

## DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

### **Defining the role of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA) a reconceptualisation of the roles of institutions**

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# **Defining the Role of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): A Reconceptualisation of the Roles of Institutions**

**By**

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**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the University's requirements for the  
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## Abstract

At its core, this research project is a revision of how we conceptualise the role of international organisations. The concept of *role* is often invoked International Relations when discussing the function of institutions like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), but its full meaning in this context has never been problematised, leading to varying perceptions of its meaning and a lack of common understanding in the discourse. In the case of the APSA, this lack of common understanding has led to a wide variance in how the role of the APSA is categorised, and a corresponding discrepancy in assessments of the institution's success and utility, which has had a knock-on effect on policy recommendations, which also differ wildly from author to author.

This thesis devises technical definitions for the various ways in which the word *role* is utilised in International Relations and related fields, and in so doing, aims to standardise our understanding of the role of institutions, using the APSA as a case study.

After developing a new technical definition of *role* based on Role Theory, the thesis develops a research programme which sets out to investigate the *true* role of the APSA, based on an examination of how the APSA's role has been shaped by key limiting and enabling factors, and how this role is shaped and influenced, and directed; all the while highlighting how it differs from the organisation's stated role, and scholarly perceptions of that role.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (UK)
AFRICAP	Africa Peacekeeping Program
AFRICOM	Africa Command (US)
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	Africa Peace Facility
APSA	African Union Peace and Security Architecture
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAMEF	Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy / Forces for the Defence of Democracy
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPX	Command Post Exercise
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DPKO-AU PST	The DPKO's African Union Peacekeeping Support Team (UN)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
EASBRIGCOM	East African Standby Brigade Command
EASFCOM	East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism

ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EUCOM	United States European Command
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FNL	Forces Nationales de Libération
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HOA	Horn of Africa
IAPF	Italian African Peace Facility
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Mission in Somalia
ISS	Institute for Strategic Studies
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commission
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JOP	Joint Operations Plan
JSCM	Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism
JSR	Joint AU-UN Special Representative
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission
MAPEX	Map Exercise
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MILOBS	Military Observers
MIOC	African Union Observer Mission to the Comoros
MIP	Mission Intelligence Plan
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the DRC
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDRR	National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NMRD	National Movement for Reconstruction and Development
NRC	National Role Conceptions Theory
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ORT	Organisational Role Theory
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Unit
PK	Peace Keeping
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PMC	Private Military Contractor
PotW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department (African Union Commission)
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PST	Peacekeeping Support Team
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
RCM-A	Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SPMU	Strategic Planning Management Unit
SMPU	Support Management Planning Unit
TCC	Troop-Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNMIS	United Nations Missions in Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force

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## **Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review**

### ***The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)***

The African Union (AU) was established on 9 July 2002, superseding the old Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) began to develop alongside the operationalisation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Constitutive Act set out many of the key institutions, powers and responsibilities of the nascent framework, and was soon supplemented by the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002), the Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004g) and many other legal documents that collectively constitute the APSA.

Ten years since its operationalisation in 2002, the APSA has already been involved in three major military peace missions, referred to by the APSA as Peace Support Operations (PSOs) as they often deploy early in the peace process. These were, chronologically, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—which has since evolved into the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It has also sponsored an intervention in Comoros, Operation Democracy in the Comoros, designed to overthrow an unconstitutional secessionist government on the island of Anjouan. AMISOM and AMIS alone have cost hundreds of millions of dollars per annum to maintain, and severe capacity gaps within the AU and its member states have led the AU to rely extensively upon its external partners—countries and organisations who value the APSA's contribution to peace and security

enough to continue paying its bills and providing other support such as training, mentoring and the provision of expertise and equipment.

The APSA has had a polarising effect on the discourse, attracting equal measures of cynicism and optimism. One reason for this discord, which will be investigated in detail below, has been the failure of APSA scholars to agree upon what the APSA is *supposed* to do; scholars with high expectations of the role of the APSA and its PSOs have a correspondingly low assessment of its success. This project will address the inconsistency of these expectations by reconceptualising what we mean by the *role* played by the APSA. It will do this by problematising the definition of an organisation's *role* and replacing the mundane definition with more precise technical definitions. A more accurate understanding of what the APSA's role is will allow for a more accurate assessment of its success or failure at performing that role.

Importantly, this thesis is not written with the primary aim of telling the APSA what to do, or what it should be doing, or what its weaknesses are. The real aim of this study is to facilitate a more objective basis for assessments of the APSA's utility as a peace and security actor, as well as the corresponding decisions about the allocation and extent of support by explaining what the role of the APSA really is, what it can be expected to achieve and what it should not be expected to achieve. As the following literature review will show, every APSA scholar has a slightly different list of recommendations as a result of their pre-existing and disparate perceptions of the role of the APSA. This thesis adopts a more methodical and deliberate approach when defining the role of the APSA.

In order to facilitate a tight and pragmatic focus to the thesis, a number of qualifications and limits have been imposed upon this project. First, the thesis will not describe the APSA's institutions, other than how they directly affect the APSA's role; after ten years, there is now a healthy body of scholarly work analysing the initial treaty framework and describing the various components of the APSA. This previous work has allowed the current project to assume a basic level of prior knowledge about the APSA, enabling it to take a more analytical tone from the outset, putting this well established scholarship in the context of the role of the its effect upon the role of the APSA. Second, the thesis will concentrate only on the APSA's first ten years of operation, from 2002-2012, and it will focus only on the APSA itself.

The acronym APSA is not consistently used; it is defined by academics, practitioners and journalists alike as either the "African Union Peace and Security Architecture" or, the broader term, the "African Peace and Security Architecture". The former term is less common, and may or may not include the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The latter term is usually used as a reference to the former, although it sometimes also includes non-AU security institutions on the continent.

For the sake of clarity and focus, when this thesis refers to the 'APSA', it is in reference to the former definition—the "African Union Peace and Security Architecture"—and will not include the security architecture of the RECs and RMs. Although they are *officially* part of the African Union architecture, their integration into the continental system is ongoing. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States

(ECCAS) and the East African Community (EAC) have all fielded peace support operations of various sizes, and have done so with the authorisation of, and in consultation with the continental level; however, they all have their own independent treaty frameworks, revenue streams, decision-making bodies and force generation systems that are separate from each other and from the AU. The relationship between the RECs/RMs and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) often resembles the relationship between the APSA and the UN Security Council. As a result of this separateness, and in order to focus study on the AU architecture in particular detail, as a single institutional framework, the RECs, RMs and other security frameworks operating in Africa—including, for example, the UN, the Arab League and the United States' Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership—have been largely left out of this study, except for where they affect the role played by the APSA. The APSA itself will be treated as an 'institution'; institutionally separate from the wider web of African security actors, and even largely separate from the wider AU, which is not focused on peace and security issues. The APSA as an 'institution' is based around the AU's core peace security organs; the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the PSC Secretariat, the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department (PSD), the Peace Support Operations division (PSOD) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). The PSC forms the focal point of the APSA, and its decisions and declarations are only rubber-stamped by the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which nonetheless sets the agenda for the PSC.

The institutional nature of the APSA is discussed in considerable detail in the following chapters, particularly in chapter six. Treating the APSA as a single

institution lends the current study greater focus and clarity, and, importantly, makes the methodology and the conclusions of the work more easily transferable to other institutions.

The remainder of this chapter will introduce the research topic in more detail. It will first examine a selection of key texts from the relevant literature, focusing only on those that have addressed the APSA directly. This review will give an overview of the fractured perceptions of the role of the APSA in the discourse, and highlight how this has led to equally fractured perceptions of the success and the utility of the APSA as a peace and security actor. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the key themes in the literature, placing the current research in context and explaining why it is needed, and will then briefly introduce the structure of the thesis and the research methodology.

### ***APSA scholarship and the Academic Debate***

The Constitutive Act of the African Union came into effect ten years ago, and since then the APSA has accrued a small, but relatively vibrant discourse of increasingly focused and analytical scholarship. In order to understand why the current research is so important, and how it will enhance the existing discourse, it is necessary to examine the key themes of APSA scholarship over the past ten years. This brief review will demonstrate that there are several crucial flaws in the existing discourse, and that a true understanding of the role of the APSA requires a different approach.

First, however, it is necessary to define what counts as APSA scholarship.

There has been a lively discourse on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (e.g. *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963 to 1993* (Walraven 1999), *The Organization of African*

*Unity: an Analysis of its Role* ([Naldi](#) 1999)<sup>1</sup>) and other African organisations involved in peacekeeping, including key RECs ECOWAS and SADC (e.g. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa* (Adebajo 2002b), *West Africa: From a Security Complex to a Security Community* (Bah 2005), *SADC: Towards a Security Community* (Ngoma 2003)). There are also many relevant debates within IR theory, especially those focused around security cooperation, English School theory, neo-Institutionalism, peacekeeping theory and other related fields, which overlap with many of the core themes addressed in this thesis (e.g. *Security Regimes* (Jervis 1982), *Security Communities* (Adler & Barnett 1998), *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Buzan & Wæver 2003), *Beyond Anarchy: the Importance of Security Institutions* (Lake 2006); nonetheless, they remain only contextually relevant to the current study. The following section will instead concentrate on the African Union Peace and Security Architecture's own growing body of discourse, as this is the immediate conversation in which the current research takes place.

This conversation did not really exist until about 2005, before which most of the literature was still focused on the OAU, often only acknowledging AU in passing; early APSA scholarship has considerable crossover with the OAU scholarship, especially before the operationalisation of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2004. The scholarship of this period, although often informative, could provide little more than a breakdown of the security provisions in the AU Constitutive Act and its protocols and some speculative analysis thereof (e.g. *The Peace and Security*

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<sup>1</sup> Like the APSA discourse, 'role' is not explicitly defined in these examples.

*Council of the African Union: The Known Unknowns* (Levitt 2003), *The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention* (Kioko 2003), *Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights* (Udombana 2002)).

2005 was a turning point in the scholarly debate, and coincided with the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which, after the relatively effective African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), began to evince the key limitations on the role played by the APSA, a shift that will be explored further in Chapter 7.

The APSA scholarship surveyed for the following review is all drawn from 2005 onwards, and focuses on three areas; describing the APSA's treaty framework, describing the extent of the operationalisation of the APSA and/or assessing how successful the APSA has been as a peace and security actor in Africa, and prescribing what should be done to increase its success. Despite the fact that these APSA scholars have been using similar methodologies, and looking at much of the same evidence, the discourse is fractured when it comes to answering this final question. In practice, every different author has come up with a slightly different answer, ranging on a scale from APSA optimists like Tim Murithi, to APSA pessimists like Paul Williams. Further, there has been a wide range of different recommendations posited by the authors in order to enable the APSA to be more successful in performing its role, some of whom seem to be encouraging the organisation to move in contradictory directions. The following section will examine this wide range of interpretations of the APSA's utility, and will isolate key themes in the discourse that could help explain these various responses.



## ***Literature Review***

For Murithi, a leading APSA expert who was interviewed for this thesis, the role of the APSA is all about African ownership of African security issues. One of his earliest books dealing with the APSA, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development* (2005), provides a general overview of the AU's early years in the context of Pan-Africanism, giving it a strong ideological component. The book is focused on the AU and its role in continental political and economic integration; the AU's institutions are put in the context of a decades-long struggle towards African unification. "The African Union", he asserts, "provides a new opportunity for revitalizing the Pan-Africanist agenda of united Africans and the Diaspora and encouraging them to work in solidarity with each other" (2005: 36). Most of the book is concerned with economic and structural development and is, therefore, out of the scope of this review; however, the fourth chapter is devoted to the APSA. Here, Murithi discusses the main differences between the OAU's security architecture and that of the AU, and he highlights the AU's engagement with civil society, human security and enhancing popular ownership of the organisation as core elements of the APSA's role. The book also puts the creation of the ASF within the same context: the pan-Africanist drive to unify Africa's armed forces (2005: 83).

Writing in 2005, he also tries to assess the effectiveness of the APSA, claiming that, although the extent of the role played by the APSA in the field by that time may have been modest, it was nonetheless a significant success for the AU to have a field presence in some of the most unstable parts of the continent. The book views the APSA as a success because, despite numerous setbacks in the planning stages, it has shown strong political will to engage with African

problems. Murithi argues that the AU will continue to face significant challenges, which must be overcome if the AU is to achieve its goal of building sustainable peace and promoting development, but on the whole, *The African Union* presents a positive view of early developments in the AU's peace and security structure.

This positive view of the APSA is developed in a more focused and analytical manner in an article penned by Murithi in collaboration with Richard Gueli a few years later: 'The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia' (Murithi and Gueli 2008). This article describes the evolution of the security architecture in Africa from the OAU, through the foundation of the AU, and to more contemporary developments. The article also discusses the evolution of the AU's nascent relationship with its external partners, especially its relationship with the EU and the UN.

The APSA's role in Africa's peace and security environment had expanded by 2008; with AU troops deployed simultaneously in Sudan and Somalia, Murithi and Gueli's article describes the now almost fully operationalised APSA as a fundamental paradigm shift in the African peace and security environment. The authors again reinforce the importance of African ownership to the role played by the APSA and urge the APSA to strengthen this role. Although they do not necessarily expect the APSA to be able to deploy North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-style PKOs, they do advocate for the AU to increase its efforts to assume a leadership role in peace and security that will focus the will of Africa's political leadership as well as the AU's external partners: "The AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take

decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 82).

The authors further promoted the APSA’s role as a pan-Africanist organisation by heavily recommending that the APSA develop common collective security norms and practices as well as clearly delineating the division of labour between the continental level and the subregional level.

In their assessment of existing structures, mobilising resources is considered to be the biggest problem that the AU has, particularly acquiring financial contributions from the member states. The authors also suggest that the AU should develop its logistical capacity. Yet, despite this recognition of insufficient resourcing, the authors express some concern at the evolution of the AU-UN partnership, warning of a new form of paternalism through the UN’s “‘fatherly’ coterie of advisors” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). They warn that, although the APSA may be best suited to the local peace and security environment, they should avoid a situation where APSA troops do the fighting while the UN gives the orders.

The article’s discussion of the APSA field missions finds many positive aspects to report, especially in AMIB. Nonetheless, the authors do acknowledge the APSA’s serious problems in terms of planning and point to military and financial capacity gaps as severe handicaps that have limited its success in the field. Despite the more cautious tone, the article still sees the APSA as a success, though beset on all sides with challenges. The article underscores the fact that the APSA still has serious work ahead of it to improve its ability to deliver peace and security to Africa’s citizens, but the authors were keen to point out that, even though the APSA was still in its early years, it had already gained

considerable field experience in missions of varying types throughout the continent. These experiences, even the negative ones, were part of the learning process.

Departing somewhat from Murithi and Gueli's pan-Africanist ideology, but remaining similarly enthusiastic about the APSA, Stephan Klingebiel's chapter in *Africa and Fortress Europe*, entitled *Peace and Security Policy of the African Union and the Regional Security Mechanisms* (2007), seeks to evaluate the AU's approach to peace and security. He judges the success of the APSA by assessing the level of operationalisation of the AU's security institutions. The chapter begins in the familiar format of summarising the AU peace and security framework in reference to the AU Treaty and the PSC protocol. Here, Klingebiel explains how the establishment of the African Union heralded a fundamental shift from the OAU's peace and security architecture through an examination of the institutional makeup of the AU peace and security architecture as well as the AU's relationship with the EU.

The author then describes how the APSA serves as a focal point for the peace and security agenda at the continental level, discussing its advantages over the OAU model. In particular, Klingebiel highlights the importance of the normative shift with the establishment of the AU, explaining that the role of the APSA is to assume responsibility for peacekeeping in the continent in line with the *African solutions to African problems* doctrine, rather than leaving conflict management to the whim of western states and the UN. Indeed, he applauds the AU's efforts to make it clear "that the involvement of other countries in this area is welcome only on condition that they are prepared to cooperate within the framework of AU approaches and that they are invited to do so" (Klingebiel 2007: 74).

Klingebiel also highlights the importance of the APSA's African ownership by claiming that the AU has been well served by many recognisable personalities including South Africa's President Mbeki, Mali's President Konaré and President Obasanjo of Nigeria, as well as the many civil society organisations that work closely with the AU.

However, like Murithi and Gueli, Klingebiel also highlights the APSA's lack of capacity; materiel, financial backing and military capacity—including the African Standby Force (ASF), which was yet to make any real progress towards operationalisation. Klingebiel also suggests that the AU ought to direct more attention to non-violent conflict management, such as post-conflict reconstruction, which had been neglected during the APSA's operationalisation. For Klingebiel, these problems serve to highlight the importance of the APSA's relationship with the EU, especially the EU's Africa Peace Facility (APF), a fund of an initial EUR 250 million that had been diverted for use by the APSA itself and has been used to fund the AU's field missions. The author highlights that the APF and the EU's renewed commitment to it makes the EU one of the most important supporters of the APSA; a reflection of the growing AU-EU partnership. The article itself was published within a collection on wider African-European relations (Gebrewold 2007).

On the whole, the article takes a very positive view of the AU's progress up to the time of writing in 2007. This judgement is based on a comparison with the OAU, rather than comparing the AU's actions with the expectations of Western academics. He claims that the AU has shown the will to act, as well as an effort to increase indigenous capacity through the African Standby Force. Although the AU's impact in Darfur has been limited, Klingebiel asserts that the simple

act of successfully launching a rapid response to Darfur is a success all on its own.

*Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture* (Klingebiel 2005) deals with the AU's relationship with the EU and a number of other external partners, making it more generalist in nature. The article is an attempt to synthesise the extent and the objectives of the external community's tangled support network for the AU. He discusses this within the context of the contemporary security environment as well as possible future developments. In general, despite highlighting the usual problems with the AU's financial and materiel capacity, the article takes a positive tone, but echoes Murithi and Gueli's concerns about the AU's external supporters' *military* focus in their capacity building efforts.

Klingebiel argues that the APSA was finding it difficult to fulfil its role because its peaceful conflict prevention and resolution elements were suffering due to a lack of funds and neglected by external partners. Klingebiel further argues that military humanitarian intervention should not be considered to be a major part of the APSA's role, as it is largely outside the APSA's capacity.

The article sees the APSA's success as dependent upon external support, but characterises the AU's external partners' interests as instrumentalist in nature. It suggests that the EU and the US are primarily interested in strengthening the military aspect of the APSA, which, Klingebiel warns, could erode African ownership, turning the APSA into a proxy for dealing with security issues that are not securitised by most African governments, such as stabilising oil exporting regions or controlling illegal immigration (or, rather, emigration).

*Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture* reinforces the role of the APSA as an African solution for African problems, and recommends that, while

Africans must own this architecture, the West must pay for it before it can succeed. The discussion concludes with some recommendations for the international community, suggesting that they focus more support on peaceful conflict management and socio-economic development, in line with the original intention of the AU's founding documents. He states that the current financial support for the APSA is well below requirements; pointing out that the European Union's initial Africa Peace Facility (APF) fund was barely enough to pay for the AU's small mission in Burundi for two years.

*The EU and the African Peace and Security Architecture* (Middleton 2009), like much of Klingebiel's work, also discusses the role and responsibility the EU plays in relation to the African Peace and Security Architecture. The article is particularly insightful as it is largely based on a study produced by Middleton for the EU Parliament Security and Defence Sub-Committee. It is both descriptive and prescriptive, with a positive and optimistic tone.

The main focus of the article is on the need for capacity building in Africa. However, the report warns of the external community expecting too much from the AU in terms of peace and security, which, the author claims, may help to explain the many negative reviews that the AU's recent missions have received. The author points out that even a fully operationalised APSA will not solve all the continent's problems, but it will help stabilise the security landscape. This correlation between expectations and perceptions of success is one of the main justifications for the current thesis, but is rarely mentioned in the scholarship; even Middleton only mentions it in passing. He notes that "Superficially, the AU looks like an African version of the EU, but it is built on different foundations and operates in a radically different, and more difficult, environment.

Understanding the realities of the AU should enable EU money to be better targeted at those areas where it can be deployed most usefully” (Middleton 2009: 7).

The article goes through different areas where the EU can help bridge some of the AU’s capacity gaps. The article examines how the APF affects the role of the APSA, making the interesting point that the APF is funded through the European Development Fund, which means that the money cannot be used for anything with ‘lethal implications’. This means that the APF cannot be used to provide military hardware to help bridge the AU’s pressing capacity gaps in this area. This has resulted in delays in paying soldiers, as AMIS is largely funded through the APF and the EU has been slow to release funds while it ensures they are being used for conflict prevention and not peacekeeping (Middleton 2009: 7). The article echoes the dismay of the AU’s leadership at this oversight and recommends funding the APF through different channels so in order to increase its flexibility and allow the AU leadership the freedom to prioritise.

The article likewise highlights the constraining effects of a lack of heavy airlift, APCs and other heavy equipment in the individual member states themselves, going on to point out the fact that ECOMOG’s successes in the field were due, in part, to the large level of support from the United States. The article suggests that the EU member states take a similar approach and bilaterally provide helicopters, APCs and other hardware that the AU needs to get to and effectively operate in the field—actions that the author sees as the primary role of the APSA. The article ends with a long shopping-list of military-focused recommendations to improve efforts at enhancing the capacity of the APSA, including recommendations echoed variously throughout the discourse (e.g.



Crupi (2005) and Williams (2006)), such as logistical support, direct support to the RECs, and a new source of funding (Middleton 2009: 11-13).

US Army Colonel J.P. Kobbie's unpublished dissertation on *The Role of the African Union in African Peacekeeping Operations* (2009) is focussed on assessing the AU's state of readiness to participate in PKOs. In the dissertation, he examines the AU missions in Burundi and Sudan and uses these case studies to highlight what he refers to as political, institutional and conceptual restraints that limit the APSA's readiness and effectiveness (Kobbie 2009: 18). The dissertation is written in an enthusiastic tone, and the author is keen to highlight the achievements of the AU up to the time of writing. It includes large descriptive sections detailing the development of the African peace and security architecture in a historical context, discussing the evolution from OAU to AU and illustrating how progressive the AU treaty is in comparison. He specifically mentions the APSA's shift from traditional peacekeeping to multi-dimensional operations as a major success (Kobbie 2009: 25). He sees the AU's Article 4(h) —the right to intervene in conflicts involving war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity—as the embodiment of the R2P doctrine making the APSA one of the first international organisations in the world that explicitly claims the right to intervene even when there is no peace to keep.

However; throughout the thesis, Kobbie asserts that peacekeeping is a global responsibility and suggests that the international community should endorse *globally supported* African solutions to African problems.

He also echoes Murithi's argument that the APSA should take on a leadership role – assuming responsibility not just for rallying African governments, but for

consolidating strong donor support for its peace missions. Kobbie describes the role of the AU as a natural response to the UN's institutional overstretch, and to the indifference and lack of political will of the external community to intervene in Africa. He is careful to point out that, although the AU is taking on more of the burden of peacekeeping on the continent, that should not be an excuse for the UN to shirk its responsibilities; reinforcing other authors' calls for the APSA to be treated as part of the global peace and security architecture.

He sees APSA's role as a rapid response force to respond to emerging crises and the UN gradually replacing them with a longer-term peace operation.

Kobbie recommends that the AU should explore and institutionalise this division of labour and involve the EU, NATO and other powers in the process. The work also contains many of the recommendations mooted by the Middleton report above, as well as several of the works below (e.g. (O'Neil and Cassis 2005), (Powell 2009)) such as integration of humanitarian, political, police and military efforts at the planning and operational level and the adoption of a common AU military doctrine.

David Francis' book, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (2006), is not exclusively concerned with the African Union, but assesses the role and successes of regional peace and security systems in Africa more generally. There is a strong theoretical component to the book and aspects of Constructivist and English School theory are incorporated through concepts such as security regimes, security interdependence, securitisation and security communities.

Like Murithi and Gueli, Francis's book also sees the efforts of the APSA as largely successful; the crowning achievement of a renewed wave of afro-

optimism, improved economic development, and renewed commitments from the external community. As an example of positive developments, Francis highlights the AU's major departures from the OAU, such as the development of a much closer bond between the continental framework (AU) and the sub-regional framework (RECs), and the establishment of a much more robust collective security framework. Francis likewise marks Article 4(h) as a paradigm shift in IR from regime security to human security (2006: 129). However, Francis sees the role of the APSA less as an exercise in African ownership and more as a keystone of regional peace and security systems in Africa—a developing security community. For Francis, the APSA's biggest success has been promoting regionalism, which he sees as an important force for stability on the continent. To support this, Francis reiterates the concept of the security pyramid in Africa and discusses the multi-level, overlapping nature of Africa's peace and security architecture (2006: 127).

Emmanuel Kwesi Aning's *The UN and the African Union's Security*

*Architecture: Defining an Emerging Partnership?* (2008) continues Francis' focus on the APSA's role as part of the overarching global security architecture, but adopts a less theoretical methodology. The article examines the role of the APSA in relation to the UN, describing and assessing the main processes of the relationship as they had evolved at the time. The article contains some interesting insights into the APSA's position in the global peace and security architecture, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This article differentiates itself by portraying the role of the APSA as a core element of the global peace and security architecture headed by the UN, and highlights the UN's responsibility for peace and security in the continent, in contrast with

Murithi's Africa-led model (Aning 2008: 18-20). Like Francis, Aning is a proponent of the pyramidal structure of the security environment in Africa, with nation states at the bottom, then RECs, followed by the AU and finally the UN as the ultimate authority on peace and security.

Aning begins in the conventional way, exploring the AU's treaty framework, particularly in relation to Article 4(h) and its relation to the R2P doctrine. Writing in 2008, in the run-up to the deployment of the United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Aning suggests that there is a deepening recognition of the importance of the APSA's role in the African security landscape, and that the UN is becoming increasingly aware of the need to adopt a closer working relationship with it. He highlights the APSA's role as a core part of the global peace and security architecture, and the APSA's specific strengths, being based closer to the conflict zones and having a wealth of local specialist knowledge and pre-existing relationships. The author suggests that the APSA's field missions will be most effective when operating within the framework of the UN as the AU suffers from many capacity gaps which could be bridged with support from the UN (Aning 2008: 21).

The article also explains some of the major problems the AU has encountered when trying to institutionalise its relationship with the UN. Aning claims that the APSA's role is undermined by the fact that the UN is not structured to embrace regional organisations, despite certain provisions for it in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. He therefore suggests that the UN needs to significantly increase its institutionalised support for the APSA. Aning sees the APSA as successful, and the African Union is described as being much more dynamic than the UN when

it comes to recognising the importance of multilateralism and synergy between the different layers of peacekeeping organisation.

O'Neil and Cassis's report for the North-South Institute, *Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur* (2005), is an enthusiastic account of AMIS based on fieldwork in Darfur, including interviews with AU soldiers and police as well as IDPs and military experts and humanitarian workers. The report contains large descriptive sections giving background information for the Darfur conflict as well as and listing developments up to the time of writing. The authors build a long list of AMIS's strengths and weaknesses near the end of the report, based on their research in the field. Many of the familiar (e.g. Appiah-Mensah (2005), Powell (2005), Murithi and Gueli (2007) and Middleton (2009)) complaints arise such as the limited deployment, limited financial capacity etc. In particular, the report discusses the weak mandate and the authors take issue with the PSC's decision to keep Khartoum on-board (O'Neill and Cassis 2005: 13-14).

Despite the many negative aspects of AMIS, the authors also collate an equally long list of successes in the field. For example; the APSA is lauded for its active cooperation with NGOs and civil society organisations, which, according to the authors, generally claim that the AU is always open to cooperation and suggestions from them. The authors' perception of APSA's successes on the ground in Darfur were a result of individual commanders in the AMIS forces who bent the mandate to allow their troops to be in the right place at the right time, often at great risk to themselves, to protect civilians, even though civilian protection is technically outside the mandate (O'Neill and Cassis 2005: 28-29). Civilians close to AMIS positions also told the authors that they felt safer with

the APSA troops nearby (O'Neill and Cassis 2005: 44). The authors point out, however, that there were nowhere near enough troops to cover a large proportion of Darfur's civilian population. The authors underscore their perception that the *will* to protect exists in the APSA; the APSA's failures in Darfur were largely a result of the external community's irresponsible decision to let the APSA take the lead on Darfur when the situation was clearly outside its capacity. Overall, this interpretation represents a departure from the previous works through its more forceful condemnation of the APSA's external partners for failing to support its critical efforts in the field.

Kristiana Powell's NSI working paper, *The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect* (2005), begins by discussing the background to the responsibility to protect doctrine and its incorporation in the APSA. It then describes the APSA's capacity for conflict management and how it fits into the wider global peace and security environment. Powell uses the APSA's field missions in Burundi and Sudan as case studies to evaluate the challenges of implementing the responsibility to protect in Africa. These case studies are detailed and highlight the author's perceptions of the successes and the failures of the AU in AMIS and AMIB.

The paper is written in the light of the APSA's policy of 'non-indifference' in conflict management enshrined in Article 4(h) of the AU Treaty and investigates the extent to which R2P has really been operationalised within the APSA, concentrating on examining the APSA's operations in Burundi and Darfur. Like the authors discussed above, Powell highlights the APSA's considerable capacity gaps, which limit its potential as a peace and security actor; she

suggests that the APSA's planning capacity, command and control structure and its logistics were not advanced enough to support a task like AMIS. She also talks of chronic financial problems including troops not being paid on time, as well as a severe lack of military capacity. Despite these difficulties, Powell also has a positive view of the APSA's efforts thus far, as they demonstrate a clear political will to get involved in organising the continent's conflict management concerns. In particular, the author mentions AMIB's protection of vulnerable populations and AMIS's ability to reduce violence in the areas in which it had been stationed (Powell 2005: 27).

Because the APSA has the will, but not the capacity, and the West has the capacity, but seems to lack the will, Powell suggests that the external community needs to do much more to support the activities of the APSA, explaining that there is a need for these donors "to provide assistance for developing a range of operational and structural conflict prevention capacities" (Powell 2005: 23). Financial and logistical support in particular is required for the APSA to be able to effectively support its field missions, although financial support has gradually increased in line with the public concern over the conflict.

At the end of the paper, the author submits several issues for policy dialogue, including how to further assist AMIS to improve on the specific capacity gaps mentioned earlier in the paper, how to improve the APSA's initial response to crises, how to improve vertical integration of the African peace and security institutions and several others.

In a related but much more theoretical piece, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Does the African Stand-By Force Need a Doctrine for Protection of Civilians?' (2007), Chiziko discusses the role that the APSA *should* play in the context of

the APSA's stated human security and ethical concerns, again paying particular attention to the R2P doctrine. However, the article is focused on the ASF, rather than the APSA as a whole, and explores the different possibilities, identities and roles that the APSA could embrace. This piece is interesting for the current study because it sees the role of the APSA not as something static or absolute, but something that is chosen—a concept that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Chiziko determines that the APSA should embrace the role of the 'guardian soldier', echoing some other authors' recommendations for the ASF to embrace a multi-disciplinary military doctrine (2007: 78; Däniker 1995: 93). Chiziko recommends that as well as providing local stability and order, AU forces should also be capable of performing rescue and aid operations. He is a strong proponent of a much closer working relationship between the APSA and human rights organisations and humanitarian agencies. He also calls for the involvement of lawyers and theologians as experts on international and humanitarian law and ethics respectively. He believes that the military rules of engagement need to be standardised and replaced with what he calls the 'rules of engagement for human protection operations' (Chiziko 2007: 78). This will help broaden the ASF's battlefield tasks to include many more humanitarian and ethical considerations.

Although there is considerable support in the academic discourse to strengthen the AU's humanitarian and ethical component, Chiziko's article is an extreme example. Chiziko's recommendations are progressive and he is trying to encourage the redefinition of the role of peacekeeping on the continent by supporting an increased militarisation of the AU's mission. Chiziko himself discusses many of the military capacity gaps and command and control



problems apparent in the APSA, highlighting excessive interference by member-state governments, language problems, lack of standardisation in SOPs, doctrines, staff procedures and equipment. He also mentions the more commonly mentioned (e.g. Powell (2005), O'Neil and Cassis (2005), Murithi and Gueli (2008), Middleton (2009)) shortfalls in terms of airlift and other heavy materiel, air-to-surface capacity and logistic support (Chiziko 2007: 84).

Echoing Francis, the article concludes that to bridge some of these gaps, the AU should institutionalise its working relationship with the UN, NATO and the EU. He recommends that the external community should specifically focus on supporting the ASF as the nucleus of Africa's peace and security architecture, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and suggests the EU Battlegroup structure as a possible model for the ASF (Chiziko 2007: 86).

Touray's article 'The Common African Defence and Security Policy' moves beyond earlier discourse, which concentrated on the AU Treaty and the PSC Protocol, to discuss the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), and uses that to examine the role of the APSA.

The article begins with the familiar discussion of the evolution of security cooperation in Africa put into historical context. It then goes on to discuss the principles, objectives and the institutions of the CADSP. According to Touray, the main role of the APSA, as elucidated in the CADSP, is having the capacity to respond to internal and external threats effectively; however, the author also talks about strengthening security cooperation between African states, building trust and enhancing the military preparedness of member states to ease the deployment of peace missions (Touray 2005: 643).

Interestingly, Touray talks about the CADSP in the context of the principle of the *indivisibility of the security of African states*, comparing its role to NATO's Article V to demonstrate a possible move towards continent-wide collective security. However, like Klingebiel, Touray criticises the APSA for what he sees as an overbearing focus on military conflict management mechanisms and its apparent belief that most of Africa's security problems can be solved by military power. He also criticises the APSA's institutions as unprepared for their role, and largely unoperationalised (at the time of writing). In particular he criticises the weak Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which he claims "is a collection and dissemination point for various news items that are readily available on radio, TV and in the written press" (Touray 2005: 649). A weak CEWS, he claims, undermines the AU's entire conflict prevention strategy, forcing it to deal with conflicts *after* they have happened.

The article presents a number of suggestions for improving the APSA, including improving the capacity at the sub-regional level, and harmonising conflict management doctrines and traditions, or adopting the UN doctrine (Touray 2005: 651) – a suggestion that is also common in much of the military academic discourse (e.g. Appiah-Mensah (2005), Crupi (2005), Chiziko (2007) and Kobbie (2009)). The author also suggests seeking assistance from NATO and the EU to plug its capacity gaps.

Makinda and Okumu share Touray's conceptualisation of the role of the APSA as a primarily military endeavour. Moreover, in putting a slightly greater emphasis on this element as the main role of the APSA, they consequently have a lower perception of the APSA's success. Their book, *The African Union: Challenges of Globalisation, Security, and Governance* (2007) discusses the

APSA within a broad context of history, law, economic development, globalisation and other aspects of the AU and its environment. Chapter four of the book is aimed directly at *assessing* the APSA's contributions to peace and security in Africa. The optimism present in many other books and articles, including Makinda's earlier works on the subject, is conspicuously absent; this may be evidence of the new millennium's afro-optimism grinding to a halt along with the peace processes in Somalia and Darfur. The difficulties the APSA faced in these states leads the authors to directly contradict Murithi and Gueli, concluding that perhaps 'African solutions' are not adequate for *all* African problems (Makinda and Okumu 2007: 93). Makinda and Okumu back up their low opinion of the success of the APSA with a long list of perceived failures during the AMIS and AMIS II periods (2004-2007), and the planning thereof. They suggest that one of the biggest problems that the APSA has is in gathering expertise. They see the organisation as knowledge-dependent and therefore recruiting the best staff and gathering the most appropriate information is the key to allowing the APSA to live up to its role as a real force for stability on the continent. The authors explain that, despite having a sophisticated legal structure that allows for robust conflict management mandates, the APSA is still chronically short of capital, materiel, personnel and expertise, and these shortages put their own limitations on the AU mandates. Makinda and Okumu have a much more militaristic view of the role of the APSA, characterising its primary role as a military peacekeeping or peace enforcement agency. This high expectation of the role of the organisation may be the cause of the book's correspondingly lower perceptions of the APSA's success. The book reiterates the call of several earlier authors for the APSA to

strengthen and formalise its relationship with the UN (e.g. Powell (2005) and O'Neil and Cassis (2005)) and even its own RECs in order to consolidate the continental security architecture and increase its collective capacity. However, the authors do acknowledge that the APSA has made some positive steps, and that it is a work in progress with several of its major organs still partially unoperationalised at the time of writing in 2007.

*AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur: Challenges and Constraints* (2005) is an article written by Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, the military advisor to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) and head of the AMIS headquarters in Khartoum. The article is ambivalent towards the APSA's track record in Sudan, emphasising the need for the AU to strengthen its capacity and expertise at all levels, through technical cooperation and appropriate assistance from the UN and partners.

The difficulties highlighted in the article are familiar to the academic discourse on the APSA; the restrictive mandate, the lack of troops, operational, logistical and planning shortfalls. Appiah-Mensah claims that there had been a continuing lack of resources since the mission began, and the mission's earlier weak mandate and subsequent political, operational and administrative mishaps by the AU leadership not only threatened the effectiveness of AMIS, but its very existence (Appiah-Mensah 2005: 19). Importantly, the article argues that assertions by some APSA scholars, as well as much of the popular press, that AMIS had failed, undermined support to the mission, putting lives at risk in Darfur.

Like Middleton's article, the author points out the important fact that the negative image of AMIS is largely based on the fact that it has not measured up

to Western *expectations* of the mission. He mentions that some have argued for the AU mission in Sudan to be judged in relation to its own mandate, rather than in relation to Western perceptions of what its mandate *should* be. He points out that, although the mission was heavily criticised, it was still the only form of external intervention in the country. All the same, Appiah-Mensah highlights the fact that the situation on the ground is still bad and that the AU must continue to adapt to that situation. He argues that mandates are not carved in stone, and the PSC and its external partners can expand and alter them at any time. The author argues that the AU must have known from the start that it was taking on a huge burden and he claims it should have attempted to harness the required resources from the member states before it started. He explains that the best way for the AU to achieve some level of success in Darfur is to actively engage its external partners including the UN, the EU and the United States in all aspects of the mission (Appiah-Mensah 2005: 20).

Another perspective emanating from the US Army War College is *Why the United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African Organisations* (Crupi 2005) written from a US foreign policy perspective by US Army planning expert, Francis Crupi. Unlike Kobbie's thesis, it also takes a low opinion of the success of the APSA. Contrary to the title of the article, Crupi recommends that US interests in the region would be better served by *ending* its support to the APSA, and re-routing that support to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

The article measures the success of the APSA through a comparison with the RECs, using ECOWAS as a case study, and finds that the APSA is less

effective, and therefore should not be supported. Crupi feels that ECOWAS “has a greater state in the development of the sub-region and a more extensive track record in peace enforcement operations” as well as being in a “well-leveraged position to influence the peace and progress in West Africa necessary for industry and commerce to thrive” (2005: 121-2). The article is more hawkish in nature than the others and concentrates on US foreign policy interests, rather than lofty humanitarian ideals. In a validation of Klingebiel’s description of external partners as essentially instrumentalist, Crupi pays particular attention to West African oil production; the US interest here is in maintaining stability in West Africa to stabilise and diversify the global oil supply. The article further argues that RECs like ECOWAS, if strengthened, could be used by the US against their transnational foes, such as Al-Qaeda, while the APSA itself is seen as weak and fractured. The author highlights some of the more hawkish elements of US development policy — embodying many of Murithi’s concerns in his assertion that “employing these groups as surrogates mitigates the risk of political and military entanglements” (Crupi 2005: 121) — and makes an interesting and unique contribution to the scholarly debate.

Finally, Paul William’s (2006) article, *Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, is one of the most negative works on the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture, and particularly focuses on the many pitfalls, flaws and outright failures during AMIS and the expanded mandate of AMIS II in Darfur.

The article begins by enumerating the possibilities open to the international community for peacekeeping – the UN, regional organisations, coalitions and

nation states. He condemns the UN for failing to authorise military action in Darfur, and the long delay before it even started discussing intervention. While the UN did finally agree to a regime of sanctions and a no-fly zone, he claims that, at the time of writing, “it was evident that neither the sanctions nor the no-fly zone had been effectively enforced” (Williams 2006: 170). Although he acknowledges that NATO had offered logistical support to the AU mission at the time of writing, Williams criticises them for not considering deploying forces on the ground.

Williams’ article is especially critical of the APSA. Even though he concedes that the AU was the only organisation willing to put troops on the ground, he does not see this as a good thing. He suggests that the international community’s enthusiasm for AMIS was simply to cover up their own desire not to get involved (Williams 2006: 178). He claims that the APSA is too weak to make a meaningful impact in Darfur, reinforcing the common concerns about the APSA’s military, logistic and doctrinal capacity gaps. He also claims that the APSA’s budget problems are self-inflicted as member states lack political will and refuse to pay their budget dues. It is Williams’ assessment that, as the weakest potential actor, it should never have been the first choice to make first contact in the Darfur conflict.

The article judges the APSA’s success in Darfur by comparing its progress against his own perception of the role of the APSA. Despite the fact that AMIS was a monitoring mission with a mandate solely for the protection of the military observers, Williams regards it as a failure because it failed to ‘neutralise’ the *janjaweed* (2006: 176), an unusually high expectation of the role of the APSA. The author holds particular disdain for what he sees as the AU’s collaboration

with Khartoum, claiming that they 'coached' the government of Sudan on how to "handle the whites" (2006: 172).

The following year, Williams published *Thinking About Security in Africa* (2007), which gives a more measured, but still highly pessimistic, view of the APSA. Coming from a strong human security perspective, Williams is sceptical of what he perceives to be the AU's militaristic focus – a point echoed in some of the more positive literature as well. *Thinking about Security in Africa* is a re-evaluation of the unique African security landscape. It is largely conceptual and theoretical in nature, drawing heavily from the constructivist/critical theory offshoot of critical security studies.

The mantra of this article is *people, justice and change*, a phrase used repeatedly throughout the article, which sums up Williams' view on what the APSA ought to be focusing on. The argument used by Williams throughout the paper is that the "the true path to security depends less on devising interstate confidence building measures than on building stable, democratic societies that can resolve their conflicts without resorting to violence" (2007: 1029).

Williams' article calls for a fundamental shift on the continent, claiming that real, fundamental change is required because the "status quo is not working for the vast majority of Africans" (2007: 1029). This is contrary to the majority of the discourse above, which is almost unanimous in its assertion that a fundamental normative shift *has* taken place on the continent with the establishment of the APSA and that a new paradigm of proactive conflict management had begun. However, Williams criticises the creation of the AU as a shift in the wrong direction, with such a large focus placed on the military aspects of conflict management. The author acknowledges the importance of having strong



independent institutions on the continent, but he does not see them as contributing to peace and security unless they develop policies based on *people, justice and change*.

In the end, Williams sees the APSA as having largely failed; in particular, he laments a severe lack of human and financial resources and what he sees as the lack of political will of its members. He sees the whole peace and security architecture as state focused and claims the Assembly is engaging in “sovereignty first” politics (Williams 2007, p 1038). In general, the article is an interesting and sophisticated look at some of the contentious issues involved in the strengthening of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture through the lens of critical security studies, providing an important counterpoint to the more positive appraisals discussed above.

### ***Defining the Role of the APSA***

There are many agreements in the works sampled above, and the same capacity problems are highlighted frequently. What is not consistent, however, is how the authors assess the importance of these capacity gaps, how seriously they have affected the role of the APSA and how or if they should be resolved.

Despite the fact that these works have all relied upon an interpretation of the role of the APSA against which to measure its success or failure, they have not provided much of an intellectual basis to justify their assertions of what those roles are. Williams, for example, takes the role of ‘civilian protection’ as said without explaining why he thinks that it *is* part of the APSA’s role (although he explains why it *shouldn’t* be). Therefore they have not based their assessments of the APSA’s success on what the role of the APSA *is*, they have based them

upon their *beliefs* about the role of the APSA, and these beliefs are based upon the authors own naturally biased views on the subject, and informed by their ideology.

Throughout this review of key APSA scholarship, the authors have displayed wide-ranging intellectual backgrounds; from Pan-Africanism, through Neoliberalism and Constructivism to Critical Theory. These varying backgrounds have led the authors to make different assumptions about what the APSA's role *should* be, often finding support for their assumptions in the language of the treaty framework, but not systematically engaging with the concept of the *role* of the APSA. This has resulted in different authors justifying their different interpretations of the role of the APSA with different evidence; or in some cases simply asserting what they believe the role of the APSA is without any supporting evidence. As a result, the authors all have different views of what the role of the APSA is, or *should be*: The APSA is a forum for African political ownership; it is a framework for security cooperation; it is a framework for external support; it is a nascent security regime; it is an interventionist humanitarian military alliance; it is a misguided attempt to push military solutions on systemic problems.

This has a knock-on effect on the validity of the conclusions of their assessments of the APSA. A defining element of the perceived success of an organisation is living up to the role assigned to it; for Murithi, success is the African Union taking ownership of the struggle for peace and security on the continent holistically, promoting African solutions for African problems. For Makinda and Okumu, success would rely upon the APSA's capacity to successfully deploy peacekeeping missions. For Williams, success would

require the APSA to leave military deployments to NATO and the UN and refocus its energies on dealing with the underlying structural problems.

This unsystematic approach to the concept of the role of the APSA is a very unstable foundation on which to conduct the debate; the variance in the expectations of what the APSA *should* be achieving, which have in turn been built on shaky ground, has resulted in a corresponding variation in the authors' recommendations for the improvement of the APSA. At this point, we can see clear, real-world repercussions stemming from this conceptual problem, as many of these authors have also been advisors to governments and international organisations, lobbying for capacity enhancement for specific areas of the APSA, or lobbying for a reduction of support to certain areas. This has three serious, real-life consequences: first, the authors, and the reports and recommendations based upon their work, are not presenting a consistent strategy for improving the APSA; many of the authors' recommendations are contradictory, resulting in confusion for policy makers. Second, the APSA is not recognised for what it is. The organisation is presented variously, in all the aforementioned guises, which has a knock-on effect for strategic level planning, particularly in terms of division of labour and interoperability; how can the UN design a clear strategy for institutionalising its relationship with the APSA, if its advisors do not agree on what the APSA is, what it does, what it should do or even if it is worth supporting at all? Third, perceptions of the success or failure of an organisation directly affect the support that it receives from its members and its partners. If the APSA is as ineffectual as Williams believes, then supporting it would be a waste of resources. However, if it is as integral to the African regional security architecture as Francis claims, then reducing support

could have serious negative consequences. It is therefore important that APSA scholars agree on the role of the APSA in order to have a stable basis to debate its success and its utility.

### ***Thesis Aims and Objectives***

In order to address the aforementioned vagaries associated with the use of the concept of *role*, and to understand the *real* role of the APSA, the thesis has adopted a clear set of aims and objectives:

- Core Aims
  - Challenge the value of the definition of the role of the APSA promulgated by the APSA itself as a poor basis for policy and scholarship.
  - Challenge definitions of the role of the APSA based upon preconceived notions of what the role of the APSA *should* be.
  - Provide an objective definition of the role of the APSA based upon the role that it actually plays in the context of its operating environment.
- Objectives to Achieve Aims
  - Provide a new theoretical framework to systematically define and quantify the role of an organisation like the APSA which explains that the practical role played by the APSA is limited, enabled and directed by multifarious influences.
  - Define the extent to which the role of the APSA is constrained by limiting factors.

- Define the extent to which these limiting factors are compensated for by enabling factors.
- Define areas where enabling factors have created a role for the APSA where no role had previously been defined.
- Determine how the APSA's capacity is pushed in specific directions, and how its role is reprioritised through the influence of various sources of governance of the organisation.
- Develop a theoretical framework to systematically analyse the effects of governance on an organisation like the APSA.
- Determine the net effect of these limiting, enabling and directing factors and use this to outline a more realistic definition of the practical role of the APSA.

It is the aim of this thesis to provide a stable and objective definition of the role of the APSA. This will create a stable basis for the assessment of the APSA's utility as a peace and security actor, and enable a clear understanding of what the APSA can and cannot do, thereby providing a stable basis for policy and scholarship. The thesis will achieve this goal by first reconceptualising the concept of the *role* of an organisation; circumventing the vagaries of the dictionary definition by establishing technical definitions of *role* through the development of a Role Theory-based theoretical framework, which the thesis has dubbed *Institutional Role Theory*.

*Institutional Role Theory* forms the main framework around which the thesis is structured. *Institutional Role Theory* allows for a more accurate definition of the role of the APSA based on what it *actually* does, rather than what it says it

does, or what observers variously say that it *should* do. According to *Institutional Role Theory*, the real role of the APSA is formed through interaction with relevant international law, its institutional framework, its member states, its partners, its governance and its operating environment. Interactions in all these areas involve influences from various sources that either limit or enable the role of the APSA. Assessing the net effect of these limiting and enabling factors will provide an outline of the space in which the APSA can act, giving a clear, systematic and subjective indication of the *real* role of the APSA, which, in *Institutional Role Theory*, is termed the *interactionist role*.

Thus, the bulk of this thesis is devoted to examining the effects of five categories of limiting and enabling factors. These are as follows: the treaty framework of the APSA; the internal capacity of the APSA; external capacity enhancement of the APSA; governance of the APSA, and the APSA's operational environment. The conclusion will present an overview of the net effect of each of these five categories of limiting and enabling factors, followed by a clear definition of the *interactionist role* of the APSA, and the repercussions of the thesis for the discourse, finishing with some suggestions for further research.

The following chapter will explain the chapter structure in more detail, including how the thesis came to settle on these particular five categories. It will also explain the research methodology by which the thesis will accrue the necessary information to assess the effects of the aforementioned categories of limiting and enabling factors; however, it will begin by problematising the concept of *role*, explaining the need to develop a new theoretical framework for using the concept in International Relations, and will focus on what *Institutional Role*

*Theory* is, and how it will be used to answer the question at the heart of this thesis: *what is the real role of the APSA?*

## **Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology**

### ***Introduction***

In order to better facilitate a comprehensive definition of the role of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture, this chapter will problematise the definition of the word *role* itself, developing a form of Role Theory for use with international organisations. This will provide the theoretical framework for the remainder of the work.

The chapter will begin by examining what is meant by the word *role*, surveying a variety of fields to demonstrate the lack of an appropriate technical/theoretical definition in the existing literature. The chapter then turns its attention to Role Theory in the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology, which *has* developed technical definitions for *role*, though only in the context of *individuals*, not institutions like the APSA. These definitions are then adapted for application to international organisations, providing an appropriate framework for the thesis through the development of a new type of Role Theory for International Relations based on Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory and Functionalist Role Theory, which will be called *Institutional Role Theory*. The chapter will then examine how this theoretical framework applies to the APSA, developing a research programme that will provide an objective outline of the real role of the APSA through an examination of the effects of five categories of limiting and enabling factors which will form the basis of the chapter structure for the rest of the thesis. After the theoretical structure has been clearly explained, and all the key technical terms defined, and the research programme and chapter structure have been discussed in detail, the methodology chapter will conclude with an



explanation of the research methods used to furnish the information required to fully analyse the effects of each of the categories of limiting and enabling factors; a process which constitutes the main effort of the thesis.

### ***Why Role?***

Before the main work of this chapter commences, it is worth taking some time to explain why this thesis has been built around the imprecisely defined word *role*; why go to the effort of problematising the concept of role, and developing technical definitions for it, when comparable, and more specific terms are available, such as *function*, *responsibilities* or *capacity*?

It is, ironically, the broad and inclusive connotations of the word role which make the term so useful, and explain why it is so heavily used in the literature; Google nGram Viewer (which searches all Google books) highlighted over 5 million instances of the phrase “role of an/the organisation/institution” since 1950. The phrases, *function* of the APSA or *responsibilities* of the APSA, do not carry the full meaning of *role*; function implies only one part of the role—its intended role—which is described in detail in the next chapter. The *responsibilities* of the APSA would explain more about what the APSA *should* be doing but, as the previous chapter showed, there is considerable disparity between authors when it comes to the role that the APSA *should* play, and challenging the use of these subjective assessments as a basis for judging the institution’s efficacy is one of the main objectives of this thesis. Both of these concepts are indeed central to understanding the role of the APSA; however, on their own they explain little, and, used interchangeably, as they frequently

are in the discourse, they can lead to further confusion about the role of the APSA.

*Capacity* is a much more easily defined term; to understand the role played by an organisation, it is necessary to understand that organisation's *capacity to act* in furtherance of that role—and a discussion of the APSA's *capacity* will constitute a large portion of this thesis. However, an understanding of an organisation's capacity alone only tells us what that organisation *can* do, not what it *does* do, or why. For example, NATO's capacity is many times more extensive and comprehensive than that of the APSA, but knowing this does not tell us that the APSA has conducted the same number of full-scale missions since 2002 that NATO has deployed since 1992, in more challenging or equally challenging theatres. *Capacity* misses much of the complexity and subtlety of the real role played by either NATO or the APSA in the international security environment.

The word *role* implies much more than just capacity; the role played by an organisation is not just what it *can* or *should* do, or what it was *intended* to do, but what it *does* do, and crucially, *why* and *how* it does whatever it does, two concepts that are only really addressed by the term *role*. *Role* offers a more holistic understanding of the organisation, providing a better basis for policy decisions. However, without a technical definition of the word for the use of the concept within a clearly defined framework, and a more systematic, evidence-based approach to measuring the role of the APSA, it is still a highly subjective term.

## **Problematizing Institutional Roles**

Although the word *role* is used in every piece of APSA scholarship, and the concept is at the very heart of most of these works, it is not used in a consistent manner. The previous chapter has shown the consequences of this lack of common understanding; every author conceptualises the role differently. In particular, three separate definitions of *role* can be identified in the literature; for some, the role of the APSA is whatever its treaty framework says it is; for others, it is an ideal to which the APSA must aspire. In the latter case, the definition of that role comes from outside the APSA, raising a further question: who gets to decide which role the APSA should be playing? And if, as the previous chapter showed, multiple commentators decide upon different roles to which the APSA should aspire, how should we, or indeed the APSA and its partners, decide which is the most valid? The third way in which the word *role* has been used is as a description of the role that the APSA is *currently* playing; but even in this more sophisticated usage we still have problems: how do we consistently decide what the current/real role of the APSA is, without a standardised system for so doing, and, as a result, how do we define its success and failure without an accepted role against which to measure? The word *role*, therefore, means different things to different scholars in different contexts; more confusingly, one scholar might use all the above definitions of the word *role* without making a clear distinction between usages.

In light of these vagaries, and the aforementioned problems they have caused for the discourse on the APSA, it would be extremely useful to have a clear, technical, standardised definition of the word *role* to use in relation to international organisations. It is the objective of this chapter to develop such a

technical definition, to develop the standardised vocabulary necessary to facilitate a clear debate on this topic and to develop a research programme that would provide a more objective definition of the *role* of an organisation as its main output.

### **Problematising the Role of the APSA**

It is surprising that no technical definition of the concept of the *role* of an international organisation has yet appeared in the IR discourse; even Liberal Institutionalists and Constructivists persevere with the vagaries of the dictionary definitions, despite the high frequency with which the word is used.

There is one pre-existing effort to problematise the concept of *role* in International Relations, in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis; however, it was not focused on the role played by international organisations, but rather focuses on the role of individuals in key leadership positions within state governments. National Role Conceptions (NRC), developed in the 1970s, builds on developments in the field of Sociology and Social Psychology, and focuses on “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (Holsti 1970: 246). Unfortunately, while on the right lines, this framework does not have the scope necessary to provide a holistic understanding of the *role* of the APSA. Applied to the APSA, it would simply reinforce the role that the AU *leadership* believes that the APSA should be playing, whatever that might be at any one time, which is not necessarily any more valid than the opinions of any of the APSA scholars discussed in the previous chapter. NRC provides little justification of the weight that it places on

the opinions of these key individuals, which are themselves subject to myriad pressures and influences, and, more importantly, it confuses the *role* of the state with the *intentions* or *objectives* of the state (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012: 7). These problems make NRC's conclusions highly subjective and therefore a weak candidate for application to this study.

It has, therefore, been necessary to move outside the boundaries of International Relations in search of a technical definition of *role*, one that embraces a more corporate or institutional focus. An extensive survey failed to find work on this subject. *Organisational Role Theory* (ORT), for example, a theory developed in the discipline of Business Studies, was developed in *The Social Psychology of Organisations* (Katz and Kahn 1966) and several subsequent works. Unfortunately, it only conceptualises the manner in which individuals accept and enact an array of roles *within* task-oriented and hierarchical systems, making it slightly more individual-focussed than NRC. As the theory focuses on the role of individuals, rather than the role of the organisations, it does not provide a usable framework for the current endeavour.

With NCR and OST failing to provide the required framework, it became necessary to go to the source and develop a new model for conceptualising the role of the APSA. Both NRC and OST were developed out of conceptual work in the field of Sociology and Social Psychology, particularly *Role Theory*, a theoretical conceptualisation of the roles played by individuals within society. NRC and OST both shied away from applying Sociological definitions of *role*, which had been designed for individuals, directly to either states or businesses respectively. However, this is precisely the route that this thesis has taken.

It is not unprecedented to apply concepts from Sociology and Social Psychology to International Relations. Alexander Wendt argues that the analogy between states and individuals “is an accepted practice in mainstream international relations discourse”, going on to assert that “substantively, states ... through their practices, constitute each other as “persons” having interests, fears, and so on” (Wendt 1992: 397). Wendt’s seminal article, *Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics* (1992), establishes the anthropomorphisation of states as a core element of Constructivist International Relations theory. Building upon the works of authors like Robert Jervis (1988), Robert Keohane (1990), and Joseph Nye (1987), the article is focused around how states’ experiences, through the construction of and participation in international institutions, shape their *identity* (Wendt 1992: 393-394). The article moves away from traditional economic theorising, and incorporates a “sociological social psychological form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the dependent variable” (Wendt 1992: 394). Goldgeiger and Tetlock’s article, *Psychology and International Relations Theory* (2001), takes this a step further and directly applies Social Psychological models to various International Relations theories in order to supplement understanding of various situations by understanding the ‘psychology’ of states.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s article, *Hegel’s House, or ‘People are States Too’*, agrees that “states are people” in his discussion of states as ‘social actors’ (P. T. Jackson 2004: 281). He goes on to say that “states and individual human beings do *not* exhaust the variety of actors being ‘personated’ in contemporary world politics. In particular, one sees references to ‘humanity’, ‘the market’, ‘the globe’, and ‘civilisation’, which can also be meaningfully studied as social

actors” (P. T. Jackson 2004: 287). By highlighting this point, Jackson is providing support for the current proposition to apply Sociology and Social Psychology techniques to an institutional framework like the APSA, rather than its individual member states. This approach is confirmed in neo-structuralist approaches such as Steele’s book, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (2008), which adopts Social Psychology techniques to show that NATO launched its operation in Kosovo out of ‘shame’ relating to its decline in relevance following the end of the Cold War (Steele 2008: 126-128).

### ***Role Theory***

The preceding section has established the need for a *new* conceptualisation of the *role* of corporate actors in International Relations, and also established the precedent for utilising theoretical frameworks from Sociology and Social Psychology in International Relations theory. However, it is not the goal of this paper to anthropomorphise the APSA any more than to simply allow it to *have* a role as a corporate entity—a far from revolutionary concept; APSA scholars all agree that the APSA *has* a role, they just do not agree on what the role is and have no established methodologies that can work it out objectively. This section will therefore examine Role Theory in Sociology and Social Psychology, before moving on to borrow from their technical definitions of *role*, and adapt them for use in the context of the thesis.

The reconceptualisation of the role of international organisations will be based upon Social Psychology’s Role Theory. According to Biddel, a key figure in the discourse, “Role theory concerns one of the most important characteristics of

social behavior—the fact that human beings behave in ways that are different and predictable depending on their respective social identities and the situation” (1986: 68). Role Theory is largely focused on three concepts which correlate with the three conceptualisations of role identified in the APSA scholarship earlier: 1) patterns of behaviour, 2) identities and 3) expectations of behaviour that are understood by all (Biddle 1986: 68). However, there are several different streams of thought in Role Theory, and the following section will examine these individually, starting with Functionalist Role Theory, moving on to discuss Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory, and finishing with a brief look at Cognitive Role Theory and Structural Role Theory, neither of which have proven fully applicable to the current study.

Functionalist Role Theory is a traditional approach, dating back to 1936, and is the most foundational way to conceptualise roles. The functionalists view social structures as collections of *designated* social positions, the shared norms of which govern differentiated behaviours (Bates and Harvey 1975: 12). For functionalists, roles represent the accomplishment of specific functions in society. The functionalist perspective describes roles which are predefined and unchanging (Biddle 1986: 70-71). For example, the *function* of the role of a police officer remains static, regardless of the individual inhabiting the role. People who inhabit this role either live up to the function of being a police officer, or they fail to do so; the conceptual role of a police officer itself never changes. Biddle, however, sees functionalism as flawed, pointing out that many roles are not associated with specific, identified social positions, and that roles do not necessarily have corresponding functions. He also claims that social



systems are far from stable and norms may or may not be shared within the system (Biddle 1986: 71).

Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory is much more fluid, stressing the roles of individual actors, rather than their functions. Roles change over time and are formed through social interaction. The Symbolic Interactionist conceptualisation of roles, according to Biddle, “reflect[s] norms, attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as understood by the actors” (Biddle 1986: 71). Symbolic Interactionism also has its weaknesses, and Biddle raises some key problems that have plagued interactionist efforts, including a tendency to produce vague and inapplicable definitions laced with ideology, and a failure to embrace empirical research. He claims that they fail to pay attention to actors' expectations of others, or to structural constraints upon expectations and roles. He also claims that it is unclear whether Symbolic Interactionists believe that expectations generate, follow on from or evolve conjointly with the Symbolic Interactionist roles (Biddle 1986: 72).

In addition to these two ‘mainstream’ conceptualisations of *role*, Biddle mentions two others. Cognitive Role Theory is focused on the link between expectations of the role and behaviour. Cognitive Role theorists examine social conditions that give rise to expectations of roles. The theory develops techniques for measuring expectations and the impact of expectations on social conduct. It also covers perceptions of the expectations of others and the effects of those perceptions on behaviour (Biddle 1986: 74). Conceptually, this would be difficult to implement for an international organisation but not impossible; a cognitive role could be established by quantifying how the APSA's perceptions of how it is perceived affect its role.

Structural Role Theory, developed during the 1950s, focuses on hierarchical structures within social structures, defined as static sets of organisations comprised of sets of people with the same role, whose patterned behaviour is directed by other sets of people within the organisation. The Structuralist conceptualisation of the role is geared towards understanding social networks, kinships, role sets, exchange relationships, comparison of forms of social systems, and the analysis of economic behaviours. Structural Role Theory is very similar to *Organisational Role Theory*, which has already been rejected as a suitable model for this thesis (Biddle 1986: 72-73).

### ***Reconceptualising the Role of the APSA: Institutional Role Theory***

So far, this chapter has established that there are no pre-existing theoretical frameworks for conceptualising the role played by international organisations; the only institution-focused role theories are Organisational Role Theory, National Role Conception Theory and Structural Role Theory, and all of these are focused on the interaction between individual members of institutions, rather than the role of the institution itself. However, a review of key IR theory texts has shown that it is not uncommon to apply concepts to states and other international actors that were derived from the Sociology and Social Psychology discourse and originally intended to be applied to individuals. The chapter will therefore now focus on the development of a new theoretical framework for a research programme aimed at defining the role of the APSA, which, in the absence of any similar work in International Relations, will build on concepts developed for Role Theory, borrowing some of its terminology. For ease of reference, the theoretical framework will be called *Institutional Role Theory*.

First, it is important to set out exactly what it is that *Institutional Role Theory* needs to deliver. It needs to provide a clear and evidence-based estimation of the role of the APSA. This will allow for more accurate assessments of the success of the role, instead of the whole smorgasbord of different opinions outlined in the previous chapter. This in turn will result in less contradictory recommendations and policy suggestions and facilitate a more consistent approach among the APSA's external partners, who will better understand what the organisation can do, and what it should not be expected to do. The role of any organisation changes over time, but the framework described in this chapter is designed to allow a researcher to discern the role played by any international organisation at any single moment in time, or even to chart the evolution of its role over a period of time, and enables that assessment to be repeatable, consistent and objective. Institutional Role Theory will facilitate a common understanding of what we mean when we use the term *role* in the context of international organisations, even though the output of the theory (a description of the role itself) will probably change over time.

As explained above, Role Theory is largely focused on three concepts: 1) patterns of behaviour; 2) identities and; 3) expectations of behaviour that are understood by all (Biddle 1986: 68). This can be roughly applied to the APSA as: 1) what it does; 2) what it intends to do and; 3) what others think that it is supposed to do. These three points all describe interpretations of the same actor's role, but are all very different. It was very clear from the literature review that scholars' expectations of the role of the APSA were usually quite different from what the APSA was actually *able* to do. It is also clear, as Chapter 3 will show, that the role that the APSA was *designed* to play in Africa is in many

ways more ambitious than either the role that it *actually* plays, or the role that it is *expected* to play by commentators. It is therefore important to understand and rationalise the differences between these three approaches to the role of the APSA.

### **The Functionalist Roles of the APSA**

In the vocabulary of Role Theory, the role that the APSA is *designed* to play, which is outlined in the treaty framework and discussed in more detail in the next chapter, is clearly a functionalist role. As discussed earlier, the functionalist role is a static role that is placed upon the actor, and is defined by a predetermined function; in the case of the APSA, this predefined function is described in the treaty framework, including the mandates of individual PSOs. However, the role that the APSA is *expected* to play shall also be considered to be a functionalist role in *Institutional Role Theory*, as it is a generally static role built around a predetermined function.

Therefore, within the context of *Institutional Role Theory*, the *functionalist role* is the appointed role that an organisation is *supposed* to perform, and can be split into two categories; the *functionalist role* can be either self-determined (which shall be termed the *endemic functionalist role*), or pre-defined by the subjective expectations and perceptions of the observer (which shall be termed the *projected functionalist role*). For example, Paul Williams' (2006) *projected functionalist role* of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was the protection of all civilians in Darfur; a role that AMIS clearly failed to live up to, but was never actually a part of its *endemic functionalist role*, as defined in the original mandate. While the *endemic functionalist role* could perhaps provide a benchmark against which to measure success or failure, a *projected*

*functionalist role* provides very shaky ground for an assessment of an organisation's success, a prediction of the organisation's future, or any number of other important analyses. The exact nature of the *projected functionalist role* changes with each observer, each of whom has slightly different expectations of the role that an organisation *should* be playing. This was the source of the problems in the discourse highlighted in the previous chapter. By contrast, the *endemic functionalist role* of an organisation is relatively consistent. It is focused on what the organisation itself *intendeds* to do, and, in the case of the APSA, is established in writing in its founding charter and subsequent official documents; the perception of the *endemic functionalist role* will, therefore, remain relatively unchanging regardless of the individual observer, although the role itself may evolve over time along with the development of new protocols to the treaty.

However, the *functionalist role*, whether *projected* or *endemic*, is still only a description of what an organisation is *supposed* to do, and therefore policy decisions based upon either interpretation of the *functionalist role* could be seriously flawed. Understanding the *functionalist roles* of the APSA does not systematically explain the practical, *de facto* role played by the organisation within its operating environment, which could be quite different. It therefore provides a skewed perception of the organisation, contributing to misconceptions and misunderstandings that could have serious repercussions for policy, potentially leading to wasted resources, or worse, increasing instances of blowback.

There are no shortages of examples of support being provided to organisations, largely on the basis of functionalist interpretations of role, that has failed to yield

results, or actually ended up being used against whomever supplied the support in the first place. In particular, US support for organisations that it had defined as anti-communist frequently backfired; the US's *projected functionalist role* of these organisations failed to take into account the scale and importance of other elements of their roles. Gerard Prunier and Barbara Wilson (2006) cite a recent, African example of this problem related to the United States' policy in Somalia. In early 2006, the United States, searching for viable partners in the country, announced that it was willing to support any group which was prepared to fight against terrorism in Somalia. Clan-based alliances of warlords and their militias immediately redefined their *endemic functionalist roles* in order to attract US support, establishing the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) on 18 February 2006 (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). The US began heavily funding the group, providing \$100,000-\$150,000 per month to the organisation through the CIA (Kagwanja 2006: 83), a policy that was based almost entirely on the ARPCT's *endemic functionalist role*, rather than a systematic assessment of the real role that it actually played. Far from playing the role of an effective counter-terrorism force that could root-out al Qaeda elements in the country, or, for that matter, a force for the restoration of peace, the ARPCT played the role of an alliance of self-interested, power-hungry warlords, "hungry for funds, and keen to weaken the authority of the TFG" (Transitional Federal Government of Somalia) (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). The TFG argued that if the leaders of ARPCT were serious about fighting terrorism, they would have been prepared to come to Baidoa and work with the Government on the issue (United Nations 2006d: 2). A 2006 UN report stated that the ARPCT was recruiting child soldiers in Mogadishu (United Nations

2006d: 10). Michael Zorick, a senior US diplomat in Kenya at the time, protested against payments to the ARPCT, calling them counter-productive (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). If the United States had based their understanding of the organisation on an assessment of the role that the organisation was *actually* playing in Somalia, rather than the role it was *supposed* to play, or *claimed* to play, then it may have reconsidered providing the organisation with small arms, training and capital.

Similar examples abound: the *endemic functionalist role* (or indeed, many elements of the *projected functionalist roles*) of the Sudanese Border Guards, or the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Mai-Mai self-defence militias, or any number of other organisations, would be very different from an impartial assessment of the *real* role that these actors perform.

An evolving example is the perception of the Arab Spring's revolutionary movements in the West, which has adopted a *projected functionalist role* of revolutionary groups in North Africa and the Middle East as pro-Western and pro-democracy; however, as the situation evolves, and particularly after the election of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, there are fears that these revolutionary movements were not playing the role of *pro-democracy* freedom-fighters struggling against oppressive governments, but were more like *pro-Islamic* freedom-fighters, struggling against oppressive *secular* governments (Totten 2012). Michael Totten questions whether the Arab Spring is really an *Islamist Winter* (Totten 2012), while Hoda Badran highlights how the Arab Spring has translated into a reduction of freedom for women in the affected countries (Badran 2012). In light of these developments, a less subjective definition of *role* might have resulted in different policies from Western actors

such as NATO, the EU and the United States; all of whom (after initial misgivings) became heavily involved in promoting the Arab Spring.

### **Interactionist Role**

Developing a systematic approach to defining a non-subjective understanding of the term *role* is the driving force behind this thesis. It would allow for a repeatable, objective, systematic and evidence-based interpretation of the APSA's evolving role, instead of the subjective and contradictory ascriptions of the APSA's role described in the literature review. To achieve this, *Institutional Role Theory* will draw from *Symbolic Interactionist Theory*, and establish the third interpretation of the role: the role that the organisation is *actually* performing, which will, henceforth, be referred to as the *interactionist role*.

As explained in the discussion of role theory, *Symbolic Interactionism* does not define peoples' roles based on preconceived *functions* that they are expected to perform. Instead, the Interactionists argue that roles are established organically through interactions within society. Thus, interactionist roles are not static; they evolve in response to various push-pull factors in the individual's environment. In *Institutional Role Theory*, this will be interpreted to mean that the *interactionist role* is shaped and formed by myriad influences acting upon the APSA, which shall be termed *limiting* and *enabling* factors.

### **Limiting and Enabling Factors**

Each enabling factor creates space for the APSA to act in a specific area; for example, the provision of troop contingents from APSA member states *enables* its role as an agency for the deployment of Peace Support Operations. Without troop contributions, the APSA could not perform this role. Likewise, the size and



quality of these troop contributions will have a corresponding effect on the role that the APSA can play in this area (i.e. its *capacity* to play this role).

Conversely, limiting factors have the opposite effect, limiting the extent to which the APSA can perform a role in a particular area, regardless of how much the APSA *wants* to, or is *expected* to perform that role; for example, the poverty of African states is a factor that limits the AU's general budget, and has a knock-on effect on the APSA's Peace Fund, limiting its ability to pay troops serving in its Peace Support Operations. This means that troop-contributing countries often have to pay out of pocket to support their contributions in the field, making the contribution of troops for APSA PSOs impossible for many of Africa's poorest states, and undesirable for most others. This severely limits the role that the APSA can play as an agency for the deployment of Peace Support Operations. However, the APSA's role in this area is expanded by external capacity enhancement; financial support from the United States, the European Union, the UN and other partners gives the APSA the financial capacity to play a much larger role in this area than would otherwise be possible, allowing the APSA to (eventually) start reimbursing the troop-contributing countries, restoring their faith in the whole process and enabling the APSA's role.

Governance of the institution can also be considered to be an enabling or limiting factor, and occupies a special place in Institutional Role Theory, as it enables or limits the *use* of the institution's capacity in certain areas for certain roles, and can also include decisions about which parts of the institution's capacity to enhance, and which to neglect.

The number of roles in which the APSA acts, and the extent to which the APSA is able to perform in them, is completely dependent upon limiting and enabling

factors. As a result, it is possible to come to an objective view of the role of the APSA through a detailed examination of these limiting and enabling factors, and to ascertain their net impact on the organisation. The *interactionist role* can be discovered in the space between these limiting and enabling factors. We can therefore develop an *interactionist equation* to help define the *interactionist role*: enabling factors minus limiting factors equals the *interactionist role*.

## Technical Definitions of Role

This chapter has thus established three technical definitions of *role*:

1. *Endemic Functionalist Role*: This is the role that the actor was originally intended to achieve. This provides little information about the real role performed by the actor, especially in the case of the APSA, which has a highly ambitious *endemic functionalist role*, as the following chapter will explain. This thesis aims to challenge and replace the use of *endemic functionalist roles* as an effective basis for policy. The *endemic functionalist role* of an institution will change only as its treaty framework is expanded and amended.
2. *Projected Functionalist Role*: This is the role that observers believe that the actor *should* be performing. This is the most common way in which the word *role* has been used in the discourse, and its subjective nature is also the biggest problem with the literature, as the previous chapter explained. This thesis aims to challenge and replace the use of *projected functionalist roles* as an effective tool for the assessment of the effectiveness or utility of an actor, especially where these assessments are used to inform policy. The *projected functionalist role* of an institution changes in relation to the observer's opinions about the role; it shifts

from person to person, and can change as the observer's opinions change.

3. *Interactionist Role*: This is the 'real' role that the actor performs in practical terms. The *interactionist role* is formed and shaped by various limiting and enabling factors which act upon the institution in its operating environment. The *interactionist role* can be defined through the application of the *interactionist equation*. Thus, the *interactionist role* of an actor can be discovered through an investigation of the effects, extent and direction of the various limiting and enabling factors. This will be the main task of this thesis, and will provide a much more realistic and less subjective idea of the role of the APSA. The *interactionist role* of an institution can change over time with the ebb and flow of limiting and enabling factors, but it does not change relative to the observer, or the observer's opinions, notwithstanding debate over the effect, extent or direction of various limiting or enabling factors.

### ***The Institutional Role Theory Research Programme***

In order to define the *interactionist role* of the APSA, it is necessary to develop a research programme based on understanding the impact of limiting and enabling factors upon the role played by the APSA. The research programme developed in this section will form the basis for the rest of the thesis.

First, it is necessary to identify all the major limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA, and organise them into categories, to which we can then apply the *interactionist equation*. It is likely that the five categories devised by the present thesis for use in the context of the APSA would also be transferable to

studies of the *interactionist role* of other international organisations of a similar type, and possibly even other types of international actors such as states or NGOs.

The five categories of limiting and enabling factors used in this thesis are as follows:

1. Structural and Legal Factors
2. Internal Capacity Factors
3. External Capacity Enhancement Factors
4. Governance Factors
5. Environmental Factors

These five factors were developed through an extensive investigation of the mission environments of the APSA's three Peace Support Operations, as well as the AU-sanctioned Operation Democracy in the Comoros. This investigation highlighted all the major influences on these missions that impacted on the APSA's capacity to act, or affected its use of that capacity. The conclusions of this investigation of the PSO mission environments are included as Chapter 7 of this thesis, as the mission environments *themselves* are limiting and enabling factors, placing constraints upon the APSA PSOs. The APSA tends to deploy early during the peace process and, as a result, the mission environments are usually still violent and extremely dangerous, acting as a major limiting factor on the role of the APSA as a peacekeeper/peacemaker.

The investigation also uncovered legal and structural factors that have, for example, enabled the APSA to deploy without the requirement of a ceasefire. The United Nations, however, *is* limited by its treaty framework to only deploy

where there is 'peace to keep' (although creative interpretation of the Charter is reducing that limitation when convenient). This has acted as a limiting factor, restricting UN support to the APSA and preventing its missions from transferring to UN control in violent mission environments where the UN is not supposed to have a role. Such transferral of mission ownership is not just the APSA's only working exit strategy, but also a core part of its *endemic functionalist role* as a bridging force for the UN.

Internal capacity gaps have become extremely prominent problems, limiting the APSA's capacity to act during the APSA PSOs. Examples include the lack of heavy airlift capacity, the lack of logistical capacity and the lack of planning expertise. These factors have severely restrained the role that the APSA has been able to play in the field. However, many of these capacity gaps have been bridged with extensive external support for the APSA and its missions. External support constitutes a major enabling factor, but external partners also have a significant influence on how the capacity they provide is used, often placing conditions on aid, or earmarking it to enable only specific elements of the APSA's role, limiting the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* as an African-owned and African-led project, and shaping it into something of a more global nature. Various limiting and enabling factors like this have moulded the governance of the APSA, which in turn affects the role played by the APSA.

## **Chapter Outline**

This section will provide an overview of the techniques and sources used in each chapter to collate and analyse the information required to discover the major limiting and enabling factors within each chapter's respective factor groups.

### *Chapter 3: The Treaty Framework and Endemic Functionalist Role of the APSA*

is the starting point for the investigation, largely devoted to understanding the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA, as well as how the structural and legal factors which define that *endemic functionalist role* also limit and enable the role of the APSA. The information examined in chapter 3 is largely drawn from an analysis of the APSA's treaty framework. Access to the treaty framework was achieved through the AU's new electronic archives, but as there were gaps in the electronic archives (which have now mostly been closed with the launching of a new Situation Room website in 2011), supplementary work was done in the African Union Commission Building in Addis Ababa, allowing access to copies of communiqués, reports and protocols which were not available online at the time. This chapter establishes a clear view of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* in the course of examining the limiting and enabling factors of the treaty framework. The APSA's *endemic functionalist role*, as defined in key documents such as the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Peace and Security Protocol, provides an interesting starting point from which to chart the evolving *interactionist role* over the ensuing chapters. However, the main purpose of the chapter is to highlight how the relevant legal framework limits and enables the *interactionist role* of the APSA.

*Chapter 4: Internal Capacity* examines how the APSA's internal capacity limits and enables its role. The chapter is enhanced by interviews conducted in Addis Ababa with key APSA personnel and external partners, who all had a lot to say about the APSA's capacity problems, and were able to put them in the context of how they have limited its role. The chapter also utilises the *Reports of the*

*Chairperson of the Commission*, which are released several times a year and are available in electronic archives and at the AUC in Addis Ababa.

*Chapter 5: External Capacity Enhancement* is focused on explaining how external partners have been able to enable the role of the APSA, but also looks at the effects of the limitations that have been placed upon the role of the APSA as a result. The chapter is largely drawn from United Nations archives, especially the various memoranda of understanding, framework agreements and declarations on the subject of the UN/AU relationship. Various Reports of the Chairperson of the Commission, drawn from the African Union archives, have also proved invaluable to charting the progress and actual implementation of pledged external support, or locating delays and unfulfilled pledges; unfulfilled pledges, or impounded armoured vehicles, do not have a corresponding enabling effect on the APSA's role.

In the absence of a theoretical framework that could be used to systematically track how the role of the APSA is limited and enabled by internal and external governance, *Chapter 6: Governance of the APSA* establishes a new theory of governance based on Policy Governance from the field of Business Studies, and uses that as a theoretical framework for the rest of the chapter. An examination of the major agreements between the APSA and its external partners furnishes the chapter with limiting factors stemming from the restrictions of these agreements. The chapter also assesses which areas of the APSA have received the most external funding, and which have been neglected, thereby demonstrating how external partners shape the role played by the APSA through targeted and conditional support. It also benefits from

interviews conducted in Addis Ababa, where representatives of both the APSA and its partners had strong views on the matter.

*Chapter 7: The African Security Environment* investigates the limitations placed on the APSA by the mission environments in which it operates. To achieve this, the chapter examines each of the APSA's four missions in chronological order, showing how the missions were shaped by the limiting and enabling factors placed upon them by developments in the security environment. The chapter also seeks to outline how these developments and experiences have shaped the role played by the APSA's PSOs over the long term. The information used in the chapter is largely drawn from the Reports of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the Reports of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union. Various Peace and Security Council Communiqués are also utilised, and the information is systematically cross-referenced with press reporting.

*Chapter 8: Conclusion* seeks to provide an overview of the limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA, and will apply the *interactionist equation* to these factors, subtracting limiting factors from enabling factors. This will allow for an outline of the *interactionist role* of the APSA, which can be compared and contrasted with the *endemic functionalist role* outlined in chapter three, and the *projected functionalist roles* outlined in chapter one. In this way, we will be able to measure the success of the APSA against its own high ambitions, and against the expectations of the discourse. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the repercussion of *Institutional Role Theory* for the discourse.



## ***Research Methodology***

### **Pre-Research Period**

In order to gather information on the APSA's various limiting and enabling factors, their origins and the extent of their effects, the author adopted two main research methods both categorically qualitative: archival research, based upon the APSA's increasingly well-stocked electronic archives; and interviews with key individuals working within the APSA framework and key representatives of the APSA's main partners, based in Addis Ababa in 2010.

The methodology adopted by the thesis is common to the existing APSA scholarship; similar works, such as Benedikt Franke's (2009) *Security Cooperation in Africa*, which provided a snap-shot of the APSA's state of operationalisation in 2008 and its effect upon enhancing security cooperation in Africa, or Kristiana Powel's (2005) working paper on the APSA's implementation of R2P, were similarly based upon official documents and reports, supplemented with unstructured interviews with representatives of the APSA and its partners in key cities in Africa, in particular Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Bujumbura and Johannesburg.

Field work in the PSOs' operating theatres themselves, potentially based in Mogadishu or El Fashir, was considered for the thesis, but the time and capital required to work in these volatile environs were not proportionate to the insight they would have provided. A further complicating factor was that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Coventry University advice was not to travel in these areas, making ethical approval for such work effectively impossible.

Linnea Bergholm's 2009 thesis—which focused on UN/AU cooperation in Darfur—did incorporate fieldwork as a cornerstone of her research method, including anonymous interviews in Darfur and other key locals. These were an extremely valuable part of her thesis because they provided qualitative insights into the participant's "feelings, values, attitudes and perceptions" (Bergholm 2009: 12). Bergholm emphasised this method because her project was designed to "describe and understand social phenomena, rather than seeking to explain or theorise from such phenomena" (Bergholm 2009: 9). By contrast, the present thesis *does* seek to explain and theorise. Further, while Bergholm, like Powell and others, was focused on the operational and tactical level, the present thesis is only concerned with it insofar as it affects the continental level and the overarching institutional framework. While understanding the operational level is the key to understanding the role of the APSA, the broad scope of the thesis would not have been sustainable with so much effort going into such detailed work on either AMISOM or UNAMID. As a result, a different balance of research methods has been adopted for the present thesis, with a heavier focus on archival research, but with a correspondingly lighter focus on fieldwork. As a result, it is important to acknowledge that the thesis is limited by a reliance upon official and unofficial reports of developments in the APSA's operations, rather than first-hand observation.

## **Archival Research**

Much of the work in this thesis is informed by analysing primary sources, including reports by organisations such as the North-South Institute (NSI), the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI), the Institute for Strategic Studies

(ISS), and others, which are themselves based upon official documents, secondary research, interviews and/or fieldwork related to APSA PSOs. However, the most important primary sources for the present study were the African Union's own electronic archives which were available in English, French or both (the author generally favoured the language that the document was originally written in), as well as those of the United Nations and, to a much lesser extent, those of the European Union. The African Union's official documents have been imperative to the study, providing the majority of the information about the APSA's limiting and enabling factors. They include the Constitutive Act of the African Union, its Protocols, the Decisions and Declarations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Communiqués [sic] of the Peace and Security Council, Reports of the Military Staff Committee, Press Releases of the Peace and Security Council, Press Releases of the Assembly, and the Reports of the Chairperson of the Commission.

In the early stages of the research for the thesis, only the core of these documents was available electronically, and gaps in the electronic archive, including many reports by the Military Staff Committee and some Communiqués and other reports, were supplemented with a visit to the African Union Commission (AUC) building in Addis Ababa in May 2010. Since then, however, the APSA's online presence has improved drastically, and a near-complete electronic archive is now available at the official AU Situation Room website. Reports of several working groups and committees are still difficult to find however, as a result of the African Union's continuing personnel capacity problems which have a knock-on effect on its online presence.

In light of the analytical methodology outlined above, a strong understanding of the treaty framework and the inner-workings of the APSA treaty framework has been imperative, in particular to understanding the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA, as well as understanding limiting and enabling factors affecting the organisations, including those stemming from the organisation itself.

### **Elite Interviews**

Careful consideration was given to the ethical implications of the interviews prior to arranging the research trip to Addis Ababa. Full ethical approval for the research was sought from the faculty, and was granted in accordance with the procedures of Coventry University Committee on Ethics.

Interviews were not conducted anonymously; the interviews were not seen to put the interviewees at risk because of their largely procedural and technical nature, which focused on topics such as logistics, interoperability, CONOPS, C<sup>3</sup>, cash-flow and the interpretation of various protocols, communiqués, charters and treaties. Further; helping to spread knowledge of the activities of the APSA and its partners was often an element of the job description of the interviewees, making the interview process a natural and frequent occurrence for them which, as highly-educated specialists, they were well prepared to deal with.

Even still, before the interviews took place, the offices of interviewees were provided with a leaflet that explained who the author was and the nature of the research project. The leaflet ensured that the interviewees understood the nature and purpose of the interviews, and what would happen with the information they provided. It also ensured that they were made explicitly aware

that they could withdraw permission for the use of the material they provided me at any time, either during the interview or by contacting me subsequently via the contact details provided on the leaflet or on the author's business card, which was provided to each interviewee and some of their staff.

Explicit oral permission was sought at the beginning of each interview to record the conversations on a digital recording device, which was later used for transcription and analysis.

The interviews were conducted primarily in English (with some facilitation and clarification in French), which was not the first language of all of the interviewees, but is the working language of the African Union and its partners in Addis Ababa. They served two core purposes within the research methodology; first, they were used to cross-reference, confirm, expand on and prioritise information about the nature and extent of various limiting and enabling factors that had already been gleaned from the archival research, reports from think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Swedish Defence Research Agency and the North-South Institute, and a survey of secondary scholarship, which itself contained the conclusions of various interviews.

Second, it was hoped that the interviewees would be able to propose additional limiting and enabling factors that the author had not yet considered, allowing for new avenues of research on return to the UK; this is a process which Jeffry Berry refers to as 'branching' and requires the interviewer to decide if the interviewees proposed topic for conversation is a distraction, or a potentially valuable avenue for study (Berry 2005: 801). In particular, the interviews shed light upon the massive personnel problems in the APSA, which have limited the

APSA's capacity to act, and capacity to absorb external financial support, as will be explained in more detail in chapter four.

In light of these two objectives, and in light of the preceding research, which had shown that the APSA was highly dependent upon external support as a major source of enabling (and a few limiting) factors, a conscious decision was made to embrace as many of the APSA's key partners as possible, sending requests for interviews to the United States' Mission to the African Union, the European Union Delegation to African Union, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Chinese Delegation to the African Union and the French and British embassies in Addis Ababa, in addition to requests for interviews at the AUC, especially the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretariat.

### ***Interview method***

Berry highlights the importance of giving interviewees 'licence to roam' but also places high importance upon the interviewer's ability to keep the interview on track (Berry 2005: 680). In light of these insights, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured and open-ended manner to encourage the free exchange and interpretation of ideas and concepts surrounding the subject matter. They were, however, focused around the two objectives mentioned above.

Interviewees were asked to explain their view of the nature, the extent and the importance of several limiting and enabling factors. Some key questions, prepared in advance, were used to stimulate discussion in some of the interviews:

1. *How would you define the role of the AU's peacekeeping component?*

2. *What are the security functions of the AU military capacity?*
3. *Does the practical role of the AU's military peacekeeping component differ from the role defined in its mission statement?*
4. *Why not leave peacekeeping to the UN?*
5. *Should the AU strengthen and formalise its relationship with the UN?*
6. *What is/should be the role of the international community in supporting AUPKOs?*
7. *Does the AU's dependence on external actors compromise its African ownership?*
8. *Do you think the AU should diversify its income (look for support from China etc.)?*
9. *How important is diplomatic support to the AU's military activities?*
10. *Is the current ad-hoc system of troop generation sustainable?*
11. *Will the ASF be a viable tool for the PSC?*

### ***Problems encountered***

The APSA's limited administrative capacity, and the over-loaded schedules of the people targeted for interviews, meant that setting up meetings from the United Kingdom was extremely difficult. Interviews with Koen Vervaeke, head of the EU Mission to the African Union, and Timothy Murithi, the Programme Head of the PSC Report Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), as well as interviews with Sandy Moss and Sam Jeremy at the UK Embassy, were

confirmed before heading to Ethiopia, and tentative arrangements were made to interview Ambassador Battle, head of the United States Mission to the African Union.

However, a major concern was the lack of confirmed interviews at the African Union itself; officials would not respond to emails, and all the phone numbers available for these individuals were routed through the main administrative desk of the AUC, where secretaries were wary of forwarding unsolicited calls to APSA officials. Some tentative interviews were set up with PSC Secretariat officials.

Unfortunately, the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in April 2010 prevented air travel in northern Europe for two weeks, resulting in the postponement of interviews and making it impossible to interview Koen Vervaeke, Ambassador Battle and some other potential interviewees in Addis Ababa who had since left the city. On arrival in Addis Ababa, the author was unable to secure access to either the ECA or the AUC without a prior agreement.

Dr. Murithi, provided the author with invaluable support in the form of mobile phone numbers for some of the key individuals interviewed at the AUC, including Dr. Admore Kambudzi, head of the PSC Secretariat. So armed, establishing interviews at the APSA became much easier.

## **Potential Limitations on the Research Methodology**

### ***Archival Research***

It is arguable that the thesis' heavy reliance upon official AU documentation could give an institutional bias in favour of the APSA. The author has noticed some (though not many) areas where major setbacks in the APSA PSO's were



not covered in the Chairperson of the Commission's Reports, or were covered in passing with very little detail.

In order to compensate for this problem, the thesis has, where possible, cross-referenced much of the information presented in the official AU documentation with other primary sources, such as official UN documents, government and institutional reports and interviews, as well as the context provided by the secondary literature. However, owing to the obscurity of much of the subject matter, some sections of the thesis rely exclusively on information gleaned from the AU archives and, as a result, it should be acknowledged that the risk of a certain level of bias in the APSA's favour may remain.

### ***Interviews***

The author also made a conscious decision to target elites within these organisations to ensure that interviewees had the freedom and knowledge to talk about the relevant issues. Targeting elites for the interviews was also partially a result of time constraints and difficulty in gaining access, which could have facilitated more *ad hoc* interviews. This resulted in a smaller pool of interviewees, and perhaps resulted in missing out on valuable information that could have been gleaned from lower ranking staff.

Moreover, it is important to recognise bias in the interviews (Dexter 2006: 119-121). Each organisation's representatives had their own biases, which became clear during the interviews especially in light of the number of organisations covered. All the interviewees became slightly defensive when responding to claims made by the other interviewees. Where such bias has been suspected, it has been clearly stated in the thesis that the information was the interviewee's *opinion*. Additionally, some interviewees had a tendency to stick to the 'party

line', sometimes providing information that was readily available in mission-statements and other non-critical sources.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has explained how the thesis intends to address the problems with the APSA scholarship that were raised in chapter one. It explained the need for a reconceptualisation of what is meant when scholars talk about the *role* of an organisation. Borrowing from the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology, the chapter developed a new version of Role Theory, called *Institutional Role Theory*, which is designed specifically to analyse the roles of actors in International Relations. In the course of developing *Institutional Role Theory*, the chapter developed three different technical definitions of the word *role*, the *endemic functionalist role*, the *projected functionalist role* and the *interactionist role*. These technical definitions allow for a much clearer understanding of what is meant by academics when invoking the *role* of an actor. The chapter also developed a research programme that enables researchers to provide an outline of the *interactionist role* of an actor by investigating the limiting and enabling factors that act upon it and applying the *Interactionist Equation*.

The remainder of this thesis is devoted to examining the limiting and enabling factors that act upon the APSA so that the *Interactionist Equation* can be applied, revealing a systematic and objective interpretation of the role played by the APSA. The following chapter will begin this process with an examination of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA, and the limiting and enabling factors of the legal framework which set out that *endemic functionalist role*.

## **Chapter Three: The Endemic Functionalist Role and Treaty Framework of the APSA**

### ***Introduction***

Since the AU's inception in 2002, it has evolved a considerable treaty framework; in addition to the AU Founding Treaty, it is made up of numerous Protocols, Decisions, Declarations, Common Positions and Communiqués which, considered as a whole, can outline the endemic functionalist role of African Union Peace and Security Architecture; the role envisioned for the institution by those who developed the texts from which it is constructed. It delineates the legal boundaries within which the APSA is required to operate, but it has also allowed for the creation of a comprehensive set of tools and institutions to enable the APSA to promote peace and security across the continent, and gives the APSA the freedom to use them in a number of ways in a number of situations.

This chapter will analyse the APSA's treaty framework in order to meet two key outcomes: first, the chapter will present a clear outline of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA—the role that the APSA was intended to perform. It will use statements of intent and key objectives, mandates and areas of operation outlined in the treaty framework to do this, rather than relying on external assumptions of what the role of the APSA ought to be. Second, this chapter intends to begin the long process of outlining the *interactionist role* of the APSA; treating the treaty framework itself as a limiting and enabling factor, showing the impact it has had on the role played by the APSA by limiting or enabling its capacity to act in certain areas.

To achieve these objectives, the chapter will first focus on the treaty framework's progressive conceptualisation of security, which will form a solid platform from which to conduct the rest of the study. It will then go on to examine the nature of the role of the APSA envisaged in the treaty framework. It will discuss the limitations that the AU treaty framework places on the role played by the APSA, and will then focus on the capacity that the AU treaty framework has authorised for the APSA to carry out its *endemic functionalist role*.

### ***Conceptualising Security***

To understand how the AU perceives its role in peace and security, we must first understand how it conceptualises security issues. The most important document in this respect is the Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which sought to provide a "common understanding of defence and security as terms embracing both civilian and military aspects" (African Union 2004g, Preamble 10). As this statement suggests, the APSA has embraced a very wide definition of security that heavily incorporates human security concepts. Article 6 of the CADSP reaffirms the AU's commitment to traditional state-centric security, but it also puts forth a broad range of civilian issues that have been securitised by the AU: human rights, structural security including good governance, economic development, access to resources, poverty, education, health, gender equality and environmental issues (African Union 2004g, Article 6). At the launch of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004, the African Heads of State and Government explicitly labelled HIV as a security problem for Africa (African Union 2004h, Article 11).

This progressive concept of security laid the foundations for the securitisation of threats to human security in the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. In the pact, aggression is defined as “...the use, intentionally and knowingly, of armed force or any other hostile act by a State, a group of States, an organisation of States or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign or external entity, against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party to this Pact...” (African Union 2005a, Article 1c).

The most important consequence of this concept of security is that it allowed the APSA to embrace the growing consensus, since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, that sovereignty is a responsibility, not a right, and that states have a responsibility to uphold human security, not just state security. If a government fails in its responsibility to protect, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act gives the AU the authority to intervene, without any requirement for the consent of the government of the state in question, but only “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Organisation of African Unity 2000). Article 4(h) marks a sharp break from the OAU’s infamous and intransigent reification of state sovereignty. The APSA’s right to intervene under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act was expanded further in the proposed Amendments to the Constitutive Act; however they have not yet been ratified (African Union 2010f).

The AU views socio-economic development as interdependent with state security (African Union 2002b, Article 4d), therefore it is in the interests of human security that the APSA has also renewed Africa’s efforts to address state-centric security issues. Important OAU documents such as the Lomé

Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, The OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism are still at the core of the AU's security policy (African Union 2005a).

Importantly, the APSA treaty framework also constructs a belief in Africa's security interdependence: "the indivisibility of security in Africa, and particularly the fact that the defence and security of one African country is directly linked to that of other African countries" (African Union 2004g, Preamble). Again, the AU's interpretation of what constitutes security *interdependence* is extremely loose. Bearing in mind the broad definition of security outlined above, the CADSP defines *common security threats* as any security threats which "confront all, some, or one of the countries or regions of the continent" (African Union 2004g, Article 7); i.e. *all* security threats are defined as *common* security threats – essentially a statement of solidarity, which is encapsulated in the NATO-inspired Article 2c of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact: "...any aggression or threat of aggression against any of the Member States shall be deemed to constitute a threat or aggression against all Member States of the Union" (African Union 2005a).

Thus the APSA treaty framework casts a wide net over security, allowing a vast number of processes to be securitised, and providing the AU with the freedom and legitimacy to bring to bear the full resources of the APSA and the member states to deal with even the slightest security threat.

### ***The Endemic Functionalist Role of the APSA***

The APSA treaty framework provides us with a large number of goals, objectives, standards of behaviour, statements of intent and justifications for its existence. Collectively, these statements represent the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA. This represents the APSA's *raison d'être*, as imagined by its creators, the guiding principles that govern how and why the APSA employs whatever means are at its disposal. Every document in the treaty framework contributes something to this constructed role, and reinforces what came before; however, there are several important themes that arise frequently that represent an outline of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role*.

At its most basic level, the APSA, and indeed the whole African Union, is a collective bargaining tool. Its goal is to “promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples” (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 3d). A relevant example of this is the AU's common positions delivered at the United Nations General Assembly, such as the Ezulwini Consensus, which calls for two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for Africa on the UN Security Council (2005c). The AU's highest common objective is African socio-economic development, and it was to that end that the APSA was created. The preamble to the AU Constitutive Act states “that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent” and emphasises “the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda” (Organisation of African Unity 2000); a sentiment repeated in subsequent documents (African Union 2002b: Article 4d), (African Union 2005a: Preamble). The APSA is likewise committed

to the “peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security” (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4i). The PSC Protocol was penned to enhance the APSA’s capacity to play “a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent” (African Union 2002b: Preamble). Thus, the promotion of peace is a core element of the constructed role of the APSA.

In this respect, the APSA views itself as an extension of the United Nations peace and security architecture, describing itself as a regional organisation in keeping with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (African Union 2002b: Article 17.2), (African Union 2002b: Preamble). As such, the APSA undertakes to cooperate with the UN in the promotion of peace and security (African Union 2002b: Article 4). It achieves its objectives in peace and security through a number of strategies.

The APSA’s constructed role in conflict management is extensive and ambitious. The APSA assumes primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent, undertaking to address each and every conflict that emerges on the continent in a timely manner, and to do so effectively (African Union 2004h: Article 3). The Statement of Commitment to Peace and Security in Africa boldly states that the APSA “shall not shrink from decisive actions to overcome the challenges confronting the continent.

Henceforth, there will be no conflict on our continent that will be considered to be out of bounds for the African Union” (African Union 2004h: Article 7). These articles could be the source of much of the criticism of the APSA, as they seem to make the resolution of all conflict in Africa part of the APSA’s role; compared to such a lofty objective, it is certain to fall short. However, they could equally



be seen as a statement of political will and an assertion of African ownership of Africa's underlying security problems.

From this examination of the treaty framework, it is possible to synthesise the APSA's *endemic functionalist role*, which is fostering peace by engaging with small arms and light weapons proliferation, peace building, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, child soldiers land mines, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) proliferation and terrorism (African Union 2004g: Article 10). It is the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* to prevent inter-state or intra-state conflicts (African Union 2005a: Article 2a(iii)). Where conflict already exists, the APSA, through the PSC has the *responsibility* (not simply the right) to deploy peace-making and peace building missions to resolve the conflict (African Union 2002b: Articles 3b and 4b).

A further aspect of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* is defence cooperation. The APSA is supposed to "defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Member States" (Organisation of African Unity 2000 Article 3b). The CADSP was designed to provide a framework for defence cooperation, including military training, intelligence pooling, and the development of common military doctrine, capacity and threat deterrence (African Union 2004g: Articles 13c, 13f and 13r). Moreover, despite the low rate of occurrences of inter-state conflict in Africa, the CADSP even includes a NATO-style mutual defence clause—Article 2c (African Union 2005a).

The most powerful tool afforded to the APSA by the treaty framework is the African Standby Force. It enables the APSA to carry out its endemic

functionalist role in peace operations under six different mission scenarios (African Union 2003d: 3):

- **Scenario 1**: AU/Regional Military advice to a political mission.
- **Scenario 2**: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission.
- **Scenario 3**: Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission.
- **Scenario 4**: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.
- **Scenario 5**: AU PKF for complex multidimensional PK mission with low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).
- **Scenario 6**: AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.

According to the ASF Policy Framework, scenarios one to four should be able to deploy with thirty days notice. Scenario five should be able to fully deploy within ninety days; however, the military component should be on the ground within thirty days. Under scenario six, the APSA should be able to deploy a robust military force in 14 days (African Union 2003d: 6-7). Further, forces deployed for scenarios one, two and three are expected to be self-sustaining for 30 days, whereas scenarios four, five and six should (ideally) be deployed with self-sustainability for 90 days (African Union 2003d: 15). Such a standing force, if fully operationalised, would exceed the capacity of even the United Nations and the European Union's stand-by arrangements, an indication of the extremely high ambitions of the APSA.

The treaty framework also states that humanitarian assistance is an important component of the role of the APSA. According to the PSC Protocol, the ASF is supposed to perform humanitarian assistance missions to “alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters” (African Union 2002b: Article 13.3). The ASF is also expected to be able to perform Quick Impact Projects (QIP), small, cheap targeted missions making use of specialist staff to perform small-scale humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction missions (African Union 2003d: Article 3.24.e).

It is clear, therefore, that the APSA is supposed to have a very considerable military aspect to aid it in its *endemic functionalist role* as Africa’s primary guarantor of peace and security. However, despite this, a powerful, recurring normative feature of the treaty framework is the APSA’s commitment to the pacific resolution of conflicts (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4e). The military elements of the APSA are supposed to be methods of last resort and its *endemic functionalist role* in conflict management is primarily peaceful. The treaty framework underlines political dialogue as the “essential mechanism for preventing recourse to insurrection and armed struggle”, supplemented with the wider AU’s commitment to addressing the underlying causes of conflict (African Union 2004h: Article 11). For example, promoting structural security is a cornerstone of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA; the promotion of human rights, democracy and democratic culture, good governance and the rule of law (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Preamble and Articles 4m and 3h).

Indeed, an important part of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* is its commitment to conflict *prevention*. Early warning, preventive diplomacy and peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation and conciliation, are integral to the APSA's role in conflict management (African Union 2002b: Articles 4b, 6b and 6c). This sentiment is reinforced in the CADSP, which emphasised the APSA's desire to promote a 'culture of peace and peaceful co-existence' in Africa and to promote the pacific resolution of conflicts and the non-use of force (African Union 2004g: Article 13k). One of the objectives of the AU Non Aggression and Common Defence pact is "to ensure that disputes are resolved by peaceful means" (African Union 2005a: Article 2.a(iv)).

From the above, it seems that there may be a certain level of *role conflict* between the pacific and interventionist elements of the APSA's role. It is perhaps telling that the APSA has not fully embraced the new interventionist ideals for which it has been lauded. Article 4(h) provides for a *right* to intervene in a state without the consent of the government under specific conditions, not a *responsibility*, as would later be recommended by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its now famous R2P report (ICISS 2001). Likewise, the treaty framework reconfirmed its commitment to state sovereignty and territorial integrity from the start (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 3b). Importantly, the controversial Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which considerably expanded the APSA's right to intervene without the permission of the state in question, was never ratified by the requisite two thirds of the member states. Further, the Ezulwini Consensus explicitly states that the obligation of a state to protect its citizens should not be used as a pretext to undermine state sovereignty or territorial integrity (African

Union 2005c: Paragraph B(i))—perhaps indicating that Africa’s leadership is still not fully comfortable with the R2P concept, despite being on the cutting edge of its operationalisation.

### ***Treaty Framework***

The *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA is therefore broad and complex. In order to enable the APSA to fulfil its role, the AU has developed a robust treaty framework to establish powerful mechanisms and institutions. However, this treaty framework both limits and enables the APSA’s capacity to act. The most significant limiting factors of the APSA treaty framework come from the APSA’s position within the wider framework of international law, especially the AU’s relationship with the United Nations.

From the beginning, the APSA has respected the role of the UN Charter (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 3e). In the Preamble of the PSC Protocol, the AU acknowledges the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the maintenance of international peace and security (African Union 2002b), a sentiment repeated in the AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact (African Union 2005a: Article 17a). The AU also acknowledges the UN as the supreme mandating authority and stated explicitly in the Ezulwini Consensus “that the intervention of Regional Organisations should be with the approval of the Security Council” (African Union 2005c: 6) and that it “will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements actions” (African Union 2003d: 4).

The APSA treaty framework also accepts the primacy of international human rights law (African Union 2002b: Article 4c). The Universal Declaration of

Human Rights is acknowledged in the Founding Treaty itself (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 3e), along with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which is reaffirmed in article 3(h) (Organisation of African Unity 2000). Further, the treaty framework has recommended (although not enforced) the accession of AU member states to various international treaties bilaterally, such as the Convention on Banning the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons with a Traumatic Effect or Which Strike Indiscriminately (African Union 2010e: Decision 321). The APSA must work within the boundaries of these international agreements during its operations.

The African Union also continues the OAU's traditional respect for the borders on independence (African Union 2002b: Article 4i) and this dogmatic adherence to the independence borders removes the APSA's freedom to recognise the sovereignty of autonomous sub-state regions such as Somaliland or Cabinda. The promotion of self-determination has been a useful tool in resolving conflicts in other parts of the world such as East Timor and Kosovo.

Finally, as explained above, another important theme of the APSA treaty framework is the strong commitment to the pacific resolution of conflicts (African Union 2004g: Article 15) (African Union 2009e: Article 13). Even this may well be considered a limiting factor if it delays military deployment in a crisis.

While acknowledging these limiting factors, the treaty framework is also the source of the APSA's legitimacy and its mandate to act. The treaty framework's important enabling factors collectively outline the potentiality of the APSA. It has facilitated the APSA's capacity to act in many areas, most famously the right to intervene in support of peace.

The AU treaty framework confers the right to intervene in a member state in one of two ways. The simplest path is through Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act, whereby a member state can request that the APSA intervene within its borders in order to “restore peace and security” (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4j). However, under ‘grave circumstances’ – war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, the Assembly may authorise intervention, and does not require a request from the government of the member state concerned to do so (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4h). If the Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act is ratified, which now seems unlikely, these grounds for intervention would be expanded to include unconstitutional changes of government (as defined in the Lomé Convention) (African Union 2003e: Article 4).

The APSA’s *endemic functionalist role* as a peacekeeping organisation rests heavily on its capacity to deploy peace missions, which is facilitated by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which established the PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 2.1). The PSC has the power to act on the behalf of AU member states on matters of Peace and Security (African Union 2002b: Article 7.2); although the Constitutive Act references the Assembly, the power to authorise peace support operations and intervention under the above articles also lies with the PSC (African Union 2002b: Articles 3b, 6d, 7.1c). In order to further enable the APSA’s capacity to fulfil its *endemic functionalist role* in this area, a number of institutions have been created to supplement the PSC. Theoretically, the most important of these institutions is the African Standby Force (ASF); a standby arrangement under

the control of the Peace and Security Council consisting of five multinational brigades, one from each of the Regions.

The PSC Protocol helps to enable the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* in peacemaking by permitting the preventive deployment of the ASF under certain circumstances: "in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement" and also allows the ASF to deploy observation and monitoring missions (African Union 2002b: Article 13.3). The Policy Framework for the Operationalisation of the ASF develops this aspect of the APSA's role further by explicitly outlining the types of conflict scenarios in which the ASF would be expected to deploy, including military advice to a political mission, observer missions, which may be co-deployed with a UN mission, Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions, complex peacekeeping missions and finally full-scale interventions under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (African Union 2003d, :3). The Ezulwini Consensus limits the APSA's role by underlining the need for the APSA to obtain approval from the Security Council for intervention; however, it goes on to state that such approval may be sought *post-facto* (African Union 2005c: Paragraph B(i)) – effectively allowing the APSA to deploy on its own initiative and seek legitimacy in its leisure, enhancing its role as a first responder and as an African-owned organisation

The AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact further strengthens the interventionist elements of the APSA's role. Article 3(d) (African Union 2005a) requires that the APSA *prevent* genocide, mass murder and other crimes against humanity. Likewise, Articles 4(a) and (b) (African Union 2005a) commit



member states to provide mutual assistance against any aggression or threat of aggression and to respond “by any means necessary.” Bearing in mind the wide definition of security used by the APSA, these articles could be invoked to justify intervention in a very wide range of situations, establishing the APSA’s freedom to act in pursuit of its *endemic functionalist role* as a military peacekeeper/peacemaker. Member states are further required to arrest and prosecute armed groups, mercenaries or terrorists that pose a threat to any member state (African Union 2005a: Article 6b), a process which would likely require the use of force.

The treaty framework also outlines a limited *endemic functionalist role* in counter terrorism for the APSA. The AU Charter reconfirmed its commitment to the implementation of the OAU Convention on Combating Terrorism (African Union 2002b: Article 17.1.i). Meanwhile the 2002 Algiers Plan of Action established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (African Union 2002a). The AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact extends the APSA’s capacity to act by allowing member states to extend all assistance necessary in the event of a terrorist threat, and allows the arrest and prosecution of any irregular armed group (African Union 2005a: Article 6).

On the other hand, the role of the APSA envisaged in the treaty framework is heavily focused on the pacific resolution of conflict and as such has more than hard-power tools at its disposal. The PSC Protocol creates a number of soft-power options for use in conflict management. The most important of these is the Panel of the Wise (PotW), a panel of highly-respected African personalities “who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace and security and development” (African Union 2007g: Article 3), one from each sub-

region. The PotW was created to support the PSC in the area of conflict prevention to take whatever action it deems necessary to promote peace and security in Africa (African Union 2002b: Article 11). The panel was operationalised at the 100<sup>th</sup> meeting of the PSC with the adoption of the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise. The treaty framework enables the PotW, utilising their good offices, to provide advice to the PSC and the Commission based on fact-finding missions: they can conduct informal shuttle diplomacy, assist mediation teams, encourage political dialogue, confidence building and reconciliation and other preventive diplomacy techniques, making the PotW a potentially invaluable asset in fulfilling the APSA's role in the pacific resolution of disputes (African Union 2007g: Chapter III).

The treaty framework also allows for the development of the APSA's role as a humanitarian actor. The PSC protocol instructs the PSC to facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict or natural disasters. Coordinating and conducting humanitarian action is the responsibility of the PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 7.1p, 13.3f and 15), and the ASF is mandated to facilitate the activities of humanitarian agencies in mission areas (African Union 2002b: Article 15.4).

Bearing in mind the APSA's emphasis on prevention, and the requirements of the above capacities, the treaty framework enables the development of an early warning capacity. Established in the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002b: Article 12.1), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is designed to enable preventive diplomacy and anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity (African Union 2002b:

Articles 6b, 7.1a). The CEWS operates on ‘clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action’ (African Union 2002b: Article 12.4). Information gathered from the CEWS was envisaged to be used by the chairman of the commission to advise the PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 12.5). The CEWS is located in the Conflict Management and Analysis Division in the Peace and Security Directorate, and it consists of a Situation Room, responsible for data collection and analysis (African Union 2002b: Article 12.2a). It is linked to observation and monitoring units in the Regional Mechanisms (African Union 2002b: Article 12.2b). The modalities of the CEWS are further refined in the Draft Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System (African Union 2008c).

Although the treaty framework described above has *allowed* the APSA to have a role in these specific areas, and has outlined a structure for the APSA, it is still just a stack of paper. To enable the APSA’s member states and partners to turn this treaty framework into real action, the APSA established the Peace Fund in Article 2.1 of the PSC Protocol. The peace fund is made up of only 6% of the AU general budget; however, from 2011, the general budget contribution to the Peace Fund began to increase, and will rise to 12% in 2014 (African Union 2010d: Decision 287). Other sources of income for the Peace Fund outlined in the PSC Protocol are voluntary contributions from member states and African civil society and fundraising, as well as from external donations (African Union 2002b: Article 21.2, 21.3). It was envisaged that these funding sources would enable the APSA to spring to life, enabled and legitimised by the

documents described above, and it would be able to fulfil its *endemic functionalist role*.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* and the legal framework which authorises it. It may appear that this dissertation could happily end at this point as we now have a clear idea of the role that the APSA was established to play in the African peace and security environment. The role played by the APSA is an African-owned peacekeeping, peacemaking, rapid response, humanitarian organisation with early warning capabilities. It has responsibility for ending current conflicts and preventing future ones on the continent, as well as supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development, promoting human security and providing humanitarian assistance. The APSA also plays an important role as a key partner of the United Nations. The APSA is a framework for a standing multinational military force, capable of deploying a full brigade of 20,000 to a peace enforcement mission operational theatre within 90 days. At the same time, the APSA is a multilateral diplomatic effort aimed at the peaceful resolution of conflict through high-level negotiation and shuttle diplomacy. On top of all that, the APSA is a mutual defence and security cooperation pact.

However, this is not the role the APSA *is* playing; it is the role that it was intended to play, or the role that it one day aims to play: the *endemic functionalist role*. It does not tell us much about the reality of the role performed by the APSA, which may not resemble the *endemic functionalist role* at all. But this fact does not necessarily mean that it should not be considered strategically important as an organisation, and it does not mean that the role

that it *is* playing, although clearly not as extensive as the one outlined above, is unimportant either. In fact, the role played by the APSA in Africa's regional security environment is of pivotal importance for APSA member states and external partners.

Seeing all the elements of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA outlined in one place highlights the absurdity of using the *endemic functionalist role* as a benchmark to measure success. The *endemic functionalist role* is very far from the real role played by the APSA, and this is a result of various limiting and enabling factors acting upon it. Some of these factors have already been discussed; the treaty framework itself, in addition to setting out the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA, also enables the operationalisation of the APSA by making it legal and by setting out a plan for its operationalisation. It helps to organise resources and provides legitimacy in the eyes of international law. It further acts as a limiting factor: by stating where the APSA is *allowed* to develop, it establishes the organisation's legal boundaries. In some areas the APSA's role has been explicitly limited by the treaty framework—such as requirements placed on intervention—and in other areas limitations have been indirectly applied—for example, the requirements set out in the UN charter which the APSA must operate within.

However, there are many more limiting and enabling factors which explain why the real, or *interactionist*, role of the APSA is so different from the extremely ambitious *endemic functionalist role*. The following chapters will go on to examine the most important of these limiting and enabling factors in detail, beginning with the APSA's internal capacity problems, which have prevented the full operationalisation of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA;

whereas the institutional framework gives the APSA the permission to assume its role, the process of operationalisation requires expansive sources of capacity which, in the poorest continent in the world, are not easy to come by.

## Chapter Four: The Internal Capacity of the APSA

### *Introduction*

The treaty framework itself creates a meta-level of limiting and enabling factors, and also sets the agenda for the APSA, outlining its organs and plans for their operationalisation. However, the organs themselves contain a whole new set of limiting and enabling factors that have had a huge, if not entirely unexpected, impact on the role played by the APSA. Ten years after the founding of the AU, very few of the APSA's institutions are fully operationalised; most are short-staffed overworked and under-resourced. Further, a lack of either capacity or political will on the part of AU member states has had a knock-on effect on the capacity of the APSA; the operationalisation of the ASF has taken much longer than expected, force generation for missions is extremely difficult, and the Peace Fund has been consistently empty.

Certainly, the APSA has operationalised to a great extent, and it clearly does have the capacity to play a role in the African security environment, as we will see in the subsequent chapters. However, that role is very different from the *endemic functionalist role* described in the previous chapter, and one of the main reasons for this is the problem of severe and chronic capacity gaps within the APSA institutions. In order to outline the effect this has had on the role played by the APSA, this chapter will focus on the APSA's current weaknesses in three key areas of capacity that were frequently highlighted in interviews with AU staff and external advisors conducted by the author in Addis Ababa. First, it will examine the APSA's chronic lack of expertise, technical knowledge, and qualified staff. It will then go on to discuss the APSA's lack of indigenous enforcement capacity in the form of military capabilities. It will finish with a

discussion of arguably the most fundamental capacity gap: the APSA's limited financial capacity. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the effect of the APSA's internal limiting and enabling factors upon the role of the APSA.

### ***Human Resources***

In interviews and in the literature, one of the APSA's most reported capacity gaps is its failure to recruit enough people with the requisite skills to fully operationalise its institutions. The APSA has had worryingly low staff levels relative to the extraordinary responsibilities required of it by its *endemic functionalist role*, with only a fraction of the number of staff members working on peace and security issues that the European Union and NATO have at their disposal (Moss 2010: interview). Despite the fact that Peace and Security is the largest department within the AU Commission, staff levels are much lower than required for the *endemic functionalist role* because of a litany of problems, including a limited HR budget, loss of skilled Africans through the brain-drain, mission creep, poor recruitment procedures, limited salaries compared with comparable rates in local international organisations and high work-loads; all of which has resulted in high turnover rates (Murithi 2010: interview). The bureaucracy has been so under-staffed that staff members have had to take on more responsibilities, with many performing multiple roles (Murithi 2010: interview). Even senior staff members are known to work extremely long hours, often losing weekends, evenings and lunch breaks trying to manage their workloads (Suifon 2010: interview). Some AU advisors explained in interviews with the authors that to try to make up for these shortfalls, the AU has had to make extensive use of external consultants in many of its departments, such as the Continental Early Warning System (Gomes 2010; Murithi 2010: interview).



However, this solution does not address the long term problems of the APSA, while raising obvious questions over African ownership of the APSA.

The programme head of the PSC Report Programme at the Institute of Security Studies, Dr. Tim Murithi, helped to elucidate some of the underlying causes of this chronic staff-shortage in an interview with the author in 2010: the AU does not have the resources to hire as many people as it needs to effectively execute its *endemic functionalist role* (Murithi 2010: interview). Further, staff retention is a continuing problem for the APSA; high workloads, low remuneration and a poor working environment have resulted in many capable staff members leaving the organisation (Murithi 2010: interview). The lack of space compounds these problems; the bureaucracy has overflowed from the AU HQ complex and is spread over Addis Ababa in a web of office space spanning disjointed commercial buildings. In 2007 the Chinese government provided 100 million USD towards the construction of a new building in Addis Ababa (Franke 2009:242); however, the building work is considerably behind schedule and, at the time of writing, the new complex is still not completed.

One of the most serious causes of the staff deficiency, however, is the AU's recruitment processes. The slow recruitment process is highlighted by Klingebiel et al. (2008: 68) as a major problem for the APSA, resulting in a smaller number of overburdened staff. In an interview with the author, Solomon Gomes (2010: interview), a senior political advisor at the AU Commission, echoed this sentiment, and explained that the AU's cumbersome and unresponsive procedures for recruitment create a bottleneck within the administration. He claimed that as a result of these problems, recruitment often lags three or four months behind official requirements. These inefficient

processes are reminiscent of the staid bureaucratic practices of the OAU, which according to Murithi, are still very much a part of the African Union's corporate culture (Murithi 2010: interview). Murithi pointed out the fact that the APSA's bureaucracy has not been fully computerised; staff are still regularly walking hard-copies of documents across different buildings to collect signatures—a significant amount of red-tape for such a large organisation. To remedy these difficulties, a new AU Deputy Chairperson was brought in specifically to transform the AU's administration and make it more efficient; however, there has been some resistance to change in the organisation (Murithi 2010: interview). On top of this, during various interviews at the PSC Secretariat in Addis Ababa in 2010, the author came across an increasing lack of confidence in the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, who was seen by some to spend too much time travelling, rather than focussing on enabling the day-to-day administration of the organisation. Significant efforts are being made to enhance the administrative capacity of the APSA; however, institutional reform is a long-term project which will take years, and in that time, these capacity gaps will continue to have a limiting effect on the role played by the APSA (Gomes 2010: interview).


Given the low staff numbers, it is not surprising that the bureaucracy is falling short (Murithi 2010: interview). However, even with all the positions filled, the AU would still not be in a position to deliver on the high expectations placed upon it by its *endemic* or *projected* functionalist roles. The severe capacity shortages at the PSC secretariat and the Peace Support Operations Division were highlighted by Dr Admore Kambudzi, head of the PSC Secretariat. In an interview with the author, Kambudzi explained that the PSC Secretariat “doesn't

have enough staff, it doesn't have enough equipment, and it doesn't have enough operations staff" (Kambudzi 2010: interview). He underlined the importance of the PSC secretariat to the effectiveness of the APSA, as without an effective PSC Secretariat, the APSA cannot function (Kambudzi 2010: interview). The PSC Secretariat is currently designed for two officers; however, Kambudzi explained that in order to serve the PSC effectively it must grow to about ten (Kambudzi 2010: interview).

It is important to note that the PSC Secretariat is not the only department facing these problems; departments across the APSA are increasingly failing to handle the proliferation of their workloads. According to a 2010 re-evaluation of the APSA's staffing requirements, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development unit (PCRD) requires about fifteen staff members, from level P2 right up to level P4 and P5-- a considerable increase from the three staff members that the PCRD unit had at its disposal during the author's visit to the African Union Commission (AUC) (Suifon 2010: interview). In an interview with the author, Takwa Suifon from the APSA's department of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development pointed out that there is also a lack of support staff for the African Union 'Special Representatives'; put on the ground in AU member states without a network of specialist support staff, the Special Representatives find that they are unable to perform their complex tasks. By contrast, the UN Special Representatives usually have a staff of about fifteen to twenty specialists (Suifon 2010: interview). Therefore, the APSA not only needs to fill all the existing vacancies, but in order for it to perform its role properly, a significant number of *additional* positions will need to be created and staffed as well.

Another major problem undermining the APSA's human resource capacity is a lack of Africans with the required skills, qualifications and experience required to fill positions in the APSA. Thus, not only the quantity, but the quality of the AU's staff is brought into question. A 2005 report of the Chairperson of the Commission concerning the early stages of AMIS complained about the slow progress in the staffing of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which was responsible for the coordination of AMIS. The report recounts a slow and delayed response by member states requested to second officers to the DITF, and goes on to state that some of the officers posted to the DITF had no prior experience with planning and management in peace support operations at the strategic level (African Union 2005b: 12).

The extent of this kind of capacity gap in the APSA was highlighted by Kevin Warthon, Peace and Security Advisor at the United States Mission to the African Union. During an interview with the author, he explained that the United States "can give the AU all of the assets and the things that it needs and we're doing that. But ... if the institutional intellectual management capacity does not exist, then all this stuff that we give is for nought" (Warthon 2010: interview).

Providing the APSA with equipment or systems  they do not have the expertise or technical know-how to manage does not increase the APSA's capacity to act (Warthon 2010: interview). Gomes reinforced this position when discussing delays in accepting external support, explaining that "you have a situation where an offer is made and it takes you time to take the offer because you don't have people who can manage it" (Gomes 2010: interview). To illustrate the seriousness of this problem, Warthon recounted a high-level meeting of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) joint taskforce

where the deficiencies of AMISOM's Mission HQ staff (the political leadership of AMISOM) became painfully clear: Mission HQ staff had failed to produce a Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) for AMISOM. The Plans and Operations Unit (a strategic level organisation that analyses information, conducts research, and provides support to the APSA) offered to send a team to help with writing the plan; however, a staff member from the AMIS Mission HQ staff told the joint task-force meeting that "you can send as many teams as you like, and they can be there for as much time as you want them to be, and we still will not be able to do it, because we simply just don't have the capacity or capability on our staff to do this." The Special Representative for the Chairperson's Commission concurred with this assessment (Warthon 2010: interview). The same problem has been highlighted by the 2006 G8 report on peacekeeping, which called the APSA's lack of capacity in planning and the definition of mandates "a hindrance to mission success" (G8 2009: 6).

Further deficiencies are visible around the APSA, such as at the CEWS, the focal point of the APSA's role in conflict prevention. According to Gomes, "it is not an early warning unit. It is an office with computers where people are photocopying all kinds of latest news and passing it to officials" (Gomes 2010: interview).

These personnel capacity problems do not seem to be teething problems, but long-term limiting factors on the role of the APSA. According to Warthon, the only real solution is a long-term commitment to education and training on the continent to identify bright young minds and place them in fast track programmes to prepare them for positions in the APSA; they need people who "know how to do the research, know how to do the analysis, and know how to

manage these governmental pillars that have been designed” (Warthon 2010: interview). Another cause of this lack of expertise is that limited funds available for personnel results in losing prospective applicants to comparatively higher salaries paid by other institutions, such as the UN (Stephan Klingebiel et al. 2008: 68).

The issue has been raised at the AU Assembly, showing an awareness of this serious problem. The Assembly addressed the issue in the 2009 Tripoli Declaration: “Making and sustaining peace and security is an intellectual challenge. We therefore undertake to build the capacity of our universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what succeeds and what fails in conflict resolution efforts, and to arrive at African-centred solutions, drawing from our own distinctive and unique experience” (African Union 2009e:4). Unfortunately this rhetoric has not yet translated into any concrete action, and so this lack of capacity will continue to be a limiting factor for the foreseeable future. However, it should be noted that despite these endemic capacity gaps, the APSA’s personnel have been able to conduct complex administrative tasks that have kept the APSA operational over the years, such as the rotation of Rwandan troops in the early stages of AMIS, even though the Darfur Integrated Taskforce was at half-strength at that time and lacked the relevant experience (African Union 2005b: 12).

### ***Military Capacity***

Although the APSA’s personnel problems are a serious concern, the subsequent chapters will show that the APSA is able to limp by with support from external advisors. However, this section will now discuss an even more serious capacity problem that is even harder to compensate for. One of the

cornerstones of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* described in the previous chapter was its capacity for the deployment of what the APSA calls *Peace Support Operations* (PSOs), which include peacekeeping operations, peacemaking, prevention and other military-based operations in support of peace. This element of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA has become renowned for its pioneering interventionist undertones; embracing the R2P doctrine years before the UN did.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the APSA's treaty framework gives it the right to intervene in a state without the permission of its government in order to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity. It also has a clearly stated desire to intervene quickly, either with the aid of the CEWS to field preventive missions, or by deploying during conflicts before the signing of a ceasefire agreement in order to field protection missions. With this in mind, it is clear that the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* is in many ways more demanding than that of the United Nations. It would follow, therefore, that a very large, well equipped and well trained military component to the APSA is an absolute necessity. However, the APSA's military resources are far from correspondingly capable.

### **The African Standby Force (ASF)**

The APSA is designed to have a standing military capacity of five brigades (roughly 100,000 elements), which it can call upon to field complex PSOs at only a few weeks notice. The African Standby Force (ASF), which was originally supposed to be operational by 2010, is still a long way from the force envisaged in the treaty framework. Some significant progress has been made on the project, such as its successful completion of the AMANI AFRICA command

post exercise held in late October 2010 to test the ASF's operational readiness (Ashine 2010). AMANI AFRICA was conducted with support from the United Nations Office for the African Union (UNOAU), in close coordination with the European Union and NATO, to assess the operational readiness of the ASF. The successful completion of the exercise marked the end of the ASF Road Map II. The UNOAU is now assisting with the development of the African Standby Force Road Map III, which aims to complete the operationalisation of the ASF by 2015 (United Nations 2011a: 4).

Further, there was a small East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) mission to AMISOM right at the end of 2011; the APSA's first decade in existence ended with the drafting of a plan by the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) to deploy 14 staff officers and 57 trainers from EASBRIG, in October 2011, and a level II hospital in December 2011, to Mogadishu. This constitutes the first operational deployment of ASF assets; a major milestone in the operationalisation of the ASF, and a positive sign for the APSA's future military capacity (African Union 2011c: 8-9).

However, despite these promising developments, the ASF has not been able to play a role in any of the PSOs mounted during the APSA's first ten years (with the exception of the small mission to AMISOM). As the AU states in Article 3.3 of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF, "There are clear, significant and fundamental gaps between the capabilities needed to realise the AU goals and current capacity. The main areas of concern being lack of political will and readiness; lack of financial resources; lack of equipment and logistical capacity; and in some areas, lack of training. For these reasons, the full development of the ASF will need to be viewed as a longer-term project"



(African Union 2003d). Unfortunately, these capacity gaps are almost as prevalent today as they were in 2003. In an interview with the author, Thomas Peyker, Head of the Peace and Security Section of the EU Delegation to the AU, explained his view that the effort expended in overcoming these problems, largely led by the EU, will be more than compensated for by the operationalisation of the ASF; reaction times and deployment timetables will be much faster, the field missions will have a larger impact, and it will be easier for the UN to take over mission leadership (Peyker 2010: interview). This reflects a generally positive view shared by the AU's other international partners on the value of the ASF project (Moss 2010: interview; Warthon 2010: interview).

All the same, by some estimations, it might take another five to ten years before the ASF is operationalised to the point that it can deploy in a PSO (Murithi 2010: interview; Jeremy 2010: interview). As such it will not be able to increase the APSA's capacity to act for the foreseeable future and will therefore not play a major part of the current study, despite being the crown jewel of the APSA on paper. The ASF is such an ambitious project that it is difficult to see its slow progress as a failure. In an interview with the author, Sandy Moss from the UK Embassy in Addis Ababa suggested that we shouldn't "... blame the AU for the problems of multilateralism ... You've got the linguistic barrier, you've got 23 of the 25 poorest countries in the world, you've also got religious differences between the states" (Moss 2010: interview). Even with all the resources available to Western nations, where force generation concepts are well understood and highly developed, they still run into difficulty during interventions (Warthon 2010: interview). Further, there are logistical difficulties associated with the ASF that could limit their effectiveness even after they are

operationalised; as Goams pointed out, “it’s one thing to have brigades in formation, it’s another thing to have the requisite logistical resources that allow you move from point A to point B in 30 minutes as opposed to 5 days” (Gomes 2010: interview).

However, much of this is academic to the current study; the ASF remains a focal point for the APSA and its partners, but it has not had a major effect on the role of the APSA throughout the period of study. Instead, it is possible to view the ASF project simply as a trust-building exercise throughout this period, or as a symbol of the member states’ commitment to security cooperation. One other indirect way in which the ASF may have helped to enhance the role of the APSA during its first ten years is that less developed African militaries are getting exposure to the professionalism of the more developed militaries in Africa, such as those of South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, which may help to contribute to the process of professionalising African militaries in general (Jeremy 2010: interview).

Regardless of the relatively promising progress in the operationalisation of the ASF, it has not yet been able to provide any meaningful capacity to the APSA. As a result, the APSA has to go outside the treaty framework discussed in the previous chapter and rely on *ad hoc* force generation (i.e. ‘passing the hat around’), which is still the only means of generating a viable force for PSOs today. This complete reliance on *ad hoc* troop generation has proven to be a major limiting factor on the APSA’s role in humanitarian intervention—probably the most definitive element of the APSA’s role. *Ad hoc* force generation is extremely unreliable, relying on the political interest, political will and the military and logistical capacity of the member states, without which a mission is either

impossible or severely compromised. For example, Ghana and Nigeria pledged troops to AMISOM and were promised additional US training equipment and logistical support to bridge all the capacity gaps that would have prevented deployment. Nevertheless, neither country deployed its forces to Somalia. As USAF Major Cochran recounted “when asked to explain this lack of response despite previous pledges, a senior US military official in the region opined that Somalia “scared the ... out of them” and that they had no direct interests related to the mission. In other words, “Why would Ghana care about Somalia?” (Cochran 2010: 136).

The AU’s current *ad hoc* force generation method is known as the ‘Burundi model’, after the APSA’s first PSO AMIB, which was the first time the model was used. This model requires troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to support their own troop contributions in the field until the United Nations can take over responsibility for the mission or until they can be reimbursed with funds from other external partners such as the US or the EU. The Burundi model is a pragmatic approach to force generation against a backdrop of the debilitating resource gaps of the APSA and its member states.

However, as will be explained in chapter seven the Burundi model’s strategy of placing the significant economic burden of deploying and supporting troops contributed to a PSO on the TCCs themselves is undermined by TCCs’ own lack of resources, especially logistics capacity (African Union 2005b: 11). For example, the deployment of the first two battalions of Burundian peacekeepers earmarked for AMISOM was delayed by a lack of resources and logistic capacity required to transport them to Somalia and sustain them in the field.

The same problem has prevented the deployment of a contribution of the 1,200

desperately needed troops from Nigeria and Ghana (Hull and Svensson 2008:8-9).

In some ways, the weakness of the Burundi model stems from a lack of synergy between the AU and the UN. AMISOM's original mandate was adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council at its 69<sup>th</sup> meeting (African Union 2007f), which explicitly stated that the mandate was for six months, after which it was supposed to begin to evolve into a UN mission. In spite of UN resolution 1744 (2007b), which agreed that the secretariat should look for a way to allow the UN to take over the mission, five years later, the UN is still no closer to deploying.

Another major problem with the Burundi model of force generation is the opt-in element. With the responsibility to support your own troop contributions for the first few months, and the AU's poor reputation for paying soldiers' wages and reimbursing costs to member states, it is not surprising that APSA troop levels were so low before funding levels increased. The capacity to project power across the continent and sustain a contingent of peacekeepers for years is well beyond the capacity of most African states. Even Burundi and Uganda were heavily reliant on external support; in the first year alone external partners such as the United States and the EU had to provide force multiplying capacity including heavy airlift, logistics, planning and training staff, as well as paying 36 million USD bilaterally (only a tenth of AMISOM's operating costs in the first year) (Hull and Svensson 2008:19-30). Out of the fifty-three African Union member states, only Burundi and Uganda had supplied troops to the mission until 2012; and it took them five years to get up to the full mandated force-strength. In addition to the financial cost and logistical challenges posed by the Burundi model, member states are further put off by a lack of political will.

Warthon (2010: interview) suggested that many nation states simply don't see Somalia as their problem, regardless of their commitments and responsibilities enshrined in documents such as the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AU CADSP and the ASF Protocol.

However, the case of Somalia shows that the Burundi model is not a total failure. Because Uganda and Burundi were the only countries that were prepared to contribute troops to AMISOM, they have had to step up to the challenge of being the lead nations, and, with significant support from external partners, they have been able to keep the mission alive. In 2010, shortly after the Al Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kampala, President Museveni stated that 12,000 UPDF soldiers were ready to deploy to Somalia, but despite considerable political will, Uganda lacked the resources to deploy them to Mogadishu; "we can raise any number which our brothers and sisters ask us to raise. But they must bring the money and the equipment. We have the human beings, we have the experience, we have the training, but we cannot provide the money" (Habati 2010). Further, because of the APSA's interventionist stance, the AU TCCs are gaining a great deal of combat experience quickly, especially in Mogadishu, where the small Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping force has slowly grown in confidence and ability, eventually turning the tide on the Islamists in 2010, killing 300 enemy combatants during Al-Shabaab's Ramadan offensive and, expanding to capture 11 new forward outposts and about 40% of Mogadishu (African Union 2010a). The successes in Somalia since then, as well as successes in the APSA's other PSOs (discussed in detail in chapter seven), show that the future of the AU's military

capacity is far from worthless; it is, however, inextricably linked to the capacities of the TCCs, and external support, as the following chapters will explain.

### ***Financial Resources***

The capacity gaps defined in the previous two sections both have their roots in the most serious of all the APSA's capacity problems: financial capacity. Just like with the APSA's military resources, the APSA's financial capacity is inextricably linked to the poverty of its member states. The Peace Fund, established in the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002b: Article 21), is a bourse drawn from the General Budget, and topped up with donor contributions, and it is ear-marked for use by the APSA to fund peace missions. In 2007, the same year that AMISOM was launched, the AU Peace Fund income was 145,290,000 USD. Less than three million USD of that money had come from AU member states' contributions (Franke 2009:146-147). Of that 3 million, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa paid 75%, followed by Tunisia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Thus, eight countries paid about 85% of the member state contributions out of 53 member states (Kambudzi 2010: interview).

The APSA is acutely aware of the problem and has been striving to increase member state contributions. Article 18 of the Tripoli Declaration commits member states to substantially increase their contributions to the Peace Fund, in order to enable Africa to "truly own" the APSA. The declaration also requested that the Commission take the necessary preparatory steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 to 12% (African Union 2009e). The AU's Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance (CAMEF) has been tasked with identifying alternative sources of funding because of difficulties in raising the money from voluntary

contributions by APSA member states, coupled with the lack of ownership associated with an over reliance on external funding (African Union 2009c: Article 9).

Nevertheless, external funding remains the single most important source of funding for the APSA, especially the European Union's Africa Peace Facility (APF), which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Securing reliable streams of funding is the biggest challenge facing the APSA. It is clear that, for the foreseeable future at least, the APSA will be completely dependent upon external partners for funding. This funding brings with it unease on the part of the APSA, which feels beholden to the donor countries for fear that funding will be cut off. This literal external ownership goes against the concept of African ownership which is considered to be such an important element of pan-Africanism.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has begun to show the extent of the discrepancy between the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA and the real role that the APSA actually plays. The APSA's internal capacity is a severe limiting factor, contributing to an *interactionist role* that is much more muted than its *endemic functionalist* counterpart. While African ownership was an integral part of the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA, this chapter has already shown that the *interactionist role* of the APSA does not have the same high-level of African ownership; much of the APSA is currently paid for by its external partners.

The AU's military capacity is also weak. Although it has the troops, and they generally perform well when they are in theatre, the APSA has to rely on

impoverished member states to pay for the upkeep of their own contingents of troop contributions in the short term, and then relies on external support for the medium-to-long term. The APSA has also had great difficulty with specialist-knowledge and capital-intensive tasks, such as mission planning, logistics and heavy airlift, that are largely out of its price range. These simple bottlenecks, which also derive from a lack of financial capacity, have a knock-on effect on the APSA's military capacity: if the troop contingencies cannot be transported to the theatre because of lack of airlift capacity, or because they lack essential equipment, then those contingents cannot be counted towards the APSA's capacity. The APSA's military capacity gaps put considerable limitations on the APSA's military-intensive role in humanitarian intervention. However, these gaps have not prevented it from playing that role altogether, thanks to external capacity enhancement efforts which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The APSA's internal capacity problems are largely caused by one fundamental capacity gap: poverty. Despite this, the APSA is not a lost cause. Several of the APSA's more powerful member states, including the eight mentioned above, have shown considerable political will to contribute to enabling the role of the APSA; however, if anything, this chapter has shown that, at the moment, the APSA's indigenous capacity is not enough to provide a solution to insecurity on the continent, and is not enough to enable the APSA's *interactionist role* to resemble the *endemic functionalist role* in any meaningful way. Therefore, internal capacity is only one part of the story of the APSA. The next chapter will examine the effects of the real driving force behind enabling the role of the APSA; the external partners.



## **Chapter Five: External Capacity Enhancement of the APSA**

### ***Introduction***

“There is broad recognition that the ability of the African Union and its subregions to react quickly has, in most instances, been positive. They could have achieved much more if they had been given the necessary support” (United Nations 2008a: 14-15).

As previous chapter explained, the APSA’s role is limited by several shortfalls in its capacity. This lack of capacity has made external capacity building measures a fundamental, day-to-day element of the APSA (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 48). The APSA’s external partners have been determined to support its role as a peace and security actor and have been able to shape that role through their enhancement of the APSA’s capacity in specific areas for specific reasons.

This chapter will examine how the AU’s main partners limit and enable the role of the APSA through their capacity-building efforts. The chapter will confine its attention to the capacity-building efforts of the APSA’s three biggest external backers: the United Nations, the European Union and its member states, and the United States. Although there has been some capacity enhancement by a few states beyond these three partners—in particular, Canada’s provision of helicopters and APCs for AMIS, NATO’s extensive provision of airlift capacity, Norway’s *Training for Peace* programme, and China’s \$200 million project to construct a new building for the PSC Secretariat—the UN, EU and the US constitute by far the largest and best established sources of external capacity enhancement for the APSA.

This chapter will first examine the United Nations' more institutionally focused, top-down support for the APSA, then it will discuss the EU's partnership approach, which seeks to enhance African ownership, and it will conclude with the United States' bottom-up approach to capacity building for the APSA. Each of the three sections will be split into halves; first examining institutionalised support to the APSA, which is a much more predictable and reliable source of capacity enhancement, though focussed on long term development, and then going on to examine the more immediate and *ad hoc* support given to the APSA, which represents the bulk of the APSA's practical capacity, internal or external. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the extent to which the APSA's capacity gaps have been bridged, and how this external capacity building has affected the role of the APSA.

### ***The United Nations' Capacity Enhancement of the APSA***

Two thirds of the active items on the Agenda of the Security Council concern Africa. About three quarters of the Security Council's time is spent on African issues. The United Nations, therefore, has a considerable stake in the expansion of the role of the APSA to help shoulder that burden (United Nations 2011a: 12). The UN believes that the APSA cannot operate without external support and that a "shared vision" between the African Union and the United Nations is imperative (United Nations 2011b), a view supported by the findings in chapter seven.

The UN currently is one of the AU's main sources of external capacity enhancement. Its wide-ranging partnership with the APSA is geared to enhance capacity in several key areas, enabled by the UN treaty framework as well as through an increasing number of agreements between the two organisations.

Cooperation between the UN and the AU occurs at the highest levels; members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council hold regular joint consultative meetings in Addis Ababa and New York (United Nations 2011c: 3).

According to Vinay Kumar, the UN's efforts to enhance the capacity of the APSA frequently get "bogged down in helping counterparts meet urgent day-to-day needs, and achieve little in terms of strengthened capacity" (United Nations 2011a: 3). In order to avoid this outcome, the UN has heavily institutionalised their support for APSA capacity enhancement. The first half of this section will dissect the UN's complex support structures for the APSA, examining the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme – the guiding document of the UN/APSA partnership – and then looking at the UN organs responsible for enhancing the APSA's capacity to act as a peace and security actor. The second half of the chapter will focus more on the "urgent day-to-day needs", examining how the United Nations' mission-specific support to the APSA's PSOs has enabled, sustained and transformed the role played by the APSA in African security.

### **The Ten Year Capacity Building Programme**

The primary point of contact between the United Nations and the APSA has been the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa. Although the ECA is largely focussed on economic development issues, the ECA complex hosts the secretariat of the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa (RCM-A), the workhorse of the UN/APSA partnership, as well as offices relevant to peace and security.

In 2004, an ECA report expressed concerns that despite its promising rhetoric, the RCM-A had failed to deliver on joint action and strategic coordination (Nour

2008: 11). Frustrations with the lack of movement led to a fresh approach in 2005, culminating in the launch of the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme (10YCBP). The programme was set in motion during the 2005 World Summit, which declared its support for “the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union” (United Nations 2005: 24). The World Summit declaration was followed by a joint AU/UN declaration on *Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme*, signed by the AUC Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006 (United Nations 2006a). The 10YCBP is designed to enhance the capacity of the AU as a whole, not just the APSA, and it is split up into *six areas for cooperation*: Institutional Capacity and Human Resource Development; Peace and Security; Political, Legal and Electoral Matters; Social, Human and Cultural Development; Economic and Environmental Development. The 10YCBP was described by the UN as “a model of true partnership” between the UN and the AU (United Nations 2011b). However, its impact on the role played by the APSA has been modest.

The Declaration was conceived as an evolving strategic framework for UN/APSA cooperation (United Nations 2011c: 1). Paragraph 2 of the declaration on the framework for the 10YCBP describes the programme’s primary objective thusly: “to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and African subregional organisations to act as effective UN partners in addressing the challenges to human security in Africa” (United Nations 2006b). The AU’s external supporters often describe the key role of the APSA as being a ‘viable partner’ to act as a focal point for external support, highlighting in particular the

need for a partner in the field of peace and security (Warthon 2010; Peyker 2010). During its first three years, the 10YCBP has focused on peace and security issues and on supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture (United Nations 2010a: 6); however, most of this support has been confined to knowledge transfer and training for the APSA staff in Addis Ababa.

The 10YCBP has faced difficulties during its operationalisation because of the lack of a clear work programme (United Nations 2011a: 9). As a result of this unsure start, the 10YCBP has had a very limited impact on the role of the APSA, and there is a very low level of awareness of the 10YCBP amongst stakeholders; consequentially the UN's cooperation with the APSA is still firmly based on the pre-existing cluster system of the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa (RCM-A) – a system which has been shown to be inefficient in the past (RCM-Africa 2010a).

### **Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa**

The RCM-A operates through nine *thematic clusters*. However, it should be noted that the RCM-A's nine *clusters* do not reflect the *six areas for cooperation* outlined in the 10YCBP Cooperation Framework; instead, the cluster system still reflects the priorities of NEPAD, its former partner, rather than the APSA. Despite this, the success of the 10YCBP depends upon the work of the RCM-A and its clusters because the 10YCBP is largely implemented within this cluster system, through the *Peace and Security Cluster* (RCM-Africa 2010b: 38).

The RCM-A decided at its seventh session, in 2007, that it would serve as the main implementation mechanism of the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme to help UN agencies to synergise and avoid duplication in their support for the

APSA. This required the RCM-A to expand its remit, which was previously focused purely on capacity building for NEPAD, in contrast with the 10YCBP's APSA-focused approach (RCM-Africa 2007: 1-2). The RCM-A, however, was not necessarily the best choice for an APSA-focused approach, as it had not been designed to support the AU and its wide-ranging requirements; its original focus was on the Special Initiative for Africa in the 1990s, which was superseded by NEPAD after the policy framework was finalised in 2001 (Nour 2008: 34). Despite the fact that NEPAD has been subordinate to the AU since 2002, it is only relatively recently that the RCM-A has started to shift its consciousness from NEPAD to the wider AU and the APSA. As a result, institutionalised support for the APSA's capacity has been slow to develop.

#### ***Peace and Security Cluster***

The Peace and Security Cluster of the RCM-A is co-chaired by the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), which represents the UN-Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the African Union Peace and Security Council secretariat (UNOAU 2010: 1). The head of the UNOAU (who is also the chairperson of the Cluster) is a Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the level of Assistant Secretary-General; an indication of how seriously the UN takes the UN/APSA partnership (United Nations 2011a: 2). The UNOAU works closely with the APSA, consulting with senior AU officials on a daily basis (United Nations 2011a: 2). The head of the UNOAU also regularly participates in AU PSC meetings on country-specific issues (United Nations 2011a: 3). This has helped to consolidate the APSA's role as part of the global peace and security architecture.

The Peace and Security Cluster focuses on expanding the role of the APSA by strengthening the AUC in the fields of peace and security, post-conflict reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation. It also supports the implementation of the 10YCBP. The Cluster has devoted most of its resources to enhancing the APSA's personnel and management capacity, helping to bridge many of the capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter through dozens of training activities and workshops for APSA and REC staff on peacekeeping, planning, logistics and other operational and administrative issues (United Nations 2011a: 4-6). Chapter 7 will highlight how important some of these key areas are in determining the extent of the role the APSA has been able to play in-theatre.

The Peace and Security Cluster has been organising desk-to-desk meetings since 2008 in the interest of enhancing APSA capacity, sharing knowledge and expertise and enhancing synergy (ECA 2010: 1). A regular series of desk-to-desk consultations was held in 2011 between staff of the UN Secretariat, the AU Commission, UNOAU, the RECs/RMs and members of the Peace and Security Cluster. The meetings involved thorough discussion and analysis of contemporaneous security hot-spots such as Somalia, Sudan and Ivory Coast (United Nations 2011a: 4). Further, the UNOAU, on behalf of the Cluster, and working with the European Union and NATO, supported the AMANI AFRICA Command Post Exercise (CPX) in 2010, which was designed to assess the operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF) (United Nations 2011a: 4). These processes are of considerable use to the APSA, enhancing its organisational, logistical and strategic capacity.

The Cluster has also focussed much of its energy on revising and standardising the APSA's many documents and strategies; in particular, UNOAU is currently assisting with the development of the African Standby Force Road Map III, which should culminate in the operationalisation of the ASF by 2015 (United Nations 2011a: 4).

***Sub-Cluster on the African Peace and Security Architecture***

The Peace and Security Cluster is made up of three specialised Sub-Clusters: Peace and Security Architecture of the AU; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development; and Human Rights and Justice and Reconciliation (UNECA 2011). Of the Peace and Security Cluster's three Sub-Clusters, the Sub-Cluster on the African Peace and Security Architecture has had the largest enabling effect on the APSA's role. The Sub-Cluster is chaired by the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' African Union Peacekeeping Support Team (DPKO-AU PST) (UNOAU 2010: 6). This Sub-Cluster has been instrumental in implementing the 10YCBP (Haastrup 2011: 6); its support programmes are intended to reflect the priorities of the 10YCBP and the AU Strategic Plan 2009-2012, focusing on the APSA's operational development and the African Standby Force (ASF) in particular. The DPKO-AU PST itself was set up in January 2007 specifically to support the implementation of the 10YCBP (UNECA 2008: 5).

Support from the Sub-Cluster is focused on the development of the ASF, Strategic Air, Sea and Ground lift and civilian police capacity. The DFS has taken the lead in assisting the APSA to develop a logistics capacity, helping to relieve one of the APSA's most debilitating limiting factors (United Nations



2011a: 11). The Sub-Cluster is also supporting the development of a civilian component concept, as well as manuals for logistics, field medicine and evaluation of the ASF (UNOAU 2010: 7). The DPKO-AU PST has also taken the lead in working with the Situation Room of the APSA's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to help to expand the APSA's role in the area of prevention and rapid deployment (UNOAU 2010: 3).

The Sub-Cluster has likewise been heavily involved in training APSA personnel, facilitating specific training requirements for the ASF and the African Union Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD), such as senior mission leadership and strategic and operational planning courses, senior-level retreats and training programmes (UNOAU 2010: 7). The DPKO-AU PST, with the support of the EU and other APSA partners, also frequently organises the training workshops for senior representatives of the ASF brigades, with the understanding that they can then go on to transfer the knowledge to their sub-regions and adapt it to the local context (Haastrup 2011: 8). Building up the APSA's in-house expertise has helped to reduce the effects of the APSA's expertise capacity gaps; an endemic limiting factor.

### ***Strategic Level Capacity Enhancement***

In addition to the support structures outlined above, the strategic relationship between the United Nations and the APSA is further strengthened by three bodies that do not operate through the RCM-A system; the *Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism*, the United Nations/African Union *Joint Task Force on Peace and Security*, and United Nations Security Council *Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa*.

The Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) was established at the AU compound in Addis Ababa to facilitate AU/UN communication, coordination and information sharing.

The United Nations/African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security was established on 25 September 2010 to enhance cooperation at the operational level (United Nations 2011a: 5) and was launched at UN headquarters in New York by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping on 15 November 2010. The task force enhances UN and AU strategic cooperation through meetings twice a year at the senior level to review immediate and long-term strategic issues (PANA 2010). This expands the APSA's capacity by allowing it access to UN expertise, and it further expands the APSA's role as an integral part of the UN system, allowing APSA missions to become interoperable with UN systems, to facilitate streamlined UN support for APSA missions, effective cooperation, and ultimately smoother APSA-UN transitions of mission ownership.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, pursuant to the Security Council presidential statement of 31 January 2002 (S/PRST/2002/2) (United Nations 2010b: 193). Its mandate is to monitor and implement the recommendations of S/PRST/2002/2, which includes a desire to cooperate with the OAU (since updated to the AU), "including assistance within existing resources ... in the field of capacity building, particularly in early warning conflict prevention and peacekeeping" (UNSC 2002: 1).

Overall, the UN's institutional enhancement of the role played by the APSA is focused on knowledge transfer, specialist training and collaboration; it has

provided important support, with real effects on the APSA's proficiency and professionalism. However important, this type of support is cheap. What the APSA really wants, as highlighted in chapter four and chapter seven, is not desk-swopping and specialist brainstorming retreats, but hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and military hardware which would give it the capacity to succeed in the field. This type of capacity enhancement is not provided by the UN on an institutional basis, but is grudgingly disbursed *ad hoc*, under the direst of circumstances.

### **Mission-Specific Support**

This mission-specific *ad hoc* capacity enhancement has meant the difference between success and mission failure in both AMIS and AMISOM. It is therefore an extremely important element of the APSA's capacity, which has enabled it to play a much larger and much more militaristic role than would otherwise have been possible. This section will outline the effect that such UN support has had on the *interactionist role* of the APSA through a discussion of the extent and direction of the UN's capacity enhancement to the APSA's missions in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia.

#### ***The African Union Mission in Burundi***

As explained in Chapter 3, AMIB was largely supported by the TCCs themselves, led by South Africa, through the Burundi Doctrine, and there was only limited support from the UN—AMIB being very early in the development of the UN/APSA relationship. However, the UN, through the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC), did manage to enhance the role played by the APSA in Burundi through the provision of technical support including assistance with public information, headquarters administration and some limited support with the

assembly stage of the DDR process (Svensson 2008a: 14). The UN support to Burundi did not have a transformative effect upon the role of AMIB, but it did help AMIB to play its role more competently. It is also arguable that the United Nations provided a significant level of support to AMIB simply by agreeing to assume control of the mission, thereby providing the APSA with an exit strategy before its chronic capacity problems became too obvious (Paul Williams 2006: 354). The UN's support in this regard also contributed to the early evolution of the APSA as a bridging force for the UN.

### ***The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)***

Nowhere is the United Nations' partnership with the APSA as pronounced as the hybrid operation in Sudan: the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). However, the UN has helped to enhance role of the APSA in Darfur since the very beginning. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was involved in the North/South dispute, was tasked to work closely with AMIS. The UN dispatched a planning assistance team from New York to Sudan from 4 to 17 August 2004 (UNSC 2005b: 10). In October 2004, the APSA's role in Darfur was about to expand, and the UN accepted the AU's request to establish a full-time assistance and liaison cell at the African Union Commission to provide a more suitable basis for *ad hoc* capacity enhancement (United Nations 2004: 14). The UN Assistance and Liaison Cell was mandated to assist AMIS in planning, provide technical advice, identify where the United Nations could offer further support and to advise the UN Special Representative and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations accordingly. The Liaison Cell also worked closely with other external partners to secure much needed resources

from donor governments to further enhance the role played by AMIS (UNSC 2005b: 10).

The cell enhanced AU Command, Control and Communications (C<sup>3</sup>) capacity by connecting AMIS offices in El Fashir, Khartoum and Addis Ababa to the United Nations communications network. It also assisted the AU in the drafting of the expanded CONOPS and logistics plan; as well as helping to coordinate support from external partners (UNSC 2005b: 10). The United Nations contributed to the MAPEX in El Fashir, and arranged for training for AMIS. Even at the strategic and tactical levels, the AMIS military observers (MILOBS) and their Protection Force coordinated closely with UNMIS and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs staff in all three of the Darfur states (UNSC 2005b: 11). This close relationship between UNMIS and AMIS helped to bridge many of the APSA's capacity gaps in technical expertise outlined in chapter four, enabling the APSA to play a more sophisticated and more professional role in Darfur. However, this positive relationship was undermined as the situation in the south became more fragile following the death of John Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), in 2005, and the UN decided to not to spread itself too thinly by supporting AMIS with force reserves (Ekengard 2008: 37-38).

One of the UN's most important contributions to AMIS was, as in Burundi, simply agreeing in principle to take over the mission, providing the APSA with an exit strategy and contributing to the role of the APSA as a bridging force. However, the government of Sudan refused to give its consent for a UN mission in Darfur, leaving AMIS as the only viable peacekeeping force in the country. As a result, the focus switched from replacing the faltering APSA mission to

bolstering it (United Nations 2007a: 2-3). Resolution 1706 had a transformative effect on the role of AMIS; through a series of capacity enhancing support packages, AMIS went from being a small peacekeeping mission crippled with logistics and financial problems, to being the largest peacekeeping mission in the world, shifting the role in a much more militarised direction, and adopting more of a protection role (UNSC 2006b: 3-4). After considerable international pressure and a series of consultations and meetings with the Government of Sudan, permission was finally given for a hybrid UN/AU mission to deploy to Darfur: UNAMID (GoS 2007: 2). UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769 (UNSC 2007c: 3).

The UN and the APSA agreed that the transition from AMIS to UNAMID would be managed in three stages (Ekengard 2008: 38). The first stage was the provision of the Light Support Package, which provided capacity enhancement to AMIS that was immediate, if limited in scope. The 'Light Support Package' enhanced the APSA's technical capacity through the provision of more UN advisors, including intelligence advisors, and field equipment such as GPS technology, light amplifiers, tents and generators. The Light Support Package also included 105 military personnel, 33 police and 48 civilian staff (Ekengard 2008: 38). The second phase was the 'Heavy Support Package', a major bolstering force of 2,250 military personnel, 721 police and 1,136 civilian staff for AMIS, fully funded and equipped by the UN, which had a significant enabling effect on the peacekeeping role played by the APSA in Darfur (Ekengard 2008: 38). The third phase was the transition of the mandate from AMIS to UNAMID, under joint AU/UN authority.

UNAMID contributes to capacity enhancement of the APSA through information sharing and mentoring—through work on joint projects such as the African Union-United Nations joint mediation—continued consultations with the government, armed movements and other Darfur stakeholders. The mission has been supported by a Joint AU-UN Special Representative (JSR), appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN. At the time of writing, the current JSR is Ambassador Abiodun Bashua (African Union 2011b: 1). The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are appointed by the Chairperson of the AUC in consultation with the Secretary-General; the Force Commander also has to be African, in deference to African ownership (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 41). This has helped entrench the APSA into the UN framework, developing a previously unseen role for the APSA as not just an ally of the UN, but an integral part of the UN system, while at the same time maintaining the APSA's role as an African-led organisation.

### ***The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)***

Despite the UN's heavy footprint in Somalia in the 1990s, it is currently running a much smaller humanitarian operation with no security component. This is largely a result of the chronically unstable security situation in the country. The UN has provided significant support to AMISOM, but the UN has been wary of supporting peacekeeping in the country: "We stress that the capacity development of peacekeeping personnel, though essential, is not a substitute for adequate equipment, logistics and training" (United Nations 2011a: 7).

The Peace and Security Cluster helped to enable the mission through the provision of vital expertise. In the early stages of the AMISOM, the UNOAU conducted several pre-deployment visits to gather intelligence to facilitate the

insertion of African Union troops. The UNOAU also provided assistance to the African Union Commission in generating the required troops, as well as support in recruiting civilian staff for the mission. The Cluster has also helped the APSA to update AMISOM's strategic and operational documents to ensure that the operation is in line with UN standards, including updating the communications strategy and the strategy on the protection of civilians, as well as translating and publishing a pocket version of the AMISOM mandated *rules of engagement* and *code of conduct*. (United Nations 2011a: 4). This support has ensured interoperability with the UN, but has been of limited utility in real day-to-day terms, because the proposed UN mission to take over from AMISOM seems no closer to deploying.

Although this type of support has been useful, it is not really expanding the role played by AMISOM, simply further enabling it. However, following the announcement of Ethiopia's intention to withdraw from Somalia, and after repeated requests for support from the APSA, the UN Security Council Resolution 1863, on 16 January (UNSC 2009), authorised a large logistics support package for the APSA. Logistics has been a chronic problem for the APSA, so the logistics package went a considerable way to enhancing the role that the APSA was able to play in Somalia, accelerating the deployment of the mission and resolving some of the mission's capacity gaps. The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established in Nairobi in April 2009 to implement the support package, and by 2010, the UNSOA has rolled out logistical support to AMISOM in the areas of public information, rations, secure communication, fuel and airlift support for Medical Evacuation. The UN support cost \$210 million, taken from UN assessed contributions (African Union 2010i:



11). AMISOM personnel also received specialist training in logistics, and the UNSOA began work on the building of the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu; erecting hard-walled secure office and residential accommodation for the civilian, police and military personnel of the mission (African Union 2010i: 11).

The same resolution also authorised a voluntary Trust Fund to help pay for AMISOM, which was managed by UNSOA and has been used for reimbursements to TCCs for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) (African Union 2010i: 11). The Logistic Support Package, helped prevent AMISOM from failing, but little more. The APSA, meanwhile, continued to argue that the UN's support to the mission was insufficient and that it would have to be substantially enhanced and improved to effectively meet the challenges that faced the mission on the ground, highlighting in particular the inadequacy of contributions to the Trust Fund for military related expenditure, resulting in AMISOM troops going without wages (African Union 2010h: 19).

## **Conclusion**

“The United Nations retains the primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and therefore there is an expectation that it must contribute to the role of regional and subregional organisations, which has in recent years been shown to be seminal, especially in the context of the African Union. We are convinced that the interests of peace will be well served if the requisite synergy and cooperation exist between the two organisations at both the strategic and operational levels” (United Nations 2011a: 5).

Enabling the role of the APSA through capacity enhancement is increasingly seen to be in the interests of the United Nations. However, it is indispensable for the APSA. The first half of this section has shown how UN institutional capacity enhancement has enabled the APSA to overcome many of the institutional capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter, particularly in the

areas of logistics, technical expertise, specialist training, standardisation, planning, and other core areas. However, the labyrinthine complexity of the institutional framework appears to be the source of some confusion, even within the UN, as to, for example, how the cluster system relates to the 10YCBP.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the depth and complexity of the institutional framework surrounding the UN's efforts to enhance the APSA's capacity, the second half of this section has shown that the UN's biggest impact has been in its *ad hoc* support for the APSA's PSOs. Although this support has always been late and inadequate, it has been nonetheless essential, providing the APSA with the minimum capacity required to perform its role; maintaining its operations in the field and preventing mission failure. Without the UN support for the missions outlined above, AMISOM and AMIS would probably have ended in mission failure, so the UN has massively enabled and expanded the role that the APSA has played in these countries.

The UN prefers not give monetary contributions to the APSA. There is a sense that the UN has more to offer in terms of experience and expertise. However, as Haastrup points out, this is symptomatic of the United Nations' own chronic capacity shortages (Haastrup 2011: 7). The United Nations' support to the APSA is heavily focussed on training, management, expertise, knowledge transfer, long-term planning and doctrinal globalisation. The UN takes a sophisticated, value-added and long-term approach to enhancing the capacity of the APSA. However, this approach frequently frustrates the APSA which is usually faced with more pressing financial and military concerns, such as

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<sup>2</sup> For example, a recent UNSC meeting used these terms interchangeably when they in fact represent completely separate institutions (United Nations 2011a: 3)

running out of money to pay for troops, and lacking the capacity to deploy and rotate troop contingents, which will be discussed in detail in chapter seven. For predictable support in these areas, the APSA relies more heavily upon capacity enhancement from the EU and the USA.

### ***European Union Support to the APSA***

Of all the APSA's external partners, the European Union has had the most substantial long-term institutional support for the APSA. The EU, like the UN, has also provided invaluable capacity enhancement to the APSA on an *ad hoc* basis. Although this support has not been as significant as the UN's *ad hoc* support, the EU's efforts in this area are still extremely important. The first half of this section will examine the EU's institutionalised efforts at capacity building and explain how these have affected the role played by the APSA. The second half will be devoted to explaining how the EU and its member states have enabled the role played by the APSA on an *ad hoc* basis.

### **Institutionalised Capacity Building**

The EU's approach to capacity building for the APSA is built around the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The JAES sets the tone for the EU's approach to economic development in Africa; "It is now universally recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. Peace and security are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development" (Commission of the European Communities 2005). The JAES founding documents include major innovations aimed at overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship and fundamentally changing Africa-EU relations (Bossuyt and Sherriff 2010: 3). The JAES highlights Africa's *right* to

development, and in the light of this new partnership, the EU has become the APSA's largest financial supporter. (European Union 2007: 3). Most of the European Union's institutionalised support to the APSA is provided through the capacity building component of the APF, as well as EU programmes, such as Euro-RECAMP/AMANI Africa (European Union 2007: 7).

### ***Africa Peace Facility***

At its second ordinary session in 2003, the AU Assembly requested that the European Union establish a bourse of EU monies that were already earmarked as African development aid. The idea was that these monies could be re-routed through the AU instead of going to member states individually. This process, in no small way, *defined* the role played by the APSA by enabling it with the capacity to finance extremely expensive peace support operations, like AMIS or AMISOM, without having to wait for contributions from member states which might never materialise and would almost certainly never be enough (African Union 2003c: Decision 16). In response to this request, the EU established the Africa Peace Facility (APF) in April 2004, with a starting budget of EUR 250 million—200 million of which was earmarked for support of APSA PSOs, 35 million of which was destined for capacity building for the APSA, and the remaining 15 million of which was used to cover audits, evaluations and contingencies (Mpyisi 2009: 7). The capacity building budget has been used for several institutionalised projects, including support to the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in the form of office space, which has been rented out for them by the EU, and from the provision of funds for additional staff, whose salaries will also be covered by the EU. The capacity building funds have also allowed for PSOD staff to participate in training exercises run by the

Kofi Annan Centre (Vines and Middleton 2008: 27-28). This type of support addresses the personnel capacity problems outlined in the previous chapter head-on, helping to ease their limiting effect on the APSA's interactionist role.

The facility was exhausted much sooner than intended, as a result of the exponential expansion of AMIS, and increased to €440 million in 2007, most of which was paid for by France and Germany (Pirozzi 2009: 26). The facility was subsequently renewed in the 2008-2010 EDF with EUR 300 million under the intra-ACP Indicative Programme (Franke 2009: 240-241). This renewal has allowed the APF to continue to act as a fundamentally pivotal enabling factor, without which much of what the APSA has done in the field would not have been possible. AFP grants were allocated to provide the APSA with the capacity to shoulder the heavy economic burden of AMIS and AMISOM (Mpyisi 2009: 7). The Africa Peace Facility (APF) has provided vital support to AMISOM, covering expenses relating to pre-deployment, troop allowances, payments for death and disability and other day-to-day expenses (African Union 2010h: 18).

The APF has been an extremely reliable source of funding for APSA PSOs, and the new APF includes an early response mechanism fund for the financing of fact-finding and pre-deployment missions. This fund is pre-approved by the EC so the APSA simply requires an exchange of letters to disburse funds, allowing the APSA to begin preparations for mission deployment very quickly, enhancing its role in the area of rapid deployment (Pirozzi 2009: 27).

However, there are limits on what the APF can achieve. The APF is part of the European Union's global security or multilateral security approach, where it strengthens regional organisations to take more responsibility for what happens

in their own spheres (Peyker 2010). However, because it is drawn from the European Development Fund (EDF), the money is only allowed to be used for 'non-lethal' purposes – quite a set back for a security actor. Decision 2003/3 of the APC/EC Council of ministers of 11 December 2003 proscribes the use of APF funds for military and arms expenditure, military training, EU military technical assistance, or offensive military equipment for the ASF; these are major handicaps for a bourse designed specifically to support the APSA's PSOs, and as a result, most of these vital areas have to be covered through *ad hoc* support to the APSA, as well as through the efforts of individual EU member states (Pirozzi 2009: 25).

#### ***Italian African Peace facility (IAPF)***

The Italian African Peace Facility (IAPF) is an example of one of these member state-led efforts. The IAPF was established at the Africa-EU summit in December 2007 to support the EU peace and security agenda. The IAPF has a budget of €40 million, which *is* allowed to be used for the development of offensive military capabilities as it is funded directly by Italy. The IAPF is focussed on regions of particular interest to Italy and has been particularly involved in the Horn of Africa. The IAPF has provided financial support to the components of the ASF training plan and has been invaluable in the ongoing operationalisation the ASF-Brigades (Pirozzi 2009: 24).

#### ***Training Programmes***

Although economic capacity enhancement through the APF has been the EU's biggest institutional contribution to enabling and expanding the role of the APSA, the gaps in expertise highlighted in the previous chapter highlight the importance training has as an enabling factor. The EU and its member states

have taken a leading role in the provision of training for the APSA, and some of the highlights of this process are discussed below.

### ***Euro Recamp/Amani Africa***

RECAMP was originally a French training programme, but has since been absorbed by the European Union as a framework for EU support for the APSA's extensive training requirements (Bagayoko 2007: 9). Under French leadership, the RECAMP programme was focused purely on tactical level operational training of military units for peacekeeping missions. However, since 2005, the RECAMP concept began to take a broader approach, bringing in strategic level support (Bagayoko 2007: 4), including support for the African Standby Force (Bagayoko 2007: 19).

The programme has since been europeanised, and is now run by the EU Political and Security Council and implemented by an international team involving European and African representatives. The programme is financed by the APF, as well as EUR 20 million from voluntary contributions (including contributions from partners outside the European Union, such as Canada and the United States). EURO RECAMP/Amani Africa promotes a "multifunctional approach", enhancing police capabilities, civil affairs, human rights, and more (Bagayoko 2007: 5). It delivers strategic-level military and civilian training to the APSA, and in 2010, it also provided vital support to the Command Post Exercise (Pirozzi 2009: 36-37).

Some elements of the RECAMP programme have not been fully europeanised, however. For example, France established three supply depots: one in Dakar, one in Libreville and another in Djibouti. These French depots are available for use by the AU and the REC/RMs, marking a first step in alleviating some of the

APSA's logistical capacity gaps, which have been limiting its role in the field. However, most of the EU member states have indicated that they were not interested in contributing to these logistical depots (Bagayoko 2007: 19).

### ***Africa Conflict Prevention Pool***

The United Kingdom's Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) is a fund for capacity enhancement in sub-Saharan Africa run by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The ACPP has more than 130 military personnel permanently based in Africa, delivers training to APSA personnel and provides financial and technical support to the Peace Support Operations Division of the AU Commission. It has been particularly involved in the development of the East Africa brigade of the ASF (EASBRIG) (Pirozzi 2009: 38).

### **Ad Hoc support to the APSA**

*Ad hoc* support from the EU and its member states comes in many different forms, and is far from rationalised. Each country has its own preferences and caveats, and separate reporting and oversight requirements. These, coupled with the requirements of the APSA's many other donors, place such a strain on the AUC's limited secretariat that it creates a bottleneck for the APSA's absorption capacity (Murithi 2010). However, *ad hoc* support for the APSA nonetheless constitutes an absolutely vital source of capacity enhancement, expanding the role of the APSA in the field; some examples of which will be discussed below.



### ***African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)***

The capacity of the African Union Mission in Burundi was significantly enhanced by support from the EU and its member states. The UK assisted the Mozambican contingent of AMIB with equipment and provided airlift capacity to deploy it to Burundi. However, once the Mozambican forces arrived in the mission area, they were largely dependant on South African support (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 71). In June and July 2003, AMIB set up a cantonment area at Muyange, which housed hundreds of fighters waiting to take part in the DDR process. The APSA relied upon the EU to pay contractor GTZ for the delivery of food to these men during August 2003. When even more fighters arrived at Muyange during November, the EU agreed to provide food for them as well (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 64).

### ***African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)***

The United Kingdom also provided a particularly high level of support to AMIS, providing \$3.4 million to help pay for the initial deployment of the observer mission (African Union 2004c: 4). The UK also helped to significantly enhance the mission's mobility, enabling AMIS MILOBS to reach a much larger area of the operational zones through the provision of 143 vehicles in December 2004. The UK went on to provide another 476 vehicles through British private security company (PSC) Crown Agents in 2005, which also provided satellite communications technology, including Thuraya satellite phones, which were vital for the monitoring mission (Erikson 2010: 22).

The Netherlands also supported AMIS through the provision of financial support for the lease of four fixed-wing aircraft from JMC; helping to bridge the APSA's very broad capacity gaps in the area of air-support and airlift (African Union

2006c: 15). Denmark provided financial support to the mission totalling \$736,664.25 within its first few months (African Union 2004d: 8). Germany provided \$1,165,120.20 to the mission, supplemented with €100,000 worth of communications equipment.

### ***African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)***

There has also been some limited *ad hoc* support for AMISOM, particularly from the UK, which contributed £8.5 million to help pay for AMISOM deployments and to provide assistance to AMISOM's Support Management Planning Unit (SPMU) (African Union 2008d: 9). The UK also provided £4 million for the reimbursement of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) (African Union 2011d: 3). Further, on 19 May 2009, the UK High Commission in Nairobi released £75,000.00 for the urgent purchase of medical supplies for AMISOM clinics in Mogadishu (African Union 2009d: 8).

Other EU member states contributed to the mission too. The Government of Sweden provided the mission with a level-II hospital, which represented a significant enhancement of AMISOM's capacity; the facility provides healthcare not only for AMISOM but also for the United Nations agencies and local staff operating in Somalia (United Nations 2008e: 5). And in the pre-deployment period, France conducted a training programme for the first Burundian battalion to deploy to Somalia, and provided airlift support to get the troops to Mogadishu (African Union 2007j: 3).

Finally, the EU, in addition to payments through the APF, pledged €5 million for AMISOM's Strategic Planning Management Unit (SPMU) and another €500,000

to cover insurance costs as well as technical assistance for budget-related matters (African Union 2008d: 9).

## **Conclusion**

This section has shown the extent to which the European Union has been able to bridge many of the APSA's endemic capacity problems, highlighted in the previous two chapters. In particular, the EU's structural support to the APSA is invaluable; training up military planners, peacekeepers and civilian police through several programmes. The EU is also extremely important because of the APF, which goes some way to solving the biggest problem highlighted in the previous chapter: economic capacity.

The APF has been an invaluable source of funds for AMIS and AMISOM; however, the restrictions on its use mean that it cannot completely bridge the APSA's economic capacity gaps, especially when it comes to contracting offensive military equipment, or even simply paying the salaries of peacekeepers. To provide this much needed support to the APSA, the EU relies on its member states, but also its allies; particularly the USA.

## ***United States Support to the APSA***

The European Union's African development priorities are echoed by the United States. In a 2009 speech to the AUC-ECA Partners Dialogue Meeting, Ambassador Battle, the leader of the United States Mission to the African Union, explained that "the U.S. sees peace and security as foundationally and fundamentally integral to all other issues. It is only in a context of peace and security that the tenets of good governance necessary to address the

development needs of the African continent can flourish. It is therefore of no surprise that the U.S. relationship with the African Union focuses heavily, though not exclusively, on Peace and Security” (Battle 2009).

In contrast to the EU, a 2010 report by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union highlighted the fact that the United States seems to eschew providing support directly to the APSA, preferring to support AU member states individually, especially TCCs, rather than support the organisation as a whole. It also prefers to give support in kind, as opposed to the UN and EU, which has offered significant financial support (African Union 2010h: 19).

In contrast to the UN and the EU, the United States’ capacity building for the APSA is focused around operational support, specifically enhancing APSA capacity in areas relevant to US foreign policy. To achieve this, the US supports the APSA at all levels, with targeted funding, specialist support, training, cooperation and coordination between US forces and the APSA. In general, the USA’s priorities for the APSA are focused around moulding it into a viable partner for US efforts to promote security on the continent (Warthon 2010).

### ***Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)***

The US State Department-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was founded in 2004 and is designed to enhance the capacities of US partners in the fielding of peace support operations. The Initiative is focused on key APSA member states, rather than the institution as a whole, and aims to increase the roster of capable military elements and formed police units available for deployment in peace support operations, with the goal of training-up 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly in African countries. The Initiative also facilitates the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of military units into the mission

theatres (Serafino 2009: i), and sponsors retired U.S. Army officers who are contracted as advisors to the APSA (Serafino 2009: 7). The GPOI has focused mainly on supporting TCC capabilities, but some support has been provided to institutions, including around \$9 million a year for the AU (Serafino 2009: 13).

### ***US African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA)***

The US African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme is the GPOI's principal training program in Africa, and one of the United States' most developed forms of institutionalised support to the APSA (Serafino 2009: i). It is managed and funded by the US State Department, and designed to improve the APSA's ability to respond quickly to crises by providing selected African militaries with the training and equipment required to successfully conduct peace support operations (Council on Foreign Relations 2008).

The training programme is similar to EURO RECAMP/AMANI Africa, but ACOTA has logistical and tactical elements that are not available through the European programme. ACOTA is not just focussed on peacekeeping, but has courses more suited to the realities of APSA PSOs; ACOTA prepares African troops for operations conducted in complex and hostile environments, training troops in offensive manoeuvres as well as defence. ACOTA also helps bridge another major capacity gap pointed out in chapter 3, by *equipping* the African units trained under the programme. ACOTA includes a weapons component and provides all the equipment necessary for combat, something that would be difficult for EDF-derived EU programmes (Pirozzi 2009: 38).

### ***Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP)***

The Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) is another US State Department programme designed to build peacekeeping capacity amongst African armed forces bilaterally through training programmes in peacekeeping, conflict management and prevention, as well as through the provision of logistics and necessary construction activities (Avant and Nevers 2011: 2). The work of the AFRICAP is provided through PMC contractors. AFRICAP has awarded contracts for training, air transport, information technology, infrastructure, mission support, disaster relief and public relations to DynCorp and PAE, which have both been heavily involved in AMIS and AMISOM (Avant and Nevers 2011: 4). New York-based Bancroft Global Development also employs about 40 South African and European military trainers who have been working with AMISOM troops, particularly focusing on how to deal with the specific threats posed by Al Shabaab without harming public support for the mission through collateral damage. They were officially retained by the APSA at a cost of \$12.5 million, but the APSA was reimbursed by the US State Department (Kelley 2011).

### ***United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)***

Unlike the programmes discussed above, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is a military command structure, run by the Pentagon. It was operationalised on 1 October 2008, and is based in the buildings of the European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart. AFRICOM's mandate is to build up the capacity of African national defence forces rather than focusing on enhancing the capacity of the APSA directly. AFRICOM's ultimate goal is keeping American troops out of Africa in the long term, without compromising

security on the continent (Cochran 2010: 111). Nonetheless, AFRICOM does provide some institutionalised support to the APSA; in particular, it provides financial support for the ASF's Command and Control infrastructure development. AFRICOM also provides expert support through its Liaison Officer as well as through a programme that provides US military experts to help mentor African officers and to advise on issues related to peacekeeping, training, reconnaissance, patrolling, maritime security and communications (Pirozzi 2009: 38).

AFRICOM also enhances APSA member state capacity in areas of interest to the United States; especially counter-terrorism through the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara, through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Programme, provides funds in support of anti-terrorist training and border security for countries bordering the Sahara, including the May 2010 three-week-long 'Flintlock 10' training programme, which included 400 troops from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia (Pham 2011: 112).

Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa also plays a capacity enhancing role, and is led by the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which is housed in the United States' only major African base in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (Pham 2011: 115). Its goal is to enhance local capacity for counter terrorism against the backdrop of the Islamist insurgency in Somalia (Pham 2011: 115). The United States' support to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 was largely provided in this context, and is discussed in more detail below. In addition to bilateral training with selected militaries in the region,

CJTF-HOA has also worked closely with the APSA on the establishment of the EASBRIG.

### **Ad Hoc Support**

In addition to its extensive training efforts, aimed at increasing the capacity of the APSA through its member states, the United States has also been invaluable to enabling the peace support operations of the APSA through *ad hoc* support to the missions or their TCCs directly, paying particular attention to AMISOM; Somalia, defined as a third front in the War on Terror by several US generals, is a key strategic location for the US (McLure 2011: 235).

### ***African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)***

The United States did not support AMIB extensively, but it did provide financial support for the deployment of Ethiopian forces to the mission theatre, which made up the second largest contingent in the mission after South Africa (Svensson 2008a: 13). Heavy airlift is something which has continued to place severe limitations upon APSA TCCs, and external support has been integral to getting troops on the ground.

### ***African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)***

After the initial 300-strong AMIS protection force arrived in Darfur in July 2004, it became clear that the existing logistics system would be insufficient to sustain the mission's increasing size. The logistics system needed to be enhanced to allow AMIS to carry out its new mandate and support from the United States was instrumental in achieving this. Rather than becoming directly involved on the ground in Sudan, the U.S. opted to fund a contract with Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE), a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, to construct camps, provide



water and food, and provide other fundamental services such as laundry and maintenance (Ekengard 2008: 18). The United States spent about \$240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and pledged another \$40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain the thirty-two camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur. PAE also provided AMIS with three fixed-wing aircraft; two Antonov An-26 and one Antonov An-24, which PAE rented on AMIS's behalf on an *ad hoc* basis (Ekengard 2008: 22). By 2006, the US had also paid \$23.5 million to US PSC DynCorp on behalf of AMIS to provide equipment and strategic transport for U.S. efforts to build AMIS camps (GAO 2006: 55).

In 2005, the US provided AMIS with equipment for three Rapid Response Teams, enabling the mission to deploy small units rapidly to enable it undertake preventive deployments, reinforce unstable areas and respond rapidly to crises (African Union 2005b: 11-12).

### ***African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)***

In the run-up to the African Union Mission in Somalia, the United States security strategy in the Horn of Africa revolved around bilateral support to Ethiopia. In 2002, the US allocated \$3.6 million in security assistance for Ethiopia, increasing over the subsequent years, and in 2005 Ethiopia became the top recipient of US security assistance in Africa (Cochran 2010: 130-131). This support was geared at encouraging participation in regional peacekeeping initiatives and in the African Crisis Response Initiative (Cochran 2010: 130). In 2006, the year that Ethiopia invaded Somalia, Ethiopia had received \$21 million of military capacity building support from the United States' Global War on Terror budget (Cochran 2010: 131). During the Ethiopian invasion and the

subsequent occupation, the United States cooperated militarily with Ethiopian forces on the ground, many of which the United States had trained and equipped through ACOTA. US special operations forces, intelligence assets, and precision airstrikes, supporting a large-scale intervention by a US partner became known as “the Somali Model” (Stevenson 2007: 44). By enabling the Ethiopian invasion, the United States made AMISOM possible. However, the invasion also contributed to the increased militarisation and the confrontational nature of the security environment in Somalia, creating serious difficulties for AMISOM.

The United States also provided considerable support to Uganda’s two initial battalions for AMISOM, providing Uganda with assistance in terms of airlifting, the provision of equipment and procurement of supplies, logistical support and sustenance for the Ugandan troops in the mission area (African Union 2007j: 3). After the expansion of the mandate of the African Union mission in Somalia and the withdrawal of Ethiopia, US support was vital in bringing the mission strength to the UN mandated 12,000. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Elisabeth Frazer, fearing a recrudescence of the UIC in the wake of the Ethiopian withdrawal, referred to AMISOM as “a crucial component of our strategy in Somalia”, leading to US training, equipment, and logistical support to be provided bilaterally to Uganda and Burundi, specifically to enable their deployment to AMISOM (Cochran 2010: 133-134). As will be discussed in chapter seven, one of the main stumbling blocks for the deployment of troops, especially the Burundian battalions, was the lack of the necessary equipment. In 2011, the US facilitated the deployment of an

additional 4,000 Ugandan and Burundian troops to the mission through the provision of this necessary equipment (African Union 2011d: 3).

Although US support to AMISOM TCCs has been vital, the US strategy also highlights a failure of the APSA's partners to bridge the capacity gap of flagging political will: Ghana and Nigeria in particular received considerable military capacity building from the US, and were offered more support tailored to the requirements of AMISOM, but without any strategic interest in Somalia, and in light of the collapsing security situation, both countries continued to prevaricate when it came to deployment (Cochran 2010: 136). This highlights the limitations of external support; even extensive training and support from the US cannot make sending troops to Somalia seem like a good idea.

### ***Conclusion***

While the EU has tried to redesign the donor-recipient relationship to highlight African ownership, the US has continued to pursue a more traditional model; attempting, as US Air Force Major Shawn T. Cochran puts it, "to translate donor-recipient relationships into effective sponsor-surrogate relationships as a means of shaping the African security environment and pursuing US objectives" (Cochran 2010: 137). The United States takes a ground-up approach to capacity building for the APSA, leaving much of the structural capacity enhancement to the UN and the EU. The United States prefers to support member state capacity, supporting Ethiopia in Somalia out of the belief that the APSA did not have the capacity to mount such an offensive operation (Cochran 2010: 132).

## ***Conclusion***

This chapter has shown that, despite the APSA's reputation for debilitating capacity gaps as highlighted in the previous chapter and chapter one, the reality is quite the opposite; the APSA has access to vast resources, all the resources required to field some of the world's largest peace operations, allowing the APSA to play a major role in this area. These resources are largely provided by its external partners. In fact, almost all of the billions of dollars spent by the APSA since its inception have come from external sources. However, in practical terms, the APSA's 'surrogate' capacity has been underestimated by much of the discourse, as have the attendant roles that the APSA is capable of playing.

External support from the UN, the EU and the US has bridged many of the capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter to a greater or lesser extent, enhancing, or frequently *creating*, capacity in core problem areas—namely funding, planning, training, contingent owned equipment, heavy air lift, military intelligence, and many technical and specialist areas. Moreover, external support that creates capacity in areas which were never explicitly part of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role*, such as counter-terrorism, show how the pull factors of the APSA's external partners have shaped and twisted the role of the APSA. Further, the role played by the APSA in the field can be transformed and expanded through support such as the United States' provision of heavy air-lift and rapid-reaction capacity to AMIS. Although not all support to the APSA has had such a transformative effect on the role played in the African security arena, even small amounts of capacity enhancement have helped the

APSA's missions to appear more professional and more competent to the outside world, allowing the APSA to attract confidence and support.

One capacity gap that has remained unaddressed, however, is the APSA's limited administrative staff; still over worked and underpaid, the APSA's bureaucracy is struggling under the weight of the myriad accounting requirements for each of its individual sources of external aid. A case in point is the €6 million from the APF which was earmarked for strengthening the AU PSOD in 2008. A year after it was pledged, only €1.6 million had been spent and only 11 out of the required 40 personnel had been recruited because of major procedural obstacles within the AU Commission that the original pledge had been designed to ameliorate (low staff levels, out-dated systems, lack of specialists etc.). This demonstrates that the APSA has a limited capacity to absorb external support, limiting the extent to which external partners *can* bridge the APSAs capacity gaps (Pirozzi 2009: 26).

Further, there are still capacity gaps in the mandate and mission planning process: a need for improved interoperability and further standardisation of the doctrine, particularly for civilian police components and a need for more equipment and logistics support, which, as will be shown in chapter seven, has only ever been at the minimum level required to postpone mission failure (G8 2009: 6). Although significant airlift capacity has been provided by the United States via DynCorp contracts, as well as through partnership with NATO, the lack of strategic airlift is still a major operational limiting factor for the APSA and African TCCs. This was made clear in 2010; after the bombings in Kampala, the Ugandan government made thousands of troops available to AMISOM that were not deployed for months because there was no strategic airlift available

until the US stepped in. Similar cases can be seen with other troop-contributing countries such as Nigeria, which had pledged thousands of troops to AMISOM but has not had the means to deploy them. Finally, although external partners did provide AMIS with considerable financial backing, the majority of this support has not been institutionalised and the *ad hoc* nature of these sources of funding has created a high level of uncertainty, hindering planning (Ekengard 2008: 37). The APSA could not function without *ad hoc* external support; however, the slow and complex process of institutionalising the provision of external support further limits the APSA's freedom to act, and its ability to plan effectively, limiting the APSA's capacity, African ownership and ultimately limiting the *interactionist* role.

It is clear that, even with the support of the APSA's external partners, its capacity to act as a peacekeeper is limited by enduring capacity problems in familiar areas—mission funding, specialist equipment and expertise, logistics etc.. However, external partners *have* enhanced the APSA's capacity beyond a minimum level required to carry out its mandates. In contrast to claims by scholars such as Paul Williams, the APSA, with the support of its external partners *does* have the capacity to successfully complete its mandates; all four of its peace support operations have been hugely dependent upon external capacity enhancement, but all four of them have also met with success; so limited internal capacity does not need to be the defining factor of the role of an institution like the APSA.

In total, the APSA's external partners have transferred training, equipment, services and capital to the APSA worth billions of US dollars, most of which has been spent on the operational requirements of AMIS and AMISOM. This shows

how different the APSA's *de facto* capacity is from a plain reading of the APSA's internal resources, as presented in the previous chapter. It is not simply that the APSA's external partners are *enhancing* the APSA's capacity; to a large extent the APSA's partners *are* its capacity. Without external partners to facilitate them, the APSA's PSO's in Somalia and the extended mandate in Sudan would probably never have reached the mission theatre. Operation Democracy, which will be discussed in chapter seven, has shown that the APSA does in fact have the capacity to mount operations on its own based on the Burundi model, but only small and/or fast missions, with lead-states willing to take ownership of the mission. Further, the early days of AMIS and AMISOM show how far the APSA is able to go without significant support. However, even before the mass mobilisation of funds for AMIS and AMISOM, external contributions still dwarfed internal pledges; and when it comes to transforming the mission environments, as we have seen in Somalia, hundreds of millions of dollars of external funding is not just helpful, it is a prerequisite.

Therefore, the external partners, while external to Africa, are not truly external to the APSA. They are at the very heart of the APSA. Moreover, the APSAs external partners are not only providing the bulk of the capacity required to drive the APSA forward, they are also steering the APSA into specific areas by the selective provision of their aid in a form of passive governance. By selecting specific elements of the APSA's role to enhance in accordance with their own Africa policies, the APSA's external partners have shaped the role of the APSA into something they would see as more useful. External capacity enhancement of the APSA has focused on military aspects; even the provision of expertise and specialist training is aimed at enhancing the military side of the APSA. The

APSA's missions have become expansive intercontinental security cooperation projects. It is therefore clear that external partners have a significant effect on, not just the APSA's capacity, but how that capacity is used. An examination of how this 'external governance' affects the role of the APSA will be the subject of the subsequent chapter.



## Chapter Six: Governance of the APSA

### *Introduction*

The previous chapter has shown how external capacity enhancement of the APSA has not just bridged most of the APSA's capacity gaps outlined in chapter four, but has enhanced and expanded the APSA's capacity to act. This has meant that the APSA has been able to play a much larger role than its modest internal capacity would indicate. However, when it comes to the effects of external capacity enhancement on the *interactionist role* of the APSA, the 'elephant in the room' is ownership. The previous chapter concluded that external capacity enhancement is not supplemental to the APSA; the APSA could not exist in its current form without it, and the role it plays in the African security environment would be very different. Dependency creates leverage and control, giving the external partners considerable influence over the scale and direction of the capacity which they provide.

Member state governments also have a considerable influence over the role played by the APSA, even if they are not involved in the official decision-making framework. The Burundi model creates a similar type of dependency and the choice to intervene in a conflict or not often depends not on a decision by the PSC to launch a mission, but the willingness of key lead states to act.

While the previous two chapters have examined the APSA's capacity and how that capacity shapes the APSA's *interactionist role*, this chapter will address how that capacity is directed and by whom. In the effort to understand the *interactionist role* of the APSA, an understanding of the APSA's *interactionist* governance processes is more informative than an understanding of the

*endemic functionalist* governance of the APSA, i.e. the way that governance of the APSA is *supposed* to be conducted.

It is therefore imperative to systematically quantify and analyse governance in the APSA. In pursuit of this aim, this chapter seeks to answer a few key questions: *What do the APSA's governance structures look like? Who is 'pulling' the APSA's 'strings', and to what ends? Whom does the APSA serve—is it the African people, their leaders, or is it external powers like the United States or the European Union? And most importantly; how does the governance of the APSA limit, enable and direct its role?*

In order to effectively and objectively answer these questions, it will be necessary to problematise the concept of governance. As a result of the fact that no appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of governance in this way exists in International Relations, a new theory of governance will be developed for use in examining the effects of the APSA's governance structures upon its *interactionist role*. This process will constitute the first part of the chapter. With a technical definition of the core elements of the APSA's governance structures clearly established to focus the study, the chapter will then go on to examine the APSA's internal governance structure, explaining which African actors are involved and what the relationship is between them, and challenging a core element of the *endemic functionalist* definition of the role of the APSA: African solutions for African problems. The last half of the chapter will discuss the subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which the APSA's external partners can use their influence to guide and mould the *interactionist role* of the institution through selective capacity enhancement, conditional aid, unequal relationships and other techniques.

## ***Defining Governance and Establishing the Boundaries for Study***

Governance is significant because it doesn't just limit or enable the APSA's capacity like the factors discussed in the three preceding chapters; it dictates how that capacity is to be used. When the concept of governance was originally developed, it was captured with the German word *Steuerungstheorie*, literally 'steering theory' (Mayntz 2003: 27). This term perhaps gives a better image of what governance does when applied to institutions – it *steers* the organisation into the desired role or roles. In this sense, understanding governance processes takes us to the very core of understanding the *interactionist role*.

In order to systematically analyse the effects of governance on the role of the APSA, the most appropriate way of conceptualising governance must first be established, so that the concept can be applied consistently throughout the chapter. Governance theories are most often used to provide an idealised model of governance that organisations should aspire to, similar to the *functionalist* approach in Institutional Role Theory. In the context of Global Governance—IR's most influential theoretical framework for the conceptualisation of governance—this approach has been referred to as the *normative* use of governance theory (Dingworth and Pattberg 2006: 193-196). Normative governance theory includes theories such as Good Governance, which are models describing an ideal of governance—they list the requirements of effective governance, sometimes outlining a strategy for adopting these requirements. Therefore, the normative use of governance theory is not useful to the present study, which is less interested in what the governance of the APSA *should* be, but needs to understand the practical effect that the APSA's governance has on how the organisation employs its capacity and, therefore,

the effect it has upon the APSA's interactionist role. By invoking Good Governance in the context of the APSA, academics and practitioners are making value judgements of the quality of the APSA's governance structures; claiming, for example, that the APSA's governance is not *good* enough to meet a shopping list of various preconditions. The current thesis does not challenge the value of such scholarship in other contexts, but it is clearly a *projected functionalist* endeavour, and as such cannot be used to systematically explain what those governance structures are and how they affect the APSA's role.

This study needs to investigate the APSA's governance structures as they are, rather than what they ought to be, and to that end, it is more useful to employ what Dingwerth and Pattberg refer to as the *analytical* use of governance theory (Dingworth and Pattberg 2006: 189-193). One such analytical framework for governance is Rosenau's Global Governance theory, outlined in issue one of *Global Governance* (Rosenau 1995). Global Governance provides the archetypal form of analytical governance theory.

Rather than simply writing out a shopping list of processes that Western academics claim are necessary for 'effective' governance to take place, Rosenau adopts a completely different approach to the subject, conceptualising the world's governance, good and bad, as a "crazy quilt" of millions of different interdependent actors, from families to supranational organisations, all attempting to assert their influence over governance mechanisms in order to achieve their ends (Rosenau 1995: 15-16). In this way, Global Governance opens up the field of governance, moving beyond the staid examination of official descriptions of governance and allowing us to examine any and all influences that may contribute to the steering of an organisation, enabling us to

better understand the processes behind governance and how they shape the role of an institution.

However, it is the sheer scale of Rosenau's concept of governance that makes it difficult to implement in the study of institutions like the APSA. Critics of Global Governance have highlighted the problem that if 'everything is governance', then the theory is difficult to use as an analytical tool. Therefore, the problem is how to make sense of these governance processes: e.g. how can we isolate and evaluate the most important governance actors affecting the *interactionist role* of the APSA, and isolate them from the dazzling "crazy quilt"?

One way to tighten the focus on the APSA's governance structures is to introduce concepts from outside the field of International Relations and synthesise a new theoretical framework for the analysis of the effects of governance on the *interactionist role*. The Policy Governance model, developed by John Carver, is an offshoot of Corporate Governance. Carver's most significant contribution to the Corporate Governance literature is his separation of the governance structures of corporations into three groups: the *owners*, the *managers* and the *board* (Carver 2001: 59-60). Governance, in Carver's view, is only carried out by the *board*. The *board* is a small group of elites who represent the *owners*. It is the *board's* responsibility to interpret the wishes of the *owners*, develop ends (objectives or goals) that are in line with those wishes and ensure that the *management* is working towards means (policies) which can achieve these ends (Carver 2001: 54-59).

This model makes it possible to analyse the effects of an organisation's governance structures by isolating and analysing the *board* and its relationship with the *management* and the *owners*. This will facilitate an understanding of

the origins of governance 'policies', by tracing them back to the parts of the board that originally developed them.

Although Policy Governance is a conceptualisation of the governance of private enterprises, and is largely normative in nature, the value of this model lies in the clarity with which governance processes have been isolated from conventional *management* and *ownership*. With some slight alterations to the theory, the APSA's governance may also be isolated in this fashion; enabling an understanding of which parts of the "crazy quilt" are able to design policies for the APSA, or otherwise penetrate the APSA's governance structures. Thus, by splicing together aspects from Global Governance and Corporate Governance, we can create an analytical framework to analyse the effects of governance on the *interactionist role* of institutions like the APSA.

### **Policy Governance in the AU**

In the Policy Governance model there is a fundamental division of labour between the act of *management* and the act of *governance*—a distinction often overlooked in definitions of governance found in International Relations. The APSA is a large and complex organisation, with many stakeholders, and its governance structures are multifaceted. The first step to analysing these governance structures is to apply Carver's model; identifying and isolating the APSA's *ownership*, *management* and *board*.

The *board* is the only element in any organisation that can 'steer', so to understand governance in the APSA it is important to first find *board* elements and separate them from *ownership* or *management* elements. Likewise, as the most fundamental task of the *board* is to represent the *ownership* (Carver 2001:

56), understanding the relationship between the APSA's *board* and its *ownership* is of considerable use in understanding the APSA's governance and its effects. Carver asserts that (in *functionalist* terms) "both the state and the public organisation are creatures of the public and wholly subject to its dominion" and defines the *ownership* as "the legitimacy base formed by the general public" (Carver 2001: 55). The *management* elements, on the other hand, are responsible for operationalising the *board's* interpretation of the intentions of the *owners*. These three elements, *board*, *management* and *ownership* aid in charting governance processes, and will serve as the focal points for an analysis of governance in the APSA and its effects on its *interactionist role*.

### **Who are the Owners of the AU?**

Defining the *ownership* of a corporation is a straightforward task; shareholders have literally bought a stake in the corporation; collectively, they are the *ownership*. Naturally, the African Union does not sell shares; for an international institution like the APSA, a different approach to *ownership* is required. This is often based upon *projected functionalist* approaches such as Good Governance, which explains that ownership of organisations like the African Union should be built upon concepts such as fairness, self-determination, and democracy. Therefore, as Carver stated, the *owners* of a public organisation like the APSA *should* be the African public; an assumption reinforced by the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* which is defined in the treaty framework. For example, article 4(c) of the Constitutive Act makes the "participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union" a *principle* of the organisation (Organisation of African Unity 2000). Article 3.7 of Chapter 3 of the African

Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance expresses “[e]ffective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance of public affairs” as a principle of the Union (African Union 2007a). Further, much of the APSA’s work is declared to be conducted on behalf of the African people, as opposed to the member states, external partners, or other stakeholders. Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act lists one of the AU’s objectives as to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights” (Organisation of African Unity 2000). Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act commits the AU to “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Organisation of African Unity 2000) and Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act rejects impunity; those who commit crimes against the African people will never be immune from prosecution. Finally, the PSC Protocol states one of its objectives is to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development” (African Union 2002b: Article 3(a)).

Arguably, the APSA’s most explicit *endemic functionalist* statement of where its *ownership* lies is the Constitutive Act’s Article 4(h) (Organisation of African Unity 2000), which establishes the organisation’s right to intervene in a member state specifically in situations where the people of that state are suffering at the hands of the government or as a result of the negligence or impotence of the government. This article is the ultimate expression of the African people’s *ownership* of the AU’s security structures. However, Article 4(h) has yet to be invoked, and the AU’s commitment to protecting the interests of the people over the interests of the member states is unproven. These declarations are



evidence that the APSA is working on behalf of 'African people'; they are the primary referent object of the APSA, which has securitised processes that are seen to threaten them.

It is clear from the above rhetoric that, at least in *endemic functionalist* terms, the APSA is committed to good governance, and promoting increased awareness and participation throughout Africa. However, it is significant that the majority of Africans have heard very little of the AU, and few have ever heard of the Peace and Security Council, the Military Staff Committee or the Peace Support Operations Division (Murithi 2010; Jeremy 2010).

The APSA is trying to promote awareness throughout Africa, a process which could potentially increase the relevance of African ownership in *interactionist* terms. The APSA does have a presence outside Addis Ababa, including key organs such as the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as some smaller regional offices. The quantity and frequency of AU documentation made available to the public and civil society is increasing, including leaflets and booklets designed to raise awareness. However, it has not made as much progress as it might have, and awareness amongst the public is still extremely low, meaning that African ownership has a very low impact on the *interactionist role* of the APSA (Murithi 2010). In an interview with the author, Peyker described the "problem of invisibility" as a problem that affects all international organisations, and made a comparison with lack of awareness of the European Union's agenda amongst the general public in the United Kingdom (Peyker 2010). This could indicate that high-minded notions of popular ownership of these types of institutions may mean little to the day-to-day running of such organisations.

The failure to push through what Murithi (2010) calls an effective ‘popularisation agenda’ is itself arguably a reflection of weak governance processes which undermine the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA. Murithi used the example of the African Union’s ‘Year of Peace’ in 2010; a perfect opportunity for the APSA and the wider AU to promote its agenda amongst the people in Africa from “capitals, even down to the village level” that, nonetheless, resulted in very few initiatives to increase popular ownership (Murithi 2010). Another example is the African Cup of Nations in January 2010, for which there were ‘grand plans’ to use football stars as AU ambassadors to help raise awareness of the AU and its agenda that, unfortunately, failed to translate into action (Murithi 2010). The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa—another huge opportunity to spread the word—similarly passed without any significant action. Murithi ascribes this failure to fully engage the African people in the APSA’s work to a lack of vision, leadership, and delegation—pure governance issues—in addition to the usual capacity problems (Murithi 2010).

How can the *ownership* call upon the APSA’s *board* to represent their wishes if they are not aware that they *are* the ownership? A comparison with Carver’s *normative* model would suggest that a lack of owner participation leads to reduced legitimacy for the organisation (Carver 2001: 55). However, in this *analytical* governance model, it can simply be said that the African public is *not* (currently) the ownership of the APSA. The African public does not have awareness of what the APSA’s is doing, and the APSA can hardly interpret the wishes of the African public from which to distil governance policies. The African public has no real leverage over the APSA; there are no direct means

for the APSA to be held accountable to the African public, which has not bought shares in the APSA and does not need to be consulted on major decisions.

If the wishes of the African people are represented at the APSA at all, then they only have two avenues through which they can be interpreted; either via civil society groups that lobby the AU, or via their national governments which *are* directly represented, in the AU Assembly. The normative *legitimacy* of the APSA's governance is therefore directly proportional to the level of public participation within the domestic political systems of individual African member states, and the effectiveness of civil society at lobbying on their behalf (although this only enhances the popular ownership of specific, usually wealthier and better educated, sections of the African public). However, normative questions, such as the extent of the *legitimacy* of the APSA's governance, are outside the scope of this study. The important question here is: if the African people are *not* the APSA's ownership, then who, or what, is, and how does it affect the APSA's role?

In *interactionist* terms, the day-to-day ownership of the APSA is made up of African governments (as well as some influential member states and external partners, an element of the APSA's ownership which will be explained in more detail later in this chapter). Like a group of shareholders, they each have a vote in the Assembly (external partners are represented through various advisory organs and the UN), and all treaties, conventions, protocols, charters and Decisions and Declarations are signed in the name of the member states and are *themselves* representations of the general will of the member state governments. Further, member states and external partners have, to a greater or lesser extent, *bought-in* to the APSA, which is dependent upon them for the

materiel and capital required for it to perform its role; as such, they have leverage over the APSA in a way that the African public cannot. In practical terms, African governments may not necessarily represent the African people, but the APSA certainly represents African governments.

### **Demarcating the APSA's Board**

The role of the *board* is “to ensure, on behalf of some *ownership*, that an organisation achieves what it should and avoids that which is unacceptable” (Carver 2001: 65). *Governance* is therefore the execution of the authority to interpret the general will (the aggregate wishes of the *ownership*), and to establish *governance policies* in the form of organisational values and ends, or strategic objectives based on these values. In other words, the *board* interprets the wishes of the *ownership*, (referred to in Policy Governance, à la Rousseau, as the *general will*), and devises ends to further those wishes. The *board* does not and, according to Carver's normative approach, *should not* concern itself with the means to achieve these ends—that is the domain of *management*. While the *board* may *proscribe* specific means that are not in line with its established values, such as corrupt or illegal practices, the Policy Governance model does not consider meddling in operational details to be effective governance (Carver 2001: 62-63).

In the AU (if not the APSA), the appellation of *board* seems to fall upon the AU Assembly, as it interprets the wishes of the *ownership*, and sets long term *ends* without involving itself in the day-to-day management. The AU Assembly only meets in ordinary session twice per year; this simple fact precludes the Assembly's capacity to develop complex strategies, limiting its remit to *governing* the AU. However, in *interactionist* terms, and in light of the previous

section, there may well be some overlap between the Assembly as *board* and *ownership*. If the *de facto* owners of the African Union are the member state governments, rather than the African people, and the Assembly is made up of the Heads of State and Government of African Union member states, then the Assembly may well be seen to be more like a twice-yearly stockholders' meeting (i.e. *ownership*) than a *board* meeting. A close relationship between the *board* and the *ownership* would be a good thing, but if the *board* has effectively redefined itself as the *ownership*, then there are serious repercussions for good governance, as the normative, or *functionalist*, *ownership* has effectively been cut out of the governance process.

The Peace and Security Council, one step removed from the Assembly, cannot be described as an *owner* in interactionist terms; even though it is made up of state representatives, its membership is rotating and never constitutes the entirety of the ownership as one might argue that the Assembly does. It constitutes the APSA's *board*, and is focused on interpreting the *general will* of the Assembly, as expressed in the Assembly's Decisions and Declarations. Whether the Assembly is a *representative* of the ownership, or whether it *is* the ownership, does not affect the PSC's position as the *board* of the APSA in *interactionist* terms. The PSC meets more frequently than the Assembly (several times a month), and is focused directly on peace and security issues, but nonetheless limits itself to setting policies and *governing* the APSA.

### **Demarcating the APSA's Management**

The day-to-day running of the APSA, including developing *means* to achieve the values-driven *ends* set by the Assembly and the PSC in their governance policies, is left to the AU's main *management* body: the AU Commission;

specifically the Peace and Security Council Secretariat, the Peace Support Operations Division, the Military Staff Committee, as well as other management structures within the commission such as the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) which deals with issues related to conflict prevention, structural issues and refugees. The PSC Secretariat itself can recommend new 'policies' to be adopted by the PSC, primarily through the reports of the Chairperson of the Commission, which are presented to the Peace and Security Council on a regular basis on specific issues. The Secretariat also provides the PSC and the Assembly with advice on which areas of the APSA require the most attention, but it cannot adopt its own policies, its own values or long-term objectives; thus, as in the policy governance model, the act of governance in the APSA is a one-way street from the *owners* (African governments/the Assembly), through the *board* (the Peace and Security Council), to the *management* (the PSC Commission/the Department for Peace and Security (DPS), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the office of the Chairperson of the Commission).

Carver's model, as he says himself, is normative; an aspirational ideal. As we have seen, the APSA does not correspond perfectly to it, particularly in terms of *ownership*, and, as will be discussed later in the chapter, the APSA's governance is even more complex when full account is made of all the *interactionist* influences which affect it. In an organisation as complex as the APSA, the chain of governance is much less elegant, less linear and much more complicated.

### ***Governance in the APSA***

“...the governance function is a derivative of ownership rather than of management. A theory of governance does not begin with considerations of

the needs and language of management, then, but considerations of the needs and language of ownership” (Carver 2001: 59)

According to Carver, “the size of the population of *owners* and the breadth of an organisation’s charge will contribute to the difficulty in determining the general will” (Carver 2001: 55). This fact has a significant impact on the APSA’s interactionist governance structures. Establishing the general will of the *ownership* is a difficult job for the *board* of any organisation. The APSA consists of 54 member states with a combined population of over nine-hundred million people. There is very little awareness of the APSA amongst the general population, which is compounded by low levels of literacy and education, a weak civil society, limited government control in some areas, low public participation in national politics, limited free speech and limited freedom of the press coupled with many long running and searing conflicts. This results in innumerable contradictory interests between ethnic groups, states, civil society groups, businesses and other parties. In light of this, discerning an aggregate *general will* is next to impossible.

This means that, as explained above, the Assembly is less interpreting the *general will* of the African people, and more representing the interests of their own governments (which may or may not include the interests of the public).

However, settling upon African national governments as the *de facto ownership* presents further problems as there is a further lack of representation here; many African governments lack the capacity or the political will to take *ownership* at the continental level. Murithi feels that many African states are treating the AU with a ‘take it or leave it’ approach (Murithi 2010). For example, in an interview with the author, when discussing member-state participation in AMISOM, Warthon bemoaned a lack of knowledge about the situation in

Somalia amongst member state governments, resulting in a lack of interest, a lack of support and ultimately a severely constrained APSA PSO in Mogadishu (Warthon 2010). In practical terms, there is only a small core of member states that actively govern the organisation. African sub-regional powers such as Nigeria, South Africa and, until recently, Libya, have dominated the APSA's *board*, setting the agenda, financing elements they agree with and neglecting those they are not interested in.

Carver states that the "People-as-a-whole makes an inspiring anthem" (Carver 2001: 56), that is to say that they hold the key to legitimacy; however, to get things done requires material support. In a corporation, this material support comes from the practice of buying stock; this represents the owners' (the stockholders') investment in the company and is the main reason that the owners' views are ever respected.

In an organisation such as the AU, the legitimate *owners* (in normative terms), the African people, have not put any money or resources into it directly, and as a result, the APSA can continue to function without *needing* to consult with them at all—they have no leverage over the institution and as a result are not part of the governance process. However, the APSA *does* need material support in order to continue to function and those who provide it with such support (such as key member states and external partners) *do* have to be consulted. In this sense, they are the real owners of the APSA, as they are the only elements of the *ownership* that affect the APSA's *interactionist role*; they are the ones that wield influence in practical terms, regardless of whether this is 'legitimate' in normative terms. The APSA's dependency upon them for support is not unlike corporate dependency upon key stockholders for fluidity, and they



have similar power over the APSA, and can shape its *interactionist role* using the resources they provide as leverage. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to understanding these interactionist owners, and the effects that they have upon the role of the APSA.

### **Member-State Governance of the APSA**

The development of the African Union in the late 1990s was driven largely by the efforts of three African leaders: Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria; Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (Tieku 2004: 251). The following section examines how the influence of these governments over the governance of the APSA has in turn shaped the *interactionist role* of the institution, through their participation as *owners*, according to their own military, economic and political priorities.

#### ***Nigeria***

Nigeria has become one of the wealthiest African states, as well as possessing one of the most powerful military forces on the continent. Nigeria forms the backbone of ECOWAS and ECOMOG, and, as such, is a staunch supporter of regional integration. By the time the African Union was established, Nigeria had become very active in regional peacekeeping through ECOMOG's efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, which were becoming increasingly expensive and unpopular domestically. It is against this back-drop that Nigeria was committed to refocusing the continental architecture to take a more active role in peace-keeping (in contrast to conflict prevention or addressing structural violence), and was an early proponent of the Peace and Security Council (Tieku 2004: 264). Obasanjo hoped to maintain Nigeria's 'vanguard' role in West Africa, by using the AU to mobilise financial support to help shoulder the million-dollar-

per-day financial burden of its own military peacekeeping efforts (Tieku 2004: 158-260).

Nigeria's focus on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and its need to secure international backing for such operations, has been driven by the 'pax Nigeriana' concept (Adebajo 2002: 93-92). The Nigerian strategy has been to consolidate its power as a regional hegemon allowing the government to entrench its increasingly powerful position in the wider geostrategic environment.

### **South Africa**

Under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, South Africa took up a leadership role within the Pan-African movement. South Africa, as the continent's richest state, is also mistrusted by many of its peers. This is largely because South Africa's financial interests have moved it to pursue a neo-liberal economic agenda. South Africa's GEAR policy in the 1990s was focused on attracting FDI by improving South Africa's image and by providing economic conditions attractive to external investors (Vale and Maseko 1998: 229-243).

South Africa was instrumental in the drafting of the Constitutive Act and, as a result, had a significant influence upon the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA which reflects its own national preferences. Firstly, despite its popularity among many African states, there is almost no trace of Libya's United States of Africa concept, which South Africa consistently opposed and vowed never to be a part of. Secondly, there is a focus on human rights, good governance and human security in the treaty framework, which had been popular with foreign investors, and in-line with GEAR and South African priorities, bearing many similarities to Thabo Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' concept (Tieku 2004: 262)

## **Libya**

Libya has been one of the most vocal supporters of the APSA, and was one of its most significant backers. Throughout the 2000s, the Gaddafi regime increasingly adopted a leadership role, not just within the AU project, but within the pan-African movement as a whole. Gaddafi turned to African Unity as his main passion coincidentally with his increasing frustration with other Arab leaders and the stagnation of pan-Arabism (Totman and Hardy 2009: 10-12).

The Libyan concept of the role of the APSA is much more extensive than the *endemic functionalist role* described in chapter three. Libya under Gaddafi saw the AU as a nascent pan-African nation-state, the United States of Africa, and the ASF as an embryonic pan-African army. Despite his attempts to take over the OAU reform process, the constitutive legal text that was approved at the Lomé summit in June 2000 contained none of the ideas of the 'United States of Africa' (Tieku 2004: 262).

However, the Gaddafi regime continued to be a driving force behind the integration process, and Libya tabled a list of amendments to the African Union Constitutive Act to try to get some of these concepts into the treaty framework. The most significant of these was the amendment to Article 4(h), which would give the AU the right to intervene in a state in order to prevent 'unconstitutional changes of government' (African Union 2003e). This has proved prescient in light of the recent revolution in Libya, undoubtedly an 'unconstitutional change of government', where Gaddafi's amendment to Article 4(h) could have provided a legal basis for an APSA intervention to defend or reinstate his regime.

Considering the fact that Gaddafi's own route to power was through a similar 'unconstitutional change of government', it is not a stretch of the imagination to

presume that Gaddafi was using his country's role as a member of the AU's *ownership* not in the interests of the African people, or even the Libyan people, but in the interests of his regime security, allowing unelected African leaders like Gaddafi to stay in power with the blessing and support of the African Union. These concerns, amongst others, have so-far prevented Libya's proposed amendments from being ratified by the required number of states to make the amendments an official protocol to the Constitutive Act (Baimu and Sturman 2003).

In 2009, Gaddafi was elected chairperson of the African Union and intended to use his time in office to push for a single pan-African army (Polgreen 2009). This vision of the APSA has been opposed by many other major African nation states, including Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia, resulting in the failure of his bid for re-election in 2010 and his subsequent disillusionment with the pan-African project (McLure 2010).

From this brief examination of three of the most active members of the AU *board*, it is clear that African states do not have a single unified agenda; their preferences represent competing factors that militate against each other to steer the APSA and set policies according to their own interests and preferences in an interactionist fashion.

### **Civil Society**

Civil society organisations, such as unions, media, business groups and charities, as representatives of some elements of the APSA's normative *ownership*, the African people, only have a very muted influence upon the governance of the institution. The APSA conducts its activities in close

coordination with civil society organisations and think tanks such as the Institute for Strategic Studies. Despite the fact that Civil Society is not a formal part of the APSA, they are still representatives of core parts of the African public; so, in the interest of increasing its perceived legitimacy, the AU has tried to increase its relationship with civil society (AU Civil Society Forum 2004).

Civil society organisations frequently lobby the African Union, if not the APSA itself. An example is the 2002 declaration on NEPAD, where forty-one civil society organisations came together during the Durban Summit to condemn the neo-liberal economic leanings of NEPAD, which was being incorporated into the AU (SAPRN 2002). Much of the conference's concerns about NEPAD stemmed from external ownership issues; NEPAD, they claimed, serves the interests of external powers (SAPRN 2002). However, Civil Society groups are almost unanimously focused on economic and social issues, not peace and security issues. Further, the *board* has no legal requirement to act on civil society suggestions, and like the African people, they contribute little to the day-to-day running of the organisation. The appearance of a close relationship with such organisations does, however, check boxes for various external partners, which, as the previous chapter highlighted, contribute more to the operational costs of the APSA than the member states themselves.

### ***External Governance***

In practical terms, the APSA's *board* and *management* do not only represent the interests of the African Union member states. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the APSA could not conduct its business without the financial and material support of its many external partners. This support has become increasingly important over the course of the AU's existence, and the APSA in

particular has become heavily dependent on it; close to 90% of the APSA's costs have been shouldered by external partners (Franke 2009: 239).

The European Union and the United States are the APSA's main financial donors, each contributing hundreds of millions of dollars over the APSA's first ten years. Such a vast transference of resources cannot occur without a significant level of oversight. This includes (in policy governance terms) the *management* of the processes of raising money and distributing it, but there is also a very important governance element involved; the various *boards* of the EU, the USA and the UN (the European Council/Council of Ministers, Congress and the Security Council respectively), all get involved in setting policies for their support packages. These policies (in terms of accounting practices, conditions on support, targeted aid etc.) are usually enforced by the APSA's own *management* structures (i.e. the AUC), allowing a certain level of *external governance* of the APSA.

Further, aspects of external *management* can become embedded in the APSA's own *management* structures, creating a much more robust, direct and pervasive form of external governance. In order to preserve African *ownership* of the African Union, the APSA is restricted to employing African citizens exclusively, at all levels of its business. However, as described in chapter four, a range of problems has led to a lack of highly skilled, highly qualified staff in the APSA's *managerial* elements, including the highly important PSOD and the PSC secretariat. This has resulted in an increasing reliance on external advisors who are not (in *functionalist* terms) part of the APSA system, but who nonetheless take on significant responsibility for the day-to-day running of some aspects of the organisation. There are representatives of the UN, the EU and

the US operating in the APSA in this manner. These operatives do not just report to the APSA's *board*, but to representatives of the *boards* of their own organisations or states.

The APSA's external partners do not all interfere in the APSA's *management* to the same extent, and to give an idea of the level of influence these external partners have 'steering' the APSA's *interactionist role* in this way, the thesis has split up external governance practices into three major categories; unobtrusive governance, parallel governance, and invasive governance. The practices of the APSA's main external partners all fall into one of these three categories. The following sections will discuss the impact that external governance has had in the interactionist role of the APSA, briefly looking first at Chinese support, which represents a low impact on the APSA's governance structures categorised as *unobtrusive governance*. This will be followed by the United States' medium impact approach, *parallel governance*; moving on to examine *intrusive governance* of the type practiced by the EU and the UN.

### **Chinese Governance of the AU (Unobtrusive Governance)**

Unobtrusive external governance is exemplified by the Chinese approach to supporting the AU (and other Chinese partners), and has the lowest impact on the steering of the APSA and its *interactionist role*. Chinese financial and material support to the APSA is accompanied by a unilateral pledge of impartiality and non-interference (Li 2007: 74-75). The effect of unconditional aid upon human rights, safety, the environment and corruption within recipient countries is still debated (Woods 2008: 1207, 1211). The PRC, when conducting business and politics in Africa, frequently refers to itself as a non-colonial power, or even a fellow victim of European imperialism (Li 2007: 73-

75). As a result, the Chinese government does not put conventional conditions on its support packages (Woods 2008: 1211). This is also true of its relationships with the individual African member states; the PRC is fully prepared to make substantial arms deals and other security-related agreements without any stipulations or preconditions (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 221-222). Further, the PRC's principle of impartiality, which it uses to justify dealings with many states considered by the West to be undemocratic or oppressive, has resulted in China being accused of propping up violent dictatorships, such as Mugabe's Zimbabwe or Bashir's Sudan, and turning a blind eye to the abuse of human rights and democratic principles in Africa (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 220). However, the PRC has not yet become heavily involved in supporting the APSA directly, beyond providing \$200 million for the new AU building in Addis Ababa, which houses the PSC secretariat (BBC 2012). As Chinese support for the APSA is limited in scale and scope, it does not create the same levels of dependency as Western support, and China therefore has fewer opportunities to interfere in the APSA's governance anyway.

Nonetheless, the Chinese policy on external support for African security has split the international community. In many ways this is a very old argument about development aid in general that has now spread into the realm of continental security cooperation. There is a particular divide between the APSA and the Western donors in this respect, with many APSA officials and African national governments preferring China's minimalist approach, which is seen to be more in keeping with the principles of African ownership and African solutions to African problems (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 222; Suifon: 2010; Gomes 2010). Although all the APSA's other external partners are also



ostensibly committed to these same principles, many of them see an important role for conditional aid and trade 'with strings attached' to incentivise democratisation and promote good governance, liberal values and free-market economics in Africa (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 224). However, in *interactionist* terms the conditions attached to support packages provided to APSA member states are a limiting factor on the APSA's freedom to act; they not only constrain the steering of the organisation, but influence the APSA to steer in directions compatible with the donor states' interests and objectives, thereby having a significant effect on the *interactionist* role of the APSA.

### **The United States' Governance of the APSA (Parallel Governance)**

The United States has taken a much more active role in supporting the APSA than China, and as a result, it has had many more opportunities to influence the APSA's governance structures. The US has established a formal mission to the AU, with offices in Washington D.C. and Addis Ababa. Although, historically, Africa has not been high on the list of American strategic concerns, developments over the past two decades have motivated the United States to become deeply involved. Nigeria and Angola are now major suppliers of oil to US, making Africa more strategically important in its quest to diversify its supply (Ploch 2010: 15).

Further, the 'War on Terror' has spread to Africa, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn. It is against this background that the United States has targeted much of its support for African military capacity enhancement as discussed in the previous chapter (Mills and Herbst 2007: 43), including the establishment of a separate military command for Africa; AFRICOM. African states have been highly suspicious of AFRICOM, believing the nation building strategies it

represents to be an updated form of colonialism. This belief has been so prevalent that the United States had to give up its plans to rebase AFRICOM in Africa from its current home in Stuttgart, as no African nation was willing to host it (Friedman and Sapolsky 2011). However, the United States, like the APSA's other partners, rejects the notion that it is trying to take ownership of the APSA: "the United States has no interest in controlling anything; the United States has interests in partnering" (Warthon 2010).

As the previous chapter explained, one of AFRICOM's key objectives in Africa has been to enhance African capacity, but a major reason for this is to allow the United States to achieve its strategic objectives, without compromising its own forces, arguably turning African capacity into a proxy force in pursuit of objectives not set by the PSC or the Assembly, but by the Pentagon; in the words of a senior AFRICOM officer, speaking anonymously, "We don't want to see our guys going in and getting whacked . . . We want Africans to go in" (Cochran 2010: 111).

An example of this in action is US support to the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, which is referred to by the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa as the 'third front in the War on Terror', and operations in the country are conducted under the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. The successful use of US special operations forces, intelligence assets, and limited precision air strikes, combined with a large-scale intervention by the Ethiopian army, has been dubbed "the Somali Model" (Cochran 2010: 132). This division of labour could represent the APSA taking on the unpleasant role of 'expendable asset' in America's ongoing, but hands-off, war on terror in Africa, but also develops the APSA's *interactionist role* as a front-line force.

The US seems to have a preference for dealing with Africa at the nation-state level rather than focusing most of its attention at the continental level, as the EU has done. For example, the US refuses to supply weapons, equipment or training to regimes that it perceives to be a threat either to people within the state or to international peace and security. By increasing or decreasing the capacity and status of targeted member states, the US is able to promote its own values within the APSA's governance structures from the outside. It does this by 'backing winners'. African states that share US objectives and are committed to promoting those values, such as South Africa and Ethiopia, receive considerable support; states that have very different or even contradictory values, some of which might be openly anti-American such as Libya under Gaddafi, will naturally receive little or no support and may even find themselves faced with sanctions. This strategy strengthens the militaries and economies of *board* members and *owners* who are in line with American objectives, while sidelining those with contrary objectives.

The US's *parallel governance* strategy eschews the minimalist Chinese approach. However, despite AFRICOM's poor reputation, America's strategy is not as invasive as that of the EU or the UN. The United States influences the steering of the organisation without much direct interference in the governance of the APSA. The decision of which states to support and which to isolate is made within the United States' own governance structures and has a greater effect on the APSA's governance than the Chinese model without openly compromising African ownership.

### **European Union Governance of the APSA (Intrusive Governance)**

The European Union has already been explained to be one of the APSA's most significant partners, and that role is set to increase further as major EU member states gradually europeanise their support programmes. The European Union Mission to the African Union, based near the AUHQ in Addis Ababa, was the first of its kind, and forms a focal point for the AU/EU partnership. Further, some of the EUs most powerful member states were colonial powers in Africa, and still have important economic interests to protect in the continent. The EU itself has even launched its own peace mission in the DRC.

However, the EU has taken particular care to adopt the language of African ownership (Sicurelli 2010), insisting that its relationship with the APSA is a partnership and that the APSA maintains ownership of its own processes; "we see where we have common interests and where we can support them, but basically it's their decisions. We are looking for dialogue" (Peyker 2010).

Unsurprisingly, some African governments are still sceptical of the good intentions of the Europeans. The EU has its own security plan for Africa, embodied in the 'EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict'. Although the EU has committed itself to African ownership, it has also stated that cooperation between the EU and the APSA will be guided by the EU Concept, where appropriate, a concept that is much more militaristic than the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* described in chapter three (European Union 2007: 5). This preference for military solutions may lead to a situation in which developmental, governance and human security questions related to conflict cannot be adequately addressed by the APSA (Klingebiel et al. 2008: 83). However, given

the experience of the APSA's resource-starved PSOs, this militaristic focus is not necessarily contradictory of the APSA's leadership, even if it does, arguably, diverge from the APSA's *endemic functionalist role*.

The European Union's relationship with the APSA is governed by several key documents: the Cairo EU Summit in 2000; the 2005 New Strategy for Africa; and the Joint Africa Europe Strategy on Peace and Security 2007. The latter document focuses heavily on African ownership and the principle of joint responsibility, stating that the relationship between the EU and Africa should be based upon co-management and co-responsibility (European Union 2007: 3).

The 2005 mid-term evaluation of the Africa Peace Facility, commissioned by the EU, praised the APF's practical and flexible approach, and commented that it "respected the principle of African ownership" (Assanvo and Pout 2007: 24).

The EU makes available considerable supplies of financial support through the African Peace Facility and providing money rather than training or equipment ostensibly allows the APSA's own governance structures the freedom to direct how external support is utilised, thereby enhancing African capacity without threatening African ownership. However, the reality is that there are numerous conditions attached to the money provided under Africa Peace Facility, which are determined by the EU's *own* governance processes.

The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF), and the EU developed policies governing how money from the EDF should be spent during the Cotonou Agreement negotiations. The EDF is funded by member states directly and managed by a committee according to its financial rules. These rules follow the APF funds to their destination, effectively extending the EU's governance structures *inside* the APSA as in order to secure EU funding

via the APF, the AU must agree to abide by the regulations stipulated by the European Development Fund, and enforce them through its own *management*. This results in the unusual situation wherein the APSA's *management* is enforcing policies devised by the *board* of an external organisation: So in *interactionist* terms the EU's *board* is also part of the APSA's *board* as both design policies which must be implemented or operationalised through the APSA's *management*. Although the APF is specifically designed to support the AU's Peace and Security Architecture, its EDF-sourced funds may not be used to cover military and arms expenditures, military training, technical assistance and so on (Pirozzi 2009: 25). In this way, the external EU *board* of the APSA is making it more difficult for the APSA to operate as its *ownership* intends, or may even constitute an *interactionist* element of EU *ownership* of the APSA to go along with the funding which the EU provides (i.e. the EU has 'bought-in' to the APSA corporation). Moreover, the APSA's *management* structures may not necessarily think that they are good policies. For example, a 2010 AU report criticised the EU's "'one-size-fits all' conditionalities" such as "the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed," which raises problems for RECs with varying levels of absorptive capacity (African Union 2010g: 10).

Thus, the EU forms a hazy parallel governance structure, adding a few of its own governance policies to those devised by the APSA's own *board*. Of course, the APSA's *endemic functionalist board* has the power to refuse the EU's money; however, as with development aid and foreign debt amongst individual African nation states, the African Union's financial capacity problems leave it with little choice but to accept. This gives the EU a certain amount of influence

allowing the EU to help *steer* the APSA's *interactionist role* (Klingebiel et al. 2008: 54).

Many Africans have expressed concern over such practices. René Kouassi, director of Economic Affairs at the AUC, recently indicated that he hoped that the European Union would “reformulate its cooperation policy with Africa” drawing inspiration from the Chinese policy, which provides no strings attached development aid for African states (Sicurelli 2010).

Klingebiel et al. (2008: 82-83) suggest that external donors have preferences not necessarily shared by the African *functionalist* ‘owners’, and that they can target their financial support to ensure that the APSA is working on specific areas more than others. It is a policy of the EU’s board that the EU cannot, and should not, be responsible for funding all the APSA’s programmes, and that the responsibility for funding areas of the APSA that the APF cannot cover lies with other external partners, including EU member states (Peyker 2010). However, rather than letting the APSA’s own *functionalist board* decide where EU support is targeted, the EU, as part of the *interactionist board*, has an equal say in the allocation of APF funds through the APF Committee. In this way the EU can have a significant impact on agenda setting and prioritisation in the APSA—one of the most important elements of governance.

In particular, Klingebiel et al. are concerned about what they term the “donors’ darling” of military capacity. They suggest that hard-power issues may be being over-funded at the expense of developmental, governance and human security issues, which may not be addressed as a result (Klingebiel et al. 2008: 82-83). For example, the APF was established in 2004 with €250 million; eighty percent of that money was earmarked for APSA PSOs (Mpyisi 2009: 7). Mpyisi and

others suggest that by focusing on military projects like the African Standby Force rather than strengthening domestic political institutions, the APSA's external partners, and the EU in particular, are shaping the role of the APSA into something much more militarily focused than the *endemic functionalist role* would indicate (Mpyisi 2009: 8). Scarce resources have been funnelled into 'special-interest' initiatives such as the creation of an AU Anti-Terrorism Centre (Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 149). External partners, including the EU and the UN, have remade the role of the APSA in their own image. "As a result, a notable dichotomy has developed between how Africans think about the concept of 'African security' and how non-Africans think about it" (Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 149).

The EU member states' individual interests also have come into play, influencing the APSA by lobbying for specific EU governance policies. For example, the United Kingdom's traditional influence in Zimbabwe has motivated it to spearhead the European Union's anti-Mugabe policies. In the run-up to the 2007 EU-AU summit in Lisbon, the UK lobbied hard to have Zimbabwe excluded from the summit, prompting criticism from Alpha Konaré, who characterised Zimbabwe as a problem for "Africans themselves" and urged the EU to focus on the summit agreements instead of interfering in African politics (Sicurelli 2010).

As the Prodi Report explains: "Much has been said about the principle of African ownership over the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Yet it is difficult to achieve ownership by augmenting the African Union Commission with external support. Ownership will only be achieved through the development of home-grown structures and procedures supported



by effective mechanisms for funding” (United Nations 2008a). As the principle source of much of that external funding, the EU plays a major part in shaping the role of the APSA.

### **UN Governance of the APSA (Intrusive Governance)**

As the previous chapter showed, the United Nations has a wide-ranging operational and legal partnership with the AU, as well as being a major source of support for capacity enhancement. This comprehensive relationship naturally brings with it many opportunities for the UN to affect the *interactionist role* of the APSA through its effect on the APSA’s governance, which will be evaluated in the following sections. Because the United Nations governance of the APSA takes place on more levels than that of other external partners, this section will look at these levels separately; first examining the formal relationship between the UN and the APSA, then it will look at influence gained through the provision of support. It will then discuss operational control, concluding with an examination of how the UN influences the APSA through agenda setting.

#### ***The Formal Relationship between the UN and the APSA***

The APSA is considered by the UN and the AU to be a ‘Regional Organisation’ under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (United Nations 2008c: 13); this has significant ramifications for the *interactionist role* of the APSA, as regional organisations are generally considered to be subordinate to the UNSC. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission have worked together to incorporate the APSA more securely into the UN framework. The Prodi Report (United Nations 2008a) was the first time the UN considered using the UN assessed budget to support AU-led PSOs. However, this funding would only be available for six months, and only if the APSA were to gain UNSC

authorisation and were able to get the UN to agree to take over the mission. This practice was made a reality when the UN established a special account of assessed contributions to the regular budget to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (Browne 2011: 11). This globalisation of the APSA, and the adoption of UN norms and values, SOPs and operational doctrine in the organisation, has resulted in the APSA's role looking less like the *endemic functionalist* vision of a framework for regional solidarity, and more like a regional subsidiary of the UNDPKO.

The APSA's relationship with the United Nations is largely governed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (1945). Article 54 requires the APSA, as a regional arrangement, to report to the UNSC, which it has done, reinforcing the hierarchy. Importantly, Article 53 of the UN Charter asserts UNSC supremacy over the APSA in the area of enforcement action: "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council" (United Nations 1945). Ostensibly, this makes the UNSC a *board* member in *interactionist* terms, giving the UNSC the right of veto over the policies of the APSA's *board* in the area of peace and security; a power similar to Carver's 'proscription of unacceptable means'; one of the cornerstones of the *board's* responsibilities in policy governance (Carver 2001: 63). This is a significant level of governance coming from above the continental level, outside the APSA's own governance structures. However, the extent to which such a veto is feasible is unclear as there is significant precedent for operations being granted UNSC approval retroactively. Indeed, one of the APSA's comparative advantages, and a core element of its *interactionist role* is its capacity for relatively fast action.

In terms of interventions under Scenario 6, it can be argued that the APSA does not need to seek UNSC approval. The APSA's Article 4(h) allows for a violation of state sovereignty in the interests of protecting civilians and it is the only legal basis that the APSA has for launching such missions; Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not extend (nor proscribe) such extensive powers to regional organisations (Dersso 2010: 82). This is an example of the AU creating its own legal space, shaping and extending its role and reinforcing the primacy of its own *board* through its legal capacity.

The precise legal status of regional organisations relative to the United Nations is still evolving. For example, a recent UN resolution has given the EU Council president almost all the same rights at the UN as a president of a UN member state. In order to get support for the resolution from other regions, the EU suggested an amendment that extends the same rights to other regional blocs, including the AU, should they ask for it (Phillips 2011). This further entrenches the position of regional organisations within the UN system, and, in particular, the United Nations' primacy over them.

While these factors may limit African ownership in some ways, the APSA's proactive engagement within the UN framework may also be seen to *enable* African ownership, enabling it to force the priorities of the AU *board* onto the agenda at the United Nations. The APSA has come under some criticism for pursuing its policy of non-indifference in Somalia and Darfur; taking on more of a burden than it had the capacity to deal with (Williams 2006). However, Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter clearly state that action by regional actors does not *preclude* action by the UNSC. For example, when AMISOM

deployed, it was with the expectation that the UN would take over the mission within six months, a situation explained in detail in chapter seven.

Many APSA officials and APSA scholars have referred to its role as a 'bridging force', preparing the way for a UN mission. The UN will not deploy until there is a peace agreement, so the APSA's goal is to create the necessary conditions for a peace agreement so that the UN has no excuse not to deploy. In the case of AMIS, it took the APSA four years before it could get the UN to finally enter the field; but even this belated response may have been a victory for the APSA, which was able to use its fast action on Darfur to take the moral high ground and force the issue high on the UN's agenda. In this way, the APSA's role has evolved and developed in relation to the United Nations, to the point that the organisations have become largely interdependent.

### ***Dependence on UN Support***

However, this legal discussion is rendered a moot point by the realities of the APSA's capacity problems; the APSA may have the right to intervene without the support of the UNSC, but doing so would be impossible without significant backing from the APSA's external partners; the UN in particular. Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter explains that Member States have the right to "collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (United Nations 1945). This, coupled with the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (African Union 2005a), clearly legitimises the AU's right to respond in the interests of security; but it does not provide any guarantee of support from the United Nations for such collective action. For the UNSC to withhold material and

financial support for a PSO is as debilitating as withholding permission for a PSO. Policies of the UN *board*, such as the policy not to deploy a peacekeeping mission unless there is a peace to keep, are at odds with the APSA's policy of non-indifference. However, the APSA's dependence on UN support limits the APSA's *board's* freedom to act without the blessing of the United Nations' own governance structures.

### ***UN Operational Control over the APSA***

One of the key elements of the policy governance structure is *management*. As discussed in previous chapters, the APSA's capacity gaps in human resources have resulted in a heavy reliance upon UN (as well as EU and US) advisors, who have taken responsibility for large swathes of the day-to-day *management* of the organisation. The Declaration on the Ten-Year Capacity Building Program provides the legal basis for UN permanent representation at the AU and coordination of UN assistance to the AU (United Nations 2006c: 2). These UN officials, although embedded at the APSA, are still part of the UN governance structure, responding to governance policies from the UN as well as the AU. This situation facilitates further external governance, allowing the United Nations to shape the role of the APSA to something approximating a UN subsidiary: "It is not clear to what extent the AU can declare total ownership of the conceptualisation, design, planning and implementation of its peace operations, when 'collocated' UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs" (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). Through this benign infiltration of the APSA's *management* structures, the United Nations has become a significant part of the its interactionist governance, wielding a considerable influence on APSA PSOs in particular. Even before the United Nations began providing

support for AMIS, there had been a high level of UN involvement at the operational level. For example, “the AU together with UN launched an assessment mission to Darfur in March 2005, with the purpose of investigating means of strengthening AMIS. This mission did not recommend changing the mandate, but pointed to weaknesses in command and control capabilities and logistics. It also recommended a phased expansion of AMIS” (Ekengard 2008: 20).

The latest incarnation of this globalisation of the APSA’s *management* is the establishment of the UN/AU hybrid mission. This concept should ideally create a healthy synergy between the two organisations, allowing them to use the comparative advantages of both, as well as minimise their weaknesses. However, some experts urge caution, suggesting that this type of partnership might raise further governance issues: “Is the hybrid partnership in effect a hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of UN advisors?” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). This concern is backed up by the statistics: by February 2009 UNAMID numbered 12,421 troops and 2,510 police officers, the vast majority of which were African (Møller 2009b: 15). However, the mission is directed by non-Africans and the mandate was drawn up by the UN. This represents a high level of Africanisation, without a corresponding increase in African control (Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 26). However, the heavily African aspect of the hybrid mission was part of the compromise agreement which formed it (Badescu and Bergholm 2009: 300).

### ***Agenda Setting***

According to corporate governance theory, the capacity to set priorities is a key element of governance (Carver 2001: 69-70). The fact that most meetings between the two bodies have been chaired by the UN (usually the RCM-A/ECA) indicates that it is the United Nations that is setting the agenda as an interactionist member of the *board*.

The APSA's dependence upon UN support for its PSOs and other capacity-enhancement projects has also allowed the UN to set the capacity enhancement agenda. The UN gains real leverage over the APSA's *board* through the UNSC's ability to target financial support, encouraging growth in some areas while neglecting it in others. Although the United Nations is working for peace in Africa, its priorities, and those of key member states, are not always in line with those of the APSA. For example, the US, the UK and Mexico refused to back a UN office for Central Africa that would have provided capacity in preventive diplomacy despite the Under-Secretary General's arguments that setting up the office would be cost-effective. The office was supported by African states, the UN and many external partners (United Nations 2010b: 195).

Another problem is the UN's NEPAD-centric approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. NEPAD has lost credibility in many quarters within Africa:

“Critics of NEPAD argue that the programme relies heavily on a neoliberal market economy framework which, analysts argue, keeps Africa from developing and is therefore a part of the problem. Programmes that compel governments to repay their unsustainable and odious debts instead of investing in the health care and education of their people will only serve to reinforce Africa's dependency and underdevelopment” (Murithi 2009: 9).

However, these same neoliberal leanings have made NEPAD popular in the West, and the UN adopted NEPAD as the framework for all its support to Africa. UN documents reference NEPAD at least as frequently as the AU, frequently

using the blanket phrase ‘the AU and its NEPAD programme’. As the preceding phrase implies, NEPAD is subordinate to the African Union; however, the UN had for some time dealt with NEPAD as the overriding African interlocutor of continental integration and development.

The relationship between the UN and the APSA may well be at risk of becoming a different kind of donor-recipient relationship; both organisations acknowledge the United Nations’ ultimate responsibility for peace and security in Africa, however, the division of labour is not clear; does the relationship mean “*complementing* UN activities [or] *delegating* the responsibility for peace support operations to regional arrangements” (Haastrup 2011)? The APSA was established in no small part as a result of the UN’s limited progress on the continent; in particular its failures in Rwanda, Somalia and Darfur. In this sense, one element of the role of the APSA is to do the jobs in Africa for which the UN holds primary responsibility but has, so far, been incapable of carrying out.

## ***Conclusion***

This chapter has shown how important the role of governance has been in shaping the *interactionist role* of the APSA. It obvious that governance affects the role played by an organisation; however, in its attempt to document the exact effects of governance on the interactionist role of the APSA, the chapter was met with a serious obstacle; there are no techniques available to systematically and objectively chart the effects of governance upon an organisation. As a result, the chapter has blended concepts from global governance theory with Policy Governance from the field of Business Studies, and in so doing develop a version of policy governance, which does



problematise governance and track the effects of governance on an organisation, which can be applied to International Relations.

This chapter has suggested that ordinary Africans do not have *ownership* of the APSA; indeed, in some cases, the elements of the *interactionist ownership* may be extra-continental. The straightforward African *ownership* discussed in the treaty framework is far from the reality of the APSA's complex governance structures. The African people, the *endemic functionalist owners* of the AU project, are almost completely silent in the APSA. Their will is supposedly interpreted by the African Union Assembly, with some help from a very loose relationship with civil society groups such as the African Union Civil Society Forum. In *functionalist* terms, the Assembly represents the APSA's *ownership*; however, it is not unified, and represents many diverse and conflicting interests as well as states of varying capacity and motivation. The constant compromise required to pass legislation has had a conservative effect on the role of the APSA, limiting radical changes such as the Libyan-proposed amendments to the Founding Treaty.

For the most part, the APSA's *board*, the PSC, is left to rule. However, it does not govern alone. The PSC is not the only source of governance policies, norms, values, objectives and interdictions. Through conditional aid and legal restrictions, the European Union and the United Nations have been able to permeate the APSA's governance structures, coercing the APSA into following policies that have been devised by the *boards* of external organisations. These policies are not always in accordance with the African governments' wishes.

At the *management* level, the AU's governance structures have been influenced and controlled by external powers through the placement of advisors

and liaison officers who are in the pay of external organisations and nation states. Although these advisors may be imperative for capacity enhancement, they are influencing the way the APSA's *management* is conducted, making the APSA more similar to the organisations it is working with.

All these different and often competing factors have to be taken into account when conceptualising the over-all governance of the APSA; a combined effort with many different actors involved, resulting in an *interactionist role* which is slowly globalising, increasingly military-focused, on the front-line, highly Africanised, but with an integral element of external governance. In interactionist terms, the APSA's governance is thoroughly multi-continental: The *owners* consist of a few powerful African states, as well as external partners who are prepared to provide considerable financial support which buys them influence; namely the US, the EU and the UN. The *board* consists mainly of the PSC, but is supplemented with elements of the United States Congress, the EU Council of Ministers and the UN Security Council, all of which make policies related to their support packages which have to be operationalised by the APSA's *management*, which itself, is filled with experts, specialists and advisors from the US, the EU and especially the UN, supplementing the work done by the APSA's *endemic functionalist management*: the AUC and the PSC Secretariat.

## Chapter Seven: The APSA's Operational Environment

### *Introduction*

This chapter will focus on the experiences of the APSA's three Peace Support Operations (PSOs), as well as the experiences of the AU-backed peace enforcement mission: Operation Democracy in the Comoros. It seeks to achieve three key outcomes: 1) it will provide a preliminary outline of the role being played by the APSA in Africa's regional security environment, highlighting key patterns in the evolution of the role of the APSA over the course of the four missions. 2) The most important objective of this chapter is to begin to explain *why* and *how* the APSA has played the role that it has in these mission environments; in particular, it will focus on how major developments in the African security environment have shaped and moulded the *interactionist role* played by the APSA; presenting the APSA variously with severe challenges and unique opportunities, which serve as limiting and enabling factors of the *interactionist role* of the APSA. 3) The chapter also intends to give a preliminary examination of how all the limiting and enabling factors, including the stresses of the regional security environment, have come together to impede, facilitate or expand the role played by the APSA.

The chapter will examine the four missions in the chronological order of their authorisation, allowing the chapter to highlight key themes and to identify patterns in the evolution of the APSA's role over time. The chapter commences with a discussion of the evolution of the role played by the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB); it will continue with an in-depth look at the role played by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), followed by an

examination of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and concluding with the AU-backed Operation Democracy in the Comoros.

### ***The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)***

The African Union's first Peace Support Operation (PSO), AMIB, deployed as a response to the December 2002 ceasefire between the Transitional Government of Burundi and Colonel Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye's faction of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The agreement heralded the beginning of the arduous peace process after almost a decade of civil war. However, Burundi was still not fully secure; not all rebel factions were party to the agreement—the highly destructive Agathon Rwasa faction of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) remained outside the negotiations and the conflict lingered on until 2005 (Rodt 2011: 9). While the Arusha Agreement had envisaged that the peace process in Burundi would be supported by a UN mission, continuing violent clashes meant that the UN was unable to play a lead role. More importantly, there were signs that one of the main rebel groups, Pierre Nkurunzisa's faction of the CNDD-FDD, was losing patience with the UN Security Council, whose ambivalence towards the peace process in Burundi contrasted unfavourably with the AU's enthusiasm. Perhaps as a result, the December 2002 peace agreement called for an *African* mission to verify and control the ceasefire agreement (Jackson 2006: 7). In this way, the APSA's role in Burundi was in part a reaction to the vacuum left by the United Nations, which was not capable of fulfilling its role as the leading force behind the peace process; and was made all the more urgent by the presence of Burundian rebel groups in the ongoing conflict in Kivu Sud in the DRC. AMIB was approved

before the launch of the PSC by the seventh ordinary session of the old Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of February 2003 (African Union 2003a: 1).

AMIB contained troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia, and when it was fully deployed, it consisted of 3,335 personnel (Rodt 2011: 9). The *endemic functionalist role* of AMIB, as expressed in its mandate, was based on four key objectives: to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreements (Arusha Accords, the October 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement); to support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on the reintegration of combatants; to strive towards ensuring conditions for the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and to contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi. The Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the military component were based on reactive self-defence (African Union 2003b: 2).

Although it was never explicitly stated, one of the key *interactionist roles* played by the embryonic APSA in Burundi was that of first responder. The APSA deployed in early April 2003, not long (especially by UN standards) after the December 2002 peace agreement, against a backdrop of continuing outbreaks of violence, with considerable pressure from the government of Burundi and the international community to show that this peace process was moving along on the ground, and that *something* was being done (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 64). In partnership with the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) of the World Bank, AMIB was able to establish a highly effective Joint Planning Group to oversee the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) , which remained operational

throughout the UN PKO that replaced AMIB (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 54). AMIB also established the DDR cantonment area at Muyange in June/July as a response to this pressure, showing that the peace process was being implemented, and CNDD-FDD and FNL forces, emerging from their operational theatres both inside and outside the country, were assembled and disarmed by AMIB forces on the ground (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 64).

The disarmament process, originally envisaged as part of the APSA's responsibilities in Burundi, was begun by AMIB, but was transferred to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004, along with responsibility for providing security for the disarmament points (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 59). It was clear from the early stages of the mission that AMIB was never going to be able to complete the DDR process alone, and from the start it acted more like a stop-gap measure. The Joint Operations Plan (JOP), which was to act as a Memorandum of Understanding for the parties involved in the DDR process (the United Nations, the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the Burundian transitional government's own National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR)), was not finalised until 9 November 2004, and the World Bank would not allocate the required funding for the MDRP until the JOP had been agreed upon. This resulted in AMIB having to go outside the mission framework and ask the European Union for infrastructure support, food and medical supplies for the 228 CNDD-FDD and FNL combatants gathered at the camp, which the EU provided with the caveat that AMIB did not process any more combatants

until the main mission began—actively (though not entirely successfully) trying to limit the role of AMIB to match its limited resources.

In its early years, although the APSA always saw itself as part of the global peace and security architecture, the APSA struggled to develop interoperability with other organisations, especially the UN, limiting its role in this area. The AU efforts on the ground were not always fully understood or recognised by the UN, and as a result, work done by the APSA was not fully capitalised on and incorporated into the UN's strategy. For example, when the JOP was agreed upon later in the year, the AMIB DDR assembly area at Muyange was left out of the official list of pre-disarmament assembly areas until much later, when it was taken over by the UN and renamed Bubanza (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 64). Interoperability and even interdependence between the UN and the APSA would develop over the course of the APSA's subsequent missions however, eventually becoming an integral aspect of its *endemic functionalist role*.

A further limiting factor on AMIB's role was the continuing low-level conflict in the mission environment, a natural symptom of early-phase peace support, which forced AMIB's role to evolve in a more military-focused direction, becoming fast and flexible in the face of such difficult conditions. Throughout 2003, in spite of the previous peace agreements, low-intensity fighting continued between the government forces and Nkurunzisa's CNDD-FDD faction, which was pillaging supplies from the civilian population. The continuing violence in Bujumbura Rural and around Bujumbura itself prevented the UN from assisting (Jackson 2006: 8), so between August 2003 and January 2004, EU-funded GTZ food deliveries to Ruyigi, Makamba and Bubanza were

successfully protected by AMIB forces (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 65). APSA peace operations have always been involved in fighting, and the Muyange camp came under attack by an unknown force in civilian clothes at the end of July 2004, which was successfully repulsed by South African AMIB peacekeepers, resulting in at least eight dead attackers (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 65). This incident highlighted how the unpredictable and violent nature of early-phase peace operations in Africa forced AMIB's role to evolve beyond the reactive self-defence RoE of its *endemic functionalist role*, embracing an *interactionist role* with a small protection mandate. AMIB proved itself capable of defending itself and conducting operations effectively in a hostile environment.

In order to enable the deployment of the UN mission, and fulfil its bridging role, AMIB began a reconnaissance mission in November 2003 to locate suitable areas for pre-disarmament assembly areas and demobilisation centres. AMIB located two potential sites, but was unable to begin preparing them as the government of Burundi delayed consent for their use (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 66). This delaying tactic can be seen as a form of external governance employed by the government of Burundi to shape, in this case to limit, the role played by the APSA. The Burundian government's capacity to shape, or steer the role of the APSA in this way is enabled by the leverage it gains through the APSA's requirement of *consent* to deploy (unless the mission were to deploy under Article 4 (h) where consent is not required), which in turn affords the government the power to withhold consent in total or in part.

The role of AMIB was also limited by a lack of the force-strength required to guarantee security in the assembly areas after the main phase of the assembly



began, culminating in 21,000 combatants in 11 camps. Security was provided by the government and the armed groups themselves, which remained armed during the pre-disarmament phase for their own safety; AMIB focused on monitoring the implementation of the JOP (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 66).

With all the combatants moved into the pre-disarmament camps awaiting processing, and the peace process well on its way, the UNSC approved the deployment of ONUB, under Chapter VII, in resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004 (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 75). ONUB was supposed to have a military component of 5,650 personnel, but experienced problems with force generation due to a lack of member state interest. The core of ONUB was provided by the 2,612 AMIS troops already deployed in the country (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 77), and South Africa's Major General Derrik Mgwebi, AMIB's Force Commander, remained in Burundi as Force Commander of ONUB (Jackson 2006: 13). In addition, the South African VIP Protection Force, which provided security to rebel leaders to allow them to participate in the peace process safely, remained in Burundi as the UN was not capable of incorporating this function into its mission, despite the integral role the VIP Protection Force played, and was continuing to play in enabling the peace process, without which the UN could never have deployed (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 69).

## **Conclusion**

Burundi highlights the APSA's role as a bridging force; AMIB deployed two years sooner than the UN was able to, and, far from being a mere token force, it held its own, providing security and laying the groundwork for the DDR

process, completing the pre-disarmament assembly phase before the ONUB was operational. More importantly, AMIB's VIP security force was able to guarantee the safety of the leadership of the CNDD-FDD, enabling it to participate in the peace process fully, including briefing it about the JOP and taking its considerations into account— a task that was outside the capacity of the UN, but was imperative for the signing of the peace agreement which led to the UN's deployment to Burundi.

However, the limiting factors underlined in the chapter four came into play, especially a lack of funds, a lack of expertise, and a lack of critical equipment and logistics; AMIB depended on external partners for much of these. The realities of the situation on the ground showed that AMIB's chronic lack of funds was a serious obstacle; while it wasn't able to provide food for the assembled combatants, it was able to successfully lobby the EU to do so, all the while pressing for a UN mission to take over responsibility for the peace process in Burundi. This highlighted the fact that AMIB was not a long term solution, and was clearly incapable of executing the full DDR process alone, but its mere presence on the ground contributed towards an environment conducive to peace, and acted as a focal point for external support (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 69). The APSA is not playing the role of a surrogate UN in Africa, and can not be expected to 'solve' regional security problems alone. Its role is that of an *enabling* force for the UN, not a replacement for it.

When the ONUB force was finally approved, it did not fully replace AMIB, but *augmented* it, utilising many of the facilities and institutions set up by the AU rather than deploying fresh troops and setting up new processes. As a result,

ONUB was able to begin its work immediately, instead of waiting for the slow process of force generation to be completed.

Of all the African Union's Peace Support Operations, Burundi has been the least unusual, and one of the most successful. The real outcomes of the mission correspond very closely to the stated mission objectives outlined in the mission's mandate at the ninety-first ordinary session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. More importantly, the regional security environment had a significant effect on the role played by the organisation; for example, the incorporation of a VIP protection force reflected both the unstable nature of the early phase of the peace process in which AMIB deployed, filled with major spoilers and punctuated with violence between the peace agreement signatories, as well as the transnational nature of the Great Lakes conflict formation, which required the main rebel leaders to return to the country from their rear-bases in DRC. Although the APSA successfully anticipated this eventuality, this still shows the how the unique security environment into which the APSA deployed helped shape the role it played; it was the role of a faster, more involved, more flexible, and more ad-hoc organisation—one focused on making peace in Burundi, not simply protecting a pre-existing peace. As a result, the mission was not particularly well planned, supported nor well equipped, making transition to UN authority over the mission an absolute necessity, rather than a preference. This trade-off has helped to define the role played by the APSA throughout its short history, as a rapid reaction peacemaking force, laying the foundations for a UN PKO.

## ***African Union Monitoring Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and its Successors***

Although the *interactionist role* of AMIB corresponded quite closely to the *endemic functionalist role* outlined in its initial mandate, the APSA's role during its second mission, the African Union Monitoring Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was forged in the fires of enduring conflict. AMIS and its subsequent incarnations have received more criticism than any other APSA peace support operation, much of which can be attributed to external frustration with the continued interruptions of the peace process and the APSA's inability to prevent them. AMIS's role in Darfur has been moulded and shaped by the changeable security environment in the region, requiring major adjustments to the role played by AMIS based on these changes. These adjustments have often been interpreted as the APSA always being one step behind the realities on the ground; however, they could also be seen as evidence of the APSA's role as a flexible first responder, continually responding to the evolving situation.

AMIS was established in 2004 largely as a response to the lack of action on the deteriorating situation in Darfur by the UN and the international community (Aboagye 2007). Before the deployment of AMIS, the AU had been involved in the push for a peace agreement, including facilitating shuttle diplomacy in N'Djamena. The government of Sudan was insistent that the conflict could not be solved militarily, but only through dialogue (African Union 2004f: 4). On 8 April 2004, under the auspices of President Déby of Chad and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, as well as in the presence of international observers and facilitators, the conflict parties signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur (HCFA) (African Union 2004f: 5). The following month, on

28 May, the ailing HCFA was supported by the signing of the *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur*, which acted as a mandate for the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the early stages of AMIS, authorising the deployment of two MILOBS teams for each of the initial six operational sectors. The 28 May agreement also made provision for a protection force to guarantee the safety of the observers in the event that the signatories to the HCFA were unable to do so (African Union 2004a).

AMIS, therefore, started off as little more than an observer mission to ensure the HCFA was being implemented. The mission was planned to be similar to AMIB, though a little more comprehensive, with the APSA taking responsibility for more of the peace process than it had in Burundi. However, the realities of the security environment on the ground soon meant that the role of AMIS would have to change. From the start, the HCFA was ignored by all the conflict parties. There was little point in an observer mission to monitor a peace agreement that was not being honoured. The increase in violence forced the APSA to bring in the protection force mentioned in the HCFA document; by August, the AU Monitoring Mission was reinforced with two infantry companies. The Rwandan company (A-Coy) arrived in the mission area on 14 and 15 August 2004, while the Nigerian company (B-Coy) arrived on 30 August 2004. Nigeria also provided two sections (about 16 soldiers) as a Quick Reaction Force attached to the CFC HQ. Both companies arrived with the necessary equipment (African Union 2004d: 6).

AMIS deployed to Darfur to oversee the implementation of the HCFA, which was not a comprehensive ceasefire, let alone an end to the conflict; it was

merely a ceasefire in specific civilian centres to allow the provision of humanitarian aid, and the HCFA was not replaced with a more comprehensive agreement until the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006. The Protection Force was intended to protect the MILOBS, not the whole civilian population of Darfur, while the role of the mission was to monitor the implementation of the HCFA, which it did successfully. The problem was simply that the ceasefire did not hold, which cannot be said to be the fault of the APSA. Although there may be an argument to be made that it was too early to deploy MILOBS at all, the monitoring mission and the Protection Force got the international community's foot in the door and had a positive effect on the situation disproportionate to its *endemic functionalist role* and mandate.

As the HCFA became less relevant, AMIS began organically adapting the mission's *interactionist role* to the realities on the ground, putting the emphasis on the protection force and taking on a more militaristic role as a response to the deterioration of the peace process but, with 310 soldiers on the ground by October 10<sup>th</sup> (African Union 2004d: 6), AMIS was at the limit of its mandate. Although the mission was only mandated for the protection of civilians within the *direct vicinity* of AU forces, and within the capacity of the Protection Force, the Rwandan company in particular pushed the limits of the reactive self-defence RoE, deliberately moving to areas of instability to discourage attacks and protect civilians, frequently putting their own soldiers in harm's way. Proactive deployment of this type, pioneered by the Rwandans, would eventually become a core part of the role played by both AMIS and the subsequent hybrid operation. However, in a region the size of France, there was a limit to what the two-company Protection Force could achieve.

The October 2004 report of the Chairperson of the Joint Commission was largely concerned with how best to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS on the ground, “including the possibility of transforming the said Mission into a full-pledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite mandate and size, to ensure the effective implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004” (African Union 2004d: 1). In the ensuing consultations, the conflict parties displayed a high degree of faith in the APSA, asking for AMIS to be strengthened in order to increase the effectiveness of the monitoring mission (African Union 2004d: 3). The conflict parties also wanted Sudanese government police and military stationed in Darfur to be replaced with AMIS personnel (African Union 2004d: 4).

A new problem emerged in 2005, as the Sudanese government began limiting AMIS’s capacity to use preventative deployments to protect civilians through bureaucratic obstructionism: rather than restricting its protection force to defending the MILOBS and civilians/humanitarian personnel in the direct vicinity, as the mandate required, AMIS requested accommodation for troops who were to be deployed to the rebel-held towns of Nteaga and Khor Abeche as a proactive deployment, specifically to deter attacks. However, as a result of “deliberate government procrastination”, there were no AMIS troops in the vicinity when about 350 Miserya militiamen attacked Khor Abeche for the second time in three days, this time defeating the SLA and destroying the town, sparing only the school and the Mosque. The attack was retribution for the theft of 150 head of cattle by the SLA (African Union 2005b: 9). The rebel groups have frequently resorted to pillaging cattle in order to feed their standing armies, creating widespread unrest amongst the pastoralist groups; a major

cause of the expansion of the conflict in Darfur from a civil war to endemic instability verging on state-failure.

As an interim measure, to deal with this increase in violence, the APSA increased the number of MILOBs to 80, while at the same time doubling the protection force to four infantry companies that were to be deployed immediately (African Union 2004b). Meanwhile, the Military Staff Committee of the PSC was working out a plan to establish a much larger AU force, which would have a much larger presence on the ground (African Union 2004d). At its 17<sup>th</sup> meeting, held on 20 October 2004, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided that an enhanced African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), consisting of 3,320 personnel, would be deployed in Darfur for a period of one year (African Union 2006c: 1). A joint assessment of AMIS, presented to the PSC on 28 April 2005 requested a further expansion of the mission to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 police, with a budget of \$466 million (Boshoff 2005: 57). The same assessment punctuated the need for this expansion of the mission with reports of “deliberate targeting and firing at AMIS personnel and equipment, lately, by unidentified gunmen” (African Union 2005b: 8). By 28 April 2005, having being deployed for less than a year, AMIS had suffered five such attacks, the first of many, and the SLA were implicated in some of these attacks (African Union 2005b: 9). Further, there were continuing attacks on civilians, commercial convoys and humanitarian organisations, and Darfur’s few working roads were (and remain) infested with *janjaweed* bandits (criminals not attached to any particular faction in the conflict), making the provision of humanitarian aid extremely difficult and impeding the peace process (African Union 2005b: 28). The AMIS mandates always stressed that responsibility for



protecting civilians in Darfur was not with AMIS, but with the Government of Sudan; however, by this stage, it was becoming clear that Khartoum lacked the capacity to enforce order in Darfur: “The assumptions on which the Mission was planned, particularly the ability of the Government of Sudan to assume its security responsibilities and the general level of compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement have not been borne out” (African Union 2005b: 25).

A further limiting factor emerged around this time as it became clear that rebel leaders were never able to fully control or represent all affiliated groups; on 24 February 2005, fighters from a Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) splinter group, the National Movement for Reconstruction and Development (NMRD), kidnapped seven humanitarian workers operating in El Geneina who were distributing food to IDPs, and shot at clearly marked UN World food Programme helicopters operating in SLA territory (African Union 2005b: 26).

AMIS planners warned that the dynamics of the military operation had changed considerably. For AMIS to succeed, they argued, there was an increasing need for it to adopt a much more proactive role (African Union 2005b: 26). The Joint Commission recommended that the AMIS infantry companies be replaced with battalions with the attendant military capabilities to enable AMIS to fill the sovereignty vacuum left by the government of Sudan (African Union 2005b: 14). The 2005 Assessment Mission stressed that there was no need to change the existing mandate, but that AMIS would have to reprioritise; with the ceasefire in a precarious way, AMIS needed to place greater emphasis on creating a secure environment, particularly in the context of the delivery of humanitarian relief, and confidence-building measures. However, as seen above, AMIS had already

organically shifted its priorities towards this end to a large extent on its own initiative (African Union 2005b: 25).

AMIS was becoming much more militarised. While the *endemic functionalist role* had not changed (the mandate remained essentially the same), the *interactionist role* of the Protection Force shifted from protecting MILOBS to protecting civilians, contractors and aid workers. AMIS was now taking some of the responsibility for protection of civilians in Darfur, especially IDPs, away from the government. The CFC ordered the government to withdraw from certain towns in Darfur, to be replaced with AMIS military and police forces (African Union 2005b: 15). The government withdrew from Labado on the 23 January 2005, and Ishma on 24 March, and Graidai on 11 March (although a police company was left in the town), transferring control to AMIS. After AMIS replaced government forces in Labado, IDPs from the area began to return home, showing greater confidence in the APSA forces than those of the government or rebel groups; when security was restored, IDPs were prepared to return, and the security provided by AMIS facilitated the provision of humanitarian aid. Similar improvements have occurred wherever AMIS was deployed, including the capital cities of the three provinces of Darfur, where security provided by AMIS facilitated the provision of humanitarian aid to the hundreds of thousands of IDPs which had gathered in those areas (African Union 2005b: 16). Also, throughout Darfur, AMIS CIVPOL units were working with the national police to help it shoulder its responsibilities for security in the villages and IDP camps (African Union 2005b: 26). The APSA's role in Darfur was changing from monitoring the ceasefire to trying to protect civilians from the ongoing conflict—a huge conceptual change in the purpose of the mission.

The biggest problem was that AMIS simply was not large enough to provide security for all the six million residents of Darfur, yet it had already grown to the point that it was struggling to support itself.

Since its inception, AMIS had been pushing at the limits of the mandate, but from the end of 2005 the limiting factors of the local security environment began to push back harder, constraining its role. AMIS troops were attacked again on 8 October 2005, near Khor Abeche, resulting in the deaths of four Nigerian peacekeepers and two PAE drivers; on 29 October, an AMIS patrol was attacked by a JEM splinter group which made off with AMIS vehicles, weapons and ammunition (African Union 2006c: 11). Another attack on 6 January 2006 claimed the life of an AMIS soldier when a patrol returned from a successful PAE escort mission (African Union 2006c: 12). Meanwhile, attacks on civilians and aid workers operating in and near rebel held territory increased and escalated, and there were several attacks by Arab militias and Janjaweed, sometimes coinciding with government assaults on SLA positions, resulting in over 400 civilians fleeing to the AMIS controlled IDP camps at Zamzam and Tawilla (African Union 2006c: 10). Ethnic conflict came to the fore during this period, with the SLA being split along ethnic lines, the Zaghwa factions becoming particularly aggressive, as well as continued fighting between Fallata and Massalit, which caused the deaths of 60 people between 6-7 November and displaced 15,000 (African Union 2006c: 12).

Further, the expanded deployment of AMIS was putting significant pressure on the mission's logistics; some of the AMIS camps were becoming overcrowded because of the rapid increase in the number of troops, and, by January 2006, AMIS was working with half the logistical capacity required for a mission its size

as it waited for orders to be fulfilled for 462 vehicles, 50 high-frequency mobile radios, 544 hand-held radios, 245 Thurya satellite phones and 16 VSATs (African Union 2006c: 13). A 2006 report by the Chairperson of the Commission highlighted that the AU has neither the logistical infrastructure nor the experience to handle urgent bulk purchases, worth millions of dollars, for such a large operation (African Union 2006c: 15). The mission was almost bankrupt by January 2006; despite the ample pledges of financial support from external partners, there was a huge shortfall in real contributions. The cash requirement for the enhanced AMIS for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 amounted to US \$252.4 million, representing 54% of the total budget; the amount received up to 31 October 2005 was only US \$ 65.4 million. Much of the shortfall was made up by the Africa Peace Facility, which helped keep the mission on its feet throughout 2006 (African Union 2006c: 16).

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was an attempt to move forward from the ill-fated HCFA, and establish a more comprehensive peace; however, the DPA fared little better: only the government and Minni Minawi's faction of the SLA/M signed the agreement, rendering it effectively useless, and subsequent talks the following year in Tripoli in October also failed (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 77). Representatives of the Abdulwahid El Nour faction of the SLA and Khalil Ibrahim, representing JEM did sign a *Declaration of Commitment* to the DPA, and pledged to fully cooperate in the implementation of the DPA's provisions, but were simultaneously condemned by the PSC for continuing to conduct military activities in Darfur and eastern Chad, including attacks against AMIS, the UN and aid workers (African Union 2006a: 1).

Like Burundi, AMIS ended with a transition to a UN force; however, unlike in Burundi, where preparing the ground for a UN mission had been part of AMIB's role from the beginning, AMIS's transition to a UN mission, or as it turned out, a UN/AU hybrid mission, was forced upon it by the strain placed upon its capacity to act by the worsening security environment and lack of external capacity enhancement. The logic behind the call for the United Nations to take over the mission was that, given the UN's experience and vastly superior resources, a UN mission would succeed where the APSA had failed (Luqman and Omede 2012: 61).

The Peace and Security Council did not explicitly accept the idea of transitioning AMIS to a UN mission until January 2006—just as the first wave of funding was starting to run out, and the spiralling size of the mission was breaking the APSA's logistics capacity (African Union 2006b). Even then, the UN resolution authorising the deployment of a much larger UN mission to take over from AMIS was delayed for over a year because the Sudanese government withheld consent (Luqman and Omede 2012: 65). The government claimed that it would not allow non-African troops to re-colonise Sudan, but it is commonly suggested that a weak international presence in Darfur was in the government's interest. Negotiations continued, with Khartoum finally agreeing to the UN mission in May 2007, so long as it was African in character, with mostly African peacekeepers (Lynch 2007). Thus, the first UN/AU hybrid mission was, from its inception, shaped by the exigencies and intricacies of the security environment and the peace process in Darfur.

The transition from AMIS to UNAMID was not part of the *endemic functionalist role* of the mission; preparing the ground for UNAMID was a role forced upon

the mission by the security environment; AMIS could not continue and UNAMID was the only viable exit strategy. By the middle of 2007, even Alpha Konaré was saying that AMIS was on the verge of collapse, dogged by government harassment, escalating attacks by the rebels—including more attacks against AMIS—and beleaguered peacekeepers going unpaid for months as a result of external partners not making good on pledges. Further, the continuing escalation of the security situation, including renewed government air strikes, was making AMIS adopt a less proactive approach, with fewer patrols. Rwanda and Senegal even threatened to withdraw their forces altogether unless external support for the mission increased (Lynch 2007).

On 31 July 2007, the UN passed resolution 1769, authorizing the Deployment of a 26,000-strong United Nations-African Union ‘hybrid’ peace operation to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (UNSC 2007c). On the 31 December 2007, AMIS peacekeepers swapped their APSA green helmets for UN blue ones, officially launching the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Jibril 2010: 10). AMIS, enhanced by the light and heavy support packages from the UN (discussed in chapter five), prepared the ground for UNAMID, and formed the majority of its troops. UNAMID has continued AMIS’s trend of increasing in size and becoming more militarised as the security situation shows little sign of improving; it consisted of 18,014 military personnel and 1,751 civilian police as of 30 June 2011 (African Union 2011e: 3). This makes UNAMID the largest UN PKO in the world (Luqman and Omede 2012: 65).

The experience of UNAMID highlights how important the security environment is in defining the role played by the APSA in Africa, and that AMIS's difficulties were not wholly a result of endemic capacity problems within the APSA, but a worsening security environment in which any PKO would soon be out of its depth; even with the resources and expertise of the United Nations at its disposal, the character of the mission has remained much the same. Although many of the logistical and financial problems have been solved, UNAMID still attracts similar criticisms to the APSA mission; this suggests that a lot of AMIS's problems were not simply problems with the APSA, but were problems inherent in the extremely complex and challenging security environment of Darfur. In UNAMID's first six months, an average of 1000 people were displaced every day, and attacks against aid workers actually increased; there were also more carjackings in the first half of 2008 than there were in the whole of 2007, which had a serious knock-on effect on the provision of aid outside the three main towns (Darfur Consortium 2008: 1-2). Even in 2012, a year after the Darfur Doha Document for Peace, carjacking incidents make it almost impossible to access Darfur by road. On 6 August 2012, a vehicle carrying \$350,000 destined for UNAMID was stolen by gunmen in Darfur (Sudan Tribune 2012). The rebel movements remain fractured, and violations of the ceasefire are still common. Conflict is escalating with continued attacks against UNAMID patrols and open hostilities between the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA and the government, including continued aerial bombardment of SLA-held territory (Luqman and Omede 2012: 67).

## Conclusion

The APSA's experience in Sudan shows how easy it is for the *endemic functionalist role* of the organisation to get muddled, or forgotten, and how different the *interactionist role* can be from the role initially foreseen. While AMIS's initial mandate and *endemic functionalist role* had a very small footprint, its *interactionist role* ballooned until it was much too ambitious for the APSA and its partners to sustain. It is often claimed in the press, and even some of the scholarly work on AMIS, that the AU deployed in Darfur because of Article 4(h), making it a Scenario 6 mission (protecting civilians against or in spite of their own government, without that government's consent); "The AU intervention in Darfur has largely been in response to its constituent commitment to "... *intervene in an Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assemble in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity*" (Jibril 2010: 10-11). Further, Bergholm consistently refers to the mandate as a 'civilian protection mandate', but provides no evidence for such an interpretation (Bergholm 2009: 160). However, as Bergholm acknowledges in her footnotes (Bergholm 2009: 161), the primary objective of AMIS was not the prevention of a genocide, but the conclusion of an extremely dangerous conflict. Even at its most militarised, AMIS was in Darfur primarily to facilitate the peace process, helping with negotiations, monitoring agreements, promoting confidence and discouraging violence by creating zones of stability. It also protected civilians where possible, and helped secure the large IDP and refugee camps around Abeché. A mission under 4(h) would have created a hostile relationship with the government. As it was, the APSA was in Darfur at the government's discretion, albeit with a high level of international pressure. This meant that the government was able to abuse its



position to obstruct the mission's progress, shaping the role and character of the AMIS by limiting the delivery of external support, such as the 105 APCs provided by Canada, which were held up in Khartoum for months.

AMIS also showed the primary weakness of the role of the APSA as a bridging organisation for the UN; if the UN is not capable of deploying, the APSA is left to sink or swim with all its myriad capacity gaps, command and control problems, logistical gaps and operational weaknesses. In the case of AMIS, the UN/AU hybrid mission came at the 11<sup>th</sup> hour, just as it was on the verge of collapse. If AMIS had been forced to withdraw, there would have been no basis for the hybrid mission, which, as with ONUB and AMIB, relied completely upon AMIS for operationalisation; thus the relationship between the APSA and the UN is one of interdependence, not dependence.

AMIS did not succeed in encouraging the conflict parties to stick to the HCFA and the DPA, but to say it was useless is not accurate. As Alex de Waal commented; "You don't put a force into a horribly difficult situation, where they are being shot at and having their soldiers killed, and then tell them that they're second-rate and deprive them of resources" (Lynch 2007). AMIS has been the only conduit for external support for the peace process; even the UN could not have operated effectively in Darfur without AMIS. More importantly, AMIS protection has been vital for the hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees in core areas such as El Fashir and Abeché, and humanitarian organisations may not have been able to operate in Darfur at all without AMIS protection and the numerous agreements with the Movements and the government, largely negotiated by the APSA and its advisors, that have facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid. Violence has certainly continued, but AMIS has been

operating beyond the limits of its *endemic functionalist role* (mandate and resources) from the beginning.

The experiences of AMIS and the continued woes of UNAMID indicate that there is an upper limit on what it is *possible* to achieve with a peace mission of this type, the primary role of which is not, and cannot be, to guarantee order in the whole of Darfur, but to support the peace process and protect civilians where possible. To take full responsibility for the safety of civilians away from the government, and to live up to that responsibility to the fullest extent, would require the APSA to perform tasks such as shooting down planes and killing rebels who will not disarm; a mandate more akin to an invasion than a peacekeeping mission.

### ***The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)***

AMIS and AMISOM are often mentioned together as part of a 'new generation of African peacekeeping'; however, in conceptual terms, AMISOM is really a step beyond AMIS. Both missions have been described as ineffective. The cause of AMIS's perceived failure was its limited mandate; AMISOM, however, has simply been perceived to be under siege and out of its depth. AMISOM's main innovation has been breaking the peacekeeping taboo of partiality, fighting almost as a surrogate army for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Islamists. Therefore, unlike AMIB and AMIS, AMISOM is not a true *peacekeeping* operation in any sense of the word. However, AMISOM had humble beginnings, and in the early stages of the mission, Ethiopia, not the AU, played the leading role in supporting the TFG.

In February 2006, the two most powerful armed groups in the southern half of Somalia fought for control of Mogadishu. The fighting ended in June, with the victory of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) over the US-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) (African Union 2007i: 2). Mogadishu was consolidated under a single political authority for the first time since the fall of the Barre regime. The subsequent six months have been described as the most peaceful and stable since the beginning of the civil war (Møller 2009a: 3). The UIC had considerable popular support from all segments of society within the areas it controlled (Barnes and Assan 2007: 159, Shank 2007: 92). It was perceived by Somalis to be the only faction that had provided incorrupt administration and public services such as health care, education, policing, law and order and even road maintenance (Shank 2007: 98). The UIC had also successfully united many different clan warlords under their banner (Barnes and Assan 2007: 152-153). Furthermore, it had the support of Mogadishu's business interests, who had consistently opposed the TFG and supported UIC rule in the capital (Barnes and Assan 2007: 154). Several relief aid organisations also expressed their preference in working with the UIC because of their efficient organisational structure.

When the UIC was in control of Mogadishu, the city was united for the first time in 16 years (Barnes and Assan 2007: 154). The port and airport were both operational and under the control of the UIC, businesses boomed, there was security, law and order and the UIC began the repatriation of stolen property (Barnes and Assan 2007: 154). There was even a massive clean-up campaign launched in Mogadishu, with hundreds of volunteers joining to collect litter and debris (BBC 2006). Despite these successes, the APSA reiterated its full

support for the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia, pledging to do everything possible to enable it to gain control (African Union 2007i: 1).

Replacing the popular and powerful UIC, with the weak, fractured and unpopular TFG was an extremely ambitious task.

The TFG had relocated to Baidoa in February 2006 and, shortly after the UIC's victory over the ARPCT in June, there were reports of UIC forces within 60km of Baidoa. In July, approximately 100 Ethiopian military vehicles carrying 'military advisors' crossed the border from Dolo Odo and literally entrenched themselves in Baidoa. Ethiopia's Information Minister, Berhan Hailu, warned that they would use "all means ... to crush the Islamist group if they attempt to attack Baidoa"; the UIC in turn demanded that the Ethiopians leave, but added that they had no intention of attacking the TFG (BBC 2006).

Although it harmed their credibility, the TFG was able to survive the UIC's rise to power thanks to this protection force of Ethiopian troops, and talks began between the TFG, the UIC and other militias. On 4 September 2006, negotiations seemingly paid off, and the two parties signed an agreement where they committed themselves to the integration of the militias, to establish a new Somali national armed forces, and to discuss power sharing and security issues at a third round of talks. However, the third round never took place as a result of the UIC's insistence that the TFG order the Ethiopian soldiers to leave the country. In October, the UIC called for a Jihad against Ethiopia and continued fighting against the TFG, prompting the TFG to request more support from Ethiopia, culminating in the full-scale Ethiopian intervention in the last weeks of December 2006 (African Union 2007i: 2-3).

The Ethiopians quickly pushed the ICU out of key areas, forcing it to retreat to its strongholds in the south without much of a fight. The massive Ethiopian presence enabled the TFG to relocate to Mogadishu, occupying the official government buildings for the first time (African Union 2007b: 1). The TFG requested the Ethiopian government to keep its troops in Somalia until the full stabilisation of the country and the deployment of AU troops (African Union 2007i: 4).

The Ethiopian invasion was seen by the APSA as a “unique and unprecedented opportunity to re-establish the structures of governance and further peace and reconciliation in Somalia” (African Union 2007i: 9). The APSA took the initiative, deploying a technical evaluation mission to Mogadishu from 13 to 14 January 2007, where it undertook consultations with the TFG and Ethiopian forces (African Union 2007i: 6). The January 2007 report of the Chairperson of the Commission highlighted the vulnerability of the TFG should Ethiopia withdraw from Somalia, as it intended to do as soon as the situation stabilised, and recommended the deployment of a peace support operation of nine infantry battalions (approximately 7,650 military personnel) with a mandate to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure. The mission was also mandated to assist with the reestablishment and training of a new, all-inclusive Somali Security Force, to support the disarmament process, to monitor the security situation, and to facilitate humanitarian operations (African Union 2007i: 7-8). The report made explicit that the mission would evolve to a United Nations mission that would support the long term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia (African Union 2007i: 8)— the first time that the APSA’s evolving role as a bridging force for the UN

was included in the initial mandate. The mandate and operations plan outlined in the report was officially adopted by the PSC on 19 January 2007 (African Union 2007b), and endorsed under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council in resolution 1744, which also finally authorised a waiver to the arms embargo in Article 6 for arms and equipment intended for AMISOM or the TFG (UNSC 2007b).

Uganda was the only real supporter of the mission at the start, deploying the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu in March 2007, along with two infantry battalions (Hull and Svensson 2008: 28). The deployment of the two battalions pledged by Burundi was delayed because it lacked the adequate equipment; it eventually deployed the first 192 soldiers at the end of December, with the rest of the first battalion deploying by 20 January 2008, bringing the mission to 2,613 personnel (United Nations 2008e: 5). During the intervening period, Uganda's two battalions were the only APSA forces in the country (Hull and Svensson 2008: 28).

Throughout 2007, AMISOM still did not play the lead role; it played the role of security guard, restricted largely to providing security and conducting patrols for the protection of the airport, seaport and the Villa Somalia (the Presidential Palace). Meanwhile, the security situation worsened. Within four months of the authorisation of AMISOM, one third of Mogadishu's population had fled the city. Looting, rape and harassment of civilians by the armed militias that controlled vast swathes of the city went unchecked by AMISOM, as it was outside their responsibility and capacity (Hull and Svensson 2008: 27). Logistical problems were multiplied by lack of security around the airport; as AMISOM's first troops arrived in Mogadishu on 6 March, the airport was mortared eight times (Mays

2009: 25), on 9 March 2007, a plane carrying AMISOM troops was shot at while landing, and later that month an AU contracted plane was shot down during take-off, killing 11 passengers and crewmembers (United Nations 2007b: 5). Further, the Islamists had recovered from the initial Ethiopian offensive. A Salafist paramilitary wing of the UIC, Al-Shabaab, had largely superseded the rest of the movement, and, from their stronghold in Hiraan and Juba districts, they struck out at Baidoa, Kismaayo, Jawhar, Beledweyne and Galkayo. More importantly, the Islamists were making gains in and around Mogadishu, and in the last quarter of 2007, the Ethiopians deployed indiscriminate weapons, such as field guns and mortars, against areas of the city that had come under the control of the Islamists, resulting in massive destruction of property, loss of life, and displacement (United Nations 2008e: 4). The use of weapons of this type turned public opinion further away from the TFG and its allies, further militarising the situation and making AMISOM's *endemic functionalist role* even more difficult to fulfil.

AMISOM's role at this point was still very limited; being a much smaller force, AMISOM let the Ethiopians take the lead role in security, and the United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, was taking the leading role in the peace talks. By mid-2008, peace negotiations between the government and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia were going well (United Nations 2008d: 1-2). In line with the commitments made under the Djibouti agreement, on 26 October 2008, members of the TFG and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) adopted a joint declaration on the establishment of a unity Government and an inclusive Parliament (United Nations 2009a: 1). In December 2008, an ARS delegation returned to

Mogadishu for the first time in two years. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) was expanded by 275 seats, 200 of which were reserved for the ARS. The process culminated in the election of the ARS Chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, as president in January 2009, who vowed to 'extend a hand to hardline armed groups still opposed to peace talks (United Nations 2009a: 2). Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, representing the most powerful anti-government group in Somalia, vowed to continue the insurgency, severely limiting the achievements of the peace process (United Nations 2009a: 3).

The subdued role of the APSA was shaken up when Ethiopian forces announced their intention to begin withdrawal from Somalia in November 2008. In spite of the worsening security situation, and the fact that AMISOM was still under half-strength, the Ethiopians chose to withdraw as a result of the considerable costs associated with maintaining their military presence in Somalia. By 15 January 2009 they had removed all their forces from Somalia, thrusting AMISOM into the lead role for providing security in Mogadishu (United Nations 2009a: 3). Shortly after the Ethiopian withdrawal, Al-Shabaab took over Baidoa without firing a shot (United Nations 2009a: 3). Attacks against AMISOM increased in intensity after the Ethiopian withdrawal, with Al-Shabaab conducting eight major attacks directed against AMISOM personnel in the second half of January 2008 (United Nations 2009a: 3-4). AMISOM was still seriously under-manned at this point but it was being forced to play a much more militant role, not as a neutral peacekeeping force, but as a conflict party. Nigeria, Burundi and Uganda stated that they had troops available for the mission, but lacked the capacity to deploy them (United Nations 2009a: 5).



Many of AMISOM's problems stemmed from the fact that it was never intended to last much longer than the original six month mandate; its *endemic functionalist role* was a rapid reaction force, designed to capitalise on the security provided by the Ethiopian invasion and lay the groundwork for a much larger UN force. The original mandate for AMISOM highlighted the fact that the mission could not be a long-term solution to the security problems in Somalia, and envisaged a re-hatting of the force as soon as possible:

"AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of six (6) months, aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation that will support the long term stabilisation and postconflict reconstruction of Somalia" (African Union 2007b: 2).

"The long term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia will require the strong involvement of the United Nations. In this respect, Council urges the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing a United Nations operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 6 months mandate" (African Union 2007b: 4).

Despite this conservative *endemic functionalist role*, almost a year and a half after its mandate was supposed to have ended, the APSA was still at only one third of the mandated force strength. The familiar problems of logistics, equipment and cash-flow plagued AMISOM. As the UN had not deployed as planned, the AU Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, wrote to the UN requesting a \$817,500,000 financial, logistical and technical support package from the UN to bridge the capacity gap preventing full operationalisation of the mission (United Nations 2008e: 5). Nine months later, as the Ethiopians were preparing to withdraw, the UN developed a proposal for a possible transfer of \$7 million worth of assets, including soft-skin vehicles, generators and air-conditioning units, which had been made available by the liquidation of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (United Nations 2008b: 3). The disparity between this less than lukewarm response and Konaré's initial request highlighted the gulf

between the external partners' perceptions of the role of AMISOM as a fatally flawed token force, and the APSA's ambitions for the mission.

Unlike AMIS, where the transition from an APSA mission to a UN mission was obstructed by the government, the new ARS led government *supported* the deployment of a UN mission (United Nations 2009a: 5). The United Nations Secretary General's office did make efforts to plan for a transition from AMISOM to a UN Peacekeeping force, but found that the conditions were particularly difficult; the UN would only be able to take over if the security situation resolved itself, which was also the only situation in which a UN force may not have been required. All the same, it did not happen, and still has not happened. In the event that the security situation did not improve, the UN posited replacing AMISOM with a UN-sponsored multinational peace enforcement mission, led by a coalition of the willing (United Nations 2007b: 13-14). By the end of 2008, however, there had been a limited response to contingency planning for a UN mission to Somalia; member states pledged logistical, technical and financial support, but no state wished to play the lead nation role or contribute troops, and there was not enough support to allow the deployment of a multinational force (United Nations 2008b: 2). The UN began to realise that AMISOM, with all its flaws, was the *only* option for a multinational force in Somalia.

In light of the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the Secretary General's office wrote a letter to the Security Council, advocating and, for the first time, *requesting*, that AMISOM remain in place, but accepted that it would need to be strengthened with a support package (United Nations 2008b: 2-3), just as Konaré had explained nine months earlier (United Nations

2008e: 5). The UN envisioned that AMISOM should perform the role that had been performed by the Ethiopian force, protecting more vital infrastructure across Mogadishu, in addition to its mandated responsibilities of supporting, mentoring and training the TFG forces (United Nations 2008b: 3). After failing to gather enough support for a UN-backed intervention, the Secretary General's office requested that those countries which *had* pledged support for such a mission now redirect that support to AMISOM, making the APSA the focal point for external peace support in Somalia (United Nations 2008b: 3-4).

Around the same time, the APSA's rhetoric hardened. On 22 December 2008, the AU PSC renewed AMISOM's mandate for only two additional months; the mandate itself remained the same, but included aspects related to the training of the 10,000 joint TFG-ARS security force envisioned in the Djibouti Agreement (African Union 2008a: 2). The same communiqué called on the UN Security Council to "immediately and without any further delay take the steps expected of it, in particular by authorizing the deployment of an international stabilisation force and, subsequently, that of a peace keeping operation to take over from AMISOM" (African Union 2008a: 3). The PSC went on to state that "the continued stay of AMISOM forces will depend on the availability of the required resources ... on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter addressed by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on 19 December 2008" (African Union 2008a: 3).

AMISOM's stronger stance seemed to have paid off on 16 January 2009, when the UN adopted resolution 1863, which "*requests* the African Union to maintain AMISOM's deployment in Somalia and to reinforce that deployment to help achieve AMISOM's originally mandated troop strength of 8,000 troops" (UNSC

2009: 2). Resolution 1863 also expressed the UN's intention to deploy a mission to follow on from AMISOM (UNSC 2009: 2). The resolution aimed to resolve AMISOM's financial problems with the establishment of a trust fund for the mission, and authorised a logistics package which would include equipment and services normally only provided to UN peacekeeping missions. The package could cover accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, helicopters, vehicle maintenance, communications, some enhancement of key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services (UNSC 2009: 4), (United Nations 2008b: 4). The first \$71.6 million of the support package was approved on 7 April 2009 (United Nations 2009b: 6). The UN institutionalised its partnership with the APSA in Somalia with the establishment of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Nairobi in April 2009 (African Union 2010c: 2). By January of 2010, the African Union had directly received US\$16,612,000 from the Trust Fund, as well as in-kind and logistical support to AMISOM TCCs, through third party contractors worth US\$23,560,000. But unpaid pledges to the trust fund amounted to \$126,919,377 (African Union 2010i).

With renewed international support for AMISOM, Uganda was able to deploy a further battalion in Mogadishu in March 2009, bringing AMISOM to five battalions (6,120 military personnel) out of the nine that had been authorised originally (United Nations 2009b: 5). In August 2009, Burundi was able to deploy a further battalion, bringing the mission strength to six battalions, for a total of 5,268 military personnel (African Union 2010i: 9). AMISOM started playing a slightly expanded role—still focused on reactive protection—providing security for TFG officials, the seaport and airport, Villa Somalia, the old

university and military academy, and other strategic sites in Mogadishu. The force escorted convoys of shipping into the port, and helped to secure basic medical support and provided freshwater to the local community. AMISOM also provided transport support and protection for visiting international delegates, including all United Nations teams, and support to the fledgling Somali National Security Force (United Nations 2009b: 6). The mandate was extended for another three months on 11 March 2009 (African Union 2009a: 2). AMISOM also began to provide more humanitarian assistance to the civilian population within its area of operation. The mission's field hospitals, which were designed to cater for the troops, extended their services to local communities, providing medical services to approximately 3,000 patients per week. By 2010, AMISOM was also providing over 60,000 litres of safe drinking water per day to hundreds of families in Mogadishu (African Union 2010h: 9).

A further indication that AMISOM's role in Somalia was changing came on 15 June 2009, when the Peace and Security Council renewed AMISOM's mandate for a further seven months, indicating the beginning of a longer term strategy. While the PSC reiterated its call for the United Nations to deploy a mission in Somalia, it also asked the Commission to review AMISOM's terms of engagement, which were still based on reactive self-defence, and called upon AU member states to urgently provide military support to the TFG to enable it to 'neutralise' the armed insurgent groups (African Union 2009b: 3).

However, despite these positive signs, the increase in instability continued throughout 2009, and Al-Shabaab continued to consolidate control over most of southern and central Somalia except for the key districts of Mogadishu held by AMISOM, and, despite some claims to the contrary, Al-Shabaab seemed to be

increasing in number (Marchal 2009: 2). The insurgents continued to plan and employ the use of vehicular and human-borne suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and mortar and sniper attacks against the TFG and AMISOM positions and convoys (African Union 2010i: 6). A major suicide attack on 17 September 2009 on the AMISOM force headquarters near the airport killed twenty people, including the Deputy Force Commander of AMISOM, Major General Juvenal Niyoyinguruza, and injured forty others (African Union 2010i: 6). Similar suicide attacks continued unabated throughout 2009 and 2010, and on 24 August 2010, three gunmen attacked the Muna Hotel, near the government buildings, killing 31 people, including four MPs (African Union 2010h: 6). Further, the situation for Somali civilians continued to deteriorate, especially in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, where stonings and beheadings were commonplace, as well as rape, torture, kidnappings and disappearances (African Union 2010h: 9).

On 11 July 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a bombing in Kampala that killed 79 people (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 2010: 1). If Al-Shabaab expected the bombing to encourage the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to withdraw its three battalions from Somalia, it actually had the opposite effect, with the APSA calling on member states to produce another two battalions to deploy in Mogadishu (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 2010: 2). At the 15<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Kampala later that month, on the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 27<sup>th</sup>, Uganda pledged a further two Battalions, along with a 150 strong support unit (African Union 2010h: 11). Further, the same summit finally approved the changes to AMISOM's rules of engagement (RoE), which had been proposed after the APSA's consultations with the troop-contributing

countries, the TFG and other stakeholders. The changes resulted in a much more aggressive interpretation of the mandate, permitting the APSA to perform aggressive defence, including pre-emptive attacks, radically altering its role (AFP 2010). With the enhanced RoE, and its strength finally approaching the mandated 9 battalions, and with much more focused support from the international community, AMISOM started to make real progress on the ground; beginning with advances leading to the control of seven out of Mogadishu's sixteen districts, by 15 October 2010, AMISOM controlled twelve new positions in the city, consolidating AMISOM's defences and cutting off the supply routes of the insurgents (African Union 2010h: 11).

On 15 October 2010, the PSC expanded the mandated number of troops to 20,000, more than doubling the size of the mission to capitalise on AMISOM's recent gains (African Union 2010b). The subsequent UN resolution, however, limited this attempted expansion of AMISOM's role; it only authorised an increase in mission strength to 12,000 troops and limited the logistical support package to AMISOM accordingly (UNSC 2010). On 10 January 2011, AMISOM's mandate was renewed for a full 12 months, perhaps indicating an acceptance of the fact that the UN would not be able to deploy in the foreseeable future (African Union 2011a). In February 2011, AMISOM was able to launch another major offensive, seizing control of the old Ministry of Defence building, and the milk factory that Al-Shabaab had been using as a logistics depot, consolidating the seven districts under their control, which now held about 80% of the population of the City (African Union 2011d: 4). In March, 1,000 Burundian troops were deployed in Somalia, bringing the force strength

up to about 9,000 and exceeding the original mandate for the first time (African Union 2011d: 3).

Throughout the rest of 2011, the Islamists were on the run; AMISOM, supported by allied militias and TFG troops, gradually seized more territory in Mogadishu, including Wadnaha Road and the symbolic Red Mosque, the old barracks, the Italian embassy building and several other key locations. On 7 June 2011, TFG police spotted and killed Al-Qaeda's leader in East Africa, Fazul Abdallah Mohammed (African Union 2011c: 4). AMISOM took full control of Mogadishu by the end of 2011. Outside Mogadishu, pro-TFG militias gained further ground in the Hiraan, Galgadud, Bay and Bakool, Gedo and Lower Jubba regions, and, throughout July and August, the insurgents attempted to recapture key parts of the Gedo and Jubba regions, but were repulsed (African Union 2011c: 5).

## **Conclusion**

The *endemic functionalist role* of AMISOM was to deploy quickly to help capitalise on the withdrawal of the UIC, protect key infrastructure in Mogadishu, protect the TFG and provide it with technical assistance. The mission was also to play its usual role as a bridging force for the UN and prepare the ground for a UN PKO, which had been expected the following year. Although the mission was intended to be impartial, as explained in AMISOM's Status of Mission Agreement (African Union 2007l: 4), it was by no means a straightforward peacekeeping operation; there was no peace to keep, no ceasefire to monitor—the mission was playing a role closer to that of a rapid reaction stabilisation force. However, the real role played by AMISOM was even more unusual.



AMISOM's *interactionist role* in Somalia has been entwined with the state-building process in the country. AMISOM has never been an impartial peacekeeper; from the start it has been on the front line, fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with the government against the rebels. AMISOM has not simply been responsible for training the nascent TFG army and police force; after the Ethiopians withdrew in January 2009, AMISOM had been the only force keeping the TFG alive, and keeping Al-Shabaab out of the Villa Somalia. In this sense, AMISOM, far from playing the impartial peacekeeper, has performed the role of a *surrogate army* for the TFG—AMISOM was able to keep the highly unpopular, factional and weak TFG in working order for four years, during which it was effectively under-siege by the Islamists. In addition to training up the TFG's new military, AMISOM reconquered the TFG's own capital city on its behalf.

AMISOM's extremely active *interactionist role* evolved organically over time, enabled by massive, if insufficient, external support, and shaped by many factors, especially the failure of its role as a bridging operation for the UN with the United Nations' refusal to cross the rather dangerous looking bridge built for it by AMISOM. The state building process and the security environment also played an important part in shaping the role played by AMISOM, especially the extreme violence of the security environment, which, coupled with the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, forced AMISOM to begin a massive militarisation of the mission, turning it into something more akin to a full-scale invasion than a small protection and training force.

Finally, UN Resolution 1863 is a turning point in the evolution of the role played by the APSA in relation to the United Nations, with the UN *requesting* the

APSA's continued presence in a conflict zone for the first time, as opposed to condoning, or welcoming the APSA's efforts, or even, in the case of the abortive IGAD mission in Somalia, IGASOM, actively discouraging a deployment. This development showed that the APSA had become a useful, or at least *necessary*, partner to the UN.

Although the AU originally condemned the Ethiopian intervention, AMISOM performed a similar role; to militarily entrench the TFG into key parts of Somalia, and to deny as much ground to the Islamists as possible. AMISOM did have a protection role, like AMIS; however, where AMIS was mandated to protect civilians, AMISOM was mandated to protect the government. This is the most important break from the previous two missions. If, for example, AMIS had been deployed to protect Khartoum from the SLA/M and the JEM, it would have been a very different mission.

### ***The African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) and Operation Democracy in the Comoros***

While the previous three missions were AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), Operation Democracy in the Comoros was an AU-authorised *coalition of the willing*, along the lines of a UN-authorised enforcement mission. Like AMISOM, which started off life as a technical mission, the APSA's role in the Comoros had innocuous origins, rooted in a series of simple election observation missions. However, as the security situation destabilised in 2007-2008, the APSA's role on the Comorian island of Anjouan changed drastically, culminating in Operation Democracy, one of the APSA's most aggressive missions, which continued a key feature of the APSA's *interactionist role* in Somalia: partiality. Operation Democracy might also be considered to be the

first time that 'peace enforcement' becomes a major part of the role of the APSA.

AU involvement in the political process in the country dates back to 2004, when the AU dispatched an AU Observer Mission to the Comoros (MIOC), consisting of 39 MILOBS, mandated for four months, which successfully oversaw the elections, reporting only minor disturbances (African Union 2004e).

A further mission was deployed to oversee the second round of elections in spring 2006 to elect the new President of the Union of the Comoros with a mandate to provide security and monitor the election. The African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) was composed of 462 military and civilian personnel, made up largely of SADC member states with South Africa performing the lead role, and remained in place until 2 June 2006, overseeing the Comoros's first democratic transition of power (Svensson 2008b: 19).

In January 2007, the Assembly of the Union of the Comoros unanimously enacted a law requiring candidates for the post of President of the Autonomous Islands to give up their official positions three months prior to a further round of elections, which were to be held on 10 and 24 June 2007 and which would elect the presidents of the autonomous islands in the Union (African Union 2007k: 2). To ensure stability, and monitor the elections, the APSA authorised the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) on 9 May 2007 (Svensson 2008b: 19). However, several incidents taking place in Anjouan threatened the integrity of the electoral process (African Union 2007d). Colonel Mohamed Bacar refused to step down from the presidency of Anjouan prior to the elections. Bacar's mandate expired on 14 April 2007, and the President of

the Union appointed an interim president for Anjouan until the elections; however, Bacar rejected the authority of the Union government and the appointment of the interim president, and relations between Anjouan and the Union government continued to deteriorate (African Union 2007k: 2). Of particular concern was the use of heavy weapons by the Anjouanese gendarmerie against elements of the Comorian national army and the premises of the Presidency of the Union on the Island, which resulted in the death of two government soldiers (African Union 2007k: 1).

The election in Anjouan was originally scheduled to be held on 10 June, but in light of the security situation on the island, the President of the Union of Comoros pushed it back to 17 June (African Union 2007e). However, Bacar chose to go ahead with the elections on 10 June, printing ballots for the vote and ignoring the PSC's warning that such an election would be unrecognised by the African Union and the international community (African Union 2007h).

MAES, which was busy monitoring the elections on Grande Comore and Mohéli, and had not yet deployed to the island, so the elections went unmonitored, and unsupported by the Union government. The Anjouanese Electoral Commission announced Bacar's victory in the 1st round, with over 89% of the votes. All the other candidates had withdrawn from the race in protest. In spite of international condemnation of the vote, Colonel Bacar was sworn in as President of Anjouan on 14 June 2007 (African Union 2007k: 5-6).

Bacar rejected proposals aimed at restoring Union authority on Anjouan peacefully, which were developed following meetings held in Cape Town on 8 July, and Pretoria on 9 July and which had attempted to take Anjouanese concerns into account (African Union 2007c). In response to this development

in the security environment, the APSA chose to expand the role played by MAES, and on 10 October 2007, altered the mandate to deal specifically with the situation on Anjouan, giving it the power to implement sanctions on Bacar and his supporters, including an assets freeze and a travel ban (African Union 2007c: 1-2). Unsurprisingly, the Anjouanese authorities refused to allow the deployment of the mission, and MAES was never able to play this expanded role (Svensson 2008b: 20).

The APSA became concerned that any further delay in the holding of new Anjouanese Presidential elections would undermine the reconciliation process in the country, leading to further destabilisation (African Union 2007c: 1). At the 10<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, the President of the Union of the Comoros requested support from the APSA to re-establish the authority of the State on the island of Anjouan by any means, including the use of force, stating that all peaceful means to resolve the crisis had failed (African Union 2008e: 1).

The Assembly agreed, requesting “Member States capable of doing so to provide the necessary support to the Comorian Government in its efforts to restore, as quickly as possible, the authority of the Union in Anjouan and to put an end to the crisis” (African Union 2008b). On 20 February 2008, a meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of those countries that had responded positively to the request for assistance made by the President of the Union of the Comoros agreed on practical, military and security measures to re-establish Union authority on Anjouan, resulting in a plan to take the island by force: Operation Democracy in the Comoros (African Union 2008e: 2-3). This coalition-of-the-willing, consisting of Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal and Libya,

emphasised that any attempt on the part of the illegal authorities in Anjouan to resist the military intervention in the Island would be regarded as a criminal act and would be dealt with as such (African Union 2008e: 3). A last-ditch attempt to persuade Bacar to capitulate, led by the French Ambassador to the Comoros, the Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in Madagascar, a representative of the Arab league and the head of the AU Liaison office in the Union Capital, Moroni, was rejected out of hand by the Anjouanese *de facto* government (African Union 2008e: 4).

1,500 Coalition and Comorian troops began to assemble on the Island of Mohéli in early March, facilitated by French Airlift capacity, which transported troops from Tanzania to the Comoros. The invasion of Anjouan took place in the early hours of 25 March. In just a few hours, the Armée Nationale de Développement (AND), with the support of allied troops from Tanzania and Sudan, took control of key strategic areas in the Island. Comorian forces took the airport, while Tanzanian forces seized the port and Mutsமுது – the Island’s capital. Sudanese troops landed at Domoni, west of the Island. By the following day, the Island had come under the full control of the overwhelming coalition forces. General Bacar escaped in a *Kwassa-Kwassa*, a small traditional boat, with 22 of his supporters, and arrived safely in La Mayotte, where he requested asylum from the French government, and was transferred to Réunion island, pending a decision on the request, to ensure public order and stability (African Union 2008e: 5).

After the invasion, MAES was able to gain access to the island, and was given a new mandate, which was to run until the end of October 2008 (Svensson 2008b: 21). On 31 March 2008, the Union government inaugurated the interim

Chief Executive of Anjouan, Laiisamana Abdou Cheikh, to organise elections, which were to be held in May 2008, but divisions remained, with some parties wanting to re-run the entire electoral process in Anjouan (African Union 2008e: 5-6). However, the presidential elections were successfully held in June, only a month later than planned; Moussa Toybou defeated Mohamed Djaanfari in the second round of voting (AFP 2008).

## **Conclusion**

Operation Democracy was an unusual mission because of its more African nature; the AU Troop Contributing Countries were able to develop a mandate, a CONOPS and generate troops for the mission very quickly while negotiations continued in the background. In less than a year from the disputed elections, the coalition was able to deploy and effectively execute the mission largely on its own, with a robust mandate, and few casualties, achieving its objectives, with very little involvement from the external community—the APSA's usual role as a bridging force was nowhere to be seen in this mission, in fact the mission did not even seek approval from the UNSC, making the mission the first solely AU-authorised PSO.

However, one of the main reasons that Operation Democracy was so quick to deploy was its *ad hoc* nature. While Operation Democracy in the Comoros was AU-backed, it was not given an official mandate by the PSC. The driving force behind the mission was the troop contributing countries, legitimised by the 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Assembly.

All the same, the APSA's experience in the Comoros could be seen as the continued militarisation of the APSA role. Although there were repeated

attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully, most of these were framed as demands for Bacar to capitulate. The government of South Africa, which had been a lead state for MAES, refused to take part in Operation Democracy, because it felt that the AU had not yet exhausted all avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and called the invasion 'unfortunate' (Svensson 2008b: 21).

Rather than accepting a protracted dispute between Anjouan and the Union government, and help to negotiate a peace agreement, the APSA chose to resolve the dispute quickly by taking sides. While the Comorian government may have lacked the capacity to stage such an invasion on its own, the APSA was able to provide overwhelming military superiority in relation to Bacar's limited gendarmerie. As in Somalia, the APSA performed the role of surrogate military; re-conquering the country on behalf of the government.

### ***Conclusion***

This chapter has shown what a transformative effect that developments in the African security environment can have on the role played by the APSA. While the *endemic functionalist role* of all four PSOs has been conservative, the *Interactionist role* played by the APSA has been extremely progressive; all the missions have taken the role of peace operations in a new direction. All of the missions have been much more militaristic and 'hawkish' than originally intended stretching the interpretation of their mandates and rules of engagement.

While AMIB and AMIS played relatively familiar roles, more along the lines of traditional peacekeeping and monitoring forces, AMISOM and the AU-backed



Operation Democracy were unashamedly partisan; intervening in Somalia and the Comoros on behalf of the internationally recognised national governments of those countries, and actively fighting against the rebels. This approach may well raise the spectre of the dictators' club, where the APSA plays the role of an enforcer for African governments. However, the circumstances of these cases belie the truth. The TFG, while flawed, weak and fractured, cannot be said to be a dictatorship, certainly not in comparison to the system envisaged by Al-Shabaab; although the mere fact the UIC was so popular and the TFG so unpopular may well show authoritarian aspects of the role played by the APSA. In Comoros too, the APSA was intervening to support an internationally supported, democratically elected civilian government against a military strongman, who was attempting to stay in power by undemocratic means. The APSA has therefore established its role as a protector of constitutional order in Africa, showing a willingness to engage with crises which would have been considered to be well outside its capacity.

AMIS and AMISOM have also highlighted the limitations of the APSA's much discussed role as a bridging force for the UN; what happens if the UN will not or cannot deploy? The APSA's role as a bridging force may be less viable than it seems. While it worked relatively well in Burundi, it took many years for the UN to deploy in Darfur, forcing AMIS to take on a role it had not expected; that of a long-term PKO. The same situation occurred in Somalia, where a UN deployment still seems unlikely, and the APSA has had to shoulder the burden that it expected to share with the UN. So while this has become a large element of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role*, it is a much more subdued element of the APSA's *interactionist role*.

A final observation to be noted from the preceding examination of the APSA's experiences in the field is how all the limiting and enabling factors come together to shape the role played by the organisation. The role that the APSA has been able to play has been severely limited by its own capacity gaps—a problem highlighted by the near-collapse of AMIS, and the three year gap between AMISOM's original deployment and the full deployment of the original nine mandated battalions. However, it has also shown that it has the capacity to deploy without support very quickly, as in Operation Democracy, helping to shape the APSA's role as a first responder. Furthermore, the APSA's huge capacity gaps have often been bridged by external support, which has enhanced the APSA's capacity in certain areas, enabling it to perform roles which would be unthinkable from a simple reading of the APSA's own internal capacity and revenue. At the same time, when such external support has not been forthcoming, especially where it has been expected or relied upon, such as UN support to AMIS and AMISOM, the lack of external support has acted as a limiting factor. Finally, in the context of this external support to the APSA which enables the role it plays in some areas and allows it to stagnate in others, it becomes clear that, despite the APSA's claims of 'African Ownership' and 'African Solutions for African Problems', the EU, the UN and the US hold a considerable amount of power over the *interactionist role* played by the APSA, which may be very different from the *endemic functionalist role* envisioned by the APSA on authorisation. A prime example of this was when the United Nations overrode the expanded mandate for AMISOM, disregarding the selection of a force strength of 20,000 as agreed upon by the APSA, and instead reducing the mandate to a more manageable 12,000.

In light of these conclusions, the thesis will now go on to rationalise what we have learned about the limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA and apply the *interactionist equation* in order to define the *interactionist role* of the APSA.

## Chapter Eight: Conclusion

### *Introduction*

This research project set out to answer what seems like a very basic question, fundamental to analysing the APSA's impact on regional security in Africa:

*What is the role of the APSA?* The more objectively accurate the answer to this question is, the more stable the basis for measuring the APSA's success and utility will be, as there will be a common understanding of what the term *role* means, and therefore less variance in the interpretation of the APSA's current role. The study has provided this stable basis through a reconceptualisation of the concept of the *role* of an organisation and by providing a methodology for ascertaining a more accurate outline of the role of the APSA at any particular time based on what it does, rather than what it *says* it does, or what APSA scholars variously say that it *should* do. This thesis did not simply aim to provide a snap-shot of the role played by the APSA at the beginning of 2012, but aimed to generate an understanding of the concept of role, as applied to institutions in general, which, instead of relying upon subjective preconceptions of what that role may be, allows for repeatable and objective descriptions of the role played in practice, which can be updated, analysed and debated, bringing together the key limiting and enabling factors which define that role at any given time.

In Chapter 1, a review of the existing literature highlighted the lack of consensus on the role of the APSA and, as a result, the wide variance in perceptions of its success and utility, as well as the disparate policy recommendations based upon these perceptions. Attempts by academics such

as Paul Williams (2006), Kristina Powell (2005) and Benedikt Franke (2008) to evaluate the success of the APSA have been very different. Without an objective and repeatable method for defining the APSA's role, scholars are measuring its success against their own expectations of its role without systematically defending those expectations.

In response, this thesis provided such an objective and repeatable method for defining the role of the APSA, or potentially any international organisation, by problematising the definition of the term *role* when applied to institutions. Borrowing from the disciplines of Sociology and Social Psychology, chapter two split the definition of the term *role* in this context into three separate, technical definitions; the *endemic functionalist role* (the role that the APSA's designers and draughtsmen envisioned for it), the *projected functionalist role* (the role that observers assume that the APSA plays) and the *interactionist role* (the role that the APSA actually plays in its operating environment, in practical terms). When assessing the APSA in the past, academics have based their criticisms solely against the *endemic functionalist role* or whichever *projected functionalist role* that they personally adhered to. This reduced the understanding of the role of the APSA to either a simple extrapolation of the APSA's role from the treaty documents, mandates and statements of intent, or an often unrealistic set of preconceived expectations. The remaining five chapters highlighted the high number, and numerous sources, of limiting and enabling factors that act upon the APSA, as well as the extent to which they alter its role by restricting, expanding and redirecting its capacity. Having established the appropriate variables, this chapter will now apply the *interactionist equation* (enabling factors minus limiting factors equals

the *interactionist role*) in order to provide an overview of the *interactionist role* of the APSA. It will then compare the *interactionist role* with the *endemic functionalist role* and some elements of the *projected functionalist roles* used in the APSA scholarship, and conclude with a discussion of how the present research into the role of the APSA, and the development of *Institutional Role Theory*, affects the discourse and acts as a basis for future research.

### ***Applying the Interactionist Equation***

The previous five chapters have focused on various limiting and enabling factors that have shaped the role played by the APSA. The following section will rationalise much of this information by giving a summary of the effects of these factors on four key areas of the APSA's capacity: African ownership; personnel capacity; financial capacity; and military capacity. Each section will apply the *interactionist equation* to explain where limiting factors have been successfully bridged by enabling factors, concluding with an assessment of the APSA's net capacity in each of these areas. This assessment of the APSA's net capacity will explain the boundaries of the APSA's capacity to act, which will help to inform the definition of the APSA's *interactionist roles*, which will be outlined afterwards.

### **African Ownership**

African ownership has consistently been described as an important part of the role of the APSA, both in *endemic functionalist* and *projected functionalist* terms; however, as this section outlines, it has not been a priority for the APSA in practical terms. Understanding this helps to reinforce the intercontinental nature of the APSA's role, which will be described in more detail later.

### ***Limiting Factors***

Chapters five and six showed that the APSA is so dependent upon so many different actors within and beyond Africa for its capacity that it could not exist in its current form without that support. Chapter five also demonstrated that very few of these actors give their support without precondition or ulterior motive; most of the APSA's external partners earmark their donations for specific projects, or ban their funds from being used for specific purposes. Especially restrictive is the limitation on the EU's Africa Peace Facility (APF), stemming from the Cotonou Agreement, which prevents funds from being used for military purposes. This degree of Western interference in the governance of the APSA has resulted in accusations of a neo-colonialist attitude amongst western partners and a perception of reduced African ownership (Murithi 2009). The seriousness of these issues is an artefact of the level of dependence of the APSA upon external sources of capacity enhancement, especially institutionalised financial support like the APF. Chapter six demonstrated how the leverage gained through such dependence compromised the African nature of the APSA's governance structures, resulting in external partners permeating the APSA's governance at *ownership, board and management* levels.

Therefore, while African Solutions and African Ownership is an important part of the *endemic functionalist*, and most *projected functionalist roles*, it is important to highlight the fact that the African nature of the APSA is not nearly as prominent in the current *interactionist* role; access to materiel, expertise and financial capacity, strings or no strings, takes precedence in the APSA today as it deals with the exigencies of two of the worlds most intractable conflict zones. Further, while external partners can pick and choose which parts of the APSA to support and which to relegate, targeting support to specific AU departments

or specific member states, the APSA itself has almost no freedom to allocate funds, except where that freedom is granted by the donor country, as contributions to the Peace Fund continue to overwhelmingly come from external partners.

### ***Enabling Factors***

However, those same 'meddling' external partners may hold the key to greater African ownership of the APSA in the medium-long term. The preceding chapters also demonstrated that external support is not just about dealing with security exigencies that concern the donors, but is also about building permanent capacity among African states. As Vines and Middleton suggested, successfully operationalising the APSA offers the prospect of more African solutions to African problems (Vines and Middleton 2008: 7).

Chapter five explained how the United States in particular focused most of its efforts towards enhancing African capacity, including training and equipping African military units, although in some cases such offers were attendant upon commitments to deploy. Further, with external support, the APSA has been able to gain significant experience in fielding large-scale PSOs in terms of expertise, logistics and force generation. Finally, external support has been instrumental in operationalising the African Standby Force. Although it is still in the early stages, the ASF will significantly increase internal *African* capacity, and therefore African ownership, when it is finally ready to deploy.

### ***Conclusion***

African ownership is figurative and dependent upon the good will of external partners. African leadership is a necessity in some situations, such as the



mission in Darfur, which could not have been deployed under UN leadership without an enforcement mandate. However, Africa does not have the capacity to *own* the peace and security efforts of the APSA. African ideas are the driving force behind the organisation (non-indifference, pan-Africanism etc.), and, as Murithi and Gomes lament, the lives of African soldiers are the fuel that drives the APSA machine. Without Africa, the APSA obviously could not exist; but the APSA is paid for, equipped by and, in many respects, *managed* by external partners, particularly the UN, the EU and the US. Without their support, the APSA could not perform the role it is currently performing. Therefore, the APSA's interactionist role looks the way it does today because of the influence of external powers. The reality is quite removed from the *endemic functionalist* ideal of African Ownership of the APSA; in practical terms, the African Union and its member states is only one of four major partners in the APSA. However, it is the most important one, acting as a framework within which external peace and security efforts can be coordinated and implemented.

The APSA does not play the role of the African solution to African problems envisaged by the founders, early APSA scholars and pan-Africanists; but as a result of the APSA's successes, the world takes Africa's role in peace and security much more seriously in comparison with the cynicism directed towards the OAU. Literal African ownership is not part of the APSA's *interactionist role* in a meaningful sense, however, the APSA is an increasingly important voice in African security; it can act, and by acting it can try to set the agenda. However, as AMIS and AMISOM have shown, large swathes of the international community are prepared to leave African PSO's floundering and under-siege for years if they do not perceive them to be in their interests, and the APSA is

severely limited in what it can achieve without external support because of the capacity gaps discussed in chapter four.

The *interactionist role* of the APSA will be, to a large extent, shaped by the governance structures of external partners for the foreseeable future—until APSA member states have developed economically to the extent that they can pay the hundreds of millions of dollars per year required to field PSOs and retain the expertise required at all levels to carry them out, or at least until the majority of external support is being paid into the AU Peace Fund without conditions, giving the PSC the freedom to allocate funds as it sees fit, without a shortage thereof.

### **Personnel Capacity**

The APSA's capacity to act is affected by personnel capacity issues at every level of staffing, from desk-workers at the AUC in Addis Ababa, to force commanders on the ground in Mogadishu. This constitutes another major influence on the functions that the APSA is able to perform, and understanding its net impact is key to understanding the *interactionist role*.

### ***Limiting Factors***

As chapter four showed, the APSA's personnel capacity represents a serious limiting factor; the staff of administrative bodies like the PSC Secretariat and the PSOD have been, for most of the APSA's history, performing several job descriptions and working long hours, frequently without the specialist training required. The APSA's personnel systems have represented a severe bottleneck, especially in light of accounting practices for external aid; the APSA has several hundred individual sources of external aid, each with their own

accountability requirements. At times, this has limited the speed and extent to which the APSA can absorb external funding. As chapter four and chapter seven highlighted, limited expertise in core competency areas, especially weak capacity in terms of operational planning for the APSA's PSOs, has had a constraining effect upon the interactionist role that the APAS is able to perform in the field.

### ***Enabling Factors***

The APSA's lack of capacity in this area is bridged through significant external involvement in the day-to-day running of the APSA. Although the APSA's treaty framework prohibits the organisation from hiring extra-continental staff, external partners frequently retain expert advisors on behalf of the APSA. Meanwhile, the APSA's existing personnel capacity is continually being enhanced through training programmes run by external partners, as explained in chapter five.

### ***Conclusion***

External capacity enhancement in this area enables the APSA to continue to perform both day-to-day responsibilities and complex administrative tasks like troop rotations or the drafting of technical documents like CONOPS and Rules of Engagement, some of which would be outside of the APSA's capacity without such support.

Further, external personnel capacity enhancement, in the form of resident liaison officers, specialists, experts, advisors and mentors, also contributes to the intercontinental character of the APSA, which has become an increasingly important part of its role. In practical terms, the APSA's personnel capacity problems are significantly less debilitating than they may appear, thanks to

external capacity enhancement in this area. While personnel capacity is still strained, and has a much more international character than the *functionalist roles* would suggest, chapter seven has demonstrated that, with external support, it is at a high enough level to conduct all the functions associated with the major PSOs, and is by no means the most significant problem limiting the APSA's role in the field.

### **Financial Capacity**

Money is the life-blood of any large institution like the APSA, and access to this resource is a transformative enabling factor for the *interactionist role* it plays. Deficiencies in this core area of capacity have threatened to break the missions in Sudan and Somalia, highlighting how capacity in this area has a defining effect on the boundaries of the APSA's *interactionist role*.

### **Limiting Factors**

As chapter three explained, the *endemic functionalist role* of the APSA suggests that the AU is responsible for ending conflict in Africa—a continent containing most of the world's on-going conflicts—but set out to achieve this with a budget one tenth of the size of that of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The APSA's budget is tiny relative to its ambitions, a problem complicated by the fact that its internal financial capacity is very irregular; few African states pay their dues on time or in full.

The capacity of the APSA to field PSOs has been crippled by this lack of budgetary resources. Only 2 per cent of the PSO budget is covered by African states, the rest comes from external partners, mostly the EU APF. However, funding from external partners is usually earmarked for specific projects and

capacity enhancement in specific areas, which has a knock on effect on medium and long-term planning, limiting capacity development to projects for which *ad hoc* external funding can be secured, leaving many areas of the APSA neglected, such as Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (Suifon 2010).

### ***Enabling Factors***

As chapters five, six and seven highlighted, the APSA has been kept operational through transformative levels of financial support from its external partners, mostly on an *ad hoc* basis. *Ad hoc* external support to the APSA had been the only thing keeping AMIS and AMISOM operational at some points. Training programmes, equipment, logistics, intelligence, Command, Control and Communications (C<sup>3</sup>), heavy airlift, camp-building, food delivery and more have been provided by PMCs, which have in turn been paid for with earmarked funds provided by the United States or, in many cases, contracted directly by the United States on the APSA's behalf. Several other major partners have provided similar assistance, especially the UK and France.

The EU, however, has taken its support to the APSA beyond the *ad hoc* model, providing a lifeline for the APSA's peace support operations by institutionalising an income stream from the development aid budget that is made available to the APSA with certain restrictions. These restrictions aside, a stable, regularly replenished, and most importantly, *vast*, source of funds like the APF is a major enabling factor, facilitating longer term projects as well as providing a standing source for the initial phases of PSOs.

### **Conclusion**

A simple reading of the APSA's financial capacity would conclude that the APSA could not have a role as a major peace and security actor. The reality is quite different; because of external support, the APSA has tremendous financial capacity available to it. The fact that it does not come from Africa does not make it any less integral to the APSA's *interactionist role*. However, even with external support, the APSA's financial capacity has struggled to support its workload at times, and has never been more than the bare minimum required to prevent mission failure, indicating that financial capacity, more than any other factor, is defining the ultimate extent of the APSA's *interactionist role*. Yet, considering the scale of those missions, and their relative success, it is fair to say that the APSA's net capacity in this area is formidable.

### **Military Capacity and Force Generation**

Military capacity and effective force generation is vital for any organisation which intends to play a role in peace and security. Limiting and enabling factors in this area have been related to financial capacity, and the APSA has relied upon external partners to bridge the gap. It is the boundaries established by these limiting and enabling factors that really define the types of PSOs that the APSA can field and the tools available to it.

### **Limiting Factors**

The APSA has no standing military capacity as the ASF is many years from full operationalisation. As a result, the APSA has had to rely upon traditional force generation techniques and the Burundi Model, which has been less successful at building balanced and well supported forces in Africa than elsewhere owing to the limited capacity and resources of African militaries. The APSA has

suffered from a severe lack of military capacity, especially a lack of key equipment, vehicles, airlift, air support, logistics capacity, strategic capacity and specialist expertise. The APSA has no standing depots and relies entirely on the sending countries and external partners to equip field missions. The APSA has not been able to pay wages to personnel deployed on its past field missions, or as in the case of Nigeria's contingent to AMIS II, it has not even been able to transport available troops to the theatre.

The Burundi Model, used extensively by the APSA to pay for deployments, requires that TCCs pay for the maintenance of their own contingents in the field. In light of the limited economic capacity of most African countries, and the considerable expense of deploying and maintaining a military force abroad, often hundreds of miles away, it is not surprising that there is little political will to contribute to APSA missions.

Another potential limitation on force generation is the number of troops authorised in the mission mandate. In 2010, the APSA increased the mandated force strength of AMISOM to 20,000, but the UN, which had by then agreed to help to pay for the force, only authorised 12,000. This led to complaints from Uganda that they had several battalions waiting to deploy that were stuck in Uganda because they were not authorised. However, as chapter seven demonstrated, both AMIS and AMISOM spent most of their existence significantly below their mandated force strengths.

### ***Enabling Factors***

The United States, the UK, France and NATO have provided operational support in the form of camp building, strategic airlift and air support. Many external actors have also provided funding, training, equipment, expertise,

personnel and other forms of support to help bridge many of the capacity gaps in the militaries of key APSA member states. This type of support has gradually improved the quality of African contingents enabling the APSA to take on the role of a major peacekeeping agency, fielding UN-scale missions such as AMIS and AMISOM. The transition to UN leadership of the missions is also a major enabler for force generation, as TCCs know that they will be reimbursed by the UN; however, the impact of this enabling factor has been limited by the UN's failure to deploy promptly, or even at all.

### ***Conclusion***

The APSA's military capacity is growing as many of the externally-led training programmes come to fruition. However, chapter seven highlighted how long it has taken for its missions to get up to full strength; both AMIS and AMISOM took years to reach their mandated strengths, indicating that this is another defining factor of the APSA's interactionist role; a solid boundary beyond which the APSA cannot act. External capacity enhancement in this area constitutes the bulk of the money spent on the APSA by external partners, paying hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain troops in the field, to provide the necessary equipment and to facilitate deployment. As a result of the transformative external investment in this area, the APSA has taken on a highly militaristic aspect, with military and force generation capacity becoming a defining feature of the APSA's *interactionist role*. Even still, despite this huge effort to bridge the APSA's capacity gaps in force generation and the military capacity of troop contingents, the pressures of various limiting factors, including the extremely challenging nature of the PSO operational environments



themselves, means that military capacity and force generation is still one of the APSA's most pressing limiting factors in net terms.

### ***Where the APSA has no Capacity, or Negligible Capacity***

There are some areas of the APSA's capacity that were prominent in its *endemic functionalist role* but have received little attention from external partners. Some of these key areas are listed below as areas of capacity that do not constitute a significant element of the APSA's *interactionist role*.

### **Sanctions**

Although the treaty framework lists coercive sanctions as part of its enforcement capacity, the APSA has never had the capacity to enforce sanctions effectively, and this capacity gap has never been bridged. However, the United Nations has imposed sanctions at the request of the APSA. For example, when Eritrea was found to be supporting the ARS in Somalia, the APSA requested that the UN impose sanctions on Eritrea, which it did in Resolution 1907 (2009) and subsequent resolutions. This indicates that implementing sanctions is not really part of the APSA's role and that this responsibility remains with the UNSC.

### **Conflict Prevention**

The Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise have received some limited support from external partners, but compared to other areas of the APSA, they have effectively been abandoned. Rarely used, and rarely effective, the APSA's conflict prevention capacity is still very low.

## **Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development**

The APSA's role in post-conflict reconstruction and development has been negligible, and there has been almost no effort on the part of external partners to develop it (Suifon 2010).

## **Conclusion**

These areas are not simply capacity gaps; they are capacity flat-lines. The realities of the APSA's failure to develop capacity in these areas highlight the importance of understanding the *interactionist role*, and the weaknesses of the *endemic functionalist role*. Policy that is based on the latter could soon find that it is designed to support a capacity that does not exist. A clear idea of the APSA's *interactionist role* highlights the extent of the work required to develop meaningful capacity in these areas.

## ***Outlining the Interactionist Role of the APSA***

This summary has provided a brief overview of the net effects of some of the most powerful limiting and enabling factors influencing the role played by APSA. However, to complete the implementation of *Institutional Role Theory*, it is necessary to synthesise the cumulative effects of these limiting and enabling factors and, in so doing, define the *interactionist role* of the APSA.

Based upon the findings of the previous chapters, the APSA in fact plays multiple roles:

1. Intercontinental framework for action on Africa
2. Part of the United Nations system
3. First Responder and Civilian Protection Force
4. Regime Protector

## 5. Statement of African Political Will

However, it does not play all these roles to the same extent, as will be described below.

### **Intercontinental Framework for Action on Africa**

The APSA's biggest role is as a partner for the UN, the EU, and the US, as well as key African Nation States like South Africa and Nigeria, in global peace and security. It is a framework for the consolidation of disparate peace and security efforts from various states and organisations inside and out of Africa. The preceding chapters have shown that the APSA is multi-continental to its core. The APSA's decision-making structure is penetrated by external partners at almost every level; in particular, decisions made in Brussels or New York have very real effects upon the day-to-day running of the organisation. The APSA can only function at all because of the very close working relationships that it has with the UN, the EU, the USA and many other bilateral and multilateral partners. The APSA is governed, equipped, trained and funded, not solely, or even largely, by African states, but by its many international partners. In essence, the APSA is an *intercontinental* solution to African problems.

However, as the Security Council recently reiterated that "the need for support does not amount to dependency. Instead, it must be viewed as a vital partnership in the global quest for maintaining international peace and security" (United Nations 2011a: 7). The problems that the organisation deals with are not just African problems, but global problems. Thus, the thesis confirms and extends one element of Klingebiel's view of the role of the APSA:

“The African peace and security architecture (APSA) is not an isolated regime comprising only African actors: this evolving architecture forms part of an international context, and foreign actors are increasingly becoming involved in African peace and security matters” (Stephan Klingebiel et al. 2008: 65-66).

## **Part of the UN System**

Building on from the APSA’s role as a multi-continental framework is the fact that the APSA is fundamentally, and increasingly, integrated into the UN system and shares many of the World Organisation’s objectives, and this has become another core part of the APSA’s *interactionist role*. The *interactionist role* of the APSA in this regard is to create the conditions necessary for peace, to support the signing of a ceasefire agreement, and to provide the core of a peacekeeping force until the UN can take over. Its role is to *support* the United Nations’ work in Africa, not *replace* it.

The APSA is a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The two organisations have been working to improve coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian components, to facilitate the transition of missions and personnel between the APSA and the UN (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 45). We have seen this transition in action in Burundi and, belatedly, in Sudan. Indeed, the APSA’s experiences in Sudan highlighted the boundaries of the APSA’s *interactionist role* in this area, primarily its lack of control over the United Nations’ willingness to deploy. The United Nations, however, is beginning to understand the importance of co-opting the APSA. Vinay Kumar, India’s representative to the UNSC, explained recently that “it would add to the credibility of the Council’s action if serious consideration were given to the views of the African Union, in

particular when the AU can help in expeditiously and peacefully resolving a crisis” (United Nations 2011a: 13).

Acting as part of the UN system, there are three main categories of inter-organisational peacekeeping cooperation within which the APSA’s close relationship with the UN can take place; hybrids, co-deployments, and transitions (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 39). The APSA has participated in all three categories during its short existence, making all three important parts of its *interactionalist role*; however, it has focussed most of its attention on *transitional* cooperation, or ‘bridging’, with highly variable levels of success.

AMIB is particularly important as a proof-of-concept for APSA peace support operations acting as bridgeheads for United Nations PKOs. The United Nations could not deploy to Burundi in 2003 because the operational environment did not meet the criteria required for a peacekeeping mission to be authorised under the Charter; in particular, there was no peace treaty to enforce and violence was on-going. However, upon the conclusion of AMIB’s mandate on 31 May 2004, the UN was able to deploy the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) (Svensson 2008a: 14). This was made possible through the work of the APSA. AMIB’s deployment created a zone of stability and security in Burundi that allowed disparate interests to come together and negotiate, including leaders who had previously fled abroad. Although violence did continue in some parts of the country, these negotiations led to the establishment of a national government and the beginning of a peace process, thereby providing the United Nations with a “peace to keep” (Svensson 2008a: 15). AMIB had facilitated the beginnings of the peace process, allowing the UN to take over the mission in 2004.

AMIB forces remaining in Burundi were simply 're-hatted' as ONUB forces; the 1041 South African troops, 853 Ethiopian troops and 225 Mozambican troops provided ONUB with a backbone of experienced soldiers for the mission (UNSC 2004: 14). Further support was provided by the AMIB 'Lead-State', South Africa, which agreed to maintain its maritime, special forces, military police, headquarters protection and engineering units until replacements were deployed (UNSC 2004: 8). South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique continued to play an important role in ONUB throughout its deployment (UNSC 2005a: 15-17).

It is interesting to note that the AU has re-established its presence in the wake of ONUB's withdrawal to support the implementation of the 2006 comprehensive peace agreement. ONUB began drawing-down its military components near the end of 2006 (UNSC 2006a: 14), leading to the successful conclusion of the mandate on 31 December 2006, and the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (UNSC 2007a: 1). However, the South African battalion remained in Burundi and on 29 December 2006, it was returned to African Union control, forming the core of the African Union Special Task Force for Burundi (UNSC 2007a: 1). The African Union Special Task Force comprises a headquarters, maintenance platoon, support elements, the South African infantry battalion in the role of a VIP Protection Unit and a Rapid Reaction Force (Ross 2009: 15). Although Burundi is the first AU peace support operation to reach this late stage in the process, the AU's renewed responsibilities in Burundi might indicate a role for the APSA in consolidating peace after the UN missions have withdrawn. The AU's decision to maintain an armed presence in Burundi turned out to be farsighted as hostilities broke out

between Palipehutu-FNL and the government security forces in May 2007 (UNSC 2008: 1).

The UN/AU relationship is interdependent; in the context of the UN's ultimate responsibility for security in Africa, the APSA's 'bridging role' seems like the APSA enhancing the capacity of the UN, lending their local expertise, experience, position in-theatre and their good offices to the UN in support of its objectives in Africa. Although it is not referred to as such, this is essentially what the United Nations is referring to when it talks about 'synergy' or 'comparative advantage' (United Nations 2009c: 5).

While the concept of the APSA as a 'bridging' organisation is quite widely recognised among scholars and practitioners alike, there are signs, however, that the APSA's bridging role is in decline. The successful hand over in Burundi was followed by an extremely delayed handover in Sudan, where the APSA waited years before the UN could take over. In Somalia, the UN has consistently failed to deploy. The recent turn of events in the country, leading to the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab and the consolidation of TFG control were *paid for* and *supported* by the UN and other partners. However, these recent successes have been achieved through the framework of AMISOM, by APSA troops with the re-involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia, not through the framework of a United Nations mission. In Comoros, the APSA restored constitutional order without any expectation of support or even a mandate from the United Nations. Therefore, the APSA's role as a bridging force might well be stagnating, if not actually in decline.

## **First Responder and Civilian Protection Force**

Another core element of the APSA's *interactionist role* is as first responder. *Ad hoc* force generation through the Burundi Model may be inefficient and unsustainable in the long term, but, if there is sufficient interest from African regional powers, it can be a relatively swift *modus operandi*, especially because it does not require the lengthy process of collecting and authorising funds centrally. Further, the APSA has the legal capacity to intervene early on in a conflict situation, and can use its good offices and local expertise and knowledge to negotiate entry. In this regard, the APSA's military capacity problems may be a bonus; the government of Sudan is not afraid that the APSA will flatten Khartoum in a bout of 'humanitarian bombing', because even if it wanted to, it lacks the capacity to do so.

Once the APSA has secured early-phase deployment in-theatre, its primary *interactionist role* is to establish conditions on the ground conducive to peace, with the ultimate expectation of the UN assuming control of the mission as soon as possible. This has generally consisted of bolstering tentative ceasefires with military observers and peacekeepers. However, the APSA has also begun to develop responsibilities in the protection of civilians, especially IDPs. This *interactionist role* has developed as a result of the AMIS and AMISOM, which were both deployed for years longer than originally intended, resulting in a role which was originally intended to remain with the UN falling upon the shoulders of the APSA.

The civilian protection role was a less important element of the APSA's first mission, AMIB; although protection of combatants and their leaders during the peace negotiations and DDR was one of the main reasons for the mission—



exemplified by the VIP protection force. AMIS was originally intended to provide protection only for MILOBS. The APSA was fully aware of its lack of capacity to protect civilians, but began developing its role in this area as it became clear that no other organisations were prepared to deploy to such a violent part of the world.

In AMISOM, protection was the main focus of the mandate; however, the focus was on protecting VIPs and infrastructure rather than civilians. The violent mission environment prevented the APSA from playing an extensive role in protecting civilians as it only controlled small sections of the city. All the same, the fact that a disproportionately large proportion of the city population remained in APSA held territory – 80 per cent of the population of Mogadishu lived in the 33 per cent controlled by AMISOM in mid-2011 (African Union 2011d: 3)—shows that AMISOM's reputation as an effective protection force was starting to gain ground.

There has been significant negative characterisation of the APSA's protection record in the field. In particular, critics recommended a broader protection mandate for AMIS, possibly even including enforcement action without the consent of Khartoum. However, this would have been impossible as the APSA would not have had the military capacity to protect civilians and maintain itself in the field, as expanding the mandate would not have improved force generation. In fact, the mission would have been more volatile, possibly much more dangerous for civilians and certainly less appealing to potential TCCs had the Sudanese government opposed its presence. Even with AMIS's extremely limited rules of engagement, the AU forces in Darfur came under attack on multiple occasions (Ekengard 2008: 25-29). In Somalia, by contrast, where the

support of the Transitional Federal Government for AMISOM is unwavering, the APSA force has been able to evolve into a much more proactive role, acting almost as a surrogate military for the TFG.

### **Regime Protector**

Despite the fanfare for Article 4(h), it has never been a part of the *interactionist* role of the APSA. However, the unratified amendments to Article 4 that would allow intervention in the case of 'unconstitutional changes of government' have been exercised to a certain extent. The APSA has intervened to protect what it perceived to be constitutional legitimacy in Somalia and Comoros, establishing an *interactionist* role in what could be termed 'regime protection', or 'the protection of constitutional order'.

It was in this light that chapter seven emphasised AMISOM and Operation Democracy as marking a significant change in the role played by the APSA. While AMIB and AMIS were fairly traditional peacekeeping missions, made unusual by the early stage in the peace process at which they deployed, the missions in Comoros and Somalia were clear examples of the APSA taking the side of the government, protecting low-capacity regimes against unconstitutional changes of government by coming in and providing a surrogate military capacity.

Operation Democracy and AMISOM (and in some instances AMIB and AMIS) are examples of the APSA playing the role of a surrogate state army, rather than a neutral peace keeping force. This is one way of countering some of the recent criticisms of peacekeeping as being toothless or too neutral, criticisms stemming from the UN's perceived failure to respond effectively to the

Rwandan Genocide and Srebrenica. Such criticism has usually been focused around the idea that peacekeeping simply extends the duration of conflicts by allowing both sides time to replenish their strength, that the peace process is deliberately extended by the leaders of the conflict parties to take advantage of the UN's hospitality, or that it prevents a clear winner from emerging and building a strong central government. The APSA's actions have sometimes indicated a preference for stability over democratic 'luxuries', and the importance of ending conflict and establishing security in order to provide a stable environment for economic growth. One way to quickly end wars, and avoid the messy process of establishing consensus governments, giving into rebel demands or partitioning the country, is to pick winners; in the case of AMISOM and Operation Democracy, this has involved the APSA entering the conflict on the side of the incumbent regime.

Of course, it is not part of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* to supplement national armies with multinational forces; however, it is part of the APSA's *endemic functionalist role* to guarantee security on the continent, ensure stability, protect civilians and promote economic growth, all of which may be best served by a speedy, rather than neutral, intervention to end to the conflict. The increased security and stability that this could bring to African governments may facilitate economic growth, stronger centralised institutions and more effective security forces.

### **Statement of African Political Will**

Finally, as explained earlier in the chapter, the APSA's role as an 'African solution to African problems' is questionable because of its lack of capacity to play the lead role in funding, planning, supporting, equipping and managing its

own efforts in peace and security. However, one of the most basic elements of the APSA's *interactionist role* is to generate and maintain African political will. This is not quite the strong pan-Africanist role envisaged by the founders and by pan-African academics, but as a result of the APSA's successes, the world takes Africa's role in peace and security much more seriously (compared with the OAU).

If an African-owned regional security project is going to develop, it will certainly be through the APSA framework; the APSA is a safe environment for African projects as it has the training wheels of foreign support. Meanwhile, it is steadily developing the capacity to field missions on its own, in terms of expertise, experience logistics and military capacity (especially the ASF). Nonetheless, literal African ownership in financial terms has not improved, and the APSA will be dependent upon external funding, and will have to live with all the attendant effects upon its capacity to act until Africa's economic development is much further along.

### ***Repercussions for the APSA's Endemic Functionalist Role***

The APSA's *endemic functionalist role* should not be interpreted as indicative of the role of the APSA. It could be seen, perhaps, more as a long-term objective, as an expression of will, or, on its most basic level, as an enabling factor; a description of what the African Heads of State and Government give the APSA *permission* to do, and not a description of what it does, or necessarily should do.

However, the *interactionist role* of the APSA is not simply a deflated version of the *endemic functionalist role*; it has strengths in areas that were not envisioned

in the *endemic functionalist role*. In light of this, it is clear that the *interactionist role* explains more about the realities of the role played by the APSA than the *endemic functionalist role* can.

### ***Repercussions for the Projected Functionalist Role***

The *interactionist role* of the APSA has also proved quite different from the *projected functionalist role*, as the definition of the role of the APSA in this chapter does not match any one author's definition; all authors have been right and wrong on some level. However, none of the authors had a fully accurate conception of the role played by the APSA.

Bergholm states that "... international organisations are affected by failures, scandals and poor or uneven performance. That is ... why the outcome or quality of an organisation's execution of its decisions warrants comprehensive analysis" (Bergholm 2009: 159). It also, however, means that such analyses should be as accurate and objective as possible, as they themselves impact upon the direction and scale of the APSA's role. Unfortunately, Bergholm's thesis, like the rest of the APSA discourse, relies on a preconceived *projected functionalist role* for the APSA which is not fully defended or explained. As Bergholm says herself, the mandate of AMIS "acted as a normative yardstick against which wider audiences now judged the AU's performance". Therefore, if that mandate has been misrepresented as a civilian protection mandate, without any evidence to back that up, when (as Bergholm herself accepts) its main focus is actually military observation, then expectations are not going to correspond to performance. AMIS's *endemic functionalist role* was military observer. However, Bergholm's *projected functionalist role* for AMIS was civilian protection (Bergholm 2009: 160); she finds AMIS correspondingly

unsuccessful as a result of its failure to perform a civilian protection role in Darfur.

This is problematic for several reasons; despite western support for a civilian protection mandate, there was not a global consensus on the matter; as Bergholm (2009: 155-157) points out, China and Russia were not in favour of intervention. More importantly, the task set for the mission, in both the UN and PSC mandates, did not include civilian protection except for civilians in the *immediate vicinity* of AMIS forces, and only if they have the capacity to intervene successfully (the average MILOB protection force only consisted of a single section of about eight soldiers). They also explicitly state the Government of Sudan has responsibility for civilian protection.

The fact that AMIS forces were able to bend the mandate to employ preventive deployments to the extent that they did indicates that the APSA was able to achieve a higher level of civilian protection than it was originally tasked with in Darfur. This indicates *success*, not failure. AMIS may not have lived up to Bergholm's *projected functionalist* role, but that returns us to the original problem with the APSA scholarship: why is one *projected functionalist role* more valid than another? Authors tend not to address this head-on; Bergholm's thesis takes the need for AMIS to perform a civilian protection role in Darfur as self-evident.

This thesis has argued that, regardless of what observers would have *liked* the APSA to do in Darfur (protect every civilian, protect all aid workers, arrest all *janjaweed* etc.), the realities of the APSA's limiting and enabling factors means that such an expanded role is not possible. It therefore makes little sense to judge the APSA to be unsuccessful for failing to achieve an objective which it

did not set itself, which the UN did not set for it, which the international community of states did not agree upon, and which was effectively impossible anyway.

## ***How Will this New Perception of Role Will Affect the Discourse***

### **Moving the Debate away from Pointless Criticism**

Creating a more evidence-based framework for analysing the role of organisations does not stifle useful debate. For example, by showing that widespread protection of civilians was outside of the role of the AMIS, *Institutional Role Theory* is simply moving the debate along, invalidating discourse that is devoted to criticising the mission for something that is outside its *interactionist role* and moving the debate towards more productive areas such as: Should we try to develop the role of the APSA as a protection force? How much capacity enhancement would be required for this? Will the APSA's governance be willing to take on an expanded role in this area? Would this role be better performed outside the framework of the APSA, through nation states of other international organisations? Should the UN be pressured to deploy earlier in the peace process and support APSA missions sooner?

For example, at the time Williams (2006) was writing, the APSA did not have a significant role in protection, somewhat invalidating his criticisms of the APSA for not doing so extensively. A more worthwhile approach may have been to explain the need for civilian protection and suggest who should provide such assistance. Williams did do this to a certain extent, but his suggestions were based upon a *projected functionalist view* of the role of NATO and the UN; Africa is out of NATO's area. Likewise, the United Nations is a peacekeeping

organisation, and cannot deploy unless there is a peace process or at least a cease-fire. The fact that these did not exist in Darfur at the time meant that it was outside the role of the UN. Again, explaining why it *should* be part of the UN's responsibilities and how to operationalise such a change to the legal framework and capacities of the UN could have been another focus for his efforts on the topic.

Institutional role theory does not invalidate *projected functionalist* perspectives, however, which can certainly be useful as goals towards which an organisation's *interactionist role* could be directed. However, it does encourage authors to explain and justify these perspectives more carefully; for example; Bergholm criticised the APSA because "when AMIS was endorsed, its troops were not screened, briefed, trained or equipped for the task [civilian protection] that was expected of them" (Bergholm 2009: 168). This criticism becomes less valid if AMIS was never designed nor intended to play a civilian protection role.

### **New Framework for Debate over the Extent of Limiting and Enabling Factors**

*Institutional Role Theory* also creates a new framework for debate over the extent and nature of the limiting and enabling factors that have exerted pressure upon the organisation. Although this thesis provides an initial exploration of these factors, the debate over their effects and extents should continue in order to refine our understanding of the role.

### **Updating the Framework**

The thesis has suggested a chronological context for the role of the APSA, and highlighted its trajectory; however, limiting and enabling factors continue to affect the APSA's role and in the future it will evolve. Documenting new limiting



and enabling factors, and monitoring existing ones, will be necessary to provide a clear and up-to-date view of the APSA's *interactionist role*.

### **Focusing on the Real Role as an Objective Basis for Policy**

The *endemic functionalist* and *projected functionalist* definitions of the role of the APSA have both been shown to be misleading. The *interactionist* definition of the role of the APSA presents an objective, evidence-based view of the role of the APSA, and where its strengths and weaknesses lie. This can then be used as a basis for policy, either as a reference for the prioritisation of capacity building, or as a basis for understanding the APSA's place in Africa's strategic environment.

*Functionalist roles* also have a part to play in policy, but this thesis has shown that they cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of what the organisation *is*, only what they think that it *ought* to be. Deciding between various *projected functionalist roles* or the *endemic functionalist role* as the long term objective, or ideal outcome of capacity enhancement may be a key element of policy decisions; however, those same decisions need to have a clear foundation in an accurate understanding of the role that the organisation *currently* plays, allowing policy makers to make a more measured decision about which *functionalist* roles are realistic policy objectives, which are too ambitious and which aim to move the organisation in an unwanted direction.

As this thesis has shown, the role of an organisation is determined by myriad influences; enabling factors would have to start pushing to expand the role played by the APSA in any one dimension, while corresponding limiting factors would have to reduce their pressure at the same time. Legality, capacity,

external support and governance all need to work together to push for an expansion. Moreover, there needs to be a requirement for this expansion in the regional security environment in which the APSA operates.

### **Adapting Institutional Role Theory for other International Actors**

As this extended case study has demonstrated, *Institutional Role Theory* could help improve our understanding of the division of labour in international relations, and could also help to highlight widespread limiting factors and ineffective enabling factors. It could be possible to work out the interactionist role of multiple organisations working in the same field (e.g. the APSA, the AU and the EU as peacekeeping agencies in Africa) and compare them to explore relative success and failure, strengths and weaknesses. It is therefore hoped that it will be applied as an analytical framework in the study of other international actors.

### **Conclusion**

This thesis has highlighted the need for academics to be much more careful about the use of terms such as success, failure, performance and especially *role*, when dealing with institutions like the APSA in international relations. It has reconceptualised what we mean by the word *role*, establishing a new version of Role Theory, which can be used in International Relations. It has provided technical definitions for three core uses of the word *role* and applied them to the APSA. In particular, this thesis has sought to define the APSA in interactionist terms as a way of establishing an objective, systematic and repeatable assessment of its role.

The thesis does not just describe what the role of the APSA is, it explains why and how the APSA plays that role through a careful analysis of the myriad limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA; twisting, shaping and moulding its role into something other than what was intended or what is expected. The thesis has thereby challenged pre-existing conceptualisations of the role of the APSA, especially criticising what the thesis has termed *projected functionalist* interpretations of the role of the APSA, which remain prominent in the literature. The definition of the role of the APSA presented in this chapter can be seen to have satisfied the objectives of the thesis, providing an all-encompassing definition of the role of the APSA, arrived at systematically through the implementation of *Institutional Role Theory*.

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# Appendix I

## *List of interviewees*

- Dr. Solomon Gomes, Peace and Security Advisor at the Peace Support Operations Division
- Sam Jeremy from the British Embassy in Ethiopia's African Peace and Security section
- Dr. Admore Kambudzi, head of the Peace and Security Council Secretariat
- Sandy Moss from the British Embassy in Ethiopia's African Peace and Security section
- Dr. Tim Murithi, Programme Head of the PSC Report Programme at the Institute for Security Studies
- Thomas Peyker, Head of Peace and Security Section of the European Union Delegation to the African Union
- Takwa Zebulon Suifon from Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
- Kevin Warthon, the US State Department's Peace and Security Advisor to the African Union