Policing Intellectual Boundaries? Émigré Scholars, the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on International Theory, and American International Relations in the 1950s

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Abstract

During the 1950s, several intellectual endeavors on both sides of the Atlantic aimed to further theoretical principles of IR. One of these endeavors was the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on International Theory that met between December 1953 and June 1954. It brought together scholars from across academic disciplines and professions, but particularly noteworthy is the involvement of émigré scholars. Tracing their contribution, this paper takes a critical stance towards common historiographical accounts of the discipline in which émigrés' involvement is characterized as a gambit to secure space for their alternative visions of scholarship in a hostile academic environment and that they had turned into critics of American liberal democracy due to their experiences with fascism in Europe. By contrast, this paper calls for a reconsideration of the role of émigrés by arguing that their engagement in IR's move to theorization was intended to help retain the discipline's pluralism in an effort to bridge theory and practice. Getting involved in this interdisciplinary field constituted their attempt to sustain intellectual pluralism across American social sciences, as they believed that behavioralism could endanger American democracy by reducing the contingency, ephemerality, and relationality of human life to questions of social planning.

The 1950s turned out to be an *Epochenschwelle* (epochal threshold) for social sciences in the transatlantic world.[1] Until then, many of its disciplines were still personally and intellectually pervious, as institutional boundaries were not yet as demarcated as they are today.[2] But after World War II, things started to change. Workshops and conferences were organized to discuss questions of theories, concepts, and methods in International Relations (IR) with the aim to substantiate the discipline. Today, the 1954 Rockefeller Foundation Conference on Theory, aiming to investigate 'the possibility, nature, and limits of theory in international relations',[3] might be the most well-known of these attempts . However, it was not the only one. The Rockefeller Foundation equally supported the Committee on the Theory of International Politics in the United Kingdom and the University of Maryland organized a Symposium in Government and Politics on the role of theory in IR in 1961.[4] One of the earliest attempts, however, was the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Study Group on International Theory that has yet to be lifted from oblivion.[5]

Although this group shared the same fate as its more famous Rockefeller Foundation counterpart, quickly 'fad[ing] away after a couple of meetings', [6] having only met seven times between December 1953 and June 1954, their meetings still deserve to be reconsidered, as they sustain current efforts to pluralize the discipline. During these meetings, participants discussed an eclectic mix of topics, amongst others historicism, the national interest, Marxism, political geography, and the problem of theory. More interesting, however, is the list of participants, as it demonstrates that IR in the United States initially was set up as a pluralist discipline. Apart from American scholars like George Lipsky, Dorothy Fosdick, and William Kaufmann and business representatives from companies like J.P. Morgan and Shearman and Sterling, many were refugees from Central Europe. In fact, they constituted a quarter of the CFR group members. Arnold Wolfers and Hajo Holborn are possibly the most well-known of them, but also Robert Strausz-Hupé, Gerhart Niemeyer, and Paul Zinner were intellectually socialized in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Furthermore, the work of Hans Morgenthau was the topic of the CFR group's second meeting. Indeed, Morgenthau was represented in spirit through his former PhD student Thompson, acting as 'his cautious stand-in', as Emily Hauptmann recently argued.[7] Even the physicist Isidor Rabi, having emigrated with his parents at the age of one, can be

counted to this group of scholars, as this second generation of émigrés continued to have close intellectual and often personal ties with Central Europe.[8]

Being inspired by their interest in substantiating IR theoretically, this paper investigates their role in providing for a pluralist IR further and reflects upon IR's move to theorization at that time. Previous research has characterized the involvement of émigrés as a gambit[9], not only allowing them to find employment in an often hostile academic environment, but it also helped them to secure space for their alternative visions of scholarship. Most émigré scholars were concerned about the epistemological prospects of behavioralism that was emerging as the dominant paradigm in American IR. For Nicolas Guilhot, 'IR theory is thus best understood as a case of intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social sciences.'[10] Apart from these intellectual differences, it has been argued that émigré scholars also settled for IR as their niche because, being 'deeply suspicious of liberal democracy'[11], they had concerns about their American colleagues' involvement in public life. According to John Gunnell, experiencing the downfall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of fascism in Central Europe, and the Holocaust had turned them into 'opponents of Weimar who viewed it as part of a transition to socialism and who had not accurately perceived the extent of the Nazi threat.'[12]

While I share many of Guilhot's and Gunnell's insights, my reading of émigré scholars and American IR leads to different conclusions, as my perspective is informed by the Central European intellectual cosmos that these scholars have been socialized in and that they brought with them to the United States, rather than approaching them from an American standpoint as Guilhot and Gunnell. Consequently, this paper calls for a reconsideration of émigré scholars' role by arguing that their engagement in IR's move to theorization was not a gambit to stay away from intellectual and public debates, but an attempt to retain IR's intellectual fluidity in an effort to bridge theory and practice.[13] As David McCourt confirms, '[d]espite the fact that a Council study group had been proceeding for six months prior to the Rockefeller conference, and that there was significant overlap in membership … no trace can be found in the archival record of the "realist gambit".'[14] In the 1950s, IR was still an interdisciplinary field, involving 'geography, economics, international law, history, anthropology, demography, social psychology … and comparative government', as Waldemar

Gurian, himself an émigré remarked,[15] and these were the disciplines many émigrés had been trained in. Prior to World War II, political science and IR were hardly established disciplines in Central Europe.[16] Getting involved in this interdisciplinary field, therefore, constituted their conscious attempt to sustain intellectual pluralism across American social sciences, coinciding with the ambition of other CFR group members like Lipsky. It was their belief that behavioralism would potentially endanger American democracy by reducing the contingency, ephemerality, and relationality of human life to questions of social planning. Having already experienced the downfall of one democracy, it did not seem unlikely to them that it could happen again and it was their ambition, both in theory and practice, to prevent this.[17]

This argument is disentangled in three steps, considering mutually constitutive intellectual developments and external factors. First, this paper charts the development of behavioralism in American social sciences until the 1950s. Taking this wider perspective shows that, while behavioralism appeared relatively late in political science and IR to become its dominant paradigm during the 1950s, this does not mean that it was merely a reaction to counter the discipline's penetration with Central European political thought. Rather, behavioralism had gradually gained ground in American social sciences since the end of the nineteenth century, not least through the help of some émigré scholars and the transatlantic transfer of Central European intellectual discourses. Eventually, behavioralism also came to influence political science and its subdisciplines, as it promised to address some of the pressing political problems at that time.[18] The second section traces the debate of the political in Weimar Germany, as this debate took place as a reaction to the limits of positivism in *Staatslehre* to capture the antagonisms within societies. It is shown that it is due to these Weimar experiences that most émigrés were suspicious about the intellectual and societal prospects of behavioralism and that their contributions to American IR were not guided by a rejection of democracy, but a concern to facilitate these antagonisms without them turning into violence. Finally, the last section demonstrates that émigré scholars experienced a similar debate in the United States after their arrival in the mid-1930s and, by bringing in their outsider perspectives, they aimed to enrich American intellectual debates and help its democracy to retain its socio-political fluidity.

Behavioralism in pre-World War II American Social Sciences

When these Central European refugees arrived in the United States, its intellectual world seemed barren to most of them. This is not to say that all American social scientists at that time were behavioralists or that émigrés formed an intellectually monolithic group. In fact, second generation émigrés, i.e. refugees who received most or all of their education in the United States like Henry Kissinger and Heinz Eulau, were often much more susceptible to the potential prospects of positivistic science. For most émigrés involved in the CFR group, however, Gunnell's claim that 'there was striking uniformity across a broad spectrum of the émigré experience … that was in sharp conflict with the values of American social science'[19] persists. They saw the rise of behavioralism among American social scientists critically, as it contrasted with their '*erfahrungswissenschaftliche* foundation'.[20] In fact, this kind of scholarship was so alien to them that some émigrés started to work on projects that aimed to map the plurality of political thought. In an interview with *Radio Bremen* in 1958, Arnold Brecht even claimed that prior to his most recent work (published as *Political Theory. The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* in 1959) there had been no engagement with political theory. Certainly, this remark bears the contours of intellectual vanity, but Brecht was primarily concerned of behavioralism, becoming the all but dominant paradigm in American political science and IR.[21]

The success story of behavioralism in the United States began at the turn of the twentieth century, coinciding with the expansion of the American state.[22] Both, domestic and international developments required the United States to significantly increase their administrative apparatus and invest in new research facilities. While Ido Oren might be right that in the end social science had 'not much'[23] of an impact on (foreign) policy making, it still sustained a 'social reform movement'[24] that considerably changed the preferred epistemologies, advanced social-scientific methodologies, and altered the university sector at large.

By the end of the nineteenth century most American universities were still 'driven by demand'[25], to use Miles Kahler's words, in the sense that they provided for a practical education of the local population, but gradually research moved into their focus, as exemplified in the foundation of Johns Hopkins University (1876), Clark University

(1887), and the University of Chicago (1890). This development was furthered by the United States' entry into World War I, and later World War II as well as the Cold War. This global engagement manifested significant knowledge gaps about foreign countries, their cultures and languages, caused by its geographical distance from the main theaters of conflict in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and political seclusion since the Monroe Doctrine. To make up for this gap, government institutions were established to provide space for conducting problem-oriented research during which 'a new world of concepts, methods, and research practices'[28] were developed and tested. Often these institutions cooperated with universities and encouraged academics to work for them. This is particularly true for émigrés who offered otherwise unavailable expert knowledge. This is reflected in the formation of the Office for Strategic Services (OSS), a precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 1942. Despite their often different theoretical perspectives, many émigrés like John Herz, Franz Neumann, Ernst Fraenkel, Herbert Marcuse, and the CFR group members Wolfers and Holborn were sought after by the OSS,[29] not as spies, but as 'an arsenal of knowledge on Germany'.[30] Their task was to devise strategies for a German post-war political order. The OSS, however, was not the only government effort to make up for this knowledge gap and not the only one that made use of émigré expertise. Others included, the Office of War Information, the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communication at the Library of Congress, and the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force.[31] Even the Rand Corporation that had been initiated by members of the OSS, the Department of War, and industry representatives profited from the intelligence offered by émigrés. The Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton with its seminar on questions of defense played a role in setting up Rand and counted émigrés like Felix Gilbert, a long-time acquaintance of Holborn, and Alfred Lauterbach among its members.[32] Hans Speier, who initially found refuge at the New School's University in Exile in New York and then worked for the OSS, even became the first director of its Social Science Department.[33]

American democracy, however, came not only under attack in international politics with the rise of fascism in Europe and East Asia, but also faced domestic challenges. The Great Depression of the 1930s caused unemployment on an unprecedented scale,

bringing about 'social upheaval and widespread misery, [leading] to fears that elected institutions and the separation of power could not survive capitalism's failures.'[34] Through numerous modernization and welfare programs, financial reforms, and public works projects under the New Deal, the effects of the Great Depression could be attenuated. If we believe Fraenkel, who like Morgenthau used to work for the labor lawyer Hugo Sinzheimer in Frankfurt, émigrés also made a significant contribution to these programs, as many of the New Deal acts were inspired by the work of Weimar social-democrats.[35] In the wake of these developments, questions of political behavior became important that in turn helped to mobilize science for policy-making processes. As behavioral approaches allowed to engage with these questions in a more quantitative fashion, it helped to pave their way in political science and IR.[36] It gradually also affected the mindset of academics, understanding themselves now 'as possessors of tools and programs designed for precision social engineering.'[37] This self-consciousness was encouraged by a deep-seated belief in the ability of science to create social progress, as behavioral approaches promised to deliver these tools and programs.[38] Regardless if a critical stand towards the rise of behavioralism is taken or not, it confirms Brecht's claim that 'one is very interested in theory here [in the United States]'[39], coinciding with Joel Isaac's view that 'the nature and function of "theory" became a subject of increasing concern in sociology, political science, and economics'.[40]

The extension of the American state, however, was not the only reason why behavioralism emerged dominant in theoretical discourses of American social sciences until the mid-twentieth century. Its rise was also sustained through 'the uncontested status of the basic contours of the country's liberal order'.[41] The United States' insularity not only required the country to increase its knowledge production significantly, but it also meant that its understanding of liberalism had turned static, leading to absolute truth claims.[42] As Seán Molloy notes, '[w]ithout a tradition of international involvement, the Americans were forced to rely on the Enlightenment ideology of reason and its 19th century successor, positivistic science, as the key to effective, rational practice in international relations.'[43] Even more perspicacious in this respect is the comment by the émigré educationalist Robert Ulich:

> The American is actually helpful …, but he [sic][44] is lacking international experience, the ability to feel empathy towards the specific problems of other nations. The American is living with an eighteenth century conscience: for him, some things are simply true and … others are wrong; and since democracy is right in America, everything else has to be wrong.[45]

Treating truth as an absolute and pursuing a normative scholarship based on an uncritical endorsement of liberalism favored behavioral approaches, as through them claims of a value-free science could be made. This left basic ontological axioms untouched and consequently the collection of large quantities of data only helped to sustain the socio-political status quo, rather than challenging it.[46] As poignantly put by Louis Hartz during the time when the CFR group met, '[i]t is only when you take your ethics for granted that all problems emerge as problems of technique.'[47]

While most émigrés experienced behavioralism as alien to the Central European thought they had been educated in, behavioralism's rise in the United States was also the consequence of intellectual developments that had originated on the other side of the Atlantic. The long-standing admiration for German culture and higher education led to scholarly exchanges, enabling numerous Americans like John Burgess, Talcott Parsons, Charles Merriam, Harold Laswell, and Willard Van Orman Quine to pursue part of their studies at Central European universities.[48]

There, these American students and early career scholars found themselves in the midst of a fiercely led dispute between what Wilhelm Dilthey had termed *Geisteswissenschaften* (humanities) and the natural sciences. The latter had gained in popularity in Germany after its unification in 1871 led to concerted industrialization efforts. Indeed with the term *Geisteswissenschaften*, Dilthey aimed to set them apart from the natural sciences to retain their leading academic status. While the natural sciences' popularity was founded in their claim to produce nomothetic research, i.e. the ability to make objective truth claims by empirically identifying general laws, the humanities were idiographic, meaning that their scholarship was spatio-temporally contingent and therefore could not satisfy aspirations of producing a value-free science.[49] Often the latter turned to Immanuel Kant's epistemology in their defense, and, while scholars in the newly emergent social sciences did the same, they were

critical towards 'Kant's transcendental notion of concepts, intuitions, and a priori justifications.'[50] Instead, they argued for a radical re-appropriation of Kant's epistemology based on natural sciences. This impacted on the theoretical perspectives of many of these young American scholars and upon their return to the United States they brought with them a '[s]cientific philosophy [that] offered a theory of knowledge in which mathematical conventions and scientific practices filled in the gaps left in epistemology by the erosion of Kant's system during the nineteenth century.'[51]

Behavioralism was further sustained by Viennese scholars seeking refuge in the United States during the interwar years. Although legal positivists, empirical sociologists, and logical empiricists ("Vienna Circle") had been working in the same city, their connections were only loose. However, with the political changes threatening their work and democratic convictions, they started to explore their intellectual affinities, provocatively summed up by Otto Neurath as a 'science without philosophy'.[52] Hans Kelsen, for example, acknowledged in a letter to Neurath from February 15, 1936 striking parallels between his work and Rudolf Carnap's, a member of the Vienna Circle.[53] In Europe, their positions had remained relatively marginalized, but in the United States their perspectives were positively received and they 'assimilated easily'.[54] Paul Lazarsfeld and other Viennese empirical sociologists were quickly able to exert influence on American social research, attracting significant financial support.[55] Equally, unlike many other émigrés, members of the Vienna Circle found relatively easy access to prestigious American institutions like Harvard, Princeton, and Chicago, sometimes because of the support of their former American students.

More important, however, was that logical empiricism offered American behavioralists a philosophical basis in which 'theories were viewed as changeable linguistic frameworks built upon a … universally valid realm of observation'[56] that allowed them to argue for a value-free, unified science. This unity of science was supposed to be achieved through logical empiricism's neutral observation language, making it applicable to all sciences. To promote this epistemological perspective, the Vienna Circle started to work again on their *Encyclopedia of Unified Science* in the United States, after the war had forced its members to abandon the project in Europe. Sympathetic to this idea of a unified science was Kelsen, who published one of his books in Neurath's *Library of Unified Science* series.[57] In contrast to other Viennese

scholars, however, Kelsen's legal positivism was perhaps the least well received in the United States. William Scheuerman suggests that Kelsen had been victim of the disciplinary delimitation after World War II that narrowed the intellectual horizons within the disciplines and his former students that made their career in political science and IR like Herz and Eric Voegelin as well as scholars who had personal ties like Morgenthau were not convinced of Kelsen's pure theory of law and consequently did not promote it in their disciplines.[58]

As this section showed, behavioralism was not only a reaction to the arrival of refugees from Central Europe, but already gained ground in American social sciences before the war. While there was a move from empirical history to theorization in IR in the 1950s with 'the persona of theorist [becoming] widely accepted as essential'[59] in IR, questions of theory had been of interest to American social scientists before World War II.[60]

The Role of CFR Group Participants in the Weimar Debate on the Political

Tracing the debate on the political in Central Europe during the interwar years through the contributions of CFR group participants in this section helps to clarify their stance towards liberal democracy. Rather than being critical in the sense of a refusal, they were critical in the sense of being concerned about the fragility of democracy. Émigré scholars promoted a scholarship that acknowledged the contingency, relationality, and ephemerality of life, identity, and meaning and rejected assumptions of absolute knowledge.[61] For them, democracies were the most appropriate form of government to reflect the resulting 'antagonisms of interests', as Morgenthau would have called it.[62] The looming rise of fascism in Central Europe and the subsequent threat to live these antagonisms, convinced many of them that their work cannot be restricted to academic scholarship, but they had to seek opportunities to engage with the public.

The debate on the political evolved in the 1920s against the backdrop of a crisis of modernity. This *Kulturkrise* (cultural crisis) did not only emerge with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, as Robbie Shilliam writes,[63] but it had evolved since the second half of the nineteenth century when the effects of modernity like mass society and technological developments begun to challenge previously commonly accepted identity constructions, causing the deterioration of social cohesion and leading to the

atomization of people.[64] Experiencing socio-political and economic changes as a crisis was not exclusive to Germany or even countries in Central Europe, but, as the case of the "overcoming modernity" debate in Japan highlights, it affected people globally.[65] Also the United States struggled with its changing role internationally and the economic downturn during the interwar years. Hence, I agree with Klaus Lichtblau that the atomistic tension between the socio-individual experiences of fragmentation on the one hand and the belief in progress on the other hand was not specific to Germany, but its perception was different to other countries. [66] As Holborn remarked in a letter to his doctoral advisor Friedrich Meinecke on February 7, 1935, '[i]t is interesting to see that the crisis has made the people here [United States] far more socially-minded and liberal. They have become far more open and unprejudiced than they used to be.'[67] Germany, by contrast, engaged with this crisis more negatively, fearing that it would lead to a "Decline of the West" (Oswald Spengler). Aiming to avoid this decline, Rainer Eisfeld[68] writes that many Weimar Republic social scientists may not have been outspoken supporters of fascism, but they were critical of democratic pluralism and not averse to the idea of a strong political leadership. Morgenthau captured this fear when he wrote to his mentor Sinzheimer on March 11, 1932 that '[e]verything is in the dark … Germany's absolute fear of reality pervades the air.'[69] Therefore, 'a sense of crisis manifest in culture, philosophy, and politics'[70] dominated intellectual discourses in Weimar Germany, giving rise to belligerent conceptualizations of the political as well as attempts to separate the political from the reality of the state.

Perceiving the question of the political to be central for social sciences, as it is within this realm that people form their identities and in doing so develop a sense of spatio-temporal belonging,[71] also many scholars that only a few years later were forced to leave Central Europe contributed to this debate. In this paper, the focus is on Morgenthau, Wolfers, and Holborn due to their personal or intellectual involvement in the CFR group. Other émigré CFR participants would have been Niemeyer and Strausz-Hupé. As a CFR employee, Niemeyer was not an official group member, but he still actively participated in most meetings. However, Niemeyer only finished his doctorate in 1932 and left Germany the following year, joining Hermann Heller in Madrid. This made it impossible for him to contribute to this Weimar debate. The

latter had left for the United States even earlier in 1920. Hence, Strausz-Hupé not only received most of his tertiary education in the United States, but he also had emigrated before the debate on the political intensified with the publication of Carl Schmitt's article in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik* in 1927. In this article and a later book from 1932, Schmitt aimed to provide people with a common identity tied to the state.[72] Although Schmitt did not conceive of the political as intentionally belligerent, he still envisaged a political realm that is not averse to violent conflicts by reducing it to a 'distinction … between friend and enemy'.[73] In providing an outlet for these conflicts, Schmitt hoped that 'neutralizations and depoliticizations' caused by a 'plurality of loyalties'[74] would be averted and eventually people would find the possibility to actively engage with the crisis of modernity.

While Schmitt represented the majoritarian position in Weimar Republic humanities, there were scholarly efforts – the future émigrés among them – who opposed this view. Knowing that this understanding of the political would have the potential to transform the state into an ideological tool, as it would no longer encourage to seek compromises for a common good, Kelsen, a strong supporter of democracy in the Weimar Republic, tried protecting the state by identifying it only as a legal order (*Identitätsthese*). Inspired by neo-Kantian philosophy, positing the separation of *sein* (is) and *sollen* (ought), Kelsen argued that the state applies to legal questions only.[75] This separation enabled Kelsen to argue for a basic norm[76] that, although hypothetical, embodied a legal unity that applied to everyone under the same legal system to the same extent. Hence, by trying to distill identity through the legal system whose basic norm democratically applies to everyone and in view of the rise of ideologies in Central Europe, Kelsen hoped to avoid further tainting the Weimar Republic with ideologies.

For many émigré scholars, however, Kelsen's pure theory of law provided no solution to protect democracy from the rise of ideologies in interwar Central Europe. Certainly, they shared his political convictions and concerns. Holborn, for example, remarked during one of the CFR group meetings that 'ideological forces have exerted a tremendous influence on the historical process by their very influence upon the minds and actions of men.'[77] However, as evidenced in Niemeyer's work, they criticized Kelsen for neglecting that these ideologies exert significant influence on power relations that shape (international) politics and therefore lived reality, regardless if it

is a legal matter or not.[78] As a consequence, they rather followed Schmitt's basic assumption that the mere establishment of institutions enforcing a legal system cannot settle conflicts particularly on the international level.[79] Instead, the political has to precede the establishment of institutions.

This is, however, were the affinities with Schmitt ended. Rather than drawing on Schmitt, as Guilhot claims,[80] they were inspired in their conceptualizations of the political by the work of sociologists, most notably Karl Mannheim. Morgenthau and other émigrés found affirmation in his work to perceive knowledge as spatio-temporally conditioned; i.e. knowledge (and ultimately meaning and identity) is created through human relations. Consequently, knowledge cannot claim objectivity beyond that specific context. As Morgenthau put it a few years after the CFR group meetings, 'political thinking is ... "*standortgebunden*", that is to say it is tied to a particular situation.'[81] Consequently, émigrés rejected Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction for its absoluteness and, contrary to Guilhot, for émigrés like Morgenthau the political could not be reduced to mere 'power politics'.[82] Rather because of this conditionality, the political lacked a fixed substance and is to be considered as a 'coloring'[83] that can affect any subject. Hence, whenever people congregate to express their views about a subject, while actively engaging with other perspectives, the political is established.

Although Wolfers and Holborn did not provide a comprehensive treatise on the political in the same manner as Morgenthau, at least Holborn's preface to the German translation of one of Alfred Zimmern's books indicates intellectual affinities to Morgenthau's position.[84] They also initially shared similar epistemological convictions, although they started to diverge in the United States. While Wolfers converged towards behavioralism,[85] Morgenthau and Holborn stayed true to their convictions. Holborn, for example, disagreed with neo-Kantianism in perceiving the historian's task merely as that of a collector of facts of history.[86] Rather, drawing on Dilthey, Holborn argued that 'living experience is never a solipsistic experience',[87] meaning that there are no objective facts of history because these facts have been constructed in a specific spatio-temporal context. Furthermore, these contexts cannot be grasped in their entirety, as an objective resurrection of the past is unattainable.[88] Similar to

Morgenthau, Holborn considered such attempts futile, as each such attempt would be influenced by the 'subjective experience of the scholar.'[89]

Arguing against Schmitt and Kelsen was for émigré scholars, however, not only a matter of political dispute, but required political activism. In contrast to other émigrés connected to the CFR group, Morgenthau was little known prior to their emigration to the United States. But even he engaged with the public through means available to him at the time. There are, for example, newspaper articles in the liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on questions of jurisprudence and higher education. Wolfers and Holborn could reach a wider public in Weimar Germany, given that they were already established professors and particularly the latter was considered to be the 'Wunderkind' of German history.[90] Both used their prominent positions at the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* to speak publicly in support of the Weimar Republic to an extent that Gerhart Ritter argues that Holborn would have become a professional politician would the Weimar Republic have lasted.[91]

In contrast to Holborn, Morgenthau, and Niemeyer, who were deeply concerned about the rise of Nazism and consequently left Germany shortly before (Morgenthau) and shortly after (Holborn, Niemeyer) the Nazis seized power in January 1933,[92] Wolfers misjudged their rise, dismissing it as temporary revisionism.[93] In a talk given at Chatham House on October 18, 1932, Wolfers remarked that '[t]he threat of dictatorship by one part has … been taken from Germany … A country which is so divided, which in itself unites such fundamentally different groups, characters, tendencies and ideals, is certainly least fit for the exclusive rule of one party.'[94] Even after his emigration, he believed that German nationalism was inward-facing and that no external ambitions were sought, as highlighted in a dispatch of the German Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from February 27, 1934.[95] This error in judgment, however, did not stop Wolfers's career in the United States. Instead, he eagerly sought connections to public figures in the United States and to engage in its public sphere. Like his fellow émigrés Morgenthau and Holborn,[96] the downfall of the Weimar Republic had shown him that maintaining the political was not a question of right or wrong in the Schmittian sense, but required commitment from everyone to ensure that the common good is a reflection of the plurality of voices in every society.

A Gospel of Opportunity and Productive Misunderstandings: Émigré Scholars and American IR

Returning to mid-twentieth century United States, the final section investigates why many émigrés got involved in IR since their emigration in the 1930s. It is highlighted that this involvement was driven by a conscious desire to reach out to American colleagues and the general public, enrich American intellectual discourses, and help protect American democracy.

In his memoir, Henry Pachter recollected the United States as a 'gospel of opportunity'[97] for the newly arrived immigrants from Central Europe. However, while finding refuge in the United States saved their lives, émigrés still encountered obstacles in rebuilding them. During the 1930s, the United States was in the midst of the Great Depression, leading to a significant reduction of university budgets. As a consequence, many universities lacked the financial means to hire new faculty members. Equally, philanthropic organizations were reluctant to support émigré scholars 'because they represented competition for jobs that young American academics would otherwise fill.'[99] Financial constraints, however, were not the only reason why many American universities were reluctant to hire émigrés. After all, only 54 of them were to excel in American political science and IR.[100] Anti-Semitism also played a significant role. Individual faculty members at American universities openly voiced their anti-Semitic convictions and even prestigious institutions used quota systems to minimize the intake of Jewish students and faculty members.[101] Consequently, many émigrés struggled at the beginning to find employment. Even the ones, who ended up having 'brilliant career[s]',[102] faced difficulties in finding access to American academia. Morgenthau's first academic position at Brooklyn College required him to teach 'everything under the sun'.[103] Furthermore, like about 50 other émigrés, Herz, after not having his contract renewed at Trinity College, and Ossip Flechtheim only found employment at African American universities at a time when racial segregation was still the norm in many parts of the United States. Consequently, such institutions of higher education were perceived as a hindrance by white American scholars to their academic careers.[104] Many CFR group members had a somewhat easier fate because they had already arrived earlier (Strausz-Hupé) or

because they were well established academics in Germany with ties to the United States (Holborn, Wolfers). The latter two found employment at Yale and Holborn was already elected into the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1941.[105] Strausz-Hupé spent his academic career at the University of Pennsylvania, before serving as a foreign policy advisor to several Republican politicians and as ambassador amongst others to the NATO.

The difficulties that many of the émigrés faced did not stop them to try to build a dialogue with their American peers. While many of them published in journals founded by émigrés like *Social Research*, *Dissent*, and the *Review of Politics* and their work accounted for less than two percent of the entire journal output in American social sciences, it also quickly appeared in some of the most prestigious journals in these disciplines like the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *World Politics*, *American Political Science Review*, or the *American Historical Review*.[106] Certainly, establishing these dialogues was difficult, as 'the contrast between [them] … was so great that even the scholars shared subjects and concerns they could not communicate effectively.'[107] However, during the mid-twentieth century, the American university system was also less rigid and formalized as it Central European counterparts and, while the Great Depression had reduced the financial abilities of the American university sector, it also meant that the United States started to question its self-understanding. As a consequence, there was an open-mindedness towards new ways of thinking and ideas, particularly among younger faculty members which encouraged émigrés to voice their concerns about American democracy, sharing their different views about what constitutes politics with their American colleagues.[108]

While Brian Schmidt[109] has carefully elaborated that we would be misguided in reducing American international political thought to a question of realism versus liberalism, the latter and derivatives of it (Wilsonianism, idealism, and Wilsonian idealism) are still terms that émigrés used in order to express discomfort with the development of American democracy. Indeed, the last meeting of the CFR group was dedicated to the study of Wilsonian idealism.[110] This did not mean that émigrés were rejecting liberal democracies. Rather, experiencing the downfall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of totalitarianism, and the Holocaust turned them into fervent democrats. Due to the nature of the CFR meetings, however, totalitarianism and the

Holocaust were only briefly mentioned. In the group's discussions, Lipsky referred just once to the Holocaust and totalitarian(ism) was only mentioned nine times, including Strausz-Hupé's doubts about attempting 'to define a "totalitarian mind".'[111] Still, their experiences had told émigrés that democracies cannot be treated as static institutions,[112] but as political orders that are being constantly renegotiated. In this process, all societal interests are being incorporated. Aiming to silence critical voices or simply voices that speak against one's own positions disregards what émigrés considered to be a fundamental aspect of democracies, potentially even giving rise to extreme ideological positions in the sense of an "ism". As Morgenthau put it shortly after the CFR group met, '[m]oral principles can never be realized, but … at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts.'[113] As they saw exemplified in McCarthyism, the desire for stability had also led in the United States to the exclusion of controversial voices, exposing the fragility of its democracy. 'In the name of anti-Communism', as Morgenthau reflected later in his life, 'this desire led to the suppression of all manifestations of social unrest and to the suppression of reform.'[114]

Also intellectually, émigré scholars worked in IR not to separate themselves from the American academic world, but they used this 'flea market'[115] to uphold disciplinary bridges that had characterized IR and the social sciences in general until the mid-twentieth century. Hence, while I agree with Richard Devetak that émigrés wanted 'to cultivate, and create … space for, a theoretical persona; one which they saw as being intimately related to a political battle over the Enlightenment heritage',[116] they did not try to achieve this through disciplinary boundary drawing. Rather, they 'had little interest in the policing of boundaries between disciplines', as Sophia Rosenfeld writes for the case of Hannah Arendt.[117] And why would they? Despite all drawbacks, émigrés could relatively easily integrate into the United States because of the elasticity and diversity of its higher education sector.[118] Even more important, in keeping the connections with other disciplines, they wanted to retain intellectual diversity. Only this diversity allows to approximate a more comprehensive understanding of human life. This interdisciplinary attitude was not only developed in the United States, but émigré scholars already positioned themselves for it in Central Europe. Holborn criticized German historians for the 'ever-increasing specialization and

professionalization' as it interfered with 'wide communication'.[119] Wolfers also argued in a review that the interdisciplinary character of American social sciences would help 'the nascent [discipline of German] political science to remain practical and stay focused on the present age.'

It is in this context that many émigrés themselves, but also many commentators spoke of the émigrés' ambition to establish a 'synthesis'[120] of academic disciplines and between cultures, as émigré scholars wanted to bring in their Central European perspectives to further sustain intellectual diversity. This what has been identified as an "outsider experience" or "borderline situation" (*Grenzsituation*) is highlighted in an assessment about Morgenthau, arguing that his 'great advantage is that, as a scholar and citizen already mature, when he chose the United States as his country, he can look at it from within and also with the critical objectivity of an outsider.'[121] This capacity to synthesize and identify commonalities across different perspectives is even more poignant in remarks by fellow émigrés Brecht and Paul Tillich. Both demonstrate the striving towards a common good, rather than forgetting one's common goals over differences. The latter remarked in a handout prepared for his colleagues in the late 1930s that 'there is a *common* chance: the borderline situation gives the opportunity to see the general state of the society clearer and to generate a societal impact.'[122] Brecht spoke in the same vein, highlighting that

> the emigrant … will make comparisons. He [sic] will find positive and negative aspects. However, if he is really trying hard to make the best out of his situation, he will realize we are all humans; not only with regards to human failures, but also with regards to the incredible opportunities that are within human nature and mind (*Geist*).[123]

Certainly, it was only occasionally that émigré scholars would open up as much to behavioralism as Wolfers did. Most like Holborn and Morgenthau remained critical to their American peers' hope that knowledge could be inductively derived from the simple collection of data.[124] Rather, they wanted to contribute to transcend behavioral thought and they remained hopeful that they would succeed. As late as 1969, Morgenthau wrote to a former student that 'I am sorry to hear that the behaviorist

fashion, which seems to be declining here, is still in full swing in England. But I am sure that it will die there too at its own bareness.'[125] This criticism towards behavioralism, however, did not mean that they would not have engaged with this epistemological perspective. On the contrary, silencing this kind of scholarship would have threatened intellectual plurality. Hence, by critically engaging with behavioralism and bringing in their different intellectual horizons, they embraced the potential of 'productive misunderstandings', as Tillich put it in a workshop as part of the fourth anniversary celebrations of New School's Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science in 1937.[126] Providing space for such critical encounters could enrich political thought by treating translations not as questions of fidelity, but 'a moment of political contestation over different meanings of the social',[127] in whose process unexpected commonalities could be identified, one's own intellectual positions strengthened, or different, previously unconsidered aspects or perspectives stimulated. As Tillich maintained, 'the transfer of cultural contents always entails a transformation of them. Creative reception, and therefore cross-fertilization, is connected with transformation of what has been received. This transformation occurs through a mental activity which includes at the same time understanding and misunderstanding of the new.'[128]

The CFR group and their meetings epitomize productive misunderstandings thus understood well. It brought together a cross-section of social scientists and natural scientists, policy makers, representatives of think tanks and foundations, as well as business people.[129] This combination of diverse scholarship, métiers, and interests was bound to fail if we hold them accountable against the ambition of producing an IR theory. They even could not agree what theory was supposed to mean. As McCourt shows, Lipsky had a practical orientated understanding, in the sense of supporting policy-makers, Kaufmann was more in favor of behavioralism, and Holborn would have highlighted the spatio-temporal contingency of any IR theory and argued that 'the construction of a theory of international relations is not just a problem of drawing conclusion from the actions and reactions of 60-odd nations.'[130]

Still, their meetings and those of other groups like the ones sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation had significant impact on American IR and beyond, helping to bridge theory and practice. These meetings brought together scholars that at least at their time shaped intellectual discourses. Some of their work still influence social

sciences discourses today, as particularly the émigrés Morgenthau, Holborn, and Wolfers evidence. Others like Thompson impacted on the discipline by supporting research projects financially and thereby steering some of the discipline's discourses. Finally, Fosdick significantly influenced American foreign policy-making until the 1980s. Most important, the CFR group meetings foreshadowed current attempts to establish a globally more inclusive discipline and produce a more comprehensive picture of the history of international affairs and its political thought.[131] Over the course of the CFR group meetings, Lipsky, rather unsuccessfully, tried to promote his nominalist approach, in the sense that there could be no single IR theory, but only multiple ones in a pluralist discipline.[132] As Stanley Hoffmann asked a few years after the CFR group meetings: 'How could one agree once and for all upon the definition of a field whose scope is in constant flux …?'[133] Even though the other member wanted to steer discussions in a different direction because after all the meetings were about developing a theory of IR, Holborn, Morgenthau, Niemeyer, and even Wolfers would not have disapproved of this approach, as it tied with their own perspectives on international politics. Certainly, this 1950s attempt cannot claim to reach the same scope and breadth as today's discourses. Given the time and space its meetings took place, with racial segregation still being rife in the United States and global decolonization only nascent, the CFR group could not capture the multitude of voices in international political thought. However, the CFR group still transcended disciplinary, cultural, and possibly even gender boundaries in trying to establish an IR theory. At a time, when behavioralism started to dominate IR discourses of the next few decades, the CFR group's attempt to produce a more comprehensive picture of humanity stands out and it is for this 'humanistic endeavor'[134] that reflecting on the CFR group has the potential to stimulate current discourses in the discipline still today.

Conclusion

What are we to make of these seven meetings and the émigrés' contribution to them that took place more than sixty years ago?

Back then, behavioralism evolved into the dominant theoretical paradigm in IR. Its foundationalism suited the changes to the political and academic landscapes in the United States that had begun at the end of the nineteenth century. Intensified during

the first half of the twentieth century with the Great Depression and the two World Wars, the country continued to be in need for specialist expertise and quantifiable knowledge in the second half of the century with the Cold War in full swing. At the same time, the role of philanthropic organizations and even individual knowledge managers is not to be underestimated. Backed by close personal ties, foundations like Ford and Rockefeller significantly invested into the steering of research agenda and the training of scholars in the 1950s.[135]

Still, the rise of behavioralism in IR was merely the culmination of intellectual and political developments that had affected the United States before and were not merely a reaction to the influx of émigré scholars since the mid-1930s. It has also been shown that their contribution to IR was not a gambit in the sense of a withdrawal from the wider academic world in the United States and cannot be interpreted as a sign of their anti-democratic views. Rather, the academic context of the 1950s has to be considered. Until then, academic disciplines were not yet as demarcated as they were today and IR in particular was an interdisciplinary effort. Émigrés, themselves an interdisciplinary group of scholars, found this field ideal to stimulate debates with their American colleagues and create (and contribute to) fora, such as the CFR group, to discuss potentially diverging viewpoints. This happened based on an understanding of the political as a conscious and fruitful exchange of antagonistic interests and ideas, constituting the core of democratic cohabitation (*Zusammenleben*).

Reassessing the contribution of émigrés to the CFR group and IR's move to theorization encourages to rethink their integration into American academia. While earlier scholarship perceived it as an 'acculturation' and even 'assimilation'[136], alluding to a linear process of adaption in the host country, and the idea of a gambit at least evokes images of a failed assimilation, as it implies that émigré scholars withdrew themselves from American academia, their conviction to CFR group speaks for a 'functionalistic integration'.[137] This kind of integration is not to be understood normatively as with the case of assimilation, but accepts that this process is messy in the sense that it is not linear, but partly reversible or may happen only partially. It also means that the majoritarian position will be affected gradually, moving towards the position of émigrés. This is because integration happens through participation in which immigrants have the opportunity to voice their interests and ideas and have

them debated as much as they can listen to others' interests and ideas and debate them with the majoritarian society. The CFR group as well as other efforts like the Rockefeller group were venues for a functionalistic integration, as they were perceived by émigré scholars to make their perceptions of (international) political thought more widely known among their American colleagues as much as they saw an opportunity in them to reflect on the latter thoughts.

In times of a globalizing academic world, in which transcultural research projects with a plurality of perspectives being purposely brought together are increasingly the norm, this functionalistic integration of émigré scholars into American social sciences invites current IR scholarship to rethink the purpose of integration and how its success is defined. Success is not enforced assimilation, but to withstand human differences, knowing that incorporating a variety of perspectives helps scholarship to approximate truth. While mid-twentieth century émigré scholars are a specific academic case, their integration is a timely reminder for societies around the globe at large.

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[1] Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 455.

[2] Nicolas Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory' in Nicolas Guilhot (ed), *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 128; Richard Devetak, *Critical International Theory. An Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 20; David M. McCourt (ed), *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on International Theory, 1953-1954* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming).

[3] Nicolas Guilhot, 'Introduction: One Discipline, Many Histories' in Nicolas Guilhot (ed), *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 7.

[4] Horace V. Harrison (ed), *The Role of Theory in International Relations* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964). Also, Inderjeet Parmar, 'American Hegemony, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of Academic International Relations in the United States' in Nicolas Guilhot (ed), *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 201; Brian Schmidt in this issue.

[5] For a more detailed discussion of the CFR group meetings, see in this issue: David McCourt, 'Revisiting the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on International Theory, 1953-54: An Introduction to the Special Section'. Transcripts of the meetings are in McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*.

[6] Kenneth Thompson recalling the Rockefeller Foundation Conference. Cited in Tim Dunne, 'A British School of International Relations' in Jack Hayward, Brian Barry, and Archie Brown (eds), *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 412.

[7] Emily Hauptmann at the 2018 ISA Annual Convention in San Francisco.

[8] Andreas W. Daum, Hartmut Lehmann, and James J. Sheehan (eds), *The Second Generation. Émigrés from Nazi Germany as Historians* (New York: Berghahn, 2016).

[9] Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit'.

[10] Ibid., 130.

[11] John G. Gunnell, *Political Theory and Social Science. Cutting against the Grain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23. Similar, John G. Gunnell, *American Polity. Political Science and the Discourse of*

Democracy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); Robbie Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations. The Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 184; Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 15.

[12] John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory. The Genealogy of an American Vocation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 190.

[13] Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, 146. For an excellent overview of the current debate on theory and practice, see Beate Jahn, 'Theorizing the Political Relevance of International Relations Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* lxi, no. 1 (2017).

[14] McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*.

[15] Waldemar Gurian, 'On the Study of International Relations', *Review of Politics* viii, no. 3 (1946), 276-7. At its inception in the late nineteenth century, the same was true for political science at large (Justin Buckley Dyer, 'Political Science and American Political Thought', *PS: Political Science & Politics* l, no. 3 (2017), 786).

[16] Felix Rösch, 'Introduction: Breaking the Silence: European Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of an American Discipline' in Felix Rösch (ed), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations. A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 4.

[17] For example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (London: Latimer House, 1947); Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (Orlando: Harvest, 1970); Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics. An Introduction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). For the current discussion: Ira Katznelson, *Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge After Total War, Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Versuchungen der Unfreiheit: die Intellektuellen in Zeiten der Prüfung* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006); Caspar Sylvest, 'Realism and International Law: the Challenge of John H. Herz', *International Theory* ii, no. 3 (2010); Douglas B. Klusmeyer, 'The American Republic, Executive Power and the National Security State: Hannah Arendt's and Hans Morgenthau's Critiques of the Vietnam War', *Journal of International Political Theory* vii, no. 1 (2011); Felix Rösch, *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Hartmut Behr and Hans-Jörg Sigwart, 'Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics' in Cornelia Navari (ed), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Critical, Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*.

[18] For example, John G. Gunnell, 'American Political Science, Liberalism, and the Invention of Political Theory', *American Political Science Review* lxxxii, no. 1 (1988); Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*; Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit'; Robert Adcock, 'Interpreting Behavioralism', in Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson (eds), *Modern Political Science. Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Hans-Jörg Sigwart, 'Strömungen der US-amerikanischen politischen Theorie' in Christian Lammert, Markus B. Siewert, and Boris Vormann (eds), *Handbuch Politik USA* (Wiesbaden: VS Springer, 2016).

[19] Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, 185. Also, H. Stuart Hughes, *The Sea Change. The Migration of Social Thought, 1930-1965* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 15.

[20] Behr and Sigwart, 'Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics', 38.

[21] Radio Bremen, *Auszug des Geistes. Bericht über eine Sendereihe* (Bremen: Heye & Co., 1962), 140. In this interview, Brecht disregards that George Sabine already had published a *History of Political Theory* in 1937. Voegelin was also working on a *History of Political Ideas* since the 1930s, but the manuscript never got published during his lifetime (Behr and Sigwart, 'Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics', 34). Still, Shilliam is right to argue that 'before World War I, continental intellectual history was hardly studied in the American academy' (Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, 184).

[22] Udi Greenberg, *The Weimar Century. German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 20.

[23] Ido Oren, 'The Enduring Relationship between the American (National Security) State and the State of the Discipline', *PS: Political Science and Politics* xxxvii, no. 1 (2004), 53.

[24] Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 57.

[25] Miles Kahler, 'Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945' in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 22.

[28] Joel Isaac, 'Tangled Loops: Theory, History, and the Human Sciences in Modern America', *Modern Intellectual History* vi, no. 2 (2009), 410.

[29] Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA. Ihr Einfluß auf die amerikanische Europapolitik 1933-1945* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971), 181. Also, Richard Ned Lebow, 'German Jews and American Realism' in Felix Rösch (ed), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations. A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[30] Greenberg, *The Weimar Century*, 93. Tim Müller even has established that through having been brought into contact with likeminded American scholars at the OSS, émigrés could contribute to the development of the New Left in the United States (Tim B. Müller, 'Die gelehrten Krieger und die Rockefeller-Revolution. Intellektuelle zwischen Geheimdienst, Neuer Linken und dem Entwurf einer neuen Ideengeschichte', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* xxxiii, no. 2 (2007), 198-227).

[31] Oren, 'The Enduring Relationship', 52 Joel Isaac, *Working Knowledge. Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),, 172-3.

[32] Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, 35.

[33] Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile. Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 175. On Speier, see Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

[34] Greenberg, *The Weimar Century*, 21.

[35] Ibid., 112-3.

[36] Adcock, 'Interpreting Behavioralism'.

[37] Isaac, 'Tangled Loops', 398.

[38] In a letter to Dean Acheson from March 30, 1963, Morgenthau criticized this 'Washington scene' (acknowledging, however, that this is not specific to the United States or current times) as follows: 'It is as though people were to judge paintings not in view of their intrinsic aesthetic value but in terms of, say, the cost of their production, the chemical composition of the paint, or their physical relations to each other' (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau papers, 1858-1981, Container 2).

[39] Radio Bremen, *Auszug des Geistes*, 140. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German into English are the author's.

[40] Isaac, 'Tangled Loops', 410.

[41] Katznelson, *Desolation and Enlightenment*, 110-1.

[42] Critical, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Rationalizing Realpolitik. U.S. International Relations as a Liberal Field' in Neil Gross and Solon Simmons (eds), *Professors and their Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).

[43] Seán Molloy, 'Realism: A Problematic Paradigm', *Security Dialogue* xxxiv, no. 1 (2003), 72.

[44] Human (*der Mensch*) takes a masculine grammatical gender in German. This is not to be conflated with biological genders.

[45] Radio Bremen, *Auszug des Geistes*, 47-8. Following Samuel Moyn, American politics still suffers from these beliefs (Samuel Moyn, 'Beyond Liberal Internationalism', *Dissent*, available at https://bit.ly/2NBuKpg (accessed July 8, 2018)).

[46] Sigwart, 'Strömungen der US-amerikanischen politischen Theorie', 75; Emily Hauptmann, 'The Ford Foundation and the Rise of Behavioralism in Political Science', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* xlviii, no. 2 (2012), 154.

[47] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1955), 100.

[48] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, 184; Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 806-7; John Bew, *Realpolitik. A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 205.

[49] Wilhelm Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. Rede zum Antritt des Rectorats der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg. Gehalten am 1. Mai 1894* (Strasbourg: Heintz, 1904).

[50] Isaac, *Working Knowledge*, 5.

[51] Ibid., 22.

[52] Friedrich Stadler, *The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism* (Vienna: Springer, 2001), 158.

[53] Friedrich Stadler, 'Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre – Über Familenähnlichkeiten' in Clemens Jabloner and Friedrich Stadler (eds), *Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre. Beziehungen zwischen dem Wiener Kreis und der Hans-Kelsen-Schule* (Vienna: Springer, 2001), xvi-xvii.

[54] Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, 183. Also, Hughes, *The Sea Change*, 34.

[55] Paul Neurath, 'Paul Lazarsfeld und die Institutionalisierung empirischer Sozialforschung: Ausfuhr und Wiedereinfuhr einer Wiener Institution' in Ilja Srubar (ed), *Exil, Wissenschaft, Identität. Die Emigration deutscher Sozialwissenschaftler 1933-1945* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 79.

[56] Isaac, 'Tangled Loops', 401.

[57] Stadler, 'Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre', xv.

[58] William E. Scheuerman, '"Professor Kelsen's Amazing Disappearing Act"' in Felix Rösch (ed), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations. A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Also, Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001); critical, Oliver Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[59] Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 14.

[60] Hauptmann, 'The Ford Foundation', 155.

[61] This is a position that we find among many classical realists. See, Duncan Bell, 'Political Realism and International Relations', *Philosophy Compass* xii, no. 2 (2017), 3.

[62] Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Power as a Political Concept' in Roland Young (ed), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 75. Earlier, while still in Europe, Morgenthau had simply termed it 'discussion' (Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 126).

[63] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, 178.

[64] Klaus Lichtblau, *Kulturkrise und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende. Zur Genealogie der Kultursoziologie in Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996); Rösch, *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview*, 25-30.

[65] Richard Calichman (ed), *Overcoming Modernity. Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

[66] Lichtblau, *Kulturkrise und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende*, 16.

[67] Cited in Gerhard A. Ritter, *German Refugee Historians and Friedrich Meinecke, 1910-1977: Letters and Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 44.

[68] Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft 1920-1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991).

[69] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Letter to Hugo Sinzheimer*, March 11, 1932 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau papers, 1858-1981, Container 197).

[70] Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, 146.

[71] Manfred Gangl, 'Einleitung' in Manfred Gangl (ed), *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 14; Felix Rösch, 'Morgenthau in Europe: Searching for the Political' in Cornelia Navari (ed), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 9.

[72] Manfed Gangl, '"Das Politische ist das Totale." Carl Schmitts Bestimmung des Politischen' in Manfred Gangl (ed), *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 42-3.

[73] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 23.

[74] Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1932), 66; Gangl, '"Das Politische ist das Totale"', 38.

[75] Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*, 82.

[76] Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*, 83.

[77] McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*.

[78] Gerhart Niemeyer, 'Review of Peace through Law', *Harvard Law Review* lviii, no. 2 (1944), 305-6.

[79] Kelsen supervised the doctoral dissertations of Herz and Voegelin and Morgenthau's post-doctoral dissertation (*Habilitation*) at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva only passed because Kelsen provided a positive endorsement, despite Morgenthau critically engaged with Kelsen's pure theory of law in his thesis (Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Postscript to the Transaction Edition: Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau' in Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds), *Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984), 353-4). Interestingly, while Kelsen was sympathetic to Morgenthau, his relationship with Voegelin dwindled, after the latter criticized Kelsen in his *Habilitation* (Eric Voegelin, *Autobiographical Reflections* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 81).

[80] Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 100-1.

[81] Hans J. Morgenthau, P*olitics in the Twentieth Century. Volume I. The Decline of Democratic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 72-3; italics in the original. Holborn spoke in a similar vein during the CFR group meetings, expressing doubt 'as to whether most practitioners were greatly influenced by an explicit theory of international relations. He felt that weight must also be given to the more nebulous social mores and customs prevailing upon the practitioner at the time' (McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*).

[82] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt's Begriff des Politischen* (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, 1858-1981, Container 110), 5; Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment*, 99.

[83] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* (Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1929), 67.

[84] Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt*, 116. Also, Felix Gilbert, 'Hajo Holborn: A Memoir', *Central European History* iii, no. 1-2 (1970), 5.

[85] Guilhot, 'The Realist Gambit', 151.

[86] Hajo Holborn, 'The History of Ideas', *American Historical Review* lxxiii, no. 3 (1968), 684.

[87] Hajo Holborn, 'Wilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason', *Journal of the History of Ideas* xi, no. 1 (1950), 101.

[88] Hajo Holborn, 'History and the Humanities', *Journal of the History of Ideas* ix, no. 1 (1948), 68.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Alfred Vagts in Otto P. Pflanze, 'The Americanization of Hajo Holborn' in Hartmut Lehmann and James J. Sheehan (eds), *An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 171. Also, Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, 54-5; Gilbert, 'Hajo Holborn', 3.

[91] Ritter, *German Refugee Historians and Friedrich Meinecke*, 43.

[92] Pflanze, 'The Americanization of Hajo Holborn', 172; Felix Rösch, 'Crisis, Values, and the Purpose of Science: Hans Morgenthau in Europe', *Ethics & International Affairs* xxx, no. 1 (2016), 23-4.

[93] Rainer Eisfeld, 'From the Berlin Political Studies Institute to Colombia and Yale: Ernst Jaeckh and Arnold Wolfers' in Felix Rösch (ed), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations. A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 114. Also American scholars like Merriam misjudged the rise of fascism in Europe and as late as 1939 positive assessments about Nazi Germany can be found in the *American Political Science Review* (Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US. America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 8-9).

[94] Arnold Wolfers, 'The Crisis of the Democratic Regime in Germany', *International Affairs* xi, no. 6 (1932), 769.

[95] Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt*, 118.

[96] Greg Russell, 'Morgenthau in America: The Legacy' in Cornelia Navari (ed), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 153.

[97] Henry Pachter, 'On Being an Exile. An Old-Timer's Personal and Political Memoir', *Salamagundi* x-xi (1969-1970), 30.

[99] Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, 78.

[100] Alfons Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration. Studien zu ihrer Akkulturation und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 21, 289.

[101] Marjorie Lamberti, 'The Reception of Refugee Scholars from Nazi Germany in America: Philanthropy and Social Change in Higher Education', *Jewish Social Studies* xii, no. 3 (2006), 159; Daniel Bessner, '"Rather More than One-Third had no Jewish Blood": American Progressivism and German-Jewish Cosmopolitanism at the New School for Social Research, 1933-1939', *Religions* xxx, no. 1 (2012), 108.

[102] Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, 74.

[103] Morgenthau, 'Postscript to the Transaction Edition', 367.

[104] Gabrielle Simon Edgomb, *From Swastika to Jim Crow: Refugee Scholars at Black Colleges* (Malabar: Krieger, 1993).

[105] Holborn later also became the first non-American born President of the American Historical Association.

[106] Karen J. Greenberg, 'Crossing the Boundary: German Refugee Scholars and the American Academic Tradition' in Ulrich Teichler and Henry Wasser (eds), *German and American Universities. Mutual Influences – Past and Present* (Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum für Berufs- und Hochschulforschung der Gesamthochschule Kassel, 1992), 70; Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, 214; Alfons Söllner, 'Vom Völkerrecht zur *science of international relations*. Vier typische Vertreter der

politikwissenschaftlichen Emigration' in Ilja Srubar (ed), *Exil, Wissenschaft, Identität. Die Emigration deutscher Sozialwissenschaftler 1933-1945* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 177; Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration*, 21, 289.

[107] Katznelson, *Desolation and Enlightenment*, 117. Also, Bew, *Realpolitik*, 212.

[108] Hughes, *The Sea Change*, 3; Oren, *Our Enemies and US*, 18; Brian Schmidt, 'Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* lxxii, no. 3 (1998), 441. This, however, also applied to behavioralism that became the dominant paradigm in IR during the 1950s.

[109] Brian Schmidt, 'Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist Theory and the Myth of Interwar Idealism', *International Relations* xvi, no. 1 (2002). Also Cameron G. Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate', *European Journal of International Relations* viii, no. 2 (2002).

[110] Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest. A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 4; Hans J. Morgenthau, 'What is the National Interest of the United States?', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* cclxxxii (1952), 2; Arnold Wolfers, *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), x.

[111] McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*. Totalitarianism and the Holocaust, however, were of importance to many émigrés. See Douglas Klusmeyer, 'Beyond Tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Responsibility, Evil and Political Ethics', *International Studies Review* xi, no. 2 (2009).

[112] Irving Louis Horowitz, 'Zwischen der Charybdis des Kapitalismus und der Szylla des Kommunismus: Die Emigration deutscher Sozialwissenschaftler 1933-1945' in Ilja Srubar (ed), *Exil, Wissenschaft, Identität. Die Emigration deutscher Sozialwissenschaftler 1933-1945* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 56.

[113] Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The Decline of American Government' in *The New Republic*, December 16, 1957, 9.

[114] Karl Kränzle, 'Kissinger's politisches Vermächtnis. NZ-Interview mit dem amerikanischen Historiker Hans Morgenthau' in *Basler Nationalzeitung*, 1976 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, 1858-1981, Container 32). Shilliam adds that 'the psychological and political institutions that supported a multiplicity of truths … were … eroded from *within* American society' (Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, 196; emphasis in original).

[115] Stanley Hoffman, 'International Relations. The Long Road to Theory', *World Politics* xi, no. 2 (1959), 348.

[116] Devetak, *Critical International Theory*, 20.

[117] Sophia Rosenfeld, 'On Lying: Writing Philosophical History after the Enlightenment and after Arendt' in Joel Isaac, James T. Kloppenburg, Michael O'Brien, and Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen (eds), *The Worlds of American Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 220.

[118] Eva-Maria Ziege, *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie. Die Frankfurter Schule im amerikanischen Exil* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2009), 84.

[119] Cited in Bew, *Realpolitik*, 155.

[120] Hughes, *The Sea Change*, 31; Pachter, 'On Being an Exile', 49; Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, 214; Gerald Stourzh, 'Die deutschsprachige Emigration in den Vereinigten Staaten: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politische Wissenschaft', *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* x (1965), 60-1; Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, 'Alien Nation. Hannah Arendt, the German Émigrés and America', *European Journal of Political Theory* iii, no. 2 (2004), 170.

[121] Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, 1858-1981, Container 144.

[122] Cited in Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, 49; emphasis added.

[123] Radio Bremen, *Auszug des Geistes*, 52.

[124] Behr and Sigwart, 'Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics', 37.

[125] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Letter to Rosemary Galli*, January 3, 1969 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, 1858-1981, Container 24).

[126] Paul Tillich, 'Mind and Migration', *Social Research* iv, no. 1 (1937), 303.

[127] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, 13.

[128] Paul Tillich, 'Mind and Migration', 303.

[129] McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*.

[130] Ibid.

[131] For example, Amitav Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds', *International Studies Quarterly* lviii, no. 4 (2014); Pinar Bilgin, '"Contrapuntal Reading" as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR', *International Studies Review* xviii, no. 1 (2016); Julian Go and George Lawson (eds), *Global Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Felix Rösch and Atsuko Watanabe, 'Approaching the Unsynthesizable in International Politics: Giving Substance to Security Discourses through *basso ostinato*?', *European Journal of International Relations* xxiii, no. 3 (2017); Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit (eds), *The Globalization of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[132] McCourt, *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group*.

[133] Hoffmann, 'International Relations', 347-8.

[134] Holborn, 'History and the Humanities', 69.

[135] Hauptmann, 'The Ford Foundation'.

[136] For example, Herbert A. Strauss, Hans-Peter Kröner, Alfons Söllner, and Klaus Fischer, 'Wissenschaftstransfer durch Emigration nach 1933', *Historical Social Research* xiii, no. 1 (1988), 115; Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner (eds), *Forced Migration and Scientific Change. Émigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Antoon de Baets, 'Exile and Acculturation: Refugee Historians since the Second World War', *International History Review* xxviii, no. 2 (2006); Markus Lang, 'Vom Political Scholar zum Global Citizen? Perspektiven der Emigrationsforschung' in Frank Schale, Ellen Thümmler, and Michael Vollmer (eds), *Intellektuelle Emigration. Zur Aktualität eines historischen Phänomens* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 244.

[137] Philipp Ther, *Die Außenseiter. Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2017), 27.