

Understanding the dilemmas of integrating post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives: Evidence from Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the extent of links between the processes of post-disaster reconstruction and post-conflict reconstruction in three places – Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – which have all experienced both processes within a relatively short period of time. Drawing on extensive interviews with policy makers and practitioners it explores the dilemmas of attempting to link post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction activities (PDR and PCR), and the key factors in decision making by those stakeholders who support this approach, and those who oppose it. The paper finds that whilst there is an appetite among many practitioners and stakeholders to link the two processes, there is also a concern that this will be difficult to achieve in a context that is already highly challenging. It demonstrates that in practice the two processes have largely been understood and practiced as separate, though there are some important instances of overlap between the two. Where this overlap has occurred, it has produced very different effects in the different cases. Finally, the paper identifies a number of factors that appear to either prevent or enable links being made between post-conflict and post-disaster programming. These factors include politics and coordination, the nature of the conflict settlement, the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory, and the importance of sustaining the pace of the processes.

Keywords: Post-disaster reconstruction; Post-conflict reconstruction; Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia.

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1. Introduction

This paper presents the first analysis of data from a research project carried in three sites in 2017, looking at the extent of links between the processes of post-disaster reconstruction (PDR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR).¹ The research focussed on three places – Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – all of which have experienced both processes within a relatively short period of time. It sets out to find out whether there was an appetite to make links between PCR and PDR to ‘build back better’ and whether such an approach was favoured by policy makers and practitioners, and if not, what were the barriers to this. The paper finds that whilst there is an appetite among practitioners and stakeholders to link the two processes, there is also a concern this will be difficult to achieve in a context that is already highly challenging in terms of political interference and socio-economic and physical vulnerabilities. It demonstrates that in practice the two processes have largely understood and practiced as separate, though there are some important instances of overlap in terms of a coordinated response between the two. Where this overlap has occurred, it has produced very different effects in the different cases. Finally, the paper identifies a number of factors that appear to either prevent or enable links being made between post-conflict and post-disaster programming. These factors include politics and coordination, the nature of the conflict settlement, the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory, and the importance of sustaining the pace of the processes.

2. Theory

We started this research from a particular understanding of natural hazard related disasters and conflict as being interrelated in important ways. Their interrelation made us question why responses to the challenge of rebuilding after these often devastating events were not, generally, similarly interlinked. It also led us to believe that there would be a lot of potential in highlighting the links between the two processes, and designing interventions and projects that acknowledge and build on this. This view of the links between natural hazard related

¹ This investigation adopts holistic definitions of both processes which see reconstruction processes as wide in scope and spanning several phases of action from relief to long term recovery. We follow Anderlini and El Bushra (2005:51) in defining PCR as “interventions to rebuild in aftermath of violent conflict, spanning immediate response, transition and consolidation of sustainably peaceful societies, and encompassing activities as diverse as physical reconstruction and addressing security, governance and justice issues as well as economic development and social well-being”. In a similar vein, we adopt the UNISDR (2017) view of PDR as “The medium- and long-term rebuilding and sustainable restoration of resilient critical infrastructures, services, housing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk”.

disasters and conflict, and the processes that follow them is based on a number of widely accepted arguments drawn from the literature on natural hazard related disasters, conflict and reconstruction.

Firstly, we know that conflict and disasters tend to happen in the same places - 50% (rising to 80% in some years) of the world's natural hazard related disasters affected populations between 2005 and 2009 were situated in fragile and conflict affected states (Peters and Budimir 2016), so it is fair to expect that post-disaster reconstruction and post-conflict reconstruction activities will similarly coincide.

Secondly, one of the most important reasons that conflict and disasters tend to coincide is the way each event exacerbates the conditions for the other from a vulnerability perspective (Keen 2008, Duffield 1994, Godschalk 2003, Peters et al 2016, Uexkull 2014). We support the view of theorists such as Pelling and Dill (2006, 2010) in understanding both conflict and disaster as human made events, the result of the interplay of vulnerabilities, political and economic choices, and hazards, which crucially impacts the capacity of communities to deal with such hazards.

We see both events as parts of a “negative cycle” (Vivekananada et al 2014) in which fragility caused by conflict increases vulnerability to climate change and natural hazard related disasters, which in turn reduces human security and increases the likelihood of conflict. According to Nel and Righarts (2008) “natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and medium term, specifically in low- and middle-income countries that have intermediate to high levels of inequality, mixed political regimes, and sluggish economic growth”. Communities affected by conflict are even less able to respond to the impact of a disaster, whilst the effects of disaster on the availability of resources and the resilience of a society can make conflict more likely (see Uexkull's work on drought and conflict (2014), and King and Mutter (2014), Peters (2018) and Siddiqi (2018) for an overview of the coincidence of conflict and disaster). Crucially, we do not see the relationship between conflict and disaster as straightforward causality, but as something more nuanced, rooted in the specificities of the local context. This supports Brzoska's findings that the impact of disaster on conflict produces a “diversity of outcomes” which are, above all, “contingent on the historical and social specifics of individual cases” (Brzoska 2018: 321).

Thirdly, we believe that reconstruction following both disaster and conflict is about more than just rebuilding infrastructure or houses, but about addressing the socio-economic and cultural vulnerabilities and root causes of poverty, injustices and structural inequalities that led to the crisis. This is in keeping with contemporary approaches to both practices, whether through actions associated with PCR such as transitional justice and governance reform, or through the famous mantra of ‘build back better’ that has been so popular in PDR in more recent years. PDR and PCR can be understood as part of a moment of opportunity to rebuild in a transformational way (Pelling and Dill 2006, 2010). Equally, however, it is important to

recognise the multiple transformations that these processes can engender, being variously linked to processes of modernisation (Suhrke 2007), economic liberalisation (Klein 2007) and the introduction of a hegemonic liberal social and political model (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Walch (2018) reminds us that PDR and PCR interventions should not be assumed to be carried out by an inherently benevolent state actor, but by one with its own political aims and agenda which may not chime with the kind of positive or emancipatory transformation envisaged by the likes of Pelling and Dill (2006).

Fourthly, we acknowledge, in a practical sense, that the tasks of PCR and PDR often fall to the same people and institutions from the local level (affected communities), to the national level (governments) and international level (UN architecture, big NGOs, donor governments) (King and Mutter 2014). Although there are significant and important differences between PCR and PDR programming, there is also a great deal of overlap. For example, taking key elements of PCR - security, governance, socio-economic recovery, transitional justice and reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al 2011, Özerdem 2016) – we can identify numerous activities that are common to PDR also (such as the rebuilding of infrastructure, services and housing, return of displaced populations, revitalisation of local employment and livelihoods, for example), although other activities such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, dealing with landmines, trust building between divided communities, are more strictly considered part of the post-conflict reconstruction process alone. As we shall see in this paper, many of the participants we interviewed had been tasked with working on both PCR and PDR processes.

Given these basic – and widely accepted – principles, we might expect to see the two processes being linked more (even despite the well documented problems of coordination within each process). By linked more we mean systematic coordination of projects, sharing of approaches and learning, and the introduction of projects designed to address both issues. To this effect, the conceptualisation of the nexus between PCR and PDR by Harris et al (2013) in the Overseas Development Institute report ‘When disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention’ demonstrates how this could happen in practice, and why it might be a fruitful approach to improving reconstruction outcomes. This forms the starting point for discussions in this paper. Harris et al insist on the links between conflict and disaster, drawing on numerous studies to show how conflict can increase the risk of disaster, and disaster increase the risk of violent conflict, whilst acknowledging that there are no absolute causal links, and that in some cases the inverse might be true. They argue that the integration of frameworks designed to address the aftermath of conflict and disaster would make these links clearer, prevent actions carried out under the aegis of one process from exacerbating tensions in the other (the problem of unintended consequences), and help to identify “points of convergence” (p. 37) where actions to prevent disaster and conflict would be most effective. Harris et al suggest the integration of Disaster

Risk Reduction (DRR) into existing peacebuilding frameworks, and the application of conflict sensitivity into disaster response frameworks as a practical first step in moving towards this kind of integration. Field testing these approaches, underpinned by further rigorous research would, they argue, eventually lead to the development of new tools, methods and a conceptual framework appropriate to engaging effectively with the conflict-disaster nexus. Building on DFID's 'Building Peaceful Societies and Communities Framework', Harris et al (2013:40) propose an adapted version by incorporating the 'natural' disaster components of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda (Figure 1).



Figure 1: Adapted version of DFID's 'Building peaceful states and societies' framework illustrating the 'natural' disaster components of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda (Source: Harris et al 2013, p. 40)



Figure 2: Situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and Release Model (Source: Harris et al 2013, p.41)

In order to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, a number of PDR specific responses are proposed within three key areas - 1. Support inclusive political settlements; 2. Develop core state functions; 3. Respond to public expectations, as possible entry points for the PCR-PDR nexus. Similarly, by situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and Release Model, as seen in Figure 2, Harris et al (2013:41) also explain how natural disasters and risk management could be another entry point for the conceptualisation of the nexus.

The preceding conceptualisation of the PCR-PDR nexus is a helpful tool for framing discussions around the issues of long-term reconstruction and development in communities affected by both armed conflict and disasters. Although some work has been done in translating this into practice, for example through the notion of conflict sensitivity in programming such as the Humanitarian Practice Network guidelines, this has been patchy at best and, as we shall see later, counter-productive at worst. Therefore, one of the driving forces of this research project was to ask whether it is feasible and/or desirable to integrate conflict transformational approaches to PDR or disaster risk reduction strategies through PCR activities; whether the arguments proposed by researchers in favour of linking these processes are being reflected or adopted by practitioners on the ground; and what sort of questions factor into decision making around whether or not to pursue work that focusses on the PCR-PDR nexus.

3. Material and Methods

With this in mind we carried out research with policy makers and expert practitioners in three places that had been subject to both post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction processes, and crucially where there had been a level of overlap between these activities, albeit with different sequencing of the events – Banda Aceh (Indonesia), Nepal and Sri Lanka. These three sites were chosen as “critical cases” (Flyvberg, 2006: 230) that would enable an in-depth and contextualised investigation into the coincidence of PDR and PCR processes. Both Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka were severely affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26/12/04, and in both locations this disaster overwhelmingly hit regions already suffering the effects of protracted civil conflict. However, the two cases diverge in their experiences after the tsunami. In Banda Aceh the disaster effectively ended the war, meaning that PDR and PCR processes were carried out simultaneously (although ultimately for different durations). In Sri Lanka the conflict reignited in 2008 (eventually leading to a military victory for the Sri Lankan government), meaning that a period of PDR was then followed by a period of PCR, with some overlap between them. By contrast, in Nepal this sequence was reversed. The country’s decade of civil war came to an end in 2006, kickstarting PCR activities which were ongoing when the first of two massive earthquakes hit in April 2015. Here a significant PDR programme has followed on the heels on PCR activities, overlapping in some respects (as discussed in detail below). Crucially, these three cases share important features that make for a valid comparison; all were affected by civil conflict between a state and non-state actor, all were subject to a large scale natural hazard related disaster, and all engaged with the international community in responding to both conflict and disaster. It is these similarities in context and differences in sequencing that make these case studies particularly pertinent for this investigation, and has given an unique opportunity to this project to provide a comparative analysis by focussing on the following three main questions: Firstly, are links being made and exploited between PCR and PDR in these cases? Put another way - is there an appetite for this approach? Secondly, what are the key factors in decision making by those stakeholders who attempt to implement this approach, and those who do not? And finally, what are the effects of coordination – or lack thereof – of these policies and programmes?

Over the course of three periods of fieldwork in 2017 the research team carried out 57 interviews with 85 people. Since this research is mainly interested with the formation and implementation of PDR and PCR projects at the policy level, we sought to engage with policy makers and high level practitioners – these were mainly based in the capital cities of Kathmandu, Colombo and Jakarta, as well as Banda Aceh, the regional capital of Aceh. These participants were drawn from government agencies and ministries, United Nations bodies and other international organisations, local, national and international NGOs, representatives of donor governments, academic institutions and research organisations. We carried out

semi-structured interviews with participants, generally lasting between 45 – 60 minutes (the shortest was 33 minutes, and the longest 1 hr 45 minutes). Interviews were all carried out in English. During field research, the team undertook initial analysis of early interviews to ensure that the questions being put to respondents were effective at eliciting information and appropriate to the context, and to discuss the addition of supplementary questions related to key ideas that had emerged in early interviews. Following field research, verbatim transcripts of these interviews, along with key policy documents and field notes, were interrogated using a thematic analysis approach, enabling the research team to identify and refine key themes to develop from the data. The consistency of themes was tested through a process of triangulation of sources, in which the research team examined whether the same ideas or concerns were being expressed by respondents from different backgrounds, in different settings or referring to different time frames (Patton 1999). This approach reflected the research team's commitment to techniques based in grounded theory, which allows themes to emerge from the data rather than applying a preconceived model or framework to it. Particular care was taken to adopt a self-reflexive approach to the research, identifying and critically engaging with some of our own assumptions (such as the notion that PCR and PDR should be linked) throughout our interviews. The paper also draws on one author's previous research trips to earthquake affected Nepal in 2016, Sri Lanka in 1999, 2001 and 2002 (whilst the conflict was ongoing), and Indonesia in 2016. This provided valuable context during the research process, though the analysis in this paper is based on the interviews detailed above.

4. Results

So, is there appetite for these links to be exploited, or is it asking too much of practitioners already overburdened with the difficult task of implementing PDR and PCR programmes? Our research suggests that the majority of practitioners we engaged with are interested in linking the two, but that concerns remain about how feasible this would be. When asked if it was expecting too much of PDR practitioners to think about conflict, for example, the answer was quite clear that the people implementing these projects see the overlaps between conflict and disaster work, and the importance of acknowledging these, but struggle to put this into practice. As the former head of one international organisation's disaster response put it, when questioned in Jakarta about the feasibility of expecting post-disaster reconstruction actors to address conflict drivers, "No, asking that question is not problematic, doing it is problematic".² Another donor government representative in Kathmandu complained of a "gap

² Interview with regional organisation representative, 03/11/17, Jakarta.

in the research” that had left them scrambling to find information about the conflict-disaster nexus when the earthquake hit.³

In fact, in many cases participants (particularly those speaking from a PDR perspective) revealed that they were already attempting to use their activities to address social and political issues, and in some cases conflict related questions. For example, Nepal’s Post Disaster Reconstruction Framework clearly identifies a set of actions related to improving gender equality and inclusion, crucial issues addressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the civil war. In Sri Lanka respondents described several projects implemented after the tsunami that explicitly sought to address issues such as intercommunal relations that were explicitly linked to the conflict, such as intercommunal building projects (Clarke, Fanany and Kenny 2010). In Banda Aceh – where the simultaneous timing of the tsunami and the end of the civil war made us most likely to encounter linked projects – a high ranking representative of the BRR (the agency tasked with overseeing post-disaster reconstruction) explained that although he did not have the authority to undertake large scale infrastructure projects for conflict victims, he found other ways to channel support to the PCR process. As he explained “I cannot build houses for everybody, for sure, but I can provide them with some money for capacity building, like papaya [farming]”.⁴

However, it is important to recognise that these cases were often ad hoc, and took place within frameworks that quite deliberately kept the agencies and activities separate. This is partly because there is a widespread perception that the mandates and activities of post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction are fundamentally different from one another – “totally separate” in the words of one Nepali participant.⁵ Often, the PCR activities were perceived as inherently ‘political’, and the PDR activities as fundamentally ‘apolitical’. This concern was shared by another DRR specialist working with an international organisation, who warned that combining PDR and PCR was “Like eating ice cream with steak – you can do one after another, but not eating them together”.⁶ Similarly in Nepal, government representatives expressed concern that linking the two processes would risk slowing down the PDR by introducing the political wrangling that had characterised much of the PCR process in that country.

Another important concern raised was the risk that asking PCR practitioners to build disaster risk reduction strategies into their work – and vice versa - would result in this being demoted to a ‘tick box’ exercise in what is already a highly challenging work environment. One international donor representative in Indonesia (a veteran of PDR and PCR in numerous loca-

³ Interview with donor government representative, Kathmandu, 14/02/17

⁴ Interview with government representative, Jakarta, 03/11/17.

⁵ Interview with Representative of the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, Kathmandu, 07/02/17

⁶ Interview with regional organisation representative, 03/11/17, Jakarta.


tions for more than two decades) also made a compelling case for why these are separate. He argued that organisations generally “lack the human resource that can work effectively on both issues”, and that whilst linking the two processes may be academically or theoretically possible, this is not the case “in reality”, warning that practitioners had already been asked to consider a range of lenses such as climate change and gender, and asking them to do more may not make the process more effective.⁷ Indeed, the fear that attempts to coordinate PCR and PDR activities would, in practice, become a largely procedural exercise rather than a transformational approach represents a significant reason preventing integrated approaches to these challenges. This mirrors concerns raised about previous attempts to mainstream concerns such as gender, which have often been criticized as becoming a “formalistic exercise” (Meier and Celis 2011).

Taking this into account, we can see that a tension exists here. On the one hand, there appears to be a widespread understanding on the part of practitioners that there is a logic to linking these two processes, and that to a certain extent this is already happening, as we shall explore in the next section. Participants in this research repeatedly told us they wanted to learn more about how this could be possible. At the same time, however, there is a real fear that linking the two may slow down vital processes, and put stress on already overburdened systems. One important finding that is important to note here is that this interest seemed to flow in one direction. PDR practitioners were generally interested in finding ways to integrate conflict dynamics into their work, but PCR practitioners were far less prepared to talk about how to build disaster resilient systems and communities in the wake of conflict. In other words, in practice the two processes are largely understood and practiced as separate. There is some overlap between them, as touched upon above, and the next section will explore the different types of overlap and separation produced in each case.

⁷ Interview with donor government representative, Jakarta, 04/11/17.

Extent of links between the processes so far

Nepal




The huge earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015 took place less than a decade after the end of the war that had raged for 10 years in the country, pitting the state against a Maoist insurgency in a conflict that would eventually claim around 13,000 deaths and displace up to 150,000 people in the country. Following the adopting of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 (and the end of the monarchy), a programme of physical, political and social reconstruction began, with varying degrees of success. In Nepal PCR and PDR processes are seen as completely separate – particularly by the main government stakeholders. A central theme to emerge from speaking with local stakeholders in Nepal was the sense that the government, and perhaps some members of the international community, are attempting to draw a line under the post-conflict peacebuilding phase of Nepal’s history and definitively move the focus to the earthquake reconstruction by framing PDR as wholly separate from PCR and entirely apolitical. A striking example of this was the way the country’s new constitution was swiftly adopted in the aftermath of the earthquake. This is despite the fact that numerous elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remain to be implemented, and central issues in the conflict, such as citizenship and minority rights, continue to cause serious political unrest (see the violent Madhesi protests in 2015). What is more, conflict dynamics and unresolved PCR issues around representation have serious consequences for PDR. For example, the instability that has characterized Nepal’s national politics has been a key factor in preventing the National Reconstruction Agency from working effectively (as discussed in greater detail in section 5) (Harrowell and Özerdem 2018). The inclusion of gender equality in the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and Post Disaster Reconstruction Framework (PDRF) is one example of this.

Similarly, concerns about the impact of reconstruction and relief programmes on social cohesion and social justice were expressed by many stakeholders, including government representatives. The proposed solutions for this varied wildly, however, with government stakeholders telling us they favoured a “blanket approach” to reconstruction, where all affected

parties received the same support regardless of caste, gender or ethnicity.⁸ Such an approach reflected the belief that the earthquake “did not recognise who is well off, who is poor, who is marginalised”, and that introducing targeted programming that did recognise these differences risked provoking Nepal’s already turbulent experience of identity politics.⁹ However, other actors were quick to point out that the earthquake had actually produced highly uneven effects, hitting the most marginalised groups worst. By not acknowledging these inequalities – the very same that drove the civil war – in their PDR programme, participants from every background (with the notable exception of Nepali government representatives) worried that the government risks exacerbating them.

Even if the government wished to keep PDR processes separate from the concerns of PCR, and therefore free from what is perceived to be an inherently political process, this has not been a success. PDR in Nepal has been repeatedly hampered by its political context – the body tasked with overseeing the PDR process, the National Reconstruction Authority, has already changed leadership four times since it was established in 2015 – as each new Government seeks to install its own candidate at the head of an important public body. The politicisation of PDR extends to the point of delivery, where political parties jockeyed to include their supporters on beneficiary lists and were often clearly linked with NGOs delivering projects (as one interviewee noted “everyone has their list in their pocket. They come with their own list”).¹⁰ As Hillhorst and Jansen (2010) note, this is indicative of both the strategies employed by aid recipients to obtain resources (and amply demonstrates the oft overlooked agency of these groups) as well as the stubbornly political nature of actions and actors in the “humanitarian space”.

Sri Lanka



For almost three decades, Sri Lanka suffered a devastating conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who sought to establish an independent state for the large ethnic Tamil community in the north and east of the country.

⁸ Interview with Representative of the National Reconstruction Authority, Kathmandu, 06/02/17.

⁹ Interview with Nepali NGO representative, Kathmandu, 09/02/17.

¹⁰ Interview with Nepali NGO representative, Kathmandu, 07/02/17.

This brutal conflict, which claimed between 80,000 – 100,000 lives, was eventually brought to an end through the outright military victory of the Sri Lankan state in 2009. Throughout this period, projects carried out as part of development aid, PCR and PDR have become enmeshed as they have been used to address problems outside their usual scope. Development aid, and funds for proposed post-conflict reconstruction in particular, had long been used to incentivise negotiations following the 2002 ceasefire by offering the possibility of a peace dividend (Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007). A number of post-tsunami projects were designed with the aim of preventing conflict or help war-affected communities. Post-conflict reconstruction being carried out in the east via the Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Awakening) programme, began whilst war was still ongoing in the North, and both this and the subsequent Uthuru Vasanthaya (Northern Spring) programmes targeted the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure that had themselves been built as part of the disaster response.

However, attempts to use PDR to work towards conflict transformation after the tsunami produced unintended consequences. The post-tsunami reconstruction effort was overwhelmingly led by international actors, and highlighted a number of elements familiar to liberal interventionist paradigms, for example using participatory reconstruction methods and community involvement in housing reconstruction, and the guiding mantra of ‘build back better’ (see Korf 2005, Amarasiri de Silva 2009, Mannakkara and Wilson 2013, Kennedy et al 2008). Crucially, this also included attempts to use reconstruction projects to address conflict drivers, both at a local level (for example, by applying ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches to reconstruction or bringing different groups to work together on building projects) and at the national level, through negotiations around the P-TOMS mechanism. The Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was intended to coordinate responses to the tsunami between the national government and LTTE, though the international community also had clear hopes that this would kick start the stalling peace process. Although a Memorandum of Understanding for P-TOMS was signed in 2005, the mechanism provoked the anger of nationalist politicians who felt it legitimised the LTTE (Hyndman 2009). Instead of providing an opportunity for peace, the failure of P-TOMS and impact of the ‘aid tsunami’ paved the way for the victory of the nationalist Mahinda Rajapaksa in the Presidential elections of 2005, signalling a return to open war (Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007, Goodhand 2010).

In contrast, the process of PCR has swung in the opposite direction (though not as far as some might think). The Eastern Awakening and Northern Spring programmes paid little attention to participatory methods and was instead frequently military led, and characterised by a focus on infrastructure, swift economic development and consolidating central control over the territory. This process was tightly controlled by the government, with far less leeway granted to NGOs and international organisations (Ruwanpura 2017, Goodhand 2012, Hoglund and Orjuela 2012, 2011, Walton 2012). Interestingly many of the activities, such as

transitional justice, reconciliation or security sector reform, that might usually be associated with reconstruction after war, (Özerdem and Lee, 2016), did not feature significantly in the Rajapaksa government's approach. Whilst the space for 'traditional' humanitarian actors to engage in post-conflict reconstruction programming appeared much reduced, Sri Lanka instead turned to governments such as China and India, viewing them as donors less likely to impose human rights conditionalities to any loans they provide. As one interviewee noted wryly "they [the government] will go for easy money like if China is giving us one billion without much hassle they will try to take that rather than apply to ADB and going through all the monitoring assessment".¹¹ This reflects other analysis of so-called 'new humanitarian actors', which highlights a growing preference among these donors for direct channeling of funds to governments (rather than via international organisations) and less emphasis on conditionalities (Sezgin and Dijkzeul 2015).

However, whilst it is clear that PCR work has been more tightly controlled by the national government - perhaps a lesson learned from the massive influx of actors following the tsunami - our research shows that the post-conflict reconstruction that has taken place since 2009 should also be understood as more than simply a backlash of the national authorities against international intervention. The Presidential Task Force (or PTF) was established in May 2009 to oversee programmes to resettle IDPs, and rebuild the economic and social infrastructure of conflict affected areas. This body was emblematic of the way the government approach to and oversight of reconstruction following the war. In effect, all proposals for reconstruction work in the North and East of the country passed through this body, which demonstrated a marked preference for the so-called 'soft' elements of reconstruction (such as work on rights or reconciliation) rather than the provision of 'hard' infrastructure, according to many NGO representatives we interviewed. It is important to recognise that whilst this body limited the autonomy of INGOs and international organisations such as the UN to act as they did in the PDR process, they were still able to implement projects, so long as these did not fall outside the remit defined by the PTF.


One intriguing exception to this noted by representatives of two NGOs and one research institute, and echoed by a JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) representative, was the idea of the "Japanese model", which they saw as demonstrating a "greater degree of tolerance of difficult stakeholders".¹² This was seen as having enabled Japan to continue to participate in the kinds of PCR activities that other actors had been warned away from, including 'soft' initiatives such as grassroots capacity building. A representative of JICA detailed the steps they had taken, including adding partners from the majority Sinhalese south of the country, adjusting terminology ("emergent regions" rather than "conflict affected"), and

¹¹ Interview with academic, Colombo, 20/04/17.

¹² Interview with academic, Colombo, 21/04/17.

drawing on a long held relationship of trust with the Sri Lankan government, in order to maintain their programming in the North.¹³ Once again, this demonstrates that the field of humanitarian intervention is far from homogenous, rather being characterised by “a reality of institutional multiplicity (...) often leading to collective action dilemmas” and refusing to conform to neat binaries of local-international, or ‘new’ versus ‘traditional’ donors (Sezgin and Dijkzeul 2015: 339).

Banda Aceh



In the case of Banda Aceh PDR and PCR processes happened largely at same time, since the tsunami effectively ended the conflict, leading to its characterisation by many interviewees as a “blessing in disguise”.¹⁴ Until that moment Aceh had been locked in a conflict between the Indonesian state and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) who, since 1976, had fought for the province’s right to secede from Indonesia, leaving around 15,000 people dead. Accordingly, many respondents recalled UN Special Envoy Bill Clinton’s famous words on Aceh “there is no reconstruction without peace”. One Acehnese interviewee, now working for an international organisation, recalled that there were hopes in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami that these processes would be integrated, and that this was spurred on by the government’s decision to categorise the whole province as disaster affected, rather than just the coastal zone.

Given the timing of the two processes, we expected to see the most cross-over here, but in fact the picture was more complicated. Officially, these two processes were still carried out by separate institutions - the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) for PDR and the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA) for PCR. These organisations had separate remits and political structures, with one (the BRR) reporting to the President’s office in Jakarta and the other to the newly established Acehnese provincial government. They also had separate budgets, and approaches. Whilst the BRR was quite widely lauded for having employed a transparent

¹³ Interview with donor government, Colombo, 20/04/17.

¹⁴ Interview with international organization, Jakarta, 02/11/17; Interview with former BRA representative, Banda Aceh, 26/10/17; Interview with academics, Banda Aceh, 27/10/17.

approach with relatively little corruption,¹⁵ there were repeated concerns that the BRA had become something of a political fiefdom and resource for ex GAM combatants.¹⁶ The BRR had at its disposal far more funds than the BRA, following the massive international aid effort in response to the tsunami. The former heads of the BRA and BRR confirmed this separation to us, noting that it stemmed from the political structure of the institutions – one former BRA head explained “BRA under the governor; BRR under the President. This is very clear, that’s very clear – there is no mixture, no mixture”.¹⁷ They all reported that there were no formal coordination meetings between the two institutions, let alone joint programmes.

However, another picture emerged through speaking with individuals and organisations tasked with implementing reconstruction programmes at that time. In spite of this institutional and political separation, there was a widespread recognition of the necessity of working across this divide, and of the opportunity this presented both for consolidating the peace process and ensuring that the post-disaster reconstruction could be fully carried out. Participants saw this as important for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was a recognition that the PDR process – with its influx of foreign money and aid workers – could quite easily be derailed by a flare-up in the conflict. Secondly, practitioners were concerned at the potential for conflict between both sets of victims, if one were to be perceived as receiving large amounts of support when others received nothing. Thirdly, there was a recognition that some people had been affected by both events, particularly due to population displacement and the economic impacts of the disaster. In response to these concerns, our research revealed numerous cases where work was done under the aegis of the post-disaster reconstruction to support conflict victims. In some cases, this represents the policy choice of smaller organisations who operated outside the framework of the BRR and were able to make the case to their funders that work on a conflict that was previously relatively unknown on the international stage was necessary. As one international NGO representative explained, they had shied away from working purely with tsunami affected communities out of a concern that this would spark tensions between different types of victims (i.e. conflict affected, tsunami affected), and would overlook the support that conflict-affected villages in the interior were providing to those fleeing Banda Aceh, which was less affected by the conflict but had borne the brunt of the tsunami. At the heart of this approach was the quite simple idea that “it’s very important for the post-tsunami folks to have peace”, so programmes should also address this.¹⁸

¹⁵ Interview with academics, Banda Aceh, 27/10/17; Interview with international organization representative, Jakarta, 20/10/17; Interview with local researchers, Banda Aceh, 31/10/. Interview with local researcher, Jakarta, 22/10/17.

¹⁶ Interview with local researcher, Jakarta, 22/10/17

¹⁷ Interview with former BRA representative, Banda Aceh, 26/10/17.

¹⁸ Interview with international organisation representative, Jakarta, 03/11/17.

By contrast, the BRR had to take a more circumspect approach to supporting work related to post-conflict, because of the political context of the two organisations. As one former senior representative put it “I’m in charge for reconstruction of post-tsunami, I’m not in charge for the peacebuilding, so that’s, what do you call it, the China Wall that you cannot pass because these are politics and these politics are under the vice-President. ... I have to do something with that peace, because I want my reconstruction project to be successful. That is actually the base of the whole conceptual idea. But because of the China Wall I have to do it in a very low profile way sometimes in a subversive approach”.¹⁹

5. Discussion: Factors in decision making

Reading across the three cases above, it becomes clear that there are striking similarities as well as important divergences between their experiences of PDR and PCR. The experiences of these three critical cases highlight a number of barriers which prevent greater integration of PDR and PCR processes, or explain why attempts to do this have not been widely successful so far. The following section will explore these with reference to the ‘entry points’ identified by Harris et al (2013). These areas can be identified as the nature of the conflict settlement, political considerations and institutional responses, and meeting public expectations through the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory.

Short termism and lack of institutional memory

In all three sites, participants from a wide range of organisations identified a high turnover of staff at the national and international level as being a key factor that prevented more knowledge sharing and joint programming between PCR and PDR activities.²⁰ At times this was explained as the result of political alternation (for example the constant churn in the NRA and Ministry of Peace in Nepal). In other cases, participants pointed to the need for local and international NGOs to chase funding, leading to projects being sidelined once the issue was no longer in the limelight. Linked to this, several interviewees raised the difficulty of keeping policy makers and communities engaged with the importance of some work, such as DRR, as the memory and perception of risk faded, and other more immediate needs took precedence.

¹⁹ Interview with government representative, Jakarta, 03/11/17.

²⁰ Interview with NGO representative, Colombo, 12/04/17; Interview with academic, Colombo, 21/04/17; Interview with NGO representative, Colombo, 19/04/17; Interview with local researchers, Banda Aceh, 31/10/17; Interview with NGO representative and academic, Kathmandu, 08/02/17.

Another point frequently raised was the nature of international organisations and NGOs, with their highly mobile international workforce perceived as rarely settling in one country for more than a few years, instead rarely staying for longer than the duration of their particular project. This could be characterised as the challenge of the ‘programme versus process’ approach, where the imperative of meeting the requirements of projects and programmes in post-crisis contexts (particularly regarding accountability to donors, and monitoring and evaluation) can undermine the goals of the longer-term reconstruction process. As Krause so eloquently notes “the pursuit of the good project develops a logic of its own that shapes the allocation of resources and the kind of activities we see independently of external resources but also relatively independently of beneficiaries’ needs and preferences” (Krause 2014: 4). This was strongly expressed by one longstanding Sri Lankan humanitarian worker, who complained that the sector had changed significantly in his lifetime, saying “every agency’s number one priority is to ensure that they are compliant with their contract. NGO headquarters will make sure that becomes their priority because you mess up here, you won’t get your funding in Liberia. So all these headquarters their main thing is risk management. So I see over the years, how have lost space, although the jargon is about more participatory, but in real practice we are less.”²¹ This growing preoccupation with risk management has been noted by researchers such as Duffield (2010) who have explored its impact on everything from the spatial organisation of aid interventions to the choice of implementing partners. On the ground such a context has a very real impact on staff capabilities and willingness to explore beyond the box and being able to undertake innovative approaches to link PCR and PDR.

These factors combine to make it highly difficult to maintain an effective institutional memory, meaning that even when there is an appetite for sharing learning between PCR and PDR activities, the knowledge has often been difficult to access.²² It also highlights one of the dangers of privileging international knowledge and capacity over the local, since it is inevitable that international attention will, eventually, move on to the next crisis.²³ To be sure, institutional memory and staff turnover is also a challenge at the local level, particularly when this is exacerbated by what Scheper et al have termed ‘poaching’ of local staff by international organisations (2006:10). And yet despite these challenges, local organisations and the individuals that work for them generally have a longer term commitment to their own communities than external organisations. Affected communities are both the first to respond to crises and at the centre of long term reconstruction and mitigation efforts (Scheper et al 2006). Recent scholarship focussing on the interplay between PDR and PCR in Sri Lanka has highlighted how important local knowledges and power dynamics are in setting

²¹ Interview with NGO representative, Colombo, 12/14/17.

²² Interview with International organization representative, Kathmandu, 06/02/2017; Interview with international organization representative, Jakarta, 20/10/17. Interview with international organisation representative, Colombo, 17/04/17; Interview with government representatives, Colombo, 11/04/17.

²³ See Loquercio (2006) for a richer discussion of some of the factors that contribute to staff turnover at the international level.

the agenda in reconstruction, and how often this is overlooked in current scholarship (Harrowell and Özerdem 2018). To return to the ‘points of entry’ for integrating PDR and PCR processes identified in the ODI report, there is clear potential here. PCR and peacebuilding activities aimed at improving core state functions and responding to public expectations should address this lack of institutional memory. Moreover, if they wish to pursue an approach to reconstruction that links PCR and PDR, international humanitarian actors and, in particular, donors (who represent a highly significant actor in these situations) should take steps to ensure that their expectations and the timescales they work to do not create a culture of short termism. Instead they should support the development of an institutional memory of reconstruction practices that could serve as the bedrock of an integrated framework for reconstruction.

Politics, institutions and coordination

There is an understandable sense of urgency in the aftermath of a crisis, and many participants stressed the need to move swiftly to address pressing problems following a conflict or disaster. This was often presented as a compelling reason for not trying to further integrate PCR and PDR work – there were real worries that trying to combine other elements into an already highly challenging process would make it too slow, thus failing to meet public expectations of a swift response. To quote a representative of one international donor country in Jakarta, “more lenses don’t necessarily mean more clarity”.²⁴ Previous research has demonstrated difficulties in integrating other “lenses” such as gender within the humanitarian and aid sectors (Tiessen 2007), and shown how the ‘projectised’ nature of much international humanitarian and development aid has often stood in the way of coordination between different approaches (Leader and Colenso 2005). There is also a legitimate concern about the types of politics that might be introduced to PDR through linking with it PCR. After all, some researchers and practitioners emphasise the importance of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ – seen as neutral, impartial and independent – as a hallmark of post-disaster interventions (and humanitarianism more widely) which is being undermined by being linked to political aims such as peacebuilding (De Torrente 2004, Rieff 2003, von Schreeb 2018). Whilst our research has demonstrated both an appetite from practitioners to explore linkages between PCR and PDR processes in the hope of improving reconstruction outcomes, it is important to ask whether these potential benefits advanced by researchers such as Harris et al do in fact outweigh the possible risks. Certainly in the case of Aceh, it was repeatedly suggested that the formal separation of the institution responsible for PDR (the BRR) from that responsible for PCR (the BRA) was a key factor that enabled the BRR to carry out its work, effectively insulating it from local politics and absolving it of formal responsibility for addressing conflict dynamics. Similarly, in Nepal numerous stakeholders expressed their concerns that post-earthquake reconstruction - already heavily criticised for being slow to deliver - would

²⁴ Interview with donor government representative, Jakarta, 04/11/17.

be further delayed if the process was also asked to deliver peacebuilding aims, and that these two areas were too different to one another to make for easy integration under one programme of works.

Therefore, in all three cases there were strong pressures being exerted from a political standpoint to keep the PDR and PCR processes, and the institutions responsible for these processes, separate. More than a third of respondents in this research referred to a purposeful separating of PDR and PCR programmes in their context, at least from an institutional or theoretical standpoint. This is interesting, given that in the models proposed by Harris et al (2013) it is precisely this political standpoint that offers an avenue for integration – either by recognising the role of “Social structures, political systems and governance mechanisms” (41) in creating disaster vulnerability, or the opportunity to embed disaster risk reduction strategies within inclusive political settlements in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. In practice, it appears these ‘points of entry’ have not produced the outcomes so far that that Harris et al suggest they could facilitate. As described in the previous section in Aceh there was a strong distinction between the BRR – tasked with post-tsunami reconstruction and under the authority of the national President, and the BRA – responsible for post-conflict activities and answering to the regional Governor. Although, as we have seen, there was in fact a level of work carried out by the BRR in the sphere of PCR, and there were links between the two institutions – one BRA head actually sat on the board of the BRR as the Rector of a local university - these were ad hoc and under the radar. In fact, at times there were significant tensions between the two organisations, as BRA representatives dismissed the BRR as outsiders (with one disparaging the airport built by the BRR as in particularly colourful language).²⁵ From the other perspective, numerous respondents reflected that the lack of engagement with the BRA was a blessing for the BRA since it allowed them to swiftly pursue their aims without becoming “bogged down” in local politics.²⁶

In Nepal, there was no collaboration or experience sharing whatsoever between the National Reconstruction Authority and the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, the bodies tasked with overseeing post-earthquake and post-conflict reconstruction respectively. Representatives of both bodies underlined that it was the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction’s job to rebuild the public buildings damaged in the conflict and to oversee DDR and transitional justice programmes, and the NRA’s job to focus on the private property, the houses, destroyed by the earthquake. This was part of a wider narrative affirmed by the government, that PDR activities were completely unconnected to the political issues of the conflict, and that the work of the NRA (and anyone else engaged in PDR) should focus on infrastructure provision and housing, rather than capacity building or other politically focussed activities. Indeed, the

²⁵ Interview with former BRA senior representative, Banda Aceh, 26/10/17.

²⁶ Interview with international organisation representative, Jakarta, 20/10/17.

cases of Nepal and Aceh seem to strongly support Siddiqi's assertion that "leaving the politics out when studying disasters in conflict areas is the 'politics of disasters'" (2018).

In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the two types of reconstruction became strongly identified with two different visions of politics. As discussed above, the post-tsunami reconstruction was strongly identified with a liberal international and interventionist mode of politics, with a strong role for the international community and a focus on inclusive and participatory practices of reconstruction. Led by the Rajapaksa government, the PCR process was positioned as a definitive break from this approach, an authoritarian model of reconstruction with a leading role for the military and little room for the kind of 'soft' rights based projects widely seen during the PDR. Although the separation of PDR and PCR from one another is often used by government and other institutional stakeholders as a way of obscuring the political nature of post-disaster activities, what is striking about the Sri Lankan case is that it does precisely opposite, highlighting the response to the tsunami as part of a political discourse his nationalist government had rejected. However, despite their differences all three cases seem some way away from the integration proposed in Harris et al's framework.

The nature of the conflict settlement

There is a general belief that the type of reconstruction that takes place in a country or community can be predicted by the type of conflict settlement that preceded it, particularly with reference to post-conflict reconstruction (Barash and Webel, 2009; Cox and Sisk, 2017). That is to say, if there is a negotiated political settlement, then the reconstruction process is assumed to be more consensus based, participatory and inclusive. If the conflict has ended through an outright military victory, then the reconstruction that follows would be less likely to adopt these approaches. Intervention by an external power, whether unilateral or mandated by an international organisation, might be assumed to usher in its own brand of reconstruction. These three cases complicate such assumptions. They show that conflict settlements do impact reconstruction processes, but not necessarily in the way we might expect. In fact, they show that other characteristics and qualities play a significant role such as the political navigation of different actors, good leadership by individuals and institutions and the nature of the political space created by the conflict settlement. For example, in Sri Lanka – we would have expected to see in the PCR process a rejection of the participatory methods and international leadership that characterised PDR there, as the government was emboldened by its victory over the Tamil Tigers, and did not feel the need to make any concessions to what it perceived as Western liberal values in its reconstruction process. This was certainly what we witnessed to a large extent. However, as discussed above, our research also shows that the process was as closed to the international sphere as is often thought,

and issues such as trust also played an important role in determining how reconstruction was carried out.

In our other two case studies – where in both cases violent conflict was brought to an end through the signing of negotiated settlements – we might have expected to see more of an openness to taking a flexible approach, and working across PDR and PCR divides. Again, as we have seen above, this is not so clear cut. In Aceh, where the conflict settlement could be characterised as a win-win, with Aceh gaining autonomy and the Indonesian state disentangling itself from this long running conflict but maintaining territorial integrity. The reconstruction process mirrored this settlement to a large extent, with each party to the peace agreement taking responsibility for overseeing one element of the reconstruction process separately, with very little formal coordination or crossover between the two, even though this might have been expected given the timing of the two processes. In Nepal the Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought about a definitive end to the old order, with the institution of a Constituent Assembly, the inclusion of the rebel Maoists into mainstream politics and the dissolution of the monarchy. But the new contours of governance in Nepal have not yet been fully realised, and Nepalese politics is defined by instability and short termism. This space of political uncertainty has strongly affected the post disaster reconstruction process. The NRA has been hamstrung by the removal and reinstatement of politically affiliated appointees at its head. As one interviewee memorably put it, the NRA is ‘directly co-constituted with the post-conflict politics’, which is the politics of constant alternation.

These three cases put paid to the idea that there is a direct correlation between the kind of conflict settlement and the type of reconstruction that follows. However, it is of vital importance to acknowledge the contextually specific and long lasting ways in which the political dynamics of the conflict and post-conflict affect the way both PDR and PCR are carried out. This supports Harris et al’s (2013: 39) emphasis on the importance of contextual analysis, actor mapping and detailed analysis of the dynamics of the conflict-disaster interface in specific settings, in order to effectively integrate PDR and PCR initiatives. This would lead to the development of contextually specific DRR sensitive post-conflict interventions, and conflict sensitive post-disaster initiatives – the first steps in bringing the two practices into closer dialogue. In this our findings support that of other recent work in this field that seeks to advance a more nuanced vision of the conflict-disaster nexus and how it impacts on policy decisions (see, for example, Field’s recent work on “divided disasters” in the Philippines (2018)).

6. Conclusions

This research presents a mixed picture overall of the extent to which post-conflict reconstruction and post-disaster reconstruction processes are currently being linked in practice. The situation is revealed to be diverse, multi-layered and strongly informed by its context, with practices often differing between local, national and international actors, formal and informal engagement, and strongly affected by the local political context (often a product of the conflict settlement). As set out at the beginning of this paper, there is a significant and growing body of work within academic literature that recognises the conflict-disaster nexus, and suggests that PCR and PDR interventions could be improved by placing this nexus at the heart of their approach. According to the paradigm adopted by Harris et al, this could be achieved by on the one hand, adopting conflict sensitive approaches to DRR that take into account the way conflict drivers contribute to disaster risks, and on the other “recognising the role of natural hazards in igniting and exacerbating conflict, investing in natural disaster mitigation and prevention as a form of upstream conflict prevention and addressing the impacts of natural disasters as part of conflict prevention and peace- building initiatives” (Harris et al 2013: 40). This would represent the first step in developing a specific conceptual framework that could enable an integrated approach to PDR and PCR.

Keeping this in mind, our research can offer a number of useful reflections on how far such an approach is currently being adopted, and what barriers remain to this. Firstly, there was a widely (though not universally) held belief amongst practitioners, policy makers and researchers interviewed, that the links between PDR and PCR should be better understood and integrated into reconstruction practice. Indeed, it is increasingly acknowledged that it simply is not feasible to treat the two as entirely separate if the interdependent challenges facing communities in the wake of conflict and disaster are to be effectively addressed. Respondents in all three sites described how failing to take into account the interactions between conflict and disaster dynamics had led to tensions between disaster and conflict affected communities, and the double marginalisation of vulnerable groups such as women or minorities. However, in the three case studies examined during this research project, we see that in practice PDR and PCR processes are in fact normally conceived of and carried out as formally separate. Where crossover between the two processes does take place, this is often on an ad hoc basis, as a result of local leadership and personalities (for example, as was the case in Banda Aceh). In Sri Lanka, the only case where there was a more concerted effort to use PDR efforts to address peacebuilding aims following the tsunami, these actions produced unexpected outcomes. Perhaps most interestingly, where interest was expressed in working across the PCR-PDR divide, this overwhelmingly came from policy makers and practitioners working from a disaster perspective. These actors seemed much more ready to integrate a consideration of conflict into their work, whereas those focussing on post-conflict issues expressed less interest in building a disaster sensitive element into their interventions. It seems one ‘point of entry’ to integrating the two spheres is more receptive to such an initiative than the other.

Although our research has further underlined the importance of understanding the interrelated nature of conflict and disaster in order to respond to either phenomenon more effectively, it also shows that significant barriers exist to this on the ground. By focussing on the experiences of Aceh, Sri Lanka and Nepal we have shown that PCR or PDR processes are influenced in significant ways by other reconstruction processes that preceded them (or, in the case of Aceh, that ran concurrently). In short, these responses are contextually specific and that context is innately political. This is why recent academic research suggests so strongly that the two processes be brought into closer dialogue with each other (Harris et al 2013, Siddiqi 2018, Peters 2018, King and Mutter 2014). And yet this research again shows a tension between this aim and the reality on the ground. These case studies highlight a number of factors that prevent the two processes from being further integrated. Notably, in practical terms, interviewees highlighted a problematic lack of institutional memory in all cases, that prevented lessons being learned and links being made between PDR and PCR processes occurring across different timeframes. This is exacerbated by the waves of international actors that arrive in the aftermath of a crisis, and then move on a few years later. There is also a serious concern that asking PDR to address conflict issues, or PCR to advance disaster resilience, risks slowing down both processes, and overloading actors on the ground who are already struggling to deliver their aims.

Perhaps the largest obstacle to linking these two processes, however, remained the thorny question of 'politicisation'. That is, the idea that issues related to peace and conflict should be kept separate from issues related to disaster, to prevent the latter from being politicised (and thus delayed or complicated). This was the most commonly articulated concern expressed during the course of this research, and is clearly a very real worry in the minds of policy makers and practitioners. Such a concern should not be dismissed lightly. And yet to deny the links between disaster and conflict does not make them go away - in fact, as Siddiqi (2018) reminds us, denying the politics of the disaster is in itself a political act. It seems unlikely that integrated approaches to PDR and PCR will be widely adopted if this tension remains unresolved. The PCR-PDR nexus, and arguments to build this into policy responses to disaster and conflict, does make sense on a theoretical level and there is a growing acknowledgement of this from practitioners, particularly from the disaster perspective. However, this research underlines that in practice it raises many challenges at the policy and programmatic levels. Unless those issues are addressed, the conceptualisation of an integrated framework for PCR and PDR is likely to remain a laudable idea, rather than a game-changing reality.

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