

## DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

### A critical analysis of European Union good governance policy towards Ghana, 2000-2013

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# **A Critical Analysis of European Union Good Governance Policy Towards Ghana, 2000-2013**

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the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

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# Abstract

Since the emergence of ‘good governance’ as a policy driver in the 1990s, numerous academicians and practitioners have put considerable faith in this concept (discussed in detail in the literature review and conceptual framework chapter). Scholars such as Crawford (2005) and Champagne (2016) are the exceptions, but given the presence of a vast conceptual and theoretical literature on ‘good governance’, it is surprising that very little of this work is underpinned up by ‘real word’ evidence and examples. First and foremost, this thesis seeks to generate empirical data enabling an assessment of EU good governance policy. This will go some way to correct the absence of data feeding the current (over-conceptualised) academic debate on good governance.

The data collected by this research has been generated by a case study of EU good governance policy towards the Republic of Ghana between 2000 and 2013. This research has at its heart personal interviews and archive work. Three key research questions were asked ‘what were the objectives of EU good governance policies in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?’, ‘what was the nature of the implementation of European Union good governance policy in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?’, and ‘what were the outcomes of the EU good governance policy in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?’

In terms of research findings, the thesis found that, although positive benefits were obtained, EU policy was flawed in four areas: mission creep; a lack of local ownership, a lack of will to confront the Government of Ghana in certain areas; and a failure to recognise the prevailing socio-economic environment in Ghana. It is argued that these flaws arise largely from a failure of the EU to define ‘good governance’. It is further proposed that this failure arises from a general ‘over-conceptualisation’ of this concept found amongst both academics and practitioners.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

In 1989, the World Bank declared that ‘a crisis of governance’ was holding back Africa’s development. In this report, the Bank indicated that its preferred liberal economic development strategies were being hindered by issues of governance (World Bank 1989: 55-61). From this point onwards, ‘good governance’ has become a central theme in the work of international organisations and international financial institutions (see, for example, IMF 1997 and Boutros-Ghali 1995). The European Union was no exception. Institutions within this supranational body adopted good governance as part of its external foreign and development policy. The European Council and Member States on 28 November 1991 adopted the term good governance for the first time in a *Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development*. This resolution made it clear that:

The Council stresses the importance of good governance. While sovereign states have the right to institute their own administrative structures and establish their own constitutional arrangements, equitable development can only effectively be achieved if a number of general principles are adhered to: sensible economic and social policies, democratic decision making, adequate governmental transparency and financial accountability, creation of a market-friendly environment for development, measures to combat corruption, as well as respect for rule of law, human rights and freedom of the press and expression (European Council 1991:2).

Since the 1990s, the EU has consistently reiterated the importance of good governance for its external relations. In 2003, for instance, the European Commission (2003:4) declared:

Governance is a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction, democratization and global security. This is why institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of good governance and the rule of law is one of the six priority areas for EC development policy that is being addressed in the framework of EC programmes in developing countries.

Further adding in 2006 that:

Good governance means more than tackling corruption. Though the EU takes an extremely firm stance on this matter, viewing corruption as a major obstacle to achieving development goals, it nevertheless sees it as symptoms of poor governance and of a lack of transparent, accountable management and control systems. Tackling corruption must not be addressed in isolation but integrated into development and poverty reduction strategies



and into support for the process of democratic governance. This means strengthening the role of civil society and the media protection for multiparty democracy and electoral competition, a transparent system for financial political parties and support for parliamentary oversight and for other judicial institutions (European Commission 2006 5-6).

Following this ideological commitment to good governance, the EU has allocated resources and formulated policies to promote this phenomenon within its external partner states. This thesis is about critically assessing this good governance policy. The EU's work in this field is analysed through a case study of European Union good governance policy towards Ghana between the dates 2000 and 2013.

### **The gap in literature**

Since the emergence of 'good governance' as a policy driver in the 1990s, numerous academicians and practitioners have put considerable faith in this concept (discussed in detail in the literature review and conceptual framework chapter). Institutions, such as the European Union, have expounded the practical benefits of promoting good governance. Indeed, since the Cotonou agreement of 2000, good governance has been at the heart of the EU's relations with its African, Caribbean and Pacific country (ACP) partners. Despite this reality, there is very little empirical research assessing EU good governance policy in these states, with the continent of Africa being particularly badly represented. Scholars such as Crawford (2005) and Champagne (2016) are the exceptions, but given the presence of a vast conceptual and theoretical literature on 'good governance', it is surprising that very little of this work is underpinned up by 'real word' evidence and examples. First and foremost, this thesis seeks to generate empirical data enabling an assessment of EU good governance policy. This will go some way to correct the absence of data feeding the current (over-conceptualised) academic debate on good governance.

### **A case study approach**

The data collected by this research has been generated by a case study of EU good governance policy towards the Republic of Ghana between 2000 and 2013. The

methodology chapter explains the selection of a case study method, and the choice of Ghana specifically, in more detail, but Ghana was considered a valuable target of this research because of its impressive (albeit relative) progress from an authoritarian state to a more liberal political culture during the last quarter of a century. If ‘good governance’ promotion can make a difference anywhere, then Ghana is a likely candidate. The timeframe selected likewise matches this transition period. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 marked a new phase of the EU’s relationship with Ghana, and other ACP states, while 2013 marked the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (although the thesis has taken the liberty to reflect on events outside this timeframe, if this data help shed light on arguments advanced concerning the 2000-2013 period). Ghana in this 2000-2013 period, at face value at least, would have seemed an ideal partner for external good governance promotion, and an ideal test case for the efficacy of EU policy.

### **Key case study research questions**

Three key research questions were asked in order to collect data enabling an assessment of EU good governance towards Ghana.

The first of these questions was ‘*what were the objectives of EU good governance policies in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?*’ If an assessment is to be made of this good governance promotion strategy, it is first necessary to ascertain what the aims of the EU policy were. Using the EU’s own statements and communications, this thesis establishes what the EU sought to achieve, as elucidated in this institution’s own words. These are the policy objectives that the policy outcomes are the measured against, defining success or failure.

The second research question was therefore; ‘*what was the nature of the implementation of European Union good governance policy in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?*’ Having established the aims of EU policy, the study then assessed how this policy was implemented on the ground. Did the EU achieve what it set out to do? As it will be seen below, in several areas, a gap opened up between policy intentions and policy achievements, resulting in mission creep and policy slippage.

The third research question was; *‘what were the outcomes of the EU good governance policy in Ghana between 2000 and 2013?’* This research question is designed to determine the impact of this policy. Ultimately, by comparing policy objectives and policy outcomes, a measure of success can be calculated.

### **The Research findings**

The main argument of this thesis is that, despite the fact that the European Union good governance policy yielded positive results in Ghana, the implementation of this policy failed to realise its full potential. This was largely because the EU neglected to define sufficiently what it itself, as an institution, understood good governance to be, thereby leaving gaps between policy rhetoric and practise, and between policy expectation and actual outcomes. At the same time, because of this failure to define good governance as a practical policy concept, internal and local social, economic and political pressures on EU policy implementation led to policy slippage and mission creep.

EU good governance support did help correct certain dysfunctional institutions and address specific problems in Ghana during the case study period. For instance, as part of its ‘good governance through democracy’ programme (see chapter 4), European Union support built the capacity of the Electoral Commission of Ghana and helped increase the credibility of the Ghanaian elections. Similarly, EU policies had some success in assisting an increased number of women being returned to Ghana’s legislative body. Elsewhere, the EU’s efforts at promoting ‘good governance through decentralisation’ won praise amongst local assembly members, and made an impact in terms of electoral practise at the grass roots level (see Chapter 4). EU projects partnering with district assemblies managed, for instance, to train 1,100 senior district assembly officials and 8,800 district assembly members in ‘good governance’ and public management matters. In addition, the European Union support also gained results in the area of human rights and the rule of law. EU expertise and resources led to the initiation of an affirmative action bill, improved the criminal justice system and developed the legal rights of children in Ghana (see Chapter 6). One of the clearer benefits of EU good governance intervention during this period was the increased the capacity of the Ghana Audit Service (GAS). The subsequent audit of government

departments implemented by the GAS resulted in significant reforms of public policy (see chapter 7). Similar positive consequences can also be found in EU efforts at building capacity amongst Ghanaian civil society organisations (see Chapter 8). In sum, in these specific cases, the research did indeed find that the European Union's good governance policy facilitated changes bringing real improvements to public services and civil society capacity in Ghana. There was a positive return on the resources and effort expended.

Notwithstanding these returns, however, EU good governance policy towards Ghana between 2000 and 2013 is more accurately characterised by its flaws. Four such flaws stand out, undermining the positive results highlighted above. These impediments raise critical questions concerning EU good governance policy in Ghana specifically, while also illuminating the similarly flawed broader academic debate on good governance.

The first of these flaws was mission creep. Evidence of policy slippage was present in the research data collected across all the policy 'clusters' of the EU's good governance programme in Ghana, whether this be in 'support for democracy' (discussed in Chapter 4), 'decentralisation' (see Chapter 5), 'human rights and rule of law' (Chapter 6), 'public administration reform' (Chapter 7), or 'civil society organisation capacity building' (Chapter 8). This evidence suggests that because of the vague working definition of good governance employed by the EU, all too often, specific good governance initiatives morphed into more generic developmental projects. Chapter 4, for example, highlights good governance projects seeking to increase the number of women in parliament. The EU funded partners such as Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Women in Law and Development of Africa (WILDAF) to help develop programmes with this objective, yet these objectives became lost in translation, with the money being spend on generic women's enterprise workshops instead. Even though these programmes achieved their own successes, which apparently appeased EU officials on the ground, these outcomes were significantly removed from promoting the original good governance objectives. Chapter 5 similarly identifies mission creep in decentralisation and capacity building projects. Civil society organisations such as the Integrated Social Development Centre and Christian Aid of Ghana, charged with delivering good governance training at the local level, embarked on more familiar projects of capacity building instead. They

concentrated on the human resource departments of district assemblies. Funds earmarked specifically for good governance training were spent on council procurement (motorbikes, safe cabinets and computers). The concept of 'good governance' had been stretched beyond recognition in order to purchase much needed resources, ignoring the original remit. As it will be seen, this was a familiar pattern across all the 'clusters'. Funding earmarked for good governance was utilised for better understood 'development projects' instead. Indeed, for many in Ghana (EU and local workers), little distinction seems to have been made between the concepts of 'good governance' and 'development' generally. This was a failure of policy definition on the EU's part, and a reflection of the broader academic and practitioner failure to actually define 'good governance' as a concept (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).

The second flaw in the implementation of EU good governance policy highlighted by the Ghana case study relates to the 'ownership' of these projects. Ownership remained very much in the hands of the European Union. This was despite the EU emphasising that the intention of its good governance promotion policies centred on 'Boosting ownership of local actors' (EU 2016: 42). Although the aim was to help bolster Ghanaian governance institutions and systems in order to serve the democratic will of the Ghanaian people, the EU's own policy demands had to be met first. Chapter 4, for instance, will show that the EU put considerable effort at building the capacity of local electoral observation. Yet, partner organisations in this field complained that the parameters of this mission were strictly policed by the EU, preventing these partners from tailoring a more local programme of observation. The EU made it clear that local ownership does not mean handing over control of such project to civil society organisations. Chapter 5, likewise, highlights the lack of local ownership in projects designed to assist human resources development in district assemblies. Here, officials from the Institute of Local Government in Ghana complained that the premise of the project was highly determined by the EU, at the expense of their own authority. The EU, once again, was adamant that local ownership cannot be at the expense of the EU relinquishing control. EU direction was required to ensure value for money and transparency. EU decision makers dominated these projects from beginning to the end.

The third good governance policy flaw evident in the case study data was the limited ability of the European Union to challenge the Government of Ghana, and local

politicians, when it came to conflicts of interest. This was most noticeable in the areas of differing cultural values and instances when local political structures became threatened. The EU elected not to cross certain political boundaries. For instance, even though the European Union considers certain human rights universal and inalienable, its good governance support for 'human rights and the rule of law' shied away from areas of controversy. In Chapter 6, it will be seen how the EU, while acknowledging that LGBT rights are insufficiently protected in Ghana, felt powerless to press this issue. This chapter also discusses the EU's inability to deliver its version of good governance when it came to the death penalty. Elsewhere, in terms of this good governance policy not gaining traction when it came to vested political interests within the Government of Ghana, Chapter 4 highlights how EU projects aimed at disrupting political incumbency failed to reach their objectives. In these cases, EU officials felt they could not push their Ghanaian counterparts any further, for fear of damaging broader diplomatic relations.

The fourth policy flaw extrapolated from the case study research related to the socio-economic break placed on good governance in Ghana. The EU promotes good governance as tool to assist social and economic development. Yet, there was limited acknowledgement built into EU programmes implemented in Ghana between 2000 and 2013 that these very same social-economic conditions could themselves limit the impact of the policies deployed. There were several cases of unrealistic good governance goals being sought in deprived communities. Chapter 6 of the thesis, for example, identifies EU projects seeking to promote the rights of children. These projects did indeed sensitise communities to the position of children within society, most noticeably in terms of the harm child labour can exact, but despite this knowledge, child labour continued. Knowledge of harm does not compensate for a lack of an alternative source of income, should the child stop working. Wider economic conditions invalidated the EU's efforts on this issue. Similarly, Chapter 7 discusses the EU's support for forest governance as part of its 'civil society capacity building' cluster. Forest communities were sensitised on the need to preserve the forest, and trained in methods of good governance that would underwrite this management. Yet, given that these are poor forest communities, where forestry is the dominant income source, it was naive of the EU to think that illegal logging could be significantly reduced by good governance training. Local residents may want to

manage the forest more sustainably, but one cannot sell ‘good governance’ instead of timber.

### **Relevance of the case study findings to the broader literature**

Although, as it will be seen in the following chapter, there is limited case study data evaluating good governance policies available in the existing literature, the findings of this thesis’ Ghanaian research do resonate with the empirical work of other scholars. A common conclusion amongst scholars collecting empirical evidence in this field is that international agencies rarely employ a precise definition of ‘good governance’, using this phrase as a generic label covering many varied projects seeking democratic, or broader social, political and economic, reforms. This was also the case in Ghana. Mirroring Kurtz and Schrank’s (2007) work in Latin America, for instance, this case study found that the EU’s conceptual understanding of good governance, and its notion of the utility of this concept, to be vague and lacking clarity. This Ghanaian case study similarly reinforces Grindle’s (2007) work on Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Wetzels and Orbie’s (2012) more broad ranging survey, when issues of failing ‘conceptualisation’ clarity were highlighted. This thesis’ findings are also in line with those of Isa and Nogal (2016: iv), who focussed on southern Mediterranean states, arguing that the EU should be ‘paying attention to the local context, to the local actors, and the local ways of framing concepts.’ The thesis thus contributes much needed empirical data to this growing school of criticism over how the EU, and other international organisations, have used the concept of good governance in their external policies. It will thus be argued that Ghana is not a unique case study. The findings of this research do fit a wider pattern of policy disfunction found in the literature. This criticism will be developed in all the following chapters.

The thesis’ research findings also make contribution to the broader conceptual debate over ‘good governance’. To some extent, the empirical evidence presented below supports the problem-solving approach to this concept. The direct aid given to struggling and/or under resourced Ghanaian state and civil society institutions did result in verifiable changes of governance. As mentioned above, positive outcomes, whether these be capacity building amongst district representatives or electoral institutions (Chapter 4), direct assistance for the delivery of justice (chapter 6), reform

of public administration processes (Chapter 7), or governance support amongst civil society organisations (Chapter 8), made a difference to real peoples' lives. Cox's (1981, 128-129) 'general aim of problem-solving', making 'relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble', is satisfied by these positive outcomes.

Yet, the evidence collected by this research resonates better with those scholars and practitioners who advocate 'good governance' should be subject to a broader approach of 'critical thinking'. Despite advocating 'partnership' and 'local ownership' in its rhetoric, for instance, the European Union's good governance relationship with Ghana did not escape the reality of broader power inequalities between these collaborators. The EU limited the deferral of 'its' good governance policy to local partners. The parameters were always determined in Brussels. Universal, for 'universal' read 'western', understandings of what good governance is, and what it is for, defined this policy. Local notions of how to implement electoral observation (Chapter 4), for example, or support for devolved government (Chapter 5), were not accepted. Instead, the global power relations readily highlighted by critical thinkers were in play. Likewise, the projects conceived by the problem solving approach were consistently hindered by socio-economic realities. It will be seen how good governance projects were undermined by more pervasive conditions of economic poverty, for example, and how conflicting cultural beliefs held by EU officials and their Ghanaian counterparts led to unsuccessful good governance policy initiatives. This thesis clearly shows that broader social parameters found at the heart of critical thinking cannot be ignored when considering good governance. The analysis of this thesis taps into these theoretical ideas, and supplies empirical evidence that supports this approach.

The findings of this thesis, however, have most resonance beyond this 'problem solving' versus 'critical thinking' debate. The research fits squarely amongst a third school of thought, specifically those scholars that have criticised the good governance debate for becoming over-conceptualised. This Ghana case study reinforces the idea that academic debate and practical applications of 'good governance' are based on vague and ill-defined understandings of what good governance actual is and what it can achieve. In the EU's case, as discussed above, mission creep is a direct consequence of this vagueness. It was all too easy for policy slippage to occur as the



term of ‘good governance’ had the ability to become all things to all people. Thus, good governance training can morph into support for entrepreneurship (Chapter 5), and bolstering good governance in district politics can result in the purchase of motorcycles. The EU’s failure to avoid this mission creep is mirrored by the academic failure to find a definition of this concept that has any significant amount of support. The ‘good governance’ utilised by both practitioners and academics is a very vague concept. Again, this background of over-conceptualisation is explored throughout the thesis.

### **Chapter structure of the thesis.**

This thesis is presented in eight substantive chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides the literature review and theoretical framework for the thesis. This chapter provides a definition of good governance, explores how this concept has been developed by scholars using different conceptual frameworks, and then focusses on the available literature analysing the EU’s utilisation of this concept.

Chapter 3 will explain the methodology of this research. An explanation is provided outlining why qualitative techniques were chosen over quantitative or mixed methods. The chapter then proceeds to analyse the rationale behind the case study approach and why the European Union and why Ghana were chosen as the focus of this. The chapter will then discuss the methods used to collect the field data, how the data was analysed, and the tests employed to ascertain the reliability of the data. This chapter will also consider the ethical framework of the research.

Chapters 4 to 8 deliver the thesis’ research findings. Each of these focuses on an individual EU (self-designated) programme ‘cluster’ of EU good governance policy. The four clusters are ‘support for democracy’, ‘support for decentralisation’, ‘support for human rights and the rule of law’, ‘support for public administration’, and ‘support for civil society organisation capacity building’ (EU Handbook for good governance 2004).

Chapter 4 therefore discusses EU good governance policy with respect to the first policy cluster: support for democracy. This chapter identifies EU support for electoral processes in Ghana, namely programmes promoting electoral observation, civic and

voter education, increasing women's participation in politics and monitoring abuse of political incumbency. Although the EU's support for democracy to some degree helped to promote good governance, there was evidence of mission creep, lack of local ownership, and lack of political will on the part of the EU to cross certain political lines; an unwillingness to challenge the Government of Ghana in this area.

Chapter 5 examines the EU's support for decentralisation vis-a-vis good governance. The chapter identifies that the EU supported decentralisation using five strategies. These strategies were support for decentralised cooperation, human resources development for district assemblies, promoting social accountability, and support for regional coordinating councils. The chapter shows that, although the European Union's support for decentralisation increased capacity of local government stakeholders in Ghana, there was mission creep. For instance, when the EU decided to support decentralised cooperation, projects drifted to skills development and other generic development activities. At the same time, the policy was marked by lack of local ownership due to contested policy conceptualisation and formulation.

Chapter 6 discusses the EU's support for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana. The chapter will analyse the five strategies utilised by the European Union. These were support for gender equality, the promotion and protection of children's rights, support for law enforcement bodies to improve the criminal justice system in Ghana, campaigns against the death penalty and support for the rights of the LGBT community in Ghana. The chapter findings show that EU support enhanced gender equality, increased children's rights and improved in delivery of criminal justice system in Ghana, however, due to the vagueness of its good governance policy, again, mission creep can be identified. Also, there is evidence that the EU was not willing to confront the Government of Ghana over more sensitive issues of human rights.

Chapter 7 of the thesis will analyse the EU's support for public administration reform and assistance addressing the management of public finances. This chapter will analyse the EU's projects assisting the audit of public agencies and departments in Ghana. Although the EU support in this area undoubtedly improved governance regimes, once again, there was evidence of mission creep and a lack of ability to challenge the Government of Ghana. The financial audit made some important recommendations to 18 agencies; the government of Ghana has largely failed to

implement these recommendations. Yet the EU is not willing to cross the political lines to ensure that these recommendations are implemented.

Chapter 8 will examine the European Union's support for civil society capacity building in Ghana. The chapter will scrutinise two strategies (health and forest governance), analysing the aim, implementation and outcome of these strategies. The findings show that, although these civil society organisations succeeded in enhancing the health and forest rights of the local level, due to the vague nature of this policy, there was mission creep. Also, the socio-economic factors also affected the outcome of the policy. For instance, some of the farmers were still engaging in illegal logging due to poverty and lack of economic opportunities in these areas.

Finally, the concluding chapter (chapter 9) reviews these research findings and discusses their implications. Alongside summarising the four flaws hindering EU good governance policy towards Ghana, demonstrating that, despite some positive outcomes, Brussels' approach was hobbled by its vague conceptual foundation, the significance of the research for the academic literature is also highlighted. Alongside this cases study supporting the small but growing body of work critical of EU good governance policy, the broader conceptual debate is reflected upon. Here, it is argued that academic work on good governance has become over-conceptualised, which itself has had a detrimental effect on any practical real-world benefits of this 'good governance' debate.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical/Conceptual Frameworks**

This chapter reviews how the concept of ‘good governance’ manifests itself in the academic literature. It discusses the theories and debates that have underpinned the study of good governance since the 1990s and highlights how this thinking has been utilised by both academics and public policy practitioners. The objective of the chapter is to identify the broader academic context within which the thesis’ Ghana case study is located.

The chapter begins with the definition of good governance. Immediately, it can be found that ‘good governance’ is a contested concept. Indeed, a certain vagueness is attached to this concept’s definition which has very practical implications for the Ghana case study. As it will be seen, vagueness of definition translates directly into policy slippage and mission creep when it comes to the European Union promoting good governance in Ghana.

The second section of this literature review chapter highlights the theoretical frameworks that have dominated academic debate on ‘good governance’ in the modern era. In this respect, this study’s own theoretical framework is best formulated in response to the three competing approaches to the concept of governance, most usefully seen as a problem-solving school, a critical thinking school, and what can be termed a more sceptical school. Each of these three schools is subjected to critical evaluation, drawing comparisons with the others.

This literature review will then move on the practical application of the concept of good governance. How does the case study institution - the European Union (EU) – itself define and understand ‘good governance’? Where does the EU’s position sit within the three theoretical schools identified from the academic literature above? The EU’s own literature/documentation is assessed to this end.

The fourth section of the chapter then addresses previous academic literature that specifically assesses EU good governance policy. As it will be discussed below, most of these scholars, despite their own attempts to inject more empirical data into the good governance debate, highlight the lack of sustained case studies on this topic, and within the good governance debate generally. All too often sweeping statements are made about the need for, or impact of, good governance without these being supported by empirical evidence. Exploring this small literature, this section will highlight research that suggests EU good governance policy

is full of inconsistency. For instance, in countries like China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan where EU economic, political and security interests are at stake, these interests gain precedence over good governance (Algieri 1990:90-91 and Crawford 2008:178). Also obvious from this work is that EU good governance policy, in ACP countries particularly, lacks local ownership (Slocum-Bradley and Bradley: 2010). The most prevalent theme in this literature, however, is that, in most cases, the EU's promotion of good governance remains vague in concept and lacks clarity in implementation, most notably in countries like Congo, Rwanda, North Africa and Middle East.

The final chapter section concentrates on the existing specialist literature addressing EU good governance policy in Ghana. Although this scholarship is limited to just two authors, the findings taken from this previous scholarship proves to be a useful starting point for the current research.

Overall, this literature review chapter serves to anchor the current study in the wider academic work on the concept of good governance. As it will be seen, criticism over vague definitions, arguments emerging from the critical thinking and sceptical schools, and key findings from the more specialist assessment of EU good governance policy, are all taken forward into the current study. Informed by this literature, the Ghana case study is then presented. It is offered as a contribution to enrich this boarder academic debate on good governance. For, above all, this thesis is about addressing the paucity of empirical evidence and real-world cases studies that the theoretical scholarship on good governance suffers from.

### **Good governance defined**

Good governance is a concept that has, since the 1990s, come into regular use in the disciplines of political science, international relations, and public administration (Agere 2000:1). Almost all the major institutions concerning themselves with international development take the view that promoting good governance is essential (see, for example, World Bank 1989; IMF 1997 and Boutros-Ghali 1995). For that reason, the concept has risen up these institutions' agendas (Gisselquist: 2012). At the same time, good governance has become a concept more widely debated in the academic literature. Despite this rise to prominence, little consensus has emerged on a shared definition of 'good governance';

different authors define good governance differently. The trend is for users to define the concept as they wish. Individual authors take different tacks. Some define good governance with an emphasis on corruption, while others focus on the broader management of the country's resources. Some good governance scholars concentrate on the state, while others look deeper into society. Likewise, some academics see good governance narrowly linked to public administration, while others equate it to democracy as a whole (Johnson 1991; Agere 2000). As a consequence, with scholars ploughing their own furrows, the definition of good governance found in the literature lacks coherence and uniformity. (Ali 2008: 67).

Good governance began to become associated with research on international development in the early 1990s. At this point of inception, the concept was used to focus on the desire for the efficient management of resources in an accountable and transparent manner. Consequently, Johnson (1991) defined good governance as competent management of a country's resources and affairs in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, equitable, and responsive to people's needs. Like Johnson, Tahir (1998) defined the scope of good governance as the management of resources and organisation of resources, individuals, and groups into formal and informal bodies and institutions. In the 1990s, most shared this position of Johnson and Tahir. Good governance was about the efficient and accountable management of resources.

As the 1990s progressed, the academic study of good governance gained momentum. Dev Raj (1996) broadened the definition to include decentralisation. Raj argued that power should not be concentrated at the centre but must be devolved and developed at the local level. He considered decentralisation to be at the core of good governance because this was the best way to check state power and promote the aspirations of the broader citizenship.

Agere (2000) also broadened the definition of good governance. Agere emphasised that this definition must include political participation (elections, for example), the actions of non-state actors, and the promotion of civil society organisations. For Agere, good governance occurs when there is a democratic system in place that allows for citizen participation, services are delivered, human rights are respected, and the government is transparent and accountable. Agere also observed that, at the turn of the twenty-first century, good governance was becoming an end in itself. He noted that, 'several important perspectives' of this 'new paradigm' have 'become 'the focus of the debate in the political arena as well as in the academic institutions' (Agere 2000:2). By 2004, Johnson, expanding his original definition, likewise advocated that good governance should encompass political systems,

building on the management of his resources focus of the 1990s. For Johnson, good governance now implied the rule of law, the safeguard of human rights, and the existence of honest and efficient government promoting accountability, transparency, predictability and openness.

As the twenty-first century progressed, the concept of good governance has expanded further to absorb elements of contemporaneous debates addressing diversity and inclusiveness. Stefanova (2007:2), although agreeing that good governance needed to embrace the rule of law, accountability, transparency and openness, argued that this concept must also take into account gender equality. According to Stefanova, ignoring gender would simply lead to a form of governance that itself would be limit engagement and participation of half the population. Otto (2014: 1) likewise emphasised the importance of gender considerations for good governance, advocating that this element should be placed at the heart of the concept. This is because ‘good governance should be inclusive, a positive use of power and authority’.

More recently, there has been a backlash in the good governance literature against this broader social definition of the concept. In effect, reacting to how broad and nebulous the concept of good governance had become, being all things to all people, a number of scholars began to seek to direct any definition the concept into something of practical use. Fukuyama (2013) sought a more focussed definition by contending that good governance is a government’s ability to enforce rules and deliver services, irrespective of whether that government is democratic or not. Fukuyama (2003:4) further argued that democratic accountability can be excluded from the definition of good governance because some authoritarian regime can govern well, just as some democratic states can be mal administered.

Despite these attempts by these scholars to define the concept of good governance, it is evident that there is little coalescence around a single definition. Scholars have tended to push their own classification, using ‘good governance’ in a manner that suits their own research. Indeed, and as a consequence, Alcantara (1998), Doornbos (2001), and Hyden and Court (2002) conclude that there is no specific definition of good governance. Good governance simply means different things to different people, which can make the concept vague and contradictory.

Alcantara, as early as 1998, for example, wrote that good governance serves different people differently. Those who want to reduce the inference of the state will push notions of democracy and accountability when defining good governance, while those who are less

interested in such agendas will see good governance more simply as the preserve of the state. Good governance is about states managing resources efficiently and effectively. Martin Doornbos (2001:95) similarly observed that the term ‘good governance is elastic and has no specific meaning’. While accepting that good governance scholars share a general area of common interest, he argued good governance ‘hardly carries a particular purpose’. Instead, Doornbos saw this concept’s intrinsic openness, vagueness, and inherent lack of specificity as tending to generate a good deal of probing and debate as to what is, or should be, a proper meaning of the term. Hyden and Court (2002:7) concur. They suggest that, despite the popularity of good governance as model, amongst both academics and practitioners, the concept continues to mean different things to different people.

It is not only scholars who struggle to define good governance. For international organisations, ‘good governance’ similarly implies different things in different contexts. The 1992 World Bank publication *Governance and Development*, the report generally seen as the genesis of the modern good governance debate, defined good governance as a means of managing a country’s resources. For the World Bank, in 1992, good governance was co-terminus with sound economic and financial management. Good governance was about effective and efficient public administration and enterprise. Consequently, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both placed emphasis on ‘good governance when providing policy advice, financial support, and technical assistance to its member countries’ (World Bank 1992:1). Fast forward to 2019, and the Washington-based international financial institutions, had developed a much broader definition of good governance than the term they themselves coined in 1992. The IMF in 2019 stated that good governance is a broad concept covering all aspects of how a country is governed, including its economic policies, its regulatory framework, and its adherence to the rule of law. (IMF: 2019). The Organisation Economic Co-operation and Development likewise expanded its definition over this time period. According to OECD in 1997, the critical factors of good governance revolved around the competence of civil servants, the capacity of government organisation, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, and participation (OECD:1997). By 2017, the OECD had added ‘democracy’ and ‘decentralisation’ to its understanding of good governance (OECD, 2017: 2). The United Nations Development Programme’s definition differs again. By 2011, this institution had consciously substituted the entire phrase ‘good governance’ with ‘democratic governance’ instead, with the aim of promoting



‘meaningful and inclusive political participation – basically people having more of a say in all of the decisions which shape their lives’ (UNDP: 2011).

Despite similarities in language and broad issues addressed, then, differences in the detail suggest that there is no specific universal definition of good governance, neither amongst academics nor practitioners, thereby rendering the concept vague. The variety in definitions show that while some scholars and organisations try to define good governance within the context of managing state resources, others also broaden the scope to include political elements such as accountability, democracy, the rule of law, decentralisation and gender rights. The concept does not have a collective meaning; good governance is a catch-all phrase providing general utility but little accuracy. Donor countries and organisations demand good governance from donor recipients, and it is a useful tag for funding programmes, but the concept covers so much ground that the meaning is more symbolic than scientific. Consequently, the academic study and practical promotion of good governance may be about elections, government decentralisation, civil service reform, human rights protection or gender equality, just as much as this study or programme may be about the efficiency of government decision making, anti-corruption drives or privatisation. This absence of a common and precise definition available in the literature, and the concept having more a symbolic value rather than being precise tool of analysis, has practical implications. As it will be seen below, in the EU/Ghana case study, the reality of good governance being ‘all things to all people’ was perpetuated in policy design and implementation, and amongst policy formulators and policy recipients. A direct consequence of this was mission creep and policy slippage.

### **Theoretical frameworks: a problem-solving vs. a critical thinking approach vs. the sceptics**

The theoretical literature on good governance is best reviewed through assessing three competing conceptual frameworks: the problem-solving approach, a critical thinking approach, and a school of thought based on scepticism.

#### *Good governance and the problem-solving approach*

Robert Cox (1980) asserts that the problem-solving approach, 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble' (Cox 1981, 128-129). The benefit of problem-solving theory lies therefore in its capacity to address a problem without radically challenging the status quo. According to Cox and Sinclair, problem-solving theories concern themselves with solving issues that arise in a distinct part of a complex situation. In their own words:

Since the general pattern of institutions is not called into question, problems can be considered in relation to the specialized areas of activity in which they arise. ... The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination (Cox and Sinclair 1996:88).

In advancing Cox and Sinclair's argument, Leysens (2008) argue that problem-solving theory is status quo oriented by design and deals with issues that arise from the parameters of prevailing dominant power dynamics and institutional relations. The approach is 'ahistorical' because it views the modern international relations systems as a mirror of the past and the future. The problem solving approach to good governance, therefore, is all about improving the performance, efficiency and accountability of host states. It is about precisely adjusting state laws and regulations, limiting the scope of action to a manageable set of variables. Given their delimited focus, scholars and practitioners of this school are less concerned about broader societal issues affecting good governance.

Both the 'Washington School' and 'Post-Washington' schools fit squarely within this problem solving approach. Good governance scholars sympathetic to this world view see a lack of institutional accountability and transparency as crucial problems within developing countries. Good governance, as a counter to dysfunctional political institutions, is thus promoted as a key ingredient in the best recipe for economic and social development (Hazenber: 2018). Indeed, North et al. (2008) argue that even though good governance can be defined in many ways, within differing contexts, there is always a strong connection between governance and development. They state:

The institutions of the country may create an incentive for investment and technology adoption, for its business to invest, and the opportunity to accumulate human capital for its workers thus engendering economic growth. Or they may discourage such activities leading to stagnation. They may create incentive for politicians to work towards creating a growth-enhancing environment. Or they may encourage rent-seeking activities, corruption, and the unfettered pursuance of personal gain at great cost for the rest of the society (North et al. 2008:2).

The Washington consensus was about the state delivering on ten prerequisites of economic development. This is the problem solving approach at its very simplest! Good governance, in this context, was about the state simply underpinning economist John Williamson's (1989) recommendations: namely (1) fiscal discipline; (2) redirecting public expenditure; (3) tax reform; (4) financial liberalization; (5) adoption of a single, competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment; (8) privatization of state owned enterprises; (9) deregulation of market entry and competition; and (10) securing property rights. The Post-Washington consensus demanded more sophistication from the state in terms of providing political stability and accountability, helping to facilitate a liberal economy, but, again, this school of development fits squarely into the problem solving approach. Good governance was institutionally focussed, concentrating on specific policies and regulations, addressing specific variables of macro-economic policy.

North, et.al, (2008) sought to demonstrate that good governance was an integral part of this agenda. These authors focused on a comparison of North and South Korea, asserting that South Korea became more prosperous than North Korea because of its chosen path of governance. They state South Korea's higher levels of governance-transparency, the rule of law, and lack of corruption have been rewarded by better economic growth and development. In short, the problem of development can, in part, be solved by good governance.

Kauffman, Kray and Mastruzzi (2008), of the World Bank, similarly highlight the effectiveness and importance of good governance for economic development. They focus on six indicators:

1. Voice and accountability - measuring perception of the extent to which citizens of countries can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, association, and media.
2. Political stability and absence of violence - measuring perceptions of the likelihood that constitutional government will be destabilised or overthrown by unlawful or violent means.

3. Government effectiveness - measuring the quality of public service, degree of its independence from political pressure and credibility of the government's commitment to policies.
4. Regulatory quality - measuring the perception of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permits and promote private sector development.
5. Rule of law - measuring perception of the extent to which citizens have confidence in and abide by the rule of citizens.
6. Control of corruption - measuring the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gains by state elites.

Kauffman, et.al, used these six governance indicators in a seminal study, applying them to more than two hundred states, using data from extracted from 2002 to 2008, creating the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database. The work was based on aggregate indicators from hundreds of specific disaggregated individual data sets measuring various dimensions of governance. After considering the margin of error, Kauffman noted that countries which recorded high scores in governance improve their economic standards over the years. To that effect, Kauffman, Kray and Mastruzzi (2008) argued that there is a strong correlation between good governance and economic development. Although this study was not without critics, it became widely feted by Washington consensus scholars and practitioners alike (see Kaufmann, et.al., 2007: 1).

Also using Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's WGI data, Theodore Davis tested the significant relationship between good governance and human development in Sub-Sahara Africa. According to Davis (2016), over the last 40 years, despite the richness of its resources, Sub-Sahara Africa has not only lagged behind other regions in the world but also has one of the weakest human capital foundations. Despite this handicap, Davis argues that there is a strong empirical evidence showing that countries that are embarking on good governance in Sub-Sahara Africa are recording higher levels of sustainable growth and poverty reduction. In testing Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's six indicators of good governance against the Human Development Index (HDI), Davis' evidence shows a positive correlation between good governance and human development. For instance, countries such as Cape Verde, Seychelles, Ghana, and Botswana with a high level of 'voice and accountability' scored high on the HDI. States such as the Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau with a low level of 'voice and accountability' recorded lower on the HDI. This pattern is repeated in relation to 'political stability and absence of violence'. Countries, such as Mauritius, Seychelles, and Botswana, enjoying comparatively high political stability

recorded over 70 points on the HDI. Countries such as Niger, Burundi, and Eritrea, with low political stability and persistent violence, recorded less than 40 on the HDI.

Like Davis, Bayar (2016) also used these six World Governance Indicators to advance the Post Washington argument. Bayar argues that public governance is an important determinant of sustained economic growth. He examined the impact of the good governance on economic growth, from 2002-2013, in 12 European Union countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. At an empirical level, Bayar's (2016) findings show the quality of public governance affects economic performance. The study suggested that positive public governance heavily influence economic growth in these countries.

Liu, et al. (2018) can also be placed in this Washington/PostWashington consensus problem solving school. These scholars investigated the impact of governance on economic growth in China. Their definition of good governance focused on anti-corruption measures in the public sector, thereby ignoring other aspects of good governance (such as democracy, human rights and rule of law). Examining the relationship between the quality of governance and economic development in two regions of China, these authors argued that good governance promoted economic development. For instance, from 2001-2015, the western part of China had a lower governance quality resulting in smaller economic growth. On the other hand, the eastern region had a higher governance quality. This resulted in GDP growth of six percent, as compared to 4.5 percent in the west (Liu, et al. 2018:14).

Overall, it is evident that Washington/Post-Washington scholars and practitioners see good governance as an important driver for economic growth and development. Consistent with the problem-solving approach, these scholars focus narrowly on the state in their understanding of, and advocacy of, good governance. For them, good governance is all about the state underwriting a limited number of variables, freeing the market to deliver economic growth.

### ***Critical thinking approaches***

Countering the problem-solving approach within the 'good governance' debate are scholars advocating a critical thinking perspective. This critical thinking theoretical

framework is most associated with the Frankfurt School, which emerged within the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt's Goethe University during the inter-war period. At the heart of this approach is a critique of, and challenge to, the status quo of the modern state and international economy. In this respect, 'critical theory' may be distinguished from the 'problem solving approach' in that it is a theory that seeks 'human emancipation from slavery', acts as a 'liberating ... influence', and works 'to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers' of human beings (Horkheimer 1972, 246). In both a broad and narrow sense, critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms (Bohman 2019) This framework gained a foothold within the discipline of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century (Haacke:2005).

According to Cox (1981), critical thinking approaches confront the dominant theories of IR (neo-realism and neo-liberalism), challenging the social status quo that they underpin. Hoffman (1987), for example, argues critical thinking, through a process of self-understanding and self-reflective can provide a critique of existing social and international order revealing its imminent capacity for change and human potential realization. By subject the processes and institutions of the status quo to criticism and uncovering paths to a more radical evolution of society and economy, greater freedom can be gained for future generations.

Roach (2009) quantified four reasons why critical thinking theory is important to the study of International Relations. First, unlike problem-solving theory, critical thinking addresses the reflective dimension of individual theory, actions, and values. Importantly, as a reflective theory, critical theory opposes positivism or the employment of deductive, inductive, and empiricist methods to objectify international phenomena. Rather critical theories are immanent to our actions and knowledge of society. Secondly, critical thinking theory focuses on the mutability of political structures and seeks to demonstrate how political power and ideological controls can nurture the perception of political and economic structures. Thirdly, critical theory is an open-ended interdisciplinary approach rooted in both ethical concerns and social and economic relations of production. Fourthly, critical theory is an integration analysis of

reality as it provides a guide to reality, model production, and cognitive mapping of societies.

Similarly, Leysen (2008) argues that critical thinking theory does not only focus on problems by isolating them from the broader context, but rather starts by looking at an aspect of social and political power. More importantly, critical thinking theory does not deal with the problems by trying to resolve them so that the system functions properly but ask how the system gave rise to the problem in the first place. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory as a guide to strategic action aims to change the status quo. In advancing Leysen's argument, Davies (2014) argues that unlike problem-solving theory, critical thinking theory is more holistic. Critical thinking theory does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but rather calls them in question. Importantly, critical thinking acknowledges social and political complexity rather than only investigating problems in isolation. To this end, Denmark and Martin-Bernett (2015) observe that critical theory is not just an academic exercise, but an emancipatory approach committed to creating an equal and just world. As a post-positivist theory, critical thinking consists of theoretical plurality and epistemological positions that open different forms of criticism to neo-realism and neoliberalism that has dominated the field of International Relations. Critical Theory does not only challenge the understanding of mainstream international politics but has also spurred the development of alternatives forms of analysis. These authors maintain critical thinking theory provides a dynamic and new meaning to international politics.

Thus, when it comes to the literature on good governance, critical thinking approaches open up this concept to rigorous examination. Critical thinkers unlike problem solvers does not take good governance and its power relations for granted but calls them into question and how they might be in a process of change. Of particular relevance here is the work on good governance inspired by post-colonial and feminist thinking. These two branches of critical thinking raise critical questions about good governance and challenge the Washington and Post-Washington stand on the importance and relevance of this concept.

### *Post-colonial critiques of good governance*

Arguing from a critical thinking perspective, post-colonial scholars generally portray 'good governance' to be a mechanism used by Western institutions to exert their own interests and hegemony over developing societies. According to Rita Abrahamsen, the good governance discourse is merely the latest version of the development dream that entitles the North to develop and democratise the South in its image. Abrahamsen (2000: 47-65) argues that good governance is not neutral, but rather historically contingent and dependent on power relations. Through critically analysing texts published by the World Bank, Abrahamsen exposed inherent inconsistencies, evasions, and silences associated with this institution's use of 'good governance'.

Abrahamsen argued that the good governance agenda seems to go around in circles, always leading back to economic liberalism. For instance, within this good governance discourse, democracy emerges as a key ingredient. However, an analysis of the discourse of the World Bank reveals that, for this institution, democracy and economic liberalism are conceptually linked. Therefore, to be in favour of democracy one has to promote free-market economics and structural adjustment. Thus, as Abrahamsen reasons, for the World Bank, when people choose democracy, they are effectively inviting external intervention leading to measures that, in turn, adhere to a free-market ideology. Even though the promotion of democracy claims to liberate the poor, this evidence from the World Bank shows that this institution sees neo-liberal economics more as the liberator.

Continuing this post-colonial critical analysis, Abrahamsen also observes that, when it comes to cultural sensitivity, the World Bank is only interested in promoting traditions that are well-suited to capitalism. For instance, the African continent is well-known for its active family, communal and ethnic ties. Instead of building on these ties, as evidence from World Bank documents, Abrahamsen shows that instead, the Bank is more interested in measures that go a long way to promote individualistic economic liberalism. These measures include creating a free market economy, support the business community, and attempt to privatise state enterprise. Consequently, the World Bank's concept of good governance reproduces the hierarchies and unequal relationships that have characterised capitalist development ever since its inception, and, importantly, can be seen as part of the exercise of power in global politics, as it has helped underwrite the North's continued power and hegemony in the South.



Abrahamsen's analysis shows that the World Bank's idea of good governance reflects the thinking, and serves the interests, of the World Bank and its more powerful member states.

Ian Taylor (2004:124) similarly argues that the promotion of good governance, as advanced by international institutions like International Monetary Fund, is a powerful example of how certain self-interested ideas are constructed as common sense. Good governance should be seen instead as a hegemonic discourse pursued by the North to define the South in its image. Although Taylor (2004) offers no empirical or statistical evidence to back this notion, he is clear that the IMF and the World Bank have advanced good governance as a concept bound within the neoliberal normative framework: efficient management of the economy with a clear bias towards a free-market economy. Taylor suggests there are four crucial problems with the current emphasis on good governance. These problems revolve around who is advocating this type of governance; how is it being advocated; what exactly constitutes good governance; and whose interest does this agenda serve? Taylor maintains that tackling corruption, transparency, and mismanagement is not a bad thing, but conferring the IMF with the ability to determine what constitutes good governance and the power to implement such prescriptions to sovereign states is hugely problematic. Should a relatively unrepresentative institution, arguably more interested in promoting a neoliberal agenda, be the institution defining what good governance is, and how best it can serve a society?

In 2000, Adejumo observed that 'good governance' is 'the new puzzle words on the global agenda' (p.x). In discussing issues of good governance and their prospects in Africa, Adejumo asserts that the World Bank, under its liberal economic agenda, places great emphasis on good governance. Although he did not provide a specific case study or empirical evidence, Adejumo argued that there were two problems with this World Bank position on good governance. First, while the World Bank preaches good governance, its favoured Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) undermines this concept. SAPs instead of empowering civil society organizations, and encouraging public ethics and accountability, instead encourage ruthlessness, repression, and dismemberment of civil society. SAP deregulation reforms similarly weaken the capacity of the state to control corruption, while privatization has created a host of opportunities for personal accumulation. In reality, SAPs reduce the capacity of the state to control and squeeze the capacity to govern. Adejumo thus argues that the Structural Adjustment Programmes do not go hand in hand with good governance.

Adejumobi's second issue with the World Bank's vision of good governance was that this concept was divorced from the direct interests of African citizens. At best, the vast majority of Africans would only benefit indirectly from an enabling project whose key goal was to get a capitalist market to function effectively. At worst, they would be directly exploited by this activity. In sum, Adejumobi (2000: 4) argued that, although the 'World Bank discourse on human rights, the rule of law and transparency was significant to the African condition, its good governance projects were unfocussed, full of contradictions and not grounded in African interests'.

Even though the research findings of these authors were not based on empirical evidence or specific country case studies, mirroring the broader theory-dominated nature of the good governance debate, the theoretical typology produced on good governance emerging from this critical analysis shows that international organisations are open to the charge that they promote a form of good governance serving their own interests, ignoring local dynamics. Western/northern external 'good governance' intervention in the South has promoted western conceptions of good governance defined by a neo-liberal economic agenda. This is a theme picked up later in the thesis. One of the findings emerging from the Ghana case study does indeed back this idea that there is little local input into defining what good governance is, and how the concept can be used best to serve local communities. As it will be seen below, the European Union too was guilty of defining good governance in its own interests.

### *Feminism and good governance*

Within this the critical thinking sphere of the good governance debate also lies a growing feminist literature. According feminists, the version of 'good governance' advanced by the problem-solvers inadequately considers gender. The concept should be broadened to address gender inequalities and injustices. Good governance may be a very important ingredient of development, but meaningful development may only be achieved through gender equality. Lokanadham (2014) argues that good governance should promote effective and accountable institutions enabling citizens to participate in decision-making processes. Therefore, a gender-aware definition of good governance needs to acknowledge that governance at all

levels requires equal gender participation. This concept also needs to recognize that existing governance policies, processes, and traditions currently fail to meet this prerequisite. They are full of inequalities, which need to be addressed for gender-sensitive reform to take place. Just as local interests are squeezed out from good governance programmes, so are women. Most good governance bodies and decisions are predicated by masculinity. For Lokanadham (2014), a good governance process must ensure that an effective quota system is in place to create more opportunities for women to attain a higher position. Importantly, governance institutions need to ensure that women are part of the policymaking process at all levels.

Like Lokanadham, Ndedi, Gnupou, and Njiondock (2015) also argue that good governance must represent the interests of both women and men to promote equal access to resources, rights, and a voice. They further contend that, even though good governance is a vital ingredient to achieve some level of sustainable development, it is only attainable through gender equality. For that reason, the development of policies and institutions in a state must ensure all citizens, including women, have a voice in decision making. Yet, Ndedi, Gnupou, and Njiondock suggest that there are persistent gender disparities in these opportunities, rights, and voice. Despite the implementation of good governance programmes, women are limited in their ability to participate as full citizens in social, economic and political life. This is a view shared by Stefanova (2014). This scholar contests that good governance can promote a level development needed only when it is implemented from gender angle; because this is the only means to ensure that both men and women are involved in decision making processes.

What is absent from these authors' work, and the feminist literature on good governance in general, are empirical case studies providing evidence and illustrative examples. While this school of analysis is well established theoretically, there is little data to support this debate. There are studies, such as Akin's (2010) measuring women's representation and participation in state structures, but there is little work assessing real-world examples of women participating in, or implementing, programmes of good governance. Once again, the good governance debate is data poor. This thesis goes some way to address this lack of empirical evidence. It will be seen that, although the European Union promoted several gender literate good governance programmes, once again local participation tended to be absent.

### ***The sceptics: ‘over-conceptualisation’, ‘vagueness’ and ‘overemphasis’***

Beyond these problem-solving and critical thinking approaches to good governance lies what may be called a more sceptical school of thought. These scholars point to issues of ‘over-conceptualisation’ and ‘over-emphasis’ when it comes to academic and practitioner debates on ‘good governance’. The sceptics hold that problem solving and critical thinking approaches to good government put too much faith in a poorly defined concept, failing to support theoretical findings with empirical evidence. The charge is that the debate over this concept is too vague and abstract. ‘Good governance’ as a concept is too divorced from the real world. Consequently, academic claims concerning the utility of good governance are often conflated and inflated and devoid of evidential proof. This vagueness can be found in initial definitions, right through the academic debate, and then manifests itself, as will seen in the main body of this thesis, in policy formulation and policy implementation (affecting policy outcomes).

Getting to the heart of the ‘vagueness’ charge, Kurtz and Schrank (2007:552) question the measurability, reliability, and validity of good governance as a concept. Even with Kuuffman, et al.’s (2005) more empirical work, applying the World Governance Indicators data, Kurtz and Schrank claim there is still inconsistency in their definition. Consequently, the measurement of certain elements of good governance, such as the rule of law, does not necessarily reflect reality. This can be seen in how Kauffman, et al., changed their definition of good governance over time. For instance, for Italy, the focus of the rule of law in 2006 was defined as the respect of citizens for the state. However, by 2007, this definition changed to the ability of the police and courts to maintain law and order. These changes had direct consequences for Italy’s rule of law ‘score’. In 2006, this rule of law score was seven but had changed to 1.05 in 2007. There was no parallel seven-fold decrease in Italian law and order performance in the real world.

Amongst Kurtz and Schrank’s (2007) other criticisms of this WGI work was their rejection of the assumption that smaller government promotes better governance. Although this was an idea promoted by Washington and post-Washington consensus scholars, producing, in their eyes, a clear path to economic development, Kurtz and Schrank again contested the use of the WGI data. They pointed to evidence from Latin America that specifically demonstrated that a bigger public workforce coincides with better human development statistics. In Guatemala, for instance, public sector workers accounted for five per cent of those employed in 2005.

Guatemala's Human Development Index (HDI) was less than 0.7. By contrast, the public labour forces in Panama, Mexico, and Argentina all measured approximately eleven per cent. Their respective Human Development Index scores were higher, at an average of more than 0.83. This suggests that a larger public sector creates better HDI scores.

Goldsmith (2005) likewise argues that, as a concept, good governance is not as important as the Washington and Post Washington theorists claim. Goldsmith suggests that, even though real world good governance itself can produce a level of political stability and economic development, the more abstract academic or policy concept seems static, ahistorical, and ignores the political and economic costs of governance reforms. In reviewing good governance in four countries (the United States, Republic of South Korea, Mauritius and Jamaica), Goldsmith found that the problem solving approach to good governance does not tell the whole truth. In some of his case study states good governance did not always result in economic development, while, for good measure, he also found that economic development sometimes generated poor governance. In the United States, for example, Goldsmith calculated that economic upturn may sometimes generate poor governance by creating rent-seeking behaviour amongst public officials. Elsewhere, in terms of good governance, Argentina historically has been characterised by political instability, military intervention, executive pressure on the judiciary, and electoral fraud. Yet, this Latin America country still attained one of the highest levels of economic development relative to its neighbours. Equally, in the post-independence era, Mauritius was marked by accusations of corruption, with a small group of family-owned companies controlling public contracts. Despite these bad governance practices, Mauritius' economy still grew stronger (seven percent per annum) than most other developing states (four per cent) between 2000 and 2002. Goldsmith's research found opposite results in Jamaica. Post-independent Jamaica had relative strong governance institutions, with a robust judiciary and competitive elections. However, economic growth stalled. Goldsmith points to the evidence from these four case studies, highlighting that there are no auto-consequences of good or bad governance. Development does not necessarily occur as a result of good governance. Indeed, sometimes nations with good governance still record poor economic growth. This indicates that impact good governance is sometimes exaggerated and should not be taken for granted.

Rostein and Teorell (2008) also support this notion that 'good governance', as a concept, lacks definition and precise utility. These two authors argue that, in the literature, good governance has a tendency to cover everything, failing to distinguish between issues that

concern access to power and those related to exercise of power. Importantly, because good governance is utilised vaguely, it is difficult to distinguish between the content of specific policy on the one hand, and governing procedure on the other. Due to 'over-conceptualisation', good governance often generates tautological explanations and meaningless policy implications. Rostein and Teorell specifically point to the relationship between good governance and corruption, dismissing the blanket notion that large government and government intervention mostly leads to corruption and abuse of office. They suggest that there is no empirical support for this assumption because small governments are not synonymous with the absence of corruption. They note the examples of Sweden and the Netherlands, which have comparatively large governments for European states. Despite this fact, levels of corruption are comparable to neighbouring countries hosting small state structures.

Grindle (2007) similarly raises critical questions about good governance. According to her, the notion of good governance sounds seductive, but the definition of the concept is too broad to offer precise analysis. For Grindle, because definitions differ, good governance may imply different kinds of processes, be this institutional functions, macroeconomic policy, poverty reduction, open trade, or democracy. Given this lack of focus, Grindle (2007:555) observes that 'it is even not clear how governance can be distinguished from development itself'. Beyond the problem of definition, she also raised a question about the measurability of the concept. This difficulty of measurement leaves government officials and other practitioners often confronted with a long list of things to in order to achieve good governance, yet no real mythology for proving cause and effect when it comes to policy successes (or failures). As a consequence, good governance has become a catch-all phrase, with many points of focus. Good governance activities differ widely from state to state. For instance, in collapsed states such as Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, where there is no effective central government, governance priorities come to focus on personal safety and basic conflict resolution. In personal rule states like Turkmenistan and Guinea, where government is rule through personalities and personal connection, the good governance emphasis is on political succession and government ability to carry out to basic tasks. In contrast, in institutionalised non-competitive states like China, the prominence of good governance is on fair justice, government response to accountable groups, and open government decision. Meanwhile in countries such as South Africa and Chile, where there is a stable and legitimate government, the focus of good governance is on the government becoming fully accountable for its

decisions. Grindle concludes that given the vague nature of the concept, ‘the more improved governance is needed, the more difficult it is to achieve good enough governance’ (Grindle 2007: 572).

Langbein and Knack (2010) and Gisselquist (2012) mine a similar seam of reasoning. They argue that good governance components lack viability: the meaning is endless. According to Langbein and Knack, the six variables of governance advanced by Kaufmann, et al, are important for academics. However, the six indicators (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory quality) appear to be inseparable and too vague for most practitioners. ‘Voice and accountability’ are too closely related to ‘control of corruption’ for the distinction to have utility for practitioners, as they both measure the ability of citizens to hold politicians accountable, and the independence of bureaucracy from political interference.

At the empirical level, Langbein and Knack (2010), maintain that the broad and vague nature prevents these governance indexes from successfully representing six distinct concepts. For instance, an index of effective government is too broad and vague that it is impossible to distinguish it from other aspects of good governance. The broad nature also affects the implementation of the concept. For instance, the methodology used to measure human rights and democracy could be used also to measure rule of law and voice and accountability. In drawing evidence from Freedom House, Langbein and Knack observe political rights and civil liberties are mostly assigned to voice and accountability element of good governance, but also linked to other governance indexes. Civil liberty and political rights involve freedom from harm (political stability), free market in land (regulatory quality) and accountability, and transparency (corruption control). On the other hand, it also includes how the government manage resource (government effectiveness) and fair application of law (rule of law). These authors maintain that the six governance indicators are attractive to academics, but, in terms of their practical utility, they are too broad and vague so as that there is not much difference between them.

Gisselquis (2012:4) argues that few donor institutions seeking to promote ‘good governance’ fully address why specific components of good governance are included in their definition. While the Africa Development Bank emphasises accountability and participation in its definition of good governance, the Asian Development Bank explains this concept as the ‘manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social

resources for development'. Gisselquist asks should human rights be understood from a civil, political, economic, or cultural angles? Or should a state be considered democratic because there is competition between the political elites? She suggests there is no clear basis on how to define a state as well-governed or poorly governed. Drawing an example from Rwanda, for example, Gisselquist maintains that on the one hand, Rwanda has progressed in economic and management reforms since the end of genocide in 1994. On the other hand, many other observers are worried about the recent record on democracy and respect for civil and political rights in the country. Whether Rwanda is considered as well-governed because of its economic advances, or poorly governed because of its democratic deficits, has very clear implications for external development assistance funding for the region. Yet, different donors measure good governance differently (Gisselquist 2012:14).

In short, this more sceptical literature correctly highlights that vagueness, over-conceptualisation and overstatement are a feature of the good governance debate. 'Good governance' is certainly an attractive and useful concept within debates on social and economic development, but before this concept is invoked, it is wise to first consider its ill-defined and ephemeral nature. The real world manifestation of 'good governance' has to be nailed down for this concept to have any practical utility. It is thus to the thesis' case study international organisation – the European Union – that this literature review chapter now turns. How does the EU define 'good governance'? This is ascertained through analysing the EU's own literature and documentation.

### **The European Union's concept of 'good governance'**

The European Union puts 'good governance' at the heart of its goal of promoting economic and social development, both amongst member states and in its external relations. As early as November 1991, for instance, the European Council adopted a resolution that stated;

The Council stresses the importance of good governance. While sovereign states have the rights to institute their own administrative structures and establish their own constitutional arrangements, equitable development can only effectively be achieved if a number of general principles are adhered to: sensible economic and social policies, democratic decision making, adequate governmental transparency and financial accountability, creation of market-friendly environment for development, measures to combat corruption, as well as respect for rule of law, human rights and freedom of the press and expression (European Council 1991: 2)



It is also evident that the EU has a problem solving conceptual approach to good governance, sharing the Washington consensus. As explained in a European Commission (1998:4) communication to the Council and Parliament:

Good governance refers to the transparent and accountable management of all country resources for its equitable and sustainable economic and social development. The concept of good governance remains implicit in the political and institutional environment respecting human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. But it takes specific account of the role of the authorities in managing resources, promoting a favourable climate for economic and social initiatives and deciding how to allocate resources. Good governance therefore implies the existence of competent and effective institutions respecting democratic principles. The concept therefore extends the aims of democratisation into the sphere of resource management.

Under the Cotonou Agreement signed between the EU members states and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, the fifteen EU member states at this time (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom) pushed for good governance to be included as an ‘essential element’ of the agreement. After extensive negotiations, ACP representatives downgraded this phrase ‘essential element’ to a ‘fundamental element’, yet good governance was now an important goal and measurement of the EU’s relationship with its ACP partners (European Commission 2000: 9). Article 9.3 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement read:

Good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic, and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources, and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming at preventing and combating corruption (European Commission 2000: 9)

The EU’s own literature on good governance is rarely nuanced or critical. Good governance is promoted as a self-evident common sense tool to overcome obstacles to development. This approach fits very much the problem solving school highlighted above. The EU’s *Handbook on Good Governance* (2004), written as a guide for EU officials, for example, juxtaposed the fortunes of Zimbabwe and Botswana. Zimbabwe, despite a post-independence economic boom, had squandered this development through bad governance. The *Handbook* concluded, ‘with continuing violence’ and poor ‘human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, public finance management and overall lack of good governance, the outlook of Zimbabwe is very bleak’ (p. 2). Botswana, on the other hand, at the time of independence was faced with serious challenges. Despite this handicap, the *Handbook* observed how Botswana enjoyed constitutional government since decolonisation, underwritten by free and fair elections,

human rights, and rule of law. The *Handbook* explicitly links Botswana's commitment to good governance with this state's relatively successful economic development. Other variables that may have explained these contrasting fortunes are not discussed in the *Handbook*.

For the EU's *Handbook on Good Governance*, then, good governance concerns the state's ability to serve its citizens. It refers to the rules, process, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. Despite this concept's 'open and broad character' (p. x), good governance is a key component for securing poverty reduction and sustainable development.

The European Union's understanding of 'good governance' has not been static. From 2005, responding to criticism (identified above), the EU began efforts to build stakeholder support for the concept of good governance. It was recognised that good governance could not be imposed by external power but instead needed to grow organically within societies. The EU therefore began to adopt a more supportive role. In 2005, the European Commission let it be known that:

Good governance is a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. Good governance is no longer a vague concept imposed by the EU and other Western countries. But rather, the European Union will provide support for the implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism which serves an important tool for monitoring good governance on the continent. One central element of good governance process is the establishment and strengthening of credible national institutions, such as parliamentary, Judiciary system, police, and management of public finances - at the central, regional, and local level (2005:4)

In a 2006 joint communication from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the European Regions, the EU emphasized that its concept of good governance had moved beyond simple anti-corruption drives. This communiqué read;

Good governance is more than tackling corruption. Though the EU takes an extremely firm stance on this matter, viewing corruption as a major obstacle to achieving development goals, it nevertheless sees it as symptoms of poor governance and of a lack of transparent, accountable management and control systems. Tackling corruption must not be addressed in isolation but integrated into development and poverty reduction strategies and into support for the process of democratic governance. This means strengthening the role of civil society and the media protection for multiparty democracy and electoral competition, a transparent system for financial political parties and support for parliamentary oversight and for other judicial institutions (2006: 5-6)

The Commission further purported that democratic governance should not be compartmentalized but rather approached holistically because it linked into other sectors of

the economy. That is, good governance helps to create a ‘better environment conducive for sustainable economic growth, development, and private investment into the economy’ (European Commission 2006: 5-6).

Thus ‘good governance’ had become measure of performance, with external partners needing to prove progress in order to access further EU development assistance funding. Indeed, by 2012, good governance had become a condition of future cooperation. The Council of the European Union (2012: 2-3) emphasised that it would support partners in the fields of poverty reduction and sustainable development, but it could only do this if recipient states made progress on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. This meant that EU development support would only be provided when there was trust, and with objectives set based on shared values of good governance. To that effect, if it was deemed that governance standards were deteriorating, the EU made it known that it would reassess its development budget support.

In short, this section shows that the EU, in its own literature, put considerable emphasis on ‘good governance’ being at the heart of its external relations. This institution saw good governance as a key driver of economic and social development. Just like the Washington Consensus theorists above, the European Union considered building governance through institutional reform as an essential path to greater prosperity for all. In this respect, the EU aligned itself with the problem solving school. What is absent in the EU literature, however, are more critical voices. EU policy may have evolved, after 2010, in an attempt to broaden its remit, and to engage with civil society groups within target states, but there is little debate in EU documents on structural problems within host societies, and how best good governance could address these. Indeed, in this literature ‘good governance’, as a concept in itself, is rarely questioned. This lack of critical voices has been picked up by academics assessing EU good governance policy.

### **Critiques of EU good governance policy**

Critiques of this EU good governance policy are limited in number. Within the academic literature, one can find research that incorporates elements of good governance policy – civil society capacity building in Eastern Europe (Parau 2009), for example, or the EU human rights interest in Turkey with respect to possible accession (Seyrek 2012) – but few scholars

have addressed EU good governance policy holistically and directly. Those that have done this have concentrated on three issues: the question of the EU failing to push a good governance agenda in states where to do so may endanger other European interests (inconsistency); the EU pushing its own agenda, rather than promoting locally founded good governance (self-interest); and the lack of coherence surrounding EU good governance policy (vagueness).

### ***The inconsistency argument***

A number of scholars have charged the European Union with being inconsistent over where it demands or fosters good governance. It is argued, that where EU economic, political, or security interests may be compromised by good governance campaigning, there is corresponding break placed on the promotion of good governance. One of the key proponents of this line of thought is Algieri (1999). Drawing upon empirical evidence, Algieri (1999: 90-91) reasoned that because China is of significant economic value to the EU, and a security rival, Brussels' good governance approach toward this state is incoherent. Following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, for example, the EU decided to apply sanctions on China. Yet, due to the significant economic interests amongst member states, the component parts of the EU could not sing from one hymn sheet. Whilst France pushed for sanctions, Germany and Italy were pressured by their business communities to normalize relations. In the meantime, the United Kingdom continued its bilateral relations with China with an eye on its interests in Hong Kong. Sanctions were lifted after Chinese cooperation over the First Gulf War, and China and the EU went on to build the trading relations enjoyed today (Algieri 1999: 92). The 'good governance' agenda plays no part in this relationship. The charge is that the EU would have referred to more to its good governance policy if lesser economic and security interests were at stake.

Crawford (2008) advanced a similar argument. In one of the most detailed assessments of the EU good governance approach, using a Central Asian case study, Crawford suggests that the implementation of EU good governance in the region has been, at very best, statements of principle undermined by inaction (p.175). Crawford (2008: 177) emphasises that the EU human rights and democracy promotion is high in rhetoric but very limited in reality. In the aftermath of the Andijan Massacre in Uzbekistan in May 2005, for example, where up to 750 unarmed civilians were killed as a consequence of government suppression, for example, the

EU failed to act. At the same time, during a subsequent Uzbek crackdown on human rights and independent journalists, coordinated action was lacking from member states. Despite the common position agreed by the EU to place an embargo on Uzbekistan, combined with a visa ban on Uzbek officials from 2005 to 2007, diplomatic sanctions soon had to be removed due to the strategic interests of powerful EU players, most notably Germany. German troops were stationed at an Uzbek military base. This interest took precedence over confronting the Uzbek government, forcing it to address good governance issues (Crawford 2008: 177).

Also, energy interests held sway in this region. The energy needs of EU members and European commercial interests were of a higher significance than the desire to promote good governance in Central Asia. Crawford (2008: 177) highlights that the European Union was willing to issue Common Foreign and Security Policy statements of censure concerning human rights and democracy failings in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with the aim of encouraging political dialogue between these countries and the EU. By contrast, Kazakhstan was not singled out in this manner, despite a similar good governance record to its neighbours. Kazakhstan was the biggest gas and oil producer amongst these four states (Crawford, 2008: 178).

Crawford also highlights, from 2002 to 2007, the EU failed to mainstream human rights and democracy as part of its bilateral relations in Central Asia, even though a Commission communication of 2001 instructed officials to do so. Rather, EU-Central Asia assistance focused on the promotion of trade and investment in the oil and gas sector. European private corporate interests trading with this region received a total of €74 million in EU grants during this period. Additionally, a further €112 million were allocated to the region addressing other EU agendas, notably organized crime, migration, and asylum management (Crawford, 2008: 178).

Hoffmann (2010) also argues that, even though good governance remained part of EU ambitions in the Central Asia region, the EU's emphasis was placed on security, energy and trade interests first. Post 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan, the Central Asia sub-region increased in strategic value to the West. EU military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan expanded as a result of the EU member states' involvement in the Afghanistan war. EU energy interests in the region also enlarged, with the EU helping to construct the Nabucco gas pipeline. Hoffmann (2010: 99) demonstrates how a wide range of good governance initiatives were downgraded for the sake of strategic interests at this time. In

2007, for example, as a consequence of human rights dialogue between the EU and Uzbekistan, the EU had initially proposed a range of human rights initiatives seeking to bolster freedom of speech and freedom of the media. Even though the Uzbek Government accepted the policy initiative, this agreement resulted in no reforms. The Uzbek government continued to tightly control civil society and media houses. Similarly, a number of good governance and trade initiatives were announced after a round table discussion between the EU and the Uzbek government in 2009. Trade expanded, but the EU failed to act when the Uzbek government reneged on the good governance element of this package. Like Crawford, Hoffmann concluded that, although good governance was a rhetorical aspect of EU external relations in Central Asia, this element of external policy was frequently downgraded if there was any danger other EU interests could be damaged.

### ***EU self-interest: a lack of local ownership***

Another criticism of EU good governance policy is its failure to accept or nurture local ownership and consultation. According to these critiques, the implementation of EU good governance policy is not sufficiently respectful of local cultures or interests. Rather, the EU hides behind good governance principles in order to impose its own model of development. In this respect, like Abrahamsen (2000) and Taylor (2004) above, Slocum-Bradley and Bradley (2010) maintain that the good governance policy adopted and implemented by the European Union is contradictory in a number of cases, and the instruments used are not necessarily favourable to the development of ACP countries. These authors came to this conclusion after analysing three EU governance instruments: the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the European Development Fund (EDF), and the 2008 revision of the Cotonou Agreement. In each case, Slocum-Bradley and Bradley documented how these instruments are a product of Brussels' interests, more than their partner states. Taking one instance as an example, these authors noted how the revised Cotonou Agreement includes an article on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This issue is very low down on the agendas' of ACP states, and not much to do with this agreement's overall objectives, yet the article was adopted. Effectively, EU negotiators offered the ACP countries a trade package whereby multi-annual financial payments would be provided on the condition that the ACP states accept the inclusion of this provision. The ACP states had little choice but to do this. Such are results of negotiations between politically and economically unequal

partners. This led Slocum-Bradley and Bradley to conclude that, with these three instruments, the EU routinely sacrificed local ownership in order to realise its own negotiating objectives.

The Catholic campaigning group CIDSE (2006) has likewise highlighted instances of the European Union failing to nurture local ownership of its good governance programmes. This organisation argues that the European Commission unilaterally defines good governance goals and performance indicators. Time and space allocated for meaningful inputs from the partner countries is limited (CIDSE, 2006: 2). Drawing upon evidence from Zambia, for example, CIDSE charts how the European Union imposed its own priorities over those of the Government of Zambia. The Government of Zambia chose education to be a priority in these good governance negotiations. The European Union rejected this focus, instead requiring public administration reform to be of central importance. This core aim was imposed without significant consultation with the Government of Zambia (CIDSE 2006). Whether or not this choice of priorities was better for securing good governance, it was clear that the EU's willingness to cede local ownership was limited.

In short, these authors argue that the EU implementation of good governance is not always in the interest of host countries, nor do host government and societies have a meaningful input into defining what good governance is, or what it should prioritise. This 'lack of local ownership' is, again, a theme that resonates with this thesis' own research findings. As it will be seen below, the Ghana case study also saw Brussels fail to build a good governance partnership based on consultation and shared interests.

### ***The vagueness of EU good governance policy***

Even though the problem solving approach influences the literature on the EU's good governance policy, and critical thinkers raise fundamental issues of importance, it is the more empirical approach of the 'sceptics', highlighting the problems of multiple definitions, over emphasis and over-conceptualisation, that dominate this small body of work

Grindle (2007), and Rostein and Teorell (2008), as discussed above, set out the theoretical limitations of the concept of 'good governance'. Wetzal and Orbie (2012:2) add empirical data to this argument, using the EU as a case study. According to these authors, for more than two decades, the European Union has committed itself to promoting democracy in other parts of the world. This promotion is directed by EU's own initiatives such as the 'Partnership for

Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, and its ‘Strategic Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’. Despite the growing importance of good governance in the EU’s external relations, policy goals remained vague. For example, Wetzel and Orbie point to different EU officials defining democratic governance differently. Senior officials, such as Catherine Ashton, former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for instance, defined democratic governance in terms of gender, civil society and private investments, the EU’s governing ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, on the other hand, failed elaborate at all on the substance of what should actually be promoted. Even the EU’s own enlargement process, incorporating new member states from eastern Europe, which is often considered as a prime example of successful democracy promotion, demonstrated inconsistencies, with the EU often failing to provide details over what the democratic conditions of accession actually meant in reality (Wetzel and Orbie 2012:2)

Beyond the EU’s vague conceptual definition, Wetzel and Orbie (2012) also maintain that EU good governance policies remain unclear in practice. For instance, democratic governance projects in the Congo and Rwanda are implemented under a banner of security sector reform. These projects seek to promote security by strengthening democracy. Yet, nowhere in the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy is security sector reform addressed. This is just another example of an EU external assistance project being unthinkingly labelled ‘good governance’.

Wetzel and Orbie (2012) conclude that the EU’s poor conceptualisation of what constitutes good governance, and its vague notions of how this concept should be implemented as policy, are underlined by three obvious failures. First, the EU does not define what it considers to be the relationship between democracy and human rights. Most EU documents simply lump ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ together without any thought over the distinction between these two concepts. Even though there are aspects of democracy that have a direct connection to human rights, and vice versa, these are absolutely two different phenomenon. Each needs a nuanced and dedicated policy of its own, if they are to be successfully promoted. Secondly, the EU collects together under a generic banner of ‘good governance’ policy initiatives that may have no direct relationship to good governance. Again, socio-economic development projects addressing issues of poverty reduction and social and economic redistribution, in the areas of health and education perhaps, may have an impact on good governance, but there is no automatic connection. It is not helpful to classify all development assistance projects as



‘good governance’ initiatives. Thirdly, Wetzel and Orbie maintain that good governance must promote an independent judiciary and political accountability. As we have seen, the EU, on occasions, overlooked failure in this area when broader liberal reforms of the economy were gaining traction. For instance, much of the EU support in North Africa and the Middle East, pre-Arab spring, concerned economic liberation, not democracy. Yet, the label was still ‘good governance’. Therefore, Wetzel and Orbie (2012) conclude that, for EU good governance support to have any meaning, the concept should first be defined clearly.

Also members of this more sceptical school of thought, Isa and Nogal (2016:7) similarly argue that

one of the most puzzling features of the EU’s action in the field of human rights and democracy is the lack of conceptual clarity. Even though the EU’s understanding of human rights and democracy have a grounding in international human rights law, its conceptual approach to democracy and human rights remains vague, inconsistent, ambiguous, and unleashes competing visions.

Even though the EU has formulated strategic plans on human rights and democracy, it is still unclear what the EU really wants to achieve in these fields. They argue, while the promotion of human rights is an elementary ingredient for democracy, evidence shows that not all EU human rights projects are favourable for promoting good governance. Isa and Nogal point to the southern Mediterranean region. Here the EU prioritised human rights projects in the area of children and women’s rights; however, these projects tended to be less relevant to democracy promotion (as children do not vote and the women’s rights were focussed on economics). Human rights projects promoting freedom of expression and participation are perhaps controversial, and more difficult to implement, but are more important for the promotion of good governance.

There is therefore a strong sceptical school found in the literature addressing the empirical performance of EU good governance policy. Much of this work focusses on the conceptual weakness of this ill-defined policy. The conclusions of this scholarship are supported by the research findings presented in the main body of this thesis. The Ghana case study also found EU good governance policy to be confused and muddled, which had practical implications in this policy’s implementation. Conceptual weaknesses led directly to the flaws of mission creep, a lack of local ownership, a failure to confront the Government of Ghana, and policy that failed to get to grips with structural social and economic obstacles.

## **European Union good governance policy in Ghana**

Given the focus of this thesis is EU good governance policy in Ghana, the current chapter would be incomplete without reviewing any existing literature directly addressing this policy. This body of work is confined to two authors.

Akin to the Washington consensus, Champagne (2016) uses her work to identify the different types of instruments the European Union utilises to promote good governance in Ghana. Champagne categorises these projects into policy-reform-enabling support, legislative safeguarding, the promotion of checks and balances, institutional capacity building, and effective enforcement of financial governance assistance.

Champagne's work is mostly confined to simply documenting what policy has been implemented in Ghana. Under the 'policy-reform-enabling support' heading, for example, this author highlights that the European Union has encouraged the use of policy frameworks that share expertise based on international norms and practice. When it comes to legislative safeguarding, she notes the European Union supports the development of vigorous legislative work through the local Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). This survey continues by noting the European Union has put checks and balances at the heart of promoting good governance to compensate for an excessive executive. To this effect, the European Union is tackling three main challenges in particular; a weak parliament, the fragmentation of civil society and a lack of media independence. Under institutional capacity-building, Champagne identifies a significant portion of European Union development assistance within organisations such as Ghana Audit Service, the Electoral Commission of Ghana, the Ghana Media Commission, and the National Commission for Civic Education. Continuing this policy survey, Champagne argues that 'effective enforcement' is supplied by the European Union also working with civil society organisations to ensure that Government of Ghana/European Union projects are implemented effectively (Champagne 2016: 33-34).

In assessing the European Union's good governance policy in Ghana, Champagne suggests these initiatives have yielded a positive impact in terms of development. For instance, the EU support to civil society organisations allowed these CSO's to implement projects effectively, which in the long run promoted development at the local level. Even though Champagne's analysis lacks any significant data, her conclusion is that EU good governance policy has netted encouraging results in that macro-economic and social indicators are improving. Cause

and effect are not studied closely, and the problem solving approach judges the actions of institutions involved at face value.

In contrast to Champagne, Gordon Crawford takes a more critical (thinking) approach. Crawford (2005), based on evidence drawn from a desk-based survey of EU programmes in Ghana, contends that the EU's promotion of good governance in Ghana is high in rhetoric, but low in achievement. He characterises Brussels' work in this field as 'weak in implementation and poor in performance' (p.30), observing that, given that Ghana was a high profile partner, and ripe for democratic assistance, it is a surprising how 'limited' the European Union's intervention actually was (p.27). At the heart of Crawford's argument is the idea that the EU's decision to put most of its good governance resources into 'decentralisation programmes' and 'public sector reform' was an ideological choice, primarily serving the EU's own agenda. By focussing on these two sectors, an opportunity was missed to reform central state institutions that could have had most impact on consolidating democratic practise in Ghana. Crawford is of the opinion that this emphasis on support for non-state actors was borne out of anti-statism and neo-liberal thinking, ruling out a more holistic approach for reforming Ghana's political culture. The EU shied away from opportunities whereby it could support state institutions in order to help deliver democratic reform. Civil society groups should certainly be encouraged and funded, helping to increase political accountability, but this civil society support should not be at the price of ignoring the state's potential for delivering democratic transition. In the EU's eyes, democracy would best be encouraged by building pressure from below, rather than building central government legislative and executive capacity in this field. Thus, the EU did not progress beyond its belief that the state was to be slimmed down, in all its functions. In Crawford's own words,

the particular form of liberal democracy promoted [by the EU] is one that emphasises the liberal over the democratic component. Rather than seekign the extension of popular control over decision making, it can be seen as part of wider efforts by Western governmetns to re-constitue state and state-society relation in Africa in a manner consistent with the continued promotion of neo-liberal hegemony (p. 31)

## **Conclusion**

When it comes to assessing EU good governance in Ghana, in reality, previous scholarship tells us little about the successes and failures of this EU initiative. Champagne (2016) and Crawford (2005) have made a start, but there is no sustained critique of this policy available. The same is largely true for a broader critique of the EU's good governance policy. A few

case studies are available, but only tentative conclusions may be drawn over whether, or not, the European Union has had a positive impact, globally, in terms of promoting good governance. We have little evidence to hold the European Union accountable for its actions, either in Ghana or beyond, nor do we have substantial findings to feed back into the broader debate over the utility of good governance as a concept.


The above literature review demonstrates that arguments and opinions addressing good governance are substantially adrift from empirical data that could provide the basis for a more scientific assessment. This is what this thesis is about. The thesis intends to start to plug the gap in this literature by providing data that can test the European Union's claims about its own policy, and assess the views of local stakeholders. Building this empirical knowledge will permit the thesis to feed back into the broader debates on good governance. Given that this conceptual debate itself is starved of real-world examples, and, from a policy point of view, already over-conceptualised, the current research is timely. As it will be seen, the evidence presented below suggests that EU policy, although netting some positive outcomes, was fundamentally flawed. These flaws themselves stemmed from conceptual failings. It should therefore come as no surprise that this thesis's research findings, in terms of these broader conceptual frameworks, minimally support the problem solving approach, share more ground with the critical thinkers, but fall squarely behind those more sceptical scholars pointing to the current conceptual vagueness, and the limited practical utility, of good governance as a concept.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **METHODOLOGY**

This chapter outlines the nature and scope of the research methods employed by the thesis to assess EU good governance policy towards Ghana between 2000 and 2013. Having established in the literature review that the good governance debate is ‘theory rich but data poor’, this part of thesis reveals the methodology developed to capture and analyse new, much needed, empirical data. The chapter begins with a consideration of the conceptual framework of the research. The rationale for the choice of a qualitative approach is then discussed in the next section. Section three of the chapter explains the value of adopting a case study approach. This section discusses why the EU and Ghana were chosen as appropriate subjects, alongside discussing an inherent problem of cases studies: judging whether findings from these are representative or exceptional. Next, the methods and tools used in the data collection are explained, most notably highlighting the approach adopted for informant sampling and conducting interviews. The fifth section will look at the methods deployed for data analysis. This is followed by an explanation of the measures taken by the thesis to enhance the reliability and validity of this analysis. The final section then concentrates on ethical considerations. Taken together, these seven sections give a comprehensive overview of the methodology underpinning the research findings.

**Table 3.1 Research methodology process flow chart**



### Conceptual framework

Having examined in some detail, in the previous chapter, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that currently dominate the good governance literature, it is worth first outlining how this debate informed the methodology of this research. To what extent did the thesis' research take a problem solving or critical thinking approach? How relevant is the more sceptical body of work emphasising the ill-defined and over-conceptualised nature of 'good governance'? Has the study its own conceptual framework?

The research recognised the value of limiting its scope to a manageable set of variables, as advocated by scholars taking a problem solving approach. It acknowledges that "the strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination". (Cox and Sinclair 1996:88) Yet, this thesis shies away from limiting its scrutiny to state dynamics and formal institutional relations. It is evident from the literature that wider social and economic relations play too great a part in

determining the nature and benefit of good governance. Broader societal drivers cannot be ignored. Instead, the research has been made manageable and sufficiently focussed through adopting a case study methodology (discussed below) rather than doing this via a blinkered conceptual approach.

Likewise, the research has been informed by those scholars taking a critical thinking approach to good governance. Following Davies (2014) advice, the thesis absolutely did not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but rather calls them in to question. The existing literature successfully shows that ‘good governance’ programmes cannot be taken at face value, as those adhering to the Washington and Post-Washington consensus would advocate. There is too much evidence suggesting that external powers fail to maximise good governance, and instead serve their own interests alongside those their intended ‘beneficiaries’. This research, from the outset, was aware that the view of good governance, as promoted by the Washington consensus, was not universally accepted. In this respect, the research has taken a critical approach.

The methodology adopted by this research also acknowledges the existing work on the ‘vagueness’ and ‘overemphasis’ of good governance identified by more sceptical scholars. With no generally accepted definition of this concept, a methodology was adopted that would heed Rostein and Teorell’s (2008) warnings that good governance sometimes generates tautological explanations and results in meaningless policy implementation. In this respect, a view was taken that the above problem-solving and critical thinking theoretical frameworks are only of relevance if they help explain real world events and processes. Likewise, the research started from a position that ‘good governance’ itself is only useful as a concept or policy foundation if it improves governance, as evidenced by a net improvement in real peoples’ life experiences.

Indeed, although acknowledging the value of these theoretical/conceptual debates, and the influence they have had on this research, the overwhelming finding from the literature review was that the current good governance debate does not rest on a sufficient foundation of empirical data. Scholars are largely debating ideas in an abstract form. All too often no real-world evidence is offered to support arguments. Empirical evidence is absent from this contest of ideology and theory. Thus, this thesis is about trying to provide such evidence. The dominant overriding research framework, in this sense, is ‘empiricism’.

Empiricism is research that emphasises the role of experience and evidence in the formation of ideas. Empiricists argue that the only knowledge humans can trust is that based on experience, observations or sensory data. Consequently, theoretical insights or intuition are unreliable (Hjorland 2005:130). The search for empiricism can be traced back to ancient times, with the work of Aristotle and theological scholars (Hindu, Muslim and Christian) being prominent (Davies 2003). Empiricism's relationship with political analysis emerged in Renaissance Italy, most notably with Machiavelli's 'realistic account' of statecraft in which he argued that 'the real should override the ideas' (Warburton et al. 2006:6). This approach underpinned Enlightenment thinking too. French political philosopher Montesquieu (1823), for example, in his 1748 *Spirit of the Laws*, likewise advocated that the human understanding of politics should be based on actual systems and their functions. In more modern times, Lawsell (2002:286) explained that empiricism is an ideal method for understanding policymaking as it relies upon undisputed facts as the basis of knowledge.

Empiricism is the 'theoretical framework' adopted by the current thesis. Having been influenced by the literature's conceptual and theoretical debates on good governance, rather than be led by them, this thesis tests the application of 'good governance' in the real world, analysing the impact of a (foreign) policy implemented in its name. The focus is assessing whether or not this policy was of benefit, and to whom. The thesis is about whether this case study of good governance policy meets its self-proclaimed goals.

## **A qualitative approach**

The methodology built to deliver this empirical study revolves around a case study qualitative approach. This method was chosen because it was the best means for capturing a diversity of relevant 'real world' opinion. Qualitative research is concerned with the subjective world and offers insight into social, emotional, and experiential phenomena. The aim is to draw out understandings and perceptions, to explore the features of settings and culture, and to understand the linkages between process and outcomes (Bogdan and Taylor 1987). Qualitative researchers, in this respect, investigate the meanings people attribute to behaviour and actions. In social science, it is qualitative research that can illuminate why society is as it is by going directly to the source: the people themselves (Savin-Baden and Major 2013). What better way to identify the goals, problems and successes of good governance policy



than to ask policy makers, implementers and recipients of this policy their own opinion on such policies and policy outcomes?

Creswell (2014:4) identified two major benefits associated with qualitative research. First, it produces an in-depth account of informants' feelings, opinions and experiences. This approach therefore highlights the relationship between information process and performance. Secondly, qualitative research offers the researcher a holistic opportunity to understand informant experience in a specific setting. Consequently, the thesis was able to collect data addressing thematic-related variables. Another advantage of the qualitative approach is that it fosters broad and open-ended inquiry, which allows participants to articulate their own interpretation of events, not having to express this as a pre-determined value (Choy 2014:102; 2011:18; 2014:402). The problems of research based on pre-conceptions or employing a narrow conceptual framework are thus avoided.

Qualitative research also made sense for this thesis because the aim was not only to seek multiple 'elite' views on the EU good governance policy in Ghana but also work from bottom-up capturing the views and experiences of policy recipients, building a broader understanding of the policy implemented. This meant the research was able to go beyond narrow figures and statistics generated by official bodies (see Denzin and Lincoln 1994:2; Soiferman and Manitoba 2010:3; Kelly: 2011).

Quantitative research methods were considered at the initial research design stage of this project, in order to identify any relationships between variables measured numerically and analysed statistically (Martin and Bridgmon 2012). If sufficient statistical data could be collected this would have been a powerful method to assess the performance of EU good governance policy. However, in reality, this approach was not followed through because accumulating the quantity of data needed in order to provide meaningful findings would be difficult in the Ghanaian context. There is limited official data published in this format. Likewise, it was judged that generating substitute, original, statistical evidence, on a scale needed to match potential successes of qualitative methods, to be beyond the scope of a single researcher in the time period available (see Flicks 2004:542). It was therefore decided that, with the resources to hand, better quality data could be generated by qualitatively exploring participants' and stakeholders' experiences and opinions on European Union's good governance policy through qualitative methods.

## **A case study method**

At the heart of this research is a case study. Mitchell (1983: 192) defines a case study as a 'detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical principles'. Yin (2009:18), by contrast, takes a more empirical perspective, defining this method as 'as an inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not evident'. Simons and Woodside share this more practical approach. Simons (2009: 21) sees case studies as an, 'in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexities and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program[me] or system of real life'. Woodside (2010:1) emphasises that 'case study research is an inquiry that focuses on describing and understanding.'

The benefits of a case study approach for the researcher are several. Both Eisenhardt (1989) and Merriam (1994) point to case studies being able to accommodate and combine multiple methods of data collection. This aids data analysis based on triangulation (see below). The findings of one method can be tested against another. Case studies are also an approach associated with obtaining a relatively high volume of detailed and relevant data. This volume and detail increases the chances of validity (Jacobsen: 2002). Flyvbjerg (2006:235; 2011:309) suggests 'the advantage of a case study is that it can "close in" on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice'. In this respect, case studies, at their best, encourage an open approach and are distanced from pre-conceived ideas. The relatively deep level of inquiry often results in researchers finding information, and revealing outcomes, that were not anticipated at the beginning of the fieldwork (Merriam: 2009). These multiple benefits of a case study approach thus permit the production of accurate 'detailed qualitative accounts' which 'not only help to explore or describe the data in a real-life environment, but also help to explain the complexities of real-life situations which may not captured through experimental or survey research' (Zainal 2007:4).

Despite these advantages, the case study approach is not without its critics. Garber (2013), for example, argues that because the case study researcher becomes part of the research, the researcher may subconsciously guide the subjects towards the expected results. Yin also highlights that case studies are often accused of lack of rigour. Faced with a vast volume of evidence, 'the case study investigator has been sloppy' and has allowed 'equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions' (Yin 1984:21).

This why case studies are best conducted with an open mind, with research findings relying on the triangulation of a considerable volume of data collected from multiple methods.

### *The selection of the European Union and Ghana as the objects of the research*

Having ascertained that a case study approach was best method for generating empirical data in order to assess ‘good governance’ as a focus of foreign policy, two subjects were selected: the good governance policy initiator (the European Union) and the recipient state (Ghana). The EU was chosen as appropriate case study subject as this institution is a leading advocate for ‘good governance’. Brussels enthusiastically promotes this concept through its external policy. This supranational body sees itself as ‘helping to build peaceful and inclusive societies’ and readily affirms its support for developing ‘good governance worldwide’ (European Commission 2019:55). Although this style of rhetoric can be found in statements of other international institutions, and amongst Western states alike, the EU took the lead in consciously writing ‘good governance’ into its external policy. More so than its allies, Brussels made good governance (human rights, democracy, the rule of law and efficient public policy) a condition of agreements signed with external partners (the Cotonou Agreements, for example). As it was seen above, after 2000, good governance became an integral part of the EU’s foreign policy, and it backed this undertaking with considerable funding and personnel resources. In short, The European Union’s commitment to this concept was not just rhetorical. There was a material policy underpinned by resources, combined with a commitment of policy implementation. This made the EU an ideal subject for the case study approach. There was a tangible policy to evaluate and hold to account.

Ghana was selected as the recipient state for the case study because Ghana, on paper, looks like an ideal candidate that would be receptive to, and could benefit from, external good governance support. This state has made remarkable progress from an authoritarianism to a more liberal political culture during the last quarter of a century. Rather than enduring multiple coup d’état and poor political representation, as was the case in the first four decades after independence, Ghana in the twenty-first century has enjoyed seven successful elections, with power changing between competing political parties four times (Gyimah-Boadi 2012:1). Today, the World Bank’s assessment of Ghana reads:

In the past two decades, it has taken major strides toward democracy under a multi-party system, with its independent judiciary winning public trust. Ghana consistently ranks in the

top three countries in Africa for freedom of speech and press freedom, with strong broadcast media, with radio being the medium with the greatest reach. Factors such as these provide Ghana with solid social capital (World Bank 2019)

The government in Accra too is committed to 'good governance'. President Kufuor, for example, himself made it known in 2005 that Ghana welcomed external scrutiny and assistance in this field. Such cooperation he said, 'demonstrates our commitment to democracy and good governance as prerequisites for development' (Harsch 2006). This position remained steadfast over a decade later. Minister Ishmael Ashitey re-iterated this now familiar mantra: 'The fundamental requirement for sustainable development is good governance' (Obeng 2017). Again, Ghana appears to be fertile ground for any policy programme seeking to promote good governance.

The case study selected, therefore, is EU good governance policy towards Ghana. This puts the research focus on a leading international organisation in this field cooperating with a recipient state avowedly open to, and ideologically committed to, this assistance. If good governance as a foreign policy driver is to perform well anywhere, it is here. Policy initiator, policy recipient and the host's public policy are all aligned in a favourable direction.

#### *Are case studies typical or exceptional?*

Scholars conducting case study research are always required to consider the contest between typicality and exceptionalism. This consideration should be considered during their choice of case study subject and when claiming significance for their research findings.

The first dilemma for the case study scholar is whether to select what the researcher considers to be a typical or unique unit of investigation. A typical case is the rough equivalent of the 'median value' in quantitative research (Campbell 2003). The advantage of using a typical case is that there is a greater chance of a more direct translation of results to other real-world examples, generating a greater acceptance of its representativeness. The idea is that an 'average subject' will create 'average results' with 'average relevance' to other cases. Yet, Sammat-Bonnia and Mcgee (2015:1) suggest that the researcher may deliberately select what they consider to be a unique subject: 'the basis for selecting the case [may be] that it is exceptional or unusual in its own right, without a critical comparison to an expected norm'. Case studies of this type provide unique data that can be used comparatively to help illuminate differences to the norm. Exceptional cases may be more effective for challenging

existing analytical assumptions and pushing theory forward. They may be considered the ‘exception that proves the rule’ (Campbell 2003:9). Of course, whether the scholar is seeking a ‘typical’ or ‘exceptional’ case as their subject, as this choice is made in advance of the research actually taking place, this makes the choice highly subjective. What was thought to be a ‘unique’ case may turn out to be ‘typical’, once the data is analysed, or vice versa. This is why the logic outlined in the previous section determined the choice of case study subjects for this thesis.

Indeed, after the data is collected, one may have a better idea of the subject unit’s ‘typical’ or ‘exceptional’ value, but even at this point a categorisation, if made in isolation, remains largely subjective. If only one unit of analysis has been assessed, the researcher is unsure whether the research findings are ‘typical or unique’. To what extent can these findings be extrapolated to other units of assessment?

One method to potentially increase typicality is to address multiple case studies in a programme of research. The more cases that can be studied, the more points of similarity can be identified. Yet, this cuts against the whole point of a case study. Case studies are about detailed investigation (Heart: 2017). They are about depth, not breadth. Research resources, especially in the context of a PhD project, spread over multiple units of investigation would result in multiple weak examples (Mathison 2005), rather than one data-rich case, and it is precisely this paucity of empirical data that the good governance debate currently lacks. This research thus made a conscious decision to risk theoretical parsimony in order to preserve empirical richness.

Researchers narrowing their case study to one unit of investigation, however, do have a responsibility to make their research findings relevant to other subjects. According to Campbell (2003:8), the scholar’s task in this instance is to make the single case as ‘modular and comparison-friendly as possible, using accepted variables and providing full disclosure of any extenuating circumstances regarding the case’. He suggests, given the limited availability of research resources, ‘that a well-done single case, presented in an easily translatable format, is more compelling and ultimately more useful than an anaemic set of multiple cases where the analysis is a superficial set of lowest common denominator comparisons’.

Hirschman sees a similar distinction in his classic attack on the preoccupation with searching for paradigms, arguing against a premature rush to look beyond the case to find underlying rules (Hirschman 1970). There is a divergence of intellectual motivations here (Campbell

2003). Is the researcher's task to produce a single in-depth case study seeking to distil a single underlying model (with modest, rational variations), or else to reveal a universal model from this data applicable to, in this instance, all external policies promoting good governance? The thesis took the view that its primary task was to produce sound research findings based on one case study. Its responsibilities beyond this were to compare these findings to other case studies found in the literature, helping to slowly build the volume of empirically based assessments of good governance policy. Likewise, tentative observations on the more conceptual side of the good governance debate are made. Yet, it is underlined at this point that such observations are tentative. Until there are multiple empirical case studies of good governance, conducted by multiple scholars, the charges (discussed above) that the good governance debate is 'over-conceptualised' will still ring true.

### **Data collection/fieldwork techniques**

Three main methods of primary data collection were employed to build this case study: face to face interviews, archive work and a newspaper survey.

#### *Interviews*

Interviews have long been an essential item in the research toolbox of social scientists. The interview is a principal method for qualitative researchers, often seen as the 'gold standard' for collecting primary data (Burnard 1994; Doody and Noonan 2013; Myers and Newman 2007; Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin 2009; Schultze and Avital 2011). Kazmer and Xie (2008:258) consider these exchanges to be 'the most direct, research-focused interaction between research and participant', while Pattern (2002:234) regards interviews as one of the best ways to 'enter into the other person's perspective'. Through organising this form of data collection, the thesis sought to understand interviewees' opinions, knowledge and insights concerning EU good governance policy in Ghana.

The interviews were conducted during three periods of fieldwork in Ghana (three trips of two weeks duration) and one period in Brussels (one trip of one week). The time expended on this fieldwork paid dividends, confirming Bailey's (1994:174-175) view, as it provided space for

flexibility, increased response rates, and allowed a greater command over the research environment. These interviews provided the researcher with a range of different opinions and viewpoints on EU good governance policy towards Ghana. Access was gained to representatives from all stakeholder groups (see below), whether these were policy makers, policy implementers or policy recipients. Importantly, the use of interviews offered opportunities for respondents to voice their own views on this policy, voices not previously recorded. The main objective of utilising interviews was therefore met: the capture opinion data not currently found in the existing literature (Henn el al 2006; Rapley 2004; Gubrium and Holstein 2002).

In conducting interviews, the thesis had the choice of using structured, semi-structured, or unstructured interviews. In a structured interview, questions are the same and asked in the same manner, regardless of the subject or the answers given. The main advantage of structured interviews is that they are easy to replicate, as a fixed set of closed questions are asked, which provides data that is easy to quantify. This, in turn, makes testing for reliability more straightforward. The main disadvantage of structured interviews is that questions cannot be asked impromptu, as the fixed interview schedule must be followed. This means the detail collected is limited. Opportunities will be lost to clarify why a subject holds a certain opinion (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Futing Liao 2004; Alsaawi 2004).

With unstructured interviews, the questions are not standardised. As no specific questions are predetermined, the answers of the interviewee guide the interviewer and there is complete freedom over the subject matter discussed. Qualitative data can be collected through the use of open questions. This allows the respondent to talk in some depth, choosing their own words, which helps the researcher develop a real sense of a person's understanding of a situation. The interviewer has the opportunity to probe for a deeper understanding, ask for clarification and allow the interviewee to steer the direction of the interview. The disadvantage of unstructured interviews comes with the data analysis. It is time consuming to triangulate patterns of comparison between subjects, and to validate this data, as the volume and range of information collected is much greater than that generated by structured interviews. (Ghauri and Gronhaug: 2002; McLeod 2014; Wellington and Szczerbinski: 2007).

Taking a middle path, semi-structured interviews were adopted for this method of data collection. The semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to ask the respondents open-ended questions rather than word for word questions (Estherby-Smith et al: 2002). This


method also created the opportunity to probe experts and policymakers in the field thoroughly. The interviewer was able to adjust the questions during the interview process based on answers to previous questions (Saunders: 2009; Winkler 2006: 122). Such probing helped minimise participants only sticking to set ‘official’ responses or only saying what they thought the interviewer wanted them to say, thereby making the interview data more trustworthy (Alvensson: 2002). Yet, some structure was imposed on the interviews. Questions were pre-prepared (based on the chapter structure seen below). This ensured the interviewer covered all the ground they needed to in order address all the relevant issues. Likewise, semi-structured interview questions resulted in some similarity in the data collected, making the analysis more manageable and therefore more accurate.

In terms of how these interviews worked in practice, initially, many interviewees were unwilling to partake freely in discussion. Many started by simply reciting ‘official positions’, rather than expressing their own opinions. However, after time, it was often possible to gain these subject’s trust. Assuring interviewees that the object of the exercise was not to ‘catch them out’ worked particularly well in the Ghanaian environment. After this initial trust-gaining introductory period, informants often become very open, and all allowed the use of a tape recorder during the interviews. Because policymakers and stakeholders had busy schedules, I made sure the questions were concise and precise (Boyce and Neale: 2006: 3). For instance, during my visit to the European Union offices in both Accra and Brussels, the interviewer was given only two hours, so the questions were targeted on key issues.


A total number of 102 participants were interviewed in Ghana and Brussels during the four fieldwork periods (a complete list of individual interviewees is contained in Appendix A). Respondents were approached because of their expertise, and evidence of engagement with, EU good governance policy in Ghana. The respondents included European Union diplomats, Government of Ghana officials, Ghanaian civil society organisation personnel, Ghanaian politicians and political agents, and Ghanaian community leaders (see tables 3.2 and 3.3 below). Interviews in Ghana were conducted across the country all ten of the country’s, in order to avoid any bias that may be introduced by concentrating just on officials based in Accra. The sample of those who agreed to be interviewed thus represents a full range of stakeholders involved in the formulation, implementation and outcomes of this policy. A broad collection of opinions were captured.



**Table 3.2 Categories and numbers of interviewees**



**Table 3.3 Categories of interviewees, by percentage**



In terms of arranging interviews with EU officials, emails were sent to request and set-up these meetings before travelling to Accra and Brussels. Even though these EU officials were receptive to these emails, they had to seek clearance from their superiors before the interviews were conducted. Once authorisation was granted, these individuals displayed no discernible hesitancy about voicing their views and opinions on their employer's policy of good governance, nor their own personal assessment of these policy's successes and failures.

Ghanaian government and civil society personnel were, on the whole, more suspicious of my initial emails, phone calls and visits. Many were, at first, reluctant to partake in interviews. However, after being reassured that this research was independent, and not part of a European Union performance review of their work, and the project genuinely sought to assess the merits, or otherwise, of good governance policies in Ghana, more of these subjects agreed to be interviewed. A greater number of civil society stakeholders participated in the research than state officials, but, again, a reasonable number of personnel from each category were interviewed. The researcher went into the field four times, and visited respondents in the ten regions of Ghana, meeting stakeholders in their towns and villages of work, to ensure this acceptable balance and volume of interviews took place.

### *Archive work (European Union document work)*

As the focus of the research is on EU good governance policy in Ghana, data collected from official documents of the European Union lay at the heart of this research. The approach was to identify the EU's own position on good governance, as it expressed this itself. As a starting point for the research, gaining an understanding of how the EU itself understood its policy and how this was implemented, and how this developed over time, was essential. To this effect, during the visits to Accra and Brussels, the EU's own physical archives were used to collect this data. These documents were then supplemented by resources obtained through an exhaustive search of the European Union's online document collections.

Access to the EU's historical archives is subject to a 30-year embargo for confidential items, but this institution is, in law, committed to transparency. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (United Kingdom 2008:4) commit's EU institutions to 'work as openly and as closely as possible to EU citizens'. As a rule, if meetings are open to the public, and policies discussed in public, the associated documentation is released into the public domain immediately. Key items collected in Brussels and Accra included EU handbooks on good governance, the European Commission's series of 'Communications' on good governance, European Commission staff working papers on good governance, and European Union delegation papers on good governance.

This 'hands on' work was supplemented by obtaining documents from the EU's own digital archives. Dedicated digital search engines for the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of Europe, the European External Action Service and the European Economic and Social Committee can be accessed through [https://europa.eu/european-union/documents-publications/official-documents\\_en..](https://europa.eu/european-union/documents-publications/official-documents_en..)

Documents harvested from each of these institutions helped to build a picture identifying the nature of the European Union's good governance policy. Also, these sources charted how the EU's good governance policy changed over the years.

The advantage of assessing written policy archives, according to Weber (1986:957), is that these documents are persevered in their original or draft form. They are unmediated, and the information present within them exists in its 'purest state'. The researcher is effectively transferred back in time to the point of authorship and gains access to a 'first person' dissemination of meaning. Taking a different tack, Dooley (2015:5) points to the advantage

of the ‘unique expertise’ contained within archival documents. The authors of EU policy statements and position papers on good governance activities in Ghana were undoubtedly well informed about this subject, having expended considerable time and resources collecting data themselves and assessing the best course of action to take. The documents these officials wrote offer high quality analysis, written from a unique perspective. Bruce (2019: 14) makes a more practical observation about the benefits of using archives for research. He observes, ‘one advantage of using the archival research method is that the data have already been collected’. The data is relatively easy and inexpensive to access. The information is available to the researcher in one location, and has already been organised, to varying degrees, to aid the identification of relevant material, and if the material has been collected systematically, this aids longitudinal study. Each of these three advantages benefitted the current research. What better place to start identifying the EU’s good governance position than interrogating its own unadulterated/unmediated documents? The EU’s approach to good governance, and the analysis that lay behind this strategy, was studied first-hand, and access to this data was relatively easily obtained through two physical archives and online search engines.

Despite the advantages that archival research methods bring, this approach does have its limitations. When using archives of this type, one has to remember that the documents available were created to solely aid the purposes of their creators and not the interests of posterity or the requirements of the researcher. Their relevance may be limited to the purpose they were written in this respect, so the researcher should not strain too hard to find meaning in every passage read. Alternatively, those documents that were written for public consumption should be treated as just that. Rather than being in ‘pure state’, the researcher must acknowledge any bias present in this communication, and any agenda that the document may have been produced to serve. One should also recognise that any archive, however well-constructed and maintained, will only represent a tiny proportion of the documents produced by an institution, and it contains an ‘infinitesimal proportion of the range of past thoughts, actions, reactions, and emotions’ (Lucas 1981:230) that were expended by individuals formulating and implementing a public policy. In this respect, no archive can be regarded as being a complete repository of human knowledge on any one subject. Then there is a question of the volume of material that must be analysed. Few researchers have the time to exhaustively identify and examine every single potentially relevant document for their research available in any one archive. Strategies of time saving therefore have to be deployed in selecting what material is examined. In doing this, the researcher must make sure they do


not misinterpret the data available by introducing bias through the volume or type of document selection strategy deployed.

### *Newspaper survey*

Another form of archival research undertaken by this thesis was a newspaper survey. Contemporaneous reports on EU good governance policy in Ghana were sought. As no reports on this policy were found in leading English language European newspapers, it was decided to concentrate this survey solely on Ghanaian publications. Three local media houses were visited in Accra, and their archives interrogated. The three publications/agencies selected, the state run Ghana News Agency, and the independent publications the *Daily Graphic* and the *Daily Guide*, are Ghana's leading newspapers. These national newspapers devote more time and space in their editions to political coverage than their local rivals, and so, by default, they were deemed most likely to cover stories on the EU's activity in the country.

The use of newspapers was useful in understanding local opinions and interests concerning EU good governance policy. It also gave a flavour of how this policy was implemented on the ground. This ties in with Tanackovic, Krtalic and Lacovic's (2014:2) view that newspapers reflect cultural and social values of a certain place and time and often offer unique information that cannot be found anywhere else. The survey conducted highlighted a 'local perspective' not found in the EU archives. Like all sources, newspapers can introduce bias in their reporting, with these publications often serving editorial policies. Newspaper testimony therefore needs to be treated with caution (Cassidy 2007; Whitlam and Preston 1998; Hassan, Wade and Wilkinson 2012). Yet, in term of capturing the local reaction to the European Unions external intervention in Ghanaian society, the work of these journalists proved most beneficial to the research.

**Table 3.4 Data analysis flow and process**



## **Data Analysis**

Data analysis refers to the means and process used to interpret or evaluate data collected. Analysing the data qualitatively entails a continuous in-depth process involving different layers of analysis, moving ever deeper to elicit a better understanding of the data collected and to develop meaningful research findings from this data (Crewswell:2003). According to Saunders and Thornhill (2012:546) the quality of qualitative research is based on the interaction between this data collection and analysis. Qualitative data analysis, therefore, involves drawing out patterns and themes of understanding from the insights captured. Importantly, qualitative data analysis requires processes and procedures whereby the researcher's analysis translates into explanations and understandings (Sunday: n.d).

By way of preparing the interview data for analysis, the interview recordings were transcribed into written form. Care was taken with the accuracy of transcribing word for word, alongside making sure identity of the interviewee associated with these new written records was maintained. Where there was a confidentiality agreement between the interviewer and the interviewee, this source was allocated a number in order to preserve anonymity. Although the transcription process was very time consuming, there was a major associated benefit with this process. The transcription involved close observation of data through repeated careful listening in order not to make mistakes. This was an important first step in the data analysis. This increased familiarity with the data, and attention to what was actually said rather than what was expected, facilitated initial realisations and ideas that were developed during the analysis stage (Bailey 2008).

Having all the raw data in a written word format, thematic analysis was then adopted guided by the thesis' key research objectives and questions. This 'thematic' approach describes a range of analytical procedures, focusing on matters to do with impression and interpretation of the data (Rosengren: 1981). In this case, the analysis focused most on the phrases and themes found within the text (Richardson 2007: 237). To that effect, the data was first sifted to identify common and similar patterns (Saldana: 2016). The transcripts of the interviews, and notes taken from the archive work and secondary sources, were read and re-read intensively to familiarise the author with the data (Cavanagh: 1997; Rosala: 2019). The data was then coded to look out for similar occurrences. Similar codes were aggregated to form significant themes. This task was made easier as the European Union had already divided its good governance approach into five 'clusters'. It was evident from an early stage of the data

processing that these clusters would form the main units of analysis. The task then became to identify sub-themes of explanation and argument within these clusters.

### *Coding*

To process the data scientifically, coding was put in place. This was done to look for common patterns and categorisation on which themes and arguments were built. The data collected were manually coded to search for relevant quotes, patterns, and themes. Alongside the archive notes, the interview transcripts from the EU diplomats, the Government of Ghana officials, community stakeholders, civil society organisations, and political agents were read, coded and interpreted. Each sentence and paragraph was examined for meaning. The data was coded to recognise the themes and patterns of the European Union's good governance policy in Ghana. The coding technique was used to allow the codes to act as links between the data collected and the theoretical framework (Atkinson: 1996). The coding process thus served as a vital role in identifying relevant commonalities, difference, patterns, and structures (Seidel and Kelle: 1995). The coding was also useful to organise the data so it would have meaning for external audiences (Gough and Scott: 2000)

In order to code, a hierarchy was generated for the findings of the research. Poole and Lampard (2002) argued that there are different traditions used in analysing qualitative data; whatever the path taken, however, effectiveness is dependent on 'complete coding'. They continued:

By coding and sorting the data, we are merely seeking to make them more accessible and easier to understand. While it may be our objective to understand an institution, a set of interaction or social phenomenon historically, and this may have been the reason for opting for qualitative approach in the first place, it is unlikely that we will be able to achieve such understanding without first looking in detail at individual characteristics which constitute that institution, those interactions, or that phenomenon. The code is, therefore, a necessary tool to help us do that. (Poole and Lampard 2002:195)

Basit (2003:152) maintains that qualitative data comes in the form of text, which is non-numerical and structured, and coding therefore plays a crucial role in the analysis of such data. Coding is not only about maintaining the context of data by 'reduction, condensation, distillation, and classification, but above all is to allow the researcher to communicate and connect with the data to facilitate the comprehension of the emerging phenomena and to generate theory grounded in the data'. To group the data into categories of similar ideas and themes helps do this.



Codes were therefore manually assigned to the various data collected from the field. Colours, letters, and numbers were used to identify reoccurring themes and categories from the data. (Coffey and Atkinson: 1996). This coding became evidence for the arguments presented in the analytical chapters. To that effect, the words of the interviewees, and from the archive documents, were quoted as much as possible to support the argument. The codes were categorised in accordance with the five clusters EU good governance in the first instance, and then the against the detailed arguments and ideas developed within these clusters. Coding also took place to identify phenomena that occurred in multiple clusters, to help identify broader findings. Through a long process of editing, aggregation, and constant re-checking, the data was eventually marshalled into themes that would best present the research findings which, in turn, addressed the original research questions.

### **Research validity and reliability**

Research reliability and validity are obvious goals for any academic work. The validity and reliability of the research ensure the accuracy of the research findings (Creswell: 2013). This is all the more relevant for this thesis as it adopted a qualitative method. Unlike quantitative methods, where researchers use statistics to justify their results, qualitative research has inherent problems relating to issues of time, location, and interpretation (Pole and Lampard, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003). In terms of interview data, for example, although the flexible interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee allows for valuable probing of meanings, it can lead to generalisation and may fail to capture precise implications. The question of how to assess trustworthiness therefore remains a critical challenge to qualitative researchers (Guba and Lincoln: 1994). To address this challenge, the research design came up with two validation and reliability strategies based on the triangulation of data and a meticulous protocol for preparing and conducting interviews.

The first of these was to make sure a broad range of voices were heard amongst the target policy's stakeholders. Numerous semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals representing many groups, hailing from different geographic areas (see Appendix A). This resulted in a diverse range of often conflicting opinions be collected, which were more difficult to code, but collectively provided a more accurate picture of the efficacy of EU good

governance policy in Ghana. The bias of any one individual was effectively balanced, or 'averaged out', by capturing numerous, diverse, opinions. The same approach was taken with the archive data. Numerous sources were collected and analysed. No one document, nor author, were relied upon as a sole data source. Diverse documentary evidence was identified in order to provide multiple views on an issue. This represented a triangulation of data, whereby the 'multiple data sources are used to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena' (Patton 1999). The aim is to provide a check on selective perception and illuminate isolated blind spots in an interpretive analysis. The goal is not to seek consensus, but to understand multiple ways of seeing the data. However, any patterns that do remain after the triangulation 'averaging out' has occurred can form the basis solid research findings. It is tried and tested qualitative research strategy to test validity through the convergence of information from different sources (Denzin 1978).

The second validation and reliability strategy was to prepare and conduct the interviews in a meticulous manner. By way of preparation, for example, all participants were given enough notice to prepare for the interviews. For the vast majority of interviewees, email or postal communication was established in advance. This opened up opportunity for both parties to clarify the purpose and likely content of the interview. On the part of the interviewer, rigorous background checks were conducted on each participant in order to build a better understanding of the operations of organisations and experts involved. That made for more accurate questioning. Likewise, the specific EU good governance policies that are the subject of this research were made clear to the interviewees to avoid any misunderstanding, and their understanding of these gauged prior to arrival in Ghana. Continuing with this 'built in' accuracy approach, all the interviews were recorded in order to preserve a permanent oral record of the meeting. The audio file could be referred back to if there was any doubt over meaning. Another element of this interview protocol was to ensure that all interviews were transcribed as soon as possible, and defiantly within three weeks of the appointment, in order to avoid any confusion of memory (Healey and Robinson: 1994). Some of the participants spoke in Twi (a local Ghanaian language), requiring special attention to ensure validity and reliability when translating into English for the written transcript.

## Ethical considerations

As part of conducting research, the researcher needs to understand ethical implications throughout the research process, whether this be at the point of conception, design, data collection, data analysis, or when drawing up data findings (Creswell 2013: 57). First, before going to the field, ethical clearance for the thesis' research methodology was acquired from Coventry University. Clearance was obtained through an application to Coventry's University Research Committee. This committee's acceptance of this application implied that the research complied with codes of practice issued by the UK Research Integrity Office and the UK Concordat on Research Integrity, in that it;

- ensured risks relating to sensitive projects which may have a profound impact on the environment, communities or individuals are proportionately controlled without exposing individuals, or the environment, to unnecessary risk; [and]
- ensured that projects involving animals, humans, human material or human data are only permitted when there is no alternative research technique and the expected benefits outweigh any possible adverse effects (Coventry University 2029)

In practical terms this meant that communication was essential to ensure that the thesis' research participants were provided with adequate information in an appropriate form that would enable informed consent. After the project was explained in detail, the nature of the disclosure of data outlined, and a 'participant information sheet' distributed, all participants were asked to sign a consent form confirming their willingness to participate in the research. It was made clear that participants had the right to withdraw this consent, at any time, up until the data was published. Permission was also sought to audio-record the interviews. Where informants declined, permission was sought to take notes. A few respondents requested anonymity, which was granted. In these cases, a respondent number was allocated to the associated data, from the transcription phase onwards. In terms of handing and storing this, and other, data it was made sure that all aspects of the project complied with the European Union's *General Data Protection Regulation* 2016/679.

Even though the researcher is no stranger in Ghana, having lived there from 1978 to 2002, sensitivity to the local social and cultural settings of the country was extended. As the topic of good governance can be controversial, and can mean different things to different people, clarification around conclusions made were double-checked. Likewise, care was taken travelling around Ghana. A full risk assessment was conducted prior to each period of

fieldwork travel, with this risk being reviewed by Coventry's University Research Committee.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, the procedures and methods employed by this research have been outlined. Relevant competing conceptual and theoretical frameworks were investigated, and pertinent elements acknowledged, but it was decided that an empirical approach would be taken in order to best address the lack of empirical data currently found in academic and practitioner utilisation of the concept of 'good governance'. This strategy tied in well with a qualitative approach based on a case study method. Although it was appreciated that pursuing an in-depth case study may limit the universality of the research findings, again, it was decided that this method would create the best volume and quality of data, which, in turn, could be compared to other scholars' (current and future) work on good governance. The data was collected via a multi-methods approach based on interviews and archive work (official documents and a newspaper survey). The data collected was then coded manually using a thematic approach, and the validity of this analysis was underwritten by the method of triangulation. All this research was conducted with the ethics and risk mitigation frameworks managed by Coventry University.

Having outlined, in its first three chapters, the aims of the research, the project's position in the existing literature and the methodology employed to collect and analyse data, it is now time for the thesis to turn to the nature of the data collected and the findings made. The remainder of the thesis therefore consists of an evaluation of EU good governance policy towards Ghana, with respect to this policy's performance and the relevance of these findings to the broader good governance debate. Structurally, this is done by examining, in turn, chapter by chapter, each of the European Union's self-designated 'clusters' of good governance support, starting for 'support for democracy'.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **EU SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY**

This chapter analyses EU support for the democratisation process in Ghana in the context of its commitment to good governance. According to article 2 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), ‘the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (Maastricht treaty 1992: 3). At the regional level, promotion of democracy has been incorporated into regional agreements and partnership. For example, under the Cotonou Agreement’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighborhood Policy, democracy was advanced as a shared value and an objective. At the same time, there have been multiple references to EU support for democratisation process at various levels by the European Commission, European Council and the Council of Ministers (Crawford: 2002).

In 2001, the European Commission adopted a communique ‘The EU Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third World Countries’. The communique identifies three areas where the Commission can act effectively to promote democracy as external policy. Firstly, promoting coherent and consistent policies in support of democratisation and human rights. This relates to both EU internal policies and external ones, especially in the area of official assistance and development. Secondly, placing a higher priority on democratisation and human rights in EU external relations with developing world countries, whilst at the same time taking a positive approach through dialogue, trade and external aid. The aim is to promote ‘constructive partnerships’ in order to improve mutual understanding and respect. However, in cases where there is no genuine commitment on the part of the third country to pursue democratic reforms, there is the option for the EU to suspend assistance. Thirdly, adopting a more strategic approach to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), matching more EU programmes and projects in the field with the

EU's commitment to democracy and human rights (Commission of the European Communities: 2001).

In advancing EU support for democracy as part of its good governance strategy, the EU Handbook on Good Governance (2004: 35) states,

Democratisation is a gradual and continuous process which needs to take into account the country's socio-economic and cultural context. This process consists of a series of principles which include civil control, political equality, plurality system and existence of collective binding decisions. Democratisation is important a strong link to other aspects of good government.

This position is further echoed by a European Commission Communication (2006), which explained that 'good governance is more than tackling corruption, but rather creating a democratic environment that ensures protection of multiparty democracy, electoral competition, transparent system for political participation and awareness'.

In this regard, the EU, as part of its overarching good governance policy has engaged and implemented various strategies in Ghana to actualise increased democracy. According to former Ambassador Head of EU Delegation to Ghana, Ambassador Claude Maerten, the EU attaches importance to development of democracy worldwide. Support for democracy is crucial to the EU as it is considered the political system that best fosters human dignity (Larbi 2012: 3). EU diplomats have promoted the solid progress of democratisation in Ghana as an example for the African continent and are committed to support this good practice. After the 2008 elections in Ghana, Benita Ferrero-Waldner; the EU former Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy stated that,

I would like to congratulate the people of Ghana for their strong commitment to democracy in the country. I also want to commend the authorities for the orderly conduct of the elections, which took place in an open, transparent and competitive environment. I am pleased to see that fundamental freedoms such as the right to stand for election, the right to vote and the freedoms of assembly, expression and movement were widely respected. These elections can hopefully serve as a good example for upcoming elections in other countries on the African continent (European Commission 2008: 1)

Similarly, Louis Michel, former EU Commissioner for Development declared that,

These are the fourth competitive general elections in Ghana since 1992. Once again, the proper conducts of these elections illustrate Ghanaian political maturity and represent an important milestone in further consolidating and strengthening Ghanaian democracy. The Ghanaian people showed their commitment to peace and democratic development of their country and I trust that other countries in the region will follow this path. The EU remains engaged with Ghana and will continue to support the country's democratic and economic development in line with the EU-Ghana Country Strategy (European Commission 2008: 1).

During the fieldwork, Joseph Bogrebon Allan from the Governance Section, Delegation of the EU in Ghana, an EU official who worked in formulating democracy projects in Ghana argued that ‘Ghana has become a leading example for democracy on the Africa continent despite all the challenges...Therefore, the Commission will continue to support Ghana to make progress in the area’ (Personal interview with Bogrebon: 2014).

Given the importance of democracy to its overall good governance strategy, since 2000 the EU has implemented five strategies aimed at consolidating good democratic practice. These strategies focussed on increasing women’s participation in politics; electoral observation; civic and voter’s education; the monitoring of corruption by elected officials; and the electoral process. The chapter analyses each of these strategies sequentially.

Research findings established that EU support for conduct of elections and election observation enhanced the credibility of the electoral process, whilst also mitigating electoral fraud. Additionally, support for civic education created a platform for stakeholders to engage with each other, understand voting rights and prevent electoral violence. EU support for women’s participation in politics resulted in affirmative action by political parties leading to an increase in the number of women elected to parliament in the 2012 legislative elections. Lastly, support for monitoring corruption by incumbent politicians helped civil society organisations lead the fight against corruption in the political system.

There were, however, limitations to the implementation of the strategies. A fundamental limitation was mission creep and there was evidence of policy slippage. As with the strategies to encourage decentralisation (see chapter 5), projects aimed at promoting fundamental change in policy and practice became re-directed to address narrow goals specific to the organisations tasked with implementing the strategies. Likewise, as with the decentralisation strategies, ownership of the projects was an issue. Finally, a conflict of interest developed between the EU and Ghanaian politicians at national and local levels.

## Increasing the participation of women in politics

The EU is committed to encourage women's participation in politics globally. In Ghana, since the return of democracy under the Fourth Republic, the level of representation of women in parliament remained largely static (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Number of Women in Ghana Parliament under the Fourth Republic

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of parliamentarians</b>	<b>Total number of women parliamentarians</b>	<b>Percentage of women parliamentarians</b>
<b>1993-1997</b>	200	16	8%
<b>1997-2001</b>	200	18	9%
<b>2001-2005</b>	200	19	9.5%
<b>2005-2009</b>	230	25	11%
<b>2009-2013</b>	230	19	8.3%
<b>2013-2017</b>	275	29	10.6%

*Source:* Delegation of the EU to Ghana (2013).

The drop in the representation of women following the 2008 legislative election from 25 to 19 prompted the EU to develop a project to encourage women to enter politics under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (Delegation of the EU to Ghana: 2013). According to Maerten,

The political participation and inclusion of both men and women is critical for the balanced development of the country. The current low representation of women in the Legislature and at the local government level requires immediate attention from all stakeholders. The under-representation of women in politics indicates Ghana is not maximising its full potential for development (Delegation of the EU to Ghana: 2013).

Furthermore, an EU diplomat involved in the implementing the strategy emphasised that,



The EU is an institution that is really committed to ensuring global gender balance including politics. This commitment is not only expressed in our various communications and press releases, but also practical funding that ensure good governance. This is because we cannot talk about good governance when more than half the world's population are cut off from political decision-making. Therefore, following the outcome of the 2008 elections, which recorded the lowest level of female representation in parliament, the delegation came to the conclusion to launch this policy (Interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

Similarly, another EU respondent who played a role in formulating the policy argued that,

Gender equality and non-discriminatory are fundamental human rights but at the same time democratic objectives. This is the reason why we as the Commission do have various policy documents on gender equality and how instrumental it can be towards poverty eradication. And I do know in Ghana there are basic gender issues like low economic participation of women, lack of opportunity for women and high mortality rate. We believe that, these basic gender issues cannot be disentangled from the low political space and participation for women. Therefore, we as the Commission, based on the observation we made in 2008 election, decided to have this policy to ensure that not only more women are elected to parliament but also more space for them in the political arena (Personal interview with Natalie Mitchell-Bernett: 2015).

The EU sought to engage with the under-representation of women at both national and local levels through four distinct programmes. The first programme involved sensitising women about political participation in 25 districts. The second programme engaged with the political parties to encourage affirmative action. The third area of implementation was a workshop and training session for female parliamentary candidates. These included both the incumbents and those seeking election with a view to ensuring there was no further drop in the number of women elected to parliament. A final programme focussed on the six districts of Northern Ghana and Upper West Region with a view to increasing the number of women candidates at both local assembly and parliamentary levels.

In terms of the first programme, the EU supported the establishment of Coalition of Women in Governance (COWIG) chapters in 25 districts through funding for Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), a 'pan-African organisation that promotes gender equality and development by advocating the rights of women and increasing their participation in decision making in Ghana using law as a tool'. This was aimed at fostering a general understanding of the importance of women's participation in politics, and to specifically support women candidates standing for election at the district assembly and parliamentary levels. WILDAF trained the COWIG chapters on good governance and the electoral process, as well as organising workshops on issues such as biometric registration and women's participation (COWIG 2013: 11). These activities included engaging and building the capacity of female parliamentary candidates standing for all the five main parties - the Convention People Party (CPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic

Party (NPP), the People's National Congress (PNC) and Progressive People's Party (PPP) - whilst also seeking to engage with religious groups, youth groups, traditional leaders, and market women (Ghana News Agency: 2012). The former Executive Director of WILDAF, Bernice Sam contended that wider engagement was necessary to challenge physical and cultural barriers to women's involvement in politics prior to the 2010 local government elections and 2012 general elections (Personal interview with Sam: 2014).

The second programme sought to encourage affirmative action by political parties. The EU encouraged the parties to reduce filing fees for women candidates by 50% and reserve 40% percent of candidatures for women (COWIG 2013: 4). According to Charles Owusu, a communications expert for the People Progressive Party (PPP), there was serious engagement between the EU, WILDAF and the five political parties that helped to reinforce the aims of the affirmative action programme (Personal interview with Owusu: 2015).

A series of training programmes across Ghana were organised for prospective women candidates. The EU, in partnership with the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), organised capacity-building training for 40 women drawn from all parties with representation in parliament (Institute of Economic Affairs: 2012). Topics covered by the training included campaigning, electoral laws, political networking, political party manifesto analysis, and campaign messages (Adam: 2012). Training events were also held in conjunction with session was held by the EU with the non-governmental organisation ABANTU Ghana for a further 30 potential candidates.

The final programme focused on six districts: Tamale, Bimbilla, Yendi, Saboba, Wulensi, and Buiepe) in the Northern Region. The EU and the Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA) worked with women candidates, traditional authorities, opinion leaders, and political party leaders to address the issue of under-representation. Through support for enhanced public awareness for women candidates at local and national level, the programme sought to increase the number of women elected in the district assembly and parliamentary elections in these six districts by 20% and 30% respectively. Meanwhile, to make sure that the policy devolved to the grassroots communities the EU, together with Concern Universal, engaged directly communities to encourage willingness to vote for women in the local elections (European External Action service 2012: 1).

The COWIG chapters proved successful in achieving their targets. In the Asante Akim South District, a three-day workshop was held for 35 women, whilst in Obuasi, 12 women were trained in aspects of the political process and, as a result, also improved their understanding of good governance (Ghana News Agency: 2010). According to one of the stakeholders who attended the workshop, even though she had voted in previous elections, she had little interest in politics. However, the workshop made her understand the importance of having more women involved in government (Personal interview with Agyeiwaa: 2015). Similarly, a woman teacher stated that the workshop helped her to understand the extent of women's marginalisation in politics (Personal interview with Blankson: 2015). COWIG activities also played a concrete role in helping women to get elected. In the Jaman South, COWIG was instrumental in assisting the campaigns of women candidates in the 2010 district assembly election. According to one successful candidate who stood against three men,

Thanks to the EU funding, through the support I received from my fellow COWIG members, I came to understand the importance of having women in the political process. Also, I won this election because of COWIG community engagement at marketplaces, meeting of queen mothers and active education on the importance of having more women on governance matters (Personal interview with Mansa: 2015).

A COWIG Executive in the district emphasised the importance of the EU's funding of the COWIG chapter in encouraging and supporting women's participation in the local elections, 'As I speak to you know, the story of Adwoa Mensah is not the only good news we had but seven other COWIG members also won the elections. These seven are now all serving in different administrative capacity at the District Assembly' (Personal interview with Manu: 2015).

Similarly, Regina Ocansey who stood against five men in the GA South electoral area, highlighted the important role played by the EU in funding her COWIG chapter.

This election was a close call between me and one other male candidate. However, thanks to the support of the EU and backing COWIG members, I was able to engage more communities, opinion and traditional leaders. And this campaign went well with the people who decided to give me the four years mandate' (Personal interview with Regina Ocansey, 2015).

COWIG also played an important role in the success of women candidates in Agortime Kpotoe-Ziope and Sissala East. In the words of Juliana Azumah Mensah, former MP for Agortime Kpotoe-Ziope,

WILDAF and its partners did a lot for us female Parliamentary candidates. I would not have won this election depending on my own effort alone because, COWIG in my constituency, Agortime-Kpoteo-Ziope, was firmly on the ground and were always moving ahead of my campaign team, sensitising the communities one after the other, from house to house, and in some circumstances telling them why they should vote for a woman in the 2012 election (COWIG 2013: 14).

The five political parties also adopted affirmative action. Three political parties – the CPP, NDC and NPP - reduced their filing fees by 50% while the other two political parties – the PNC and PPP – waived the filing fee entirely. This resulted in increased numbers of women standing for election, including for the two main parties, the NPP and NDC. There was a sizeable increase in the number of women standing for election from the previous election, 64 from 42 (COWIG 2013: 4). The reduction and waiving of filing fees key to the increase as argued by the constituency chairman of the NDC,

As a political party we had a serious engagement and dialogue with WILDAF and the EU. We all discussed and came into conclusion that, in order to encourage more women into politics, it is important for us to slash the filing fees by 50%. when we did this it really encouraged many women to contest for different positions (Personal interview with an NDC constituency chairman: 2015).

According to a woman candidate who is now a Member of Parliament,

Even though, the number of women MP in politics in general is very small, it is quite difficult to challenge the men because there are too many cultural challenges and continue to control resources. Therefore in 2012, when our political party decided to reduce the fees by 50% for female candidates, it encouraged us to know our party stand on affirmative action. It is really refreshing to know that the EU really played such instrumental role for this to be a reality (Interview with female candidate A: 2015).

Eleven out of the 70 female aspirants who attended the training programme were elected.

Candidates who became MPs attested to the value of the training during fieldwork interviews.

Female aspirant B stated that,

The training provided by the EU did not only give me confidence and knowledge about politics, but also the strategic thinking on campaigning really gave me insights to go about things. Also, the financial support I received from COWIG was used in printing of T-shirts, posters and to buy some airtime on local radio. This really helped me to sell my campaign messages.

Likewise, another successful candidate from the Greater Accra Region, now an MP, responded,

I have always been active in politics even back at my university days. However, in a patriarchal society like ours, the political scope for women is quite limited. When I decided to stand, I was called all sorts of names. However, during the training we were taken to all sorts of programmes not only to build our confidence but also to understand politics from a feminine angle. I can say that the training played a very important role in building my

confidence which eventually helped me in winning my seat. Therefore, I can see that, the policy was very successful (Personal interview with female aspirant C: 2015).

However, whilst the support delivered by the project proved invaluable to individual candidates such as those interviewed as part of this study, there were fundamental limitations to this part of the overarching strategy. Firstly, there was mission creep. Resources given by the EU to some civil society organisations were used to fund activities that, whilst relevant to women, were not directly connected with increasing the participation of women in politics. For example, COWIG expended resources to engage the district assembly on issues relating to teenage pregnancy and the provision of toilet facilities for girls. In Kassena Nankana District, meetings were held on the provision of lockable stores for women. In Kpando, COWIG members were diverted to mediating between taxi drivers and market women over a dispute over fares, rather than focussing on supporting the seven women standing for election in the district (COWIG 2013: 6-7). Good governance workshops in Akuapem North District and GA West ended up discussing maternal health, breast cancer screening and how pregnant women and lactating mother get access to health (Daily Graphic: 2014), whilst a workshop to train women in leadership and decision-making in Asante Akim South District instead focussed on sanitation.

A further limitation to the project's stated aim to increase the participation of women in politics was the fact that some of the beneficiaries were standing in safe seats. Juliana Azumah Mensah, for example, won a seat that was recognised as safe for the NDC and for which she had been MP since 2004. Whilst COWIG's involvement might have been beneficial in spreading the message of women's participation in politics at grassroots level in the constituency, Mensah was likely to win the seat with or without its help.

Yet, ultimately, the number of women that won their seats at both national parliament and district assembly level was modest. Out of the 70 female parliamentary candidates that attended the two series of workshops only eleven, or 15%, of them won their seats. The project also sought to increase the number of women in the district assembly by 30% in the six regions of the northern region, and to increase the number of women candidates for local and national elections in the six districts by 20%. However, in 2010, out of the total number of 1817 candidates, 1672 were men (92%) and 145 were women (8%). Moreover, compared with the 2006 elections, there was a decline in the number of women elected from 38 to 21 (Regional News of Friday: 2013). At the national level, none of the six districts elected a woman MP.

So whilst the project proved supportive of individual women candidates and had some consciousness-raising impact at grassroots level. However, largely as a result of losing focus on its fundamental aim, it only had limited success in achieving its own targets of raising the participation of women in local and national politics.

### **Electoral observation**

Electoral observation was another key means of promoting democracy in line with its good governance policy. According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner; former EU Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood,

Ghana has been a positive example for Africa over the past 16 years. The EU elections observation mission is a contribution to strengthening confidence of all electoral stakeholders in credibility of all stages of the electoral process and in the democratic structure in the country. I am confident that the EU EOM's comprehensive assessment will help the electoral authorities in further improving the conducts of elections (European Commission 2008: 1).

There were two ways in which the strategy was implemented: direct EU observation and support for the Coalition of Domestic Observers (CODEO).

The full details of how the elections were observed between 2000 and 2012 as a result of EU, and whether the observation was undertaken directly by EU representatives or sub-contracted are set out in Table 4.2.

In 2008, there was a shift in policy direction. Following an invitation by the Electoral Commission, the EU observed the elections directly (EU External Service, 2009; Myjoyonline: 2016). Consequently, as indicated in Table 4.2, 70 EU observers visited 466 polling stations in 70 of the 230 constituencies in Ghana. This was done to assess the campaign strategies of political parties and pre-election preparation by the electoral commission. This group was later joined by Short Term Observers (STOs) locally recruited from diplomatic missions of EU Member States resident in Ghana. They were positioned over the election period to observe voting, counting, and tabulation of results (EU Election Observation Mission to Ghana, 2009: 7). During the presidential run-off in 2008 and special voting in Tain constituency, these observers monitored the voting and tabulation of election results. Equally in 2012, the EU observers observed not only the campaign strategies of political parties but also monitored the voting and tabulation of results.

Table 4.2 EU Election observation in Ghana

Year	EU	Coalition of Domestic observers (CEDEO)	Number of observers deployed	Polling stations visited	Number of regions visited
2000 1 <sup>st</sup> round	No EU involvement	CEDEO deployment through EU Support.	5500	137	10
2000 2 <sup>nd</sup> round	No EU involvement	CEDEO deployment through EU support	5900	147	10
2004	No EU involvement	CEDEO deployment through EU support	6600	257	10
2008 1 <sup>st</sup> round	Direct involvement	N/A	70	466	10
2008 2 <sup>nd</sup> round	Direct implementation of the policy	N/A	56	327	10
2008 3rd rounds (Tain constituency)	Direct implementation of the policy	N/A	26 observers	1 constituency	1
2012	Direct implementation of the policy	N/A	24	75 constituencies	10

*Source:* compiled from CODEO report, 2000; GhanaWeb, 2008; EU Election Observation Mission to Ghana, 2009; Myjoyonline, 2016.

The EU observation team reported on both the positive and negative dimensions to Ghana's elections. In 2008, the EU praised the elections as open, transparent and professional with fundamental freedoms such as the right to stand in elections, right to vote and freedom of expression respected. On the other hand, women were still under-represented, there were 48 electoral offences and 12 cases of illegal possession of identity cards (EU Election Observation Mission, 2009). Aside from the concrete outcomes of monitoring, the visibility

of observation helped to maintain confidence in the electoral process, enhance transparency, and increase political parties' acceptance of the results of the election (CODEO report 2001: 16). According to Aborampah Mensah, CODEO programme officer,

Election 2000 was one of the most successful elections in Ghana's history. This was the first time we changed government through the ballot box. Thanks to the EU support, the presence of CODEO at the polling stations restored confidence in the electoral process. Because there is some level of mistrust between the political parties and the Electoral Commission, the presence of CODEO at the various polling stations helped built public confidence in the election (Personal interview with Aborampah Mensah: 2014).

A coordinator for CODEO in the Greater Accra Region also recognised that, despite the difficulties encountered by CODEO officers, their presence made a big difference in ensuring the transparency of the elections. During his assignment in 2000, he observed that despite the observers' logistical challenges, their presence made the election more credible (Personal interview with Ayettey: 2015). Another CODEO coordinator from the Ashanti region also made a similar comment. According to him, apart from CODEO presence giving credibility, it also offered assurance to the voters and political parties (Personal interview with CEDEO coordinator in Ashanti Region: 2015). However, it is not only the coordinators that confirmed the success of the strategy but also the political parties. According to Akoto Osei, Member of Parliament for Old Tafo, the EU support for electoral observation has provided both domestic and international credibility and transparency (Interview with Osei: 2015).

Analysis of the strategy also found that the project helped the EU to plan its future strategy for democratisation in Ghana. In the run-up to the 2012 election, the EU decision to prioritise its support for voter and civic education, promote more women in politics and address corruption was based on its experience observing the 2008 election (EU Election Observation Mission to Ghana final report, 2009).

Whilst the EU's direct and indirect support for electoral observation led to more credible elections, there remained the issue of ownership with management and leadership functions largely in the hands of the EU. Despite the EU emphasising that the intention of its good governance promotion policies centred on enhancing the ownership of local actors, according to the CODEO regional coordinator for the Greater Accra region, 'the parameters of the policy was highly influenced by the EU...the implementation process to the outcome was guided by the EU terms and conditions' (Personal interview with CODEO regional coordinator). The programme officer of CODEO Aborampah Mensah also confirmed that



even though electoral observation was instrumental in affirming the credibility of the election, the policy was determined by the EU. The only role CODEO played was, in essence, attending the polling stations to fulfil its monitoring function. For Mensah, the EU determined the whole process. As Mensah commented, ‘my understanding of local ownership is the local agents taking control of the project’ (Personal interview with Aborampah Mensah: 2014).

However, EU diplomats made it clear that local ownership did not mean handing over the election observation project to CODEO. According to Joseph Bogrebon Allan,

Local ownership is very important to us when it comes to any of our good governance project. However, we have a duty to ensure that the right implementation procedures are followed in order to ensure success of our projects. As much as we believe in local ownership, it does not mean handing over the whole project to our local partners (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

Pilar Palmero Vaquero from the EU’s Governance Section likewise cautions that ‘the input of our local partners is welcoming, but it is wrong for anyone to think that local ownership will mean no involvement at from the EU’ (Personal interview with Pilar Palmero Vaquero: 2014).

### **Civic and voter education**

Aimed at educating citizens on political participation and the electoral process, this strategy was implemented in towns and rural areas through Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and national civil society organisations to educate the wider electorate citizenry (National Commission for Civic Education). According to Allan, ‘Voting education forms part of the delegation's means of achieving good governance. But we realised that most of the people did not understand their voting and constitutional rights. We provided support to CBOs to educate the voters at the grassroots level’. (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

Prior to the 2000 election, CBOs engaged with 15 rural communities throughout the country. These communities were educated on voting rights, violence-free elections, and counting of elections results through local traditional durbar, engagement with opinion leaders, and workshops for local stakeholders. Similarly, before the 2008 election, the EU provided

election education in 25 community organisations through churches, Muslim groups and traditional women groups.

In addition to the CBOs, the EU worked with national civil society organisations such as the IEA, the Fredrich Naumann Foundation (FNF), and the Institute of Democratic Governance (Gyimah-Boadi 2010: 3). Prior to the 2000 election the EU funded national radio and television broadcasts developed by the IEA and FNF. Local initiatives drew on established village personalities such as traditional leaders, and opinion leaders. Civil and voter education was launched in 15 out of 216 districts to educate voters on their roles, rights, and duties. A similar support package was offered to Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) during the 2008 polls (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Ghana: 2010).

The EU also worked with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) to deliver civic and voter education. In 2012, Ghana the EU gave the NCCE €1.5m to educate the electorate about the new biometric system (EU 2012: 1). Workshops were organised in 20 districts from ten regions engaging youth leaders of political parties, traditional leaders, opinion leaders, Ghana Police Service concentrating the biometric system and the need to avoid electoral violence. Methods used to disseminate information included focus groups, drama, theatre workshops, and flyers on peaceful elections (Ghana Business News: 2012).

Assessing the over-arching strategy, the organisations funded to deliver the civic and voter education were confident that it succeeded in meeting its aim. This is borne out by feedback from the communities. According to an opinion leader in Dormaa Central, the project created the platform for political stakeholders to engage each other, understand voting rights and the need for violence-free elections (Personal interview with an opinion leader in Dormaa Central: 2015). This was corroborated by Kwaku Agyeman Manu, Member of Parliament for Dormaa Central. According to him, the workshops created a platform for political actors to engage in critical political discourse such as voting, peaceful elections, and voting eligibility (Personal interview with Manu: 2015). Fieldwork by the author indicated that national CSOs also made a positive impact in educating citizens on democratic and election matters. An opinion leader in Samsam agreed that the town hall meeting he attended helped him understand the importance of voting (Personal interview with opinion leader: 2015).

The NCCE also organised activities funded by the EU aimed at promoting violence-free elections actions. Samuel Ankuamoah of the NCCE argued that,

As a governance institution, one of our basic duties in terms of ensuring good governance is to deliver civic and electoral education in Ghana. Therefore in 2012, the implementation of the policy helped us to engage and educate all relevant stakeholders on violence-free elections and biometric registration. These stakeholders included youth leaders of all the political parties, traditional leaders and the members of the communities. Besides educating the youth on the use of intemperate language that could result in violence during the elections, we also worked to dilute some cultural barriers that were slowing down the biometric registration exercise. This is because in some communities, some of the people were not interested because they believed that; biometric machine will render them impotent. Therefore, we went there to educate the people, and this really helped in getting many people to vote (Personal interview with Ankuamoah: 2014).

Fieldwork in three districts confirmed this impact. For instance, in Wa in the Upper East Region of Ghana which has been a hotspot in previous elections, the EU/NCCE workshops created a platform for the to publicly commit to violence-free elections. Yaw Gyan, a member of the NPP, a participant in the workshop noted that,

Wa has been a hot spot in previous elections. Since the return to multi-party democracy, this has been a swing seat, especially at Wa East Constituency. This brings much tension during elections, which sometimes ends up in serious violence, even death. Mostly this violence is perpetrated by the youth. Therefore, during the workshop, we were educated on the importance of the peaceful election and that politics is battling ideas not to win or die situation. The electoral education we received from the NCCE helped us to work together to achieve a peaceful election (Personal Interview with Youth Executive of NPP, 2015).

A counterpart from the NDD agreed. According to him, in the 2012 election the EU project created an important platform for all political actors to commit to a peaceful election: ‘as a result of this, we achieved violence-free elections this time around (Personal interview with NDC constituency youth executive, 2015).

The same could be said of the impact of the workshops in Sekyere East district. A youth worker, Yaw Asare, involved in the project offered: ‘The voter education was a contributory factor in ensuring peaceful elections in the district. We were educated in the district not to allow selfish politicians to use us for their political interest. (Personal interview with Yaw Asare: 2015).

Moreover, according to the NPP Weija Constituency Chairman Samuel Ofori Ampomah,

In past elections, the Weija constituency has been known for electoral violence. This includes multiple voting and illegal interruption of the electoral process. But after education we received from the NCCE supported by the EU, all the political parties were committed to clean electoral process. As a result, the 2012 elections were very peaceful. It did not only create the opportunity for inter-party dialogue commitment to peace, but also became a podium for other democratic matters’ (Personal interview with Ampomah: 2015).

This corresponds with the assessment of the Wa District Police Commander Superintendent Henry Amankwaatia.

Over the years, there has been some level of violence in this community during election year. Thanks to the EU who made these workshops possible, the level of violence went down during election 2012 especially among the youth. From our records, the 2008 elections recorded 23 incidents of electoral violence but for 2012, there were just 2 minor incidents (Personal interview with Amankwaatia: 2015).

Likewise, the Deputy Police Superintendent in the Sekyere East commented that, ‘During the election 2012 there was not a single incident of electoral violence. Even though other factors might had played part in achieving this record, the EU/NCCE programme also created a platform for the two main political parties to commit to peaceful elections’ (Personal interview with Deputy Police Superintendent: 2015).

### **Support to monitor and highlight the abuse of incumbency**

The abuse of incumbency is harmful to democracy and political competition. According to EU Election Observation Mission final report (2016: 19):

The abuse of incumbency is a recurring problem in Ghana’s elections and leads to un-level playing field. The campaign period is not regulated by any specific laws and no measures to regulate use of resources have been introduced. The system of direct presidential appointment of regional and district chief executive’s officials limits the ability public administrations to act neutrally and impartially. Distribution of money and goods to individuals and communities is a widespread phenomenon in the campaign. Major parties also distributed party materials such as t-shirts and provided food at the rallies. Parliamentary candidates of both major parties admitted to the EOM that they distribute money and goods while campaigning.

In the words of Per Brixen, Ghana Desk at European External Action Service,

Fighting corruption is an essential aspect of our good governance policy. The EU, both in Brussels and our Delegation in Accra believe that, abuse of political incumbency constitutes electoral corruption. Therefore, given the developments since Ghana returned to multi-party democracy, we support and engage civil society organisations during general and by-elections to highlight this political corruption with the aim of not only stopping the practice but also, to push the relevant institutions to take action. This way we can achieve good governance by ensuring that there is transparency and accountability in the electoral system (Personal interview with Per Brixen, 2015).

According to Bogrebon Allan who was involved in implementing this strategy,

This policy became relevant because since the return to multi-party democracy in Ghana, elections are keenly contested. Stakes are mostly high, and we realised that, political corruption is likely to occur. We said ‘look, one way of rigging elections is through abuse of incumbency and there was the need to create a level playing field for all political parties and actors. Therefore since 2004, the Delegation has provided support to civil society

organisations to monitor and highlight this abuse of incumbency. These CSO's have managed to highlight different level of abuse (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan, 2015).

Thus, prior to the elections in 2004, 2006 and 2008, the EU funded the IEA and Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) to address political corruption, notably the abuse of incumbency. Five particular instances of the abuse of incumbency were targeted:

- The obvious demonstration of political colours during non-partisan events.
- Politicisation of access to facilities.
- Turning official events into campaign rallies. For example, durbars and festivals being used for political campaigns and rallies.
- Using public goods for partisan purposes such as political campaigns and rallies.
- Continued use of public resources after elections are called, for example, continued occupation of state bungalows (Ghana News Agency: 2004).

In 2006, the EU supported an investigation by the IEA into abuse of incumbency by the sitting government. This included the use of 70 official vehicles in the Offinso by-election, state security apparatus, and the use of state aircraft to transfer political materials. (Institute of Economic Affairs: 2008; Ghana News Agency: 2011; STAR Ghana, 2013)

Before the 2012 election, the EU, as part of the STAR Ghana programme sub-contracted three civil society organisations - Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), the CDD, and the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition) to investigate abuse of incumbency and electoral corruption. These civil society organisations were tasked with uncovering serious corrupt practices including the funding of political campaigns, the abuse of state-owned media and vote buying. The organisations trained 35 observers in 30 constituencies, and developed and published corruption indicators. Additionally, five monitors were trained and deployed to observe abuse of incumbency in three state-owned newspapers, one state-owned television station and one state-owned radio station (STAR Ghana Document: 2013). The observers and monitors found eight cases of electoral corruption including vote buying and nine cases of abuse of incumbency. This included former President John Mahama and the NDC government who were found to have used the death of President Atta Mills for electoral campaign purposes, turned public functions into campaigns events and granted themselves unfair access to the media (STAR Ghana Document: 2013). However, as with anti-corruption investigations in Sri-Lanka, Brazil and Nigeria (Richie et al, 2017), the three civil society organisations found themselves stymied when it came to sanctioning those found to have been involved in

political corruption. No politician was prosecuted for the abuse of incumbency as a result of these investigations. The EU's Allan commented

As far as the policy is concern, it has worked to the extent of highlighting the culprits but is also about enforcement. We can only support civil society organisations and can only highlight that this party or politician is taking advantage of its position in Government to do A, B, C, D, but it is up to electoral commission to respond. But the Electoral Commission does not have the teeth to bite. So, for us, we raise this issue, the only thing you result is the conscience of the people (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

The culture of political corruption is deeply engrained and requires mutual agreement from the main parties if it is to be effectively addressed. This is, at present, unlikely. Allan continued: 'It is impossible to achieve success in this policy area because all the political parties will tell you that given the chance, they will do the same thing. For this to work all political parties will have to come together and all must agree that either the police or the electoral commission to sanction them if any of them abuse their incumbency' (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

On the other hand, Christopher Ackon, a programme officer at the EU Delegation suggested that 'the only way the policy helps to put an end to electoral corruption is if the state sponsor elections' (Personal interview with Ackon, 2015). This is disputed by Ackon's colleague Allan.

State sponsoring elections does not stop the abuse of incumbency - to stop abuse of incumbency in general is difficult. This is because if we the president going to contest elections and decides to commission a project; can we say that when he goes, he should not mention anything about elections. Given these political instances and realities in Ghana, it makes the policy illusive. Therefore, we can only support and outsource this civil society organisation to only highlight this level of abuse (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

But it is not only EU diplomats who were struggling to decide whether their own policy has been successful in terms of reducing or stopping abuse of incumbency. Two civil society organisations agreed that even though the EU support has been instrumental in highlighting the levels of electoral corruption, the policy has not been able to halt the abuse of incumbency. According to Aborampah Mensah from CDD: 'the policy has not stopped, neither has it been able to halt politicians from indulging in this practice, but we in the civil society community can only highlights and hope that the Electoral Commission and Ghana Police Service will take action' (Personal interview with Mensah: 2014).

Vitus Azeem former Executive Director of Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), the local branch of Transparency International echoed this position: 'It is difficult to tell because as much the

policy did well to point out these abuses, politicians have developed strategies to gain an advantage. Many public officials do not consider the abuse of incumbency as a politically immoral act but rather see the acquisition of public office as a certificate for political advantage' (Personal interview with Azeem: 2014).

Thus, whilst the EU funded programme to expose abuse of incumbency succeeded in discovering instances of corruption, the ubiquity of the practice made it hard to eliminate, and hence the overall record of the programme remained debatable.

### **Electoral process programmes**

The EU considers the assistance it renders to developing world states to conduct elections, the 'heartbeat' of its commitment to expanding democracy (Handbook for European Election Observation 2016: 5). The objective of support for the electoral process is to promote credible elections, political participation, inclusiveness and transparency (European Commission 2016: 1).

In Ghana electoral assistance involved three core strategies: support to provide photo-identity cards for voters; procurement and printing of ballots papers; and institutional capacity building for election stakeholders. For the 2000 election, photo-ID was proposed as a solution for the widespread multiple voting fraud perpetrated during the 1992 election which led to an opposition boycott (Aubynn: 2002). The EU paid for the entire project at a cost of €500,000. (General News of Monday 2000: 1). According to an EU official in Accra who was involved in implementing the strategy, 'The use of thumb print ID cards became a bone of contention after 1992 and 1996 General and Parliamentary elections. There were many allegations of multiple voting and voting by underage individuals. After series of consultations with the relevant political actors, the Commission decided to support the Electoral Commission of Ghana to provide photo-identity cards for voters for the first time' (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

The 2000 election would prove pivotal for the future of Ghana's democratic transition. Allan continued: 'During the 2000 election, the stakes were very high. The opposition parties were united to end Rawlings 18 years of rule and Rawlings was also determined to hand over to his vice-president. Therefore, there was the need to ensure there was no allegation of rigging

and the Commission saw one of the means to avoid double voting was to ensure voters had photo-ID cards' (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

As a result of the EU's funding, the Electoral Commission of Ghana supplied all voters on the electoral register with official photo-ID.

Between 2004 and 2008, the EU gave the Electoral Commission €4m for the procurement and printing of ballot papers. This was a response to violence which broke out on previous election days over the shortage of ballot papers (Gyimah-Boadi 2010: 3). According to Vaquero, 'this action was taken because shortage of ballot papers became a major threat to the holding of elections' (Personal interview with EU official Pilar Palmero Vaquero: 2014).

The final strand of this element of the strategy was the provision of funding for human resource training and institutional capacity. Before the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections, the EU gave the Electoral Commission €4,540,000 towards staff training (Pan African News Agency 2000: 1; European Commission: 2016). This resulted in the training of 550 electoral officers from 217 districts in the practical skills of voter registration, authentication of the voter identification, voting procedure and conduct of the ballot.

In 2012, the EU gave €3.8 million towards technical support including digital mapping of polling stations and their geographic boundaries (European Commission: 2016). The election was also the first time that biometric readers were used. The EU organised an Intra-Party Advisory Committee to ensure all parties were aware of the technical aspects of using biometrics. Additionally, the Electoral Commission organised training for the 275 constituency collation officers (European Commission, 2016). In order to encourage transparency in the 2012 elections, the Commission purchased projectors, fax machines and laptops for the 275 constituency collation centres. According to former EC Public Relations Director Owusu Parry, 'The EU has been an essential partner to the Electoral Commission. The assistance in 2012 helped us to not only hire more staff but also train them to understand the electoral process. Besides, the projectors, laptops, and faxes whom we acquired through the EU support helped us to collate results speedily from the 275 constituencies' (Personal interview with Parry: 2015).

EU support for technical innovation to limit electoral fraud, notably the introduction of photo-ID and biometrics, has been credited with embedding transparency in the Ghanaian electoral system. This in turn provided the impetus for the rigorous democratisation process



for which the country became known. Former Constituency Chairman of Dormaa Central, Mumuni Alhasan explained that, ‘This was the first time the photo-ID card was introduced in our electoral process. In the past, there were report of multiply voting especially in the government strongholds and we in the opposition always complained. The introduction of the photo identity cards did not only stop multiply voting, but also became a reliable form of identification’ (Personal interview with Mumuni Alhasan: 2015).

Civil society also recognised the key role played by the EU in funding the technical apparatus used in Ghana’s elections. According to Aborampah Mensah,

The introduction of photo-ID cards remains a critical milestone in Ghana’s democratic credentials. This is because the thumbprint ID cards used in 1992 and 1996 raised a lot of suspicion of double voting. However, in 2000 we moved Ghana’s good governance to another level when the EU supported the Electoral Commission to introduce photo-ID cards (Personal interview with Mensah: 2014).

EU support for Ghana’s electoral process fits with its overarching good governance policy. There was widespread acceptance by the parties, the public and the international community of the fairness and credibility of the 2000 elections (Anebo 2001: 70). This was underlined by a statement from the US Embassy that, ‘the elections were conducted in the manner that was substantially free, fair and transparent’. Similarly, the UK’s Foreign Office stated that, ‘as Ghana heads towards a second round of elections, we continue to support a free, fair and peaceful process, the results of which will command widespread acceptance among the people of Ghana and International Community’ (Ghana News Agency 2000: 1).

The use of high-tech methodologies to restrict corruption and enhance transparency also requires those involved in conducting the elections to be fully trained in the relevant ICT skills. According to the District Director of the Electoral Commission, ‘One of the ways to ensure good governance is the ability to hold free and fair elections. Elections 2012 was the first time the biometric registration was used in Ghana. It became important that we train the officers who will conduct the affairs of the elections. Through the EU support, we were able to train our staffs in the district’ (Personal interview with Addo: 2015).

## Conclusion

Concluding this survey of EU good governance policy towards Ghana focussing on the cluster of ‘support for democracy’, a pattern is evident that will be repeated across all the subsequent clusters/chapters of this thesis. As a consequence of the EU’s intervention, positive material benefits did emerge. Good governance was enhanced in Ghana. Yet, the European Union’s good governance strategy was undermined by common flaws. In this cluster of ‘support for democracy’, the EU’s programme was hindered by mission creep, a lack of local ownership, and the inability of the European Union to successfully confront the Government of Ghana in areas of vested interests.

In terms of the positive material benefits, as evidenced above, the work seeking to increase women’s participation in politics netted results. Workshops did inspire participants to seek careers as elected representatives, and eleven out of the seventy female political aspirants supported by the COWIG project did win their elections. Likewise, EU funding made a difference to elections in Ghana. More sophisticated election observation enhanced this country’s reputation for free and fair elections, as did the introduction of voter identification cards. Participants also reported the benefit of attending voter education events.

In a sense, in these specific cases, the problem solving approach was born out. Faults in governance were identified and initiatives taken to correct these faults. If there are too few women participating in Ghanaian politics, the set up a project to increase the number of female representatives. No reference to the broader socio-economic or political environment is needed, and the dysfunction is directly addressed. This is largely what happened, and all this can be done in the name of ‘good governance’.

Yet, the EU’s approach was flawed. Variables identified by critical thinkers, and more sceptical scholars, were in play, which undermined the benefits won by the above projects. First, there was mission creep. Initiatives billed as enhancing good governance all too easily drifted into more familiar development assistance projects. As even EU officials themselves had difficulty in distinguishing between what a ‘good governance’ programme and a ‘development’ scheme looked like on the ground, local partners also struggled with this concept in the administration of EU contracts. It is no surprise then that the above research found that funding allocated for securing more women in politics was spent on engaging the district assembly on issues relating to teenage pregnancy and the provision of school toilet

facilities for girls, or a group set up to support seven women standing for election spent its resources mediating between taxi drivers and market women over a disputed fare rise. As ‘good governance’ has a very elastic definition, all these activities can be done in its name, and EU officials seemed to acknowledge this reality. The ill-defined nature of good governance as a concept became its downfall in the field.

The second flaw that the above evidence points to is a lack of local ownership. The EU was keen to talk of creating partnerships with local actors in Ghana, yet in many cases, the Ghanaian NGOs were, in effect, just contracted service providers. They had little share in the decision making over project conception, for example, and delivery was tightly audited. This was evident in the electoral observation programmes above. Although local actors did have alternative views on how these elections could be better validated, the contracted partner had to stick to strict protocols of observation determined in Brussels. This would seem to be a case of the external partner, once again, determining what ‘good governance’ actually is, and Ghanaian NGOs needing to comply with this version of good governance. As the critical thinkers would have it, this aspect of EU good governance policy did not escape the realities of pervasive global power structures (Abrahamsen 2000; Taylor 2004). Southern partners needed to learn from their Northern counterparts, not vice versa.

The third flaw evidenced above is the limited ability of the EU to challenge the Government of Ghana when good governance initiatives rub up against the latter’s vested interests. EU good governance projects did successfully highlight and monitor the consequences of the abuse of political incumbency in Ghana. Yet, the work of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana Integrity Initiative, and Centre for Democratic Development went unutilised. Although the EU commissioned these incumbency reports, it did not challenge the Government of Ghana with evidence collected, and there was a weight of damning evidence. As this issue ran straight to the heart of state power, the EU shied away from testing these vested interests. Brussels instead took the position that it was for local agents to act upon this information. The EU could only highlight the problem. A key issue laying at the epicentre of good governance in Ghana therefore went unchallenged. This is a good example of problem solving actors seeking to solve a problem from within the status quo.

The findings of this chapter’s research addressing the EU’s support for democracy in Ghana therefore boil down to a number positive of outcomes emerging, but these are overshadowed by policy failures underpinned by conceptual flaws in the European Union’s whole approach

to good governance (namely this policy's vulnerability to mission creep, its failure to nurture local ownership and Brussels inability to challenge the Government of Ghana in key areas due to vested interests). This is pattern that is repeated in the next cluster analysed: 'support for decentralisation'.

## CHAPTER 5

### EU SUPPORT FOR DECENTRALISATION

This chapter explores EU input into Ghana's decentralisation policy as it effects good governance. The EU has produced a number of documents that capture its position on this cluster. The EU *Handbook for Good Governance* (2004) emphasises the connectivity between decentralisation and good governance. The Handbook states, 'Decentralisation occurs when national authority transfers powers and resource to democratically elected regional or local authorities because it is more effective and efficient for these powers to be exercised at that level. Decentralisation enhances local democracy and the participation of local people in their communities' (2004:85).

Equally, EU diplomats have expressed the importance of decentralisation as a mechanism to promote good governance in Ghana. According to the current Head of the EU Delegation to Ghana, Ambassador William Hanna,

The EU is working with Ghana to ensure that more citizens get better service at local level. We aim to strengthen local authorities to play their role in better accountability, transparency and service delivery. The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies are crucial partners of central government, who should both implement and add to national development efforts. The decentralisation reform in Ghana is making headway and that's why we are backing it financial support along with other developing partners (European External Service 2016: 2).

In the same vein, the former Head of EU Delegation in Ghana, Ambassador Claude Maerten contends that,

Ghana has put forward a very ambitious decentralisation policy which we are proud to support. Decentralisation reform processes are highly complex and long term by nature. And yet the aim of such reforms is straight forward: improving service delivery and democratic governance by bringing the centre for decision-making over resource and development priorities closer to the people. The EU will support capacity building at local level, notably in the human resource management, social accountability on local governance performance and monitoring system to follow-up on the decentralisation reform process (Delegation of the EU in Ghana: 2011).

Additionally, Bogrebon Allan, who works in formulating and implementing decentralisation projects in Ghana, argues that,

Decentralisation is very crucial to poverty reduction especially at the district level. This is because poverty is a rural phenomenon. In fact, poverty is mostly found at the district level, so we think that it's important we intervene in that arena to ensure that people at the local level get their basic needs. So, we are supporting the whole process of the implementation of decentralization policy which includes human resource functioning at the district level, the social accountability platform and support for regional coordinating councils (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

Given the importance of decentralisation as a driver of good governance, the EU implemented four strategies with the aim of promoting good governance in Ghana. These strategies focused on decentralised cooperation, human resource building for district assemblies, promotion of social accountability, and support to promote regional decentralisation in Ghana.

The first section of the chapter examines EU support for decentralised cooperation at the local level. Under this initiative, the EU gave €200,000 to two non-governmental organisations, Christian Aid of Ghana and the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISDC), to build their capacity to promote good governance at the decentralised level. It then explores EU support for human resource building at the district assembly level, analysing the aim, implementation and outcome of the project. Thirdly, the chapter examines EU support to promote social accountability aimed at reducing apathy at district level. The final section considers EU support for regional coordinating councils as a means of promoting decentralisation in Ghana.

EU support for decentralisation increased engagement with good governance policies. For instance, in order to support human resource building for district assemblies, the EU provided training and skills development for stakeholders. The social accountability strategy also contributed to raising awareness, sensitising stakeholder interest in local governance, and helping to instil a spirit of self-help at the community level. Additionally, support for the regional coordinating council also strengthened capacity and knowledge of stakeholders at the regional level.

Despite these positive outcomes, EU support for decentralisation in Ghana between 2000 and 2013 is equally characterised by its shortcomings. Two such limitations stand out as undermining the constructive results highlighted above. The first of these was mission creep. Evidence of policy slippage was present in the policy. EU resources directed to partners such

as Christian Aid of Ghana and ISODEC to help promote decentralised cooperation, were diverted to skills development and other generic development activities. For example, EU funds set aside for capacity building in district assemblies were spent on motorcycles. Moreover, EU funded social accountability projects at the local level included objectives not explicitly aimed at improving good governance.

The second drawback in the implementation of EU support for democracy relates to ownership of the policy. Partners complained that EU projects to build human resource capacity at local level were disproportionately regulated by the EU with only limited input from the partners. These two policy flaws are discussed in more detail in the chapter's conclusion.

### **Support for decentralised cooperation**

Under this initiative, the EU aimed at building the capacity of non-governmental organisations to promote good governance at the decentralised level (Republic of Ghana-European Community 2003: 18). According to Allan,

When it comes to support for decentralisation, non-governmental organisations play a vital role at the community level and are much closer to the people than the bigger institutions in Accra and Kumasi. But the reality is that, most of these non-governmental organisations are not able to perform such a function due to financial and operational constraints. For this reason, we supported these two non-governmental organisations financially to carry out decentralisation project at the local level (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

Equally, Sara Piccoli, the EU Programme Officer-Governance Section in Accra, a diplomat who was also part of formulating and implementing of the project, argues that, 'Non-governmental organisations in Ghana are the ones that bring tangible effect to communities. Therefore, under support for decentralisation as part of good governance policy, we decided to build their capacity towards their activities at the grassroots' (Personal interview with Sara Piccoli: 2014).

The EU provided €200,000 to two non-governmental organisations, Christian Aid of Ghana and ISODEC to carry out projects at the local level. Consequently, these two non-governmental organisations initiated skills development projects in five communities. Skills included carpentry, sewing, baking, animal husbandry, and agro-forestry (Republic of Ghana-

European Community, 2003:16). According to ISODEC's CEO, Steve Manteaw, who was involved in implementing the projects, 'EU financial support assisted us to carry these skills development programmes at the grassroots level' (Personal interview with Manteaw: 2015).

EU support was instrumental in the success of the projects. The EU's own assessment of the project indicated that 'communities in which the activities were carried out were appreciative of the assistance and the programmes have shown good results' (Republic of Ghana-European Community 2005: 18). A follow up on this by the author in 2015 also confirmed that the strategy made an important impact at grassroots level. According to Manteaw,

The basic goal of our organisation is to support grassroots communities in Ghana. Most of the youth and women at the grassroots communities are unemployed because they lack the relevant skills. Through this EU support we were able to provide training in the area of sewing, carpentry and baking. Currently as I speak to you, some of the youth and women who received training have their own businesses (Personal interview with Manteaw: 2014).

Further interviews with two of the beneficiaries confirmed this. According to beneficiary Ama Ankrah, 'The skills acquired from ISODEC really changed my life. After junior secondary education, I could not further my education or learn a trade. Through this training I now have my own small sewing business, and this has changed my life. I now have a stable income thanks to my small business' (Personal interview with Ankrah: 2015). Another beneficiary, Vivian Asare, was also positive about the impact of the project: 'Through the ISODEC development skills programme in my community, I started my small business. I started a small baking business and have employed six people (Personal interview with Asare: 2015). However, despite these achievements, there was clear evidence of policy slippage or mission creep. As a component of a strategy aimed at encouraging decentralisation, the core aim of the initiative was to promote decentralised cooperation at the local level. However, the focus shifted to skills development. Manteaw's explanation for the policy shift points to 'the poverty level in these communities', adding that 'even though the aim was to promote decentralisation at the local level, it would have been senseless talking about decentralisation when the communities are so poor' (Personal interview with Manteaw: 2015). The EU diplomat in charge of governance programme in Ghana confirmed this position. According to him, 'The original aim of the project was to promote decentralised cooperation in these communities. However, given the state of poverty and lack of economic opportunities in these communities, it became necessary to build the capacity of the locals first. After all good governance also include skills development' (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015). Whilst understandable, this is, nonetheless, mission creep. A strategy



with fundamental political ambitions, to empower local communities, became, for the most part, a training exercise, albeit a quite successful training exercise.

### **Human resource development for district assemblies**

Another EU strategy aimed at promoting decentralisation as part of its wider good governance policy was the support for human resource development for district assemblies (Republic of Ghana-European Community 2003: 16). According to Lily Howars Boney, an official from the EU Human Resource Development in Ghana who was involved in designing, formulating and implementation of the strategy, the EU supported training and capacity building of the core staff of district assemblies to enable the beneficiaries to implement development programmes for their communities (Ghana News Agency: 2003). Allan, who was also involved in formulating and implementing the project, emphasises the importance of the district assemblies in the context of decentralisation:

The district assemblies' play important role when it comes to promotion of decentralisation in Ghana. But these assemblies still lack the relevant training to carry out their functions. We design this strategy with aim to build the capacity of the assemblies so that they can functions effectively (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

There were two means of implementing the strategy. The first means involved capacity building training for district assembly members and opinion leaders of 110 districts in Ghana. The second means involved financing of logistics to enhance the capacity of district assembly and sub-district structures.

Under the first means of implementation, capacity building programme were organised for 110 district assemblies in Ghana. Consequently, 1,100 senior district assembly officials and 8,800 district assembly members and opinion leaders were trained in the areas of financial management, district planning, project implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the project (Republic of Ghana-European Community 2003: 17& European Commission 2007: 9). These four programmes offered knowledge provision and skills building for the stakeholders. In relation to financial management, the stakeholders were trained in effective and efficient means of managing and accounting for the district assembly common funds. The planning programme involved training of stakeholders in the efficient planning and management of public functions. Meanwhile under the project implementation programme, stakeholders were trained to implement district assemblies' programmes to meet their

objectives. Regarding monitoring and evaluation, the stakeholders in the 110 districts were trained in the management of outputs and the impact of the assemblies' projects (Republic of Ghana-European Community 2005: 18). There was also the production and distribution of 5000 copies of six legal and regulatory documents for the Local Government Secretariat and Institute of Local Governance Studies which served as a basis for training sessions offered to assembly members in all districts of the country (Ghana-EU Cooperation 2007: 9). According to Petrina Etu Amartey, Human Resource Director of Local Governance Secretariat; 'The EU has been an important partner when it comes to promoting decentralisation. In this area, the EU support was important to us in carrying out our duties. The production and distribution of these training manuals helped us in training our staffs at the assembly level' (*Personal interview with Etu Amartey: 2015*).

The second means of implementation saw the EU support logistics for district assembly and sub-district structures. This included procurement of 44 motorbikes; 120 safe cabinets; 40 computers; 120 pieces of office furniture, and 120 typewriters to enhance the capacity and structures of sub-districts (Ghana-EU Cooperation 2007: 9 & Ghana Decentralisation Support Programme 2010: 2).

Analysis of the strategy revealed that it achieved two main positive outcomes. Firstly, the training built the capacity of these stakeholders to carry out their decentralisation duties. According to Senior District Assembly Official, Kusi Beko who took part in the training: 'The capacity-building training gave me the relevant skills to carry out my local governance duties at the assembly. I was trained on managing the district assembly common fund in terms of revenue mobilisation' (*Personal interview Kusi Beko: 2015*).

Two more beneficiaries echoed this positive assessment. In the words of a district assembly official who also took part in the training, 'The training increased my skills and knowledge on project planning. As a result of the knowledge gain, I lead in planning of projects in the district. During the construction of the local market, I was part of the planning team and I applied the skills and knowledge received from the training' (Personal interview with Yaw Oppong: 2015). Similarly, Kwame Addo, an opinion leader who also benefited from the training also expressed the importance of the training;

I am not an elected assembly member. As an opinion leader, I play an important role in my locality. I was among the few opinion leaders selected across the country to attend this training. The training helped me to gain knowledge and skills on project management. Ever since, I have had the opportunity to work with

the assembly on some important projects (Personal interview with Kwame Addo: 2015).

When he was asked why he thought the training successful Addo responded ‘before this training, I had no basic training on how to execute programmes ... but after training, I understood the ins and outs of managing project especially ensuring value for money’ (Personal interview with Kwame Addo: 2015). This response was reiterated by other respondents who had received training.

The logistics support provided the means for the district assembly officials, especially those in the rural areas, to carry out their functions effectively. A district assembly member from the Berekum district, who received a motorbike, stated that the new means of transport allowed him to overcome the poor condition of the road network and meet with constituents more regularly, improving their involvement in local governance (Personal interview with Addai: 2015). This was endorsed by another member whose constituents often lived in farm cottages otherwise difficult to access (Personal interview with Coffie: 2015). This was confirmed by a constituent who agreed that the motorbike meant that he met his assembly member more frequently to discuss community matters (Personal interview with local Farmer who spoke in Twi language: 2015).

However, again despite some specific positive outcomes, there were caveats. Firstly, there was evidence of mission creep. For instance, the legal and regulatory documents published as part of the project often drifted off-message. Whilst the documents dealt with matters such as pensions and employee welfare, the Local Government Service Secretariat (LGSS) was explicitly mandated to develop a coherent framework for performance management at district level. The content of the documentation did not adhere to this mandate, often merely handling general welfare matters. So, whilst the provision of the motorbikes, for example, clearly brought practical benefits, it is moot whether this fits into a strategy to promotes good governance at the local level?

The second flaw lies with the issue of ownership. As with electoral observation (see Chapter 4), the parameters of the project were highly determined by the EU. Even though the EU claim to prioritise local ‘ownership’ and the concept of ‘partnership’, evidence indicates that Ghanaian actors had less influence on the project than their EU counterparts. According to Petrina Etu Amartey, Human Resource Director of Local Governance Secretariat, ‘Although the project was supportive, it was not entirely helpful because the EU took over the project. We were interested in purchasing more motorbikes, typewriters, office furniture, and

computers. However, the EU insisted that the project must also include capacity-building workshops. We didn't think that the workshop was going to address the needs of our staff' (Personal interview with Amartey; 2015).

The EU emphasised that 'local ownership' does not translate as 'local control' of the project. According to an EU diplomat who was involved in formulating the good governance project, 'we appreciate the input of our local partners; however, ownership doesn't mean money without responsibility' (Personal interview with Pilar Palmero Vaquero: 2014).

### **Promoting social accountability**

In addition to supporting decentralisation, the EU promoted social accountability as a means of encouraging good governance. The strategy was aimed at to reducing citizen apathy to local governance by building capacity at the decentralised level (Atafori: 2012). A baseline survey conducted by Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) found indifference amongst Ghanaians to the decentralisation process (Ghana News Agency, 2015 p.1). For this reason, the EU outsourced the social accountability project to the CDD with a mandate to enhance participatory democracy and improve transparency at the district level. According to Maerten,

Promoting social accountability is directly linked to the EU's support to decentralisation in Ghana. This platform will go a long way to promote the harmonisation and monitoring the performance and service delivery at district level by communities and civil society organisations. The EU is of firm conviction that accountability of public officials and citizen empowerment is the bedrock of good governance and pre-requisite for effective democracy. The EU by providing to this project, and other similar ones, seeks to contribute to good governance and improved service delivery by facility improved conditions and increased capacity for social accountability (cited in Freeman: 2012).

The Programme Manager of the CDD, Aborampah Mensah who was involved in implementing this strategy explained the projects purpose.

The project which was being implemented in 17 selected Metropolitans, Municipals and district assemblies' primary aimed at assessing the extent to which citizen's interface, participate and engage with the current local governance system and structures. The project was to serve as a basis for the enhancement of participatory democracy, transparency, and accountable system of local governance through the reduction of citizen's apathy in local governance (Kyei-Boateng 2013: 1).

The strategy which was implemented in 17 districts across ten regions of Ghana adopted two methods. Firstly, citizen and stakeholder education and secondly the provision of small grants for practical projects. In order to build citizen and stakeholder capacity, citizens would be educated to better understand the rationales behind decentralisation. Methodologies employed by this education campaign included infomercials, posters, live radio programmes, and capacity building workshops. These were rolled out for almost 2 months to sensitize the populace and share with them research findings on administration of their districts and the need for their involvement in local affairs. For instance, in Obuasi on the 11<sup>th</sup> April 2015, a capacity building workshop training was organised for 28 traditional leaders, elected assembly members, unit committee members, political leaders, youth, women groups and persons with disabilities aimed at promoting good governance in public office. During the workshop, stakeholders were trained on the need to participate in local governance matters. According to Senior Research Officer at the CDD, Edward Ampratwum who led the training in the district, it is the aim of the CDD and EU to ensure improvements in citizen participation. He observed that community involvement is critical in ensuring positive local development as well as addressing local development challenges (Ghana News Agency: 2013).

Similarly, in Accra, a four-day workshop was organised to build the capacity of local governance stakeholders such as women's groups, persons with disability, unit committee members, traditional rulers and district assembly staff on citizen understanding and participation in the governance process in their communities. During the workshop, Maxwell Agyei Ashon, Research Officer of the CDD explained that,

A study conducted by the think-tank last year revealed that knowledge about development at the district assemblies was weak amongst the citizenry. Sensitising, imparting knowledge, building capacity and cultivating attitudes of local leadership and citizens are goal of the workshop. Encouraging citizen's participation in local governance through active engagement with structures of local governance and strengthening the credibility of local authorities to promote local government accountability is another objective of the workshop (Ghana News Agency: 2013).

In Ajumako-Enyan-Essiam district on 20<sup>th</sup> August 2013, the CDD and EU broadcast live radio and television programmes on the importance of citizens in the decentralisation process, and organised capacity building workshops over three days to raise awareness of the need to participate in the decentralisation process. Those present included youth representatives, 29 traditional leaders, district assembly and metropolitan assembly members, and District Chief

Executive civil society-community based organisations and opinion leaders (Ghana News Agency: 2013).

The second methodology was the provision of small grants. The CDD/EU provided \$1000 for each of a selection of practical projects and pilots, encouraging community-based organizations, as well as youth and women groups to identify a particular community problem that had not received the attention of the district assembly. Out of 165 proposals received, 51 - three from each district – were selected to receive \$1,000 each. The fundamental criterion for selection was a willingness to work alongside local government to solve their particular community problem. The underlying rationale was to encourage collaboration and self-help. main idea is to rekindle the spirit of collaboration and self help in solving common public problems. Problems addressed by the community groups in conjunction with the relevant department of the district assembly included the environment, sanitation, political participation, youth dialogue and issues concerning women.

According to programme manager of the Centre for Democratic Governance who led the implementation of the strategy,

The EU has been our important partner in various good governance projects. In specific to this project, as I speak to you now, some of the groups who benefited from the small grants have been instituted as permanent community development groups working together with the assemblies to implement self-help programmes. This increase citizens interest and participation in governance of their localities, monitor projects in their localities and ensure accountable governance (Personal interview with Aborampah Mensah: 2014).

The social accountability strategy had two main positive outcomes. Firstly, awareness and understanding of decentralisation was strengthened across a broad range of stakeholders. Fieldwork by the author in three of the districts where the strategy was implemented demonstrates that the workshops did not only increase the understanding local governance, but that stakeholders became more involved in the development of their communities. A traditional ruler in the Obuasi district who attended the workshop stated that even though under Ghana's constitution traditional rulers are not allowed to be actively involved in politics, the workshop had rekindled his interest in local governance. Previously, his focus was on traditional chieftaincy matters, but the workshop delineated areas such as revenue mobilisation and project implementation where he can play a role (Personal interview with traditional ruler A: 2015). Another traditional ruler in the same district also stated that, the workshop has changed the relationship between the assemblies and other local stakeholders

and that as a result there was more sharing of information regarding the operation of the assembly (Personal interview with traditional ruler B: 2015). One of the sub-chiefs who worked on the committee also stated that,

Constitutionally, chiefs are banned from active politics in Ghana. But during the workshop, we were trained to understand that, even though we are banned from active politics we can still use our knowledge to help the assembly to promote its policies. As a result, I am working on the mining committee and actively involved in district matters (Interview with Nana Brekum: 2014).

Additionally, the capacity building workshop created a space for participating communities to strengthen their ideas, skills, knowledge and participation in decentralisation and local governance policies to ensure social accountability. According to one of the opinion leaders in the Efutu community of Central region of Ghana, ‘the workshop increased our knowledge on good governance at the local level. It gave our community the platform to understand the need to participate in local governance decision process and scrutinise the actions of assembly members (Personal interview with Agyeman: 2015).

The presiding member of the Efutu Municipal Assembly, Eldad Bonney, confirmed that since the capacity building workshop, the level of political apathy at the district level has reduced. In the past, the level of interaction between the assembly and local people was very low. However, since the workshops, stakeholders have shown a keen interest in the activities of local government (Personal interview with Boney: 2015). Boney explained that the number of people attending communal labour and assembly meetings in the district had gone up and that opinion leaders who had no previous interest in local government matters are now showing interest.

In addition to building up skills, knowledge and participation, the open forums that were held during the training workshop also deepened transparency, accountability and allowed participants to demand answers from assembly members, for example, on taxes paid to fund development projects. In the context of the Obuasi Municipal Assembly, Kwaku Mensah, leader of a community-based organisation contended that,

The forum gave all relevant stakeholders the opportunity to dialogue in openness. We were given the opportunity to ask the assembly members and Municipal Chief Executive about certain issues pertaining to the development of the area. The assembly also had the opportunity to do the explanation. I will say that the programme was successful if only for the opportunity it created for some of us to question this elected elites (Personal interview with Mensah: 2015).

The second positive outcome of social awareness project was that, the small grant initiative engendered a spirit of collaboration and self-help in solving in common problems. The community-based, youth and women groups who benefited from a small grant partnered with the relevant assembly department to implement projects to address problems in the community. This increased citizen participation in governance, encouraging them to monitor projects in their localities and ensure accountable governance. For instance, in the Obuasi Municipal Assembly, one of the community-based organisations partnered with the disaster prevention department of the assembly to educate miners about the effect of illegal mining on the environment. Although mining is the major source of income and employment in this community, it has affected farming, drinking water and the forests. The leader of a local community organisation described the mutual benefits of partnering with the environmental department of the district assembly, which helped both in educating local miners and fostering a collaborative relationship with local government (Personal interview with community-based organisation leader in Obuasi: 2015).

Likewise, another community-based group; Youth Alliance for Development partnered with the education, youth and sport department of the assembly to discuss issues concerning youth development in the district. This created a spirit of collaboration between the communities and the assembly. According to Ali Tanji, a programme manager of the Youth Alliance for Development who was involved in implementing the youth dialogue programme, ‘through this grant we received from the EU, my organisation partnered with the assembly to create youth dialogue to discuss problems facing the youth’ (Personal interview with Tanji: 2015).

Despite these specific examples of increased collaboration and/or self-help, as with the other decentralisation strategies, there is evidence that those involved in delivering the implementation of the strategy allowed themselves to divert from its core focus. Positive outcomes that promoted self-help at the local level, such as help with the consequences of mining activities and sanitation, were not explicitly focussed on promoting local good governance *per se*.



## **Support for the Regional Coordinating Council**

In addition to the three projects analysed above, a further means by which the EU promoted decentralisation was support for the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC). This support, part of the EU's commitment to promote decentralisation in Ghana, sought to enhance the institutional capacity and internal structures of the ten regional councils to carry out their functions effectively and efficiently (Ghana News Agency: 2014). According to Maerten, who was involved in signing the agreement,

The grant aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity and the internal structures of the various regions for carrying out their general function effectively and efficiency. The RCC were supposed to play a fundamental role in bringing together key actors in Ghana's decentralisation context. Decentralisation is a complex process needing a high level of steering, coordination and controlling to make it effective and maintain confidence and energy of stakeholders in making things happen. Therefore, the regional level in its role of coordinating, monitoring and evaluation performance of the districts is instrumental in the gathering of information on the impact of the EU sector budget, to support the performance and quality of service delivery at the local level (Ghana News Agency: 2014).

Akwasi Oppong Fosu, former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development who was a signatory to the project agreement, noted that the objective of EU support was to strengthen the institutional capacity and internal structure of the regions to carry out their functions efficiently and effectively (Ofori: 2014).

During implementation of the project, the EU provided €2.5m for the ten RCCs. The focus of implementation was stakeholder workshops tailored according to the needs of each region. For instance, in the Greater Accra region, the focus of the workshop was on enhancing stakeholder understanding of the planning and monitoring of activities of Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in order to improve public services. As a result, 80 stakeholders including coordinating directors, a budget officer, planning officer and two officers from the Human Resource Unit from each of the 16 districts in the region attended a two-day capacity-building workshop (Zangina-Tong: 2015). Like Greater Accra, the Ashanti Regional Coordinating Council organised a knowledge sharing platform for 150 stakeholders from the 30 districts in the region. However, the focus of workshop was on effective project monitoring and supervision (Ghana News Agency, 2016).

Based on evidence gathered during fieldwork, the project was instrumental in strengthening the capacity of stakeholders to deliver good governance. George Gyapani Ackah, Head of the

Regional Planning Unit (RPU) at the Greater Accra Regional Coordinating Council stated that the workshop played influential role in building the knowledge base of stakeholders.

You know one of the core roles of regional planning unit is to monitor and train the district planning units to ensure that citizens are given the best local service. However, we had not be able to undertake this important course due to lack of funds. But thanks to the EU support, 80 stakeholders from the planning unit of 16 districts assemblies had their capacity enhanced for efficient service at the local level (Personal interview with Ackah: 2015).

Ackah supported this contention pointing to ‘80 district planning officers that are at the forefront of major projects in their districts and are applying the knowledge they acquired from the workshop’ (Personal interview with Ackah: 2015).

Fieldwork in two districts, La Dade Kotopon and Adenta Municipal Assembly in the Greater Accra region, confirmed the significance of the capacity-building training at the district level with respondents impressed by the results of the training. Vivian Mensah a District Planning Officer at La Dade Kotopon Municipal Assembly emphasised that this was first time such training had been organised in the region: ‘As a result, the capacity building training gave us the opportunity to refresh our knowledge on project planning. Currently, I oversee the two major projects in the district, building of public toilets and the central market, and the knowledge I acquired during the training really helped me during the planning of these two projects’ (Personal interview with Mensah, 2015).

This position was supported by Victor Coffie, a planning officer from the same assembly who noted that the workshop was instrumental in improving the quality of governance at the local level. At the same time, the Municipal Coordinating Director of Adenta Municipal Assembly underscored the manner in which the workshops influenced the attitude of service providers, improving the efficiency of the district planning unit mainly as a result of the improved relationship between service providers and service recipients. Increased engagement at the grassroots has led to district projects more directly reflecting the needs of the people (Personal interview with Alhaji Salam: 2015). A further respondent, a stakeholder from the Adenta Municipality Assembly considered the project successful for two main reasons. Firstly, it was unique in that it was the first workshop of its kind to be organised in the region. Secondly, the workshop emphasised the importance of community engagement in good governance leading to concrete steps to increase the level of collaboration (Personal interview with Ewa: 2015).

## Conclusion

The research findings from this chapter addressing ‘EU support for decentralisation’ mirror, almost identically, the findings of the previous chapter which studied ‘support for democracy’. Again, it is a case of the European Union’s initiatives securing tangible benefits for good governance in Ghana, but these benefits being diluted by two systemic flaws in the European Union’s approach: mission creep and a lack of local ownership . These flaws themselves were a product of conceptual ambiguity at the heart of this good governance policy.

The positive outcomes stem from the governance capacity built at the local level. District government officers and politicians gained and enhanced professional skills, whether this be in human resource management, accountancy or project planning; local communities likewise gained expertise in carpentry, sewing, baking, animal husbandry, and agro-forestry; and, those involved in the Christian Aid of Ghana and ISODEC project gained insight into how best local communities and local government could work in partnership. The thesis’ fieldwork research captured excellent feedback on these projects from those who participated in them. There is no doubt that some lives were changed significantly for the better by the experiences that this series of projects offered. Yet, good feedback and positive generic outcomes does not necessarily enhance good government.

Again, mission creep is evident. Why, for example, was a project seeking to promote ‘good governance’ concentrating on cooking, sewing and woodwork skills? EU policy implementer Bogrebon Allan’s explanation, quoted above, sums up the situation well: the

‘original aim of the project was to promote decentralised cooperation in these communities. However, given the state of poverty and lack of economic opportunities in these communities, it became necessary to build the capacity of the locals first. After all good governance also include skills development’ (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015).

If ‘good governance’ as a concept is stretched this far, it has no meaning at all. It is truly everything to everyone (Rostein and Teorell 2008). There is nothing inherently wrong with skills building at the community level, and such skills may begin to contribute to good governance at some level, but so do thousands of other such variables. Clearly, a more focussed good governance project would have netted better good governance results. Instead, EU officials were content to fund these more ‘traditional’ development projects in Ghana

under the banner of ‘good governance’. The fact that the European Union’s own definition of good governance lacks clarity (see chapter 2), and the academic literature struggles with this definition too, maybe explains this mission creep and policy slippage. As Grindle (2007:555) observed, amongst confused academics and practitioners it is now ‘not clear how governance can be distinguished from development itself.’

The second flaw to emerge in this decentralisation cluster is a familiar lack of local ownership. The EU’s human resource development project for district assemblies demonstrated this. Although ‘partnership’ was mentioned in the project’s documentation, the European Union called the shots. One can understand this, especially as the district councils concerned wished to use the EU funding for procurement, rather than capacity-building workshops, but whose notion of good governance should win out? The Ghanaian local government official who considers having access to new desks and computers would increase his governance capacity, or EU ideas insisting that shared skills are the way forward? In the end the budget-holder one out. The EU was the arbiter of good governance in this case. Again, we are back to the North defining good governance in its own image, at the expense of the South (Abrahamsen 2000; Taylor 2004).

The findings of this chapter’s research concentrating on the ‘support for decentralisation’ cluster, once again, suggest the EU realised a number of positive outcomes, but these are overshadowed by policy failures underpinned by conceptual flaws in the European Union’s approach to good governance: specifically mission creep and a lack of local ownership in this case. As it will be seen in the remaining chapters, this is a pattern of findings that is carried across all the clusters.

## CHAPTER 6

### **EU SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN GHANA**

This chapter addresses the European Union's input into matters of Ghana's human rights, the rule of law and administrative justice, with respect to promoting good governance. These two 'clusters', 'human rights and the rule of law' and 'administrative justice' are at the heart of the EU's external policy of good governance promotion. The EU *Handbook on Good Governance*, for example, makes it known:

All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. They have the same value, regardless of where the individual resides. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of all states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of all those within their jurisdictions (EU 2004:38).

European Union officials held their Ghanaian counterparts to this 'duty'. On a positive note, Ambassador Claude Maerten, Head of EU Delegation to Ghana, stated in 2013:

Ghana's human rights situation has experienced many encouragements since the restoration of civilian rule 22 years ago. Governments elected under the 4<sup>th</sup> republic constitution has shown, for the most part, an increasing respect for the rule of law, independence for the judiciary, a friendly legal environment for human rights defenders, and civil society in general to undertake their activities. Ghana has also ratified many international treaties relating to the promotion of human rights and rule of law, and its record in this regard has improved since the return of democracy in 1993 (Delegation of the European Union to Ghana 2013:1).

Yet, despite these inroads, Ambassador Maerten made it known that, 'there are still many human rights challenges confronting the country. These concerns include gender inequality, access to justice, the death penalty and discrimination against the LGBT community in Ghana' (ibid). This was a point reiterated by EU officials during the fieldwork interviews.

Joseph Bogrebon Allan, a member of the Governance Section of the EU delegation in Ghana, for instance, emphasised that:

Human rights are central to the European Union as an institution. For us, in everything we do we consider human rights. ... In Ghana, though, there are not major human rights issues as compared to countries like Zimbabwe, Syria, Sudan, Nigeria and The Gambia, but there are still civic and social rights issues like access to justice, gay rights, overcrowding in prisons, children rights and the death penalty. We do recognise these concerns, and our country strategy is to engage and support the Government of Ghana and some civil society organisations to address these concerns (Personal interview with Joseph Bogrebon Allan: 2014).

The European Union thus implemented five strategies under these ‘human rights and the rule of law policy’ and ‘administrative justice’ policy clusters, with the aim of promoting good governance in Ghana. These strategies focused on gender equality, improving juvenile/children’s rights, improving the criminal justice system, abolishing the death penalty, and securing the rights of Ghana’s LGBT community (Delegation of the European Union 2013).

This chapter is structured around interrogating each of these five strategies to ascertain the aims, and nature of implementation, of these initiatives. The outcome/impact of these policies on promoting good governance is also assessed, in each case.

In terms of the chapter’s research findings, positive results are identified. EU support for gender equality, for example, resulted in a degree of nationwide sensitisation on affirmative action in terms of the gender gap. This resulted in the launching of, with the EU’ support, a *Women’s Manifesto* regularly referred to by civil society organisations (Coalition on the Women’s Manifesto for Ghana 2004). Additionally, as it will be seen below, support to promote and protect children rights increased community awareness on the issues of forced and early marriage. Importantly, support to law enforcing bodies also saw impact in terms of the delivery of justice and the expansion of operations combatting human smuggling.

Notwithstanding these returns, however, EU support for human rights and the rule of law, and administrative justice, were hampered by significant obstacles. Just as it was seen in previous chapters, familiar flaws were present. In these cases, two issues stand out: mission creep and the limited ability of the European Union to challenge the Government of Ghana in areas of vested interests. In terms of the mission creep, this was evident in efforts to promote and protect children’s rights. It will be seen below how community platforms established to

discuss this issue failed to deliver on this agenda. While, in terms of challenging the Government of Ghana to uphold universal rights, the EU made little progress on matters such as the death penalty and Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights in Ghana. EU officials effectively put these issues on the back-burner in an effort to make progress in areas where the EU's own values were less contentious. The chapter will conclude by assessing how this empirical evidence informs the broader conceptual debate on good governance. The mission creep observed, for instance, can be linked directly to the ill-defined nature of good governance, while failure to confront the Government of Ghana, in part, is informed by problem solving approaches tending to ignore broader social and cultural forces in play.

## **Support for gender equality**

Gender equality is a central plank in the European Union's understanding of human rights:

The promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women is a key priority for the European Union. A gender perspective, encompassing the equal participation of men and women, is both an essential goal and means to help prevent conflict and promote a culture of inclusive and sustainable peace (European Union 2017).

The European Union primarily targeted its good governance support for this particular goal on measures designed to address the gender imbalances in this country's decision making processes. Ambassador Claude Maerten commend Ghana for the important steps it has taken over the years to conform to international convention and protocols'. It was acknowledged that Ghana ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1986 and Optional Protocol in 2011, and the 2007 African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Rights of Women in Africa (Delegation of the European Union 2013: 1). Yet, the EU was concerned about the number of women holding decision making positions within Ghanaian society.

Addressing this shortfall, the European Union assisted the Women's Manifesto Coalition (WMC) to launch a *Women's Manifesto* (European Commission, 2013). These projects involved drafting this manifesto through broad based consultation; delivering a country-wide sensitisation campaign on affirmative action based on this manifesto, and organising a national media campaign publicising this initiative.

Given the importance of the WMC, the European Union in 2003 provided financial support for a year of broad-based consultation. This focussed on civil society associations (including 180 women organisations), District Assemblies, media practitioners, political parties, government ministries, departments and agencies, and parliamentarians from all the ten regions of Ghana. This consultation addressed the low representation of women in governance, poor access to resources by women, the predominance of women who live in poverty, and number of other issues concerning critical wellbeing of women (Coalition on the Women's Manifesto for Ghana 2004): 4).

The EU also backed the nation-wide sensitisation affirmative action campaign based on the *Women's Manifesto* produced. Consequently, the Women Manifesto Coalition launched an awareness campaign on affirmative action in 20 districts of the 10 regions of Ghana. During this campaign, workshops were organised for stakeholders in these local communities to enhance their knowledge of the gender gap and to promote women's representation in public life (European Commission: 2013). For instance, in Accra, Abantu for Development and the European Union organised workshops for gender stakeholders (in this instance, queen mothers, female assembly members and representatives of the National Commission for Civic Education were invited). The workshop focussed on the need to address gender imbalances. A forum was thus established for stakeholders to draft and review a proposed consolidated local government bill, which would require accountability over gender equality at the local governance level. Additionally, the workshop created opportunities for stakeholders to discuss structural barriers within local economies that hindered gender equality. Resolutions drafted at such workshops nation-wide called upon institutions all levels of government in Ghana to ensure the voices and concerns of women are considered in policy making fora (Ghana News Agency 2014: 1).

The Women's Manifesto Coalition, backed by EU funding, also targeted Ghana's media houses to get its manifesto publicised. It particularly aimed to get the principles of manifesto embedded into discussions surrounding the 2008 and 2012 general elections. For the 2008 election, for example, the Women's Manifesto Coalition, in partnership with Women, Media and Change and Abantu for Development, organised a two day media workshop in Kumasi to build the capacity of 30 journalists on gender sensitive issues. The curriculum of this event aimed to equip journalists to report on women's participation in political campaigns and in decision making at all levels of government (Business Ghana: 2008). Subsequent to this election, there was the establishment of Media Advocacy Team on Affirmative Action



(MATAA). This team comprise employees from 10 media institutions at the national level, which met once a month not only to review progress of the affirmative action program but also to promote the acceleration of the advocacy process. This team included representamen from the Ghana Journalist Association and the Ghana Institute of Journalism. Individual media houses were challenged to strengthen their capacity to report on issues of concern for women, encouraging increased women's visibility in the media (European Commission 2013: 3).

In terms of the material outputs gained from this EU support, first there was the 2004 *Women's Manifesto* itself (European Commission, 2013). This document invited readers to consider human rights in the areas of women's economic empowerment, women in politics, women's access to land, women and social policy, women and development, gender discrimination in cultural practices, and women's access to the media. Ghanaian campaigners for gender equality now had a definitive document they could refer to, and publicise, which had the backing of a broad selection of this state's civil society organisations and political representatives. EU support also resulted the manifesto being supported by draft legislation. Again, civil society organisations and opposition parties had a fully drafted document, the Affirmative Action Bill, that could be utilised as the centrepiece for their lobbying of the Government of Ghana on gender relations.

Alongside the outputs of these two documents, over 5,000 Ghanaians (70% women and 30% men) benefited from the associated nation-wide sensitisation campaign on affirmative action (Commission: 2013). The fieldwork undertaken for this research suggests that individuals who took part in the workshops became more gender conscious and are still reaping the benefits of participation. According to Rose Mensah-Kutin, the Director of ABANTU for Development, who helped spearhead the project, the sensitisation workshops created the platform to discuss wide range of issues concerning women. When asked if she thinks the sensitisation project was successful. She replied,

Apart from the numbers of people that were sensitised, some of the stakeholders are now actively involved in politics at both local and national level. Typical examples can be Freda Prempeh and Victoria Hammah. These two benefited from our sensitisation workshops. Freda became more interested in politics and she is now the MP for Tano North and Victoria Hammah is currently runs her own gender think tank (Personal interview with Rose Mensah-Kutin: 2015).

A workshop participant, Ama Ankrah, concurs. When interviewed, she noted how this event has made her much more gender conscious. She recalled: ‘during the workshop, we were presented with facts and figures to understand the gender imbalances and encouraged get more involved in politics. Even though I had little interest in politics, the sensitisation workshop arose my interest in politics. I follow political much more closely today.’ (Personal interview with Ama Ankrah: 2015).

The creation of Media Advocacy Team on Affirmative Action (MATAA) also had a positive impact. Involvement in this project resulted in Ghanaian media houses creating space for the reporting of women’s involvement in politics. In particular, women’s participation became more visible during election years. For instance, in 2012 the Ghana News Agency made the conscious effort print/broadcast such issues, and to raise items that would have been covered anyway higher up the hierarchy of news headlines. These two front page headlines give a flavour of this more proactive reporting on gender issues: ‘*National Democratic Congress blue print on women for election 2012*’ (Ghana News Agency: 2012a) and ‘*Women groups says Election 2012 is test for Ghana*’ (Ghana News Agency: 2012b).

Yet, despite this EU support leading to tangible beneficial outputs, the reality is that these projects did not lead to a major increase in gender equality in Ghana. The *Manifesto* is just this, a manifesto. It is a set of principles, not a legally binding document. This fact is underwritten by the reality that the Affirmative Action Bill has not been enacted by the Government of Ghana. The administration of John Mahama (2012-2017) did move the government’s position from that of rhetorical support to cabinet approval, but this Bill has still not entered the legislative process (Bessey and Quarshie: 2016). In 2020, 16-years after the draft bill was written, Rose Mensah-Kutin’s assessment is that: ‘support women’s agency to address the inequalities have been largely ignored by policy makers who must act to support women’s rights. Efforts in Ghana, including civic education, have not significantly changed the situation’ (Mensah-Kutin 2020). An Affirmative Action Act remains a mirage due to government and parliamentary obstruction.

As discussed in more detail below, if the European Union really wishes to promote gender equality in Ghana it needs to find a better way to confront the Government of Ghana in these areas where doing so unsettles vested interest. Raising awareness within society, and helping produce documents for civil society campaigners, has its place, but this level of support has patently not resulted in legally binding changes.

## **The protection of children's' rights**

The human rights of children was a second specific focus the EU's support programme for good governance in Ghana. William Hanna, Head of the European Union's Delegation to Ghana, summing up his time in this country, made it known that 'the European Union has identified the need for the promotion and protection of child rights in Ghana as part of the EU human rights strategy' (Delegation of the European Union to Ghana: 2017). Ambassador Maerten had highlighted the danger earlier: 'Children in Ghana are still victims of a lot of abuse (domestic violence, trafficking and labour, including forced labour, lack of care, school depravation, sexual abuse and female genital mutilation). Despite the fact that legal and policy environment are ripe in order to tackle the main abuses, the [danger] persists' (Delegation of the European Union to Ghana: 2013).

Central to the EU's strategy in this field was a €600,000 grant contract signed with three civil society organisations: International Needs Ghana, the Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Centre and Maata-n-Tudu. The EU sought to work in partnership with these parties to 'promote the human rights and well-being of children' in Ghana (Government of Ghana 2014 and Peacefm Online 2014). The resulting projects concentrated on the prevention of forced labour and early marriages among children specifically, and the promotion of an enhanced safe and protective environment against child abuse, generally (Ghana News 2014).

Ignacio Burrull, Head of Cooperation at the European Union Delegation in Ghana, pronounced forced and early marriages to be an 'act of insensitivity and callously against girls which must be objected by all stakeholders in societies across the country'. He called these practices 'a serious offence under international convention' and made it known that 'the Union supports Ghana to bring the situation under control' (Boateng 2015). This support came in the form of, once again, 'sensitisation' workshops. The two municipalities of Nkoranza and Kintampo, for example, were targeted for workshops addressing forced and early marriages. This was because both these districts had recorded relatively high instances for these marriages: 53 in 2013 for Kintampo and 13 in Nkoranza (Ghanaweb 2014). Stakeholders attending these workshops included municipal government heads of departments, district assembly members, traditional chiefs, queen mothers, 40 members of community-based action teams (COMBAT's) and 50 peer educators. These stakeholders

were ‘sensitised’ on the legal and scientific problems associated with forced and early marriages. (Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Centre: 2015).

Similar workshops were also organised in Tamale, Bunkpurugu and West Mamprusi, in the northern region of Ghana. Here the focus was the prevention child abuse more generally. As a result of €20,000 received, the development focussed ngo Maata-n-Tudu brought together stakeholders including chiefs, district assembly members, members of parliament and representatives of the media to consider measures to mitigate violence against children. This was followed by a radio discussion and community *durbar* addressing violence against children (Government of Ghana: 2014).

In the central regions of Ghana, more practical steps were taken to protect the human rights of children. In Gomaa East, Gomaa West and Efutu Municipality, the emphasis was on promoting an enhanced safe and protective environment for children to prevent child abuse and exploitation (Ghanaweb, 2016 and Koranten: 2016). Twenty-one communities were selected and empowered to implement new measures through local by-laws. The consequence of these local initiatives were the creation of new local government institutions with child protection mandates, investment in establishing youth clubs, and the appointment of community level leaders with special responsibility for children (International Needs of Ghana: 2015).

In terms of assessing the EU’s support for childrens’ human rights, once again, the positive outcomes must not be overlooked. Between them, during the project period, the three funded ngos identified 13 cases of forced or early marriages, with the consequence of these children being ‘rescued’ and enrolled in local high schools (Ghana News Agency: 2015). Also, because of the sensitisation workshops, communities became aware of legislation concerning forced and early marriage. According to Nana Adusei Sarfo Kotoko, Chief of Senya,

Forced and early marriage among children was done in secret and the people who were involved were not aware that it was a crime to do so. However, through the sensitisation workshop, the people are now aware that, giving away or forcing a child into a marriage is a crime. Also, even though I do not have the official statistics for the whole district, the Senya community has not recorded a single incident of forced or early marriage since the workshops (Personal Interview with Sarfo Kotoko, 2015. Translated from Twi by the author).

The Assistant Superintendent of Police in Nokaranza North, Ambrose Aboagye, reported a similar situation. He noted, in the 12 months after the sensitisation workshops, the district police command had not received any complaint of forced or early marriage. ‘The

communities are much aware that they can be prosecuted for this crime' (Personal interview with Ambrose Aboagye, 2015).

The sensitisation projects also changed the attitude of locals towards children labour. According to a farmer at Gomoa Otsew, one of the communities that benefited from the International Needs of Ghana project, the sensitisation workshop made 'me to understand the dangers associated with child labour'. In response to the researcher inquiring how the training has improve children rights in the community, he commented: 'I cannot speak for the whole community, but at a personal level, I have stop taking my son to the farm on school days. Even though financially it is not easy for me, I am trying my best to keep him in school (Personal interview with a farmer, Gomoa Akotsi: 2015). Another woman interviewed, who sells maize with her daughter by the road side, claimed she stopped her daughter from selling on school days as the workshops convinced her of the importance of education for children (Personal interview with Antie Afua, Gomoa Kweikrom: 2015).

Yet, despite this anecdotal evidence that the workshops had an impact, these projects were not immune from the familiar generic flaws undermining EU good governance policy in Ghana. First, there is evidence of mission creep. Participants' less versed in the definitions and meanings of 'human rights' and 'good governance', digressed into matters unrelated to the protection of children. For instance, during the forced marriage sensitisation workshop in Kintampo, the Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Centre conveners facilitated exchanges on the benefit of the spirit of communal labour. Also, during a workshop in Anapahsu, even though the main focus was mean to be about children rights, the programme slipped into broader discussions over women's rights and the standard of education within the district (International Needs 2014). True, communal labour and women rights are important issues, but like many good governance initiatives, the temptation to drift into more generic 'development' areas proved too much. The 'good governance/human rights' agenda was no longer being served at these times, yet participants, organisers and donors did not seem too concerned that this wat the case.

The second generic flaw evident in these Children's' rights projects relates to inadequate economic opportunities present in these communities, and this not being sufficiently addressed in the design of the good governance initiative. Context is everything. There is nothing wrong with sensitising a community to the damage that child labour or child marriage does, but these projects needed to be more nuanced in recognising why children are

abused in this manner in these communities. Chief Nana Adusei Safo Kotoko observed ‘the only way these criminal acts will stop is if more economic opportunities are created in the area’. He continued, most of the people who engage in this act are from poor background with less financial resources. Therefore, ‘the only option parents are sometimes left with is to marry their child off or put them to work.’ (Personal Interview with Sarfo Kotoko 2015. Translated by the author from Twi).

### **Support for the criminal justice system**

Demonstrating how the EU’s ‘support for human rights’ and ‘support for the administration of justice’ clusters worked in parallel, Brussels also operated good governance programmes to assist law enforcement agencies Ghana. The aim of this external policy was to equip the relevant state bodies, enabling them to better carry out their functions strategically and efficiently (European Commission 2007: 9). Two projects dominated this programme: support for the Ghana Police Service in its criminal evidence collection, and support for combatting human trafficking (European Union External Action 2012: 1).

In terms of building criminal evidence collection capacity, the European Union provided €3 million in 2011 to refurbish a multi-purpose forensic science laboratory in Accra (European Union-Ghana Cooperation 2007: 9). According to former Head of the EU Delegation in Ghana, Claude Maerten, the ‘laboratory was a timely addition to Ghana’s crime fighting machinery’, adding that ‘with the refurbishment, the capacity of the Criminal Investigation Department has been considerably strengthened’ (Modern Ghana: 2011). The President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, agreed: ‘without this facility, criminal investigation was really difficult as sometimes samples had to be taken to South Africa, with attended costs in the form of air fares and the distance that had to be travelled’ (Ghana web: 2011). The laboratory was fully equipped with modern forensic equipment, such as an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and DNA analysis tools (European Union External Action Service, 2012: 3).

The second focus in this cluster was the European Union’s assistance aimed at combatting human trafficking. This involved support for the Ghana Immigration Service and the Ghana

Police Service's Anti-Human Trafficking Unit. Over three years, the European Union provided €100,000 of ICT equipment (Ghana News Agency 2013: 2). The Acting Head of European Union Delegation in Ghana, William Hanna, made it known that the EU considered 'trafficking in human beings to be an extremely serious crime and a gross violation of human rights, which could be classified as modern forms of slavery, and it is the EU priority to help combat this crime'. He 'expressed the hope' the support extended to the GIS and the Ghana Police Service 'would enhance their capacities in their dealing with this type of crime by developing new threat assessment methodologies, defining intervention priorities and establishing links with national security strategies' (Ghana News Agency: 2013).

Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that the EU's support for these agencies did net positive results. A senior police officer, who wished not to be identified, stationed at the refurbished forensic laboratory, confirmed that the 'refurbishment of the centre has really aided in the work of the Ghana police in their investigations' Being able to process potential evidence in-house, and not rely on foreign laboratories, 'really speeds up the investigation process' (Personal interview with Senior Police Officer, Police Forensic Laboratory, Accra 2015). A DNA expert in the Ghana Police Service, Charles Coffie, agrees. He noted, previously 'we could only analyse limited numbers of samples due to financial and logistics constraints. But now we analyse evidence faster which speeds up prosecution times and conviction rates' (Personal interview with Charles Coffie, 2015). European Union support also helped the Ghana Police Service's Anti-Human Trafficking Unit. Although no evidence was found that this specific funding reduced the number of trafficking cases, AHTU operational activity did increase at this time (Ghana Police Service 2020).

Despite these benefits, however, one has to question the extent that 'good governance' was actually advanced in Ghana as a consequence of these 'support for the administration of justice' EU programmes. These assistance projects were certainly billed as advancing good governance, and justified as such, but with such diverse programmes receiving this classification, is it not true that any reform of a public service, or new policy initiative, can qualify as such? The EU found it useful to attach the concept of 'good governance' to many of its programmes in Ghana. The above examples support the idea that this concept is consequently ill-defined amongst practitioners, it can be stretched as concept exponentially, and donors and recipients are both content to keep things vague in order to gain benefit from this one size fits all method of policy validation.

## **Abolition of the death penalty**

As stated by the Council of the European Union (2013):

The European Union has strong and unequivocally opposition to the death penalty in all times and in all circumstances. Therefore, and encouraged by the growing momentum towards the abolition of the death penalty worldwide, the EU will continue its long-standing campaign against the death penalty.

The European Union External Action Service (2016) clarified that this position:

stems from the universal and fundamental right to life. It is also embedded in human dignity of every human being, even of someone who has committed the most atrocious crime. The abolition of the death penalty worldwide is one of the flagship objectives of the EU's human rights policy and as such one of the top priorities in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.

Even though no execution has taken place since 1993, Ghana still retains the death penalty and its courts continue to hand down death sentences (Amnesty International 2015:167). The European Union has therefore used different platforms in Ghana to express its opposition to the death penalty, and it lobbies the Government of Ghana to abolish this punishment. The EU's Ambassador Claude Maerten, for example, echoing the statements above, told the *Ghana News Agency* that the 'EU is committed to achieving a universal abolition of the death penalty. The abolition of the death penalty was one of the objectives of the EU's human rights policy because the EU considered the death penalty as inhumane and violation of human dignity' (Ghana News Agency 2011). Diametrically opposed positions on the death penalty were therefore a factor underlying EU good governance policy in Ghana for the entire period of this study.

Aside from public pronouncements, the European Union also used diplomatic channels to lobby the Government of Ghana on this issue. Regular set piece dialogue between EU officials and State House regularly have human rights and the death penalty on the agenda. Although this dialogue only results in the two parties stating their own position, and respectfully disagreeing with the other's stance, the EU does persist with this formality in order to keep up the pressure (Personal Interview with Bogrebon Allan 2015; Delegation of European Union to Ghana 2013). As Alessandro Valdambrini, of the human rights section of



the EU Directorate-General Development and Cooperation, confides, when it comes to personal diplomatic contacts with the Government of Ghana ‘we remain very vocal’ (Personal interview with Alessandro Valdambrini 2015)

The following two research interview excerpts explain the EU’s strategy well. Joseph Bogrebon Allan, a programme officer in governance at the EU Delegation to Ghana stated:

We are still against the death penalty but also recognise the sovereignty of [Ghana]. This is not to say that in Ghana, the EU has folded its arms and is doing nothing about the death penalty. We are operating this matter on right to life. This depends if the country is enforcing the law. In Ghana’s case, there has been de facto moratorium on the death penalty. Naturally, there should be no death penalty at all, but at the end of the day, the de facto moratorium is better than nothing. Together with Amnesty International, we are waving the flag and the government is listening. But the government itself is sensitive to the view of the citizenry because, during the public education on this, it came out clear that public opinion supports the death penalty. From the EU point of view, it is clear to us that if the Government of Ghana really wants to abolish the death penalty, we will encourage this, because I have heard top members of the Government telling me in secret that we cannot boost good governance when we still have the death penalty. Nevertheless, public opinion is against the abolition of the death penalty and we need to respect the Government’s position (Personal interview with EU official Bogrebon Allan 2015).

Indeed, during a 2016 meeting between European Union and Government of Ghana officials, Marietta Brew Appiah-Oppong, the Attorney General of Ghana, let it be known that Ghana would only abolish the death penalty if this was mandated by a referendum. She indicated that the Government of Ghana had well advanced plans hold such a plebiscite on the matter, but public opinion was unlikely to support abolition (Ghana News Agency 2016). To date, this poll has not taken place. Natalie Mitchell-Bennett, the EU Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) Ghana desk officer in Brussels, sums up the situation, and the EU’s pragmatic approach, well:

When it comes to Ghana, we have chosen political dialogue and diplomacy rather than a hard approach like sanctions, because we believe this is the right approach. This is because for the past 22 years, Ghana has not executed anyone. However, we will continue to dialogue until the day where we finally reach the position of the abolition of the death penalty (Personal interview with Natalie Mitchell-Bennett 2015).

This empirical example of good governance policy in practice challenges the idea that the concept of ‘good governance’ itself is universal. Scholars and practitioners of the Washington School push the notion that good governance is good for development. This would include the advancement of both human rights and democracy. These two goals are often seen as two sides of the same coin. Yet, in this case, there is a clash between the two. Universal human

rights, in the EU's eyes, demand the abolition of the death penalty. Democracy, in the Government of Ghana's calculations, prevents the abolition of the death penalty, as this is opposed by public opinion. Is it possible for the two parties to advocate diametrically opposite positions using the same concept of 'good governance' as their standard?

This example also raises the issue on whether, or not, 'good governance' can be supported/defined by an external power. This is where the work of the critical thinkers enters the analysis. They argue that instead of 'problem solving' the immediate obstruction (of the death penalty), by lobbying the Government of Ghana, the EU should be more active trying to address broader, societal issues that host these alternative cultural beliefs. Yet, the EU chooses not to challenge the Government of Ghana, nor the Ghanaian people, too hard on this issue. Effectively, with such entrenched beliefs to overcome, EU officials are more willing to make their position clear but then move on to supporting 'good governance' elsewhere, where there are chances of better returns made on time and resources spent. This was also the case with the EU's policy on supporting the LGBT community in Ghana.

## **Rights of the LGBT community in Ghana**

In 2010, the European Union issued a 'toolkit' seeking to promote and protect LGBT rights in all third countries where it had diplomatic relations (European Union 2010). This document made it clear that:

The EU strongly supports the entitlement by all individuals, without discrimination, to enjoy the full range of human rights. The promotion and protection of human rights features as a key objective of the EU's external action. Through the different tools available to it within its external action, including financial instruments ... the EU will seek to actively promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBT people (European Union 2010:7).

This too kit underpinned a strategy of lobbying for the decriminalisation of homosexuality, condemning any legal or social discrimination against this community, and championing those who campaigned to secure these rights (European Union 2010:10-12). This unequivocal stance put the EU into direct conflict with the Government of Ghana, as same sex-relations in Ghana are illegal.

In seeking to promote this aspect of its human rights/good governance agenda in Ghana, a dual track strategy was implemented: diplomatic dialogue combined with direct support for the LGBT community in Ghana. Under the diplomatic track, the European Union persistently kept LGBT rights on the agenda in its private dialogue with the Government of Ghana, and through public statements. In 2012, for example, during a diplomatic meeting between the EU and Ghana, the Delegation of the European Union noted that ‘Ghana has ratified many of the international treaties relating to the promotion of human rights and rule of law, and its record in this regard has improved since the return of democracy in 1993’. The EU, however, raised its concerns over discrimination against LGBT persons (Delegation of the European Union to Ghana: 2012). A year later, in this dialogue, the EU explicitly recommended the discrimination of same-sex relations (Delegation of the European Union to Ghana 2013: 2).

Joseph Bogrebon Allan, of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana, who worked on this aspect of governance, explained:

Ghana has made tremendous progress when it comes to human rights and rule of law as part of good governance, however not everybody’s rights are protected and respected when it comes to this area. We as a Union continue to dialogue with the Government of Ghana on this issue. Also, we constantly have meetings with the LGBT community in Ghana, to make sure we listen to their complaints about the abuse they constantly face (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan 2015).

This strategy of keeping LGBT rights on the agenda, in effect ‘expressing the EU’s concern’ but not fully confronting the Government of Ghana or Ghanaian society, was explained by Natalie Mitchell-Bennett, of the DEVCO Ghana Desk in Brussels. Mitchell-Bennett noted:

The EU is aware of this discriminatory law in section 104 (of Ghana’s Criminal Code]. This is another area that we are trying to highlight through diplomacy. However, on this subject, the Government is determined to hold the status quo because the majority of the population are in favour of it. Also, even though there is discrimination, Ghana’s situation has not reached the Uganda [situation], where we had to stop our bilateral relations when parliament passed a bill to sentence homosexual people to death. However, we are in constant dialogue with the Government of Ghana to seek the best way forward (Personal interview with Natalie Mitchell-Bennett 2015).

As with the death penalty, the EU does not confront the Government of Ghana as it deems the relative scale of the problem to be better managed by dialogue.

In addition to this diplomatic dialogue, the European Union has direct contact with LGBT community groups in Ghana. The Delegation in Ghana hosts regular meetings with known activists within this country’s LGBT population. Joseph Bogrebon Allan explained:

The reason why we as a delegation decided to go for this approach is that we realised that, apart from the diplomatic dialogue, it is important we provide direct support to the LGBT community. This is because this community continues to face persecution and discrimination. On international Gay Parade day, we recognise them; we hold a small event in the Delegation and invite all the civil society organisations campaigning for gay rights. During these events we speak against the hatred for LGBT and come together in solidarity (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan 2015).

The inability of the European Community to secure LGBT rights in Ghana, again, raises the question to whether ‘good governance’ can be supported or defined by an external power. What is good governance in this instance? The EU championing ‘universal’ human rights, or the Government of Ghana reflecting the local democratic will? As with the issue of the death penalty, the EU followed a path of making its views known to the Government of Ghana, and raising issues of discrimination when they came to the Delegation’s attention, but confrontation was kept to a low level. Accra, on its part, made it clear that it was not about decriminalise homosexuality, nor would it tolerate more aggressive lobbying from external powers to this end (Africa News: 2017; Ansah and Opoku, 2017) As Ghana was ‘not as bad as Uganda’, Brussels deferred to Accra’s sovereignty and democratic mandate. Yet, arrests (but few, if any, prosecutions) of homosexuals continued, and discrimination against the LGBT community remained widespread in Ghanaian society (Human Right Watch 2018). The reality was that the EU could do little to materially advance this aspect of good governance. It was unable to persuade the Government of Ghana to recognise these human rights, and consequently invested more of its resources in areas where it could make more of a difference.

## **Conclusion**

This survey of the EU’s ‘human rights’ and ‘administration of justice’ clusters of good governance activity in Ghana follows a similar pattern to the previous chapters. The time and resources EU officials put into this policy netted positive material results. Ghanaian lives were improved as a consequence. Yet, the common flaws of good governance policy, found elsewhere in this thesis, are also present in these clusters. Mission creep and an inability confront the Government of Ghana in areas of vested interests are evidenced above.

In terms of the positive material benefits, the EU's support helped produce a *Women's Manifesto* that proved useful to ngo officials working on gender rights. There is also evidence that individuals benefitted from the sensitisation workshops, whether these events inspired women to seek elected office or asked elected (male) officials to reflect on gender during their decision-making. This campaign would also seem to have resulted in media houses making women more visible in their reporting. Likewise, the human rights of Ghanaian children were more protected as a consequence of EU policy. Although no direct impact can be quantified, EU sponsored workshops did take place at a time when attitudes were shifting in Ghanaian society. The stakeholders attending these workshops were the same opinion leaders who helped the idea of indulging child marriage or child labour become less acceptable in Ghanaian society (Anokyewaa Sarfo, et.al. 2020; Afriyie, et.al, 2019 ). Then, there was the support for the administration of justice through the refurbishing the country's main forensic lab and offering support to combat human trafficking. Again, even if significant problems remained with Ghana's justice processes, criminal justice capacity in Ghana would have been weaker without this assistance. Fewer positives emerge from the EU's lobbying on the death penalty and LGBT rights, but it could be argued that without this EU pressure, the Government of Ghana may have applied its legal code more aggressively.

Despite these achievements, however, the flaw of mission creep once again emerges in this cluster. With a confused notion over what 'good governance' actually is found amongst local project implementers and their target audience, it was easy for everyone to drift in their focus. It is not surprising that the above workshops specifically organised around the rights of the child, for example, could morph into familiar 'development' workshops of the type delivered more regularly on women's issues or community enterprise. EU officials seemed reasonably content that their funding was being spent on valuable development assistance, even if the initial specific human rights impact had become blurred (Personal interviews with Bogrebon Allan 2015; and Natalie Mitchell-Bennett 2015). With these examples, the sceptical literature on good governance resonates. An ill-defined conceptual base will lead to an ill-defined policy implementation (Ali 2008: 67).

The second common flaw identified in this cluster was the limited ability of the European Union to challenge the Government of Ghana in areas of vested interest. Put simply, the Ghanaian government was not going to decriminalise homosexuality or abolish the death penalty. There was no local mandate for it to do this. This position can be explained both in terms of officials exercising democratic representation and the fact that Ghanaian politicians

had no wish to alienate their constituents over these matters. The argument advanced by the critical thinkers that Western governments have defined 'good governance' in their own image, and are wrong to impose these external values on other societies (Abrahamsen 2000: 47-65), came home to roost in both these cases. Again, it should be asked what is best for 'good governance': the promotion of 'universal' human rights, as defined by a foreign power, or upholding the democratic will by locally elected representatives?

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **EU SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Effective and transparent public administration and management of public finances is accepted as a key component of good governance. The EU Handbook for Good Governance cautions that,

Poor public administration can lead to misguided allocation of resources, inappropriate, government intervention, arbitrations and corruption which deter private investment and increase citizen mistrust. Public administration reform is the search for public service structures that respond to the needs of citizens and deliver appropriate public goods and services efficiently, responsively, and impartially, including macro-economic and public policy formulation, definition and implementation (2004: 71).

The former Head of the EU Delegation, Claude Maerten emphasised the relationship between effective public administration and good governance,

Ghana's has a positive track record of good governance. The Union consequently, pledged it continuous support for Ghana in these efforts and urged the nation to intensify the fight against corruption, by reinforcing powers of independent constitutional bodies and the role of parliament (Ghana News Agency 2013: 1).

The chapter analyses two key elements of the EU's overarching good governance policy in the context of public administration reform. Firstly, support for the Ghana Audit Service (GAS) to financially audit eighteen government agencies. Secondly, EU support for performance auditing in a number of economic sectors including education, roads, art and culture and water.

These audits resulted in a range of reports and recommendations. However, as with other areas of good governance addressed by the EU's overarching strategy, there was often a lack of focus on the fundamental aim of the strategy – in this case to make public administration across government ministries, departments and agencies more efficient and transparent. In the case of public administration reform, there is also evidence that some of the

recommendations that came out of the audits did not take into account constraints at macro and micro level. Funded by the EU, the audits were reasonably comprehensive. However, the EU as donor was inhibited in its capacity to pressure the hierarchy of government in Ghana, notably the government, to provide political will and resources to implement these recommendations.

### **Financial auditing strategy**

The purpose of the financial auditing strategy was to promote good governance by encouraging transparency and accountability in the public financial management system (Modern Ghana 2003: 1). The EU funded 67 GAS officials to conduct a financial audit on 18 government agencies. These were the Ministry of Private Sector Development; the Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC); Serious Fraud Office; the Ghana Institute of Journalism (GIJ); the Ghana Legal Council (GLC); the Ghana Prisons Service; the Ghana National Fire Service; the Passport Office; the Judicial Service; the Public Works Department; the Public Servant Housing Loans Scheme Board, Mamprobi Polyclinic; the Forestry Commission; the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI); the Statistics Service, Funds and Procurement at the Ministry of Education and Board of Legal Education; and the Public Records Administration and Archives Department (Ghana News Agency 2003: 1).

The subsequent report produced by GAS came to seven key, and concerning, conclusions:

1. The GIJ; Statistical Service, Ministry of Justice, Ghana Prisons Services and Mamprobi Polyclinic lacked the capacity to undertake internal audits.
2. Mamprobi Polyclinic and NVTI had no supervisory board.
3. Even though the Ghana Audit Service Act (2000) requires agencies to establish audit implementation committee, none of the 18 agencies had established these committees.
4. Staff at the 18 agencies lacked the necessary skills to perform their work effectively and efficiently.
5. All the agencies had inadequate procurement procedure.
6. There was a general non-adherence to payroll routines and procedures.
7. The agencies failed to deduct withholding tax (Special Auditor Report of the Auditor General 2003: 5-6).

In response to these findings, GAS made a series of recommendations.

1. There should be a comprehensive review of skills and expertise of all staff employed in the financial department of ministries, departments and agencies.
2. Boards should be established in all state departments required to do so.
3. All 18 agencies should establish Audit Implementation Committees as required by law.



4. There should be broad review of the internal audit functions in all ministries, departments and agencies to include assessment of staff and trainee needs, scope and the internal audit teams relationship with management.
5. Each state agency should self-assess to ensure effective financial control.
6. All agencies should follow effective procurement procedures in order to ensure transparency and accountability of operations.
7. All 18 agencies are required to follow the Ghana Revenue Act (2000) and deduct withholding tax.

In keeping with previous Auditor General's reports, the report based on the financial audit funded by the EU was submitted to Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee compiled their own report and made recommendation for Parliament. Ultimately seven recommendations were adopted (Parliamentary Centre 2009: 40). All 18 government agencies were required to implement these recommendations.

Fieldwork between 2014 and 2015 indicated that three of the recommendations had not only been implemented, but had also clearly helped to improve efficient administration in the agencies. Two of the agencies established Audit Report Implementation Committees based on the Auditor General and Public Account Committee (PAC) recommendations. The Senior Officer of Funds and Procurement at the Ministry of Education explained that:

We were one of the eighteen organisations in 2003 Auditor's General report without ARIC. Based on the Auditor General's Report (2003) and PAC's recommendations in 2005, we had complied with Section 30 (1) of Audit Service Act 2000 (Act 584). Currently, we have established a committee to monitor all activities, particularly matters concerning financial matters (Personal interview with Senior Officer of Funds and Procurement: 2015).

The Chief Statistical Officer of Ghana Forest Commission also confirmed,

We as a Commission has now established ARIC based on Auditor General and PAC's recommendation. Since its inauguration, the committee deals with matters of financial audit in order to ensure good institutional governance. Thanks to the committee, we always submit our reports on time (Personal interview with Mensah: 2015).

Fieldwork research also indicated that the GEPC had reviewed the skills and expertise of the staff employed in the financial department. The GEPC acted on some of the recommendations. It trained staff in order to be able to perform its own internal audit and established an Audit Report Implementation Committee (Personal interview with Bawauah: 2015). Likewise, interviews with representatives of the Ghana Statistical Service and Forestry Commission on the ground indicate that they are also seeking to implement the recommendations. Mamprobi Polyclinic and the NVTI have set up supervisory boards. Kwame Agyeman, auditor of the NVTI emphasised that the appointment of the supervisory board was not just to comply with the Auditor General's instructions, but as a measure

recognised as enhancing its internal good governance. ‘The NVTI decided to establish supervisory board following the directive from PAC’s. In specific to supervisory board, as I speak to you now, they even met last week to review the work of the Managing board to ensure that we are following all the necessary steps that ensures good governance’ (Personal interview with Agyeman: 2015). This sentiment was echoed by Emmanuel Kyei, senior auditor of Mamprobi Polyclinic (Personal interview with Kyei: 2013).

Other recommendations from the report are yet to be implemented. In particular, the deduction of withholding tax and non-adherence to payroll routines and procedures (Auditor General’s Report: 2013). Fieldwork for this study indicates a lack of political will on the part of the government. This is the assessment of Osei Akoto, MP for Old Tafo and Ranking Member of the Finance Committee of Parliament: ‘As results of the EU support to Ghana Audit Service, the GAS submitted various reports to Public Accounts Committee to take the necessary actions. But over the years, some of the recommendations are yet to be implemented because both past and present government lacks the political will to do so’ (Interview with Akoto: 2015). This lack of commitment was also echoed by Richard Quartey; the former Auditor General. According to him, the audit report provided an independent evaluation of public administration, but there needed to be the political will on the part of the Legislature and Executive to implement these recommendations (Brako-Powers: 2016).

Interviews with representatives of GAS show that most of the 18 agencies still delay or fail to produce financial statements for audit. One reason seems to be a continued skills deficit in these agencies. Kwabena Gyamfi; senior auditor of Ghana Audit Service explained that,

State organisations are legally required to submit their financial statements within three months of the financial year. The case of the 18 agencies cited in EU-funded Auditor General’s Report is no news because it is very common to most state agencies. Despite the fact that the EU-funded report in 2003 made a strong recommendation, there should be comprehensive review of skills and knowledge of all finance departments in all MDA, this is yet to be implemented in most MDAs (Personal interview with Gyamfi: 2015).

Despite the EU funding the rigorous Auditor General’s report that uncovered deficiencies in public administration, there is political limit on the pressure it can exert on the government to force the implementation of the recommendations.

From the EU’s perspective, ‘We as a Delegation are quite aware of the failure on the part of Government of Ghana to implement certain aspects of the auditor’s general report. Even though we do bring these concerns up during our meetings with the Government, there are

certain political lines we cannot cross. That is, we cannot force the Government of Ghana to implement these recommendations' (Personal interview with Allan: 2015). In addition, Alexandro Valdambrini from the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation Unit remarked that 'even though the EU is not happy that the Government of Ghana is not implementing all the necessary measures as far as good governance is concerned, we are bounded by Ghana's sovereignty...there is a limit to what we can do' (Personal interview with Valdambrini: 2015). As with the abuse of incumbency, the death penalty and LGBT rights – all issues with which the EU takes exception to the government's position - there are limits to the EU's capacity to change government policy.

### **Performance auditing strategy**

As a major donor, the EU has a duty to the tax payers of its Member States to ensure that its funding is being efficiently used. The efficient public administration and management of public finances is also a pre-requisite for good governance. In order to ensure that government agencies were making best use of funding and resources, the EU funded GAS to undertake performance auditing exercises in a number of public agencies (Ghana-EU Cooperation 2003: 17). According to Bogrebon Allan the programme was established to 'ensure value for money, transparency and better use of resources' (Personal interview with Bogrebon Allan: 2015). Commencing at the same time as the EU-funded audit of government agencies, the performance audit covered four main economic sectors: education; roads; art and culture and water.

In the education sector, GAS was tasked with auditing performance in four areas. The supply and distribution of textbooks to Senior Secondary Schools; the Functional Literacy Programme (FLP); the Auditor General's report on distribution of teachers in basic schools; and the administration of the government's scholarships for second cycle institutions. The findings of the performance audit discovered ineffective procurement procedures in the supply and distribution of textbooks. The FLP suffered from a high dropout rate; inflexible training programmes; inadequate income generation activity; poor community awareness; problems of ownership; resource utilisation; lack of incentives for facilitators and lack of

support and supervision. Recommendations included essential component strategy, changing recruitment practice, encouraging community ownership and enhancing technical support. The GAS also advised a review of the way teachers were allocated and incentives to encourage teachers to work in deprived areas (Ghana News Agency 2004: 1).

In relation to government scholarships, the performance audit discovered that the scholarship list was inaccurate with 230 students who were either dead or withdrawn still included. The audit also reported wastage and inefficiency costing \$15m. Some beneficiaries were excluded. Some prospective candidates were not aware that the scheme existed as a result of inadequate public advertisement. The Ghana Education Service (GES) secretariat was required to rectify these deficiencies. Ironically, a further recommendation required the Office of the President and Chief of Staff to develop a framework to measure the performance of the secretariat (Performance Audit 2004: 10-11).

The performance audit indicated some positive outcomes such as the distribution by the GES of 10m textbooks in 2013 alone (Bonney: 2014). From 2003 to 2005, the number of students dropping out of school fell from 17% to 15%. However, many of the recommendations are yet to be implemented. The GES is yet to review its procurement manuals and the current manual does not meet the requirements of the Procurement Act (2003). As of 2015, there was no mechanism in place to check the performance of the scholarship and who receives a scholarship. the people who gets the scholarship.

In 2006, the EU funded GAS to performance audit the road sector. Whilst, the audit found instances of good practice, it also concluded that the country's roads were deteriorating as a result of inadequate funding. The audit also found weak supervision; delays in building toll booths on new roads and bridges; under-performance due to the privatisation of road and bridge tolls; and revenue leakage at the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA). GAS made four recommendations to improve the performance of the road sector. Firstly, GAS recommended that the Road Funds Board (RFB) should explore other revenue generating methods. Secondly, as a result of low revenue due to low inter-border trade between Ghana and Togo, the RFB should introduce revised revenue and management practices and regular supervision. Thirdly, the RFB should evaluate the ability of companies awarded contracts to deliver their contractual obligations. Finally, in order to prevent revenue leakages at the DVLA, the activities of 'goro boys', responsible for selling fake driver's licenses, should be addressed (Performance Audit Report 2006: 4). However, fieldwork in 2014 and 2015

focussed on the road sector found that the performance audit has had little impact on revenue generation by the RFB or curbing wastage in revenue collection. Though the RFB increased revenue to about 1bn cedis between 2000-2010 (Ghana News Agency, 2011), mainly due to increased road and bridge tolls and international transit fees, there is little evidence that the recommendations of the EU-funded performance audit contributed to this increase. Despite the audit calling for legislation to prevent wastage in the road sector, there has been no new legislation since the Ghana Road Act (1997). Finally, as observed in 2015, the goro boys' lucrative trade in fake documents persists.

The GAS were also tasked with performance auditing the management of Ghana's Castles and Forts for the period between 1999 to 2003. The Ghana Museums and Monument Board (GMMB) identifies 42 castles and forts in the country and these are perceived as potential major tourist attraction, especially given their connection with the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The audit was critical of the GMMB's performance in marketing the castles and forts to domestic and international tourists having failed to use contemporary marketing techniques. The management of human resources was also criticised. The audit noted that whilst the GMMB failed to retain skilled staff, it retained informal staff often drawing public funds. The audit made some concrete recommendations:

1. Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to market Ghana's monuments abroad.
2. Set targets for the Ghana Tourist Board.
3. The GMMB should consider re-train and employ inactive staff as security officers to protect monuments.
4. The GMMB should use modern techniques to bring Ghana's history – including its experience with the slave trade - to life.
5. Organise *son et lumiere* events charged at premium prices.
6. Re-examine the role of informal staff (Performance Audit Report of Auditor General 2004: iv-viii).

These recommendations sought to marry good government principles with practical policies to improve the management of Ghana's heritage industry and increase revenue. Following scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee, the recommendations were converted into legislation. Fieldwork undertaken in 2015 found that impressive progress had been made based on the performance audit's recommendations. Comprehensive in-house training by the Tourist Board has brought in 100 new members of staff. Likewise, deliberate policies and training were introduced to improve the productivity of existing staff (Personal interview

with Mensah: 2015). However, there remain problems. GMMB has overseen only limited restoration of the monuments and inspections are infrequent. GMMB involvement in the tendering processes for restoration has also been minimal. Whilst, a website has been developed, there is no evidence of collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to market the monuments.

In 2006, GAS undertook a performance audit into the water sector, specifically the provision of safe drinking water (Performance Audit of the Auditor General 2006: 1). The Community Water and Sanitation Agency Act (1998) set up the Community Services and Water Agency (CWSA) to provide potable water and improved sanitation in rural communities (Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing, 2015). Despite \$500m being spent on the provision of potable water over the previous decade only 46.4% of towns and villages had access to drinking water. Many still walked long distance to access water. Untreated water led to diseases such as guinea worm and bilharzia. The audit uncovered a number of instances of resources being mis-spent; money being given to hydro consultants to drill boreholes that produced no results, and rivalry between the CWSA and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for contracts to drill boreholes. The audit made a series of recommendations intended to build upon progress to date including improved revenue collection from the community; more emphasis on the control of disease; more efficient collaboration with NGOs and involve traditional and opinion leaders at village level in education campaigns on the hazards of polluted water (Performance Audit of the Auditor General on Provision of Safe Drinking Water 2006: 27-31).

Fieldwork in 2014 and 2015 indicated a patchy response by the CWSA to these recommendations. The CSWA have now fully decentralised and have established offices in all the 216 districts across the country. According to Siaw Coffie, Senior Officer of CSWA, 'Based on the recommendations contained in the Auditor General's report, the CSWA saw the pressing need to decentralised power by establishing our offices throughout the districts in order to ensure transparency, accountability and local participation. Since implementing this, we have more community involvement at the local level' (Personal interview with Siaw: 2014).

Research also discovered a number of initiatives that responded to the recommendations. For example, in Assin South District, members of the district assembly were given a day's orientation workshop on how to strategize and access water and sanitation facilities. The

agency had made some progress in upgrading the skills and knowledge of staff members and more than 356 members of staff across the districts have been trained (CSWA 2015: 2). The CSWA have improved collaboration with district health directorates to educate the public on measures to prevent guinea worm. Education programmes, some in local languages, have been expanded and radio broadcasts on preventive measures established (Personal interview with Boateng: 2015).

However, the majority of the recommendations have either not been implemented or only partially implemented. Little has been accomplished in terms of finding alternatives to ground water or more efficient collaboration with NGOs. For example, NGO standards for drilling boreholes do not conform with the standards required by the CWSA. During fieldwork in Brong Ahafo, Volta regions and the Northern Region of Ghana, many boreholes were found to be in poor repair, in an insanitary environment and were not being adequately monitored. Other recommendations proved aspirational. Extracting revenue from villages without tangible income was always going to prove an impossible task.

The EU's instinct to undertake audits – both financial and performance-related – in order to detect where improvements are needed was understandable. However, these audits ultimately came into conflict with multiple obstacles specific to Ghana's political, economic and social reality. As with other areas of good governance, there are limits to the EU's capacity to enforce compliance. As an EU Diplomat put it:

These recommendations remain integral part of good governance in the public sector. However, when we support the Ghana Audit Service to audits these sectors, we hope that the Government of Ghana will implement the recommendations. But if there is failure on the part of Government of Ghana or institutions in Ghana to implement them, we only continue to engage them (Personal interview with an EU diplomat who wished to remain unnamed: 2015)

## **Conclusion**

Following the pattern of research findings found in the other good governance clusters, it is evident in this chapter that the EU's support for public administration reform and the management of public finances produced some good positive results. The projects above provided clear and focussed audit recommendations in the areas of public finance and public administration. For instance, public managers in the areas of education, road construction and

maintenance, water supply, and art and culture were left in no doubt how they could improve their services. Likewise, the Ghana Audit Service used the EU's assistance to enable it to produce a damning series of revelations concerning illegal and corrupt behaviour in a range of state institution, alongside a large catalogue of mal-administration practises uncovered in the public sector generally. These functions of 'investigation' and 'exposure' were clearly beneficial to good governance in Ghana.

Yet, despite the progress that has been made in this cluster, the EU's work in Ghana is undermined by a familiar flaw. As with previous clusters, the EU's inability to successfully confront the Government of Ghana in areas of vested interest came to the fore. The above evidence clearly demonstrates a pattern. The Government of Ghana is open to audit but it will only act on subsequent recommendations if it is in its own corporate interests to do so. If it is not willing to act, the European Union is powerless to progress these recommendations.

A case in point is the 2003 GAS audit of 18 key state agencies. The Service found seven common examples of patent 'bad government', and made seven recommendations to address these. No state could make a claim to be seeking 'good governance' until these basic recommendations were implemented. However, the Government of Ghana is yet to act on four of these proposals, even today. A calculation has been made that doing so would significantly damage the interests of those running the state. Ghana's neo-patrimonial state itself is the obstacle here. This shows that the European Union may be able to engage government officials on these issues, and publicly expose shortfalls, but if it is unwilling consider sanctions in order to force change, nothing will happen. As the EU Delegation to Ghana official said above, this hesitancy to confront means 'we are bounded by Ghana's sovereignty...there is a limit to what we can do' (Personal interview with Valdambrini: 2015).

The critical thinking school may be relevant here. Whereas the problem solvers have followed a neat logic – identify the problem and then implement a policy to address this – the European Union apparently simply ignored the political environment in which this policy would be executed (Whitfield 2010; Arthur 2010; Osei- Tutu, et.al. 2010). There is merit in enabling the GAS to ascertain and highlight state agencies' 'non-adherence to payroll routines and procedures' and to recommend these agencies 'follow the Ghana Revenue Act (2000)' (Special Auditor Report of the Auditor General 2003: 5-6), but it was naïve to think that the Government of Ghana would alter deeply entrenched political practices and act on these recommendations. A policy less 'problem solving' and more 'critical thinking' may have addressed this reality prior to its implementation. If corruption and mal-administration



are to be addressed, the consequent 'good government' initiative needs to recognise the current working practices of the very government it is trying to make 'good'.

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **EU SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION**

The final cluster of EU good governance policy towards Ghana is ‘support for civil society organisations’. The European Union puts great faith in the role of such groups in its external relations. The European Commission (2012:3) considers:

An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is an asset in itself. It represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth. It is important player in fostering peace and in conflict resolution. By articulating citizens’ concerns, civil society organisations are active in the public arena, engaging in initiatives to further participatory democracy. They embody a growing demand for transparent and accountable governance.

As such, ‘civil society’ was conceptually important to the EU’s strategy of good governance, both in Ghana and elsewhere. It is therefore important that this thesis examines the policies implemented by the EU in Ghana with respect to this civil society cluster.

It should be noted at this point, however, that, as civil society organisations were often the EU’s delivery partner for a full range of good governance projects, all the previous chapters already provide evidence of operational examples of EU/Ghanaian civil society relations in the good governance context. This (shorter) chapter’s analysis will therefore draw upon this previously presented data. The new material introduced will focus on two remaining civil society governance projects.

Each of these projects is considered in its own section of the chapter. The first of these analyses a ‘flagship’ EU good governance project aimed at building civil society capacity in the area of forest governance. The second section assesses civil society assistance for good governance in the area of maternal health policy.

The research findings in this cluster are, once again, familiar. In terms of positive outcomes, the EU helped build intuitions that, in turn, built trust between timber producers and forest communities. Conflict, as a consequence, has been mitigated somewhat in these areas, and local communities have benefitted more from logging on their lands. Positive outcomes also came from the maternal health project. Stakeholders and health care recipients gained a better understanding of each other needs, and services improved as a consequence. In both cases, innovative projects were seeking empower civil society to hold businesses and public service providers to account.

Yet, notwithstanding these positive returns, EU support for civil society organisations in the field of good governance was, once more, undermined by two conceptual flaws. The first of these relates to the socio-economic environment. As it will be seen, the forestry governance project is an example where most of the good governance benefits were wiped out by unfavourable economic conditions. Without careful policy implementation, good governance can be a casualty of poverty, and not just a spur for economic development. The maternal health, on the other hand, was beset by mission creep. Again, there is evidence of a good governance policy slipping into operational areas that have no connection with the project.

### **Civil society and forest governance**

The EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Government, and Trade (FLEGT) project aimed to build capacity within civil society in order that communities could help govern their own forest resources. The FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement was an action plan set out in 2003 primarily to address the growing problem of illegal logging. Under this action plan, big timber companies were not able export lumber to EU countries without the consent of the forest communities that resided on the land they logged. Civil society was therefore empowered to certify sources of legal logging and use the proceeds to improve the governance of the forest (European Commission: 2003). According to Christopher Ackon, the FLEGT Program Officer at the Delegation of the European Union in Ghana:

The European Union enacted this policy because the Union, over the years, had realised that there has been massive illegal logging across the globe. This is because our nations have failed to address the governance issues related to natural resources exploitation.

...The EU thought the FLEGT action plan was the good way forward; the whole idea was using trade instrument to stop illegal logging while also addressing the governance related issues for producer countries. In specific to the civil society organisations, as part of good governance, they are represented to ensure transparency, accountability, participation and working for the rights of forest users (Personal interview with Ackon: 2015).

The civil society good governance element of this project was delivered in two stages. First, multi-stakeholder dialogues were organised. Engagement between the European Union, the logging companies, civil society groups and forest communities enabled negotiation of social responsibility agreements (RSAs). These RSAs established the terms on which logging was to take place, and the community groups were a powerful position as they had the right of veto over the allocation of harvesting rights. Such forums were established at the local, zonal and district level to deliberate on forest governance issues and to channel community concerns (Leger: 2014).

The second element so the FLEGT initiative was European Union supported civil society project addressing alternative livelihoods for forest dependent communities. To this end, workshops were held where relevant stakeholders were selected, including timber trade association representatives, chainsaw operators and carriers from ten forest communities (Goaso, Sunyani, Nkawie, Juaso, Begoro, Kade, Akim Oda, Assin Faso, Tarkwa and Nkwanta). Participants discussed the problems of (illegal) chain saw milling and developed ideas about how best to move labourers of this type into the formal economic sector (McKeown, Rozemeijer and Wit 2013: 9-10).

Evidence from the fieldwork shows that as a result of the European Union capacity building, civil society organisations had made good governance impact these forest communities. Through the European Union funding initiatives, civil society organisations played significant role in negotiating the FLEGT VPAs. Even though, the early part of the FLEGT-VPA process was marked by irregularities, and a reported coldness between the civil society organisations and Government of Ghana, civil society organisations used their leverage at the Multi Stakeholders Implementation Committee to make useful contributions. For example, the Free, Prior and Informed Consent mechanism, which gave communities the right to give or withhold its consent for timber activities that may affect their lands and natural resources, gave these communities a voice. This meant that if companies, enterprises or the national government wished to use customary lands belonging to indigenous forest communities they must first enter into negotiation with them. In the final analysis, if a producer wishes to sell

timber, it must first prove they have the farmer's consents (Katz, 2015). This made the forest communities relevant.

Fieldwork by conducted by the author in two forest communities (Asunafo North and Sunyani District. It was found that the Free Prior and Informed Consent has not only helped build trust between timber producers and the forest communities, but also reduced conflict (sometimes physical) over resources. Yaw Kokofu, Assembly Member for Bediako, was explicit in his explanation that Free, Prior and Informed Consent had helped to protect and indigenous people's rights in his constituency. He explained:

The forest serves as an important source of livelihood for us in this community. However, serious mining and timber exploration takes place on our land without consent and sometimes even destroys our sacred sites. Therefore, the principle of Free, Prior and informed Consent has be vital in protecting the right of indigenous people and has given us more power to control our land. This simply means that, without our consent or permission, these timbers will not be valid (Personal interview with Kokofu: 2015).

Similarly, Adwoa Mensah, a farmer from the Sunyani District, also confirmed 'how the Free, Prior and Informed Consent has offer the local people the opportunity to take part in decision making concerning the management of resources in their community.' She added:

The implementation of Free, Prior and Informed Consent has given us the rights to hold these timber producers accountable and given us a voice in the management of the forest resources. That is, we can hold discussions and negotiate with timber producers to make sure they are not only following the necessary steps to avoid environmental degradation, but also live up to their corporate social responsibility. As I speak to you now, the 3 boreholes and the school in this community came about as a result of the community negotiation with timber producers (Personal interview with Mensah: 2015).

Despite the success of the Free, Prior and Informed Consent principle, there is one major negative issue which affected the outcome of this imitative. The project failed to achieve its full potential because some of the timber producing companies were able to bribe opinion leaders and chiefs of these forest communities, circumventing full scrutiny of the forest community. Also, because most of the forest communities lacked economic opportunities, they were more interested in the highest bidder rather than the ethical or sustainable nature of the lumber companies offers. An opinion leader, Mr Badu, in the community of Abesim explained, 'we are aware that this important procedure is available to protect us in the forest communities. Nevertheless, due to lack of economic opportunities, we are more concern about who can pay us most for our timber' (personal Interview with Badu: 2015). Another

farmer, Mr Bonsu, also of Abesim, concurred, noting that ‘the timber companies pay bribes, in order to avoid going through the long paper work (Personal interview with Bonsu: 2015).

Although the benefits of the FLEGT initiative are very apparent, and remarkably progressive, this good governance project was always going to be hampered by economic realities. To move an industry, timber production, beset by illegality into the formal sector was always going to be difficult, but to entrust that legality to some of the poorest communities in Ghana compounds this. This aspect of FLEGT needed protection. The forest communities needed to be protected from exploitation and bribery. Again, this is an EU good governance project being implemented without due care and attention to its socio-economic environment.

### **Civil society and maternal health good governance**

The European Union also funded projects seeking to use good governance as a tool to counter Ghana’s maternal health mortality. Four civil society organisations were contracted to organise citizens so as they could hold local health officials to account, increase local participation in health management, and oversee transparency of local health policy implementation. According to the EU’s Joseph Bogrebon Allan, of the Governance Section of the Delegation of the European Union in Ghana, this maternal health strategy had the aim of reducing Ghana’s maternal mortality rate to a target 185 per 1000 live births. As he explained:

In order to achieve, we decided to introduce good governance by support civil society organisations to engage these communities to bring interface between civil societies organisations, district level health authorities and district assembly to dialogue on these issues. In other words, the support to CSO’s was designed to create an enabling environment for communities to step in and fill in the gaps in order to ensure local stakeholders’ participation (Personal interview with Allan: 2015).

Consequently, the European Union provided financial support of €550,000 to four civil society organisations (SEND Ghana, Christian Aid Ghana, the Presbyterian Health Service-North, and the Christian Blind Mission) to carry out this task in 30 districts across the three Northern regions of Ghana (Ghana News Agency 2014: 1). The project was entitled: ‘Improving Maternal Health Delivery Through Participatory Governance (Improve)’. As a result of this EU support, these civil society organisations implemented the project based on three elements: community stakeholder sensitisation and awareness workshops; the

appointment and training of 27 community health champions; and engagement with local journalists in order to raise the profile of maternal health.

For their part, the Presbyterian Health Service-North and the Christian Blind Mission organised maternal health sensitisation workshops involved 225 stakeholders comprised of traditional birth attendants, district health officials, district assembly members, representatives from youth groups and traditional leaders (Ghana News Agency: 2014; Ghana News Agency: 2015). According to Mr John Abugre, the General Manager of the Presbyterian Health Service-North, these sensitisation programs was organised to ‘bring good governance to the centre of the health system’ in these districts. By so doing, the stakeholders not only ‘became aware of their rights but they also gave them the power of local ownership and the ability to hold the health providers to account’ (Ghana News Agency 2014: 1)

SEND-Ghana, at the end of the project, reported that it had contributed to ‘fifty community champions being trained and resourced to carry out maternal health education across 30 districts; 68,000 citizens sensitized during community durbars on maternal health and civic responsibility, and taxation; an estimated total of 640,000 citizens being reached via radio discussion on sensitization programs on 6 radio stations in Upper West, Upper East and Northern regions; and ninety District Citizens Monitoring Committee members across 30 districts having their capacity enhanced to track budgets and monitor maternal health service delivery’ (SEND Ghana 2017).

In addition to the sensitisation workshops, a two-day intensive training programme was organised for 27 community maternal health champions. This aspect of the strategy saw SEND-Ghana and the Ghana Health Service empowering participants to serve as maternal health ambassadors to their communities. The training comprised of the use of resources such as leaflets and audio-visual documentaries. These health champions then went into their 27 communities where they facilitated peer-to-peer sensitisation in order to make maternal health impact at the grassroots level (Graphic Online 2015: 1).

The third element of this programme involved the training of thirty journalists, from three regions, in seeking to raise the profile of this issue in media. As a consequence, a number of prominent radio stations ran awareness programmes at peak hours. (Cityfmonline 2015: 2). Similarly, newspaper stories on this topic increased in volume after this training. Fieldwork in the Ghana News Agency archive by the author revealed 23 stories on maternal health in the second half of 2015.

Assessing this project, on the positive side, the European Union's support to these CSO's helped promote good governance in these districts. Locals become more involved in the delivery of this public service. Joyce Ashun, the country manager of Christian Aid Ghana, for example, who was involved in implementing 'Improve', was of the opinion that the sensitisation workshops resulted in participants, and those in contact with these participants, 'now understanding their rights as far as maternal health is concerned'. According to her, the 'sensitisation program created an important avenue for stakeholders such as pregnant women, traditional birth attendants and district health officials to deliberate on the best means to reduce maternal mortality', and to do this 'in a transparent and accountable way.' (Personal interview with Ashun: 2015). Equally, George Osei-Bimpeh (Ghana Country Director of SEND Ghana), who was also involved in the implementation of Improve, pointed the benefit of having health champions in the community raising awareness (Personal interview with Osei-Bimpeh : 2015). Mr Abugre, the General Manager of the Presbyterian Health Service-North, concurred. He was of the opinion that 'raising awareness' of, and 'giving permission for ordinary citizens' to have, a role to play in the governance of healthcare could make a 'significant impact', starting with bringing down maternal mortality rates (Personal interview with Mr Abugre: 2015).

Given the lucid picture created by directors of CSO's implementing this policy, it was important to find out whether the strategy had an impact amongst its target audience at the grass roots level. Again, positive outcomes were reported. According to a youth leader in the Tamale Metropolitan District, the workshops were 'excellent' at explaining 'our health rights and our own responsibilities', adding 'it was made very clear what we could do to reduce maternal mortality'. The training sessions let us 'become watchmen within our own communities to make sure that pregnant women are going to hospitals regularly, (Personal interview with youth leader in Tamale Metropolis, who wished not to be named: 2015). Maamuni Alimatu, a pregnant woman from Tamale Metropolis, agreed. Having attended the workshop programme, she considered she knew 'what services are available to us..., and I know my rights, and if I don't get the service that I deserve, I know who and where to report this (Personal interview with Alimatu: 2015). A traditional birth attendant was likewise complementary. Ms. Lamu found the opportunity 'to work with other health officials from the district' most beneficial. Although she was proud of her 'traditional' approach of supporting pregnancy and childbirth, the workshops did let her 'learn' from mainstream hospital nurses on safe practices during birth delivery (Personal interview with Lamu: 2015).



State officials also benefitted from this intervention. Alhasan Abubakur, the Kassena Nankana District Assembly Health Officer, welcomed the programme, as this created a diverse forum where there was the ‘opportunity to discuss social and cultural factors that hinder communities from achieving the maternal health the government sets us’ (Personal interview with Abubakar: 2015).

At face value, of all the projects assessed in this thesis, the Improve maternal health project comes closest to realising the EU’s good governance goal in Ghana. It can certainly be argued that the impact of this programme was a ‘drop in the ocean’ when compared to Ghana’s wider health care problems (Adua, et.al. 2017), and the critical thinkers pointing to the broader context of Ghana’s neo-patrimonialism and predatory state as a form of government cannot be ignored (Kelsall 2012), but Improve did result in more information being circulated about maternal health at the local level, and it did join up providers and recipients in order to improve this service, with the latter empowered, to a degree, holding the former to account. On a small scale, good governance had been improved. Ghana’s national maternal mortality rate fell from 484 persons per 100,000 live births in 2000, to 320 in 2015 (World Bank 2019). The Improve project cannot be credited alone for this success story, but it certainly contributed.

## **Conclusion**

The European Union put a great deal of emphasis on its support for civil society organisations. It considered these bodies as an ideal partner for developing good governance in Ghana. The number of projects ‘contracted out’ to Ghanaian ngos, as witnessed in the other chapters of this thesis, is testament to this belief. The two projects highlighted in this chapter were two of the most innovative the EU funded in Ghana during the period under consideration. The objective of both was to encourage civil society participation to hold private businesses (timber companies) and public services (health bodies) to account, fostering transparency. The Ghanaian state was largely side-lined in these projects.

In terms of performance, again, these projects secured positive outcomes. With FLEGT, local forest communities were invited to understand the rights and power that tenure over their lands brought. Material benefits to these communities flowed as a consequence. Similarly, the Improve project empowered communities in relation to health rights. Stakeholders and health care recipients gained a better understanding of each other needs, and services

improved as an upshot. Importantly, civil society was given the tools to hold their health services to account.

The common flaws identified in this thesis only really applied to the FLEGT forestry project. The problem solving scholars consider good governance as important means to promote development. Yet, the evidence above shows that these same socio-economic factors hindered the forest good governance initiative. Even though local communities were sensitise and trained on the need to preserve the forest, to create value from this resource in the long term, corruption and opportunism won out. Due to poverty, most community members sought to maximise the benefits they could gain from the logging companies immediately, effectively selling their rights to the highest bidder. Likewise there was evidence of community leaders accepting bribes in order to further their person wealth. Essentially, the FLEGT project replicated common governance problems found in the state (short-termism and corruption) in its own structures. This was problematic given that FLEGT was a flagship good governance project for the EU. Boarder social-economic realities, however, made such obstacles inevitable. The conclusion that has to be taken is that it difficult to operate livelihood-focussed good governance initiatives in economically deprived communities.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **CONCLUSION**

This thesis has argued that, despite the European Union's good governance policy in Ghana helping make progress in correcting dysfunctional institutions and problems in this state, EU actions are limited in their impact due to the ill-defined nature of this policy. Building on previous EU good governance literature, this thesis argued that good governance matters to the European Union; however, the EU faces constraints of implementation due to a flawed policy framework, which leads to gaps between policy expectation and outcome. In this sense, EU good governance policy in Ghana mirrors the vague and flawed nature of 'good governance', as a concept, found in the academic literature.

This concluding chapter begins with the empirical findings of the thesis' case study research. These findings shows that even though the EU good governance policy in Ghana has been partially effective in correcting dysfunctional elements of state and civil society institutions, the policy has failed to achieve its self-defined objectives due to the broad, confused and vague nature of this policy. This has resulted in four common problems of implementation across the policy clusters.

The second section of this chapter will then assess how the data from this empirical case study reflects on the broader conceptual debate about the nature and utility of 'good governance'. This analysis will focus on the three broad approaches identified earlier in the thesis: the problem solving, critical thinking and sceptical schools. Although elements of all three of the schools are supported by the Ghana data, the above analysis suggests that a critical thinking approach is relevant, while, above all, those highlighting the over-theorised

and ill-defined nature of the good governance debate have their work confirmed by this research.

The final section of the chapter will concentrate on extrapolation of the data. Is Ghana a unique case or does the current research resonates with the findings of other scholars' case studies? This comparison will show that Ghana is not a unique case study. The data created by this research fits into a definite pattern. Despite good governance being a concept widely used to underpin public policy globally, there is no consistent definition of this concept. 'Good governance' means many things to many different people. The consequence of this reality is often vague policy goals leading to inefficient implementation, policy slippage and mission creep.

### **Empirical findings**

Evidence gathered from the five clusters of good governance above suggests that, to some extent, EU good governance policy has had successes in helping correct dysfunctional institutions and addressing specific governance problems in Ghana. In the area of democracy promotion (Chapter 4), for example, the European Union assisted the Electoral Commission of Ghana, building its capacity significantly. It also offered the Commission specific help in the printing of ballot papers and the issuing of photo identification cards for voters. The European Union was also active in this country's General Elections via participating in, and funding, electoral observation missions. EU projects also successfully assisted more women patriciate in Ghanaian politics, and highlighted the problem of incumbency in positions of state. Accumulatively, as seen above, these EU initiatives undoubtedly improved the standard of democracy in Ghana.

Similar benefits also accrued from the EU's work within its 'decentralisation cluster' (Chapter 5). Funding for decentralisation encouraged capacity building within Ghanaian local politics and increased participation at this level. For example, district councils benefitted from training in the areas of human resource and project management, while the EU projects facilitated workshops that considered the best ways local communities and local government could work in partnership.

Positive results also emerged from the EU's 'support for human rights' and 'support for the rule of law' in Ghana. As seen in Chapter 6, EU projects led to the launching of a gender equality affirmative action campaign that proved to be of utility. The rights of the child were also addressed, with tangible evidence that children were removed from exploitative labour, or avoided marriage, as a direct consequence of conscientizing campaigns funded by the European Union. Likewise, the EU's decision to underwrite the refurbishment of the forensic laboratory of the Ghana Police Service improved legal due process.

The most significant project in the 'support for public administration' cluster (Chapter 7) was the EU's work with the Ghana Audit Service (GAS). Underwritten by EU funding and consultancy, the GAS undertook a comprehensive audit of Ghana's public agencies. The outputs of this work were damning reports that highlighted corruption and mal-administration at the heart of Ghana's government. Never before had the state's nefarious operating procedures been exposed so transparently, and by one of its own institutions. Making Ghanaians aware of this issue, and forcing the Government of Ghana to acknowledge its institutionalised corrupt practices was clearly an advance for good governance.

It was also seen above, in Chapter 8, how European Union 'support to build the capacity of civil society organisations' netted positive results. Civil society organisations were empowered to promote local participation and accountability, most notably in the health and forestry sectors. Forest communities, for example, benefited from an EU project that restricted the sale of timber from Ghana to Europe. Only lumber companies that had negotiated an agreement with communities living where the timber was harvested were granted an import licence. This requirement brought material and accountability benefits to these communities. Likewise, in the area of maternal health, EU funded projects encouraged local communities to participate in their own health care, and facilitated the creation of institutions that saw health service providers come under community scrutiny. Again, these were tangible victories for good governance.

Yet, notwithstanding the above positive examples, European Union good governance policy in Ghana failed to realise its full potential. The evidence from the thesis' 'data chapters' (Chapters 4 to 8) suggests that EU good governance policy towards Ghana between 2000 and 2013 is more accurately characterised by four flaws. These four flaws were shared across the 'clusters', with individual flaws often reoccurring in multiple clusters causing similar implementing problems.

### *Policy flaw one: mission creep*

Most obviously, the Ghana case study highlights that EU good governance policy was subject to mission creep. Repeatedly, programmes specifically seeking good governance objectives morphed into more general development projects. Evidence of this mission creep can be found prominently across all but one of the policy clusters. For instance, a programme designed to encourage decentralisation ended up funding sewing, carpentry, baking and animal husbandry training. As useful as these projects may have been to those being trained, good governance was not advanced by these activities. Elsewhere, efforts at infusing good governance in local government through training public officials in what this entailed saw this funding being spent on procurement. The local government officials favoured capacity building instead; the purchasing of computers, safes and motorbikes. It has been evident right the way through this research that both policy implementers and policy recipients (and even academics) have difficulty in identifying what amount to ‘good governance’ and what is ‘development assistance’.

### *Policy flaw two: a lack of local ownership*

The second flaw in the implementation of EU good governance policy highlighted by the Ghana case study relates to the ownership of these projects. The evidence shows that ownership still remains in the hands of the EU despite the Commission saying it believe in local ownership (EU 2016:42). The EU’s good governance enhancement project for district assemblies, again, demonstrated this (Chapter 4). Although ‘partnership’ was mentioned in the project’s documentation, the European Union called the shots. One can understand this, especially as the district councils concerned wishes to use the EU funding for procurement, rather than capacity-building workshops, but whose notion of good governance should win out? The Ghanaian local government official who considers having access to new desks and computers would increase his governance capacity, or EU ideas insisting that shared skills are the way forward? In the end the budget-holder one out. The EU was the arbiter of good governance in this case. Again, we are back to the North defining good governance in its own image, at the expense of the South (Abrahamsen 2000; Taylor 2004).

### *Policy flaw three: a lack of political will to confront the Government of Ghana*

The third policy flaw that emerged from the Ghanaian case study is the lack of political will on the part of the European Union to confront the Government of Ghana on certain key good governance issues. Whether this was on political incumbency, on corruption, on LGBT rights

or the abolishing the death penalty, although the EU was prepared to keep these items on the agenda in diplomatic dialogues, Brussels would not exert greater pressure for reform. There was an acknowledgement that the Government of Ghana was entrenched in these positions for political purposes. It would not offer rights to the LGBT community or remove the death penalty, as it would lose support in the community if it did so. Likewise, corruption and incumbency served state interests. Reform was not going to happen here, either. EU officials maybe too easily switched their attention to lower hanging good governance fruit, concentrating on other issue. The EU delegation's mindset was 'we are bounded by Ghana's sovereignty...there is a limit to what we can do' (Personal interview with Valdambrini: 2015). Although this may be understandable, the Government of Ghana's lack of compliance was clearly a problem.

*Policy flaw four: lack of recognition of socio economic factors*

The fourth flaw of EU good governance policy in Ghana related to EU policy makers often ignoring the socio-economic context of their programmes. Chapter 6, for example, noted how EU sponsored projects sought to protect the human rights of children. There is no doubting the merit of the workshops offered, but knowledge of the harm that child labour brings did not compensate families for the lack income that would occur should their child stop working. This broader reality was not addressed by this project. Similarly, in Chapter 8, it was seen that the EU developed an innovative good governance project assisting forest communities. Again, there no doubting the benefit of this programme, but policy formulators again ignored the socio-economic context. The poverty of the communities concerned meant that this project was vulnerable to bribery, communities selling their rights too cheaply, and the temptation of continuing to log illegally. In reality this project was too narrow in conception. EU good governance policy makers should have anticipated, and sought to mitigate, the impact of these broader socio-economic realities.

## **The relevance of the empirical findings to the broader conceptual debate on good governance.**

Having summarised the case study findings, the conclusion now moves on to applying this empirical evidence to the broader conceptual debate surrounding ‘good governance’. Each of the three major schools of thought is assessed in relation to these research findings.

### *Relevance to the problem solving approach*

According to Cox (1981:128) problem solvers ‘take the world as they find it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised as the given framework’. As shown in Chapter 2, the problem solving approach portrays good governance as a counter to dysfunctional political institutions. It is thus promoted as a key ingredient in the best recipe for economic and social development (Hazenbergh: 2018).

To some extent, the empirical evidence presented above supports the problem-solving argument approach. Evidence gathered from these five clusters shows that EU aid to Ghanaian state institutions and civil society organisations made a verifiable change to governance. Problem solver scholars and practitioners are right in saying democracy was enhanced when the EU stepped in to assist Ghana in printing more ballot papers, or that a specific problem was addressed when EU support contributed to more women being elected to political office in 2012. Likewise, there is little doubt that EU observation of the Ghanaian elections brought credibility to these polls.

The evidence of the utility of a problem solving approach is not only limited to the area of democracy. This approach also brought benefits to the decentralisation cluster. Given the importance of district assemblies and regional coordinating councils, the European Union supported these governance institutions to build their capacity. Indeed, the list of individual issues identified and tackled by the EU are numerous, whether this be the refurbishment of the forensic laboratory of Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Audit Service’s comprehensive report forcing some state agencies to take necessary steps to correct the anomalies, benefits to maternal health or support for forest communities. Most, if not all, EU good governance projects made a material difference to Ghanaian lives. This is in no doubt. In many ways, Cox’s (1981:128-129) argument that the ‘general aim’ of problem solving’, of ‘making relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular source of trouble’, is satisfied by these positive outcomes.



However, the problem solving approach does not tell the story about the EU good governance policy in Ghana. The case study evidence suggests a more critical approach is needed if one is to obtain a full understanding of ‘good governance’ as a concept.

#### *Relevance to the critical thinking approach*

Unlike the problem solving approach, the critical thinking approach confronts the status quo, challenging existing political and social frameworks (Cox: 1981). In this context of good governance, critical thinkers challenge the above upbeat assessment of the problem solving approach. One, more critical, interpretation based on the above evidence would be that ‘good governance’ amounts to a hegemonic project, with the North defining the South in its own image, to the former’s benefit (Abrahamsen: 2000 & Taylor: 2004).

Indeed, much of the research evidence collected supports Slocum-Bradley and Bradley’s (2010) analysis, who argue that EU good governance is contradictory in that it apparently seeks local ownership, but imposes a Western/Northern view of what good governance is. The evidence gathered under the above clusters does align itself with this critical thinking argument. On paper, the EU argues that ownership remains important aspect of EU-ACP relations. According to European Commission (2003:5), ‘the main principle and good practice of development co-operation, such as ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ of recipient countries in their own development process, are now common international language’. However, in practice, the case study evidence shows that EU good governance policy in Ghana lacks local ownership. As shown in Chapter 4, the EU electoral observation project was marred differences over ownership. The EU ignored the host’s input, and imposed guidelines drafted in Brussels.

Likewise, there is the dilemma of EU’s ‘universal rights’ clashing with local cultural values. The argument advanced by the critical thinkers that Western governments have defined ‘good governance’ in their own image, and are wrong to impose these external values on other societies (Abrahamsen 2000: 47-65). This issue underwrote the EU’s approach to the death penalty and LGBT rights in Ghana. The EU had to decide what good governance meant: the promotion of ‘universal’ human rights, as defined by a foreign power, or upholding the democratic will by locally elected representatives? Which wins out, support for democracy, or support for (external notions of) human rights. In the end, the choice of EU officials was to keep these universal rights on the diplomatic agenda, but not to push too hard for fear of antagonising their host government and society.

*Relevance to the over conceptualisation approach.*

Even though both the problem solving and critical thinking schools of thought have resonance with the case study data, this thesis' research findings add more weight to those more sceptical scholars emphasising the vague nature and over-theorisation of 'good governance' as a concept. For instance, due to the lack of a meaningful working definition of 'good governance', EU projects with specific good governance aims often morphed into more generic development programmes. Due to the vague nature of policy goals, all too often the outcome of a policy was different from expectations. For instance, projects promoting women's participation in politics slipped into support for pregnant teenagers or a forum for market women to negotiate with taxi drivers (see Chapter 4). Additionally, as shown in Chapter 5, European Union support to promote decentralisation resulted in development programmes providing sewing, carpentry, baking, and animal husbandry training, at the local level. EU project monitors justified this policy slippage in terms of 'capacity first, more sophisticated projects later': all the activities concerned amounted to 'good governance'. If academic, policy makers and practitioners constantly stretch the concept of 'good governance', does it not lose its meaning all together?

The case study evidence thus clearly aligns with Grindle's (2007:555) 'vagueness' arguments, in that although good governance sounds seductive, the definition is too broad to offer precise analysis. Importantly, because definitions differ, good governance may imply different kinds of processes and it is even not clear how governance can be distinguished from development itself? The practical application of 'good governance' seen in this case study therefore mirrors the confusion of definition at the academic level. With good governance meaning all things to all people, it is easy for a specific governance projects to creep into programmes with a more social or economic focus. Just as academic read into 'good governance' what they want, so do practitioners.

## **Future extrapolation of the data**

This raises the question if this Ghanaian example is unique or typical case study?

As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis took the view that case studies are about detailed investigation (Heart: 2017). They are about empiricism and depth, not breadth. The prime objective of this research has therefore been produced a focussed set of data, and accompanying analysis, that explains the Ghanaian situation. It is not intended to now extrapolate this data into multiple units of investigation that would simply result in multiple weak examples (Mathison 2005). It is best to leave this comparative process to others, preferably once a suitable collection of 'EU good governance' case studies have been assembled, and there would be enough empirical data to make this comparison meaningful.

Instead, this thesis claims its original contribution to scholarship to be the provision of much needed empirical data. In terms of the case study itself, this evidence demonstrates that EU good governance has failed to achieve its full potential in Ghana. Positive outcomes were achieved, but four flaws persistently limited the utility of this policy. These flaws themselves can be traced back to woolly conceptual thinking at the heart of the EU policy conception. And this issue of ill-definition is shared in the academic understanding of 'good governance'. Critical thinkers and problem solvers have a value input to make in this debate, but it is the more sceptical scholars who can help practitioners most. It is hoped that this empirical case study may contribute to efforts to direct the scholarship on good governance away from its current over-conceptualised status towards a more practical consideration of how this concept can be used in the real world, helping to improve the lives of real people.

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## Appendix A

### List of Personal Interviews Conducted

Listed by category:

- European Union officials
- Government of Ghana officials
- Civil Society Organisation officials
- Politicians, political party officials, political agents

#### European Union officials

Interviewee	Name of the Organisation/Position	Month/Year	Method of data collection
Joseph Bogrebon Allan	Governance Section, Delegation of the European Union in Ghana, Accra	June 2014 and September 2015	Face to face
Pilar Palmero Vaquero	Governance Section, Delegation of the European Union in Ghana, Accra	June 2014 and March 2015	Face to face
Christopher Ackon	Program Officer, Delegation of the European Union in Ghana, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Alessandro Valdambrini	Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights section, Directorate General for Development and Cooperation Unit (DEVCO B1), European Union, Brussels	March 2015	Face to Face
Mitchell Bennett Natalie	Desk Officer, Directorate General for Development and Cooperation Unit (DEVCO B1), European Union, Brussels	March 2015	Face to face

### Government of Ghana officials

Interviewee	Name of the Organisation/Position	Month/Year	Method of data collection
Samuel Ankuamoah	National Commission for Civic Education	June 2014	Face to Face
Atta Mensah	Electoral Commission, Akuapim Akropong	November 2014	Face to face
Emmanuel Kyei	Senior Auditor, Mamprobi Polyclinic, Accra	November 2014	Face to Face
Joseph Addo	District Director, Electoral Commission, Akuapim Mampong	September 2015	Face to face
Kofi Bawuah	Officer from Ghana Export Promotion Council	September 2015	Face to face
Kwame Agyeman	Auditor, National Vocational Training Institute, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Kwadwo Mensah	Chief Statistical Officer, Ghana Forest Commission, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Kwadwo Safo	Former Deputy Chairperson, Electoral Commission, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Kwabena Gyamfi	Senior Auditor, Ghana Audit Service	September 2015	Face to face
Kwaku Agyeman Manu	Member of Parliament, Dormaa Central Constituency	September 2015	Face to face
Osei Akoto	Member for Parliament, Old Tafo	September 2015	Face to face
Owusu Parry	Public Relations Officer, Electoral Commission, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Henry Amankwaatia	Superintendent, Wa District Police Commander	September 2015	Face to face
Siaw Coffie	Senior Officer, CSWA	September 2015	Face to face
Yaw Boateng	Official from CSWA, Accra	September 2015	Face to face
Petrina Etu	Human Resources Director, Local Government Secretariat	September 2015	Face to face
Eldad Bonney	Presiding Member, Efutu Municipal Assembly	October 2015	Face to face
Mr George Gyapani Ackah	Head of Regional Planning Unit, Greater Accra Regional Coordinating Council	September 2015	Face to face
Miss Vivian Mensah	District Planning Officer, La Dade Kotopon	September 2015	Face to face
Victor Coffie	Planning Officer, La Dade Kotopon Municipal Assembly	September 2015	Face to face
Ewa Addai	Adenta Municipality Assembly	September	Face to

		2015	face
Rose Mensah-Kutin	Director, ABANTU for Development	September 2015	Face to face
Ambrose Aboagye	Assistant Superintendent of Police, Nokaranza North	September 2015	Face to face
Senior police officer	Police Forensic Laboratory	September 2015	Face to face
Charles Coffie	DNA Department, Police Forensic Laboratory	September 2015	Face to face
Senior Officer	Funds and Procurement, Ministry of Education	September 2015	Face to face
Kwabena Gyamfi	Senior Auditor, Ghana Audit Service	September 2015	Face to face
John Bawuah	Ghana Export Promotion Council.	September 2015	Face to face
Kwame Agyeman	Auditor of National Vocational Training Institute	September 2015	Face to face
Mr Mensah	Chief Statistical Officer, Ghana Forest Commission	October 2015	Face to face
Alhasan Abubakur,	Kassena Nankana District Assembly Health Officer	October 2015	Face to face

### Civil Society Organisation officials

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Name of the Organisation/Position</b>	<b>Month/Year</b>	<b>Method of data collection</b>
Aborampah Mensah	Centre for Democratic Governance	June 2014	Face to face
Bernice Sam	Former Executive Director, WILDAF	November 2014	Face to face
CODEO coordinator	Coalition of Domestic Observers	November 2014	Face to face
CSO Program Manager	CSO Program Manager	June 2014	Face to face
Director of CBO	Director of CBO, Dormaa Ahenkro	September 2015	Face to face
George Osei-Bimpeh	Ghana Country Director of SEND Ghana, Accra	October 2015	Face to face
Madam Joyce Ashun	Country Manager, Christian aid Ghana, Accra.	October 2015	Face to face
Nii Ayettey	Greater Accra Regional, CEDEO	October 2015	Face to face

Vitus Azeem	Former Executive Director, Ghana Integrity Initiative	November 2014	Face to face
Steve Manteaw	Executive Director, Integrated Social Development Centre	June 2014	Face to face
Program officer, Christian Aid of Ghana	Program Officer of Christian Aid of Ghana	September 2015	Face to face
Kwaku Mensah	Leader, Community Based Organisation	October 2015	Face to face
Ali Tanji	Program Manager, Youth Alliance for Development	October 2015	Face to face
George Osei-Bimpeh	Ghana Country Director of SEND Ghana	October 2015	Face to face
Madam Joyce Ashun	Country Manager, Christian aid Ghana	October 2015	Face to face
Mr Abugre	General Manager of the Presbyterian Health Service-North	October 2015	Face to face
personal Interview with Badu	An opinion leader in Abesim	October, 2015	Face to face
Personal interview with Bonsu	A farmer at Abesim	October 2015	Face to face

#### **Politicians, political party officials, political agents**

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Name of the Organisation/Position</b>	<b>Month/Year</b>	<b>Method of data collection</b>
Adwoa Mansa	Female candidate: Coalition of Women in Governance.	November 2015	Face to face
Charles Owusu	Communication expert for People Progressive Party, Accra.	October 2015	Face to face
Youth executive of New Patriotic Party, Wa.	Youth executive of New Patriotic Party, Wa.	October 2015	Face to face
National Democratic Congress Youth	National Democratic Congress Youth Executive, Wa	October 2015	Face to face

Executive, Wa			
Female Politician Aspirant A	Member of Parliament in Greater Accra Region.	October 2015	Face to face
Female Politician Aspirant C	Member of Parliament	October 2015	Face to face
Mumuni Alhansan	Former Constituency Chairman Dormaa Central	October 2015	Face to face
Juliana Azumah	Former MP for Agortime-Kpotoe-Ziope	October 2015	Face to face
Regina Ocansey	District Assembly Office, GA South electoral Area	October 2015	Face to face
Tetteh Mensah	Former Executive of National Democratic Congress, Accra	October 2015	Face to face
Yaa Manu	COWIG Executive, Jaman South	October 2015	Face to face
Female Politician Aspirant B	Female Politician Aspirant B	October 2015	Face to face
Female Politician Aspirant D	Female Politician Aspirant D	October 2015	Face to face
Constituency Chairman of National Democratic Congress	Ablekuma Central.	September 2015	Face to face
Youth Executive	National Democratic Congress	September 2015	Face to face

### Community leaders

Interviewee	Name of the Organisation/Position	Month/Year	Method of data collection
Farmer	Farmer in Amansaman	October 2015	Face to face
Komila Wobenu	Opinion leader of Abunyanya in the Nkwanta District	October 2015	Face to face
Samuel Ofori Ampomah	NPP Weijsa Constituency Chairman	October 2015	Face to face



Opinion leader	Beneficiary of EU training	November 2015	Face to face
Local priest	Ga District Assembly	September 2015	Face to face
Madam Adwoa Mansa	Female candidate	September 2015	Face to face
Madam Yaa Manu	CowIG executive	October 2015	Face to face
Opinion leader	Opinion leader in Samsam	September 2015	Face to face
Yaw Asare	Youth leader Sekyere East District	October 2015	Face to face
Youth leader	Youth leader in Tamale Metropolis	November 2015	Face to face
Adwoa Agyeiwaa	Market woman, Juaso	November 2015	Face to face
Female teacher	Female teacher, Juaso	November 2015	Face to face
Madam Ama Ankrah	Unit Committee member	November 2015	Face to face
Maamuni Alimatu,	Tamale Metropolis, Tamale	November 2015	Face to face
Kwame Akyekum	Opinion leader	November 2015	Face to face
Mansa	Mansa representative	October 2015	Face to face
Manu	Manu representative	October 2015	Face to face
Madam Ama Ankrah	Committee member	November 2015	Face to face
Vivian Asare	Beneficiary of ISODEC programme	November 2015	Face to face
District Assembly official A	District Assembly official A	November 2015	Face to face
District Assembly official B	District Assembly Official B	November 2015	Face to face
Opinion leader	Opinion leader	October 2015	Face to face
Addai	Community member	October 2015	Face to face
local farmer	Beneficiary	October 2015	Face to face
Nana Brekum	Community beneficiary	October 2015	Face to face
Opinion leader	Opinion leader	October 2015	Face to

A			face
Opinion leader B	Opinion leader	October 2015	Face to face
Nana Adusei Sarfo Kotoko	Chief of Senya	October 2015	Face to face
Antie Afua	Gomoa Kweikrom community Member	October 2015	Face to face
Mr Komila Wobenu	Opinion leader of Abunyanya in the Nkwanta District	October 2015	Face to face
Miss Maamuni Alimatu	Pregnant woman from the Tamale Metropolis	October 2015	Face to face
Lamu	Community beneficiary	October 2015	Face to face
Adwoa Mensah	A farmer from the Sunyani District	November 2015	Face to face
Yaw Kokofu	Assembly Member of Bediako in the Goaso area.	November 2015	Face to face

## **APPENDICES B**

### **Appendix 1- SEMI STRUCTURE INTERVIEW FOR EUROPEAN UNION MISSION IN ACCRA (JUNE 2014)**

For this interview, can you tell me your names and capacity in this organization?

What is the EU trying to do in Ghana in terms of promoting good governance?

What is the main aim or the motive of the EU to promoting good governance in Ghana?

How does the EU implement these good governance policies in Ghana?

In specific to the six clusters of the EU good governance, how does it apply to Ghana?

In specific to each of these clusters, what is the EU aim of promoting democracy as part of good governance?

Can you tell me the strategies you use in implementing this element of good governance?

Do you think these strategies were successful?

Any evidence to back up your claim?

**Appendix 2 SEMI STRUCTURE INTERVIEWS FOR EUROPEAN UNION DIPLOMATS IN BRUSSELS  
(MARCH, 2015).**

**Broad questions**

What is EU trying to achieve when it comes to Good governance?

The EU traditionally focused on fighting corruption in public sector as the base for good governance, however decided to broaden the base. Why did the EU decided to expand the scope?

**Broad question of West Africa**

In West Africa context, what is EU trying to achieve when it comes to Good governance in the Sub Region?

The EU handbook of good governance identifies six clusters of good governance (support for Democracy, enhancement of Civil Society and capacity building, Public administration reform, management of public finances and civil service reform, Reinforcement of the rule of law and the administration of Justice, Promotion and protection of human rights). Why does the EU think these forms the core component of good governance?

**In specific to Ghana**

**1. Democracy**

The EU in 2010 decided support affirmative action bill in Ghana to get more in parliament and politics in general. Why did the EU decide to go for this particular approach and do you think the policy is successful?

Towards elections 2012, the EU decided to engage three key governance institutions (NCCE, NMA and EC) and some civil society organisation for Voting Training, process of elections and Voters Education. Why did the EU found it necessary to support these programs?

The EU policy of support democracy in Ghana has been criticised by some civil society organisation of been too election-focused thereby ignoring other aspects. What is your take on this?

In specific to civil society organisation, the EU funded three civil society organisations to monitor the abuse of incumbency. Do you think this strategy was successful?

## **2. Civil Society and capacity building**

Civil society organisations in Ghana argued that during important policies implementation like Voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) in the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade and Economic partnership agreement, the EU engagement with civil society organisations was very limited. What is your take on this?

In the past and currently, the EU works with other donor partners to enhance civil societies to promote good governance in Ghana. Why this approach?

## **3. Human Right, rule of law and administration of justice**

Despite the fact that Ghana has been applying for de facto-moratorium in the last twenty years. Amnesty International Report in 2011 cited 138 people on death row in Ghana. However, despite EU condemnation on the issue around the world, why the EU takes a soft approach when it comes to Ghana?

Section 104 of criminal code of Ghana makes being Gay a criminal offence. Why has the EU not sanctioned Ghana despite the fact EU recognise full status of LGBT?

## **4. Public administration reform, management of public finances and civil service reform**

Under this cluster, the European Union supported the Ghana Audit Service to promote conduct financial and performance audit, what informed this decision?

How was the policy implemented?

Do you think the policy was successful?

Any evidence to support the claim?

## **5. Decentralisation and local government reform/capacity building**

In 2006, as part of Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II, EU signed financial agreement totalling 32 billion cedi's to support Ghana's Decentralisation programme in order to enhance democratic governance and development. Why did the EU support the program and what was the success rate?

In August, 2012, the EU and Government of Ghana signed important agreement for grant totalling 97 million euros. 45 million was channelled through strengthening local governance and decentralisation process in Ghana. Why did the EU felt there was the need to do this?

In an interview with Head of the Governance Section Ms Pilar Palmero stated that, at a high profile diplomatic relations with Government of Ghana, , the EU is of the opinion that District Chief Executives should be elected. But successive government continues to appoint them. Do you think the EU has been tough enough in sending this position?

### **Generic questions**

What are some of the constraints of EU promotion of good governance in Ghana?

What is the future of EU support for good governance in Ghana?

### **Appendix 3 SEMI STRUCTURE INTERVIEWS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION MISSION IN ACCRA (SEPTEMBER 2015).**

During my trip to Brussels the EU three EU diplomats (names withheld) confirmed that, the six clusters identified in the EU handbook for good governance forms a core component of good governance as EU foreign policy. How do these six clusters (Support for democracy, civil society and capacity building, human right and rule of law, Decentralisation, and public administration reform) inform you decisions in trying to promote good governance?

### **Civil Society and capacity building support.**

What are the EU objectives regarding civil society organisations from 2000 in the perspective of promoting good governance in Ghana?

Towards election 2012, the EU supported a program known as Monitoring Abuse of incumbency, what was the need for this support and in your opinion do you think it was successful.

There have been criticisms from some quarters that, the project still did not stop political parties to abuse their incumbencies. On reflection, do you think there would have been another way to achieve this goal?

In 2008, the EU decided to bring good governance into forest policy (FLEGT/VPA), why was this important?

During the FLEGT/VPA, CSO's in Ghana argued that they were not involved in the initial process. Why was this and what made the EU finally decided to include them in the steering committee?

Do you think this program was successful?

As part of achieving the MDG, the EU supported 2 CSO's (Send Ghana and Christian aid Ghana to bring good governance in the health sector to support child mortality. Why was the EU working with these for this particular project?

Was the program successful?

Can you point me to any area of EU support for good governance in relations to good governance in Ghana in terms of successes or lesson learnt?

### **Support for democracy.**

What had being the EU objectives regarding support for democracy from 2000 in the perspective of promoting good governance? According to my personal research into EU support for democracy was limited until 2006. Why was this case and what made the EU change its focus in 2006?

The EU in 2010 decided support affirmative action bill in Ghana to get more women in parliament and politics. Why did the EU decided to go for this approach and did you get more women into parliament? On reflection, would you try another approach in the future?

Towards elections 2012, the EU decided to engage three key governance institutions and some CSO's on voting training, election process and election education. Why did the EU found it necessary to support these programs? Again, do you think it was successful?

EU policy of supporting democracy in Ghana has been criticised by some civil society organisations of being too election-focused thereby ignoring other aspects. What is your take on this?

Would you point to any other areas of your democracy support work in relations to Ghana, in terms of success or lessons learnt?

### **Human right, rule of law and administration of justice**

What had being the EU objectives regarding support for rule of law and human rights from 2000 in the perspective of promoting good governance?

EU supported Ghana Police Service to refurbish a forensic lab in 2010, what informed this decision?

Do you think the lab had helped in administration of justice in the country?

Despite the fact that Ghana has been applying for de-facto applying for de facto in the last twenty years, Amnesty International report in 2011 cited 138 people on death row in Ghana. But it seems to me the EU is taking a soft approach towards Ghana on this matter? Is there much that can be done on the death penalty issue, given the EU and Ghana's divergence on this issue?

From research, it seems the EU support for rule of law and human rights is lagging behind other clusters in terms of funding and implementation. Is there hierarchy of goals in the EU good governance programme?

Also section 104 of criminal code of Ghana makes being gay a criminal offence. Would the EU ever consider sanctioning Ghana on this Issue?

### **Public administration reform, management of public finances and civil services.**



What had being the EU objectives regarding support for Public administration reform, management of public finances from 2000 in the perspective of promoting good governance?

The EU since 2000 have supported the Ghana Audit Service to conduct financial and performance audit. What was the motive behind these strategies?

How was these strategies implemented

Do you think the policy was successful?

Any evidence to back these claim?

### **Decentralisation and Local governance/capacity building**

What had being the EU objectives regarding support for decentralisation and local governance/capacity from 2000 in the perspective of promoting good governance?

The EU has supported decentralisation institutions since 2000 what is the motive of this support?

How was the policy the implemented?

Do you think the policy was successful?

In 2006, as part of Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II, EU signed financial agreement totalling 32 billion cedi's to support Ghana's Decentralisation programme in order to enhance democratic governance and development. Why did the EU support the program and what was the success rate?

In August, 2012, the EU and Government of Ghana signed important agreement for grant totalling 97 million euros. 45 million was channelled through strengthening local governance and decentralisation process in Ghana. Why did the EU felt there was the need to do this?

Do you think this has help improve decentralisation?

Any evidence to support the claim?

Again would you point any other areas of your decentralisation work in relation to good governance in Ghana in terms of successes or lesson learnt?

