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Examining the role of the human factor as a non-state actor in South Korea's public diplomatic strategies in Uzbekistan

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Examining the Role of the Human Factor as a Non-state Actor in South Korea's Public Diplomacy Strategies in Uzbekistan



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Master's by Research

September 2020

Examining the Role of the Human Factor as a Non-state Actor in South Korea's Public Diplomacy Strategies in Uzbekistan

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University's requirements for the Degree of Master of Research

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Certificate of Ethical Approval

Applicant:

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State and non-state actors of South Korea's public diplomacy in Uzbekistan

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Abstract

During the last decade there has been growing academic interest in “new public diplomacy”, which anticipates a more collaborative approach to international relations and also contributes to mutual understanding among nations and foreign publics. One of the central debates in recent public diplomacy research concerns the role and place of the new public diplomacy actors. This study aims to identify the role of the human factor as a non-state actor in South Korea’s public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan, thereby providing additional insight into implementation and development of public diplomacy mechanisms. Notably, Uzbekistan has the largest Korean diaspora in the CIS region and this diaspora is the fifth largest in the world. The research attempts to explore and analyse the relationship among state and non-state actors to examine how these networks collaborate to promote South Korea’s national image. The analytical focus on how the actors promote South Korea’s national brand in Uzbekistan also contributes to the knowledge of new public diplomacy. The findings show that South Korea has actively engaged with Uzbek publics, and especially the local Korean diaspora, through South Korea’s cultural, educational, medical and economic public diplomacy tools in Uzbekistan. The research identifies that South Korea puts greater emphasis on the human factor as non-state actor in its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan to maintain long lasting relationships by creating an inter-connected collaborative circle with the participation of Uzbek human factor in every public diplomacy initiative in Uzbekistan.

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INTRODUCTION

"My youngest son was recently challenged by a fellow eight-year-old in an exchange that is relevant to this:

Girl: Your dad's job is bogus. Public Diplomacy is not a real thing.

Olly: It certainly is. It has stopped a bunch of wars.

Girl: OK. Name them.

Olly: Easy. They were all called World War III.

If lawmakers around the world had Olly's confidence, public diplomacy work would have fewer worries"

Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: foundations for global engagement in the digital world"

At present foreign policy alone cannot save the world. However, foreign public engagements, whether it is soft power work or public diplomacy, can be an excellent place to look for answers (Cull 2019). In the mid-1960s the term public diplomacy was allegedly coined by a former American diplomat and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Edmund Gullion. Public diplomacy's practice became most closely associated with the United States in the following decades. Public diplomacy was a weapon in the U.S. arsenal to attain information dominance over the Soviet Union, and after the September 11, 2001 attacks it became a weapon in the "battle for hearts and minds". According to Nye, American political scientist who pioneered the concept of soft power, only after September 2001 did Americans begin to rediscover the importance of investing in the instruments of soft power (Nye 2008). He concluded that in international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organisation or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Notably, public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilise these resources to communicate with and attract the citizens of other countries (Nye 2008). Joseph Nye defined "soft power" as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values and policies" (2008: 94). Nye called soft power 'attractive power' (Nye 2008: 95). Nye claimed that a country's soft power consists in the effective deployment of a range of domestic assets and contributes to the attractiveness of a country. Conversely, Nye defined a country's hard power as "the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies" (2011: 11). Public diplomacy, as a soft power tool, plays an important role in creating an attractive image of

a country, that can improve its prospects for obtaining its desired outcomes through education, culture, sports and legitimate policies which can promote a greater understanding of the country and create and maintain long lasting international relations (Cull 2019; Melissen 2005; Park 2020; Snow 2020; Zaharna 2013). Hence, soft power doesn't work solely on positives. "There is such thing as negative soft power: negative policies and behaviours can reduce an actor's ability to lead on the international stage; cultures of discrimination and inequality; ugly words from bigoted leaders; and withdrawal from alliances can all repel as surely as noble ideas can attract" (Cull 2019: 17). Thus, Germany earned the reputation of the European bad guy during the Greek debt crisis, and "the proposal By German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble that Greece could temporarily leave the euro was interpreted as a prime example of Germany's bullheadedness which observers described as a disastrous move in terms of public diplomacy " (Hartig 2016: 260). Negative perceptions of Germany exemplify the importance of soft power and image for Germany's foreign relations (Hartig 2016). Countries do not have similar foreign policy objectives, therefore they execute a variety of public diplomacy projects based on their soft power assets.

In the past, public diplomacy was considered to be government sponsored efforts aimed at communicating directly with foreign publics, however in the contemporary world there are non-state actors who intentionally or unintentionally promote a country's image. One of the debates in recent public diplomacy research concerns the role and place of these new actors (Ayhan 2018; Cull 2019; Melissen 2005). According to Fitzpatrick, relationship approach has been put at the conceptual core of public diplomacy, the fundamental purpose of which is to help a nation establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships with strategic publics that can affect national interest (Fitzpatrick 2009). More and more countries are utilising public diplomacy tools to promote their image. Middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives (Jordaan 2003: 165). However, recently established middle powers such as Canada and Norway have been particularly active in generating their countries' soft power through public diplomacy initiatives. South Korea, which is among the world's ten most economically powerful countries, realised that its national image abroad was weak and not on par with its economic strength (Park 2020). Thus, since 2010, South Korea has laid the foundation for strengthening public diplomacy capacity as a middle power state through its history, traditions, culture, arts, values and policies. South Korea has actively promoted its national image in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) through educational, cultural, economic and medical channels. The CIS countries have also been recipients of Official Development Assistance from South Korea. Notably, the Korean

diaspora in Uzbekistan is the largest in the CIS and the fifth largest in the world. South Korea has been the first country to provide COVID19 support to Uzbekistan at the beginning of 2020. This research examines the role of the human factor as a non-state actor including the Korean diaspora in South Korea's public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan.

Although studies in public diplomacy have examined South Korea's public diplomacy strategies, little attention has been paid to the engagement among its state and non-state actors in Uzbekistan. As such, this study's research questions "How does South Korea implement its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan?" and "What differentiates those strategies from the general approach?" provide additional insight into implementation and development of public diplomacy mechanisms. The analytical focus on how the actors promote South Korea's national brand in Uzbekistan provides another contribution to new public diplomacy. The study also analyses the actors in order to evaluate their interactions. The research will examine the interaction and collaboration among state and non-state actors as a result of South Korea's public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan.

The study builds on and contributes to work on South Korea's public diplomacy and attempts to prove that South Korea's government puts greater emphasis on non-state actors (human resources) in its public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan due to the large Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan created by the migration events of the mid-20th century. The research identifies South Korea's state and non-state actors and their inter-connected collaborative circle in every public diplomacy initiative in Uzbekistan.

The research objectives are:

- to assess Uzbekistan's position and its resources in the region;
- to analyse the South Korean - Uzbekistan relationship;
- to examine the evolution of South Korean public diplomacy policies;
- to identify South Korea's public diplomacy channels in Uzbekistan;
- and to evaluate South Korea's public diplomacy actors' activities and interactions.

Structure of the Dissertation: The key aim of the study is to provide an enriched understanding of South Korea's public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan and the way in which they promote Korean national image. Thus, the main body of this thesis has been divided into three chapters.

Chapter One Literature Review presents a critical review of the literature on historical background, concepts, theories and strategies of public diplomacy in order to draw out an explanatory framework to assist in the interpretation, illustration and understanding of the findings of the research.

Chapter Two Methodology provides a detailed exposition of the methodology and methods adopted in this research. The chapter also presents a detailed explanation of how the secondary data were collected.

Chapter Three Data Analysis undertakes a presentation of analysis of the data generated from conducting content analysis of secondary data (mainly electronic media). The chapter reveals the relationship between South Korea and Uzbekistan from 1992 until 2020. The chapter also presents South Korea's public diplomacy strategy and its approach in Uzbekistan. It includes the role of the Korean diaspora, educational diplomacy, medical diplomacy and Korean businesses as tools of South Korean public diplomacy.

Conclusion sets out the key contributions of knowledge to the research. These relate to enrichment of our understanding of South Korean public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan with the emphasis on the human factor as a non-state actor through the evidence provided and analysed. This chapter sets out possible future research related to public diplomacy actors in this ever-changing globalised world.

1 CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the literature related to the field of public diplomacy. The chapter starts with an overview of social network theory and actor-network theory, which have become widely used in social sciences since the 1980s to understand how scholars have applied those theories to analyse new public diplomacy actors' networks. To have a deeper understanding of the role of public diplomacy, the chapter outlines its evolution, starting with the propaganda subchapter. Edward Bernays wrote his famous book *Propaganda* in 1928, and in 1967 Edmund Gullion coined the democratic term 'public diplomacy' to substitute propaganda. Moreover, the chapter explores Ideological State Apparatus theory by Louis Althusser (1970), which serves as an example of division of powers within a state, which might be applied in modern public diplomacy strategies. Consequently, the chapter covers soft power concept, coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s as public diplomacy is considered to be its essential tool. Historically, scholars differentiate public diplomacy into old public diplomacy and new public diplomacy. The subchapter provides literature review on why and how the old public diplomacy evolved into a new public diplomacy. It mentions the study of one of the most influential researchers in the world of public diplomacy, Nicholas Cull (2019). As the study focuses on state and non-state actors of new public diplomacy, the chapter covers some recent literature on their role and collaboration in a contemporary world. Furthermore, the chapter reviews literature on nation branding, which appeared in late 1990s, including the study of its founder, Simon Anholt. Melissen (2007) identified nation branding and public diplomacy as 'sister under the skin', however, both have very different roots. The last section of the chapter focuses on cultural diplomacy as one of the most significant and oldest elements of public diplomacy.

1.1 Social Network Theory and Actor Network Theory

Stephen P. Borgatti and Brandon Ofem (2010) argued that while intellectual forerunners of social network analysis can be found as far back as the ancient Greeks, modern social network analysis is typically seen as beginning in the 1930s with the work of Jacob Moreno, Romanian-American psychiatrist, and the foremost pioneer of group psychotherapy. During his lifetime, he was recognised as one of the leading social scientists. "Moreno called the nascent field sociometry. It involved graphical mapping of people's subjective feelings about one another" (Borgatti and Ofem 2010: 17). Furthermore, the authors pointed out that by 1980s, social network analysis had become an established field within the social sciences and in the 1990s network analysis was applied in many more fields. However, Borgatti and Ofem (2010) failed to discuss more complex networks which

could be applied to interactions among state and non-state actors in public diplomacy. Charles Kadushin (2004), argued that a network is a set of relationships. A network contains a set of objects (in mathematical terms, nodes) and a mapping of description of relations between the objects or nodes (2004). Similarly, Borgatti and Ofem claimed that relationships between actors (objects) are the central focus in the network perspective (2010). The authors also concluded that organisations are inherently relational, namely “they are social systems consisting of people with different interests, goals, and preferences, interacting, communicating, and making decisions” (Borgatti and Ofem 2010: 29). Kilduff and Tsai (2003: 18) mentioned that “the network approach allows researchers to capture interactions of any individual unit within a larger field of activity to which the unit belong”. Furthermore, the concept of network distance involves looking at networks with three or more members or nodes; the complexity of the network increases as the number of nodes in a network grows (Kadushin 2004). Kadushin (2004) highlighted that social scientists have investigated three kinds of networks: ego-centric (networks which are connected with a single node or individual, for example: good friends of mine), socio-centric (networks in a box, for example: children in a classroom), and open-system network (networks in which the boundaries are not necessary clear, for example: connections between corporations). Kadushin concluded that open-system networks may be the most interesting networks, however they are the most difficult to study (Kadushin 2004).

Actor Network Theory (ANT) was developed as part of a larger scientific movement called Science and Technology Science (STS), a research field designed to investigate production of scientific facts and technological artefacts (Vicsek, Kiraly, and Konya 2016). Later, ANT became more ambitious in its aims- not only analysing science and technology, but attempting to provide a new type of understanding of society and modernity (Vicsek, Kiraly, and Konya 2016). Bruno Latour (1992), a French philosopher, anthropologist and sociologist and one of the developers of ANT, argued that the problem with “modern” thinking is that without nonhumans, it is impossible to understand how society integrated as a whole. Latour noted that one thing which is stressed in relation to the concepts of actor and network is that they should not be utilised independently and that all actors are also networks, and vice versa (Latour 2011). Interestingly, in order to challenge social scientists who focus mainly on social actors and relations, ANT theorists opt for a position of radical symmetry, arguing that nonhumans can also have agency, and thus can also be actors. Also, ANT does not have a clear structure as far as networks are concerned, since their inner organisation is in constant flux (Vicsek, Kiraly, and Konya 2016). However, one of the strengths of ANT is that it can be used as an analytical tool for studying the construction of

networks. As such, it may help to analyse the South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan.

“The Connective Mindshift” by R.S. Zaharna, A. Arsenault and A. Fisher (2013) discussed that while the application of network theory to public diplomacy is still in its nascent stage, more and more scholars address the relevance of networks for public diplomacy. The authors claimed that relationship building, networking, alliances, engagement and partnership are all part of the vocabulary of collaboration (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). As the range of public diplomacy actors grows and the use and influence of social media increases, all these changes require more sophisticated new public diplomacy strategies involving more complex collaboration network (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). The authors (2013) argued that new public diplomacy recognises the complex structure of the multi-hub and multi-directional networks that exist between communities around the world. The international communities communicate through a wide range of networks which pivot around multiple hubs and influence flows in multiple directions. According to the authors, as a result of this complexity, public diplomacy will adopt an approach based on genuine collaboration and cooperation with these interconnected communities (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). The study (2013) claimed that relational strategies will become a core imperative and this shift will be called the ‘connective mindshift’. Furthermore, this shift recognises the power of connections and considers the nature of these relationships as key unit of analysis for public diplomacy. Yet, the authors (2013) indicated that the relationships are not of equal value and they can be positive, empowering, restrictive, coercive and abusive. Connections can enable but also constrain actions within this network society (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013: 1). In addition, the study noted that it is important to forge positive and productive connections to individuals and groups within a network of communication networks. The authors (2013) highlighted a very important fact that many individuals exchange information and develop shared meanings and interpretations of events through transnational networks organised around social, political, religious or other common interests. The study mentioned the importance of actors’ network, it also explained its complexity; however it failed to provide any particular examples of interaction between state and non-state actors of public diplomacy.

Hyunjin Seo provided more details on understanding relationship perspectives in “Network-Based Public Diplomacy” (2014). The author stressed that new types of transnational and decentralised social networks, fuelled by affordability and availability of digital devices, have influenced the conduct of public diplomacy and provided its actors with important tools to build networks (Seo 2014). As a result, governments started utilizing social media to interact with international publics as part of their public diplomacy duties. For

example, the U.S. Department of State uses Twitter and Facebook to engage with people around the world. Moreover, Seo (2014) believed that social media helps users to maintain or build social relationships around similar goals or identities. The author also concluded that digital media-based initiatives should not replace person-to-person exchange programs, but rather offer alternative ways of deepening relationships with international publics. It would be interesting to know which form of communication is more efficient as the author failed to cover this aspect. Furthermore, Seo brought an example of successes and failures of Café USA (an initiative of the U.S. embassy in Korea); and claimed that social media, when utilised effectively, maximise the relational capacities of network-based public diplomacy. In his case study, Seo identified three types of relationship perspectives South Koreans have with the United States: trust and sincerity (the group emphasised the trust and mutual respect rather than looking at the United States being successful or providing opportunities); outcome-based (the group emphasised results and providing opportunities) and access based (the group emphasised information sharing, journalists tended to fall into this group) (Seo 2014). The author believed that culture plays a decisive role and publics vary regarding how they understand relationships. According to Seo, networking is having common individuals or groups through which all parties can build and maintain relationships (2014). However, the study would have been more interesting if the author presented the drawbacks and disadvantages of network-based public diplomacy; Seo (2014) indicated the importance of communicating to publics through social media networks, but it remained unclear if there is any networking and collaboration among state and non-state actors.

“Dimensions of network and Collaborative Public Diplomacy” by R.S. Zaharna (2014) noted that ‘network public diplomacy’ consists of different networks and they vary greatly. The author clearly explained that when one speaks of a “network” initiative it is important to identify the type of ‘network’. For example, if it resembles a terrorist network composed of loosely held together individuals working in cells or it is a tightly knit, dense network, whose members interact regularly, offering support and engaging dialogue (Zaharna 2014). Furthermore, the author found that there are the communication dynamics beyond network structure, and human networks in public diplomacy are not inanimate grids, but dynamic organisms. Zaharna (2014) distinguished between networks as a structure and collaboration as a process. Thus, public diplomacy initiatives using social media tools such as Twitter or Facebook make it easy to create a network structure. The study defined six network designs and network purposes related to public diplomacy: networks of awareness (dedicated to disseminate information- they may be large, sparse and open); networks of exchange (aimed to exchange information and resources- sparse, open networks); networks of influence (aimed to change attitudes or behaviours-may seek greater density, rely on

interpersonal communication modes, and be organised around an identity based narrative); networks of empowerment (focus on creating personal or institutional capacity-network maybe more sustainable if they maintain slow growth focused on building strong network ties); and networks of collaboration (strive to generate value-added information) (Zaharna 2014). The findings would have been more convincing if the author had included examples along with definitions. For example, it remains unclear which public diplomacy purpose category would non-state actors such as business companies and diaspora refer to. The study indicated that each of these networks of purpose may vary in their network structure, network synergy and network strategy (Zaharna 2014). Therefore, Zaharna (2014) believed that exploring and documenting these differences represents a future challenge in network public diplomacy and theory, however it would have provided more clarity if the author presented a diagram with different actors' networks and their interactions. In fact, Zaharna (2014) chose one state actor (China's Confucius Institute) and one non-state actor (International Campaign to Ban Landmines) as examples of effective network-based collaborative initiatives. She provided detailed tables of the actors' elements of network overview, structure, synergy and strategy (2014). Thus, in the table of Elements of Network Synergy, Zaharna (2014) indicated that the both actors expanded external connections, but the information about the process was missing. It is unclear who the actors' new connections are, how they expanded their networks and what their communication methods were (Zaharna 2014). Notably, the study indicated important steps in identifying and analysing a network initiative such as identifying network's key participants and sponsorship; identifying the sponsor's and key stakeholders' underlying goals (politically or non-politically oriented goals); identifying time frame; and identifying a network's communication mode or the ways the members in a network exchange information or interact with each other (Zaharna 2014). When designing and executing public diplomacy initiatives, the author suggested to consider several whole-network measures: density (proportion of actors connected to each other, the greater the number of links between the members, the greater the density); network size and tie strength (a large network may be successful in creating awareness); centralization (measure the degree to which one or a few actors act as central or focal points in the network); and diversity (how similar the network members are) (Zaharna 2014). Additionally, Zaharna (2014) examined three inter-related relational processes in the dimension of network synergy: internal relations, external coalition building and diversity incorporation (combination of external and internal relationship building). Zaharna's conclusions would have been more useful if they included an example of a country with the range of state and non-state actors and showed their interactions.

“Building Blocks for a Collaborative Approach to Public Diplomacy” by Ali Fisher (2014) analysed an interdisciplinary approach to identifying factors that can facilitate sustainable collaborative behaviours. Fisher (2014) argued that public diplomacy in a globalised world includes networking and collaboration with diverse actors to devise novel solutions to complex problems. Additionally, the study used an example of the Debian Social Contract in 1997, which promoted a free exchange of ideas among computer scientists, as an open, collaborative approach to public diplomacy (Fisher 2014). Notably, Fisher (2014) believed that the open-source methodology has much to offer public diplomacy, thus the author proposed three core concepts of Open Source Public Diplomacy: unilateral attempts to redefine a relationship through focus on polishing often backfire; public diplomacy must focus on the most likely means to influence behaviour (not just on improving messages and perception); and collaboration and connection to be the key elements driving innovation. Consequently, Fisher (2014) defined four building blocks upon which to develop a collaborative theory of public diplomacy: relationships and information pathways (understanding the relationships or different pathways through which information flows); coordination and aggregation (key coordination points where communities interact); inter-organisational innovation (individual relationships and societal focal points to create innovation); and collaborative behaviours (specific factors that are likely to encourage collaborative behaviours). Furthermore, the author specified a determining factor of collaborative approach: autonomy (operating in a network society is closer to an autonomous peer-to-peer environment rather than an audience upon which power is exerted); inclusion (ensuring a sense of inclusion within collaborative public diplomacy can increase the odds of successful initiatives); involvement (genuine and direct input into a collective process rather than having a pre-defined role within a pre-existing structure); knowledge (knowledge of the connections, needs, and resources of the community can facilitate collaboration); and fairness (the relationship between actions and fairness in the eyes of the communities with which public diplomacy programs engage is a key element) (Fisher 2014).

This section has attempted to provide a brief summary of the literature related to social network theory and its recent application by researchers in public diplomacy. The subchapter below will focus on concepts of public diplomacy and its evolution.

1.2 Concepts of Public Diplomacy

1.2.1 Propaganda

Edmund Gullion, creator of term “public diplomacy” explained in 1967 that a democratic equivalent to the word public diplomacy would be ‘propaganda’ (Cull 2019). Cull (2019) argued that it is impossible to understand the role of public engagement without paying attention to the history of propaganda. The author demonstrated a list of historical examples of propaganda, a few of them were Alexander the Great (whose portrait was chiseled into busts, laid into mosaic and stamped on coins from Greece to the Hindu Kush); Ignatius of Loyola (a warrior-turned-priest from Spain’s Basque country defined the Formula of the Institute’s foundational document purpose as ‘defense and propagation of the faith’ in 1539); Pope Gregory XV (the full institutionalization of the term ‘propaganda’ came in 1622, when Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacred Congregation for Propagation of the Faith in Rome as a permanent institutional home for the counter-reformation process); and Joseph Stalin (propagated communist ideology in much the same way as a religion) (Cull 2019). Additionally, Cull (2019) noted that as of 1945 the US government had tended to see its sponsorship of information work as a crisis tool, however by 1948 the US government moved to provide funding for a range of outreach activities both overt and covert. Thus, the United States Information Agency needed a new democratic banner term under which to campaign.

Edward Bernays was an Austrian-American pioneer in the field of public relations and propaganda, it was he who wrote the world famous book ‘Propaganda’ in 1928. In his book Bernays argued that the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society and that those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society make up the true ruling power of our country” (Bernays 1928). Later, Mark Crispin Miller, professor of media studies at New York University, claimed that Bernays sold the myth of propaganda as a wholly rational endeavor and carried out by experts skilled enough to lead ‘public opinion’ (Bernays 2005). According to Melissen (2005) propaganda has much longer intellectual pedigree than public diplomacy. The author stated that public diplomacy is an “outgrowth of propaganda, a phenomenon with common historical roots and roughly similar characteristics, and there is therefore general agreement that it can be submerged into the pre-existing concept of propaganda” (Melissen 2005: 16). However, it is important to differentiate between propaganda and public diplomacy term. Melissen (2005) highlighted that propaganda is commonly understood to be a concept with highly negative meaning with its manipulation and deceit of foreign publics, for example Cold War tactics and so-called psychological

operations in post-Cold War conflicts, whereas new public diplomacy is a 'two-way street' which listens to what people have to say. However, Melissen also noted that "many of today's official information campaigns aimed at other countries' societies are basically a form of one-way messaging, and a number of countries that pay lip-service to public diplomacy actually have a better track record in the field of manipulating public opinion" (Melissen 2005: 18). Melissen's statements made it slightly unclear if propaganda still exists, and it would be beneficial if the author brought its examples. Furthermore, Melissen (2005) argued that in contemporary diplomatic practice, there are also fundamentally different and less objectionable ways of dealing with foreign publics, for example: public campaigns by Western European countries aimed at the civil society building; rule of law and the improvement of democracy in Eastern Europe as propaganda.

Similarly, according to Cull (2019) the differences between public diplomacy and propaganda such as public diplomacy is based on truth, but propaganda selects the truth, that public diplomacy is often a two-way whereas propaganda is seldom two-way; public diplomacy listens to learn, but propaganda listens to target; public diplomacy can change the sending/initiating society too but propaganda has is intended only to change the target society; public diplomacy is flexible in its approach but propaganda has a tight agenda; public diplomacy is open-ended but propaganda is closed; public diplomacy is ethical but propaganda's ethics cannot be taken for granted. Today, the force of economic and cultural globalisation have created markets, locations and corporations which transcend any one location. Therefore, "it is impossible to have one story for a home audience and one for foreign listeners" (Cull 2019: 15).

This section has analysed the history of propaganda, its relevance to public diplomacy and the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy. Cull mentioned how historical leaders were able to manipulate and govern people by propagating their ideology through religion, mass media and education. The next section will discuss Ideological State Apparatus institutions as defined by Louise Althusser.

1.2.2 Ideological State Apparatus

It is worth mentioning Louis Althusser's theory about "Ideology and ideological state apparatus" (1970) when conducting a research on public diplomacy since it is clear from the history of propaganda that state leaders used different mechanisms to spread their power within and outside their countries. Thus, Louise Althusser, Marxist sociologist, made the distinction between state Ideological State Apparatus and State Apparatus. He defined Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) as a list of the following institutions: the religious ISA (the

system of the different churches), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private 'Schools', the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), the trade union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio and television), the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc) and other. In fact, Althusser considered schools and educational institutions part of the ideological state apparatus as they prepare working-class pupils to accept a life of exploitation ISA (Althusser 1970). Studying Althusser's concept about repressive State apparatus which contained: the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which suggested that the State Apparatus functions by violence, resembled 'hard power', whereas Ideological State Apparatuses functions by ideology, resembled the 'soft power'. However, Althusser clarified that "every State Apparatus, whether Repressive or Ideological, "functions" both by violence and by ideology" (Althusser 1970: 80). Thereby resembling 'smart power'. An example of this are the Army and the Police. They both act by ideology to ensure their cohesion and reproduction (Althusser 1970). Another notable statement made by Althusser was that "there is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus" (Althusser 1970: 81). Thus, we can see that Schools, Churches, Families use suitable punishment method. According to Althusser the bourgeoisie maintained control of the proletariat via both force and coercion (repressive state apparatus) and through ideology (ideological state apparatus). Also, Althusser argued that the ruling class dominate the working class by controlling SA and RSA. Althusser believed that despite institutions such as education, family, media, the churches, and law being initially outside state control, they transmitted the values of the state and maintained order in a society. Although, Althusser's theory is based on the example of ISA within a country and was not created for diplomacy, new public diplomacy utilises some of the ISA institutions, for example in educational and cultural diplomacy, to collaborate with international publics. The next part will examine soft power concept coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s.

1.2.3 Soft Power

Joseph Nye, American political scientist who pioneered the concept of soft power, argued that the current struggle against transnational terrorism is a struggle to win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not the path to success, hence "public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power" (2008: 94). As a result, Nye concluded that "a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its

values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” (2008: 94). However, Nye failed to explain if one can measure soft power sources in terms of their influence on a country’s behaviour and how it can be proved that a country won hearts and minds by means of soft power. There are many examples that Nye’s soft power concept inspired political leaders to set relevant foreign agenda to shape the preferences of others. President Hu Jintao told the 17th party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power and then Xi Jinping sent the same message in 2014 (Nye 2015). Furthermore, China has created hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world to teach its language and culture since 2004, additionally China is spending billions to increase its international radio and television broadcasting in English. China has also reinforced its attraction by economic aid to poor countries. In the last decade, it became common to refer to these efforts as “China’s Charm Offensive” (Nye 2015). Nevertheless, the study of public diplomacy as soft power tool follows a recent trend in the international relations field that shows the importance of studying the practice to provide a more comprehensive explanation of world political arena. “When the Berlin Wall came down a quarter century ago, its collapse was not caused by a barrage of artillery, but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people whose minds had been changed by ideas that penetrated the Iron Curtain. In other words, the end of the Cold War was partly caused by ‘soft power’” (Nye 2015). It would be more convincing if Nye provided greater detail on the role of soft power in the Berlin Wall collapse. For example if there were any public diplomacy organisations involved or any other public diplomacy strategies which contributed to that historical event. Moreover, Nye highlighted that nowadays more people have access to more information and this had led to a diffusion of power away from governments to non-state actors ranging from large corporations to non-profits to informal ad hoc groups (Nye 2011). One may not think that “the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that is generated by its hard power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime” (Nye 2008: 106). Nye’s findings about soft power are persuasive and well-written, however the theory needs sufficient limitations analysis.

Whereas, Nye’s definition of soft power seems logical and easy to understand, the term itself appeals to some and not others. Marie Gillespie and Eva Nieto McAvoy argued that “Nye’s vagueness in defining the concept has often been noted-especially his conflation of the resources, tools and strategies with the desired outcomes and behaviours associated with soft power” (2016: 204). The authors believed that the technological turn erodes the distinction between agents and subjects of soft power in favour of a multiplicity of actors in

pursuance of competing and often conflicting goals that require negotiation (Gillespie and McAvoy 2016). Similarly, Naren Chitty believed that soft power has had a mixed perception, especially in academia (2016). It has become popular currency for many foreign ministries, universities and think tanks across the world, though the nature of government, corporate, civil society and media interest may vary with country and context (Chitty 2016). Chitty discussed the “moral features of soft power that are invariably derived from ethical traditions and their continuing dialogue with political thought” (2016: 19). Additionally, Chitty suggested that there are two types of theatres for the operation of soft power: world political and intrastate theatres. Actors such as intergovernmental organisations, states, corporations, non-government organisations, media, communities, groups and individuals can be found within these theatres (Chitty 2016).

“Soft power and the Korean Wave” by Joseph Nye and Youna Kim (2013) discussed why South Korea should go soft. The study also analysed a soft power strategy for South Korea, Korean Wave popular culture and the limits of Korean Wave soft power. In February 2008 the ‘Wisemen Roundtable on Soft Power in Northeast Asia’ convened by the Korea Foundation, the East Asia Institute and Joongang Ilbo reached a conclusion that “In short, South Korea needs to pay more attention to soft power if it is to play a larger role and command more attention in international affairs” (Nye and Kim 2013: 31). The authors claimed that state of the art factories, high-tech weapons, advanced information communications infrastructure are the key components that a country must have for a stronger international competitiveness and “for these ‘hard power’ ingredients to become true engines to propel the country’s growth and prosperity, they must be backed up by more sophisticated and highly efficient ‘soft power’ that runs the hardware” (Nye and Kim 2013: 31). Moreover, the study suggested that South Korea should follow the examples of Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states in soft power strategy, namely to incorporate attractive causes such as economic aid and peace-making into the definitions of their national interest. Nye and Kim (2013) highlighted that Seoul has impressive potential for soft power such as economic success, democratic political system, free elections, culture, traditions of Korean art, crafts and cuisine. Interestingly, the authors also included the impressive success of the Korean diaspora in the United States which contribute to a positive image of South Korea. The study provided soft power strategy recommendations to South Korea: attracting more foreign students to South Korea; increasing overseas development assistance to raise its profile on other continents besides Asia; sponsoring more exhibits, visiting speakers and broadcasting to convey the story of Korea’s phenomenal success; and hosting major international conferences and events. Moreover, the authors gave sufficient consideration to Korean Wave popular culture which prompted

more people around the world to seek information on South Korea (Nye and Kim 2013). For example, in a digital age Psy's Gangnam Style has become a cultural brand promoting South Korean exports from mobile phones to consumer electronics. Thus, popular culture can be considered as an important resource for soft power diplomacy, collaborations and dialogues (Nye and Kim 2013). The authors mentioned how the South Korean government, along with the private sector and the Academy have been working on the recreation of South Korea's image since 1990s. However, according to the study, due to the nature of soft power being uncontrollable and unpredictable, the Korean Wave soft power may play a limited role, albeit significant historically (Nye and Kim 2013). The article would have benefited had authors attempted to specify the factors which might affect the Korean Wave.

Kishan S. Rana (2016) presented a comparative analysis study "India and China: soft power in an Asian context". The author discussed India's and China's soft power policies and instruments; soft power actions; the countries' values, images and regional diplomacies (Rana 2016). Moreover, the study included a table of Comparison of soft power actions of China and India. The table showed the following subheading: cultural centres, culture promotions, exhibitions, cinema, social media, education diplomacy and aid, tourism flows and Diasporas (Rana 2016). The findings were interesting to read and easy to visualise, however the author could have included more comparison subheadings such as NGOs or collaboration among the actors. In the conclusion, Rana assessed attractiveness of India and China and stated that success of both countries was mainly due to their ambition.

"North America and Europe-the soft power outliers" by Katarzyna Pisarska (2016) discussed the concept that the ability to attract is strongly correlated with a country's development, measures in both economic terms and human development terms (Pisarska 2016). The author argued that North America and Europe are unquestionable soft power outliers, because both regions guarantee their societies the respect of core liberal democratic values such as the rule of law, human rights and social justice (Pisarska 2016). For example, despite Brazil building its soft power as an 'emerging' economy and becoming a country that has created and exported innovative ways to alleviate poverty (Brazil has also provided billions of dollars of aid to its neighbours), its "growing corruption and a grim economic outlook, are causing serious setbacks to the country's ability to attract and influence" (Pisarska 2016: 237). Furthermore, the author concluded that both North America and Europe might soon face fierce soft power competition from Asia, where new models of successful economic and political transformations are taking place (Pisarska 2016). The main weakness of the study was that Pisarska didn't give sufficient consideration to cultural resources of soft power and her research of the subject has been mostly restricted to social-economic factors.

“The materiality of soft power in public diplomacy” by Craig Hayden (2016) explored how information and communication technology platforms present implications for the soft power concept. Hayden argued that besides the known definition of soft power that it was intended to describe an agent-centric logic, where state actors convert soft power resources through soft power behaviours to achieve objectives, soft power may be a concept to describe what actors do to achieve what they want through the power of social ties, institutions and practices to sustain credibility and authority (Hayden 2016). In fact, “soft power is as much a capacity for agents as it is a shared resource, a quality of relations among actors to be manipulated, cultivated or managed” (Hayden 2016: 192). Moreover, the study illustrated episodes of social media advocacy in sub-Saharan Africa, one of them how the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter hashtag not only drew attention of world leaders but also created external pressure on the Nigerian president’s bid for re-election. According to Hayden (2016) this episode reflects soft power because the activists who launched the Twitter campaign had no other form of material power. It would be interesting if the author clarified if the above episode could be related to public diplomacy action. Hayden (2016) concluded that due to the growth of digital media platforms for engagement among public diplomacy practitioners illustrates an important moment to consider soft power as a prescriptive concept for statecraft and the affordances of technologies like social media provide strategic arguments that shape the practice of soft power.

Eriks Varpahovskis (2017) claimed that South Korea actively uses the education channel to establish deeply strategic relations with Uzbekistan. The study explored soft power and public diplomacy to analyse and understand South Korea’s education policies that address the Uzbek government and public. The author used the case –study format based on an explorative analysis of data, which included secondary data. Additionally, Varpahovskis mentioned South Korea’s government and university scholarships such as KOICA (Korean International Cooperation Agency), OKF (Overseas Korean Foundation) and IUT (Inha University in Tashkent) (Varpahovskis 2017). The author listed a number of mutual benefits of multilevel approach for Uzbekistan and South Korea, emphasizing that the Korean government employs a mixed approach toward selecting people for its public diplomacy policies, for example: focussing on young and talented people; and engaging with Uzbekistan’s public by supporting language and culture centres (Varpahovskis 2017). Varpahovskis (2017) concluded that it is important to understand that education should also be considered as a financial incentives. The study would have been more original if the author included any charts or network schemes to present the relations or hierarchy among South Korea’s agents which administer educational public diplomacy in Uzbekistan.

Peter van Ham (2005), Director of Global Governance Research at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, argued that the terrorist

attacks of 9/11 provoked the US identity as a superpower. Many Americans were shocked to be confronted with such a violent hatred against their country. Thus, the Bush administration was said to recognise the importance of public diplomacy to win its “war on terror” (van Ham 2005). This fact was supported by Nicholas Cull, who stated that the University of Southern California was the first to offer master’s degree in public diplomacy after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and he was hired to direct it (2019). Furthermore, Mark Leonard also highlighted that “It took the tragedy of September 11th for the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ to rise once again to the top of the international political agenda” (2002: 2). Jan Melissen, Director of the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations and also Professor in the Department of Politics, Antwerp University, stated that “After 11 September 2001, which triggered a global debate on public diplomacy, “PD” has become an issue in foreign ministries from all countries, ranging from Canada to New Zealand and from Argentina to Mongolia” (2005: 8). Additionally Melissen noted that the debate about the new public diplomacy after 11 September 2001 was dominated by US diplomacy and a strong emphasis on international security and the relationship between the West and the Islamic World (2005). However, nowadays, we can see that public diplomacy as a soft power tool is widely used throughout the world: for example “to engage with global audiences, the South Korean government’s public diplomacy focusses on using soft power, including television programs, dramas, films, books, computer games and even traditional food” (Kim 2016: 415). Also, Rui Yang reviewed soft power and higher education by examining China’s Confucius Institutes (CIs) (2010). The study incorporated findings from an empirical case study of one Confucius Institute (based at a major Australian university) as a new distinctive model of international exchange and cooperation in higher education. In fact, Yang mentioned that CIs have received some criticism from political and academic circles, suggesting that CIs have a hidden agenda (Yang 2010). Notably, Yang highlighted the importance of educational exchange “Connections between institutions of higher education are steady and civilizing influence. China has been consciously promoting international exchange and collaboration in education and skilfully employing soft power to expand its global influence (Yang 2010: 237)”.

This subchapter has shown various studies of soft power written by researchers from around the world, it also revealed how different countries utilise soft power and how it has evolved since the late 1980s. It is now necessary to explore old and new public diplomacy as a soft power tool as this study researches South Korea’s public diplomacy field.

1.2.4 Old and New Public Diplomacy as a Soft Power Tool

In the mid -1960s the term public diplomacy was allegedly coined by a former American diplomat and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Edmund Gullion. Public diplomacy's practice became most closely associated with the United States in the following decades (Melissen 2005). When Gullion established an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, his brochure provided a convenient summary of public diplomacy's concept: "Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (Cull 2006: 1)". Cull concluded that the term 'public diplomacy' is helpful as it places the engagement process as a form of diplomacy, one of the ways in which an international actor seeks to manage the international environment (2019). Likewise, Paul Sharp defined public diplomacy as "the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country's people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented (Sharp 2005: 106)".

Public Diplomacy by Mark Leonard with Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing (2002) discussed the importance of public diplomacy and its three dimensions. The authors also mentioned competitive and co-operative Public Diplomacy, Strategies and case study of UK public diplomacy in the United States of America, France, India, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. However, not much information was provided on how to categorise countries if they conduct competitive or co-operative public diplomacy. The research also showed how countries could "correct the negative perceptions produced by the marketplace and harness the power of other actors to increase their own voice on the world stage" (Leonard 2002: 4). The study was based on a two year research on how some of the largest industrialised countries like Britain, France, Germany and the United States conduct public diplomacy. The authors of the study believed that "Public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause (Leonard 2002 :8)". For example, the authors argued that Britain's reputation for tradition will help heritage brands sell their goods and their advertising campaigns will help Britain's reputation as a heritage country (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002). In addition, public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment

for individual transactions. According to Leonard there is a hierarchy of impacts that public diplomacy can achieve: increasing people's familiarity with one's country, creating positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective, influencing people, strengthening ties through education reform to scientific cooperation, tourism, study etc (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002). Leonard proposed the three dimensions of public diplomacy: news management (management of communications on day to day issues, reflecting the growing need to align communications with traditional diplomacy), strategic communication (strategic messages to promote a country to foreign public) and relationship building (developing lasting relationships with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, building real and virtual networks and giving access people to media channels) (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002). Furthermore, Leonard argued that each of these three dimensions of public diplomacy plays an important role in helping to create an attractive image of a country, however even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product. Therefore, narrowly self-serving policies are likely to prohibit rather than produce soft power. As such, effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002).

Another understanding of public diplomacy was claimed by Hans Tuch, he defined public diplomacy as "a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies" (Tuch 1990: 3). In like manner, Melissen argued in his book *The New Public Diplomacy* (2005) that foreign publics now matter to practitioners of diplomacy in a way that was unthinkable as little as 25 years ago. The author introduced the new public diplomacy as a concept and assessed current developments in that field. His analysis identified characteristics of good practice and it distinguished between on the one hand propaganda, nation-branding and cultural relations, and on the other hand public diplomacy (Melissen 2005). Hence, after 11 September 2001, a global debate on public diplomacy was arisen and as a result many ministries of foreign affairs now develop a public diplomacy policy of their own. Melissen believed that their association with public diplomacy can be seen as a symptom of the rise of soft power or as the effect of broader processes of change in diplomatic practice, calling for transparency and transnational collaboration (Melissen 2005). Thus, the new public diplomacy can be considered much more than a technical instrument of foreign policy. The author believed that the most successful public diplomacy initiatives were born out of necessity and that they were reactive. Moreover, Melissen (2005) highlighted not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of US public diplomacy, so other countries could learn from them. For example, human rights violations in the Abu Ghraib prison will damage

perceptions of the US in the Islamic world; or US military presence in Iraq undermine credibility of public diplomacy (Melissen 2005). Interestingly, the author noted that availability of unparalleled financial and media resources does not prevent small non-state actors, even terrorists, from being more successful in their relationships with international audience (Melissen 2005). Additionally, Melissen pointed out that the aims of public diplomacy should be consistent with a country's foreign policy or military actions and defined old public diplomacy as a state-centric undertaking characterised by one-flow information, while new public diplomacy is more about a greater exchange and collaboration as well as dialogue, new technologies and new actors (Melissen 2005). The study could have benefited from the inclusion of interactions of state and non-state actors of new public diplomacy.

To further understand new public diplomacy, Kathy R. Fitzpatrick highlighted more characteristics of new public diplomacy. She noted that the new public diplomacy anticipates a more collaborative approach to international relations and it also contributes to mutual understanding among nations/international actors and foreign publics (Fitzpatrick 2011). According to Fitzpatrick (2011) the new public diplomacy helps to build and sustain relationships between nations/international actors and foreign publics, facilitates networks of relationships between organisations and people in both the public and private sectors, involves both foreign and domestic publics and includes foreign publics in policy processes. Also the new public diplomacy is based on principles of dialogue and mutuality. It is important that the new public diplomacy favors people-to-people interactions over mass messaging techniques and has a primarily proactive, long-term focus on relationship-building (Fitzpatrick 2011).

The role of media in public diplomacy was discussed in "New Public Diplomacy and its Effects on International Level" by Elena Gurgu and Aristide Cociuban (2016). The authors reviewed the new type of public diplomacy and the effects it may have on international scene. The authors' objectives were to refer to the context of change, the role of the media in public diplomacy, new approaches and elements of public diplomacy, current diplomacy in scientific and technical ways. Their objectives also included the use of scientific cooperation to improve bilateral relations between countries (Gurgu and Cociuban 2016). The article had an interesting introduction emphasizing the change of public diplomacy due to the globalisation effects. Similarly, Cull noted some changes such as that social media have made it possible to deploy a host of real-time listening tools to track responses to a piece of public diplomacy from social from retweets for messages on Twitter to detailed real-time analytics of the positive or negative responses to a speech (Cull 2019). Gurgu and Cociuban (2016) indicated the increased possibility of citizens to access and disseminate information and explore and engage in support of positions in a variety of problems due to the explosion in information technology and communications

infrastructure. They also argued that with the emergence of a large number of democratic states the world saw a significant increase in global public opinion. Further, Gurgu and Cociuban (2016) introduced technical and scientific diplomacy as a part of new public diplomacy, that international scientific cooperation, can be conceptualised as a confluence of scientific goals of access and influence diplomatic goals. The authors argued that scientific diplomacy is a common language of science which helps to dilute the political and cultural differences. As such, scientific diplomacy aims “depend on the interests and priorities of states and organisations involved, ranging from solving global challenges, offering mutual insurance security, improving global competitiveness, foster economic development, regional integration, etc” (Gurgu and Cociuban 2016: 53). Their study (2016) aimed to inform academia regarding the nature of imperfect democracies newly established over a large proportion of the world population, which, coupled with unprecedented access to information, including on the activities of their own government, took time to a reduction of a public confidence towards the government or to the emitters of official positions, reducing their reliability, which is essential especially for the successful holding of public diplomacy.

“Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age” by Nicholas Cull (2019) suggested seven lessons of public diplomacy practice for international actors: public diplomacy begins with listening; public diplomacy must be connected to policy; public diplomacy is not a performance for domestic consumption; effective public diplomacy requires credibility; sometimes the most credible voice is not your own; public diplomacy is not always ‘about you’; and public diplomacy is everyone’s business. Moreover, Cull (2019) identified four needs which have emerge from the present international difficulties: to build reputational security (for example, the government of Kazakhstan hosted the expo of 2017, initiated a cycle of interfaith conferences etc); to contest disinformation (for example, Western media should be careful not to demonise the Russian people while attacking their leaders); to counter victim narratives (the victim narrative is an ideal message to resonate in social media as it tells the audience that its community has a special story of needs and sufferings and needs to be attended to as priority); and to articulate a vision of the future (for example, when the British government realised that it needed to present a vision of the future to the German public, they hired the man best known for his writing about the subject). Cull’s study covered a multitude of aspects of public diplomacy in the digital age, however insufficient attention has been paid to public diplomacy actors.

Table 1 Brief Overview of Propaganda, Ideological State Apparatus, Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and New Public Diplomacy

	Propaganda	Ideological State Apparatus	Soft Power	Public Diplomacy	New Public Diplomacy
Founder/ Creator/Main Authors	Edward Bernays	Louise Althusser	Joseph Nye	Edmund Gullion	Jan Melissen; Nickolas Cull
Year(s) of creation	1928	1970	1980s	1967	2001
Brief theory/ concept description	manipulation and deceit of publics	he distinguish between state Ideological State Apparatus and State Apparatus, which can be referred to “sticks” and “carrots” mechanisms in international relations	the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values and policies	Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies	New public diplomacy is more about a greater exchange and collaboration as well as dialogue, new technologies and new actors.

(Source: own depicted based on Althusser 1970; Bernays 1928; Cull 2019; Leonard et al., 2002; Melissen 2008; Nye, 2008)

According to Leonard, each country has a different set of institutions to manage its public diplomacy strategy: some are part of government, others are independent (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002). Hence, “each will have its own mission and priorities, but in order to practice public diplomacy effectively, it is important to examine the institutions as a spectrum and see whether there are gaps between the institutions which are not yet filled” (Leonard 2002: 11). A more detailed account of such institutions and other actors of new public diplomacy is given in the following subchapter.

1.2.5 New Public Diplomacy Actors

“The boundaries of Public Diplomacy and Non-state Actors: A Taxonomy of Perspectives” Kadir Jun Ayhan (2018) examined 160 articles and books on public diplomacy categorising the diverse perspectives into a taxonomy and explored the coherence of each. The article mapped the boundaries of public diplomacy with a much needed clear and coherent criteria and positions public diplomacy within the broader discipline of international

relations. The study investigated how scholars conceptualised public diplomacy and how they described the place of non-state actors within it. Ayhan (2018) used secondary data for his research method and in his diverse approaches to public diplomacy analysis highlighted a taxonomy of five broad groups: state-centric (restrict public diplomacy to state agencies in a coherent way rejecting diplomatic actorness of non-state actors completely), neo-static (reserve the term public diplomacy for states only, while offering alternative terms such as social diplomacy), non-traditional (define diplomacy based not on status, but on capabilities, accepting some non-state actor activity), society-centric (share most traits with non-traditional perspectives, except that they define public as people in the global public sphere) and accommodative (accommodate non-state actor activities within the realm of public diplomacy, but only if those activities meet certain criteria). According to Ayhan (2018) most public diplomacy scholars do not clearly indicate which non-state actor activities should be classified as public diplomacy and what kind of non-state actors can be labelled as public diplomacy actors. The lack of agreement on at least a basic definition of public diplomacy and its boundaries has academic and practical implications. The author used the following primary study examples Table 2 (Ayhan 2018).

Table 2 Taxonomy of public diplomacy perspectives (Ayhan 2018: 76)

	State-centric perspectives	Neo-statist perspectives	Non-traditional perspectives	Society-centric perspectives	Accommodative perspectives
Primary examples	Dutta-Bergman 2006; Cull 2013	Lam 2007; Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil 2011	Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008	Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011	Scott-Smith 2008; La Porte 2012
Theoretical tendencies	Rationalism, conventional constructivism	Rationalism, conventional constructivism	Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism	Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism	Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach)
Public as	Foreign public	Foreign public and/or subject of PD	Foreign public	Subject of PD (people in the public sphere)	Foreign public
Conditions for PD	Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention	Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention	Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics	Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics	Legitimacy, effectiveness, political agenda, intention, public interest, estrangement, connection to foreign policies
Nonstate actors as PD actors	No, nonstate actor activities can be seen as PD only if state agencies direct them	No, nonstate actor activities can be regarded as social or grassroots diplomacy	Yes, if nonstate actors are capable of engaging in PD initiatives	Nonstate actors are primary actors of PD	Yes, only if nonstate actors meet conditions above
Boundaries of PD	Analytically coherent	Vague	Vague	Vague	Analytically coherent
Count	92 (57.5%)	2 (1.3%)	60 (42.9%)	2 (1.3%)	4 (2.5 %)

Ayhan (2018) suggested that the taxonomy can guide further research on public diplomacy and help authors orientate their conceptualisations of the term more coherently and consistently by negotiating disparate perspectives behind the definition of public diplomacy. The article was innovative and reviewed a large number of articles related to the topic, however it lacked non-state actor examples. Ayhan (2015) also highlighted the topic of actors in “Why do we Need Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy?”. Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy”. The study suggested that in the literature, non-state actors are usually conceptualised as those that operate at the international level. In the case of analysing non-state actors’ roles in public diplomacy, Ayhan suggested that this definition can be relaxed to include individuals, formal and informal nongovernmental entities that operate at the international level and relevant to public diplomacy (Ayhan 2015). Additionally, Ayhan argued that non-state actors such as diaspora communities both at home and abroad as well as domestic and foreign publics can no longer be seen as mere passive audience and can be considered as “stakeholders, whose satisfaction, collaboration or resistance and pressure can be vital for public diplomacy” (2015: 62). Therefore, according to Ayhan, if not actively engaged, some of these stakeholders can turn out to be adversaries (2015).

Also, Tatiana Zvonova argued that public diplomacy is a ‘space’ where main actors are politics, culture, science and education, media, NGOs, users of social networks. She also noted that professional public diplomacy should become a catalyst for activities carried out by non-governmental actors (2012). Moreover, Brian Hocking argued about the place of public diplomacy in two contrasting models of diplomacy “on the one hand, a state-centred, hierarchical model in which renewed emphasis is given to public diplomacy within the traditional image of intergovernmental relations; and, on the other, a ‘network’ model of diplomacy” (2005: 29). Hocking (2005) noted that the hierarchical model stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations where the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic system monitor interactions between domestic and international policy environments and funnel information between them. Additionally, “the conduct of diplomacy is diffused more widely throughout bureaucratic systems-and from a rapidly changing external environment. But the emphasis tends to be on top-down processes and this is reflected in approaches to public diplomacy” (Hocking 2005: 36). However, according to Hocking, the network model provides a fundamentally different picture how public diplomacy works in the contemporary world (2005). Hocking defined a policy network as “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals” (2005: 37). Furthermore, the study argued that NGOs

and other actors have the capacity to play the 'attractive power' game and to use the results to coerce government (Hocking 2005). Hence, Melissen argued that "non-governmental organisations have also demonstrated that they are particularly adept at influencing foreign publics" (2005: 12). He stated that NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International have drawn the admiration of foreign ministries that are trying to operate in international networks. Similarly, international companies operating in a global marketplace are now also facing up to their social and ethical responsibilities (Melissen 2005).

However, Shaun Riordan believed that although a major part of the new public diplomacy will fall to non-governmental agents, the state actors such as embassies and diplomats abroad will continue to play an important role (2005). The author claimed that diplomats need to be more open and willing to go 'off-message' if they want to have an important role in engaging political elites, in many cases including key journalists and commentators (Riordan 2005). Thus, Riordan recognised that new Information and Communication Technology has allowed non-state actors to communicate and collaborate more efficiently; it also opened up a treasury of sources of information through the World Wide Web which means that they are sometimes better informed on key policy issues and geopolitical developments than governments and their officials (2005). It should be stressed that Riordan (2005) suggested state actors should engage with foreign civil societies by means of the non-governmental agents as the latter have credibility and specialist knowledge of the key areas. Many of these potential non-governmental agents of public diplomacy have already been identified: universities and individual academics, schools/colleges NGOs, journalists, political parties, citizen groups, business associations and individual companies, youth movements, sports clubs; and offshoots of the internet such as chat rooms and usernets (Riordan 2005: 191). Nye (2015) believed that governments will remain the most powerful actors on the global stage, whereas Nicholas Cull believes that the future superpower will be global public opinion (2017). However, Nye argued that often postmodern publics mistrust governments and therefore the work of NGOs and private actors can be useful channels of communication. For example, American NGOs and foundations played important roles in creating democracies in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War (2015).

It is important to mention that according to Cull "international action and communication rests not only with nation-states but with a bewildering array of actors including international organisations (both genuine and fake), corporations, subnational governments like provinces, and networks of individuals who wish to be connected to one another because of shared ideas" (2019: 15).

Table 3 Five distinct ways in which international actors have engaged (Cull 2019: 7)

Listening	an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and analysing data about international publics and using that data to redirect its policy or its communication accordingly
Advocacy	an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by presenting a particular policy, idea, or the actor's general interests to a foreign public
Cultural diplomacy	an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through facilitating the export of an element of that actor's life, belief or art
Exchange diplomacy	an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation
International broadcasting	an actor's attempt to engage a foreign public not by arguing or by presenting an objective picture of the world at large

The following subchapter will explore nation branding, the concept which scholars consider complimentary to public diplomacy.

1.2.6 Nation Branding

"Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations" by Simon Anholt (2011) discussed how the "nation brand" could be enhanced through strategy, substance, and symbolic actions. Anholt (2011) used South Korea as an example to discuss issues in branding, including reputation management, corporate social responsibility, and sovereignty. Simon Anholt is the leading authority on managing and measuring national identity and reputation, and the creator of the field of nation and place branding. The author claimed that the use of the term branding to imply a method for building brand equity is both incorrect and unjustifiable and that there is no such method (Anholt 2011). If a country is serious about enhancing its international image, it should concentrate on product development and marketing rather than chasing after the chimera of branding. Anholt (2011) found that this process consists of three main components: strategy, substance, and symbolic actions. However, the reader could have benefited more if the author provided more detail on strategy and substance and provided examples of each. Anholt provided many examples of symbolic actions and concluded that government should never do things purely for brand-related reasons; no action should ever be conceived of or dedicated to image management or image change alone. However, the study failed to provide clear justifications to support the claim that no action should ever be conceived of or

dedicated to image management or image change alone. The article also highlighted the importance of place reputation stating that in the crowded global marketplace, most people and organisations don't have time to learn much about other places. Moreover, Anholt (2011) claimed that South Korea could spend a hundred billion or trillion won on promoting its image, and it still would not make itself relevant to the daily lives of foreigners as most people in most countries aren't even very interested in their own country, let alone other small countries. Anholt recommended Korea promote tourism and increase its overseas development assistance (Anholt 2011). The author also stated that Italy has the sixth best national image in the world, according to Nation Brand Index, coming up top for tourism and second for culture, however provided insufficient detail or explanation about the index and its ratings (Anholt 2011). Anholt concluded that cultural relations are the only demonstrably effective form of nation branding, for example, the experience of countries that have successfully practiced cultural relations over many years shows that consistent, imaginative cultural exchange eventually create a respectful and flourishing environment; and people who understand each other tend to get on better, consequently, people who get on better tend to trade with each other more frequently, more freely and with greater mutual profit (Anholt 2011). Overall, the article was structured well, and the author tried to cover different topics to reveal the role of a country's image and identity in international relations, however more detailed clarification and examples could make the paper clearer.

Conversely to Anholt, Melissen (2005) stated that the art of branding is often about reshaping a country's self-image and moulding its identity in a way that makes the re-branded nation stand out from the pack. According to Melissen the practice of branding a nation requires a much greater and coordinated effort than public diplomacy, for example, "public diplomacy is initiated by practitioners, whereas branding is about the mobilization of all of a nation's forces that can contribute to the promotion of its image abroad (Melissen 2005: 19)". Furthermore, Melissen called nation branding and public diplomacy "sisters under the skin" as a result of the overlap between the two fields. Unsurprisingly, Melissen concluded that branding and public diplomacy are largely complementary: both are targeted at foreign publics and are also likely to be more successful if they are seen as long-term approaches (Melissen 2005). However, one of the major differences is that public diplomacy is "characterised by multiple links between civil societies and the growing influence of non-governmental actors (2005: 21)". The study would have benefited from a comparative analysis, presented by Melissen listing which governmental organisation are involved in nation branding and which ones in public diplomacy.

Similarly, Wally Olins argued that "launching and managing a national branding programme is infinitely more complex, sophisticated, difficult and above all long term than

managing a similar activity for a commercial organisation. It takes years, and the pay-off is slow and not readily measurable” (2005: 178). Thus, Keith Dinnie, leading expert in city, region and country brand management, claimed that the goals commonly associated with nation branding include export promotion, the attraction of foreign investment, tourism promotion, and more intangibly an increase in the influence of the nation in world affairs (2009). Additionally, Dinnie concluded that the origins of nation branding lie in business, whereas the roots of public diplomacy lie in international relations. Dinnie claimed that within the academic arena the two disciplines rarely meet and this will no doubt change as interest in nation branding and public diplomacy continues to grow” (Dinnie 2009).

“Branding the nation: towards a better understanding” by Ying Fan (2009) aimed to clarify some misunderstanding around nation branding. The study examined the origins and definitions of the concept and differentiated between nation branding and commercial branding. Moreover, Fan (2009) suggested his definition as ‘nation image management’ to substitute ‘nation branding’. The authors listed a few benefits of the newly proposed definition, for example, nation image management describes, more accurately, the topic subject as well as its chief objective in nation branding (Fan 2009). The study concluded that the biggest challenge in nation branding is how to communicate a single message to different audiences in different countries. Interestingly, Fan (2009) mentioned that for the nation to change its image, it needs first to change its behaviour and then needs to tell the people in the world about the changes. The study provided informative theoretical background.

The last section of the literature review chapter will explore cultural diplomacy as one of the most significant tools of public diplomacy.

1.2.7 Cultural Diplomacy

Nicholas Cull (2019) argued that cultural diplomacy remained a significant element of public diplomacy. The author defined four core approaches to cultural diplomacy: cultural gift (an element of an international actor’s culture to present to a foreign audience, for example British Council sending the National Theatre production of *Hamlet* to Belgrade in 2001); cultural information (sharing an unknown dimension of an international actor’s culture overseas to correct an image, for example: a classic US case to encounter a reputation for racism, as with the officially funded Mediterranean tour of ‘*Porgy and Bess*’ in 1954 and 1955); cultural capacity building (a program in cultural capacity building which can promote understanding, build link and promote development, for example: China’s Confucius

Centres, Kennedy Centre); and cultural dialogue (using culture as a site of exchange and dialogue, unlike other approaches, this one is explicitly two-way and requires the active participation of the other party, for example: Edinburgh International Festival in 1947) (Cull 2019). Moreover, the study identified the types of cultural diplomacy actors such as national cultural diplomacy agencies, regional organisations, multinational cultural diplomacy actors, global international organisations, international organisations with a smaller remit to work on and through one particular aspect of culture, bilateral cultural diplomacy structures, nongovernmental organisations and commercial actors (Cull 2019). Notably, there are multiple genres of cultural diplomacy (Cull 2019). Furthermore, Cull highlighted the following cultural diplomacy genres such as art diplomacy (music, fine art, theatre and dance diplomacy and the hosting of international festivals, for example: the International Writing Program); sport diplomacy (hosting events, expressing national culture through the propagation of an activity or codifying rules of existing sports, for example: the US/China ping-pong exchanges); and gastro diplomacy (initiative might include sending chefs on training/speaking tours of the great culinary institutes, awarding prizes or certification, for example: Thailand and Peru are the countries which have placed a special emphasis in this approach) (Cull 2019). However, cultural diplomacy is prone to a number of recurring problems, when some of them arise from the nature of culture itself (Cull 2019: 77). There is a long history of cultural diplomacy headaches arising from the unexpected behaviour of artists: the actor Ralph Richardson and novelist Colin MacInnes are on a blacklist for bad behaviour overseas (Cull 2019). Cull (2019) concluded that people learn best through participation and well-chosen projects of collaboration in the cultural field can lead to peace. Cull's study clearly differentiated various kinds of cultural diplomacy. Cull also noted that Cultural diplomacy is evaluated in the measurement of output rather than outcomes, however he failed to provide any examples.

"Cultural approaches to soft power" by Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob (2016) discussed the use of cultural forms by states as a tool for soft power. The author exemplified how the Greeks successfully projected the Hellenistic culture across Europe and extensive parts of Asia and North Africa. According to Jacob the most characteristic phenomenon of Greek domination was the expansion of Greek culture, language and education (Jacob 2016). Moreover, Jacob (2016) believed that by presenting their poetry, art, literature, Greek language and science - the Greeks demonstrated that in addition to their fierce military, there was an attractive side. The author believed that there is a greater need for global powers to develop ways and means of exercising legitimate influence through cultural influence and persuasion as the world is grappling with increasingly violent religious ideologies (Jacob 2016: 143). Notably, Jacob (2016) highlighted the importance of the use of images and

symbols of power within cultural portrayals, for example Hollywood movies such as 'Armageddon' or 'Independence Day' build a national personality cult around America, portraying its invincibility and resilience. Thus, the public diplomacy rewards cannot be quantified (Jacob 2016). Additionally, the study concluded that despite Britain's cut on spending on the BBC World Service and difficulties for tourists to obtain UK visas, it does not mean that Britain is losing its global soft power influence. Jacob (2016) stated that the UK's soft power is appreciating, but not from state cultural actions, but Britain's sports.

Gunjoo Jang and Won K. Paik (2012) discussed the Korean Wave as tool for Korea's new cultural diplomacy and the Korean Wave's impact on the world. The authors highlighted Korea's cultural gifts such as television dramas, movies, popular music (K-pop), dance (B-boys), and to a lesser extent video games, food, fashion, tourism, and language (Hangul), also known as the 'Korean Wave'. As a result of "a rapid growth of social network services such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and others made it possible to expand the Korean Wave beyond Asia to Europe (Jang and Paik 2012: 196)". The authors also highlighted that the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 made a "small Northeast Asian country the sudden centre of attention-something South Korea had wanted, but had hardly felt possible since the 1950s. The Games brought brand recognition, forged international partnerships and bolstered the national image (Jang and Paik 2012: 200)". Jang and Paik (2012) presented an organisational chart of Korea's cultural diplomacy, however it failed to show the interaction and communication flows among the actors. It would have been more convincing if the authors chose one of the specific activities of the Korean Wave and indicated how government supported the initiative. The authors brought a few examples of how the Korean Wave promoted Korea's cultural diplomacy such as: provided the opportunity for Taiwan and Korea to build positive relationship and has provided the Taiwanese with a new image of South Korea; and influenced Malaysians to prefer Korean food over Malaysian food and to purchase South Korean goods (Jang and Paik 2012). It would have been benefited had the authors mentioned how this was proved. Moreover, the study advised the South Korean government not to take the main character in the stage of entertainment business but let the culture spread itself naturally; the study suggested that the main agent or organiser of the proposed cultural diplomacy be a non-governmental organisation (Jang and Paik 2012).

1.3 Conclusion

This chapter started out by arguing a brief overview of social network theory, analysing how scholars apply it in their public diplomacy studies. However, none of the examined literature presented any research on identifying state and non-state actors and their interaction in a given country. The Concepts of public diplomacy subchapter explored classical and modern literature on propaganda, Ideological State Apparatus, soft power concept, old and new public diplomacy, new public diplomacy actors, nation branding and cultural diplomacy. Whilst all the studies contributed to their specific field either in a specific or more generalisable way, it is important that existing material is examined with a critical eye in order to fully appreciate its overall contribution. The literature review explored not only some of the general themes within the area of public diplomacy but also some of the methodological choices which have been used. The chapter showed that in today's globalised world, countries should strive to enhance their public diplomacy through its tools with the intention to conquer the hearts of people and develop understanding of their nations through education, culture, sport events, festivals and language centres. It became clear that due to increasing technological innovations in communications and affordability of internet, public diplomacy actors apply new strategies and utilise new sources of communications to reach their target publics. However, there is very limited research conducted in the field of South Korea's new public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. Moreover, the existing research does not include any diagrams or schemes of actors' interaction networks.

2 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Philosophical Stance

The study will be approached through interpretivism (known as antipositivism and negativism) as it emphasises the meaningful nature of people's participation in social and cultural life (Bryman 2016). Researchers working within this tradition analyse the meaning people confer upon their own and other's actions and take the view that cultural existence and change can be understood by studying what people think about their ideas and the meanings that are important to them (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). This study will explore the social world of people and their institutions, which is a fundamental view of interpretative philosophical stance (Bryman 2016). According to Snape and Spencer (2003) interpretivism stresses the importance of interpretation as well as observation in understanding the social world; and this has been as integral to qualitative tradition. Taking an interpretative stance can mean that the researcher will aim to place the interpretations that have been elicited into a social scientific frame. Immanuel Kant argued that distinctions exist between scientific and practical reasons, where scientific reason is based on casual determinism and practical reason is based on moral freedom (Snape and Spencer 2003). Qualitative research has been associated with this belief.

The previous chapters have pointed to a lack of information and knowledge on the public diplomacy actors of South Korea and their networks in Uzbekistan. Therefore, the focus of public diplomacy research is still on generating rather than empirically testing theories. Theory generation constitutes an important goal of qualitative research (Bryman 2016). This approach will allow for an in depth analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan.

2.2 Approaches

As an explorative study, this research will use an inductive approach. The exploratory – inductive research will be useful in this study as there is limited research in this area (Wilson 2014). Moreover, the exploratory research will help shed light on South Korean actors of public diplomacy observed in Uzbekistan. The nature of this research would ideally require a use of mixed methods, however due to the time limitation, only qualitative method will be applied. According to Dudovskiy (2018) inductive approach starts with the observations, and theories are proposed towards the end of the research process as a result of observations. Additionally, inductive approach aims to generate meanings from the data set collected, in order to reveal patterns and relationships to build a theory. Inductive

reasoning is based on learning from experience, patterns, resemblances and regularities in experience (premises) (Dudovskiy 2018). Analysis will be based on documents generated during the research process.

2.3 Strategies

This study will use a detailed and intensive analysis of a case study: South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. The study will reveal South Korean public diplomacy strategy and practice in Uzbekistan. According to Bryman (2016) the most common use of the term 'case' associates the case study with a location, such as organisation or community. Case studies tend to use qualitative methods and the emphasis tends to be on an intensive examination of the setting (Verschuren 2003). The case study method is arguably the most common research strategy in international relations. It is the oldest and most widely used by researchers in international relations. The essence of this approach is the use of historical material to explore theoretical ideas, develop coherent theoretical models of certain processes, or to test hypotheses that are derived from well-articulated theories (Zeev 2004). Case study as a research strategy often emerges as an obvious choice for researchers who are seeking to undertake a modest scale research project based on their workplace (Rowley 2002). Additionally, case study will be used in this research because this strategy may offer insights that might not be achieved with other approaches. Rowley (2002) pointed out that case studies are particularly well suited to new research areas to provide a fresh perspective. The research questions of this study are to understand how South Korea implements its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan and what differentiates those strategies from the general approach. Case studies are useful in providing answers to "How?" and "Why?" questions, and this can be used for exploratory, explanatory or descriptive research (Rowley 2002). Similarly, Yin (1994) argued that case studies are one approach that supports deeper and more detailed investigation of these questions. A case study approach will be used in this research as it investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994). This statement points out that an important strength of case studies is the ability to investigate into a phenomenon in its context and it is not necessary to replicate the phenomenon in a laboratory or experimental setting to understand it (Rowley 2002). Thus, case studies are a valuable way of learning about the world around us.

2.4 Method

The research question and the research aim and objectives dictate the research paradigm and methods. This study will use a mono-method research based on secondary qualitative data. The role of qualitative methods is crucial in identifying the important influences and generating explanatory hypotheses (Ritchie 2003). In contrast to quantitative content analyses, the method of qualitative content analysis puts more emphasis on analysing latent meaning (Kracauer 1952). Kracauer (1952) argued that meaning is not always manifest and easy to acquire, but may require interpretation. Also, qualitative analysis does not only look at small segments of a document, but takes into consideration the context surrounding these segments. Additionally, qualitative content analyses provide the researcher with more flexibility with regard to the single steps of the research process (Schreier 2012).

Evaluative research is concerned with issues surrounding how well it works, a question that is raised in this study. Because of flexible methods of investigation, qualitative methods are particularly adept at looking at the dynamics of how things operate. Ritchie (2003) argued that qualitative methods contribute to an understanding of outcomes by identifying the different ways in which they are achieved or occur.

Secondary data analysis was chosen due to multiple reasons and benefits such as:

- the collection of secondary data saves time and financial resources. Secondary analysis offers the prospect of having access to good-quality data for a tiny fraction of the resources involved in carrying out a data collection activity yourself (Bryman 2016);
- many of the data sets are of extremely high quality: the sampling procedures are rigorous, data cover a high degree of geographical spread and many datasets are generated by experienced researchers;
- secondary analysis can offer the opportunity for longitudinal research which is very rare in the social sciences because of the time and cost involved (Bryman 2016);
- the opportunity to study what can often be quite sizeable subgroups;
- secondary data provided by original sources are precise and the researcher can track the latest updates (for example official organisations' websites etc);
- more time for data analysis. Because data collection is time-consuming, the analysis of data is often squeezed. Secondary data collection means that your approach to the analysis of data can be more considered (Bryman 2016);

Table 4 Methods and Purpose

Method	Purpose
Secondary data, qualitative research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather information about social network theory and actor network theory to understand how actors communicate; • Analyse the origins of soft power (propaganda, Ideological State Apparatus) to understand public diplomacy concept in depth; • Research related to public diplomacy theories such as nation branding and cultural diplomacy to have a broader understanding of public diplomacy; • Gather information about South Korea and Uzbekistan to assess their relationship; • Collect data using official websites and other internet resources of South Korean state and non-state public diplomacy actors to analyse their activity in particular in Uzbekistan; • Research and identify non-state public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan through various internet and mass media sources to find out how they interact with state actors; • Investigate South Korea's public diplomacy strategies, in particular in Uzbekistan; • Analyse Public Diplomacy Act #13951 from 3/02/2016 and Presidential Decree #27438 from 4/08/2016 (Enforcement Decree of the Public Diplomacy Act); • Explore public diplomacy activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea

(Source: own depiction)

The public diplomacy of a country is not carried out by a single organization like the foreign ministry, but refers to an aggregation of communication efforts of both state and non-state organizations (see Literature Review Chapter). These organisations operate in different social sub-systems and core areas such as society, culture, economy and education. To identify the relevant documents for the analysis, this study will apply a keyword search on the websites and in the archives of the selected public diplomacy organisations and agencies. Moreover, sources were identified through social media, consultation with the supervisory team, mass media and other relevant references. The search will be based on the following keywords: public diplomacy, soft power, South Korea public diplomacy strategy, Uzbekistan and South Korea relations, public diplomacy actors, diaspora, educational exchange, cultural exchange, the Korean wave, nation brand, actor network theory, social network theory, public diplomacy actors' collaboration and others.

According to Public Diplomacy Act #27438 the Korean public diplomacy strategy is publicly declared to be, and is fully predicated on, the First Master Plan for Korean public diplomacy (2017-2021) as adopted by the Public Diplomacy Committee on August 10, 2017 pursuant to the Public Diplomacy Act (Choi 2019). The Master Plan describes the current status of and challenges for Korean public diplomacy activities. Currently Korean state public

diplomacy actors include the national government, governmental agencies and local governments. National government actors include primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and the Ministry of Education, etc (Choi 2019). Governmental agencies comprise the Korea Foundation and the National Institute for International Education, among others.

Selection of South Korea's public diplomacy actors that operate in Uzbekistan: by that, the study can examine activities and interactions of state and non-state actors in Uzbekistan and understand South Korean public diplomacy organisations' practice and cooperation efforts.

This study will explore the following state actors of South Korean public diplomacy in Uzbekistan:

1. Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (MOFA)
3. The Tashkent Korean Education Centre
4. The National Institute for International Education (NIIED)
5. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
6. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
7. Korea Government Scholarship Program (KGSP)
8. The Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF)
9. The Academy of Korean Studies
10. The Korea Foundation (KF)
11. Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE)
12. The House of Korean Culture and Art
13. The Korea Plant Industries Association (KOPIA)
14. King Sejong Institute
15. Korea International University in Ferghana

This study will explore the following non-state actors supported by the Korean government in Uzbekistan:

1. The Korean diaspora
2. The Association of Korean cultural centres of Uzbekistan
3. Alumni of Korean educational and training programmes
4. Korean Businesses
5. Tashkent State Pedagogical University (Korean Language and Literature Faculty)
6. Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies (Korean Studies Faculty)
7. Uzbek State World Languages University (Korean Language Faculty)

8. Tashkent Bucheon University (Department of Korean Language and Business administration, Department of Architecture and Department of pre School Education)
9. Yeosu Technical Institute in Tashkent
10. Inha University in Tashkent
11. Ajou University in Tashkent

This range of state public diplomacy organisations of South Korea enables the researcher to analyse their synergy, goals and activities in Uzbekistan. The study will examine the Public Diplomacy Act #13951 and Presidential Decree #27438 (Enforcement Decree of the Public Diplomacy Act) to understand the network of state actors, their roles, activities and interactions among themselves. The Public Diplomacy Act is essential in understanding South Korea's public diplomacy strategy as it reflects the recent discourse in the field. The Act also served as a basis for founding the Public Diplomacy Committee (Ayhan 2017). The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and comprises representatives from the national and local governments, people from the private sector and academia (Ayhan 2017). The Committee assigned Korea Foundation to carry out public diplomacy initiatives. Additionally, the study will analyse Korea's First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017-2021). The plan was implemented in the Committee's first meeting and has shared the following vision: "Attractive Korea Communicating with the World Together with Citizens" (Ayhan 2017). Thus, it will be important to take into account that the Minister of Foreign Affairs formulates a master plan for public diplomacy every five years. The heads of overseas diplomatic missions shall annually formulate and implement a plan for public diplomacy activities and report it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Korea now has a more empowered Public Diplomacy Ambassador, who directly reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador's prime responsibility is to oversee public diplomacy policies and activities (Ayhan 2017). These governmental policies summarise the rationale for selecting South Korean public diplomacy organisations in Uzbekistan. They will guide the research in identifying the state actors and their interactions with publics in Uzbekistan. Due to time limitations of the study it excludes an interview section. However, the study will look into the works of Enna Park, a former deputy minister of foreign affairs and ambassador for public diplomacy. Her article "Korea's public diplomacy" (2020) will shed light on current South Korean public diplomacy strategies. The research will examine how they are implemented in Uzbekistan.

Since the study builds on and contributes to work in new public diplomacy, which emphasises greater exchange and collaboration as well as dialogue, new technologies and new actors such as non-governmental organisations, advocacy groups and non-state

actors, it was essential to collect data about as many state and non-state actors as possible. It was important to understand what differentiated South Korean public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan from the general approach. This could be achieved by using up to date secondary data from first sources. The study will explore how the activities of the state and non-state actors are inter connected through monitoring of their activities.

This research will consist of an Introduction Chapter (provide complete information pertaining to the topic of the study, its significance, talks about the research question, aims and objectives and also a detailed outline as to what the research work should contain); Literature Review Chapter (discuss all related theories, frameworks and concepts related to the thesis); Methodology Chapter (provide how the research will be conducted, will explain the chosen research topic in detail); Data Analysis Chapter (present findings); Conclusion (connect the results to the research question and cover the study's aims and objectives, will also conclude if the research objectives have been achieved).

2.5 Data Collection

Collection of secondary data through text-based research on soft power, public diplomacy, Uzbekistan, South Korea and social network theory will include books, textbooks, policies, newspapers, journals and articles on related topics. Secondary data will be collected from the internet: Google Scholar, CU Locate, Library and official websites of the public diplomacy organisations and agencies such as: Overseas Korean Foundation, the Academy of Korean studies, The Korean Foundation, the Korea Trade-Investment Promoting Agency, The Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange, Korea International Cooperation Agency, Korean Government Scholarship Program, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan, Korean universities and their faculties in Uzbekistan. This study will rely on a wide array of government statements and releases, and other news and media sources regarding South Korea's public diplomacy and its actors.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

Social Network Theory and Actor Network Theory have been used as theoretical frameworks to gain a comprehensive understanding of South Korean public diplomacy actors' interactions and collaboration in Uzbekistan. As this study is examining the role of the human factor as a non-state actor in South Korea's public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan, it was essential, firstly, to identify those actors and their networks. These theories helped to identify seemingly unrelated actors such as hospitals, universities and

businesses and examine the interactions between themselves and between the state actors. The theories allowed the researcher to visualise the networks the actors have been a part of as well as interactions among the state and non-state actors' networks. When identifying and grouping the actors into state and non-state South Korean public diplomacy actors, the findings show the existence of completely new actors, whose status could be referred to as both state and non-state actors (mixture of both). This has not been mentioned in the public diplomacy literature to date.

Stephen P. Borgatti and Brandon Ofem (2010) argued that a network is a set of relationships and that relationships between actors (objects) are the central focus in the network perspective. The authors also concluded that organisations are inherently relational, namely "they are social systems consisting of people with different interests, goals, and preferences, interacting, communicating, and making decisions" (Borgatti and Ofem 2010: 29). The Social Network Theory enabled the researcher to capture interactions of actors within a larger field of activity to which they belong. Furthermore, the concept of network distance involves looking at networks with three or more members or nodes; the complexity of the network increases as the number of nodes in a network grows (Kadushin 2004). This theory allowed the researcher to identify that some South Korea's public diplomacy actors belonged to ego-centric, socio-centric, and open-system network. Actor Network Theory has been used as an analytical tool for studying the construction of networks. As such, this has helped to analyse the networks of South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. A more detailed description of these theories can be found in Subchapter 1.1.

3 CHAPTER THREE: DATA ANALYSIS

3.1 South Korea-Uzbekistan Relationship Background

This Chapter begins by discussing the background of South Korea, its geographical position, economic and cultural achievements, Korean wave phenomena and public diplomacy policy. The aim of this chapter is to address the research questions of the study: How does South Korea implement its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan and what differentiates those strategies from the general approach? The chapter presents and reflects on the findings of the data analysis. The chapter reveals South Korea –Uzbekistan relationship dating back to 1992. It also highlights the presence of the biggest Korean diaspora in Central Asia, which serves as a link of mutual understanding and cooperation between Korea and Uzbekistan. This research has traced South Korea's public diplomacy in Uzbekistan as it has expanded to areas such as infrastructure, education, culture, healthcare, business, and engagement with the local Korean Diaspora. The chapter identifies South Korea's state and non-state actors of public diplomacy and their interconnected collaborative circle in every public diplomacy initiative in Uzbekistan. The chapter explores cultural, education, medical and business public diplomacy tools in Uzbekistan, where one can find a similar circle of public diplomacy actors in each of these spheres. The diaspora also act as important participants in humanitarian and intercultural exchanges and business ties between the two countries. A strong understanding of these factors is crucial in analysing South Korea's special public diplomacy strategies with greater emphasis on human resources in Uzbekistan. Data analysis of the role of public diplomacy actors will identify which of these actors are given a greater emphasis by the South Korean government in its public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan and why.

The Korean Peninsula lies in the middle of Northeast Asia, flanked by China to its west and Japan to its east. South Korea borders only with one country – North Korea to the north. Since 2011 the net inflow of population has outnumbered the net outflow. The number of foreign nationals residing or working in the country has increased dramatically, particularly since 2000 (World Bank n.d.). In 2016 407,000 foreign nationals arrived in the country, the net outflow totalled 75,000, which was up by 14,000 year on year, while 714,000 foreign nationals arrived in the country (Korean Cultural Centre n.d.). Regarding the purpose of their arrival in South Korea in 2016, employment (31.8%) topped the list, followed by short-term stay (30.4%), study (13.1%), and arrivals of overseas Koreans (12.8%) (Korean Cultural Centre n.d.). South Korea received 66000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis in 2017, this figure comprises 0.8% labour migrants, 20.1% family members and 0.5%

humanitarian migrants (OECD 2019). Notably, in 2017, Uzbekistan was in the top three foreign-born population groups in Korea (OECD 2019).

At present South Korea boasts solid international competitiveness, such as shipbuilding, iron/steel, and chemical industries. The international mass media called the country one of the four Asian tigers, along with Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Korean Cultural Centre n.d.). South Korea has experienced remarkable success in combining rapid economic growth with significant reductions in poverty (World Bank 2018). It is important to highlight that South Korea is an exceptional example of an aid recipient turned a high-income country, with GNI per capita increasing rapidly from US\$ 67 in the early 1950s to US\$ 30,620 in 2018 (Macrotrends 2020). South Korea is the first former aid recipient to become a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Korea joined the DAC in November 2009 and also took the chair of the G-20 summit in 2010 (World Bank n.d.). In 2020, South Korean President Moon Jae-in accepted the American leader's invitation to join the 2020's Group of Seven summit meeting (Smith 2020). Due to the proliferation of democracy, globalisation and advances in means of communication, South Korea realised the importance of the role of the general public in decision making of a country's foreign policy. Korea also realised that it should improve its national image. Enna Park (2020), Korea's former ambassador for public diplomacy, argued that South Korea's national image abroad is weak and not on par with its economic strength. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea (MOFA) made public diplomacy one of the three pillars of Korea's diplomacy along with political and economic diplomacy (Park 2020).

South Korea recognised the Independence of Uzbekistan on December 30, 1991 and the diplomatic relations were established on January 29, 1992. What follows is an analysis of Uzbekistan and its relationship with South Korea since that date in order to understand how South Korea has been implementing its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is located in the heart of Central Asia on the ancient 'Great Silk Road' between Europe and Asia. Uzbekistan's population is 32.3 million people (World Bank n.d.). Uzbekistan is bordered by five landlocked countries and it is one of the world's two doubly landlocked countries (British Uzbek Society n.d.). The urban population accounts for 50.6% of the total, the rural population 49.4%. Uzbeks form the main ethnic group (approx. 84%); the second largest group is the Tajik (approx. 5%). The remainder of the population comprises some 100 other ethnic groups (including Karakalpaks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Koreans, Germans and Greeks) (British Uzbek Society n.d.).

The Korean diaspora represents a small part of the Uzbek population (less than 1%), however it is an urbanised and well-organised demographic involved in business, and some Koreans are also part of the Uzbekistan government (Varpahovskis 2017). A Korean presence on the territory of the then Russian empire was first established in the early 1860s, when Korean farmers and peasants were fleeing moneylenders and landowners on the Korean peninsula (Fumagalli 2016). In 1937 Soviet Koreans were deported by Stalin, and in the fall that year they were forcibly resettled to the Central Asian steppes (Fumagalli 2016). However, it was Uzbekistan that hosted the largest Korean diaspora deported by Stalin's order. Later, the Koryo saram (or Koryoin, as the "Soviet Koreans" were also called) urbanised and turned into a Russified community. Recently South Korea set up a number of programs aimed at reviving cultural identity among a Russified diaspora community (Fumagalli 2016). The Korean government has special approaches toward Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan which differentiates its public diplomacy strategy from the general approach. This chapter will highlight the importance and role of the Korean diaspora in South Korea's public diplomacy strategies, emphasizing the human factor. Within public diplomacy, diasporas are mainly relevant in bilateral relations, but they also play a wider role in regional or global issues (Rana 2014).

Kang Jae Kwon, the present Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Uzbekistan, in his welcome speech on the website of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan in 2019 mentioned that "Uzbekistan is a state that preserves ancient history and traditions, and the 180,000 Korean diaspora lives here. Uzbekistan is a traditionally friendly country that has historical and cultural similarities with our state" (ROK Embassy in Tashkent n.d.). The Ambassador also highlighted bilateral cooperation in such sectors of the economy as gas, electricity, automotive, textile, logistics, finance, ICT, 5G, healthcare and medicine and bio-industry (ROK Embassy in Tashkent n.d.). Middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives (Jordaan 2003: 165). However, South Korea has achieved its middle power status through rapid economic development and modernisation. Deepening ties between South Korea and Uzbekistan is well received by both sides. Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan has bridged the gap between the two nations and it is very often mentioned during the official governmental meetings.

In 2017 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, newly appointed president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, took part in South Korea - Uzbekistan business forum with the participation of heads of economic and financial structures in Korea (United Nations n.d.). The President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in noted that people of Uzbekistan and South Korea are

bound by a long-term friendship and share a similar culture and mentality (United Nations n.d.). It became obvious that the new president of the Republic of Uzbekistan continues close cooperation through numerous bilateral agreements and MoU with South Korea. For example, on the occasion of the 28th Anniversary of the Independence Day of Uzbekistan (September 1, 2019), Ambassador Vitaly Fen (Korean diaspora representative) of Uzbekistan in Seoul said that Uzbekistan and South Korea have upgraded their relations to the level of Strategic Partnership. This testifies that the relations between the two countries have reached a completely new level: presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Moon Jae-In signed documents between the governments and ministries regarding the promotion and mutual protection of investment, exploration of space for peaceful purposes, cooperation in technology, science and creation of the Uzbek –Korean centre for cooperation in the health sector during their meeting in Uzbekistan on April 18-21, 2019 (Lee 2019). Additionally, the Presidents exchanged views on topical issues of the regional and international agenda: South Korea supports Uzbekistan's efforts to maintain peace in the region, mitigate the effects of Aral tragedy and promote the peace process in Afghanistan; Uzbekistan supports the policy of South Korea, aimed at building up harmony on the Korean Peninsula (Lee 2019). Twenty seven years of diplomatic relations between Tashkent and Seoul have forged a genuine strategic partnership. Moreover, in 2019 bilateral trade increased by 27 percent compared to 2018, including exports by 30.1 percent (Lee 2019). Additionally, 198 Korean enterprises, including joint-ventures, were created in Uzbekistan in 2019, and their total number exceeds 800 (Lee 2019). All these economic achievements were supported by South Korea's special public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan, involving its state and non-state actors, where the mutually beneficial support circles are created.

3.2 South Korea-Uzbekistan Diplomatic Relationship

President Lee Myung-bak created the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) to promote South Korea's image in January 2009 (Rowena and Estrada 2016). As a result, in March 2009, the PCNB launched its nation branding program comprised of the following point actions: promoting taekwondo, launching World Friends Korea, conducting a Korean Wave technological aid, producing Global Korea scholarships, increasing external humanitarian aid, developing cutting edge technology, and supporting the global citizenship of Koreans (Rowena and Estrada 2016). South Korea's public diplomacy efforts focused on the creation of a new era of public diplomacy activities by introducing the term "public diplomacy" for the first time- the Korean Government declared 2010 to be the first year of

Korean public diplomacy and appointed Young-sam Ma as the first Ambassador for public diplomacy (Choi 2019).

In the late 1990s, the rise of Korean popular culture was facilitated by the opening of the Korean market to global cultural forces (Kim 2013: 4). The culture industry has taken centre stage in Korea recognising that the export of media based cultural products boosts the economy and strengthens the nation's image (Kim 2013). The Korean Wave has been a cultural phenomenon over the last two decades, in 2009, China's Youth Daily coined a new term "Hallyu, or the Korean Wave" to refer to the popularity of Korean cultural entertainment contents (Kim 2016). In the early 2000s, Korean cultural content exports was around \$500 million and by 2014, the total export volume exceeded \$ 5.4 billion (Kim 2016). In 2012, the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism set up a public fund worth \$700 million to build a drama town, a film studio and concert halls (Kim 2016). One good example is the promotion of K-Pop in Uzbekistan. The Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan co-hosted the '2019-K-POP World Festival in Uzbekistan' at the Turkistan Palace in collaboration with the Uzbekistan K-Pop Association. The event hosted around 1,000 Uzbekistan teenagers who love K-Pop and Korean culture (ROK Embassy in Tashkent n.d.). The finalist of the festival will visit Korea for competition finals and bring back positive images and associations with Korea. Such events improve South Korea's national image by involving Uzbekistan youth, who may later become non-state actors of South Korea's public diplomacy.

As Korea realised the importance of improving its national image and global influence, the budget for public diplomacy increased from KRW 6.7billion in 2013 to KRW 14.4 billion in 2018 (Park 2020). Moreover, the first Public Diplomacy Act and the Enforcement Decree were enacted in 2016. The Public Diplomacy Act is South Korea's first law on public diplomacy. The purpose of the Act is to improve Korea's image and prestige in the international community (MOFA n.d). In accordance with Article 6 of the Act, MOFA should formulate a Master Plan for Public Diplomacy every five years. MOFA should also organise a Public Diplomacy Committee to review and coordinate the principle matters of the public diplomacy policy (Park 2020). A Master Plan suggests policy directions and objectives to conduct public diplomacy in a comprehensive and systematic approach on government and national level for five years. "The First Korean Master Plan for Public Diplomacy (2017-2021)" was established by MOFA in cooperation with various concerned ministries in 2017 (Choi 2019). The same year, the Public Diplomacy Committee, under the jurisdiction of the foreign minister, was established. The Committee is comprised of around 20 members, from vice minister-level public officials and civilian members (Park 2020). South Korea enhances its national prestige and image by using its cultural assets from traditional culture to modern

culture including K-pop, Taekwondo, Korean food, Korean traditional music, television dramas, Hangul and classical music (Jang and Paik 2012). South Korean Embassies abroad and culture centres introduce Korean art through the exhibition of outstanding examples of traditional and contemporary art. As a result of Korea opening culture centres in major cities around the world, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in also opened the House of Korean Culture and Art in Tashkent in April 2019 (Uzdaily 2019). The stage presents an artistic composition about the resettlement of Korean people to Uzbekistan and their life in the country in friendship and harmony. The president of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in said at the opening ceremony that the House of Korean Culture and Art would become a common home for the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan, Koreans and all Uzbekistan people working here (Uzdaily 2019).

South Korea also promotes awareness and understanding of Korea through knowledge-based public diplomacy (Park 2020). For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Korean Studies worked together on correction of erroneous information on Korea and expansion of detailed descriptions on relevant issues in foreign textbooks. The Korea Foundation under MOFA establishes “Korea Corners” in local universities, libraries and culture centres to promote knowledge of Korea. Additionally, the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies fund research on Korean Studies overseas and operates overseas scholarship programmes (Park 2020). Exchanges and international education are some of the best-known components of public diplomacy, they are a foundational “relationship building” layer at the base of the entire foreign engagement structure (Cull 2019). At present there are dozens of centres of Korean culture in Uzbekistan. Korean philology is taught in twelve higher education institutions and Korean is taught in forty eight schools and lyceums (Uzdaily 2019).

Figure 1 (Park 2020) demonstrates South Korea’s public diplomacy vision, goals, and strategy. However, the Korean diaspora isn’t included in Korea’s public diplomacy strategy in the Figure 1 below, whilst South Korea cooperates and collaborates with it in Uzbekistan.

Figure 1 Vision, goals, and strategy of Korea's public diplomacy (Park 2020):



South Korea's public diplomacy can be broadly divided into three stages: PD 1.0, PD 2.0, and PD 3.0 (see Figure 2 below). According to Park (2020): PD 1.0 is the first generation of public diplomacy which can be described as propaganda to publicise the ideology and political system during the Cold War; PD 2.0 is also government-led public diplomacy through interactive communication involving exchanges of culture, the arts, and people to enhance a national image; PD 3.0 is the most evolved form of public diplomacy that addresses global issues shared by all people around the world through participation in external activities. Park (2020) argues that South Korea belongs in PD 2.0 and has been entering the PD 3.0 level. South Korea successfully hosted international events such as the

Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, Korea Japan World Cup in 2002, the G20 Summit in 2010, IAAF World Championships Daegu in 2011, HLF-4 (the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness) in 2011, the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, Incheon Asian Games in 2014, and the Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang in 2018.

Figure 2 The evolution of Korea's public diplomacy (Park 2020)

	Public Diplomacy 1.0	Public Diplomacy 2.0	Public Diplomacy 3.0
ACTORS	Government	Government+ people	Government+ people
TARGETS	Foreign public	Foreign public	Foreign public world citizens
MAJOR MEANS	Media	Cultural exchange, language education, and people-to-people exchanges	Global Contribution, intellectual leadership, and roles of convener
GOALS	Change in the foreign public's perception, manipulating public opinion, publicity	Enhancement of national image and creation of a favourable diplomatic environment	Enhancement of national status, international influence, mobilise support for countries' foreign policies
EXAMPLES	Cold War-style public diplomacy (US propaganda activities toward the USSR and Voice of America)	Japan, China, South Korea, etc. (Japan Foundation in its early stages, Confucius Institute, and King Sejong Institute)	Nordic countries, Canada (Canadian government's activities to conclude a treaty to ban landmines), and Singapore International Foundation 'Making Friends for a Better World'

The following example serves as proof that the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan is an important link in South Korea's public diplomacy strategy. In honour of the 100th anniversary of the 'First of March' movement and the formation of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in 2019, the fourth generation of ethnic Koreans and above in Uzbekistan are ranked among foreign compatriots. The Government of the Republic of Korea previously did not recognise the 4th-generation ethnic Koreans as their foreign compatriots and in order

to eliminate the problems associated with the separation of the 4th-generation ethnic Koreans from their parents living in the Republic of Korea, the government made an amendment to the “Regulation on the implementation of legislative acts related to the entry / exit and legal status of foreign compatriots” (ROK Embassy in Tashkent n.d.). On 25 January 2019, the Ministry of Justice revised the Enforcement Decrees of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans to extend the scope of the overseas Korean designation from third-generation Koryeoin (mostly grandchildren of the original Koreans from Russia and Central Asia) to fourth generation (direct descendants). The fourth-generation Koryoin with foreign nationality can now stay in Korea, receiving the same rights as Korean citizens in real estate and financial trading as well as quality for national health care, for up to three years at a time and extend their stay without difficulty. The Ministry of Justice said in a news release that the law will help more descendants of overseas Koreans gain legal status to freely travel and stay in Korea, which will allow them more opportunities and pride as Korean nationals. The South Korean government offers Koryoin to take classes to adapt to life in Korea such as basic Korean legal information and understanding Korean society (Park and Yoon 2019). This act from the South Korean government showed that the Korean diaspora takes a special place in South Korean public diplomacy strategies. South Korea treats the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan as a long-lost family-member, therefore, Uzbekistan for South Korea is a home of the largest Korean diaspora in Central Asia. This factor influences South Korea’s public diplomacy strategy.

In 2019 the Incheon Free Economic Zone announced that a memorandum of understanding was signed on March 11 with the Namangan regional government of Uzbekistan for development of its free economic zone (Oztarsu 2019). According to Oztarsu (2019), Korea and Uzbekistan have a dynamic relationship and found a proper way for implementation of large regional and international projects. The subchapters below provide more detail on South Korea’s state public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan and their engagement with Uzbek publics.

3.2.1 South Korean State Public Diplomacy Actors in Uzbekistan

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea supports numerous events to promote Korean national image. Along with the Embassy there are other state public diplomacy actors that provide educational (scholarships, internships, language courses, training, and child education), cultural and business expansion services in Uzbekistan.

The Tashkent Korean Education Centre (<https://tashkec.uz/>) (established by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea in 1992) is an educational institution for

overseas Koreans in Tashkent. Initially, it was created to spread Korean language education and culture to Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan, so they maintain their national identity, however, later the institution was opened to all Uzbek publics. In addition, the centre closely works with schools, colleges and universities throughout the country. The centre offers in-depth study of the Korean language in twelve secondary schools, eight vocational colleges and thirteen universities in Uzbekistan. This state initiative covers diverse layers of Uzbek population (different age groups, ethnicities, backgrounds and geographical areas of Uzbekistan) and promotes Korean national image (Tashkent Korean Education Centre n.d.). This centre has a direct interaction with Uzbek publics, who will learn Korean language and culture and will become potential public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan.

Another governmental agency is the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) (<https://www.kotra.or.kr/>). It established in 1962 to contribute to the development of the national economy by performing work such as trade promotion, investment between domestic and foreign companies and support of industrial technology cooperation. KOTRA's main functions and roles are: expanding small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) business in overseas markets; them to extend their business abroad, overseas market information production; attracting foreign investment; improving national brand; supporting international development cooperation and performing government approved projects (KOTRA 2020). Thus, KOTRA supports Korean business (non-state actors) in Uzbekistan and promotes Korean national image through its business initiatives (KOTRA 2020). At present, KOTRA has its offices only in two Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This governmental agency actively promotes Korean business in Central Asia, by expansion of Korean brand awareness to Uzbek publics. These Korean companies are potential employers of Uzbek citizens: alumni of Korean training programmes, language courses and Korean universities. This circle of inter-support becomes a win-win situation for all involved.

The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) (<http://www.koica.go.kr/>) contributes to the advancement of international cooperation through various projects that build friendly and collaborative relationships and mutual exchanges between Korea and developing countries and supports the economic and social development in emerging countries. KOICA's mission is to leave no one behind with People-centered Peace and Prosperity (KOICA 2020). KOICA is Korea's leading development cooperation agency that pursues global social values. In Tashkent KOICA makes sustained efforts in peace building, national rebuilding and policy capacity improvement for fragile states. KOICA's focus is on human resources development, economic reform and open economy policy to assist economic development (KOICA 2020). KOICA in Uzbekistan provides government officials,

employees in the public sector, or researchers in a state institute (nominated by Uzbekistan's government) a choice from around twenty graduate programmes. On average at least 100 Uzbek specialists representing various ministries and agencies undertake internships in South Korea every year (Varpahovskis 2017). In addition, KOICA allocated US\$850,000 to support an e-library at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent (Uzdaily 2007). It is obvious from the Table 5 below, that Uzbekistan was the biggest KOICA's disbursement (KOICA statistics 2020) recipient among the CIS countries in 2019. The last column represents the Korean diaspora (in persons) in the relevant countries (MOFA statistics 2019). Although Kazakhstan has a large ethnic Korean population, KOICA's disbursement is much smaller in comparison to Uzbekistan. This shows that KOICA is investing heavily in human resources in Uzbekistan. This governmental initiative is South Korea's public diplomacy strategy for Uzbekistan. An example of how KOICA's project interacts with other public diplomacy actors will be demonstrated in the "South Korea's medical diplomacy and assistance in Uzbekistan" subchapter.

Table 5 KOICA's disbursement and the Korean diaspora number (KOICA statistics 2020, MOFA statistics 2019)

Country	2018		2019
	Disbursement(KRW)	Disbursement(USD)	Korean diaspora/ no. of people
Uzbekistan	14,184,161,470	12,892,513	177,210
Kyrgyzstan	4,188,452,461	3,807,041	18,515
Azerbaijan	2,599,937,256	2,363,180	n/a
Turkmenistan	1,456,739,748	1,324,085	n/a
Tajikistan	418,413,720	380,312	n/a
Kazakhstan	391,465,717	355,818	109,923
Moldova	364,263,645	331,093	n/a
Belarus	149,937,080	136,283	n/a
Ukraine	50,618,716	46,009	13,070
	23,803,989,813	21,636,334	318,718

Besides the above state actors, there are a number of other state actors which directly engage and network with Uzbek publics and promote South Korean national image. Each of the other state actors will be examined below:

The Korea Foundation (KF) (<https://en.kf.or.kr/>) promotes better understanding of Korea within the international community and increases friendship and goodwill between Korea and the rest of the world through various exchange programs (Article 1, Korea Foundation Act) (The Korea Foundation 2020). KF organises, supports and participates in various events aimed at fostering international exchange; dispatches and invites specialists committed to international exchange; supports overseas research on Korea and distributes the results of such research. KF also supports activities by overseas Korean organizations to improve the status of Korea in the international community and to promote national solidarity. Moreover, KF organises and engages in various programs required to achieve the mission and goals of the Foundation (Article 6, Korea Foundation Act) (The Korea Foundation 2020). KF provides scholarships for Graduate Studies program aimed to foster a new generation of Korean studies scholars.

Another state agency, the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) (<http://intl.aks.ac.kr>) was founded by the Korean government in 1978. AKS was established to revitalise the field of Korean Studies by conducting in-depth research and offering education on related subjects. Activities provided by AKS range from conducting research on Korean culture from both humanities and social science perspectives to educating and training researchers and higher education professionals: collecting, researching, translating and publishing Korean classics, and publishing and disseminating research results in the Korean Studies field (The Academy of Korean Studies 2020). AKS's activities also involve compiling and distributing major reference works such as the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture and the Digital Encyclopedia of Korean Local Culture, digitalizing and disseminating academic information in the Korean Studies field, engaging in cooperation and exchange activities with academic institutions in Korea and overseas and conducting programs and projects aimed at improving the international community's understanding of Korean culture. AKS provides scholarships for researchers from Uzbekistan (The Academy of Korean Studies 2020). Tashkent State Pedagogical University named after Nizami, Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies have been also supported by the Academy of Korean Studies to promote Korean Studies in Uzbekistan (The Academy of Korean Studies 2020).

The Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF) (<http://www.korean.net>) was established in 1997 as a public institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the Project is to build the foundation of educating human resources who can make contributions to the development of overseas Korean societies as well as in the motherland by finding the next generation talents of excellent overseas Koreans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). OKF has served as a bridge between 52 million Koreans in South Korea and 7.5 million overseas Koreans over the past 20 years (Sung 2020). OKF promises to support overseas Koreans to

maintain ethnic ties and to become exemplary members in their country of residence. In 2020 OKF expanded the number of overseas Koreans portrayed in Korean elementary, middle, and high school textbooks to enable Koreans to understand overseas Koreans correctly. The Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF) does not accept support application documents directly, applicants must submit their documents to overseas diplomatic offices in residing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). Among other activities and programs for overseas Koreans, OKF also organises youth and teen camps (Overseas Koreans Foundation 2020). The Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan can find the necessary information and support if they want to immigrate to Korea. This governmental public diplomacy initiative serves as a real bridge for the Uzbek Koreans and targets at human resources, in this case ethnic Koreans.

The National Institute for International Education (NIIED) (www.studyinkorea.go.kr) is a government organization aimed at nurturing and fostering human resources of Korea in the age of globalisation, and as a competent operation agency of Korea Ministry of Education. NIIED promotes the “Study in Korea Project”, Education Fairs and manages the “Study in Korea” System (NIIED 2020). NIIED plays a leading role in revitalising international education exchanges. The Collective System for Study in Korea offers online one-stop administrative services including information on overseas study, as well as processing admission and visa applications. The system includes the Korea Overseas Study Guide System, which provides information on universities and studying in Korea, and the GKS homepage, which publicises government scholarship projects to invite foreign students to study in Korea, and KOSNET, which is an online Korean language learning site. All these services are also available for Uzbek citizens (NIIED 2020). NIIED offers Korea Government Scholarship Programmes (KGSP) which provide international students with opportunities to conduct advanced studies in undergraduate and graduate degree programs at higher educational institutions in the Republic of Korea. Scholarship benefits include flight, tuition, and stipend, medical insurance, settlement allowance and completion grants (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). This institute is another public diplomacy channel targeted at human resources to continue life-time collaboration with young people from Uzbekistan. These students receive the scholarships and grants and may become potential employers of numerous Korean companies and state institutions.

The Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) (<http://eng.kofice.or.kr>) was founded in 2003 to promote mutual understanding and friendly relations with nations around the world. KOFICE is the designated institute for international cultural exchange under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, its vision is to connect Korea with the world through culture. KOFICE shares Korea's exciting and dynamic culture

with the international community. Hallyu has brought people from all different backgrounds closer together and has transformed Korea into a nation with an undeniably impactful cultural presence (Kim, Y. 2020). KOFICE held the 2018 Korea TV Content Showcase in Tashkent in 2018. The showcase featured 11 participants from various Korean broadcasting companies, such as MBC Plus, CJ E&M, Donga TV, Arirang TV, as well as animation production companies such as Iconix, Mico, Vooz, and XrisP. Local members of the press, including officials from cable channels and national broadcasting companies, showed great interest in the showcase, which had last been held in 2013 (Lee 2018). The 2018 showcase came at an appropriate time, when the broadcast industry in Uzbekistan was undergoing a transition. The animation and sports shows, dramas, and various variety, diet, and trendcentered shows, which drew much attention in this showcase, will possibly be imported and licensed for broadcast in Uzbekistan (Lee 2018). Through KOFICE, the Korean government promotes Hallyu as a popular public diplomacy tool in Uzbekistan. This introduces Korean TV production companies to the Uzbek market, where some of the Uzbek publics will become their customers and followers. It is possible that Uzbekistan professionals in entertainment business would like to learn modern techniques and skills from their South Korean colleagues. For example, officials at the CJ E&M booth met with multiple Uzbek production companies. Uzbek companies were especially curious to learn about the newest Korean historical dramas, which have been consistently popular in Uzbekistan (Lee 2018). Also, in recent years, local cable broadcasting companies in Uzbekistan have attempted to include comedy programs that target young people, who occupy a big portion of viewership, and singing competition shows.

The House of Korean Culture and Art was opened in Tashkent in April 2019. At the opening ceremony, president Jae-in Moon said: "This is a centre of friendship and harmony. I think it will become a common home for the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan, the Koreans working here in this country, and all the citizens of Uzbekistan. The venue will be binding our two fraternal peoples and countries who have much in common" (Pravda Vostoka 2019). The stage of the House played host to an artistic presentation narrating the relocation of Koreans to Uzbekistan and their lives in friendship and harmony. The House of Korean Culture and Art incorporates a 478-seat cinema and concert hall, a conference hall, a library, an art gallery, a restaurant, as well as office facilities. The House of Korean Culture and Art is a place of attraction for the general public, especially for the younger generation, a venue for the mutual enrichment of cultures. This project marks a new page in the history of relations between Uzbekistan and South Korea as special strategic partners (Pravda Vostoka 2019). The House of Korean Culture and Art in the Uzbek capital demonstrates a positive relationship between the two countries and an official acceptance of the Korean

diaspora by both states. The local community including Korean diaspora will promote Korean culture through different events scheduled at the House of Korean Culture and Art. Here, many ethnic Koreans will maintain their identity and pass it to future generations.

The Korea Plant Industries Association (KOPIA) (<http://www.kopia.or.kr>) was launched by South Korea's Rural Development Administration in 2009 to contribute to the promotion of the plant industry and the development of the national economy by increasing the competitiveness of the plant industry. KOPIA's scope of business and function are: marketing and international cooperation activities aimed at expanding overseas plant orders; support and evaluation of plant project feasibility studies and making recommendations to the government with regard to increasing the competitiveness of the domestic plant industry. Moreover, KOPIA provides opportunities and support for receiving orders for promising projects in developing countries (KOPIA 2020). KOPIA was initially incorporated in six countries: Vietnam, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Kenya, Brazil and Paraguay. At present, Uzbekistan is the only country in the CIS region, where KOPIA operates. KOPIA's average annual budget from 2009 to 2017 was just US\$6.5 million, ranging from \$2.1 million in 2009 to \$12.3 million in 2014 (Park and Moon 2019). The KOPIA Uzbekistan Centre involves the Korean diaspora in its agricultural programme related to the use of greenhouses. The centre has also helped Uzbek farmers to increase their output through introduction of special technologies and knowledge exchange (Rural Development Administration 2017).

To sum up the activities of the above mentioned state public diplomacy actors, all of them engage with Uzbek publics and most of the state agencies have special programmes aimed at the Korean diaspora only. The state agencies interact with local Koreans through all public diplomacy channels.

3.2.2 Uzbekistan Labour Migrants and Korean Diaspora as South Korea's Public Diplomacy Tools

The previous subchapter has indicated that many South Korean state public diplomacy actors aim to support Uzbek publics and especially the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan. Below is the data analysis of these non-state actors and their relationship with South Korea through public diplomacy lens. As mentioned earlier, in 1937, tens of thousands of Koreans from the Far East unwittingly found themselves in Uzbekistan. They were forced to work in the swamps surrounding Tashkent. Under 24/7 military guard, Koreans lived in barracks and worked, after about three years, they dried the swamps, cut all the cane, and turned the lands into productive fields (Kim, V. 2017). Victoria Kim, an Uzbek researcher on

Global Korean Diaspora, introduced a number of works about the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan. She highly praises the ethnic Koreans and describes them as humble, honest, and very hard working people who slowly gained the trust of locals and even the Soviet military, under whose guard the first generation of Central Koreans were kept day and night (Kim, V. 2017). Later, they were permitted to build their own houses from clay and mud and the first Korean kolkhozes (collective farms) were established throughout Tashkent province (Kim, V. 2017). South Korea cherishes this part of Korean history and strongly supports the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan through its educational, cultural, economic and social approaches. South Korea offers a special immigration visa (F-4) for Korean people in Uzbekistan. Whereas the older generation find it hard to leave Uzbekistan for a new country, younger people are able to learn Korean and start their new lives in Korea. The attraction of the Korean diaspora to South Korea via special visa for ethnic Koreans from CIS countries can also be related to South Korea's hidden agenda to raise its birth rate and secure a labour force. South Korea's birth rate is the lowest in the world, and this rising social phenomenon in South Korea is called the Sampo Generation. The word 'sampo' means to give up three things: relationships, marriage and children (Quick 2019). Thus, this public diplomacy gesture for Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan is a win-win situation for South Korea. The UN predicts South Korea's population will peak in around 2024, but by 2100, the UN forecasts South Korea's population will only be around 29 million – the same as it was in 1966 (Quick 2019).

The Korean diaspora takes an active part in all cultural events held in the country: erected a monument at the Friendship Park in Tashkent as a sign of tolerance, sincerity and gratitude for a peaceful and tranquil life in Uzbekistan (Uzdaily 2019). The Korean diaspora has a reputation of being hard working, prosperous entrepreneurs and outstanding academicians and intellectuals (Kim, V. 2018).

The Korean diaspora have become full and active members of Uzbek society: the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan sit in the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, local Kengashes of people's deputies, they work in the state governing bodies as well as all branches of socio-economic life, thus creating a positive image of Korean people to other publics. In 2017 Uzbekistan celebrated the 80th anniversary of the ethnic Koreans living in Uzbekistan (United Nations n.d.).

The Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF) indicates the following role of Korean diaspora in politics and diplomacy: contribution to promoting friendship and establishing cooperative relations between the home country and the host country; contribution to unification between the two Koreas by spreading public opinion on unification; and

expansion of the influence of the Korean people and representing national interests based on political power. Additionally, the economic activities of overseas Koreans (Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan) have the effect of expanding the country's economic territory (domestic investment, money transfer, job creation contribution). For example, remittances to Uzbekistan from ethnic Koreans, who moved to South Korea to work, were estimated to exceed \$100 million in 2010 (Hwang 2012). The role of Korean diaspora and labour migrants from Uzbekistan contribute to product export. Korean diaspora promote friendship and establish cooperative relations between the mother country and the host country (Overseas Koreans Foundation 2020). OKF indicates that Korean diaspora enhance national image and cultural events in Korean communities and promote the Republic of Korea (Overseas Koreans Foundation 2020).

Uzbekistan is the fifth most represented country in South Korea according to the report of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea published in June 2017 (Fergana News Agency 2017). There are about 55,000 Uzbek migrants in Korea as of 2017, accounting for 3% of the total number of foreigners. South Korea keeps simplifying working visas procedure for Uzbek citizens, which attracts an increasing number of labour migrants (Fergana News Agency 2017).

The Opendemocracy media organisation interviewed Uzbek Koreans about their reasons to migrate to South Korea. Dmitry Ten and his wife Irina, 32, came to South Korea from Uzbekistan in 2014 in order to earn money for his wedding and then decided to move to Korea permanently. "You cannot compare my salary here with and what I was earning in Uzbekistan. How can you compare 2,000 USD with 100 USD? So we decided we did not want to struggle in Uzbekistan," the couple said. "Thanks to Korea, our countrymen can accomplish their goals, by saving money and buying apartments or cars in Uzbekistan," adds Irina (Iakupbaeva 2019). Today, Dmitry works at a factory that produces details for air conditioning units in cars, while Irina works at a Korean make-up company (Iakupbaeva 2019). This is one of the life stories told by Koryo Saram migrants. Seoul Mayor, Park Won-soon met Rakhmonbek Usmonov, the mayor of the Uzbek capital Tashkent. The ceremony unveiled a memorial stone in Tashkent's Seoul Park, depicting ethnic Koreans wearing hanbok (traditional Korean attire). Seoul government put up 2.6 billion won to fund the memorial. (provided by Seoul Metropolitan Government) (Hankyoreh 2017).

The Uzbekistan Korean Culture Association was founded by members of the Uzbek Korean diaspora in 1991. It was established for the purpose of reviving the culture and advocating the interests of Koreans in Uzbekistan. The Association's partners are the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan, the Korean Language School – King

Sejong Institute, the Overseas Koreans Foundation, KOICA and the Republic of Korea Education Center (Association of Korean Cultural Centres of the Republic of Uzbekistan 2020). The Uzbek Korean Culture Association holds various events to defend the interests of Koryoin in Uzbekistan such as support of the local Korean newspaper (Academy of Korean Studies 2020). At present, the Association unites the Korean cultural centres of nearly all regional centres of Uzbekistan (except for Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya), as well as the Association of Koreans of Karakalpakstan and the city of Tashkent. The Association consists of: Tingbo Scientific and Technical Society, the sports department, the editorial board of the newspaper Kore Sinmun, the literary club Arirang, four ensembles of Korean traditional dance: Koryo, Kot Bonori, Asadal, and Samdiyon, Shinsedae Youth Center, the Council of Elders and the Korean language classes (the Association of Korean Cultural Centres of the Republic of Uzbekistan 2020).

It is worth mentioning the Shinsedae Youth Centre which is a part of the Association. This Youth Centre is another example when Korea's state public diplomacy actors support the Korean diaspora's cultural centre by offering Korean language classes, employment preparation seminars and others. The Youth's Centre's mission is obtaining and applying practically necessary knowledge and skills to personal and team growth in both entrepreneurial and other fields of activity to achieve success and goals. At present, the center consists of more than 150 people and has 5 cells and 6 committees. All committees are chaired by heads and their deputies, who together constitute the Asset of SHINSEDAE MC. Cells, in turn, act as independent groups within the MC (Shinsedae Youth Centre 2020). Its Media Committee covers the activities of the centre and collaborates with other media. South Korea's public diplomacy strategy targets the younger generation of Uzbekistan. Notably, diaspora communities create transnational networks and exemplify global connectivity and the functioning of multidimensional networks by forming connections among members in their home and host cultures (Rana 2014).

However, there might be another reason for supporting the Korean diaspora, especially in South Korea's ease of immigration for ethnic Koreans. According to the World Bank, South Korea's birth rate (6.4 per 1,000 people) is the second lowest in the world after Monaco, therefore the government is trying to increase it in order to recover from the demographics crisis (The World Bank 2019). Thus, South Korea differentiates its public diplomacy strategy from its general approach. Every public diplomacy initiative is a result of joint efforts of the government, its agencies and non-state actors aimed at Uzbek publics in Uzbekistan.

3.2.3 Educational Diplomacy

South Korea has engaged with Uzbekistan at different educational levels. South Korea's government and its agencies, such as KOICA, Overseas Koreans Foundation, Korea Foundation, Academy of Korean Studies and others, are generous at providing scholarships, training, grants and other educational opportunities to Uzbek citizens. Table 6 shows student visa holder information in Korea, which proves that the number of students from Uzbekistan who hold Korean student visas surpasses the number of student visa holders from other Central Asian Countries (Varpahovskis 2020).

Table 6 The number of D-2 and D-4 visa holders in South Korea (Varpahovskis 2020)

Country	D-2* visa holders in September 2016	D-4* visa holders in September 2016
Tajikistan	55	22
Turkmenistan	37	11
Kyrgyzstan	189	118
Kazakhstan	740	191
Uzbekistan	1467	821
Total	2488	1163

Note: Koryoins are not included in the table below because there is a special visa type for overseas ethnic Koreans, including for study and work reasons (F-4).

South Korea has also engaged in pre-school education in Uzbekistan. The first experimental kindergarten was reconstructed using Korean standards, and instructors received training from specialised Korean institutions (Varpahovskis 2019). Through this pre-school approach, Korea might win the hearts and minds of Uzbek families whose children attend this kindergarten. The children are taking first steps in becoming aware of Korean culture through playing different national instruments, including Korean instruments (Varpahovskis 2019).

Additionally, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan supports many youth events and activities, for example it held the "2019 Quiz on Korea" in collaboration with the Korea Foundation and Tashkent Bucheon University. A total of 110 students from Nizami Normal University, Oriental University, Tashkent Bucheon University, World Economics and Foreign Studies University, World Language University, Tashkent Yeju University, Art Design University, Tashkent Inha University, Korea Education Center and King Sejong Institute participated in the event, including students studying Korean in the provinces such as Nukus Normal University, Bukhara National University, Samarkand

University of Foreign Studies, Urgench National University, Karakalpak National University, and Fergana National University (The Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Uzbekistan n.d.).

However, one of the most remarkable channels of South Korea's educational diplomacy is creating partnerships with higher education Uzbekistan state institutions and opening Korean universities' campuses in Uzbekistan. All the South Korean campuses in Uzbekistan are joint projects between the state and non-state actors of public diplomacy. Examples of South Korean Universities' Campuses in Uzbekistan are as follows:

Inha University in Tashkent (IUT) was founded in 2014 (IUT n.d.). It is the first Korean university campus which opened its doors in Uzbekistan. IUT was created in cooperation with the INHA University in the Republic of Korea and provides superior and comprehensive educational opportunities at various levels to both students and professionals. The university website indicated that the core objective is to educate leaders of the future in technology, industry, and business as well as other professions, who will contribute to the development of the nation and human society (IUT n.d.). In April 2019 President Moon Jae-in visited Inha University's campus in Tashkent to see Uzbek and Korean medical teams jointly demonstrating telemedicine (Lee, J. and Lee, M. K. 2019). This event was designed for Korea to outsource its digital health care industry and improve Uzbekistan's medical services. The Uzbek medical industry seeks to incorporate Korea's digital health care, which features cutting-edge medical services, information transfer and communications technology (Lee, J. and Lee, M. K. 2019). Thus, the university became a hub of South Korean public diplomacy actors collaborating in the fields of medicine, technology, business and education. All these services impact Uzbek publics and promote Korea's national image. It is evident that the campus will prepare specialists in the field of technology and business, thus the alumni of the university could join South Korean business firms, as the managers of the latter would prefer to take the specialists trained to Korean standards. Here, we can see the circle, where South Korean government helps South Korean non-state actor- Inha University -to pursue its education diplomacy targeting human resources in Uzbekistan. Since the university specializing in technology and business studies, the South Korean companies (non-state actors) will continue the cycle in the circle.

Bucheon University in Tashkent (BUT) was established by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated July 2, 2018 on the initiative of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special, Ministry of Preschool Education of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Bucheon University (Republic of Korea). BUT will assist in the development of educational systems in the republic in preschool education, architecture, as well as other popular areas of education, the establishment of close interaction between research and educational institutions, other enterprises and organizations (Bucheon

Unievrsity in Tashkent 2020). The same public diplomacy strategy can be seen in this example, but with the participation of the actors in pre-school education, architecture and design. The future graduates will be working in these fields, further promoting Korean national image.

Yeoju Technical Institute in Tashkent (YTIT) offers opportunities for obtaining education in an international atmosphere. Within the Korean-Uzbek business forum dedicated to the state visit of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyayev, to the Republic of Korea on the 22-24th November 2017, a Memorandum on the creation of Yeoju Technical Institute in Tashkent was signed between Korean and Uzbek partners (Yeoju Technical Institute in Tashkent 2020). YTIT will prepare personnel and specialists with modern professional skills demanded in the job market. The students have an opportunity to participate in exchange programmes as well as in programmes on receiving joint or double degrees.

Ajou University in Tashkent (AUT) was established in accordance with the prospects for socio-economic development of Uzbekistan by agreement on the Management of Ajou University's Academic Curriculum between the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, Republic of Uzbekistan and Ajou University, Republic of Korea, based on the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 30 November, 2018. University graduates who are provided with state support will be assigned to work with the condition of working at the state organizations for at least 3 years (Gaevoy 2018). Universities can be perfect public diplomacy tools as they reach foreign publics through their internationalisation activities: recruitment of international students; cross-border mobility of students and scholars; language learning; internationalisation of curriculum; and cross-border institutional partnerships for learning, research and development (Hudzik 2005). South Korea has developed educational diplomacy in Uzbekistan to an extent incomparable to any other countries. Uzbekistan has the largest number of South Korean overseas university campuses.

Besides the above mentioned universities, there are other educational institutions in Uzbekistan which contribute to South Korean public diplomacy.

The Uzbek-Korean International University in Fergana (KIUF) was established by the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan in cooperation with leading specialists of the higher education system of South Korea and the Republic of Uzbekistan to develop professional, practical and world-class talents (KIUF 2020). The graduates are offered Internship and employment in Korean companies with industrial cooperation with universities (UzDaily 2019). The university will prepare specialists in 14 areas

(UzDaily 2019). This is the first state university which is a result of cooperation between the two governments.

The King Sejong Institute Foundation (KSIF) offers Korean language courses for Uzbek publics. KSIF is dedicated to reaching out to the world using the Korean language as a tool. The students of KSIF deepen understanding of Korea, including enhancing their enjoyment of K-pop, traveling to Korea, and studying and working in Korean well as learning the Korean language. KSIF plans to establish itself as “a small Korea in every country of the world” (King Sejong Institute 2020). In regards to Uzbekistan, the Ministry of Culture of Korea plans to open five “special” Sejong Hakdang classes in Vietnam, Nepal, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and Cambodia for people who wish or plan to work in Korea (Lee, C. 2011).

AKFA University (AU) has been established according to the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan dated February 15, 2019. This university targets Uzbek publics through education, medical and business channels as it educates a number of people in the areas that the country needs. The university proposes solutions for the training of professional staff, produces new educational technologies and develop the principles of education and training. The university trains specialists in medical, exact and humanitarian disciplines. (Akfa University 2020).

South Korea's public diplomacy strategy involves aid and investment in nearly all Uzbekistan's economic and social spheres, in return Korea gains trust and access to many resources of Uzbekistan. South Korea has its largest number of overseas university campuses in Uzbekistan. South Korea has created a life -time collaboration circle of its public diplomacy's state and non-state actors, where the introduction of one actor involves the participation and support of other actors. Moreover, South Korea's public diplomacy has a long-term vision of the returns on investment (ROI). South Korea creates a perfect education circle, where it opens university campuses to provide education in different fields such as engineering, preschool education, medicine, Korean studies etc. Their alumni will have an advantage when applying for jobs at the Korean companies, thereby securing a future for themselves. Korea's national brand improves from year to year and has a greater number of non-state actors of public diplomacy, who promote its image further.

The popularisation of South Korea's culture and language through educational channels also contributes to the construction of its positive image. Many recipients of scholarships and grants, as well as alumni of Korean universities, constitute the core personnel involved in joint ventures undertaken by the Korean and Uzbek governments. Alumni of Korean universities are prospective employees of Korean enterprises operating in Uzbekistan and other countries. The education they receive from Korean universities and

training programmes will help secure their future and build ties to Korea. McClory (2018) believed that the ability of a country to attract foreign students, or facilitate exchanges even between countries with history of animosity, is a powerful public diplomacy tool. McClory (2018) also noted that prior research into educational diplomacy gives empirical evidence for reputational gains that accrue to a host country when foreign students return home.

3.2.4 South Korea's Medical Diplomacy and Assistance in Uzbekistan

South Korea has been the first country to provide COVID support to Uzbekistan at the beginning of 2020. South Korea has launched two big medical public diplomacy projects (hospitals) in Uzbekistan in cooperation with the Uzbek government. The recipients of the initiative are the people of Uzbekistan, who need medical treatment and doctors, who receive the training from their South Korean colleagues. Both projects involve South Korean state and non-state public diplomacy actors:

The Bukhara Himchan Hospital opened in 2019, as a jointly-operated facility that provides orthopedic services, general internal medicine and neurosurgical procedures, thanks to exchange and cooperation between the Ministry of Health and Welfare (South Korea) and the Ministry of Health (Uzbekistan) (Bakh 2020). Himchan Hospital was founded by Dongwon scholarship committee (동원장학회) in 2002 and since then hospitals have been opened in Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates and Russia.

South Korea and Uzbekistan have expanded their collaboration since they signed a joint agreement of health and medical cooperation in August 2011. Himchan Hospital is the first local private medical institution to open up a branch in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. The Korean hospital has invested about 10 billion won into restructuring buildings and installing equipment, the Ministry of Health and Welfare also provided financial support of 360 million won for the hospital construction through the Korea Health Industry Development Institute's Medical Overseas Support Project (Lee 2019). Bukhara Himchan Hospital may become a hub for medical education in Uzbekistan and Central Asia by jointly opening a physical therapy department with the Bukhara State Medical Institute. "The opening of Bukhara Himchan Hospital is the result of the cooperation between the Korean and Uzbekistan governments and the Korean government's policy to support overseas expansion of local private medical institutions," Minister of Health and Welfare Park Neung-hoo said (Lee 2019). Korean doctors have earned trust among Uzbekistan patients, thus the hospital plans to continue to dispatch Korean doctors and focus more on educating and training local medical workers to improve their medical skills (Bakh 2020).

In accordance with Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan from December 10th of 2013 the project “21st Century Uzbekistan-Korea Friendship Children's Hospital” has started (National Children's Medical Centre 2020). In October 2013 MoD (Minutes of Discussion) between Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investments and Trade, and the Ministry of Health and the EDCF (Economic Development Cooperation Fund) Appraisal Mission of the EXIM Bank of Korea took place to found the hospital. In December 2013 the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Export-Import Bank of Korea signed a Loan Agreement “21st Century Uzbekistan-Korea Friendship Children Hospital Project”. In June 2014 the 1st Project Advisor and 1st Advisory Team (Ewha Womans University) were assigned by the Korean Foundation for International Health. In April 2015 BAUM Architects Inc. became a contractor for the consultancy services. The following actors contributed to the project: Economic Development and Cooperation Fund of the Republic of Korea” (financial cooperation), KOICA (creation of a Training Center of the Children's Multidisciplinary Hospital and high tech multidisciplinary 4th level hospital, a 7 million USD grant project for strengthening the capacity of medical staff in NCH from 2019); Soonchunhyang Medical Center ,advisory team assigned by KOFIH; Samsung C&T Consortium (medical equipment supply), ILJIN & Dongwon (construction), BIT (computer for HIS supply); Seoul National University Children's Hospital (project management consultancy assigned by KOICA in July 2019) and Pusan National University Yangsan Hospital (National Children's Medical Centre 2020). Professor Jung believed that “Based on the successful experience of opening Ewha Womans University Seoul Hospital, EWUMC will provide Uzbekistan's National Children's Hospital with various clinicians and hospital administration experts for the next two years” (Lee 2019). Figure 3 demonstrates South Korean organisations involved into Children's Medical Centre creation (National Children's Medical Centre 2020).

Figure 3 South Korean organisations involved into Children's Medical Centre creation
(National Children's Medical Centre 2020)



The South Korean government has been helping Korean medical institutions advance abroad. The Ministry of Health and Welfare of the Republic of Korea established an expert advisory group by region and sector and has been providing consulting support projects to reduce risks associated with the overseas advances by private medical institutions (Lee 2019).

South Korea and Uzbekistan drew an action plan aimed to strengthen cooperation in public healthcare. The plan included the implementation of the following tasks by 2021: establishing a strategy to digitise information of the public healthcare in Uzbekistan, conducting pilot projects for ICT-based medical system cooperation, developing and operating education programs to nurture eHealth experts and collaboration for the advancement of the pharmaceutical sector. In a summit with Moon, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed building a special pharmaceutical complex to attract Korean drug companies (Kwak 2019).

All these Korea's efforts in Uzbekistan led to the success of medical tourism. In 2018, the actual number of medical tourists from Uzbekistan traveling to South Korea for medical treatments was around 3900. South Korea is a popular destination for medical tourism since it offers advanced medical facilities and technology at lower costs compared to other major countries (Won 2020). Mr. Neunghoo Park, the Minister of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has visited three Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan during President Jae-in Moon's state visit to Central Asia from April 16 to 23, 2019 (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2019). During the visit the Minister furthered the overseas expansion of the Korean healthcare industry including ICT-based healthcare technology in parallel with the promotion of Korea's advanced healthcare policy and institutions.

In Uzbekistan, in cooperation with AKFA University, Gacheon University College of Medicine provided Korean medical school curriculum to establish the first private medical university in the country in 2019. Additionally, Kyungpook National University Hospital signed the MOU to build a partnership in medical treatment with First and Second Samarkand State Medical Institute in Uzbekistan (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2019). In medical diplomacy, South Korea has created the inter-connected circle of state and non-state public diplomacy actors, where all the actors collaborate with each other and promote Korea's national image.

3.2.5 South Korean Businesses Promoting Public Diplomacy in Uzbekistan

It is worth noting that since Uzbekistan gained its Independence, there have been two Uzbek presidents in office. When the second president came to power in 2017, the Uzbek-Korean relationship has improved greatly. More companies with Korean investment have been registered during this period, and there have been regular meetings among governmental officials to promote further cooperation between the two countries.

South Korea has abundant capital and technology which Uzbekistan needs for industrial diversification and infrastructure development; while Uzbekistan can offer energy, natural resources and cheap labour. Hwang (2012) summarised that by 1992, South Korea was the leading foreign investor in the Uzbek economy with more than one billion dollars' worth of investments, mainly the automobile manufacturing joint venture Uz-Daewoo based in Andijan, the telecommunications project by Daewoo Unitel, and Kabool Textiles Ltd. In March 2006 the Korean National Oil Corporation (KNOC), Korea Gas Corporation, and Uzbekneftegaz (the national Uzbekistan gas company) signed a Memorandum of Understanding giving Korean companies exclusive exploration and exploitation rights for the two oil and gas deposits in Chust-Pap and Namangan-Terachi. Later in 2008, the Korean gas company KOGAS and Uzbekneftegaz agreed on the joint exploration and exploitation of the Surgil gas site on the Uatyurt Plateau, for an estimated cost of \$1.84 billion (Hwang 2012). The volume of investments of South Korea attracted into the economy of Uzbekistan exceeded 7 billion US dollars in 2017. Hence, there are 461 enterprises utilising South Korean capital in Uzbekistan, including 386 joint ventures and 75 enterprises with 100% South Korean capital. In 2016, the Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex was built with South Korean investments of \$4 billion. Additionally, Korean Air has been carrying out cargo transportation through Navoi airport since 2008 (United Nations n.d.). In 2019 bilateral trade increased by 27 percent compared to 2018, including exports by 30.1 percent. More recently, 198 enterprises (including join-ventures) with Korean capital were created in Uzbekistan in 2019, and their total number exceeds 800. Major projects, such as Surgil gas

processing complex, textile factories in Fergana and Bukhara, Hyundai automobile manufacturing plant in Namangan, have been implemented with investments from leading South Korean companies (Lee 2019). Commercial actors have begun to work in the cultural space, associating themselves with international cultural projects and events as a way of enhancing their brand and improving the national image of their countries (Cull 2019). Public diplomacy actors increasingly build coalitions. South Korea's case in Uzbekistan is an example of the actors' partnership. Partnership has always been central to public diplomacy, its main argument being that a partnership has an increased ability to solve complex international problems (Cull 2019).

The South Korean government supports its business in Uzbekistan by signing bilateral agreements with the Uzbekistan government, so that Korean business could promote its national brand through the production of Korean goods and services to Uzbek publics. It is clear that the newly appointed president of the Republic of Uzbekistan continues close cooperation with South Korea, for example Tashkent hosted a meeting of Uzbekistan and South Korea Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2019 (uza.uz 2019). The parties discussed the need to create joint centres, construction of high-speed railways in Uzbekistan, production of environmentally friendly cars, projects to create a tourism infrastructure, smart city, and cultivation of export-oriented agricultural products (uza.uz 2019).


With the technical assistance of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), two grant projects in healthcare were completed in 2019 in the amount of 13 million USD, and 6 projects worth 29.6 million USD are under implementation involving Korean companies. Another 10 projects worth 72.2 million USD are being developed for implementation between 2020- 2022 (UzA 2020). Moreover, in cooperation with the Export-Import Bank of Korea resources in the amount of 2 billion USD have been attracted to Uzbekistan (UzA 2020).

In July 2020, Industry Minister Sung Yun-mo met Sardor Umurzakov, Uzbekistan's deputy prime minister for investment and foreign economic relations, in Seoul to discuss ways to overcome the economic fallout from the new coronavirus pandemic, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. This time South Korea came up with a new model of FTA that will promote sustainable cooperation in the fields of trade and investment in Uzbekistan. During the meeting SK Engineering & Construction Co. inked a front end engineering design (FEED) agreement with Uzbekistan's state-run oil and gas company, Uzbekneftegaz, to modernise an oil refinery (Yonhap News 2020). The parties agreed to develop a new 3-year program of financial and technical cooperation between Uzbekistan

and Korea for the record 2021-2023 with an increase in its budget up to US\$ 1 billion. The future projects will involve the creation of an Uzbek-Korean research center to introduce advanced construction technologies and construction of an integrated Centre for training, education, personnel development and an innovative state preschool educational system (Tashkenttimes 2020). Business has a considerable role to play in public diplomacy as customers, vendors, and business partners need a firm relationship of trust in this environment (Goodman and Goodman 2006). Business has rediscovered its purpose in this context as a global citizen, expanding beyond the definition that the purpose of business is to create wealth for its owners, who are: investors who are also employees; employees who are also customers; consumers who are also local business partners; business partners who are also local stakeholders; local stakeholders who are also media; consumers who are also media; and media who are also NGOs. Global companies and their brands touch the lives of more people than government representatives ever could (Cull 2019). Business professionals in international companies are more likely to be citizens of the country they are in, as well as representatives of their companies. They can then serve a diplomatic function because of their cultural sensitivity to their own environment as well as the global enterprise they work for. In a world of instantaneous media coverage, transparency, and intangible value drives, a successful company will welcome the opportunity to play its role in public diplomacy (Goodman and Goodman 2006).

The South Korean public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan demonstrates an example of a cooperative process of state and non-state actors. The government assists Korean businesses in securing major projects in Uzbekistan through various governmental agencies such as KOTRA and KOICA. Figure 4 shows that Korea has used Official Development assistance (ODA) to create a special relationship with Uzbekistan since 1992 (MOFA statistics 2019). Uzbekistan has been receiving the largest share of ODA among Central Asian countries.

Figure 4 Korean ODA to Central Asia (2010–2018) in USD (MOFA statistics 2019).



Uzbekistan has a strong agricultural base and is one of the world's largest producers of cotton. It is also endowed with abundant natural resources, including hydrocarbons, gold, copper, and uranium (Countrywatch n.d.).


With a growing number of Korean companies in Uzbekistan, these non-state actors have become more involved in efforts to influence foreign publics' views and to promote South Korea's national image through extensive networks and locals on the ground: employees, alumni of Korean educational and training programmes, consumers of their goods and communities. International corporations have enormous communication budgets, global impact, and sensitivity to intercultural communication, all of which could be of great value to governmental diplomacy (White 2015). These companies have vast soft power resources, global worldviews, expertise in consumer research of international audiences, as well as greater credibility than governments that can be advantageous to public diplomacy.

All actors gain from working with a partner, it should be acknowledged that it can be a rewarding process, stimulating new ideas and approaches through new mixes and connections (Cull 2019). Public diplomacy partnerships typically include actors from a wide range of backgrounds, including non-governmental organisations, corporate actors with huge financial assets and an eagerness to broaden their consumer markets, regional-level actors with local knowledge and the ability to mobilise civil society and others. All such actors have unique strengths to bring to partnership.

As economic actors who have access in their countries, the diaspora becomes an instrument of outreach for the home state (Rana 2014). In public diplomacy, the diaspora are natural ambassadors of the country of origin and can play a special role of the development of its soft power in the target country (Rana 2014).

The Figure 5 below represents South Korea's public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan, where South Korea's public diplomacy strategy puts more emphasis on human factor including the Korean diaspora.

Figure 5: South Korea's public diplomacy Actors in Uzbekistan



(Source: own depiction)

3.3 Discussion

The aim of this chapter was to address the research questions of the study: How does South Korea implement its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan and what differentiates those strategies from the general approach? The study was to prove that the

South Korea's government puts greater emphasis on non-state actors (human resources) in its public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan. The results of the study suggest that South Korea's state and non-state actors of public diplomacy have closely collaborated to promote South Korea's national image with maximum engagement of the human factor of Uzbekistan. The data proved the research's hypothesis by providing evidence such as the issuing of visas for the Korean diaspora. South Korea offers a special immigration visa (F-4) for Korean people to fill its labour gap. This visa enables the Korean diaspora to permanently settle in South Korea, thus increasing the population due to a possible increase in birth rate. Moreover, many young people in Uzbekistan are involved in the educational and cultural programmes organised by the South Korean public diplomacy agencies, thereby ensuring a long lasting relationship with the Uzbek publics. The growing number of South Korean businesses in Uzbekistan further promotes South Korean national image through provision of services and goods as well as employment of local population. The central focus of South Korea's public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan was on human resources. To promote its positive image in Uzbekistan, South Korea has been allocating its largest aid share in Central Asia to Uzbekistan since 1992. The data is readily available on the official KOICA website which makes it clear to the Uzbek government that Uzbekistan is a very special partner in the region.

South Korea has directed its aid to medical, educational, technological, cultural, agricultural, and other economic sectors of Uzbekistan, where Uzbek publics can directly experience South Korean involvement in their lives through these public diplomacy tools. Moreover, the largest Korean diaspora resides in Uzbekistan, which strengthens South Korean public diplomacy goals in the country. The results appear to show, that the Korean diaspora receives extensive support from the South Korean government with access to education (pre-school education, learning Korean languages at numerous South Korean institutions, scholarships and grants for higher education, training, employment opportunities and immigration to South Korea opportunities), the diaspora is engaged with Korean state public diplomacy agencies through the House of Korean Art and Culture, the Overseas Korean Foundation, The Korea Plant Industries Association (their project directed to assist local Koreans in Uzbekistan), even such non-state actor as the Uzbekistan Korean Culture Association is heavily supported by the state public diplomacy actors and Korean government. By supporting the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan South Korea promotes its positive image and reaches out to local Korean people who will continue being public diplomacy "ambassadors".

The results of the current study point to an increase in the role of the South Korean government in supporting its state and non-state public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. The

South Korean government directs large flows of aid to Uzbekistan, and also signs bilateral agreements on strategic partnership and cooperation with the Uzbek government.

When South Korea and Uzbekistan sign agreements on large and long-term projects in Uzbekistan, South Korea first involves its state public diplomacy actors such as KOICA, KOTRA, EximBank, KOFICE, KOPIA and others to initiate the projects. Later, these agencies involve South Korean private businesses (construction, oil, gas, education, agricultural, IT, pharmaceutical, agricultural, medical etc). With the appearance of the non-state actors in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek publics becomes aware of South Korea as some of them become employees of these companies or consumers of their goods and services. The most fascinating result is that South Korea manages to create so-called public diplomacy circles, where the government, state and non-state actors cooperate with each other with the aim to involve the human resources of Uzbekistan.

Additionally, the results here support the hypothesis that South Korea's public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan puts more emphasis on the human resource, thereby creating another interconnected circle, where the government helps Korean universities to open their campuses in Uzbekistan to prepare specialists in various areas such as: technology, business, preschool education, medicine, architecture and design, and other fields with the prospect of socio-economic development. The alumni of the universities will become future employees of the Korean companies as they would be trained to Korean standards and have improved chances to be employed by them. Government's role in relational public diplomacy initiatives is limited to designing and facilitating interpersonal interactions between home and foreign publics, whereas it is the human factor as non-state actors who build and maintain these relations (Ayhan 2020). Aid, education, medicine, culture and technology are very powerful public diplomacy tools, which Korea implements in Uzbekistan. South Korea's strategy is directed at Uzbek publics and links it with its existing public diplomacy actors in the country.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of the human factor as a non-state actor in South Korea's public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan. This thesis integrated concepts of public diplomacy research (social network theory, actor network theory, propaganda, Ideological State Apparatus, soft power, national branding and cultural diplomacy). It has addressed the following research questions "How does South Korea implement its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan?" and "What differentiates those strategies from the general approach?". The research has provided additional insight into the implementation and development of public diplomacy mechanisms. Although studies in public diplomacy have examined South Korea's public diplomacy strategies, little attention has been paid to the engagement among its state and non-state actors in Uzbekistan. As such, this study filled this research gap. The analytical focus on how the actors' promotion South Korea's national brand in Uzbekistan contributed to new public diplomacy. The study also analysed the actors and evaluated their interactions in Uzbekistan using Social Network Theory and Actor Network Theory. The research examined the network among state and non-state actors as a result of South Korea's public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan. The thesis showed that public diplomacy is one of the priorities of South Korea's political agenda, thus the Public Diplomacy Act, South Korea's first law on public diplomacy, was enacted in 2016. The data presented general South Korean public diplomacy visions, goals, and strategies, they also illustrated the evolution of Korea's public diplomacy, however, the engagement with the Korean diaspora was not included in any of these data. Hence, this thesis summarised that the Korean government engages with the Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan through multiple collaborations. Additionally, South Korea has engaged with Uzbekistan at different educational levels. Korea's government and its agencies, such as KOICA, Overseas Koreans Foundation, Korea Foundation, Academy of Korean Studies and others, are generous at providing scholarships, training, grants and other educational opportunities to Uzbek citizens.

This study built on and contributed to work on South Korea's public diplomacy and proved that South Korea's government places greater emphasis on the human factor as a non-state actor rather than a state-actor in its public diplomacy strategy in Uzbekistan due to the large local Korean diaspora created by the migration events of the mid-20th century. Chapter One "Literature Review", presented a critical review of the literature on historical background, concepts, theories and strategies of public diplomacy in order to draw out an explanatory framework to assist in the interpretation, illustration and understanding of the findings of the research. The chapter started with an overview of social network theory and actor-network theory to understand how scholars have applied those theories to analyse

new public diplomacy actors' networks. Literature review outlined public diplomacy's evolution, starting with Edward Bernays' famous book *Propaganda*, written in 1928, followed by the concept of 'public diplomacy', the democratic term coined by Edmund Gullion to substitute propaganda in 1967. Moreover, the chapter explored Ideological State Apparatus theory by Louis Althusser (1970), which served as an example of division of powers within a state, which might be applied in modern public diplomacy strategies. The chapter also covered soft power concept, coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s as public diplomacy is considered to be its essential tool. The literature review portrayed the difference between old public diplomacy and new public diplomacy and the reasons why and how old public diplomacy evolved into new public diplomacy. It was important to examine the study of one of the most influential public diplomacy researchers, Nicholas Cull. As the study focused on state and non-state actors of new public diplomacy, the chapter covered some recent literature on their role and collaboration in a contemporary world. Furthermore, the chapter reviewed literature on nation branding, which appeared in the late 1990s, including the study of its founder, Simon Anholt. Melissen identified nation branding and public diplomacy as 'sister under the skin', however, both have very different roots. Finally, the chapter shed light on cultural diplomacy as one of the most significant and oldest elements of public diplomacy.

The study was conducted through secondary data collection and was approached through interpretivism as it emphasises the meaningful nature of people's participation in social and cultural life. Since Literature review chapter has pointed to a lack of information and knowledge on the public diplomacy actors of South Korea and their networks in Uzbekistan, the focus of public diplomacy research was still on generating rather than empirically testing theories. Theory generation constitutes an important goal of qualitative research thereby allowing an in depth analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. The qualitative analysis of those data involved major state and non-state actors of Korean public diplomacy.

"Data Analysis" undertook a presentation of the analysis of the data generated from conducting content analysis of secondary data (mainly electronic media). Revealing the relationship between South Korea and Uzbekistan from 1992 until 2020, the chapter delved into South Korea's public diplomacy strategy and its approach in Uzbekistan. It included the role of the Korean diaspora, educational diplomacy, medical diplomacy and Korean companies as tools of South Korean public diplomacy. It also demonstrated the interrelated collaboration and relationship among the South Korean public diplomacy actors in Uzbekistan. Middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, South Korea has achieved its middle power status through rapid economic development and

modernisation. Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan has bridged the gap between the two nations and it is very often mentioned during the official governmental meetings.

South Korea has been the first country to provide COVID support to Uzbekistan at the beginning of 2020. Moreover, South Korea has launched two big medical public diplomacy projects (hospitals) in Uzbekistan in cooperation with the Uzbek government. The recipients of the initiative are the people of Uzbekistan, who need medical treatment, and doctors who receive the training from their South Korean colleagues. As a result, both projects involve South Korean state and non-state public diplomacy actors.

The South Korean government supports its business in Uzbekistan by signing bilateral agreements with the Uzbekistan government, so that Korean business could promote its national brand through the production of Korean goods and services provided to Uzbek publics. The newly appointed president of the Republic of Uzbekistan continues close cooperation with South Korea, for example Tashkent hosted a meeting of Uzbekistan and South Korea Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2019 where the parties discussed the need to create joint centres, construction of high-speed railways in Uzbekistan, production of environmentally friendly cars, projects to create a tourism infrastructure, smart city, and cultivation of export-oriented agricultural products.

This Chapter set out the key contributions to knowledge of the research. These relate to enrichment of our understanding of South Korean public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan with the emphasis on the human factor through the evidence provided and analysed. This chapter set out the research limitations and possible future research related to public diplomacy actors in this ever- changing globalised world.

The Korean diaspora of Uzbekistan has been seen as an important public diplomacy tool to South Korea. A majority of South Korea's state actors actively participate in public diplomacy initiatives directed to support the Korean diaspora. For example, the research has shown that since 1992 not only did South Korea heavily finance the Uzbekistan Korean Culture Association to ensure that the Korean diaspora maintains its Korean identity through culture, language and association with the Korean community, but also provided the local Koreans an opportunity to move to South Korea for work and/or education purposes. Notably, South Korea has one of the lowest birth rates in the world and the attraction of the Korean diaspora could help to increase Korea's population and also fill employment gaps for economic growth.

The study assessed Uzbekistan's position and its resources in the region, analysed South Korean - Uzbekistan relationship, examined the evolution of the South Korean public diplomacy policies, identified South Korea's public diplomacy channels in Uzbekistan and

evaluated the activities of South Korea's public diplomacy actors and their interactions. The research objectives have been thereby achieved.

The key contribution of this research is to present an understanding of how South Korea differentiates its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan from its general approach. The case study may be utilised for future academic studies related to the field of public diplomacy. The study portrayed in detail, how South Korea uses its state and non-state actors in Uzbekistan to promote the national image and establish long lasting relations with Uzbekistan. South Korea puts great emphasis on the human factor as a non-state actor in its public diplomacy strategies in Uzbekistan. The research has also shown the role of the Korean diaspora in South Korea's public diplomacy.

This research is unique, as unlike most present literature on public diplomacy actors, it has expanded to deepen the understanding of non-state actors such as hospitals, university campuses, Diasporas and businesses as public diplomacy tools. The major finding was that the identified non-state actors' public diplomacy activities have been initiated by the South Korean government, which may give them the status of both state and non-state actors. For example, the South Korean hospitals and university campuses, which are non-state actors operating in Uzbekistan, were opened due to the help and support of both the South Korean and Uzbek governments. The study also revealed close cooperation of these actors with the South Korean government and its public diplomacy agencies. The research contributes to the knowledge of public diplomacy by showing how South Korea engages with the Uzbek publics and puts a greater emphasis on the human factor.

The nature of this research would ideally require a collection of primary data from semi-structured interviews with government, business, educational and the Korean diaspora representatives as the interview is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative research. However due to the time limitation, only qualitative method with collection of secondary data has been applied as "Interviewing, the transcription of interviews, and the analysis of transcripts are all very time-consuming" (Bryman 2016: 466). Moreover, due to the public diplomacy actors' residing in Uzbekistan and Korea, the geographical location became another limitation for arranging the interviews. The best scenario for the researcher would have been to travel to Uzbekistan to interview the participants, however Uzbekistan is marked as a high risk zone and it would have taken a long time to approve the trip for the ethics certificate.

Future research could include collection of primary data and seek the possibility to employ mixed methods. Also, as this study has identified some non-state public diplomacy actors such as universities and hospitals, further research is suggested to explore their roles

as public diplomacy tools. Further research on the implementation of public diplomacy strategies in other CIS countries could be conducted to expand and enhance the findings of this study.

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