gül stated that because European countries are having hesitations regarding Turkish accession to the European Union, the Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands have the great task of reflecting the “contemporary, democratic and modern Turkey” in their country of residence. The diaspora in Germany was seen as particularly important for the EU bid. The consulate general in Düsseldorf agreed with this view, stating that “if Germans wanted Turkey’s membership, it would happen… The perspective of the German public about the
Turks here influences the German government and politics”. Often, emigrants themselves appropriated such a role. For instance, Turkish emigrants residing in Germany and France have expressed a wish to become more active in developing Turkish–EU relations. In the case of Turkey, as we will see below, the AKP’s foreign policy aims are not limited to EU accession.

Turkey’s economic growth and democratic consolidation was seen as creating the conditions for an assertive foreign policy in the second half of the 2000s. The Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu envisioned Turkey being repositioned as a central, leading country, and dismissed the long-term characterization of Turkey as a bridge country between East and West. He promoted a policy of Turkish involvement in regional problem-solving in order to enhance its soft power and its regional stance vis à vis other actors. To this end, the government pursued a dynamic, multidimensional foreign policy and sought to demonstrate Turkey’s increasing capabilities. Strengthening ties with emigrants and protecting them is one such area in which Turkey might display its muscle. Similar to the trend in Brazil’s relations with Portugal identified by Padilla (2011), Turkey tried to teach host countries like Germany a lesson via interventions and statements concerning discrimination against emigrants. From this perspective, emigrants are considered both a liability to the government in terms of requiring the state to take action, and an asset in terms of achieving its soft power goals.

**Diaspora Population as a Liability**

Through greater engagement with emigrants, it appears as though the government aimed to send a message to the international audience that “we are protecting our citizens” and “whoever has links with Turkey” both within and beyond its national borders. Such messages are also linked to domestic politics: they reflect the features of the state’s new imagined
political community; expanding it by including previously excluded communities. Addressing migrant representatives on June 16, 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey has become a powerful and ambitious country which now sets itself higher goals then before. As Turkey gains a greater say in world affairs, it now bears a greater responsibility protecting its citizens abroad including kin communities. Similarly the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, noted that Turkey is a strong country that not only deals with its domestic problems but also, with issues around the world. Being a world power requires taking care of its citizens abroad. He added: “This ancient nation will respond to the call of its kin, its relatives about every issue in every place... Turkey broke the chain that slowed it down, no-one can stop Turkey”. As his speech shows, the idea behind these initiatives was also to boost Turkish citizens' self-confidence abroad in order to make them feel a part of the state that is powerful and capable enough to care for them. On that note, a Turkish Consulate General in Cologne agreed with this point and noted that Turkey aims to present “a strong country image” and make its passport as valuable as the American passport.

Some Turkish citizens abroad admire the ‘strong home country’ discourse. As the vice president of an association, Milli Görüş, in Essen, Germany, said: “When Turkey was presented as a powerful country in the German media, this gave Turkish migrants self-confidence, they identified themselves with this power, felt more allegiance. Migrants started to use similar discourses by saying things like “our home country is democratic, it is a developed country”. In Sweden, some interviewees from a youth organization said that Turkey had been depicted negatively in Swedish media and since that the AKP came to power they have seen a positive change in Turkey’s media depiction. The state’s interest in engaging with them has also contributed to their attachment to Turkey.
The institutional policies developed in Turkey, crystallized with the establishment and growth of PTAKC, provides further evidence of the role of foreign policy considerations. Although a number of bureaucrats and associations had been lobbying for its establishment for a long time, the AKP government’s foreign policy considerations provided the opportunity for PTAKC to be established. A high-level PTAKC bureaucrat in Turkey discussed this as follows.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were not able to pursue policies of soft power, their interests might have contradicted each other, and their structures did not allow them to engage with emigrants enough, it was only one of the items on their list. Thus, there was a clear need for establishing a directorate whose responsibility would be solely focused on emigrants.73

The interview accounts reveal that the PTAKC has been able to survive and grow institutionally for two reasons: first, the Foreign Minister’s support; and second, its budget. Foreign Policy Minister Davutoğlu emphasized themes like diaspora and citizen engagement. Thus diplomats were required to respect/not dispute the ‘importance’ of the PTAKC. Due to its ‘generous’ budget, the PTAKC is able to fund projects carried out by associations that are active in Western Europe and in countries where Turks live as a minority, such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Iraq.

**Diaspora as a Lobbying Asset**

AKP’s new diaspora policy surely overlapped with its new strategic outlook in other foreign policy realms that has been perceived as neo-Ottomanist, even neo-imperialist by many experts and scholars.74 As Bryant and Hatay75 put it “Turkey’s particular concern with those countries of the former Ottoman sphere with which it believes itself to have historical and cultural ties, as well as to its historical role as a leader of the Muslim world” strengthened
these arguments. Therefore, Turkey was following a neo-liberal trend of engaging with its diaspora and harnessing its potential like other countries such as Mexico and India, but at the same time it was pursuing a neo-Ottoman policy that was produced domestically as a foreign policy strategy.

Turkey’s diaspora policy was exclusionary towards Kurds, Alevites and Armenians besides other groups in opposition to the governing party, but it was inclusive towards kin communities which could be used as an asset for lobbying among other benefits in former Ottoman territories. The idea was to create “Turkish friendly” elites in these countries as part of the diaspora engagement policy, which would not only revive historical ties, alliances and cooperation, but also will create new venues of collaboration in the future, particularly trade relations. Similar to how the Turkish state approaches to its citizens abroad, the institutions responsible for diaspora engagement policies also approached elites of kin communities abroad and enhanced their relationships in economic, political as well as social levels. PTAKC pays equal attention to both diaspora and kin groups yet uses different strategies. While engaging with the diaspora, PTAKC collaborates with think tanks, diaspora organizations as well as civil society organizations in order to infiltrate into grassroot organizations, it engages mostly at the elite level and university students with kin communities. Diaspora is perceived as a potential pool of votes for the AKP besides other roles in lobbying and public diplomacy, while the kin communities are perceived as loyal allies abroad as well as investments for Turkey’s aim to be a global actor in the near future.

With the new strategy, it can be observed that for the first time, the state acknowledges the diaspora’s agency in affecting transnational policy-making procedures and has included them not as passive actors but as catalysts of state strategies. The Turkish state perceived the diaspora as a potential lobby group in their respective countries of residence with the hope
that they might impact upon policies in line with the AKP’s new vision of Turkey. Turkish migrants’ networks and their lobbying affects were seen diplomatic tools and emigrants as political and cultural agents as well as new public diplomats. The government utilized the concept of public diplomacy and established the Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship as a state institution. For example, the head of the Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship, Ibrahim Kalın, referred to emigrants as a form of strategic and social capital using the term ‘functioning diaspora’ illustrates how the strong country discourse and lobbying imperatives overlap.

Meeting with Turkish migrants in Sweden, President Abdullah Gül’s speech reflected a similar overlap when he emphasized Turkey’s new role and made a call to citizens abroad: “You should act like ambassadors of your motherland, Turkey, which you should represent here in the best way. You should protect and defend Turkey’s image, as there could be anti-Turkish propaganda.” This rhetoric clearly gives us the image that diaspora engagement was developing with only a small sector of the diaspora in mind; those who are in favor of the government’s policies and its definition of the “new Turkey.”

Although Turkey is eager to benefit from emigrants and their civic organizations through lobbying, emigrants themselves may have different approaches. Some emigrants regard themselves as social capital for Turkey. For example, Huseyin Bayçöl, a Turkish columnist writing from Germany, stated “Turkey should go a step further in lobbying through its citizens living in Europe vis-a-vis the Armenian diaspora”. This sentiment also highlights what we have previously discussed in terms of counter-balancing the opposition and their lobbying activities. On the other hand, representatives of migrant associations and journalists in Germany have stated their discomfort with the new role of lobbyist given to them by Turkish politicians. The vice head of an association in Essen, Germany explained:
Lobbying can benefit Turkey, even just some groups in Turkey but not Turks in Germany…Turkish state involvement, any involvement coming from abroad (to Germany) is something that causes suspicion. Many of us continue to live here, we will not return to Turkey, we should not be turned into an instrument of Turkish foreign policy.\textsuperscript{80}

We observed the same reluctance among the Turkish diaspora elites in Sweden. Diaspora organizations want to build contingent alliances on certain issues, rather than taking direction from the Turkish Embassy or homeland actors. Emigrants are eager to lobby for Turkey or receive support from the Turkish state in lobbying only if interests overlap and, if the state does not impose its own ideology and agenda. Emigrants are concerned about two main issues. The first is the Turkish state’s perceived dominance. For example, Kaya (2011) notes how Turks abroad have started to complain about the paternalistic approach of the Turkish state. They no longer want to be perceived as passive, obedient and in urgent need of Turkish government support. The leaders of migrants’ associations in Sweden emphasized that they were seeking ‘partners not patrons’.\textsuperscript{81} Two interviewees of Turkish background in Germany agreed with this view, saying that they were happy that the Turkish state had not engaged with emigrants in the past because they were able to successfully run associations, gain self-confidence, and communicate with groups like Kurds and Alevi (who were seen as opposition groups back in Turkey). Second, some emigrant groups believe that Turkey’s attempt to create a Turkish lobby could generate ‘competition among groups with various political and ideological standpoints within the respective Turkish communities for the claim of being their sole representative’.\textsuperscript{82} It is questionable whether the AKP’s interventions in diaspora policies, especially in Germany were actually useful. While the AKP acted to increase the scope of AKP-favoring diaspora groups’ actions and constantly intervened in Turkish diaspora-German relations, it also inadvertently created a negative image in
Germany. This is evinced by German media coverage of former prime minister and current president Tayyip Erdoğan and his policies. This situation raised concerns for host society authorities about Turkey’s close involvement with Turkish immigrants, especially with regards to seeing this involvement as a factor impeding immigrant integration. Some interviewees from Turkish umbrella organizations stated that Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Germany’s integration policies and his gathering of masses in rallies irritates many Germans and does more damage than good. One should also consider whether this selective diaspora formation strategy has entrenched already existing divisions between ethnic groups from Turkey. As it stands, currently implemented policies are not state-policies but are AKP policies, which are very much shaped by the AKP’s vision of nationhood, values and foreign policy aims. For instance, the AKP has re-activated and dominated some organizations like Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) rather than cooperating with previously established organizations in order to create new networks with members who are supporters of the AKP. Lobby networks formed around UETD and organizations like it also set the basis for the AKP’s transnational electon campaigns abroad. The basis of the AKP’s diaspora policy does not follow the democratic citizenship agenda but rather focuses on Sunni Muslim Turkish identity which is in line with its ideological stance. Therefore Kurdish, Alevite or Assyrian are not included in state-diaspora nexus, despite the fact that bureaucrats constantly make declarations that they try to reach to wider audiences.

Conclusion

The Turkish case is not exceptional with respect to the significance of international politics in designing diaspora policies. There are commonalities with the Mexican case particularly in light of the link between bidding to join a strong regional organization and a simultaneous growing interest in emigrant lobbying. It also demonstrates some similarities
with the Brazilian case in terms of an improvement in its international position. It can be hypothesized that emerging powers like Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa, which are also well-known sending states, may become more sensitive to meeting the demands of and strengthening ties with their diaspora populations as they gain greater engagement capabilities and potentially seek to utilize diaspora populations to improve their international standing.

As a sending state, similar to the other examples mentioned above, Turkey has replaced the general state negligence of the 1970s, and the shattered, ineffective policies of the 1980s and 1990s, with policies of active engagement since 2003 when the AKP came to power. Having acknowledged Turkey’s interest in diaspora formation is in line with a global trend, we have argued that we also need to take domestic and foreign policy contexts into account in order to fully understand Turkey’s aims of strengthening and designing engagement with Turkish citizens abroad. We identified a number of reasons why the AKP government prioritized transnationalizing their vision of a new Turkey. In particular, two factors, related to international politics, have had a great deal of impact on this: Turkey’s EU bid until around 2007, and its assertive foreign policy. The reflection of Turkey’s domestic politics has also played a role in how the state and its institutions formulated a diaspora engagement policy. In the broader context of foreign policy, the diaspora population is approached as both a liability by the government – in that it must protect emigrants in host countries and address their demands – and a lobbying asset that might enhance Turkey’s image as a leading country and increasing its soft power. We observe that new policies surrounding the diaspora engagement ideal actually reflects the government’s perception of a new Turkey and transnationalizes this vision in order to increase its reach as much as possible. This idea of new Turkey as a global actor had a lot to do with Turkey’s Ottoman
legacy and many rightly interpreted this strategy as neo-Ottoman. Therefore, we found that while Turkey was producing policies in line with the neo-liberal trend of tapping the diaspora resources, it was also reflecting its new vision of foreign policy to its engagement with the diaspora and kin communities. We suggest that Turkey’s diaspora policy cannot be understood without looking at its foreign policy and its neo-Ottoman undertones.

Finally, the case of Turkey provides some insights into debates around citizenship and diaspora building. Although it is evident that Turkey has attempted to expand external citizenship, it is still open to question whether it might be able to develop transnational conceptions of citizenship and belonging. It has been shown that existing diaspora policy targets groups that are favorable to the AKP government and it ignores the other groups from Turkey that are considered to be ‘the opposition’ in the broadest sense. Furthermore, the implications of diaspora building also lies in the extent to which this a process run by the state, by migrants themselves, or by both. Specifically, the reshaping of diaspora politics according to government party policy raises questions about neutrality towards different groups. Party policy priorities may create tensions amongst various diaspora groups, strengthen the positions of certain groups with regard to others, and generate host country resentments. Although it is still too early to arrive at generalizations regarding these new implementations, one can easily observe that the domestic tensions reflected in diaspora spaces and in Turkish foreign policy aspirations have become intertwined. Based on this, we believe that further research looking at the implications of these policies for diaspora populations and their relations with host states would make an important contribution to the growing literature, not only on diaspora policies but also on discussions centering on citizenship.


4 Délano and Gamlen, op.cit, p. 43.


This survey was prepared by the first author and conducted by the Research Assistant, Hacı Mehmet Boyraz in London between 31 July-4 August 2014. The Survey Sample size was 252 including during election surveys that were conducted face-to-face with Turkish voters on August 2, 3, 2014 at Olympia Center in Kensington. Post election surveys were conducted with journalists, representatives of emigrant associations and parties in the UK via telephone
and email in the two weeks following the election. The survey results are published in Turkish in the following web site: http://evsam.org/mehmet-boyraz/38-secimler.html (accessed 10 September 2015).


16 Ibid., pp. 514-515.


20 Brand, Citizens Abroad, op.cit.


22 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland, op.cit.


24 Brand, Citizens Abroad, op.cit.


26 Padilla, ‘Engagement policies’, op.cit.


29 Ragazzi statistically clusters sending states according to their diaspora policies and finds five state types: the expatriate, the closed, the indifferent, the global nation and the managed labor state. Categorizing countries with respect to their policies allows for cross-national comparison. Although Ragazzi classified the analyzed countries at a given point in time, his synthetic classification may be used to explore longitudinal policy changes in a certain state (2014, pp. 80-81).

First author’s interview 2014.


Aksel, op.cit.


According to Turkish Citizenship Law ( Law number 5091, Article 27, Issue 1), in order to renounce Turkish citizenship, individuals should apply to embassies/consulates abroad or population units in Turkey. They are required to provide an application form and a document proving their ability to get Alternative citizenship. The Interior Ministry is then required to make a decision within three months and issues a ‘renunciation document’. The individual’s population registration is deleted and they are then considered as a foreign citizen.

First author interview, 2014.
Experts suggest that there is a significant decline in this trend during the last years. For more info see [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/whos-going-to-save-turkeys-economy-erdogan-akp](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/whos-going-to-save-turkeys-economy-erdogan-akp) (accessed 10 August 2015)


Aydın, op.cit.

M. Kaçar, Published Interview with Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, Artı 90, 1, 2012, pp. 65-66.

DEIK, ‘Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu’, op.cit.

First author’s interview 2014.


First author’s interviews, 2014.

Second author’s interviews, 2009-2014.

First author’s interviews, 2014.

First author’s interviews, 2014.

First author’s interviews, 2014.
56 First author’s interview, 2013


58 Second author’s interviews 2010-2011.


61 A. Zentürk, Interview with Bekir Bozdağ’, Artı 90, 1, 2012, p. 5.


64 Mügge, ‘Managing transnationalism’, op.cit.

65 First author’s interview 2014.

66 Kaya, ‘Euro-Turks as a force’, op.cit.


68 M. Altınok, Published interview with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Artı 90, 2013, no.5, pp. 7-8.

70 First author’s interview 2014.

71 First author’s interview 2014.

72 Second author’s interview 2010.

73 First author’s interview, 2013.


77 I. Kalın, ‘YTB’nin Kuruluş Hikayesi’ [The YTB’s Foundation Story], Artı 90, 5, 2013, p. 17.


80 First author’s interview 2014.
Second author’s interview 2010.

Kaya, ‘Euro-Turks as a force’, p. 504.

Second author’s interview 2010.


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