

Collective pride, happiness, and celebratory emotions: aggregative, network, and cultural models

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In recent years, many instances of positive collective emotional manifestations of widely shared forms of pride, joy, and happiness have been reported in international media. Reactions to Obama's election victory in 2008 included pride, excitement, and euphoria amongst supporters within the USA and worldwide. In 2010, the successful rescue of trapped miners in Chile produced contrasting emotions of national pride within the country and transnational collective joy in the global audience following the drama. In Japan, the women's soccer team triumph in the 2011 FIFA World Cup produced widespread happiness only a few months after the nuclear disaster and devastating tsunami. In the Ivory Coast in April 2011, supporters of rebel Alassane Ouattara celebrated in the streets after the UN confirmed the capture and surrender of former President Gbagbo. Finally, 80% of the 1002 Britons (aged 16 years and over) surveyed about the 2012 Olympics felt that the "games has made people more proud to be British"—although 53% also agreed with the statement: "the effect will be short-lived" (BBC, 2012).

These instances of intense collective positive emotion represent only a brief list of events that require greater investigation, understanding, and explanation by an interdisciplinary combination of work from philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, political science, and social psychology. Although multiple perspectives can be taken toward the emotions that occur in groups, it is important to identify some common features. Even when groups (or subgroups) are ephemeral, collective emotion is felt by most members of the group. This demonstrates not only the means by which a group is identified by other groups and how group members conceive themselves, but also displays common group interests, values, and aims. It is useful to be aware of: (1) the wide variety of groups in which collective emotions can occur; (2) the degree of commitment, attachment, or identification involved; and (3) the types of collectives that afford collective emotions. Salmela (forthcoming) reminds us that collective emotions can occur on the basis of voluntary commitment to "teams, fan clubs, social clubs, bands and orchestras, theater ensembles, political parties, religious sects, as well as other identity groups that focus on gender, sexuality, health, environment, spirituality, or ethnicity." Furthermore, events affirming

a collective's success, status, prestige, or dominance can generate collective pride in local and transnational "social movements of all kinds, from progressive to reactionary, radical to conservative, identity-based to heterogeneous, diffuse to hierarchical" (Fominaya, 2010, p. 401).

For some groups, however, the notion that identity is a matter of choice is inconceivable and is, therefore, not simply a matter of their level of group identification. For example, when relations to a group are conceived in terms of "blood ties" rather than the contingencies of culture—as is the case for many Germans on the extreme right (Miller-Idriss, 2006)—the perceived absence of options can further strengthen the intensity of group triumphs and failures. Where a group's identity is based on the notion of a fixed and special, unique or elevated status, the predominant collective emotions are likely to be negative and narcissistic because maintaining dominance and status is paramount (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). In contrast, members of groups with social and geographical mobility as well as degree of identity pluralism may be less likely to feel intense collective emotions like group pride.

Collective pride includes, but should not to be equivocated with, collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) or a positive social identity because the latter phenomena are based primarily on what individuals feel on the basis of group affiliations. For example, people can take reflected glory from the achievements and attributes of groups with which they personally identify, are associated with through networks of relations, or with which they have an identifiable membership. These feelings can reveal much about structural relations of unequal status and power between groups, but for the moment collective pride is simply understood to occur at different levels, from family, institutional, organizational, and regional groups to ephemeral or established national and transnational communities. In the first part of the chapter, skeptical points about collective pride are confronted and differences are highlighted between this and other discrete collective positive emotions. In the second section, background issues such as structural features of collective pride, intergroup relations and historical considerations are explored in terms of aggregative, network and cultural models. In the third section, three examples of collective pride are examined: increased national pride in Germany during the 2010 World Cup, patriotic displays in the USA following September 11, 2001 (Collins, 2004; Skitka, 2005), and collective pride in "intractable conflicts" (Bar-Tal, 2007; Halperin, Chapter 19, this volume).

What is collective pride?

Collective pride is exemplified by the widespread positive emotion of a crowd celebrating a sporting or political triumph (i.e., occasions that people recall when something special or important occurred or was achieved which is taken by group members to "say something positive about us") and sensed by a person like a successful sports representative when he or she is the object of group pride and admiration. Each reader of this chapter can probably recall their own personal (rather than vicarious) experiences of group pride,

but it is perhaps instances of ambivalence, denial, emotional self-regulation or resistance with regard to these group feelings that are most relevant to the skeptical arguments we turn to now.

A first point of skepticism about the existence of any collective emotion—whether positive or negative, discrete or diffuse—is to note that there is no unified “thing” that could consciously experience such an affect. For instance, Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) briefly conjure and then summarily dismiss the picture of a societal “super-agent.” Combining a reference to Thomas Hobbes’s classic text of 1651 with an imagined extension of first-person psychological unity to a collective, they retort: “Those inclined to speak of collective emotions are not positing a self-conscious Leviathan” (p. 2). No “collective subject” is therefore needed to make sense of emotions that are genuinely collective (Salmela, 2012) but not necessarily reflexive in a manner analogous to individual self-evaluative emotion. Huebner (2011) expresses a similar skepticism about collective emotions but he still maintains: “some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states” (p. 89). The conclusion that can be drawn from these initial considerations is that “arguments for extended cognition. . . do not generalize to arguments for an extended conscious mind” (Clark, 2009, p. 472; see also Slaby, Chapter 3, this volume).

Extension of any representation of first-person uses of “pride” and “hubris” to first-person and third-person plural examples should occur only after careful investigation and conceptual qualification. When people express what “we” feel and talk about in relation to other people and “their” emotions, it is important to represent clearly the meaningfulness (or otherwise) and potential accountability of the relevant ascription and utterance. In this respect, ontologically dubious pictures of “super-agents” or “group mind” contrast with occasions when an emotion is the product of the interactions and relationships between members of a group focused on a particular object (although the range of objects of collective pride can, of course, be quite concrete physical instantiations or abstract and imagined). First-person plural expressions and third-person plural ascriptions reflect taken-for-granted linguistic and interactional constructions in daily life. Billig (1995), for example, emphasizes the repetitive flagging of nationality through deictic linguistic forms such as “we,” “us,” and “our,” noting that this banal nationalism is widespread, taken-for-granted and “not to be corralled into the sport pages or the banal clichés of vote-seeking politicians” (p. 11). Billig also considers whether occasions of strong emotion forge, sustain and thereby explain forms of collective identity in nation states. He suggests that on occasions when the state “celebrates itself. . . sentiments of patriotic emotions, which are the rest of the year have to be kept far from the business of ordinary life, can surge forth” (pp. 44–45). Billig clearly does not deny the existence of collective emotions, but he questions whether intense, widely-shared feelings are important to the everyday construction of group belonging, collective identity and dispositions to feel group-based emotions.

A second source of skepticism focuses on occasions when ascriptions of collective emotion are conceptually inappropriate. Analyzing examples of collective fear, Huebner

(2011) concludes that it is possible to extend “emotional states to other collectivities provided they have the right sort of organization” (p. 116). Huebner argues that the “computational systems governing the behavior of the collectivity” (p. 116) which are not evident when focusing on the individuals involved are necessary and sufficient for all collective emotions. Paraphrasing and extending Huebner, it seems reasonable to examine cases in which collectives are organized in ways that allow for specific forms of emotional representation; that is, to consider the specific forms of organization that define emotions such as collective pride and distinguish them, for example, from same-valence emotions such as collective happiness and opposite-valence emotions like collective shame. But do particular discrete collective positive emotions really exist? For example, an estimated one million people attended a parade of Japan’s 2012 Olympic gold medal winners in Tokyo—the first time this has happened—when they returned from the London games (*The Guardian*, 2012a). This could simply be a diffuse form of collective positivity or “effervescence” (Collins, 2004) even though it might be described in many other countries as national pride. Remarks such as “It delighted me how they lifted the spirits of the Japanese people. It was truly wonderful” (*The Guardian*, 2012a) further suggest that the crowd was happy and appreciative rather than proud of “our” achievement. It might appear that collective pride has not occurred if people do not organize themselves in ways that generate high levels of spontaneous positive expression (i.e., an intense collective self-related pride rather than a quiet satisfaction or appreciation) when they are together and close to the objects of their admiration. While the people in Tokyo may have experienced feelings of solidarity, enthusiasm, and agency from being part of the welcoming group, display rules against expressing national pride may have led to collective moderation of their emotions.

A third skeptical issue is whether people in such groups experience emotions of collective pride and solidarity that they would not otherwise feel. However, there is considerable anecdotal and empirical support for emotional contagion of positive emotion through social processes of emotional sharing (Rimé, 2007). People do feel more when they are physically co-present in a group rather than alone (Collins, 2004) and this is a structural feature of pride because group members can sense when their reactions to events coordinate with others to create group properties like noise level and their actions contribute to complex group behaviors such as chanting.

A fourth skeptical question is whether the history of a group really can affect the emotions of its members (Reysen & Branscombe, 2008). Collective pride often reflects a history of relations between groups and it can represent a group’s preoccupation with recognition by a significant collective “other.” Countries that organize mega-sport events, for example, often take particular collective pleasure in showing international critics that “we were able to host a successful event.” In order to avoid individualism and reductionism about collective emotion, it is important not to place too much emphasis on personal cognitions about a group’s history when explaining the organization that might distinguish collective pride from other positive group feelings because stories people share about supporting national sporting representatives together with group narratives can also shape both individual and group emotions (e.g., national narratives; Sullivan, 2009).

A fifth source of skepticism is whether group members can feel emotions for events they have not been directly involved in. With regard to collective pride, it is clear that people take pride in the achievements of other group members without any personal responsibility for the outcome. Miller-Idriss's (2006) qualitative research in Germany shows that ambivalence about national pride is still common and, for some Germans, sharing in a national triumph is tantamount to claiming personal responsibility for the outcome. In other countries, personal responsibility is not regarded as an appropriate reason for someone only to *feel happy for* rather than *proud of* group representatives. Often it is enough simply to want them to succeed to be able to share in their subsequent success without also feeling guilt. Of course, it is also possible for an individual to take a national success as grounds for widely shared nationalistic feelings and hubristic remarks such as "now we're back at the top where we belong." On this view, even genuine achievements that people celebrate might fuel subsequent group behavior and narratives of group superiority.

A final skeptical issue is whether collective pride is always positive. For example, Skey (2006) contrasts the notion of banal nationalism with what he tentatively describes as "ecstatic nationalism." Crucially, he is aware that there are celebrations which have a distinctly mixed flavor with some appearing to be aggressive, defiant, and based on superiority rather than merely being joyful, happy, and expressive of satisfaction. Collective pride may mark out a subgroup with a different national, ethnic, or political ideology, agenda, and interests. Skey's emphasis on making explicit the connections between culture and power therefore recognizes that "some ecstatic events may act as forces for disunity within a wider society, although they promote solidarity within a particular section of the population" (p. 152). Examples of questionable "ecstasy" include Americans celebrating the death of Osama bin Laden with chants of "U-S-A" outside the White House and "the Orangemen Parades that 'celebrate' Protestant hegemony in a divided Northern Ireland" (Skey, 2006, p. 152). The feel of different forms of positive collective emotion will be further explored in specific examples which include collective pride in conflict situations and in relation to collective shame.

Aggregative, network, and cultural models of collective pride

Having addressed skepticism about collective pride, it is important to examine different models of collective pride and similar emotions before analyzing specific examples of collective pride and collective hubris.

Aggregative models of collective pride

The aggregative model implies that collective pride has no properties additional to those emotions felt and displayed by individuals. Increases in a group's collective pride may therefore be judged on the basis of combined questionnaire responses to the items constituting measures of group-based feeling such as the Collective Self-Esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) or Collective Narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

The approach relies on statistical methods such as when averaged self-reports of national pride increase, but changes in emotional attitudes can be measured without capturing important features of collective emotion. For example, the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany changed norms regulating the display of national symbols and the relationship between German citizens and their nation, but these societal and cultural changes are not evident in the statistical data. Kersting (2007), for example, analyzed representative Social Survey Data gathered before, during, and after the World Cup and found, respectively, that before the 71% of Germans stated that they were “very proud” and “fairly proud,” during the two months of the 2006 World Cup this figure increased to 78% percent and in the post-World Cup period “only 72% had a strong feeling of national pride” (p. 283). Although Kersting correctly concluded that “this phenomenon can only be explained by the euphoria existing during the World Cup” (p. 283), he did not present a model or theoretical explanation of the collective emotions that the World Cup generated.

Statistically informed judgments of mean levels of subjective well-being for a group, combined self-report measures of individual patriotic and nationalistic attitudes or national levels of happiness are not collective pride. The aggregate model and its reliance on means self-report statistics risks misrepresenting internal relations between concepts such as collective pride, positive emotion, and communal well-being as external relations between measured variables of individual subjective well-being and pride felt in response to specific events (e.g., sporting success; Hallmann, Breuer, & Kühnreich, 2013).

Another issue with aggregate models is that group-based emotion can be experienced in isolation as the residual effects of social structures. For instance, a central feature of intergroup emotion theory (IET; Ray, Mackie, & Smith, Chapter 16, this volume; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007) is that “people who identify more strongly with a group should experience and express group emotions to a greater extent than weak identifiers, a prediction that is particularly clear for positive group emotions (e.g., happiness, pride)” (p. 432). Smith and colleagues (2007) claim that feeling positive emotion will result in people showing “stronger biases favoring the ingroup over the outgroup” (p. 433). However, their further argument that “group pride motivates people to approach other ingroup members or to increase their level of identification with the group” (p. 433) hints at forms of social organization and action tendencies specific to collective pride such as the impulses to evoke stories of previous triumphs and to celebrate at sites of national significance. Accordingly, focusing on aggregates of individual properties fails to address crucial features of context and background. Dispositions to sense and share in collective emotions that result from participation in community life do not arise only from a psychological process of identification. For example, someone in a crowd may experience solidarity and positive emotion because they share the crowd’s goals or values, but they may not fully share the intensity and nuances of the crowd’s emotions because their background is different. This person would lack sensitivity to moments of significance for the crowd and would not be able to coordinate all of their spontaneous responses with them because they were not brought up with similar embodied values, shared memories and repertoires of specific cultural knowledge.

Network models of collective pride

Network approaches to emotions in groups and as properties of group organization are highlighted by Fowler and Christakis's (2008) happiness research. The connections between people can be examined (i.e., direct and indirect relationships) and network models can include geographical or temporal constraints on the spread of happiness through a social network. The spread of emotion between people and across geographical areas indicates the type of organization needed for collective emotion which includes social sharing of emotion (Rimé, 2007), emotional contagion/entrainment and the coordination of affective expressions and displays (Collins, 2004). Network models undermines the sharp distinction between group-based emotions and collective emotions that is usually maintained by picturing individuals experiencing these emotions in isolation. Focusing on the individual in the foreground ignores features of interactions, assembly, and background context that afford and sustain a sense of a widely shared feeling.

The manner in which group-based emotions are expressed and talked about with others is important to accounts of collective emotion because, as Rimé (2007) notes, emotions are often re-experienced and more intense when they are shared (i.e., expressed to and discussed with others; see also Paez & Rimé, Chapter 14, this volume). Emphasizing interactions addresses inherent weaknesses of the aggregate model and is closer to what Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) describe as a network model of collective emotion in which "the relations between some nodes must be such as to produce characteristic responses in other nodes when confronted by certain actions, events, or states of affairs" (pp. 9–10). Using a network model, manifestations and distributions of pride (or happiness) in a community can still be considered in individual and aggregate terms even when the object is collective, but emergent network properties are emphasized (see also van der Löwe & Parkinson, Chapter 9, this volume). An additional feature of some network approaches is that an emotional atmosphere or climate that has an objective existence can be seen in the interactions between people, the symbols people display and the narratives that incorporate symbolic and other cultural resources.

A network model of collective emotion incorporates emotional heterogeneity and coordination. Collective pride might be ascribed to a group if "these responses will involve a significant percentage of persons who make up the collective experiencing affects of a particular sort" (Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012, p. 10) *and* there is relatively limited resistance by individuals or groups to the resulting emotional climate. A good example is the widespread interest, excitement, and pride that typically occurs in host countries during mega-sport events; namely, a positive mood which develops despite some protests, criticisms, and misgivings. People can, of course, experience interpersonal dilemmas when resisting or challenging a positive climate and such resistance can affect a group's balance between solidarity and alienation (Scheff, 2007).

It can also be difficult to avoid what Collins (2004) calls the common object of attention on these occasions. During the 2012 Olympics, for instance, residents of the UK living outside London found it difficult to avoid the media exposure to victories by "Team GB." Moreover, efforts to engage the public such as the Olympic Torch relay attracted large,

enthusiastic crowds and the routes were chosen to maximize interest in areas of the UK not directly involved in hosting teams or events and without any local representative competing in the games.

When people focus on a common object or complex events their attention is sustained and the potential source of pride is typically experienced in what Salmela (2012) calls a “we” rather than an “I” mode of engagement (or emotional entrainment; Collins, 2004). In the case of collective pride, the whole group would be expected to react in similar ways to events that have an impact on the shared focus of attention or, more specifically, a particular desired outcome. If in the group individual modes of relating to the event predominate, less coordination of peak experiences of positive emotion would probably occur. However, relating to an event predominantly in we-mode need not preclude individual emotional heterogeneity. When reacting to significant positive national events (e.g., winning a bid to host a mega-sport event), individual reactions include excitement, happiness, joy, euphoria, or pride. However, the group’s reactions would be expected to be more homogeneous with collective pride because the prevalence of national symbols and the readiness with which people can evoke national narratives implies group solidarity, unity, and continuity.

Cultural models of collective pride

A network model of collective pride might appear to be most appropriate because complex cultural objects such as images, films, texts, documents, symbols, and structures are included as collective emotion “nodes” (Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012). However, the example of a crowd watching an important national football team game can help to expose the limitations of a network account. For instance, when the team wins we can tell by looking at each member of the crowd that they all enjoy the victory (aggregative model), that they tend to celebrate with others in interaction rituals (network model), but they also adopt similar postures, gestures, expressive forms, and practices which draw upon an appropriate cultural repertoire (cultural model). In addition, crowds have irreducible group-level properties which include noise, social activity, spatial dispersal (e.g., going to and occupying sites with symbolic significance to continue celebrations), and economic effects (e.g., increased spending, confidence in the national economy, etc.).

There are further advantages to adopting a cultural model of collective pride in combination with some features of network models. For example, while features of interaction ritual theory (IRT; Collins, 2004) were mentioned in relation to network models, IRT also demonstrates how complex practical, material, symbolic, and interactional arrangements generate patterns of a collective emotion (i.e., including features of spread and duration). However, there are still points where the model can be improved and Collins (2012) has added an important element to IRT which is directly relevant to collective pride: the inability to predict the outcome of some rituals. Specifically, the analysis of “time-bubbles of nationalism” contrasts with earlier examples of sporting competitions in which the crowd experience appears to be an end in itself for ritual participants. The feature connecting football games, political contests, and some group conflicts therefore is

the unpredictability of the outcome and this contributes to the mixture of emotions that a group experiences (e.g., of joy, satisfaction, pride, euphoria, relief that might “average out” if we consider only valence and include negative emotions such as frustration or boredom). Collins (2012) describes the typical experience as a “three-month solidarity-and-hysteria zone” (p. 4) and emphasizes that the heightened experience of such events is felt (from the inside) to be “qualitatively different from ordinary life outside” (p. 4).

Although mega-sport events, national days, and other planned or foreseeable events can produce positive collective emotions, it is the unpredictability of some group-related outcomes that explains why “such moments in time have the emotion character of high drama; both tragic and joyous surprise” (p. 4). In situations of competition or conflict with another group, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be what the group desires. Collins also argues that the “length of the high plateau” of mass solidarity is dependent on the “degree of state penetration” (p. 4) such that nations “where symbolic mobilisation is easily perceived throughout the society, sustain plateaus of national solidarity in the three-month range; but societies that are more fragmented and less state-penetrated sustain the plateau for a month or less” (p. 4). This topic deserves more attention along with the proposal that there is a refractory period in which the collective emotion dissipates and “people cannot experience the same intensity again for some time; they necessarily have to come down” (p. 4). Such dynamic fluctuations in collective pride are not considered in aggregate models of collective emotion, except perhaps as negative correlations between group-based pride and group-based shame. For example, research by van Hilvoorde, Elling, and Stokvis (2010) on national pride, national shame, and sporting events suggests that the results of the Dutch men’s football team in the 2008 European Football Championship “which were above expectation, may have affected, or maybe triggered national feelings of pride and temporarily suppressed feelings of shame” (p. 96; an issue of the relations between collective pride and collective shame which was examined in the section on “Network models of collective pride” but which is also explored in relation to collective hubris in the last section).

Culturally available forms of national narratives (Hallmann et al., 2013; Sullivan, 2009) shape communication and expression of group achievements at both the micro and broadest macro levels. Adopting an alternative might be regarded as repressing any acknowledgement of a “we” mode of relating to an event or contributing to social disintegration. A further possibility is that some of the effects of collective emotion may be beyond conscious awareness such as an unknown desire for national “subgroups” to unite. The character of collective emotional events and their consequences evoke phenomenological concepts which do not appear to be emergent properties of a network. What “it is like” to experience a climate of collective pride can include coterminous feelings of solidarity. A further phenomenological feature of collective pride often includes a sense that the status of “our group” is elevated in the eyes of other competing groups. People sense that the focus or gaze of other groups is positive, approving, and perhaps even envious; although the latter example might indicate a widespread enjoyment of the high status of one’s group or confidence that seems more like arrogance. In this respect, the

character of authentic collective pride is often distinct from genuinely collective hubris (i.e., as a group-level rather than group-based emotion). One indication that collective pride is based on grounds that can be described as authentic (i.e., justified, reasonable) is that the reactions of other groups embody their judgment that the performance or outcome is special and desirable. In contrast, with collective hubris the reported feelings are self-assertive but often in defiance of or without any consideration of the views and interests of other groups. As Scheff (1994) has noted, experiences of collective arrogance or hubris at the level of national groups can be angry, negative, inconsiderate, lacking empathy, and even violent in a manner that has a basis in prior, usually unacknowledged, collective shame. However, it is an open question whether what is described here as collective hubris might be better categorized as collective narcissism. Nevertheless, if this nascent account is correct, there is no simple continuum from joy (with an unacknowledged or suppressed sense of the elevation of one's group) and more boisterous, arrogant or jingoistic claims (i.e., temporary celebrations of superiority, triumph or victory) to extremes of collective hubris, rather there are dynamic relations between collective forms of pride, shame, guilt, and anger. Furthermore, authenticity itself needs to be elaborated with regard to complex normative, ideological, and political issues—such as whether a group should feel and express pride on the basis of the achievements of most of the group, subgroups, or group representatives—and must consider whether relations with imagined or real other groups reflect equal competition, unequal dominance or intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Toward an interdisciplinary theory of collective pride and collective hubris

In the three contexts of group achievement, intergroup competition, and intractable conflict, collective pride and collective hubris are likely to be displayed. It is unclear, however, the extent to which collective pride and collective hubris are to be regarded as different forms of the same “object.” Drawing upon the case of individual authentic pride and hubristic pride, although the idea that there are two types of pride has received widespread acceptance there are also good reasons for dissent. A range of transgressions may lead to instances of ostensibly legitimate individual pride being used to characterize an individual's emotions as anger and defiance or to ascribe an arrogant, domineering character. Moreover, as Scheff indicates, what we might call collective pride due to the contexts in which it occurs may actually be collective anger, revenge, or a focus on dominance and status as a special group that has little to do with celebratory positive collective emotion. Accordingly, it is important to extend the caution about the “two facets-one thing” view of individual pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007) to collective pride by examining specific cases and their contexts.

As previously noted, the prototype of an event that has a clear emotional effect on a group is often one in which there is a positive outcome for most group members even when variations in membership, commitment and context are taken into account. Candidates

for these types of events include winning and successfully hosting international sporting competitions, election victories, praise from other important groups, and collective actions that result in social and political changes. Drawing carefully upon approaches to individual pride, it seems reasonable to assume that collective pride will occur when a group's standards, rules and goals are reached (e.g., for the first time) or exceeded. In contrast, maintaining standards, rules, or goals suggests refusal to accept anything (e.g., performance) below this level or it may set up unrealistic expectations (e.g., of further international success). The goals might be realistically expected to be short term although long-term commitments are also possible (i.e., instantiated across generations). For example, large nation-building projects can become sources of pride and symbols of national progress; social changes may similarly reflect the values and aspirations of a large group. Some of the outcomes that generate collective emotion may also be conceptualized in connection with dreams or desires because no group member may seriously believe that they will happen—when they do euphoria and disbelief are widespread. For example, the election of a black president in the USA seemed unlikely until Barack Obama's victory in 2008. Collective pride here includes the possibilities of relatively quiet satisfaction, happy celebrations that incorporate group symbols, and occasions of collective ecstasy and euphoria.

While collective celebrations are mostly positive when a group achieves a desired status through the variety of means available to them (e.g., international achievements), collective celebrations can change rapidly reflecting the complex situational dynamics between groups such as supporters and police. For example, after the football team Atletico Madrid's victory in the 2012 Europa League final, many fans rioted because police prevented them from celebrating at the city's Neptuno fountain. Although alcohol may have played a role it still appears that collective positive emotions were "converted" into anger when supporters perceived the police action as an affront to their collective identity. One fan noted: "What we cannot allow is that after a team from the capital, from Madrid won a European title, we are treated almost as terrorists or criminals" (*The Guardian*, 2012b). As suggested by Salmela (personal communication, January 21, 2012), it is important to note that their collective identity as Atletico fans may also be constituted by their rivalry with Real Madrid so that, on this occasion, having finally reached a similar "title-winning" status, police action to prevent them celebrating as their rivals had previously was humiliating and unbearable. Instances of group celebrations that are antisocial and can be described as collective hubris or arrogance might therefore be transgressive only immediately following a victory. At that point, any collective anger or outrage will replace rather than extend positive collective pride. Thus an abrupt transformation from celebratory mood (with some forms of exuberant or provocative celebration which are tolerated due to the exceptional nature of the achievement) to angry protest might only occur because a reaction to the celebration by another group evokes unacknowledged feelings of shame and humiliation (Scheff, 1994, 2007).

A further example of the complex relationship between collective pride and collective shame concerns Germany's success as a host of and competitor in the 2006 World Cup

which transformed the German public's relationship to their country. Prior to 2006, the phrase "I'm proud to be German" was closely associated with right-wing values and displaying national pride was taboo (i.e., internalized as profound discomfort in displaying a flag or verbally expressing pride). Although some older television viewers were disturbed by images of large groups of Germans waving flags during the World Cup (Sullivan, 2009), a form of relaxed and inclusive "party patriotism" was widespread that bore no resemblance to the emotional atmosphere and extremes of nationalism during the Nazi era. This is not to deny that collective hubris in the form of devaluation of others, exercising strength and power over others, or taking revenge against competing groups might all be enjoyed in some manner and even be fed by instances of positive collective pride; nevertheless, they are unlikely to occur without suppressing genuinely mixed collective emotions and cutting off collective shame (e.g., of the sort that occurs when a country is excluded by others).

In conflict situations, collective pride can be linked to prejudice and violence. In the context of the political struggles of the Arab Spring in 2011, Collins (2012) notes that "it is within such three-month bubbles of extreme collective attention upon a common identity and a shared danger that both precipitous ventures and violent atrocities are most likely to happen" (p. 4). It is for these reasons that collective pride continues to be linked to increases in prejudice and possibilities of hostility toward any group that opposes the group's ambitions and interests. These cognitive and emotional features of collective pride are important because even positive and ostensibly inclusive celebrations of group achievements can reduce empathy for competing groups and encourage antisocial behavior. Other cases of pride may focus on narratives of restoration of group status in competitive situations (i.e., here group or national narratives may be more about maintaining certain values or a privileged status).

Examining collective pride in conflicts illustrates further complex group relations and background features of *collective emotional orientations* (Bar-Tal, 2007) "such as fear, hatred, or anger, [which] together with collective pride, increase affiliation, solidarity, and cohesiveness among society members in view of the threat to individuals and to society at large" (p. 1442, brackets added). Bar-Tal summarizes the way in which solidarity and unity combine with other rhetorical and emotional strategies: "by justifying the goals of the conflict and focusing on delegitimization, and the intransigence and violence of the opponent, as well as on being a victim, fear, hatred, and anger, the infrastructure implies the necessity to exert all the efforts and resources of the society in the struggle against the enemy" (p. 1442). In such contexts, patriotism is a discursive variation on collective pride because it is connected with cultural practices of recognition (rather than celebration in the positive emotional sense) of heroic or selfless sacrifice in rituals of loss and remembrance. Collective pride is felt more in connection with the quiet recognition and celebration of characteristics that register persistence, determination, and survival rather than anything like joy or feelings of triumph.

Although genuinely positive collective pride can occur in conflict situations, in many instances the phenomenology of symbolic and rhetorical evocations of pride (e.g.,

through flags and speeches) is not positive. An example of non-paradigmatic, negative, and assertive or defiant forms of collective pride include displays of national pride and symbol solidarity in the USA following September 11, 2001 (Collins, 2004; Skitka, 2005) because these are self-assertive and display support for national interests but are not necessarily positive in valence. Accounting for flag displays on the grounds that “We love our country” can still be done in a manner that is defiant rather than celebratory (e.g., much like displaying a national flag at a famous person’s funeral can convey meaning about their status to the nation but does not necessarily express a positive emotion). Increased displays of the Stars and Stripes in America after the September 11 World Trade Centre attacks were collective responses, however the shared feeling at the time was clearly not celebratory and positive. Thus, even if a person attests that they acted on the basis of patriotism or nationalism rather than anger and hostility toward an “outgroup,” the action tendency was not to celebrate and the phenomenology was not pleasure or enjoyment.

If collective pride in a context of intractable conflict is exemplified by Bar-Tal’s analysis of Israel, Pettigrove and Parson’s (2012) analysis of a role for collective pride provides a very different account from the Palestinian perspective. They describe how constructions of collective pride are a key part of the collective emotional orientation to the conflict with Israel. For example, a 1973 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) document notes: “To declare Palestinian identity no longer means that one is a ‘refugee’ or second-class citizen. Rather, it is a declaration that arouses pride, because the Palestinian has become the *fida’i* or revolutionary who bears arms” (as cited in Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012). Further nodes in a network of collective emotion for Palestinians include documents, museum exhibitions, commemorations, and public spaces which demonstrate the value of collective pride as the motivation to restore a genuinely collective self-esteem and to redress the effects of collective shame created by submitting to such humiliating objects “as refugee camps, checkpoints, and the separation barrier” (p. 22). Such variations are crucial to the type of cultural account advocated here which requires that the discrete emotion of collective pride and contrasting instances of collective hubris are always seen in dynamic relation to context and a potential cultural background of collective shame.

Conclusion

Collective pride is a predominantly positive and celebratory emotion that occurs in groups such as nations in response to a range of activities, projects, and practices. Aggregative, network, and cultural models were examined with a preference expressed for a form of IRT that could be used to understand the similarities and differences between feelings and manifestations of collective pride and collective hubris in contexts of group achievement, group competition, and intractable conflict. Development of an interdisciplinary theory of collective pride and collective hubris therefore requires the inclusion of collective anger and collective shame as well as recognition that collective hubris has unique emotional contours.

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