'Use' Them or 'Lose' Them: Engaging Liberia's Disconnected Youth through Socio-political Integration

CHRISTOPHER MACLAY and ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM

_____

The war that ravaged Liberia between 1989 and 2003 had myriad causes and belligerents, but there can be little question of the demographic cohort which provided the manpower' for the war machine: youth. In particular, young, disconnected Liberians became easy recruits to the conflict's warring factions, as they sought a sense of importance and independence away from the cultural background that marginalized them. Building on qualitative field research in Liberia, this article bridges its primary case study with theory and secondary data, to examine the threat of post-war re-marginalization and disengagement of youth in the country. The article argues that economic reintegration programmes have not addressed issues of youth empowerment directly enough, and that targeted political and social engagement strategies from a vertical and horizontal integration perspective would be more effective in the re-engagement of youth in civilian life.

_____

'Liberia is in danger of losing a generation of young people.' This statement was heard throughout the country's 14-year civil conflict (1989–2003), but is worryingly still heard today, as post-war recovery efforts have largely failed to truly engage this demographic cohort in social and political life. This article investigates the nature of this danger, how

it has happened, and what the potential solutions may be. Using data from a two months' qualitative field research (March–May 2009), the article presents the status of youth marginalization, integration and engagement.

The field research was conducted in 47 communities and towns in six of Liberia's 15 counties, including Monserrado (the country's most wealthy and populous county), Bong (one of the most war-affected regions), Sinoe (one of the remotest) and rural Gbarpolu (Liberia's newest and also one of its poorest counties). Through a partnership with the international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Mercy Corps, the field research involved interviews and focus group discussions with 249 young people and 96 elders across the country.[1] While many of these interviews were centred around Mercy Corps programming and will not directly be cited, the indirect nature of questioning allowed for a clearer picture of the context to be developed, and were pivotal to the development of this discourse. This research was supplemented by interviews conducted at the national and local level with key 'stakeholders' in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, some of the research's most valuable lessons were found in informal environments such as on the football field, where natural discussion built upon familiar relationships to enable subtle but significant nuances behind the responses to be uncovered.

Overall, the article argues that many of Liberia's young people are disconnected from broader society, and in some cases are being actively marginalized. Further, although young people are essentially searching for a greater sense of importance, the economic empowerment and reintegration programmes which the international community have been pushing are failing to provide this. In order to respond to this challenge, from a vertical and horizontal integration perspective the article explores the possibility of socio-political engagement of youth in civilian life. Finally, it investigates how the ultimate goal of giving young people a degree of social importance can be targeted effectively.

Youth and Violence in Liberia

The term 'youth' is an ambiguous one. In Liberia, youth is commonly defined by the government chronologically, to denote any individual aged 15 to 35. Others have ventured alternative, and at times contradictory, definitions of what it means to be a 'youth', often based on functional characteristics or the local cultural context, such as participation in traditional rites of passage ceremonies.[2] The importance of such ceremonial initiations into traditional societies in Liberia was highlighted by anthropologist George Harley as early as 1941:

> No boy or young man is considered a member of the tribe unless he has been initiated by suitable rites into the company of his elders. The adolescent must undergo certain ordeals to prove that he is ready and worthy to take on the responsibilities of citizenship – until then he does not count.[3]

This is not only the case for boys. Many Liberian girls 'do not count' until they have been initiated into traditional *Sande* societies, the female equivalent of the *Poro* societies Harley spoke of. Until then, they may be denied the opportunity of marriage, as well as other steps considered valuable to the individuals' social development. It is also Harley's turn of phrase that will provide the basis of this article's definition of youth: a period when the individual 'does not count'. Our definition therefore represents a social status more than an age bracket; a status with connotations of marginality, when the individual boy or girl is not yet accepted by others as an adult.

Youth participation in Liberia's conflict was largely fuelled by this marginalized status, and by a disconnection from broader society. Young people in Liberia have typically had little independence or agency over their own lives, and even less influence in the community around them. They were traditionally under almost complete control of their elders until they graduated into 'adulthood'. Many young people did not achieve this transition until they were well into their thirties. Dissatisfied with their enduring 'immaturity', many young people used the opportunity of war to escape from their repressive traditional surroundings and seek some sense of independence and

personal emancipation.[4] As one ex-combatant explained: '[The war was] all because of dissatisfaction. Because those men have been marginalised and abused… at the end of the day, any man can come along and say, "we have a mission".'[5] Youth participation was therefore shaped more by opportunity than by bloodthirsty motivation.[6]

This marginalization-fuelled participation was further encouraged by disconnection from society – those individuals with least responsibility to, or acceptance from, others were most likely to see war as a viable option, as their violent actions did not bring condemnation from anyone they felt 'mattered'. As in Sierra Leone, young Liberians were even specifically targeted for this reason, as they were deemed the demographic element most 'detachable' from the existing structures of the state and civil society.[7] As a long and chaotic conflict in which soldiers frequently changed sides, accurate data detailing the demography of the war's participants at any given time is unavailable.[8] However, studies of Liberia's ex-combatant population, and countless personal accounts from the war's belligerents, victims and bystanders, lead us to the common but nevertheless disheartening inference that the war was fought mainly by youth. While the mean age of the 102,193 combatants who registered in the Liberia's formal disarmament process was an only marginally youthful 25.3,[9] this cohort included some 11,353 children, the youngest of whom were only seven years old.[10] Child fighters were recruited by all protagonist groups, including President Charles Taylor's 'Small Boys Unit', and constituted as much as 37 per cent of some factions' armies.[11]

Many of these individuals took part in Liberia's formal Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programmes, implemented by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the National Transitional Government of Liberia. DDR processes as far as they are conceptualized by the international community, intend to provide opportunities for former combatants to go through an 'identity' transformation process so that they can move from the 'norms' of fighting to civilian life. Each phase of DDR has its own critical challenges, and impacts on each other, and considering that DDR is often planned and implemented in terms of a linear process, the goal and activities of 'reintegration' do not go any further than an aspiration of 'reinsertion' into society. In most DDR cases, the reintegration element seems to be an elusive objective, which is largely due to limited funds available for such a huge task. Of

the initial US $13.5 million that had been budgeted by UNDP for the DDRR Trust Fund in Liberia, for instance, $10.2 million was spent on the first two phases of the process.[12] This well-documented funding shortfall left minimal funds available for formal reintegration activities, which Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem define as, 'the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities.'[13] In fact, only 42,395 former soldiers took part in reintegration programmes, accounting for less than half of those who were formally disarmed.[14]

Arguably, an even more significant failure of many DDR programmes is that the critical question of 'reintegration into what' is never asked.[15] War has a huge impact on society's structure, and DDR programmes must respond dynamically to this. Most relevantly, armed conflicts can 'loosen the reins of society over youth' as they 'redefine their own societal roles.'[16] In other words, through war, young people gain new experiences of independence as fighters or from enhanced societal and household roles. Women in particular (who accounted for as much as 22 per cent of total participants in formal disarmament[17]) are often afforded significantly smaller societal roles after conflict. As one female fighter explained to Irma Specht: 'We first were fighting men with our guns, now we have given up our guns, but we still have to fight men.'[18] A senior politician from the Liberian Ministry of Youth and Sports recognized that the power structure had 'radically changed,'[19] though many elders were refusing to recognize this. Failure to accept changes in social structure can be problematic. A 2008 conflict mapping exercise made clear that unless practical strategies for youth participation in social and institutional arrangements were prioritized, there remained a 'strong likelihood' of a reversion to violence, and that '[t]he "genie" of Liberian youth will not, willingly, be put "back in the bottle".'[20]

Our field research indicates that young people in Liberia are, in many cases, being forced back to their pre-war traditional roles. Whether this will result in youth participating in future conflicts is a speculative issue. However, a study for the US Institute of Peace (USIP) found that about a third of urban and rural ex-combatants said they could envisage a reason to fight again.[21] It is also important to remember that often it only requires a minority to start a war. Taylor's rebel incursion into Liberia in 1989 was

started with only 168 people.[22] Another worrying aspect is that many young people continue to see violence as the only 'bargaining chip' that works. One senior politician explained that the drafting of the 2005 National Youth Policy was only pushed forward after youth riots in Monrovia in 2004. He also observed that police station burnings across the country provides further evidence that youth are willing to use violence in order to be listened to.[23]

Liberia's Young People – are they Disconnected?

War had a huge effect on Liberia's young people. A combination of violence, displacement, and chaos provided youth with a perverse upbringing, and removed many of them from typical civilian life. As the previous section highlighted, disconnection is closely related to marginalization, which in turn encourages recruitment. A UN Population Fund (UNPFA) study conducted among nearly 7,000 Liberian households found that those most disconnected and vulnerable were less likely to seek out social services and have peer support, leaving them susceptible to other, less favourable, influences.[24] One member of the Margibi Youth Secretariat explained the difficulty of many young Liberians in engaging with any element of post-war civilian society: 'If I was born in the 1980s, what kind of experience do I have? All I have is AK-47 experience.'[25] Many young people, particularly ex-combatants, continue to feel distanced from society, and having lacked everything from family support to school and extra-curricular activities, they remain angry and frustrated with what civilian society has to offer.
It is well established in the literature that uniting former child soldiers with family is seen as the best way to guarantee reintegration.[26] Surveys of ex-combatants in Liberia have suggested that good relationships with the family would prevent a return to conflict.[27] Parenthood has also proved to be important in connecting former combatants with civilian life. The USIP study suggested that more women in particular would consider rejoining armed groups if they did not have to care for families. Similarly, a former fighter now living in Monrovia, explained: 'I was 17 when I joined the rebel group. Now I am a grown man with children. Why would I listen to [a potential recruiter] when I can hear my daughter at home crying?'[28]

While some new relationships, like marriage, can be built after conflict, ironically family is also one of the greatest casualties of war. In 2008 as many as 31.4 per cent of girls aged 10–15 and 29.9 per cent of boys in Liberia still had neither parent in the household.[29] While James Pugel's 2007 *What the Fighters Say* survey showed family social networks to be important to ex-combatants across the board, they are often removed in conflict through displacement. Over half of the population was displaced at some point during the war, and Pugel's ex-combatant study found that 42 per cent of respondents had not returned to their home communities since the war. For the particularly poorly-integrated group – the non-DDRR participants – the figure was 56 per cent. An extensive literature examines rural combatants staying in urban areas after war. In Liberia 60 per cent of Monrovia-based ex-combatants have never returned to their home communities.[30] One former fighter from outside Monrovia who, like thousands of others, stayed in the capital at the end of the war explained the impact of displacement on his disconnection from local society, even to the extent that he was no longer a citizen: 'In our different counties we have family. We have our business. We have our home. That's what makes us citizens… here we have nothing.'[31]

Life without family and peer support can exaggerate a sense of marginalization, and will also remove the positive elements of peer pressure such as the condemnation of violent action. While most ex-combatants surveyed by Pugel felt that they did not have any problems of acceptance, only 66 per cent believed that their communities perceived the general population of ex-combatants favourably. In particular, those former combatants who never took part in DDRR programmes (classified by Pugel as the 'hard core' fighters), were the most cautious; 46 per cent believed that their communities were 'watchful or distrustful' and over 10 per cent believed community members saw them 'with fear.'[32] One former fighter explained the impact of this social distance: 'It's hard to trust anyone… people don't see us (ex-combatants) as good people in society.'[33]

While this is typically seen as an issue affecting ex-combatants, one member of the Bong Youth Secretariat was keen to point out that this disconnection affects all varieties of youth who were unable to engage with normal social institutions, like school, during the war; 'We are all war-affected youth,' he explained.[34] As the war came to an

end in 2003, almost 60 per cent of females and 40 per cent of males had never been to school,[35] including 68 per cent of 15–20 year-olds.[36] This disconnection is closely related to marginalization, as those pushed to the margins may either involuntarily become disconnected, or consciously remove themselves from the society they feel to be marginalizing them. The second of these proved to be particularly relevant to ex-combatants in Liberia, who were very conscious of their insignificance in society. Another former fighter living in the outskirts of Monrovia, explained, 'I don't see no concern for us.' The day before this interview he and other amputees had buried another former combatant in a bag because no-one would take him away. He did not want to die like that.[37] This accorded with a view expressed by the founder of the National Ex-combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI), also an ex-combatant. He explained that former fighters often do not feel like a part of broader society because they feel they have nothing to offer other people.[38]

While individual agency and participation in decision making can help young people feel important and engaged in society, the next section examines the extent to which many young people feel marginalized. Beforehand, however, it is important to introduce two primary concepts used here for the analysis of youth's role in the post-conflict context: horizontal and vertical integration. While extensive literature has examined the concepts of horizontal and vertical social capital to understand community cohesion,[39] in this article the terms 'horizontal and vertical integration' are used to describe the individual's level of engagement within these (usually invisible) societal characteristics. Horizontal integration therefore is best recognized through friendships, engagement in associations, and interconnectedness. Vertical integration involves the engagement of the individual in the more visible vertical institutions of social capital such as decision-making, both at community and national level. The horizontally and vertically integrated individual finds true citizenship within civilian society, and through this acceptance becomes one of its 'joiners', helping to 'tighten' the social fabric, and in doing so building social capital.[40] It can be argued that if either horizontal or vertical integration are missing, the individual may find his or her identity outside of the realm of civilian society. This is likely to be reflected by his or her choice of actions, which may work outside of or even against the civilian institutions which form that society.

Missing the Point: The Failure of Economic Reintegration Programmes

The need to deal with the 'youth problem' in Liberia is being recognized. Liberia's *Poverty Reduction Strategy* acknowledges youth as one of the six crucial areas for attention, and much of the DDRR Trust Fund has been spent on youth. While there are exceptions, the vast majority of the money that materialized was spent on economic reintegration. Justification for the importance of jobs after war has been well-documented in the literature and will not be examine in-depth here. [41] Nor will this section attempt to evaluate all of Liberia's economic reintegration programmes, as their successes and failures have been extensively appraised elsewhere.[42] Rather, the point is that an exclusive focus on economic reintegration strategies is misguided. The World Bank's *World Development Report 2007* recognizes that in countries such as Liberia, as many as 10 per cent of the male working-age population will go through such programmes. Given their size and reach, then, it is crucial that they are tied in with broader development goals.[43]

Former combatants interviewed across the country almost universally explained that they wanted a job more than anything else. A troubled ex-combatant in his early 20s from Lexington, Sinoe County, had never returned to his home county of Nimba after the war, and finding a job was his first priority. However, after speaking for a while, he was asked: 'But why do you want a job?' While one might have expected him to highlight the importance of money and material wealth, he replied, 'To be someone in the future.'[44] This response was echoed by young people interviewed across the country – 'to be someone'. Employment is not just a means to subsistence or wealth, but has a much more important role in providing status. The 'goal' is not the job, but what it entails – status as well as money.

It is no original proposition that young people see gaining skills as more than just economics but about finding a place in society.[45] It has also been acknowledged in research on Liberia; Steve Archibald and Edward Mulbah suggest that, '[h]aving a sustainable livelihood is to have a stake in society and to have a means whereby a young person can measure his or her social worth.'[46] A 2005 report prepared for the UN

Children's Fund (UNICEF) suggests that the low absorption capacity of local economies was one of the main causes of the non-sustainability and failure of the post-1997 demobilization process. It also said 'no miracles' should be expected from the Liberian labour market in the near future.[47] In 2008, 72 per cent of the 1,400 ex-combatants who participated in one survey identified themselves as unemployed.[48]

Decimated post-war economies are ill-equipped to absorb new workers, however skilled or unskilled they may be. This denies social worth as well as income. In fact a sense of social worth may deteriorate further as expectations are unfulfilled (over 90 per cent of ex-combatants who participated in reintegration training believed that the training they received would ensure their sustainability for many years to come[49]). One ex-combatant living in central Monrovia explained that, for most ex-combatants, the UN's skill training reintegration programme had provided little alternative to the combatant lifestyle: 'The programme was fine, but after the programme, what was the impact so that they don't go back to where they were before?'[50] Mats Utas contends that, '[e]ducating youth in skills for which they find no use only forges a class of educated, but disgruntled youth, again deceived by the world.'[51]

This is not even to mention the huge costs associated with skill training exercises. An International Labour Organization (ILO/IPEC) report estimated the costs of training packages for former child fighters to be between US$1,200 and US$ 4,100 per trainee.[52] A better proposition may be to arrive at the goal of social worth through an alternative, and more direct, route. If youth participation in conflict was a means of 'strategic upward mobility aiming at obtaining respect and status,'[53] programming could target this issue of respect and status more directly. Hill, Taylor, and Temin's *Would You Fight Again?* survey concluded that there is a need to improve the 'soft side' of DDRR programmes, as reconciliation processes and efforts to repair relations between ex-combatants and their families and communities could produce greater returns than economic agendas.[54] Similarly, inclusion within decision-making frameworks can go a long way to creating a sense of importance, as well as ensuring that real needs are responded to.

This is not to say that economic capacity building programmes have no role in reintegration activities; they can be vital for the normalization of life, easing societal

reintegration and increasing social interactions. The emphasis here is that job creation programmes cannot do everything. A 2009 investigation found that they have had minimal impact in Liberia,[55] and they may have allowed issues vital to community cohesion such as youth marginalization to be overlooked. Reintegration is a, 'continuous, long-term process',[56] and more attention should be paid to potential transformation efforts than short-term, 'expedient' training programmes.

Vertical Integration

Krishna Kumar referred to some young people as the, 'voiceless children of war.'[57] In many cases, children and young people are not voiceless in war; war is their voice – when young people feel that they are not listened to along traditional lines of communication, they seek alternatives. A peaceful mechanism is needed for listening to that voice. Dialogue can provide, 'safety valves for pent-up pressure',[58] and such participation can have hugely beneficial long-term impacts on national development, as young people become 'stakeholders'. As highlighted earlier, this should not be seen as an issue of 'concession' to youth in a zero-sum scenario, or solely based around lowering socio-political instability risks, but as a new potential for partnership.

Giving Young People Their Voice

Democracy relies on citizens having a voice, and the government being able to respond effectively to that voice. It also makes them stakeholders in the system, which can be particularly important for ex-combatants or other young people who feel they may have lost political influence since the war. Including young people in decision-making early in life helps produce common goals, which support social cohesion and solidarity, and as has been previously demonstrated, promote ability and willingness to engage in the same systems later.[59] Although 54.6 per cent of the 1.3 million registered voters for the 2005 election were 'youth',[60] this irregular participation through voting has failed to satisfy many young people. One ex-combatant living in Congo Town explained, 'I am not represented – there is no-one coming here [to talk to me]… then I will know I am

represented.'[61] Over half of youth group members interviewed across the country wanted to be politicians when they grew up, many suggesting that this was because there was no way of influencing politics from the outside.

A 2005 survey conducted with 173 youth groups from all 15 of Liberia's counties found that in the previous year, while 61.3 per cent had collaborated with other Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) or NGOs, only 31.2 per cent had done so with the district or town chief, 28 per cent with the office of the mayor, and 21.9 per cent with the County Superintendent.[62] These statistics highlight a great flaw in the post-war development of civil society in Liberia; while the international community has supported bottom-up advocacy, Liberia does not have the institutions to listen and respond.

As long as civil society is provided with no more engagement than advocacy, those individual participants, particularly young people, will continue to be seen as a destabilizing threat – as 'warriors' rather than a contributors to community and state advancement. One representative from a Gbarnga-based local civil society NGO, DEN–L, incisively summarized the situation: 'We have created a lot of demand.'[63] For Liberian civil society – and the political system as a whole – to be robust, leadership from presidential to community level needs to start working on the supply. Supply does not simply mean 'getting done what is demanded', but being able to respond through dialogue to explain 'realities' and work together. As the voice of formerly silenced groups increases, particularly restless youth, structures need to be built to incorporate and respond to those voices.

Listening to That Voice

Half-way democracy does not work, and has statistically proven to be far more prone to conflict than true democracy.[64] Citizens must feel that their demands are being responded to, or at least must be informed of the reasons for delays or the inability to respond. If leadership fails to do this, citizens are, 'likely [to] attribute the lack of visible improvements to a lack of political will.'[65] One ex-combatant explained that, 'They must show concern for you before you can trust them.'[66] If working within the system does not get any form of response, young people may seek to get their demands satisfied by

working outside the system. One facilitator of a training programme for ex-combatants symbolically described the justification for many young people's violent actions: 'If a mother promises her child a bike, the child will expect to receive a bike. The child will keep asking, 'Ma, where's my bike?' every day, every week, until she receives it. If mother does not buy her child a bike in the end, the child will just take it.'[67]

The problem of youth disengagement must be comprehensively addressed. As Sommers points out, 'acceptance is not enough. Urban youth must be actively, consistently, and positively engaged.'[68] Liberia requires a truly two-way network of communication between national and local government and leadership, and young people. A World Bank study suggests that, 'a well-placed series of strategic and coordinated activities can help manage expectations, alter perceptions, build public trust in state institutions and repair citizen-state relations.'[69] In other words, the creation of direct lines of communication at community and national level can increase the 'supply' that the DEN–L representative spoke about. By creating more direct lines of communication, 'supply' can respond to individual young people.

This involves regular and periodic consultation and work towards a common goal. The youth-run West Africa Youth Network has worked to create this periodic consultation between young people and governments at a national and international level. The Programme Director of the Liberian chapter explained that, '[w]ith these periodic consultations, our voices have started to be heard.' He explained that as a lobbying group, opinions are seen as the 'flavour of the day' and not given much attention, but, '[w]hen these views become consistent, governments become obligated to listen as they realise the youth are serious.'[70] Once the two can work together, young people's faith in the government is likely to increase, and they can derive satisfaction from the feeling that their opinions are being taken into account.[71] Furthermore, it can generate ownership, making young people greater stakeholders in peaceful society. It requires a planned and systematic structure, rather than the ad-hoc procedures more typical of post-conflict environments. In order to prevent the most disconnected and marginalized youth being excluded (which many NGO programmes inadvertently do), true participatory involvement of all young people is required, rather than just cosmetic engagement with youth. This is an important issue to keep in mind as the next section

investigates the other essential step to countering marginalization and disconnection: horizontal integration.

Horizontal Integration

Potential inclusion in decision-making is not enough to fully engage many young people in society – they are only truly vertically integrated when they understand and engage with what is available to them. Some individuals are more predisposed than others to participate[72] and it is often those most disconnected that lack this predisposition. Elite and mainstream youth tend to dominate young people's representation in civil society. Although youth is not a homogenous or egalitarian population, it is a shared identity in Liberia and offers possibly the best opportunity from which to build a cooperative and bridged society. One can see this shared identity everywhere from 'Youth for the Lord' T-shirts, to 'Youth Don't Fight' billboards plastered across the capital. As the first goal of the drafted National Youth Policy recognizes, 'youth' offers a potential unifying factor while other identities such as ethnicity provoke further potential for division.

So while earlier sections showed that many young people are disconnected, the peer realm offers an opportunity for 'reconnection'. As young people develop their own identities, they 'take cues' from trends in their communities.[73] The majority of these cues come at the peer level. Thus widening the realm of peer-level interaction with different groups of young people can foster a sense of importance, engagement and inclusion in civilian life. It is the first step in a wider engagement with civilian life and vertical social capital. Social capital theory suggests that too strong bonds within groups, without corresponding bridges between groups, can be dangerous.[74] This article suggests that the initial stages of horizontal integration are simply focused on 'reconnecting' disconnected individuals with civilian life. For those truly disconnected, bonding between different youths is already a bridge between civilian and non-civilian life, and without this step, further bridging may not be possible.

Building such relationships can reduce the social distance between individuals, and between the individual and society at large. This 'tightens' social capital, supports peer accountability, identity formation, and the condemnation of violence, as well as

supporting psychosocial recovery on the individual level.[75] It thereby makes conflict less likely, as the enemy cannot be made 'not like us', a tactic commonly used by war-makers. Paul Richards explains that, 'the greater the social distance between warrior and victim the easier it becomes to kill for an idea.'[76] Experience from Liberia suggested a recognition of this; as one Liberian explained to Philippa Atkinson that, 'for war not to come back in we have to love one another and work hard for the country.'[77]

Research has shown that young people in post-conflict environments are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure.[78] This peer pressure can be negative, but 'positive peer pressure' can be critical to young people's survival and resilience in situations of conflict and displacement.[79] Horizontal integration aims to ensure that this peer-pressure is as positive as possible, and to bridge divides through a wide network of support and engagement once the individual is 'reconnected' with civilian society. Young Liberians across the country highlighted the role of building new peer relationships in helping to form identities. Motorcycle unions across West Africa have been presented in the literature as hugely valuable in this way.[80] A representative from the management of the Bong Motorcycle Union explained how its young riders benefited from association within a new civilian peer group: 'We demobilise [the ex-combatant] so that he forgets his past.'[81] Arguably one of the reasons for motorbike riders being relatively more empowered was their membership of an association. Such associations can further tighten bonds, while bridging people who had no such relationship before.

However, as in other parts of Africa, there is low engagement in associational life by young people in Liberia. While some have suggested that this is because young people do not feel that associations could offer them much,[82] a representative of the ex-combatant-run NGO, NEPI, suggested that this was because young disconnected individuals, particularly ex-combatants, felt that they could not offer anything to associations, or to the wider community. He explained that, '[t]he issue of self identity and recovery is very important. Once you understand what you can offer to society, you will find opportunities available.'[83] Similarly, upon being asked, "Why did the war happen?" one former fighter now living in Weala, Margibi County, immediately responded: "Because we never knew the importance of ourselves."[84] This issue of

identity and social importance is a large part of horizontal integration – it helps young disconnected people see themselves as having an important place in a wider social network, even if it is only through recognition from friends. When it comes to rebuilding one's identity after conflict, the *World Development Report 2007* explains that, 'a young person's identity emerges through recognition from those who count.'[85] It may be difficult initially to engender confidence through elders, government, and decision-makers, who marginalized and disconnected youth are more sceptical of, therefore bridging among youth is essential to give young people confidence in themselves and in the civilian institutions around them.

How to 'Use Them'

The concept of using peers to engage others is not new. One USAID good practice document suggested 'tapping into' youth groups and associations to reach out to alienated peers,[86] and Marc Sommers proposed using youth trainers to get through to others.[87] This theory has been the basis of NEPI's success. One representative explained why they are accepted both as youth and as ex-combatants: 'We know how they feel – we were there before.'[88] In other words, one method of building horizontal social capital is simply by giving young people more opportunity to do what they do best – build relationships. This can be particularly beneficial to former combatants to develop new civilian relationships. An impact evaluation of the UNICEF-run child soldier reintegration programme in Liberia suggested that child and youth groups set up had 'remarkable potential' at helping young people improve their self esteem and ability to deal with daily problems.[89] Disconnected youths can benefit in a multitude of ways just by being 'reconnected'. While the primary goal of the youth life skills programme that was evaluated across three Liberian counties as part of this research was, of course, life skills education, the programme's greatest benefit, by far, turned out to be its role in reintegration. Just by bringing together young people who would not normally meet, young people developed friendships and a sense of belonging. One participant explained how the programme, 'made us together,' while another explained how new interactions, 'really brought love among us.'[90] Moreover, one member of the Margibi

Youth Secretariat even likened the value of peer support to that of religion when he explained: "In order to make a non-believer a believer, first you need to make them your friend. If you make them your friend, you can do anything."[91]

As well as just increasing the quantity of interactions, effective horizontal integration can benefit from new dynamics of interaction. A USAID document suggested building relationships between youth and the wider community through mentorships and internships.[92] Another approach could be to change the dynamics of the relationships so that other people rely on young people, rather than them relying on others. Such peer-based relationships benefit both participants, not just the 'beneficiary', and can help people form new identities and grow in self-esteem as others place trust and respect in them. The Country Director of the international NGO, 'Right to Play', explained that sometimes it was the programme's facilitators who benefited even more than the 'beneficiaries', particularly when the facilitators wanted to escape from a bad reputation: 'Some people had been in the black books of society. When they are seen as doing something for the children, they are respected.'[93]

These dynamics can be shifted at a higher level by government and the international community. While academics and practitioners have recommended giving youth groups increased independence in programme design and facilitation, it continues to be seen as 'revolutionary' for many NGOs and funders to entrust faith in young people and youth groups when it comes to financial investment.[94] A leading representative of the Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY) explained how few international or national institutions in Liberia have truly collaborated with young people in this way, despite its highlighted benefits. [95] Young peoples' associations are one potential area where youth's independence could be supported, and while membership is relatively low, it is growing. A denser associational life among youth could help tighten both horizontal and vertical social capital, as it would offer a more succinct and direct demand (rather than just many voices shouting). It would also offer a more manageable and productive means of consultation and supply by the government, and could provide new dynamics of interaction with elders and authority.

Horizontal and vertical integration are therefore connected in a multitude of ways, and must be addressed together. Once a horizontal voice is built up loud enough, it

should be able to attract recognition vertically. Similarly, vertical integration needs to reach all through bridged horizontal integration, or it could exacerbate a sense of marginalization to those left out, or cause the creation of too strong bonds within groups. Supporting this will not only be of benefit to the youth and elders already discussed, but a responsible and positive youth population can have a crucial role acting as a bridge between child and adult populations and as role-models for the former.[96]

Conclusions

As young people provide the 'gunpowder' rather than the 'spark' for war, ultimately the best way to prevent their participation in conflict is to prevent conflict altogether.[97] Nevertheless, a focus should also be made on preventing a healthy youth population from becoming that gunpowder in the first place, and on using their energy and idealism for fostering peace.

 Many of the war's young participants in Liberia lacked either the horizontal or vertical integration that this article has examined. Youth marginalization in most traditional communities minimized vertical integration, as young people had no engagement in decision-making activities, and horizontal integration deteriorated ever more as the war dragged on. Although many of the estimated 15,000–20,000 child soldiers who took part in the first conflict from 1989 to 1997 were forced into participating, few of them found any 'connection' to the civilian society around them afterwards, and then willingly took part in the second round of violence, but this time as 'youth' rather than children.[98] Youth disconnection and marginalization in this way are both very serious and interrelated threats to security.

 Equally importantly, although war was seen by many observers such as Utas as a form of 'strategic upward mobility', few of the war's young foot soldiers found the wealth or lasting power they were looking for. This article therefore suggests that, as theory predicted, Liberia is in danger of 'losing' its youth (again) to armed groups who can offer them a sense of importance and personal emancipation. One young Liberian explained that, "the people that would join [militia groups] are those with no hope in

society."[99] If young people do not find 'hope', or other responsible opportunities to develop in Liberia's civilian society, they may find options that are irresponsible.

There is of course no single silver bullet solution, but rather the situation requires a holistic new approach to youth, from a societal, policy and programmatic perspective. Young Liberians must truly be engaged as partners; and as a resource for the future, rather than as a threat. Efforts to engage young people vertically must be genuine, and must make concerted efforts to incorporate a demographic group sceptical of the insincerity of their elders. Face-to-face institutions in Liberia have proved to be much more trusted by young people,[100] so governmental institutions must adapt to be just that. Those institutions must genuinely offer participation, rather than just token representation, and those periodic consultations must work on a multitude of levels, through associations as well as outreach with individuals.

In addition to participation within those vertical institutions, true bonding of disconnected youth within civilian society requires engagement at the horizontal level. New relationships among youth can help them learn how to interact with other people, experience non-violent excitement, and galvanize enthusiasm for civilian society.[101] This process can be valuable informally, and through engagement in formal associations, which can provide a site for new identity and sense of belonging.

While the necessary alternative of socio-political integration of youth that this article proposes may be seen as a form of 'reculturing', Bastiaan De Gaay Fortman saw this step as just as important an activity in post-conflict recovery as reconstruction, restructuring and reconciliation.[102] Mary Douglas argues that it is important not to give culture too much respect if it discriminates against the common interest of peace.[103] If 'local culture' marginalizes a group up to the extent that they are willing use violence in rebellion, that 'culture' must adjust to guarantee peace. In Liberia war was, 'no aberration but the implosion of a defective system.'[104] This defective system therefore needs to be addressed.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank everyone at Mercy Corps who supported this research, particularly Ruth Allen from the Mercy Corps Technical Support Unit, as well as the Terry Dowie and Todd Flower from the Liberia Country Office.

NOTES

[1] The 'young people' interviewed as part of this research ranged in age from 14 to 42. 41 per cent of young people and 25 per cent of elders interviewed were female.

[2] Alex De Waal opposes chronological definitions, in 'Realising Child Rights in Africa: Children, Young People and Leadership', in De Waal and Nicholas Argenti (eds.), *Young Africa: Realising the rights of children and youth,* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002, pp.1–28. Richard Curtain offers a more functional interpretation based on participation in economic, political and cultural life, 'Youth in Extreme Poverty – Dimensions and Country Responses', in *World Youth Report 2003: The Global Situation of Young People*, New York, NY: United Nations, 2003, ch.3.

[3] Cited in Mats Utas, 'Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War', unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, University of Uppsala, 2003, p.93.

[4] See Utas, 'Abject Heroes: Marginalised Youth, Modernity and Violent Pathways of the Liberian Civil War,' in Jason Hart (ed.), *Years of Conflict: Adolescence, Political Violence and Displacement*, New York, NY: Berghan Books, 2008, pp.111–38.

[5] Focus group discussion with seven amputee ex-combatants, Congo Town, Monserrado, April 2009.

[6] Jeremy Weinstein, *The Structure of Rebel Organizations: Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002.

[7] Paul Richards, 'Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?' in Oliver Furley (ed.), *Conflict in Africa*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1995, pp.134–70.

[8] Liberia's long conflict began when Charles Taylor and his (then small) National Patriotic Front of Liberia entered the country in 1990, backed by other West African governments, with the intention of overthrowing the oppressive regime of Samuel Doe. However, no single group emerged capable of filling the power vacuum, and a scrap for power and the wealth developed. Despite a ceasefire and elections in 1997 (in which Taylor was victorious), a new set of rebel groups emerged (most notably Liberians

United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia). By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in August 2003, 14 years of conflict had caused the deaths of over 250,000 Liberians, and had seen half the population displaced.

[9] Joint Implementation Unit, cited in James Pugel, *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Excombatants in Liberia*, New York, NY: UN Development Programme, 2007, p.19.

[10] Wolf-Christian Paes, 'The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.12, No.2, 2005, pp.253–61. According to the Cape Town Principles promoted by UNICEF, a child soldier is defined as 'any child – boy or girl – under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity.'

[11] *Labour Market and Skills Training Assessment: Mapping of reintegration opportunities for Children Associated with Fighting Forces in Liberia*, Geneva: International Labour Office/International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, 2005, p.6.

[12] Festus Aboagye and Alhaji Bah, cited in Paes (see n.10 above), p.259.

[13] Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem, 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.41, No.4, 2005, p.500.

[14] Paes (see n.10 above), p.259.

[15] Alpaslan Özerdem, *Post-war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

[16] Marc Sommers. 'Reaching the Youth Majority', in *Youth and Politics in Conflict Contexts*, conference report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007 (at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Final - Youth and Politics.pdf), p.21.

[17] Paes (see n. 10 above), p.255.

[18] Irma Specht, 'Girl combatants: Women warriors fight their way back into Liberian society', in *World of Work,* No.54, International Labour Office, 2005, pp.8-11.

[19] Interview in Monrovia, Monserrado. Mar. 2009.

[20] Steve Archibald and Edward Mulbah, 'Short Term Technical Assistance to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the Republic of Liberia for Conflict Mapping Project', European Commission, 2008 (at: www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final/volume-three-5_layout-1.pdf), p.9

[21] Richard Hill, Gwendolyn Taylor and Jonathan Temin, 'Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration', Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2008 (at: www.usip.org/files/resources/sr211.pdf).

[22] Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p.58.

[23] Interview at the Ministry of Youth and Sports, Monrovia. Apr. 2009.

[24] 'The Adolescent Experience In-Depth: Using Data to Identify and Reach the Most Vulnerable: Liberia 2007', New York, NY: United Nations Population Fund, 2008, (at: www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/PGY_AdolDataGuides/Liberia2007.pdf).

[25] By using Participatory Rural Appraisal method,s and discussion with 12 members at Secretariat meeting, Kakata, Margibi County, Mar. 2009.

[26] See Anders Nilsson, 'Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies', Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm, 2007; Beth Verhey, 'Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration', World Bank, 2001 (at: http://cpr.web.cern.ch/cpr/Library/article-childsold.pdf).

[27] Hill, Taylor and Temin (see n.21 above), p.26

[28] Semi-structured focus group discussion with six ex-combatants, Sinkor, Monrovia, May 2009.

[29] *The Adolescent Experience In-Depth* (see n.24 above), p.15.

[30] James Pugel, *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Excombatants in Liberia*, New York, NY: UN Development Programme, 2007, p.50–51

[31] Semi-structured discussion with four ex-combatants, Centre Street, Monrovia, Apr. 2009.

[32] Pugel (see n.30 above), p.50.

[33] Semi-structured focus group discussion with seven amputee ex-combatants, Congo Town, Monserrado, Apr. 2009.

[34] Discussion with 13 members of the Bong Youth Secretariat, Gbarnga, Bong County. Mar. 2009.

[35] *Labour Market and Skills Training Assessment* (see n.11 above), p.6.

[36] Dale Buscher, 'Marginalizing Youth: How Economic Programs Fail Youth in Post-Conflict Settings', report for Cooperative Housing Federation International, Silver Spring, MD, 2008 (at: www.chfinternational.org/node/21515), p.74.

[37] Semi-structured focus group discussion with nine ex-combatants, Congo Town, Monrovia, Apr. 2009.

[38] Interview with Zeleh Lealous Kolubah at NEPI Office, Monrovia, Monserrado. Apr. 2009.

[39] Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cillen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000.

[40] Jennifer A. Widner, 'Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp.222–36.

[41] See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars', Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.56, No. 4, 2004, pp.563–95; Eugenia Date-Bah, *Jobs After War: A critical challenge in the peace and reconstruction puzzle*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003.

[42] See Irma Specht and Hirut Tefferi, 'Impact Evaluation of the Reintegration Programme for Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) in Liberia', report for UNICEF Liberia, Apr. 2007; Tobias von Gienanth and Thomas Jaye, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Liberia: Much Remains to be Done*, report of the third Zentrum für Internationale Friedensätze (ZIF)/Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (AIPTC) seminar, 1–3 Nov. 2007, Accra, Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008.

[43] Kathleen M. Jennings 'Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies – The Case of Liberia', *Global Governance*, Vol.14, No.3, pp.327–45.

[44] Informal discussion with two young ex-combatants, Lexington, Sinoe County, Apr. 2009.

[45] See Michael G. Wessells, 'A living wage: The importance of livelihood in reintegrating former child soldiers', in Nick Boothby, Alison Strang and Michael G. Wessells (eds), *A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecological Approaches to Children in War* Zone, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2006, pp.179–98.

[46] Archibald and Mulbah (see n.20 above), p.23.

[47] *Labour Market and Skills Training Assessment* (see n.11 above), xii.

[48] Richard Hill, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin, 'Helping Ex-Combatants Help Themselves: Understanding Ex-Combatant Reintegration in Lofa County, Liberia', report for Cooperative Housing Federation International, Silver Spring, MD, 2008 (at: www.chfinternational.org/files/Special%20report%20No.%20211%20SEPT%2008.pdf), p.13.

[49] Pugel (see n.30 above), p.46.

[50] Semi-structured discussion with four ex-combatants, Centre Street, Monrovia, Apr. 2009.

[51] Mats Utas, 'Building a Future? The Reintegration & Remarginalisation of Youth in Liberia', in Paul Richards (ed.), *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, p.145.

[52] *Labour Market and Skills Training Assessment* (see no.11 above), p.40-1.

[53] Utas (see n.51 above), p.141.

[54] Hill, Taylor and Temin (see n.21 above), p.5.

[55] James Pugel, 'Measuring reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the gap between outputs and outcomes', in Robert Muggah, *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp.70–102.

[56] Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996.

[57] Krishna Kumar, 'The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies', in Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p.21.

[58] Okwir Rabwoni, 'Reflections on Youth and militarism in Contemporary Africa', in De Waal and Nicholas Argenti (eds), *Young Africa: Realising the rights of children and youth,* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002, pp.155-170, p.162.

[59] Roger A. Hart, *Children's Participation: From Tokenism to Citizenship*, Florence: UNICEF International Child Development Centre, 1992.

[60] Eddie Jarwolo, 'Effective Approaches to Youth Mobilization', in *Youth and Politics,* (see n.16 above), p.13.

[61] Semi-structured focus group discussion with nine ex-combatants, Congo Town, Monrovia, Apr. 2009.

[62] Albert Harris, 'Assessment of Youth Groups in Liberia', report for UNDP Liberia, 2005.

[63] Interview with civic action programme representative. Gbarnga, Bong County. Mar. 2009.

[64] Henrik Urdal, 'The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–2000', Social Development Papers No. 14, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2004.

[65] Henriette von Kaltenborn-Stachau, 'The Missing Link – Fostering Positive Citizen–State Relations in Post-Conflict Environments ', policy brief, World Bank, 2008 (at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/CommGAPBriefs_Missing Linkweb.pdf), p.3.

[66] Semi-structured focus group discussion with seven amputee ex-combatants, Congo Town, Monserrado, Apr. 2009.

[67] Unstructured interview with manager and workshop trainer at Buchanan YWCA. Buchanan, Grand Bassa, Mar. 2009.

[68] Sommers (see n.16 above), p.12.

[69] Kaltenborn-Stachau (see n.65 above), p.2.

[70] Interview with Arthur Becker, Programme Director, West Africa Youth Network, Monrovia, May 2009.

[71] Augustine Toure, *The Role of Civil Society in National Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Liberia*, New York: International Peace Academy [now Institute], 2002.

[72] See Widner (see. n.40 above), p.230–31.

[73] Ibid., p.236.

[74] Colletta and Cillen (see n.39 above).

[75] Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1996; Kimberly A. Maynard, *Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies*, New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1999.

[76] Richards (see n.7 above), p.163.

[77] Cited in Paul Richards, Steven Archibald, Beverlee Bruce, Wotta Modad, Edward Mulbah, Tornolah Varpilah and James Vincent, 'Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment', *World Bank Social Development Papers,* No. 21., Washington, DC, 2005, p.30.

[78] Margaret McCallin, 'Community Involvement in the Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers', in Patrick J Bracken and Celia Petty (eds), *Rethinking the Trauma of War*, London: Free Association Books, 2008, pp.60–75,64.

[79] Jesse Newman, 'Protection Through Participation: Young People Affected by Forced Migration and Political Crisis', working paper series, No.20, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, 2005.

[80] See Paul Richards, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, 'Social Capital and Survival: Prospects for Community-Driven Development in Post- Conflict Sierra Leone', World Bank Social Development Papers, No.12, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004.

[81] Interview with two members of the Bong Motorcycle Union committee, Gbarnga, Bong County, Mar. 2009.

[82] De Waal (see n.2 above), pp.20–21.

[83] Interview with K. Johnson Borh, National Programme Coordinator, NEPI, Monrovia, Monserrado. Apr. 2009.

[84] Informal discussion with ex-combatant in Weala, Margibi. Apr. 2009.

[85] *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation*, World Bank, Washington, DC, p.161.

[86] *Youth and Conflict: A toolkit for intervention*, US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 2005 (at: www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_Youth_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf.)

[87] Marc Sommers, 'West Africa's Youth Employment Challenge: The Case of Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire', Vienna: UN Industrial Development Organization, 2007.

[88] Zeleh Lealous Kolubah (see n.38 above).

[89] Specht and Tefferi, (see n.42 above), p.16.

[90] Interviews with project participants, Tepenni, Grand Bassa County and Panama, Sinoe County, Apr. 2009.

[91] PRA and discussion with 12 members at Secretariat meeting, Kakata, Margibi County, Mar. 2009.

[92] *Youth and Conflict: A toolkit for intervention* (see n.86 above), p.4.

[93] Interview with David Sombie, Country Director of 'Right to Play Liberia', Monrovia, May 2009.

[94] See Lowicki, 'Beyond Consultation: in support of more meaningful adolescent participation,' *Forced Migration Review*, Vol.15, pp.33–5.

[95] Interview. Monrovia, Apr. 2009.

[96] De Waal (see no.2 above).

[97] Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

[98] Only 5,000 child soldiers took part in formal reintegration programmes in 1997. See Krijn Peters, Paul Richards and Koen Vlassenroot, 'What Happens to Youth During and After Wars? A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate', working paper, Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council, Oct. 2003.

[99] PRA and semi-structured focus group discussion with 8 members of Gbarpolu Youth Association, Bpoplu, Gbarpolu, Mar. 2009.

[100] Richards et al., (see n.77 above), p.32.

[101] Hart (see n.59 above), p.33; 'Integrated DDRS Framework 5.20: Youth and DDR', United Nations, 2006 (at: www.unddr.org/iddrs/05/20.php).

[102] Bastiaan De Gaay Fortman 'The Golden Triangle of Human Dignity', in Marie Eloïse Muller and Fortman (eds), *From Warfare to Welfare. Human Security in a Southern African Context*, Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004.

[103] Mary Douglas, 'Traditional Culture – Let's Hear no More about It', in Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (eds), *Culture and Public Action*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp.85–109.

[104] Richards et al., (see n.77 above), p.31.