

Single-Issue Terrorism: A Neglected Phenomenon?

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Abstract

The willingness of some single-issue groups to use violence in the pursuit of their cause has received surprisingly little attention within the literature on terrorism. This article seeks to add to our understanding of this phenomenon – namely that of single-issue terrorism – by focusing on the increasing tendency of groups within the British animal rights movement to utilise violent methods in order to achieve their objectives. The article will seek to further the argument that some single-issue groups have been willing to use violence in past campaigns thereby highlighting the under-studied nature of the phenomenon. This will be illustrated by examining the campaign of single-issue terrorism undertaken by the militant suffragettes in Britain in the 1910s.

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Introduction

Political violence resulting from the changing tactics of single-issue groups has received little attention in the literature on terrorism. The willingness of some single-issue groups to use violence in the pursuit of their cause constitutes not only a departure from previous non-violent forms of protest but also, more importantly, a distinct phenomenon within terrorism that is unique and deserves attention. Therefore, the main aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of single-issue terrorism by examining the activities of those groups within the British animal rights movement, who have increasingly utilised violence in their demand for animal rights. In addition, it will be argued that the militant campaign of the British suffragettes involved terrorism in the years 1912-14, thereby supporting the claim that single-issue terrorism is not only an under-studied area within terrorism but also an under-examined one.

On examination of the literature discussions of single-issue terrorism tend to be located within motivational typologies, which have as their focus the goal orientations of the groups under analysis. Such classificatory schemes are concerned with the discovery of the aims or reasons behind the terrorism and usually go further than merely distinguishing between terrorism for, and against the state. Indeed, in many schemes a distinction is made between those groups pursuing a fundamental or revolutionary change in the political system and those who wish to achieve a specific political change. It is in this latter category that single-issue terrorism is usually found either as a category in its own right or as a sub-category. For example, both Crenshaw and Davidson Smith consider single-issue terrorism as a unique category in the typologies of motivation and political-orientation, which they construct. Within Crenshaw's scheme, although not explicitly labelled as single-issue terrorism, terrorism resulting from the actions of groups designed to stop particular practices – for example, the bombing of a nuclear construction site in opposition to nuclear power – is covered by the category “reformists.”¹ Davidson Smith, however is more explicit with his category of “issue” and states, “issue-group militancy stems from a wish to rectify a supposed grievance or wrong which is generally attributed to governmental action or inaction.”²

The actions of single-issue groups willing to use terrorism are viewed as sub-revolutionary given that the action although often directed at a particular government is not designed to result in its overthrow. Other

academics suggest that such terrorism does not constitute a distinct category, but is to be rather located within a broader category, for example sub-revolutionary terrorism (Wilkinson), ideological terrorism (Clutterbuck) or insurgent terrorism (Schmid and Jongman).³ In the case of insurgent terrorism, single-issue terrorism is viewed as one of three sub-categories along with social-revolutionary and separatist terrorism. Within much of the scant literature on single-issue terrorism, such terrorism is perceived as a weak extension of left-wing forms of terrorism in the case of environmental and animal rights activists, and right wing in terms of anti-abortionists.⁴ Such a view is not only oversimplistic as within many single-issue groups a plethora of political backgrounds may be found, but also detracts from the uniqueness of single-issue terrorism.

Given the above discussion it is not surprising to learn that little consensus exists regarding the exact meaning of the term “terrorism.” Subsequently, there is no universally accepted definition of the term, either among academics or government authorities.⁵ However, there is agreement within the literature on terrorism as to the core characteristics of the phenomenon.⁶ These are:

- the use or threat of use of violence
- the existence of a political motive
- the targets selected are representative of a target category
- the aim is to terrorise
- the goal is to modify behaviour
- the method employed may be extreme and/or unusual
- the act of terrorism is an act of communication

Terrorism is seen as involving the actual or threatened use of violence in an attempt to achieve a change in, or the maintenance of, the status quo. Violence, however, is also an extremely ambiguous term and its usage can be somewhat arbitrary. In labelling an act as “violent,” one is not only applying a descriptive term, but also making a judgement regarding the act’s legitimacy. Any attempt at definition will be predicated on the assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable, whereas others are not. For the purpose of this article, the term “violence” will be taken to mean “the illegal use of force or the threat of such force, against person or property.”⁷

An act of terrorism is one that has been carried out for a political purpose; it is a deliberate means to an end. It is the existence of this political motive which differentiates terrorism from “normal” crime. As Rubenstein states, “mere criminals rarely purport to act on behalf of an entire nation, class, religion or ethnic group, nor do they ordinarily accept martyrdom.”⁸ Often immediate targets are symbolic of a larger target audience that share a common targetable identification. If this identification does not exist within the target audience the violence will lose its effect. The aim of terrorism is to instil fear or to terrorise. As Schmid and Jongman note terrorism, “...consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of injury and death, and, secondly, the exploitation of this emotional reaction to manipulate behaviour.”⁹ The goal, therefore, is to modify behaviour. This is reinforced by the message imparted by the perpetrators of acts of terrorism that violence will cease when the (larger) target audience has complied with the demands of those undertaking the action. With these core characteristics outlined, the article will now focus on those groups within both the animal rights and women’s suffrage movements who have engaged in acts of terrorism in the pursuit of their cause.

The two case studies under discussion have been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, both can be seen to provide clear examples of single-issue terrorism and secondly, both are concerned with the question of who and what should have “rights.” When one examines the arguments advocated to deny the granting of “rights” to women and animals similarities can be found. In short, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, women were viewed by society as being naturally inferior to men intellectually and in terms of physical capabilities. They were seen as non-rational, weak-willed, dependent on men and emotional. In turn, animals have been denied “rights” on the grounds of their lack of rationality and their inability to exercise “rights.”¹⁰ Indeed, animal rights activists often cite the suffragettes’ campaign as one akin to their own.

Single-Issue Terrorism: Violent Animal Rights Activism

Within the animal rights movement there exist a number of groups which are willing to engage in acts of terrorism, namely, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Animal Rights Militia (ARM) and the Justice Department. All these groups are characterised by a deeply held conviction that animals have rights parallel and equal to those of human beings.¹¹ These rights would include the right to life and freedom from pain and suffering. Ultimately such an approach involves abolitionist objectives. Thus the demand for animal rights seeks the cessation of all forms of animal exploitation whether for food, clothing, consumer safety, scientific advancement or entertainment. Animals themselves cannot however, defend these rights. Moreover, human beings must recognise their clear moral duty and responsibility for advocating and ensuring animal rights.

In 1972 two hunt saboteurs decided to extend their relatively narrow scope of activism - namely anti-hunt action - to a much broader focus. These activists, Ronnie Lee and Cliff Goodman, had reached the conclusion that action should also be taken on behalf of those animals used in factory farming and in animal experimentation. Together they formed a new group calling itself the Band of Mercy, resurrecting the name used by young supporters of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1876.¹² Laboratories located in England and Wales engaged in animal experiments were soon targeted by the group. A campaign of property damage including arson and the destruction of scientific equipment was embarked upon. The campaign was short-lived however, with the arrest of Lee and Goodman, who were subsequently convicted in March 1975 of causing more than £50,000 worth of damage and sentenced to three years imprisonment.¹³ Released early from gaol, Lee formed the ALF in 1976 with initially thirty members.¹⁴ According to the *Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service*, the aims of the ALF are in the short term “to save as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse. Their long term aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies out of business.”¹⁵ These aims are to be realised by animal liberation (the rescuing of animals) and through property damage.

A core characteristic of terrorism is the use or threat of use of violence. The ALF contend that their campaign is non-violent in nature as they take precaution not to harm any living animal, human or otherwise. Violence in their view can only be perpetrated against sentient beings; thus property damage is not considered violence.

Such a position is also supported by some writers but for other reasons than sentiency. For example Teichman contends that the “destruction of property is not terrorism unless it is a precursor of a different kind of action, i.e. part of a campaign which includes physically harming human beings.”¹⁶ In its first year of operation the ALF was responsible for more than £250,000 of damage. A variety of methods were utilised mainly resulting in property damage such as arson, the breaking and etching of windows and the use of paint stripper on motor vehicles to name but three. Those targeted were from across the spectrum of businesses involved with the exploitation of animals and included butchers’ shops, animal breeders, circuses, racecourses, fast food restaurants and furriers.¹⁷ Such impersonal attacks on property continued to account for ALF actions up until the early 1980s when a shift in tactics and targeting can be seen. Property damage was superseded by personal threats to, and actual attacks on, individuals.

In 1982, a previously unheard of group, the Animal Rights Militia (ARM), sent letter bombs to the leaders of the four main political parties in Britain. This action signalled a number of new developments. Firstly, the use of violence against people in the name of animal rights and, secondly, the employment of bombs as a fresh tactic. The group also claimed responsibility for six bomb attacks on scientists’ homes in 1985 and five car bombs in 1986. Four of the car bombs were accompanied by warnings but in the case of the fifth device a policy of “no more warnings” had been undertaken.¹⁸ It is debatable whether the ARM is actually a new and distinct group. Some writers such as Geldard and Henshaw suggest that members of the ALF have acted upon Lee’s call for the invention of new names for already existing groups. These “new” groups then take notional responsibility for acts too violent to accord with the ALF’s public stance of non-violence to sentient beings.¹⁹

Violent animal rights groups have used bombs since the early 1980s. Devices vary in design and refinement. The planting of incendiary devices in department stores has resulted in millions of pounds worth of damage. For example, in the summer of 1987 fur departments in three Debenhams’ stores were targeted and £9 million worth of damage was caused.²⁰ Letter and parcel bombs have been utilised by the Justice Department. This group, like the ARM, is prepared to harm human beings in the pursuit of animal rights and accepts that their actions are violent.²¹ The group emerged in October 1993 and in three months was responsible for thirty-one

devices. These were predominately poster tube and video cassette bombs but also included a number of timed incendiary devices. In the following year the group claimed some one hundred attacks and the methods used were of a varied nature. The number of letter and parcel bombs decreased but this was offset by the planting of two serious car bombs under vehicles belonging to persons connected to animal experimentation.²²

Product contamination threats have also been claimed by animal rights groups since the 1980s. Such threats signify a shift in tactics and targeting. This was the first time that the general public at large was being targeted as opposed to those individuals and companies directly involved in the exploitation of animals. Confectionery consumers were targeted in 1984 when Mars Bars were allegedly adulterated with rat poison. The ALF claimed that Mars supported the use of monkeys in research into tooth decay and the consumer by purchasing a Mars Bar endorsed the use of animals in the confectionery business. It has been suggested that Mars lost £6 million as a result of this hoax and subsequently withdrew from animal experiments.²³ Further contamination threats have included mercury in turkeys and toothpaste, spiked baby oil and bleach added to shampoo.

The second core characteristic of terrorism is the existence of a political motive. Activists involved in the ALF, ARM and Justice Department possess a philosophical conviction that animals have rights. As already noted, a belief in animal rights asserts that animals have rights parallel and equal to those of human beings. Human beings, as moral agents, have a duty to advocate and ensure that these rights are defended. The use of violence is justified as a means to a political end, namely a change in particular company's policies or people's behaviour. Violent animal rights activists cite the inability of traditional campaigning to achieve their desired end and the continued denial of even the most basic rights to animals, for example, the right to be free from pain, as the key reasons in their decision to employ direct action, including the use of violence.²⁴

The targets selected by the groups are symbolic or representative of a target category. For example, in August 1994, the ARM planted a number of incendiary devices in Ryde on the Isle of Wight. A sports and model shop plus a suede and leather shop were targeted due to their willingness to stock and sell leather goods. The

destruction to both premises served as an example to other businesses willing to sell animal products of the potential consequences of their actions.

An emphasis on fear or terror is the third core characteristic of terrorism. Thus, terrorism involves a combination of the use of violence and the threat of more to come; this initiates a terror process. The actions of those groups willing to use violence in the name of animal rights can be seen to have achieved the production of a terror process. Evidence of this can be observed in the actions of those targeted personally and also in the larger target audience. The use of letter and parcel bombs by the ARM and Justice Department has led to the introduction in many offices and workplaces of specially designed machines to check the contents of incoming mail. The utilisation of the car bomb as a tactic in the struggle for animal rights has meant that, those persons employed in the area of animal experimentation are now obliged to check under their vehicles for devices. Companies have established pyramid alert schemes designed to warn each other of potential actions or actual attacks against them. Increased security measures have also been taken by those likely to be targeted; these include the employment of security guards, the installation of close circuit television and intruder alarms. In some cases, individuals have also taken steps to ensure their own personal safety as well as that of their families. An eminent professor at Oxford University engaged in animal experiments had a letter bomb containing hypodermic needles sent to his home address and his children were threatened with kidnap.

The actions of the ALF, ARM and Justice Department can be viewed as attempts to modify the behaviour of individuals or companies involved in the exploitation of animals. In June 1994, the Justice Department sent six letter bombs to companies involved in the live export trade, including a major cross-channel ferry company. In the weeks following this action, the major ferry companies withdrew from the live export trade. Gurj Aujla, a convicted Justice Department activist stated, “the ferry companies are not primary animal abusers, they could exist perfectly well without live exports, so hit them and they will withdraw – and they did.”²⁵ The message communicated by such actions is that the violence will desist only when animal exploitation ceases.

Although the ALF is a non-hierarchical organisation lacking a centralised authority structure. Activists possess a clear political objective, namely, an end to animal exploitation. They operate in autonomous cells and select their own targets and methods. Little is known about the internal discipline of violent animal rights groups, with the exception of one golden rule: “thou shalt not grass.” Within the various animal rights magazines including *Eco-Vegan*, *Arkangel* and the *ALF Supporters’ Group Newsletter* debates abound as to whether certain persons are a “grass” (informer). Individuals suspected of informing have received hoax letters bombs, their cars have been damaged and they are usually subjected to harassment and intimidation from other animal rights supporters.²⁶ Activists are not full-time terrorists and often engage in both legal and illegal activities. Indeed, it is claimed that members of the Justice Department are “professional,” prepared and adept at breaking the laws that hold animals captive.²⁷ Terrorism is utilised by such groups on the basis of a rational calculated strategy and involves a deliberate or intentional decision to use violence to achieve collective values. For example, the Justice Department activist responsible for the letter bomb campaign against those companies involved in live exports stated, “this wasn’t token protest, or mindless retribution, or even economic sabotage...it was strategic action. I researched that the meat trade is massive and can’t be easily beaten, but live export is one vulnerable aspect of the trade that could be defeated.”²⁸

Single-Issue Terrorism: Militant Suffragette Activism

Only one group within the British women’s suffrage movement was willing to engage in acts of terrorism, this being the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU). This organisation was committed to the idea that women should possess the same voting rights as men. This belief had roots in both humanist feminism and the Liberal notion of individual rights.²⁹ It was argued that women and men share common human attributes, such as the faculties of reason and conscience. Subsequently, they should also possess the same natural rights. Furthermore, it was the natural right of every individual to political and social self-determination. Thus the case for equal rights was made.

The women’s suffrage campaign although in existence since 1865, had not been successful in its call for votes for women by the early twentieth century. Indeed, the constitutional and law-abiding movement was compared to “a beetle on its back that cannot turn itself over and get on its legs to pursue its path.”³⁰ In

contrast, the WSPU sought to achieve the enfranchisement of women not only by attempting to coerce government, but also by appealing to the general public to join them and demand votes for women. The organisation was established in 1903 by Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst. It combined pressure group tactics such as the lobbying of Members of Parliament, public speaking at trade union meetings and the convening of mass gatherings and marches with non-conventional tactics. These were designed to provoke public disorder and included clashes with the police and attempts to enter Parliament. This dual strategy of conversion and coercion soon gave way to a two-pronged strategy of coercion. Coercion of both the general public and the government by a campaign characterised by the tactics of terrorism.

The smashing of the windows of 10 Downing Street by two WSPU members in June 1908 without the prior endorsement of Mrs Pankhurst marked a shift in policy to the destruction of property. The leadership subsequently endorsed the tactic and care was taken to only break government windows. Initially those involved in window breaking campaigns (also known as “the argument of the pane”) did not evade arrest and usually were prosecuted for their actions. However, the tactic of window breaking was extended to include non-governmental targets such as shops and commercial enterprises. The public at large were also targeted by a letter destroying campaign, whereby pillar-boxes were set alight and ink and acid were poured into them.

The suffragettes³¹ failed attempt at the burning down of the country residence of Lewis Harcourt, a leading anti-suffragist in the Cabinet, is cited as both the first serious attempt at arson and evasion of the police.³² The period between 1912 and 1914 can be seen as the most destructive in the women’s suffrage campaign. In financial terms, the suffragette campaign of incendiarism in 1913 cost companies’ £250,000 – this represents approximately £25 million in today’s money.³³ The tactics employed included attacks on works of art, the attempted assassination of Asquith (the Prime Minister of the day), the planting of bombs in both public and private spaces, and the burning down of sports pavilions and churches.³⁴ According to *The Times* newspaper, the suffragettes were responsible for thirty-nine bombs in 1913, and fourteen in the following year.³⁵ These devices ranged from the most basic, utilising paraffin-soaked twine fuses connected to candles, to more complex ones involving clocks that allowed for timer-delayed detonations. Government documents show that suffragette bombs had the potential to cause loss of human life. For example, a Home Office report

on the discovery of a bomb at a school in Sutton-in-Ashfield states: “the “bomb” in this case was really dangerous – if it had exploded while Inspector Button was trying to cut the fuse, it would almost certainly have killed him.”³⁶ The majority of devices were planted by suffragettes but a number were sent through the post. These letter bombs, together with packages containing inflammable chemicals call into question Mrs Pankhurst’s pledge not to “recklessly endanger human life” as they have a tendency to detonate or unpredictably burst into flames.

Although many suffragettes were treated as common criminals when sentenced to imprisonment, the WSPU can be said to have possessed a political motive, namely, the demand for votes for women. Indeed, the adoption of the hunger strike by imprisoned WSPU members was initially a protest by a single suffragette at being placed in the Second Division. At this time political prisoners were placed in the First Division and permitted to wear their own clothes, they could have food sent in, were able to receive visitors and were permitted to read and write if they so wished. In contrast, those prisoners placed in the Second Division wore prison garb and had no such privileges. The assertion that the WSPU did not have a political motive was rebuked by Mrs Pankhurst, who stated, “it is unthinkable to suggest for a moment that we are people who would in any way break the law for a selfish purpose, for our own interests or for our personal ends!”³⁷

The targets selected were symbolic; initially only public property was attacked, namely, government buildings’ windows but soon target selection was extended to include private property. Attacks on private property were justified on the grounds that most owners were male and already possessed the vote. Therefore, the government, in theory, was their servants. Subsequently, if the government makes a mistake or does something wrong, for example, failing to give women the vote, then the voters are also responsible. Thus by breaking voters’ windows and setting their businesses and property alight the suffragettes were making the voters aware of their responsibility. Support of the suffragettes’ cause did not guarantee that a property, church, school or business would not be targeted.

Although the aim of terrorism is to instil fear or to initiate a terror process, many academics claim that the suffragettes were unsuccessful in this endeavour.³⁸ This view, however, can be challenged. Government

ministers were forced to change their public speaking activities and many travelled with police bodyguards for fear of attack by suffragettes. For example, Asquith was physically attacked on more than one occasion. As Harrison notes, “the form of escalated suffragette militancy which the police feared most was assassination. As early as 1909, rumours were flying round London that the suffragettes had decided to assassinate Asquith.”³⁹

WSPU leaders were followed by special branch officers from 1907 onwards and a separate suffragette section was formed in 1909.⁴⁰ Officers were involved in the investigation of cases of criminal damage caused by the suffragettes, raids on the WSPU offices and surveillance of “mice” (those prisoners released under the “Cat and Mouse Act” of 1913).⁴¹ They also attempted to attend WSPU meetings but this became difficult as officers were recognised and attacked. In 1909, the police were allowed extra staff in order to protect ministers and their families. Asquith wrote that during the period of suffragette militancy: “Even our children had to be vigilantly protected against the menace of abduction.”⁴²

Watchmen were employed to guard against attacks on businesses, country residences, churches and other sites of historical interest. There were calls for the creation of organised civilian patrols and following the attacks on works of art many museums and art galleries were closed to the public.

The underlying strategy of suffragette action was to modify the behaviour of the government – the extension of the franchise to women. Thus the early activities of the WSPU were designed to demonstrate the urgency of votes for women to the government by exhibitions of popular support. The public were to be converted to their “cause” by exposure to the question of women’s suffrage through the popular press and public meetings. When these activities failed to secure the vote, violent acts including bombings and arson were employed and the general public was targeted directly. They were no longer to be converted but coerced into asking the government to give women the vote. Suffragette terrorism would stop only when this goal had been realised.

The WSPU was an autocratic organisation dominated by Mrs Pankhurst and possessed a clear political objective. Although a number of tactics such as window smashing and the hunger strike were initiated by

rank-and-file members the leadership soon adopted them. Dissent within the organisation was not tolerated and members who disagreed with leadership decisions left or were expelled. Between 1904 and 1914 there were seven such splits and expulsions.⁴³ The suffragettes were predominately single or widowed.⁴⁴ Examples would include Mary Richardson (unmarried), who was responsible for attacking the Rokeby Venus in the National Gallery and Mrs Mary Leigh (widowed), who was responsible for arson and bomb attacks. Indeed, Mary Leigh was described by the police as, “one of the most violent of the suffragists we have had to deal with.”⁴⁵ A possible explanation for the predominance of unattached females in the ranks of militants is their lack of ties and commitments outside of the suffrage campaign. The WSPU provided its members with accommodation, employment, companionship and a support network. The use of terrorism by the organisation was seen as part of a rational and calculated strategy. Not only had non-violent protest failed to secure the vote but also the Government removed peaceful methods of agitation from the WSPU by refusing to see deputations and excluding women from public meetings. The use of violence was seen as the only way to achieve votes for women.

Conclusion

From the arguments outlined in this article, one can suggest that the activities of some groups within the animal rights movement, namely, the ALF, ARM and the Justice Department constitute single-issue terrorism. These groups were all established with the same belief, a belief that animals possess rights. If these rights were secured then these groups would cease to exist. The militant campaign of the British suffragettes, namely, the WSPU especially in the period between 1912 and 1914 can also be said to constitute single-issue terrorism. The WSPU was only concerned with obtaining the vote for women. As Rosen notes, “the WSPU never committed itself to a specific set of legislative priorities to be pushed for after the vote was won...To the WSPU, ‘Votes for Women’ became virtually an end in itself.”⁴⁶ The two case studies discussed highlight the difficulty of considering such acts as merely constituting sub-revolutionary terrorism as the goals pursued by the groups concerned fall far short of sub-revolutionary. Indeed, in the case of violent animal rights groups many of those targeted are businesses engaged in the exploitation of animals. Furthermore, the single-issues under discussion transcend mere left wing or right wing political considerations. Thus, it is argued that single-

issue terrorism should be considered a distinct and unique phenomenon, a phenomenon that has been largely neglected within terrorism studies and deserves greater attention.

¹ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.13, No.4, April 1981, p.385.

According to Crenshaw, terrorists may be revolutionaries; nationalists; minority separatists; reformists; anarchists/millennarians or reactionaries.

² G. Davidson Smith, *Combating Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.7. Davidson Smith's typology includes nationalist/separatist/irredentist; issue; ideological; exile; state and state-sponsored; religious.

³ See Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1986); Richard Clutterbuck, *The Future of Political Violence* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986); and, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Longman, *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988).

⁴ For example, Clutterbuck, *The Future of Political Violence*; and, Jeremy S. Handler, "Socio-economic Profile of an American Terrorist: 1960s and 1970s," *Terrorism*, 13, 1990.

⁵ See Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism* 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Norman W. Provizer, "Defining Terrorism," in Martin Slann and Bernard Schechterman, eds, *Multidimensional Terrorism* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1987); and, Andrew Silke, "Terrorism and the Blind Men's Elephant," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.8, No.3, Autumn 1996. In contrast, Paul Wilkinson suggests that a consensus on a definition of terrorism has in fact been reached. For more details see P. Wilkinson, "How to combat the reign of terror," *New Statesman*, 2 August 1996, p.12.

⁶ For example, Schmid and Longman after content analysing 109 definitions of the term "terrorism" concluded that there is "...a solid conceptual core to terrorism," *Political Terrorism*, p.21.

⁷ David Miller, "The Use and Abuse of Political Violence," *Political Studies*, September 1984, p.403.

⁸ Richard E. Rubenstein, *Alchemists of Revolution* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1987), p.xviii.

⁹ Schmid and Longman, *Political Terrorism*, p.21.

¹⁰ For a more detailed discussion see Rosemary Tong, *Feminist Thought* (London: Routledge, 1993); Jane Lewis, ed. *Before the Vote Was Won* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987); Keith Tester, *Animals*

and Society (London: Routledge, 1992); and, Roger Scruton, *Animal Rights and Wrongs* (London: Demos, 1996).

¹¹ It should be noted that debate exists within animal rights literature and the movement itself regarding the extent and nature of the rights of animals. For example, Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* 2nd Edition (London: Thorsons, 1993) argues that there should be an end to prejudice and discrimination on the grounds of a being's species. In contrast, Tom Regan, *The Case For Animal Rights* (London: Routledge, 1988) argues that animals have intrinsic rights.

¹² David Henshaw, *Animal Warfare* (London: Fontana, 1989); Richard Ryder, *Animal Revolution* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1989); and, Robert Garner, *Animal, politics and morality* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

¹³ Ryder, *Animal Revolution*; and Garner, *Animals, politics and morality*.

¹⁴ Henshaw, *Animal Warfare*.

¹⁵ Taken from the *Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service* posting on the ALF found at <http://envirolink.org/ALF/orgs/alforg.html>.

¹⁶ Jenny Teichman, "How to Define Terrorism," *Philosophy*, 64, 1989, p.512.

¹⁷ Maureen Duffy, *Men and Beasts* (London: Paladin, 1984); Henshaw, *Animal Warfare*; and, William Paton, *Man and Mouse* 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹⁸ Paton, *Man and Mouse*; and Ryder, *Animal Revolution*.

¹⁹ Ian Geldard, "New Militancy Grips Animal Rights Groups," *Terror Update*, 7, 1989; and, Henshaw, *Animal Warfare*.

²⁰ Ryder, *Animal Revolution*.

²¹ In a press release by the group they state, "...We won't be asking anyone to stop messing with animals and make no more excuses for our violent intervention – they've had it too good for too long." Justice Department, *Liberator*, Winter 1994/Spring 1995.

²² For more details see <http://envirolink.org/ALF/orgs/jd1.html>.

²³ Garner, *Animals, politics and morality*. The ARM's claim that "the company realized the potential for further actions and withdrew from animal experiments." Posted on the Animal Liberation Frontline

Information Service's *Animal Rights Militia Fact Sheet* located at <http://animal-liberation.net/library/facts/arm.html>, dated 27 August 1998.

²⁴ Animal Liberation Front, *Interviews with Animal Liberation Front Activists* (ND); and Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service's *Justice Department Fact Sheet* located at <http://animal-liberation.net/library/facts/jd.html>, dated 30 August 1998.

²⁵ Quoted in the *Justice Department Fact Sheet*.

²⁶ See *Eco-Vegan* 7, 1995; and *Arkangel* 15 (ND).

²⁷ Quoted in the *Justice Department Fact Sheet*.

²⁸ Quoted in the *Justice Department Fact Sheet*.

²⁹ See Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* first published 1792, ed. Ashley Tauchert (London: Everyman, 1995); and John Stuart Mill, "The Subjection of Women," in *On Liberty and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

³⁰ Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, *My Part in a Changing World* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), p.2.

³¹ A distinction can be made between suffragettes and suffragists. The *Daily Mail* in 1906, coined the term "suffragette" to distinguish the militants from the constitutional law-abiding suffragists. Thus, suffragist refers to any participant in the movement for women's suffrage, whereas suffragette describes those suffragists who use militant methods.

³² See Andrew Rosen, *Rise Up, Women!* (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993).

³³ *The Times*, 21 April 1914. The approximate figure was calculated on advice from Dr J.R. Wordie, an economic historian in the Department of History, University of Reading. The average weekly wage in 1913 was £2 in comparison with today's average weekly wage of £200. Therefore the 1913 figure of damage was multiplied by 100 to give an approximate comparable figure in today's money.

³⁴ Bombs were planted in residences, railway stations, churches and hotels. See A.E. Metcalfe, *Women's Effort* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1917) for more details. Issues of the WSPU's own journal, *The Suffragette* contain reports on such actions, as do national and regional newspapers of the time.

³⁵ These figures were compiled from a close examination of *The Times* for years 1913 and 1914. They were also checked against the claims of the WSPU in *The Suffragette* and against Home Office and Metropolitan Police reports.

³⁶ Quoted from a report from the Home Office's chemical advisors in the Explosives Department. The bomb consisted of two cylinders containing ordinary black gunpowder. The fuse was attached to the cylinders and imbedded two to three inches into the gunpowder. PRO: HO 45 236973/94.

³⁷ Emmeline Pankhurst, "Defence," in Jane Marcus, ed, *Suffrage and the Pankhursts* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p.126.

³⁸ Barbara Bliss, "Militancy: The Insurrection That Failed," *The Contemporary Review*, 201, 1962; David Morgan, *Suffragists and Liberals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); and, Rosen, *Rise Up, Women!*

³⁹ Brian Harrison, *Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.56.

⁴⁰ See Bernard Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987).

⁴¹ This Act allowed for the release of suffragettes on hunger strike from prison and their re-arrest when they were in better health.

⁴² Herbert Henry Asquith, *Fifty Years of British Parliament* Vol.II (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1926), p.126.

⁴³ For details see Paula Bartley, *Votes for Women 1860-1928* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998); and, Pethick-Lawrence, *My Part in a Changing World*.

⁴⁴ Constance Rover, *Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain 1866-1914* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).

⁴⁵ Quoted from PRO: MEPO 2/1488, dated 21 November 1911.

⁴⁶ Rosen, *Rise Up, Women!*, p.77.