Coventry University

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Engaging with the Total oil corporation in Myanmar: the impact of dialogue as a tool for change towards greater conflict sensitivity

Cerletti, Francesca

Award date:
2013

Awarding institution:
Coventry University

Link to publication

Engaging with the Total oil corporation in Myanmar: the impact of dialogue as a tool for change towards greater conflict sensitivity

By Francesca Cerletti

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the University's Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2013

To Tanneke

Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to my family, friends and many people for their help and support. Without them the realisation of this project would not have been possible.

I am grateful to all those I have spoken to, with reference to this project, for their availability, willingness to share their knowledge and trust in me: I owe my achievement to you.

I would like to thank Tanneke and Ruth for their excellent proofreading and their ability to laugh with me at my creative English; your professional backgrounds, different from mine, have sparked interesting conversations from which I learnt much.

Coventry University has been amazing in supporting me. The staff of the library, IT services, and Quality and Research Support Unit have been unbelievably patient in addressing my requests, promptly and with a smile. The completion of my work has been providently supported by the Business, Environment and Society Faculty Studentship. Thank you to the Faculty members for believing in me.

Carol, Marwan, Alp, Alan and Steve in their own roles have been excellent mentors. I have valued your challenging questions and ability to push my boundaries. What you have given me will stay with me for a long, long time. I also want to thank you for your time in assisting with the administrative aspects of the course.

I have treasured the words of many, many friends as stimulus to persist in my PhD adventure. Hiroto, Paola, Mariangela, Chris, Giovanella, Tanneke, Ruth, Sitha and Kariena, I cannot express how much your emotional and practical support has meant to me: *grazie*.

Abstract

This thesis explores whether dialogue between a company and a non-profit organisation (NPO) can influence a company's way of working towards being more conflict sensitive. As a case-study I analysed the dialogue between the French oil and gas company, Total S.A. (Total), and the US based NPO, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) relating to the company's operations in Myanmar/Burma.

The objectives of the research were to ascertain if dialogue had a positive impact, and if so, what it was about the dialogue that enabled change, what was the process of change that could be observed and how embedded such change was.

Drawing on post-modernism, systems thinking and complexity thinking, I have built on organisational change, conflict transformation, dialogue and cross-sector partnership literature to examine the role of dialogue as an enabler of change. While highlighting parallels in the discourses, I analyse the process and degree of change within the company through two conflict transformation models, one by Lederach (1997) and the other by Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson (2007), which I feel best synthesise these parallels. The research is a longitudinal case-study (2002-2012), based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis.

The study adds to the limited academic research on conflict sensitivity in general, and on the implications for a company's way of working in particular. Although I find that within the business sector, the notion of conflict sensitivity is assumed in the wider concept of corporate social responsibility, noteworthy is the relevance of dialogue in change processes. Dialogue is an essential enabler as it sparks transformational levers also recognised in the literature reviewed. However it is not sufficient. The research illustrates that the dialogue between CDA and Total has played a critical role in facilitating a shift in the company's way of working, *with* the contribution of other influences at play. As such, I draw attention to the complexity of the change process and discuss the current nature of the drivers of change within Total.

Table of Contents

Table of contents – by F. Cerletti

Table of contents – by F. Cerletti

Table of contents – by F. Cerletti

Table of Tables, Boxes and Illustrations

Table of illustrations – by F. Cerletti

Chapter 1

Introduction

The engagement between corporations and civil society groups has been an uneasy one, often characterised by heated confrontations. In the past, such interactions have in the main focussed around the impacts of production on environmental and health matters. Extractive industries, scrutinised for their role in the dynamics of conflict, corruption and human rights abuses, have been at the epicentre of such interactions. Engagement with business has had many forms, ranging from advocacy campaigns, stakeholder action, to consultations and policy discussions.

During the last 15 years, however, there has been a shift towards engaging with the private sector. The notion of dialogue between business and civil society as well as non-government organisations (NGOs) emerges in the work of Heap (2000a). The literature on corporate-civil society interactions has since then taken different perspectives. A considerable body of work looks at the role of advocacy and stakeholder action (Bakker, F. G. A. D. and Hond 2008, den Hond and de Bakker, Frank G. A. 2007) and how they impact on business. Black (2009) explains how many of these initiatives aim to change the environment corporations work in either from an institutional, organisational or social perspective.

The rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a response of the business sector to address some of the criticism levied by civil society, generated an equally growing discourse. Authors like Aguilera et al. (2007), Zollo (2004) and Black (2009) have focussed on the motivations which lead corporations to shift their business perspectives toward more 'socially orientated' operation approaches.

In the last decade or so there has been growing interest in cross-sector partnerships. From the focus on design and institutionalisation of partnerships, reviewed by Seitanidi and Crane (2009), research has become more specialised, for example exploring contributions to market development (Dahan et al. 2010) specific area collaboration such as disaster relief (Nolte, Martin and Boenigk 2012) and sustainable development (Glasbergen 2011).

From a conflict/peace perspective, during the last decade or so more attention has been paid to the business sector and its potential contribution to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Authors like Guesnet, Schure and Paes (2008), Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005), Nelson (2000), Tripathi and Gündüz (2008,) and Zandvliet (2005) identify both opportunities for synergy between the business sector and civil society, and the benefits the sector can derive from contributing to peace building. The literature also brings to the fore critical issues to consider when thinking about the potential of the business sector in its contribution to conflict transformation.

A number of non-government organisations (NGOs) like International Alert, Berghof-Foundation, Care International, Save the Children, have begun working closely with the business sector, industry associations and international organisations to understand how specific private operations, like corporations, deal with conflict and how they introduce conflict sensitive approaches. There are success stories in Northern Ireland (Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz 2005) and South Africa (Lieberfeld 2002). Other initiatives have been present in Colombia (Rettberg 2012), while areas of debate draw from what is happening in the Niger Delta (Idemudia, Cragg and Best 2010), Myanmar/Burma (Bais and Juijser 2005, Bais 2008) and the Sudan. Some of these collaborations for example have resulted in manuals and guidelines for corporations: *Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices* (International Alert 2005), and (specifically for the oil and gas industry), *Operating in Areas of Conflict* (IPIECA 2008)

Drawing from practical experiences, authors such as Guesnet, Schure and Paes (2008) have started to report on the drivers which have led corporations to adopt conflict sensitive approaches and/or contribute to peacebuilding. However, it also seems important to look at how CSR relates to conflict sensitivity and more specifically to conflict transformation. Gitsham (2007) discusses the impact of initiatives in Colombia raising interesting issues of comparability.

Less, however, is available on the impact of 'soft' engagements with corporations, and, for example, how interactions translate in terms of organisational change and/or internal policies/procedures.

With the exception of contingency theorists like Hailey and Balogun (2002) (for a comprehensive review see By (2005)) who argue that companies can align to changes in context, organisational change literature tends to focus on the dynamics of change internal

to the organisation. Last but not least, the rich literature on dialogue focuses on how it improves organisational learning and work dynamics (Senge 2006), on communications (Laszlo Katria and Lazlo 2004), on bringing together parties in conflict (Saunders 1999, Laszlo Katria and Lazlo 2004), on multi-stakeholder engagement (Burchell and Cook 2006), but not as a tool of engagement between two organisations.

The aim of this research is to explore the role of dialogue as a tool of engagement: in particular if it can foster a change in practices in the way corporations work. Drawing on the experience of my 'double' professional life - as a change manager in the private and public sector and as a peacebuilding consultant – I have chosen to investigate the interaction between two organisations with substantially different backgrounds. They are: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA), a United States of America (US) based non-profit organisation (NPO), and the French oil and gas company Total S.A. (Total).

At the beginning of the last decade, Total approached CDA to contract an impact assessment of its CSR programme. Following a number of conversations, Total joined the collaborative learning project Corporate Engagement Project (CEP), led by CDA, which aims to learn how companies can decrease the negative impacts, and increase positive ones, of their presence/operations on local communities. As a result the two organisations engaged, under the auspices of CEP, in a 'process of dialogue'. In addition to Total's participation in CEP consultation, CDA made field visits to several of the French company's operations sites, for example Mauritania, Sudan and Myanmar/Burma. For each visit reports are available (www.cdainc.com).

Underpinning my research is the question: *can dialogue between a non-profit organisation (NPO) and a corporation nurture change in the corporation towards becoming more conflict sensitive?* Furthermore, building on the response, if the dialogue has influenced the company's way of working, *what was it about the dialogue that enabled change? What is the process of change? How embedded is the change?* If no impact has been observed, then the focus of the investigation would have shifted to understanding *why this is not happening and explore what needs to happen*.

Given that much has been written in terms of criticism towards the corporate world, I chose a case study that was considered a 'success story' by those who argue for principled engagement of western companies in Myanmar/Burma (Bais and Juijser 2005, Caillaud 2011)

and some NGOs working locally. I was interested to understand what was it that 'worked' in the dialogue and whether it could be replicated. In order to do so, my objectives were to *gauge whether dialogue had an impact; identify the process of dialogue adopted by the two organizations; and identify the characteristics of the relationship.*

Through this research my expectation is to be able to contribute to an expansion of the existing body of knowledge on conflict transformation and organizational change by drawing on similarities between the two disciplines with regards to the process of change. I also hope that my work fosters a greater understanding of the strategies available to civil society groups to engage with corporations, by analysing the specific processes of engagement and of change that have been taking place.

The specific focus of the research has been the dialogue that occurred between Total and CDA in relation to the operations in Myanmar/Burma. These operations are run by a subsidiary Total E&P Myanmar (TEPM) of the Exploration and Production (E&P) branch of the French company.

Total is a multi-faceted company covering the whole range of activities in the oil and gas sector, from exploration to marketing. Ethical behaviour and corporate social responsibility, areas under which conflict sensitivity would fall, are being implemented across the whole organisation. The Exploration and Production (E&P) branch of the company seems, however, to have taken the lead on what within Total is known as 'societal' issues i.e. the relationship with local context and communities[1]. Although CDA's engagement with Total is with the whole company, in the main the NPO has related to E&P and with some Group level department. The two organisations have engaged on Total's presence in Myanmar/Burma since the very beginning of the relationship (2002), and the dialogue is on-going. It was therefore possible to observe changes over an arc of ten years (2002- 2012). However, given the resources available, I have not been able to expand my research beyond E&P, TEPM and the corporate level.

At the time I began the research, few writings were available on corporate engagement in Myanmar/Burma. The publications I identified were three: *Getting it Right* the book that

---

[1] Total uses the term societal to refer to matters concerning society/community. This is specifically to avoid potential confusion with the direct translation of society in French. *Société*, or society, within business environments commonly refers to the company, as in *Société Anonyme*).

collects the lessons learned from CDA's CEP (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009), a PhD thesis by Nicky Black (2009), and *The Profit of Peace* by Bais et al that looks at how corporations can have positive impacts in area of conflicts (Bais and Juijser 2005). The advocacy group Earth Rights International (ERI) has written extensively on the issue of human rights abuses and corporate presence in the country (ERI 1996, ERI 2002, ERI 2003, ERI 2009b, ERI 2009c).

Additionally, in 2010 Myanmar/Burma began to experience a process of change that until today has led to unexpected reforms. Whether these reforms are genuine and sustainable is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is however likely that the presence of foreign business will increase rapidly in the country and the findings of the research may come useful to those who wish to engage with the private sector. It is my belief, in fact, that the actor with the potential to bring about changes in the future, both in Myanmar/Burma and in the rest of the world, will be business. At the moment (April 2012) this drive could lead to positive or negative outcomes: the dice are still rolling. There is therefore a window of opportunity to influence where business will go.

Given the substantial controversy that has surrounded corporate presence in Myanmar/Burma, I would like to clarify my position. I am aware of the abuses that occurred in the area where the joint venture gas-pipeline project, the Yadana Project, operated by Total[2], is located. Just as the horrendous abuses that have taken place in the rest of the country, these are distressing and painful for all those impacted. The remit of the research is however different. It focuses mainly on what enables the organisation to change practices and what is the process of this change.

The research draws on both organisational change and conflict transformation theories. I have been guided by several schools of thought. Firstly, I draw on the postmodern notion that there is no such thing as *the* truth (Kleining 1988) and that what we know is influenced by factors such as culture, experiences, paradigms (Harvey, MacDonald and Hill 2000). It is therefore important to understand what informs what people do, including the relationships between individuals, social structures and human agency, because of the interconnectedness that there is between them (Giddens 1984). Secondly, I have been influenced by systems thinking (Coleman et al. 2007, Senge 2006) and the view of change as an emergent process

---

[2] The Yadana Gas-pipeline, as I will explain in *Chapters 4*, is a joint venture between Total E&P Myanmar, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), PTT-EP and Unocal (a subsidiary of Chevron).

(Burnes 1996, Burnes 2004). I have followed an interpretative approach and used qualitative methods.

I have built on the similarities in how both organisational change and conflict transformation authors (Burnes 1997, By 2005, Clements 2004, Lederach and Maiese 2003, Mitchell 2002, Senge 2006) view the process of change and have made parallels between frameworks. Namely, I have noted the closeness between how Kanter (1999a, 1999c) and Lederach (2003) see change as a process requiring the participation of all those involved (the triangle). I have also highlighted how Lederach et al's matrix of the dimensions of conflict transformation (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) seems to synthesise models on the dimensions of organisational change identified by organisational change writers (Burke and Litwin 1992, Cope 2003). Both conflict transformation and organisational change see behaviours, attitudes, communications, interactions between individuals and groups, strategies, policies, procedures and culture at the heart of the process of change. They are seen as levers for change as well as being key indicators of its depth. Lederach et al neatly synthesised these in four dimensions: structural, relational, personal, and cultural (the matrix of conflict transformation (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007)).

For my analysis I have therefore relied on Lederach's triangle and Lederach et al's matrix of conflict transformation. I have also proposed a model that considers the reach that Total's CSR initiatives have on its sphere of influence and how this has changed in time. Drawing on the literature on CSR and the findings of the research, I have argued that CSR initiatives can be seen as a way for business to build relationship with its stakeholders. As such, I have developed a model to illustrate that company policies, behaviours, initiatives etc. have repercussions and ripple effects across the range of its stakeholders. Viewing the impact of such policies, initiatives and behaviours in terms of relationship building potential, facilitates understanding their influences.

The main source of primary information I have are 54 semi-structured interviews both with people who have a direct experience of the dialogue between CDA and Total, as well as people who only have an indirect knowledge of it. The range of stakeholders has been chosen to reflect as far as possible a full range of perspectives: local communities, peacebuilding practitioners, individuals from civil society organisations, individuals from other companies. Other sources of information are company documentation, and reports by CDA,

NGOs and other organisations which are in the public domain. Personal observations from the field trip also inform the research.

The main focus of the research, as mentioned earlier, has been the operations in Myanmar/Burma. However, where possible I have made considerations and stipulations on wider trends and implications beyond that, as company documents and insights from interviews have allowed. In this regard, I would like to emphasise that such considerations and speculations mainly refer to the E&P branch as well as group level functions of the French company.

In choosing this topic I have been aware of the considerable challenges posed by the large number of variables. Some of these variables are pertinent to the company: operating paradigm (economic model, organisational values, culture, staff perception and motivation, attitude to risk, knowledge and skills, cultural specificity); way of working (policies, procedure, processes, funding and lending policies; international, local, industry regulations and standards; constraints both contextual and operational); relationships (with host government and authorities as well as the one with the government of where its headquarters are located, relationships with industry and other stakeholders, for example United Nations (UN) Global Compact, pressure from lobbying and advocacy). Others pertain to the context: political and political economy environments (political direction taken by the country in which the corporation's headquarters reside, local situation, geo-economic prospects); industry trends; social demands; technology developments etc. There are also challenges inherent to evaluating the intangibles like the impact of relationships. Furthermore, as emerged from the research, the dialogue between CDA and Total occurred in a context where a number of other drivers for change were at play.

From the very beginning, therefore, I was conscious that I could not make quantitative evaluations of impact. Change has been evaluated by cross referencing what was identified by participants from the two organisations with interviews with other stakeholders. This is inspired by the 360' feedback on leadership approach adopted in the business world[3]. This research is only an opening for further investigations.

---

[3] The 360' Leadership review process is a personal development assessment used in business to evaluate employees. The evaluation is the result of feedback from superiors, peers and subordinates as well as a self-assessment.

My overall argument is that dialogue was an essential, but not sufficient, contribution to a change towards socially responsible practices within Total. The dialogue did not happen in isolation, but it was crucial in fostering transformational processes within the organisation. However, the notion of conflict sensitivity does not emerge as explicit. The findings reflect what conflict transformation and organisational change theory highlights in terms of systemic interdependencies (Coleman et al. 2007, Senge 2006), the open ended and emergent nature of change (By 2005, Lederach and Maiese 2003), and the need of multi-dimensional and multi-level approaches across the community/organisation (Kanter 1999a, Lederach 2003).

The thesis considers events up to April 2012, time of writing. It is structured in eleven chapters. This introduction, the literature review and the methodology outline are *Chapters 1*, *2* and *3* respectively.

In *Chapter 4* I offer background information about the context and the two organisations involved in the case study. The purpose is to present enough details to understand analysis in the following chapters. I briefly describe Total and CDA. I relate how the organisation we know today as Total came into being, its position in the market, its organizational structure and key decision-making processes. I then look at the operations in Myanmar/Burma, including an outline of main CSR initiatives and how they have changed over time. With regards to CDA, I note the projects it leads, the structure of the organisation, and explain CEP and the approach that underpins it.

In *Chapter 5*, I continue by offering an outline of historical developments in Myanmar/Burma, an interpretation of the conflict and of the influencing factors on the dynamics of conflict such as: political and economic developments, social issues like poor education, political polarization and politicization, militarisation of the national institutions, discrimination along multiple lines, etc. I conclude the broad brush picture of Myanmar/Burma with an overview of the political developments since 2011. Since the 2010 elections in Myanmar/Burma the course of events has taken an unexpected direction. 2011 and early 2012 have been characterised by reforms following one another at an unprecedented rate: relative abolition of censorship, political prisoner amnesty, exchange rate unification, National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, participation and overwhelming victory at the by-election, cease-fires with ethnic groups, concessions to civil society in relation to some industrial projects. At the same time there have also been

setbacks. Conflict with the Kachin Independence Army returned, and since writing the dissertation, with the Rohinghya people in Arakan state.

I conclude the chapter by outlining the main criticisms levied against Total from academia and civil society. I complete the summary of lines of tensions characterising the context of the relationship by looking at organisational tensions within the French company possibly arising from the perceived need to change as a business in relation to society and the environment, the debate on CSR, the legacy from scandals, accidents and trials.

In *Chapters 6* to *9* I discuss the findings from the research. Building on the initial description made of CEP in *Chapter 4* and the collaborative learning approach, I start *Chapter 6* by detailing the process and methodology used during the field visits by CDA. I continue by relating the motivations and goals of both organizations that have led to the dialogue. Increasingly moving towards the analysis, I then discuss how interviewees have identified the impact of the dialogue on the change in the company's practices and what were identified as enablers. As expected, interviewees agree that the dialogue contributed to change. However, they also note how it was one of a number of influencing factors. The dialogue occurred in a context where other drivers were also pushing Total towards change. Internal and contextual factors as well as the socialisation process (as described by Kantz 2007) that the French Company experienced, all contributed to a change in practice. Furthermore, I observe that there has been a change towards *socially responsible* practices; the notion of conflict sensitivity does not emerge as explicit, within the company it is implied within the broader concept of corporate social responsibility.

In *Chapter 7* I then examine the enablers of change identified by the interviewees. In addition to factors linked to the context, internal drivers to Total and the socialisation process, as mentioned earlier, interviewees have also identified factors that relate to CDA as an organisation and those that are pertinent to the relationship between the two organisations. Interestingly, there is an overlap between the aspects identified as characteristics of the relationship and the enablers. By analysing these last two sets of enablers further with descriptors highlighted by cross-sector partnership authors - Millar, Choi and Chen (2004) and Dahan et al (2010) (fit and trust) Seitanidi and Ryan (2007), (power dynamics and trust) and Seitanidi (2008) and Wadham (2009) (design) - and with fundamental principles of dialogue identified by Bohm (1996), Saunders (1999) and Senge (2006) I make two points. Firstly, the findings of the research are broadly in line with other

research findings from cross-sector partnership literature. Secondly, the comparison with the cross-sector partnership literature shows that the enablers identified by interviewees connect to the principles of dialogue, explaining the dialogue's transformative potential.

I conclude the chapter by noting how the intervention of the dialogue focussed both at the individual and the organisational level and that the enablers identified by interviewees also suggest that the dialogue has actually sparked transformational levers within the organisation. I comment how the dialogue seems to have engendered empowerment, motivation and created a safe space for experimentation and innovation, which are transformational levers acknowledged both by organisational change and conflict transformation authors as: Bowen (1992), Cope (2003), Folger and Barush Bush (1996), Saunders (1999), Scharmer (2007), Sehested and Sonnenberg (2011).

I explore the process of change in the first part of *Chapter 8*. I argue that the process of change can be explained through Lederach's triangle (Lederach 2003), and that using this framework highlights how contributing factors for change were both multi-level and multi-dimensional. The process of change, as argued by Lederach from the conflict transformation field and by Kanter (1999a) from the organisational change perspective, in fact requires that all those involved should be in some way mobilised with appropriate interventions determined by the perspective and reach individuals have in an organisation/community. Furthermore, the authors argue that there have to be good top-down, bottom-up and horizontal communication flows to enable mutual influence and participation across the organisation/community.

Next, in *Chapter 9*, I argue that the relationship building potential of the CSR initiatives undertaken by Total in Myanmar/Burma has actually increased in the time observed by the study, with a more visible trend during the last four to five years. In doing so, I map observations made about the initiatives by interviewees, CDA and other external observers to a model I proposed in the methodology chapter, which highlights the relationship building potential of TEPM's activities. As an explanation of this 'rise' in visibility, I suggest that at this time there is a confluence of a number of factors within the organisations - including a shift in understanding and in the perception of risk, a maturing of the dialogue and socialisation process that Total is experiencing - that manifests itself in a surge of initiatives.

Chapter 10 reviews how embedded change is within Total. I map the evidence of change highlighted by interviewees, to Lederach et al's matrix of conflict transformation (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007). The findings suggest that change is occurring definitively in three of the four dimensions (individual, relational and structural); however a consolidation in the company's culture is not yet evident. Structural aspects seem to drive change and the perception that emerges from comments by interviewees is that it is not embedded in the culture. Having said this, if current efforts towards institutionalisation are maintained it is likely that it will be achieved.

Looking beyond the findings of the research, I conclude the thesis (*Chapter 11*) by exploring some of the practical implications. When deciding on the research, I have specifically chosen to take a pragmatic approach: corporations are an integral part of economic life, as such it is important to engage with them. Total is a corporation that has evolved in its way of working increasing its sensitivity and attentiveness in relation to the impact it has locally. More importantly, it has the opportunity to do more and influence others. Socially responsible behaviour cannot be taken for granted in business. Learning from a success story may show ways in which stakeholders can engage with other firms to improve working practices.

The findings of the research indicate that multiple strategies/interventions are needed in fostering change, in particular, I believe, when engaging with people/organisations that have different world views as the case-study shows. One of these strategies needs to be dialogue, as dialogue has transformative power. It is important to work with the opportunities and limitations that individual companies have and hence understand how they operate, linking to internal triggers/facilitators of change, at the same time without neglecting the systemic nature of their interactions. Focus of change needs to be therefore multi-dimensional considering individuals, relationships and the organisations itself.

1.1   Some definitions

Before concluding the introduction I would like to clarify some of the terms I have used in my writing.

Conflict Transformation – Lederach has defined conflict transformation as: "(c)onflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving

opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships." (http://www.restorativejustice.org/10fulltext/lederach)

Peacebuilding – Lederach defines peacebuilding as: "a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct." (Lederach 1997:20)

Relationships – I have used the term relationships as Lederach and Maiese intend, i.e. not only between individuals, but also between groups and institutions. "(R)elationships represent a web of connections that form the larger context, the human-ecosystem, from which particular issues arise and are given life." (Lederach and Maiese 2003)

Complex environment - I use the term 'complex environment' to refer to an area, characterised by multiple coexisting lines of tension. Usually such tensions involve most of the following: instability, conflict (violent and/or societal), lack of institutional mechanisms for fair resolution of socio-economic and political issues, uncertainty about the rule of law, human rights abuses, endemic and pervasive social issues like discrimination, inequalities.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) - I refer to Corporate Social Responsibility as described by ISO 26000: "responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour that:

- contributes to sustainable development, including health and the welfare of society;
- takes into account the expectations of stakeholders;
- is in compliance with applicable law and consistent with international norms of behaviour; and
- is integrated throughout the organization and practiced in its relationships" (ISO 2010:3).

Conflict sensitivity – Conflict sensitivity is defined as "the ability of your organisation to: understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts." (Africa Peace Forum et al 2004:1)

Total, E&P and TEPM – As discussed in *Chapter 4,* Total S.A. is a corporation with group/corporate level functions and five branches. One of these branches is called Exploration & Production (E&P). In Myanmar/Burma, Total operates through a E&P subsidiary: Total E&P Myanmar or TEPM. As mentioned earlier, I have interviewed people from Total Group level and from TEPM. Although company documentation refers to the groups as a whole, I am uncomfortable, given the restricted pool of interviews, to state that change is observable across the whole organisation. I therefore have used the term Total to indicate group level and E&P.

Transnational (TNC) or multinational company (MNC) - There is no universally accepted definition for a transnational or a multinational company. The latter broadly refers to a company that has its headquarters in one country (home) and runs subsidiaries in other countries (host). When differentiation in terms of geographic location blurs, a company is usually referred to as transnational. Total defines itself as an integrated international oil and gas company (www.total.com).

Myanmar or Burma – The name of the country is still today a delicate issue. The website Network Myanmar states: "(i)n the Burmese language, 'Myanma' has long been the more formal name of the country. It is the name used in the Burmese-language version of the 1947 Constitution enacted in the last year of British rule. It has existed side by side for centuries with the more colloquial 'Bama'. However, a leading nationalist association in the 1930s called *Do Bama Asia* Yon ('We Burmese Association'), of which [General] Aung San was a founder member, chose the name 'Bama' on the grounds that 'Myanma' only represented the traditional territory of the Burman Kings and did not include the non-Burman peoples." (Network Myanmar 2012) The dual co-existence of the name is also confirmed by the anthropologist Gustaaf Houtman, who has been cited in the BBC website: "(t)here's a formal term which is Myanmar and the informal, everyday term which is Burma." (BBC 2007:np) Burma is the anglicised version of Bama/Bumah. In 1989 the then government changed the English version of the country's name from Burma to Myanmar (Network Myanmar 2012). The UN has used this term since then. Pro-democracy activists and those

with strong anti-military regime feelings tend to use the word Burma, protesting that the change to Myanmar/Burma was a typical example of authoritarian decision-making by the Generals and that is was done to whitewash the grievances of the past. During my encounters in these circles I have heard agreement for the term 'Union of the People of Myanmar'. I have chosen to use both: Myanmar/Burma.

Dialogue between Total and CDA – For the purpose of this research, by dialogue between CDA and Total I refer to a series of conversations, exchanges and visits between the two organisations, supported by written documents as well as the participation in the consultations of the collaborative learning project CEP.

Chapter 2
Literature review

I have chosen to explore the available publications by pursuing themes across several bodies of literature. Building on the key question underpinning the research, I have searched in two main directions. The first had the aim of understanding the relationship between conflict and business, whether business has a role in conflict transformation and how it can contribute to it. The purpose of the second was to learn how companies change practices and how much the engagement with civil society has contributed to this shift.

During the review other themes emerged, for example the alignment between how the conflict transformation and change management disciplines consider the process of change, and on the role of empowerment. They have been very influential in my thinking and I have chosen to discuss them jointly with my analysis (see *Chapter 3,* and *6* to *9*). In this chapter I have discussed the main findings related to the quest I set out with.

2.1   Business and conflict

Much has been written on business and conflict by scholars and civil society organisations. Since the mid-1990s academics like Collier (Collier and Gunning 1995) and Duffield (Duffield 2000) have revived the discussion on the connections between war and economic (private and public) interests. Organisations such as Global Witness and Human Rights Watch have been (and continue to be) active in monitoring and highlighting potential negative impacts of business enterprises in conflict areas (see OECD (2002)). International Alert (2005, 2008) has published a list of legal liabilities for companies operating in conflict areas. Authors like Boge et al. (2007), Banfield, Haufler and Lilly (2003), Bennet (2001), Pegg and Wilson (2003), Blanton and Blanton (2006), Nelson (2000), Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005), Zandvliet (2005), Tripathi (2007), Shankleman and Myers (2007) discuss the role of business in conflict dynamics. Jill Shankeman (Shankleman and Myers 2007) has focused specifically on the oil industry. Also Fjelde's (2009) paper on oil and civil wars, although arguing that oil brings stability through the consolidation of the authority in power as the ruling elite is able to attract loyalty by distributing economic benefits, substantially agrees with the majority on the distortive effect the industry may have listed in *Table 2.1*.

Aside from illicit behaviours (money laundering, dealing with armed groups, trade of 'blood' minerals and gems, corruption) the main issues levied against the extractive industry can be grouped in four categories: economic nature, governance, violence/conflict and local level impacts.

The first group builds on the arguments of the political economy of development discourse (Arezki et al 2011, Collier and Gunning 1995, Gylfason 2001, Sachs and Warner 1995, Shaxon 2007). Authors who have raised these issues in relation to oil and gas operations include: Patey (2007) (Sudan), Caroll and Sovacol (2010) (Asia), Haselip (2011) (Peru) and Sovacol (2011) (Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline). These arguments are connected to what is also known as 'the resource curse' i.e. the paradox of economic underperformance of a country despite the wealth of natural resources that it possesses. The focus is on macro-economic factors: distorted terms of trade; income volatility; weak economic development.

The second set of issues concerns the impact of the industry on the governance of a country: revenues from the extractive industries favour regime entrenchment and rent-seeking behaviours. Here, the voices of authors mentioned earlier like Gylfason (2001) and Arezki et al. (2011), Shaxon (2007) are echoed by Myanmar/Burma specialists such as Turnell, Bradford and Vicary (2009), Black (2009) and advocacy groups as ERI (2009c).

Thirdly, companies are criticised of perpetuating or aggravating cycles of violence through, for example, providing financial means to armed factions, or by being directly or indirectly involved in human rights abuses. Such themes are covered by authors from conflict studies, (Collier and Gunning 1995, Duffield 2000, Shankelman and Myers 2007), advocacy groups (ERI 2009c) and (Global Witness 2003) and those who explore corporate engagement (International Alert 2005, Zandvliet and Anderson 2009).

The fourth group focuses on the impacts that corporations have at local level. Authors like Boge et al (2007), Zandvliet and Anderson (2009), Banfield, Haufler and Lilly (2003) include in this group: environmental damage, negative impacts from the distribution of benefits affects deriving from the presence of the company on the local population (inflationary effects, levels of migration to the area, social unbalances, poor compensation and relocations.). *Table 2.1* below lists the principal issues.

Terms of trade	Disproportional exports of raw materials (in relation to other goods) distort the value of the exporting country's currency by increasing it. Other exports will become more expensive and imports cheaper, thus negatively impacting on the balance of payment and macro-economic dynamics. (This issue is also covered by Total in one of its internal guides, *A methodological guide: Developing Local Content and Industry Strategic Objective at Total*, (Total (2008)) to raise awareness about wider economic implications of the extractive industry.)
Income volatility	If the raw materials are subject to volatile prices, like oil is, this volatility will translate in fluctuations of income for the exporting country, rendering planning uncertain.
Weak economic development	Extractive industries, especially capital and knowledge intensive ones, have weak linkages to the rest of the economy. Given that they need to 'rely' on resources and know-how that usually lacks in the country where the raw materials are found, as well as being export orientated, extractive industries do not contribute to the country's overall development.
Regime entrenchment	Business offers a financial life-line to oppressive regimes (or armed actors who exercise control over a territory) through the payment for concessions, the revenues generated by taxation, the presentation of 'gifts' and other perks.
Rent-seeking behaviour and growth inequalities	The rent-seeking behaviour that maybe associated to the presence of resources like oil and gas, can have a negative impact on economic growth and distribution of resources/benefits. The bountiful presence of raw materials may lead those who are benefiting most, to maintaining the status that is generating the profits/benefits; thus contributing to a vicious cycle of poor governance, inequality and social exclusion. In order to maintain their privileges and status the beneficiaries may use their influence over the governance of a country to skew distribution of resources, legal protections, allocation of public funds etc. in their favour. Furthermore rent-seeking behaviour perpetuates itself, contributes to corruption and unproductive use of public resources on ambitious projects depriving critical economic sectors like education and health.
Labour issues	Companies are criticised for lack of transparency in their hiring policies, disadvantaging the local labour force; for relying on 'imported' labour and for applying lower standards to the treatment of the local labour force.
Violence/conflict human rights abuses.	Through revenues from natural resource extraction, provided by companies to governments/armed actors, business either perpetuate existing conflict cycles and with human rights abuses and/or created new ones arising as governments attempt to establish the operation of an enterprise.
Local impacts: exclusion of some groups, inflations	The arrival of corporations can have distortive effects on local dynamics in terms of inclusivity/exclusivity through, for example, the type of relationships held, the services provided, or the nature of access to jobs and opportunities. Foreign companies may also induce exceptional micro-economic systems characterised by inflated cost of living caused by their presence.

Table 2.1 – summary of the main criticisms levied against corporations.

With regards to Myanmar/Burma, there are numerous publications from advocacy organisations, (an example is ERI's (2009b) report) that point to the negative impacts of the oil exploration and production industry. I will synthesise the controversy around Total's presence in Myanmar/Burma in *Chapter 5*.

2.1.1 How can business contribute to conflict transformation?

Given the stark criticisms made, can business have a role in conflict transformation? The best synthesis on the role business can play, is from authors who draw from practice. Bennet (2001) offers a list of examples of partnerships between business, civil society organisations and/or international organisations. Tripathi's (2007) report practical ways in which the private sector has contributed to peacebuilding efforts.

Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005) connect to conflict transformation by expanding the list of actors identified by Lederach (1997) to include business.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 2.1 – on the left, Lederach's triangle of conflict transformation. (Lederach 1997) On the right, business actors in conflict prevention and resolution. (Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz 2005)

Conceptual frameworks can be found in some of the authors mentioned. These writings emphasise the systemic nature of conflict dynamics. Nelson (2000) presents a comprehensive framework that considers both the factors that determine the role in conflict as well as its potential contribution (*Figure 2.1*). The angle is one of contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.

The factors that determine the role of business in conflict

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 2.2– factors determining the role of business in conflict. (Nelson 2000)

Literature Review – by F. Cerletti

The ways in which business can make a positive contribution to conflict prevention and resolution

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 2.3 – factors determining the way in which business can make a positive contribution. (Nelson 2000)

A few handbooks are specifically conceived to help companies operate in conflict areas. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*, were first drawn in the 1970s, revised in 2000 and later updated in 2010 (Quaedvilieg 2011). However, only in their last update have the OECD guidelines been extended to include activities by companies and more comprehensive list of issues, for example by drawing on the work of John Ruggie and the United Nations (UN) Global Compact on human rights (Quaedvilieg 2011).

Conversations between a number of governments, civil society groups and several corporations resulted in the *Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights* (VPs). The VPs were agreed by participating parties in 2000. They offer high level suggestions on how to maximise the interaction between governments, companies and security agencies to ensure security and the respect of human rights (Anon:nd).

Two handbooks are for managers operating in conflict areas in the extractive industry, *Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices* by the non-government organisation (NGO) International Alert (IA) (International Alert 2005), and (specifically for the oil and gas industry), *Operating in Areas of Conflic*t by the International Petroleum Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) (IPIECA 2008).

The IA and IPIECA handbooks focus on conflict sensitivity, elaborating the concept and detailing the range of options available to companies. Taking a systemic approach, options for conflict resolution are categorised in three groups from minimum expected action to proactive engagement with conflict dynamics.

The IA handbook is extremely comprehensive and offers tools for assessing risk and conflict impact at different stages in the product cycle. It builds on Nelson's (2000) three categories of contribution (core business, social investment and policy dialogue) and identifies three levels of strategies companies can adopt when in a conflict environment: compliance, 'do no harm', peacebuilding. The publication details sample strategies and actions companies can choose from as well as analysing typical risks in conflict areas and offering suggestions for mitigation.

Figure 2.4 – hierarchy of potential action by business. Adapted from International Alert (2005)

While the IPIECA (2008) guide covers more or less the same content as the IA publication, it takes a stark risk assessment perspective. The levels of possible actions for business are presented as: do no harm, do something and do something++.

Figure 2.5 – options available to companies operating in conflict areas. (IPIECA 2008)

The UN Global Compact has launched in 2010 the *Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict Areas and High-Risk Zones* in conjunction with PRI (UN Global Compact 2010), as a resource for companies and investors on best practice. It broadly follows the categorisation of the manuals cited above. The topics are grouped in core business, government relations, stakeholder relations and strategic social investment. It is structured around ten points of

guidance on issues like corruption, rigorous supply chain management, and constructive engagement. Each point is explained highlighting challenges and opportunities.

As interest in the relationship between human rights and business increased, other works have emerged. In the main this work draws on John Ruggie's work on the responsibility to Protect, Respect and Remedy (UN 2010); for example the *Red to Green Flags* report published by the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) (IHRB, Institute Human Rights and Business 2011), which strives to use knowledge that exists to provide an overview of good practice, informed by a human rights framework, found in business offering suggestions for broader application.

Conflict transformation scholars agree that business can positively contribute to mitigating conflict. Drawing from Nelson (2000), Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005) synthesise three main areas of contribution identified:

- "1.   core business - a company's operations management
- 2.   social investment – contribution to development, social issues, etc.
- 3.   policy dialogue – influence at the policy level, institution-building, etc." (Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz 2005:8)

With reference to Myanmar/Burma, Black's research (Black 2009) reports suggestions made by national and international civil society organisations, local businessmen, managers of corporations and local community members (*Table 2.2*). These mirror well the points above. Some points are drawn from actual experience, other are stipulations based on identified opportunities.

Table 2.2 – suggestions made by stakeholders in Myanmar/Burma on the role that business can play in an area of conflict (Black 2009)

Zandvliet (2005) makes explicit links to conflict transformation, highlighting the business perspective. He also provides examples of initiatives undertaken by firms that align with conflict transformation (see *table 2.3*).

Table 2.3 – opportunities for intervention. Drawn from Zandvliet (2005)

Academic papers examining the (potential) contribution of business in dealing with conflict dynamics are few.

Oetzel, Getz and Ladek (2007) point out that the relationship between conflict and business is not explored in management and international business literature. The reviews offered by Wolf, Deitelhoff and Engert (2007), and Jamali and Mirshak (2010) add that the topic is covered by the business and society and political risk discourse. Something is also available from the political behaviour literature. However in their review Jamali and Mirshak (2010) only emphasise Gladwin and Walter's (1980) framework which describes how social conflicts are dealt by multinational companies. (It is worth noting that the frame used is one of conflict management). A section of the conflict studies literature, like Lieberfeld (2002) explores the role of the business sector in track II efforts[4]. More recently Martin (2011) has focused on the agency that individual companies have on conflict dynamics through the lenses of human security.

---

[4] Track II refers to dialogue efforts between actors who do not officially represent the parties in conflict: for example between business sector leaders and religious representatives.

Dealing with a conflict requires a multitude of interventions at different levels including different dimensions. It is important to be mindful of the characteristics of business and its limitations. The degree that business can contribute is better understood in connection with those areas where they have the greatest legitimacy (see also Rettberg (2012)) for example socio-economic aspects of life. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between what a company as a business can do and what can be done by an individual, who may take 'personal' initiative drawing from the relationships and legitimacy built through the company.

I believe that through a systemic view and a conflict transformation lens it is possible to appreciate the value and contribution of the private sector. Given its role and actual potential it is unlikely that business would have the possibility to lead a peacebuilding process on its own. All its efforts are only contributions. This is made significantly more so given the fragmentation that characterises the sector.

By combining Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz's (2005) and Lederach's (1997) triangles and including options identified by Zandvliet (2005) it is possible to note the extent of business' potential *(Figure 2.6)*.

Type of actor | Approaches to peacebuilding

Few

Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility
Big business
TNCs/foreign investors at time of negotiations

Focus on negotiations, emphasise ceasefire
High visibility mediations
Make the start of operations conditional to peace, to the government signing the Voluntary Principles on HR and security
Negotiate revenue transparency, army behaviour in company's areas of operation
Insist company hires security providers of own choice
Soft diplomacy, legitimise and support own peace and justice efforts

Leaders respected in sectors of society
Ethnic/religious leaders
Academics/intellectuals
Humanitarian leaders NGOs
National companies CEOs
Local business associations
TNCs/foreign investors in their operational phase

Problem solving workshops, training
Peace commissions
Insider-partial teams
Negotiate revenue transparency, army behaviour in company's areas of operation
Insist company hires security providers of own choice
Legitimise and support own peace and justice efforts
Workshops and training
Support to (re-)establish law and order system

Local leaders
Leaders of indigenous NGOs
Community developers
Local health officials
Refugee camp leaders
SME, Market traders
TNCs/foreign investors in their operational phase

Local peace commissions, grassroots training
Prejudice reduction
Psychosocial and post war work
Negotiate army behaviour in company's areas of operation
Insist company hires security providers of own choice
Legitimise and support own peace and justice efforts
Workshops and training
Support to (re-)establish law and order system
Ensure communities benefit directly from taxes paid by corporation

Many

Figure 2.6 – actors and options for conflict transformation; in red the options available to business. Adapted from Lederach (1997), Zandvliet (2005) and Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz (2005)

Using a conflict transformation framework broadens the perspective, enabling one to see the different businesses' contributions to a wider process of change at micro and macro level (especially considering that more often than not firms act individually). Drawing on interviews and experiences in Nepal, a recent paper by Ghimire and Upreti (2012) argues that corporations, because of their networks and position have an important role to play in the transformation of conflicts. However, corporate engagement needs to be connected to wider efforts to have maximum impact.

While perorating the role business can play, it is important to remember, as Rettberg (2012) warns in relation to difficulties of involving companies in peacebuilding: I emphasise businesses are configured to make profits that is how they survive. They are not social

workers. It is therefore very important to understand their perspective, limitations and opportunities (see *Section 2.2*.)

2.1.2   Conflict, CSR and conflict sensitivity

Some authors have followed the rise of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Boge et al comment: "The willingness of MNEs [multinational enterprises] to participate in respective endeavours has markedly increased over the last years, not least because of the pressure put on them by civil society." (2007:20) As a result of stakeholder action, in fact, several new trends can be seen (Bakker, F. G. A. D. and Hond 2008, Bakker, F. G. A. D. et al. 2009, Bakker, Frank G. A. D. and Hond 2008, Black 2009, Eesley and Lenox 2006): Boge et al describe the emergence of "targeted commodity sanctions, regimes that address financial flows sustaining war economies, and standardized global certification schemes." (Boge et al. 2007:20) There are high profile initiatives like the UN Global Compact (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/). Business has responded by introducing codes of conducts and initiatives like the Caux Round Table (http://www.cauxroundtable.org/) a network of business leaders who promote socially responsible capitalism. At an individual level, firms support social initiatives, either directly or indirectly.

This wide-ranging action falls under the CSR banner. The meaning given to CSR differs depending on whether it is used in society, academia or business. Furthermore, associated to CSR is the term 'corporate citizenship'. According to Black (2009) corporate citizenship refers to business being socially responsible. CSR indicates the activity through which that responsibility is discharged. My review of documentation from the business sector (for example from Total, the consultancy firm McKinsey, and numerous others) seems to substantiate Black's claim that managers use the terms CSR and corporate citizenship interchangeably.

As a result of the emergence of CSR, scholars have explored the specific contributions CSR can make to working with conflict. Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert (2007) develop a theoretical piece which connects human security with CSR. Jamali and Mirshak (2010) formulate a framework to understand how CSR initiatives can contribute to conflict resolution and what the experience in Lebanon reveals. Gitsham (2007) examines the implications of evaluating CSR initiatives in Colombia. Oetzel, Getz and Ladek (2007) develop another conceptual model to analyse the responses of corporations to violent conflict drawing on CSR and conflict resolution literature. Black's (2009) grounded theory of corporate citizenship in

fragile states focuses on the macro-political dimensions of a corporation engaging in an area of conflict. Others still take a risk view. Cohen and Ben-Porat (2008) for example analyse the cost-benefit analysis that underpins the decision of the Jordanian and Palestinian business communities on whether to intervene in the peace process.

CSR in a conflict environment will not necessarily dampen negative impacts of the company on the conflict dynamics *per se*. I believe that a robust conflict analysis and the awareness that there are interdependencies between company behaviour and context are needed. This includes understanding what factors fuel a conflict (dividers) and which will lessen it (connectors). Only as a result of this type of analysis and by appropriately contextualising the company's management policies, including behaviours, attitudes, processes and procedures, can a company effectively work in a conflict environment. In other words a conflict sensitive approach is needed.

Originally introduced in the development and humanitarian field, conflict sensitivity is defined by a landmark resource pack (Africa Peace Forum et al 2004) as: "the ability of your organisation to: understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, *in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts*." (Africa Peace Forum et al 2004:1 - my emphasis) The phrase in italics is the most remembered message, often shortened to 'Do no harm' from the title of a seminal book by Mary Anderson (1999). The same authors emphasise that conflict sensitivity has a strategic dimension. Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sherrif (2005) give the most breadth to this point. The authors argue that the effective adoption of conflict sensitivity requires "institutional commitment, support for capacity development, willingness to make changes within the organisation, conducive external relationships and accountability mechanisms" (Barbolet et al 2005:6).

However, despite the existence of the IA and IPIECA manuals which focus on conflict sensitivity, conflict sensitivity seems to be implicit in the way business documents talk about CSR. Total, for example, in the *Society and Environment Reports* states:

"We have forged bonds of trust (...) with authorities, industrial partners and our stakeholders. By understanding local challenges, focusing on the development of capabilities and limiting the negative impacts of our operations, we solidify our local roots a little more each day, a prerequisite for sustainable, shared growth." (Total 2010b:8)

"Our actions to improve living conditions in our host countries are grounded first and foremost in listening, dialogue, and understanding needs. Our aim is to involve local communities and competencies wherever possible." (Total 2010b:47)

"We are careful not to supplant authorities, instead working in concert with them to supplement or cascade their initiatives." (Total 2011b:56)

From the three citations above, it is possible to recognise key aspects of conflict sensitivity: mindfulness about the negative impacts of business operations; drive to build shared value, relationship building through dialogue and participation, inclusion of all relevant stakeholders; build on what works and develop what is needed.

This implicit reference to conflict sensitivity in documents produced by companies can also be verified by searching the internet. In the main, those that explicitly connect the two concepts – conflict sensitivity and CSR – are organisations working in the sphere of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

In academia too there seems to be a need for more research on conflict-sensitive approaches adopted by business. As Banfield et al (2003), point out, there is a need to research how *conflict-sensitive approaches*, beyond single issues like human rights, have been adopted by and worked for business. Zandvliet and Anderson (2009) are the authors of the book that, to-date, collects experiences on how companies have been and can be more conflict sensitive. It is addressed to managers and chooses a frame that focuses on getting community relations right (this is understandable given the target audience of the book).

If business is to have a role, more studies are needed that connect it to conflict transformation and that examine the adoption and implementation of conflict sensitive approaches.

2.2   Understanding the limitations and opportunities linked to involving business

Underpinning the discussion on business' proactive contribution to conflict transformation efforts is the assumption that managers have the ability (and/or willingness) to see the

interdependencies within the conflict system in which the operations of an enterprise are. This is not necessarily so: generally speaking, how conflict is perceived by conflict transformation and business is different.

At the core of conflict transformation is the belief that conflict is a natural, inevitable part of life. Scholars and practitioners believe that what needs changing is the way people relate to each other, shifting how conflict is expressed, from destructive to constructive means (Lederach and Maiese 2003).

In business, conflict has traditionally been viewed through the adversarial lenses of legal dispute resolution, mostly orientated towards zero sum outcomes. Even in more recent times, when there has been an increased sensitivity to the impact of conflict within organisations, the response has been mediation. The perception is that conflict is managed.

A quick search on academic databases highlights papers discussing labour relations, arbitration, competitor disputes and work place issues. The flourishing discourse on mediation, except the transformative mediation perorated by Baruch Bush and Folger (2005), focuses on facilitating settlements (see Alexander (2008) and Allen (2009)). Even in writings by practitioners (for example: http://managementhelp.org/intrpsnl/basics.htm; http://www.mediate.com/articles/kahnL.cfm; http://www.businesslistening.com/conflict_resolution.php), where conflict is described as a resource, there is a sense of needing to manage conflict. There seems to be no holistic, systemic and long-term approach to conflict.

In addition to the above, it is important to consider that from my review of the organisational change literature it seems that the majority of organisational change thinkers believe that the organisation has no power to influence the external environment[5]. From here it is possible to understand the deep-rootedness of the issues emerging from the following discussion.

---

[5] Notable exception are those thinkers who advocate for contextually sensitive approaches to change (for example Burke and Litwin (1992), Dunphy and Stace (1993), Hailey and Balogun (2002)) In this regard Burnes stands out by specifically claiming that organisations have agency over their environment and can influence it (1996, 2004). According to Burnes, managers can choose to realign internal process to external challenges or influence the environment by 'manipulating' external factors. In other words, companies have the choice of adapting to variation in their context and/or of influencing specific aspects that shape their environment (for example by lobbying politicians, or by influencing public opinion through a public relation campaign). The concept of corporate agency on the environment is in the main discussed by the literature on political behaviour of firms (Hillman and Hitt 1999).

Zandvliet (2005) explains how conflict is usually understood by companies as war. Its resolution depends on tackling issues at macro-level and therefore out of the firm's control.

Violent conflict is seen by conflict transformation practitioners as "a profound breakdown within and/or between different strata of society. This may have occurred for different reasons (...) and may manifest itself at different levels" (Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz 2005:3). Lederach sees the purpose of conflict transformation as enabling virtuous processes that foster constructive conflict to become a key catalyst for change (Lederach 2003). The systemic perspective is strongly rooted in conflict transformation.

Viewing conflict (war) as something outside one's sphere of influence, only linked to macro-level factors hinders the ability to understand and accept the complexity of such interdependencies.

Companies, as reported by Boge et all (2007), Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz (2005), and Zandvliet (2005), generally take a position of political neutrality. Political neutrality suggests the position of the observer.

Political neutrality has been heavily criticised, for example by non-government organisations (NGOs) reports reviewed by Pegg and Wilson (2003), and those discussed by Boge et all (2007). Others like Jamali and Mirshak (2010) have noted that within the political literature debate there is increasing consensus that firms have been increasingly influencing the policy environment relating to their operations in ways that are favourable to them. Hillman and Hitt (1999), for example, analyse how (not if) firms make political decisions and engage in political behaviour. However criticisms and parallels are heard with difficulty by business.

The difference in how the two fields 'understand' conflict must be accounted for when considering the relationship and role of business in areas of violent conflict (Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz 2005, Zandvliet 2005). The view of conflict as war and the perception that it is out of the company's sphere of control, have wide ranging implications on how business engages with conflict.

2.2.1 Conflict as a risk

As Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz (2005) explain, much depends on the perception of what is political. Zandvliet (2005) observes that proactive company engagement in conflict issues does not easily translate in a message that resonates with business. As noted by Avant and Haufler, it is only during the last 20 years that business has been expanding its understanding of what is a political risk: "until the end of the Cold War, most companies understood political risk as being primarily about issues of ownership and regulation and not violence." (Avant and Haufler 2010:np)

The fact that businesses do not believe they can influence conflict dynamics may offer an explanation. Zandvliet adds that when business intervenes in a conflict, it does so through a risk-management approach, aiming at stability – not peace. "Companies weigh the risks and opportunities of one context against the risks and opportunities of another and try to assess how risks related to conflict can be mitigated or addressed. Hence, conflict is only one parameter in their decision-making model. If investment decisions were based merely on the existence of conflict in a country, companies would find it difficult to invest in countries such as China (Tibet), Russia (Chechnya) and India (Kashmir)." (2005:5)

Rettberg's (2008) report indicates that companies are reviewing their business analysis, identifying direct and indirect costs of conflict, including reputational ones deriving from stakeholder action (see also Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert (2007), Oetzel and Jamali and Mirshak (2010), and Nelson (2000)). However, the author adds that the degree of the company's exposure to conflict determines their perceived entity. Perception, therefore, seems key in shaping action.

Zandvliet in summarising factors considered by companies uses a frame of risk and not cost (which implies that the item can be quantified):

- "Security risks from operating in areas that lack law and order, either due to criminal groups, rebels or other armed non-state actors
- Legacy or dependency risks when companies are compelled to provide services (such as electricity, healthcare, education) that normally should be provided by governments – the so-called 'double taxation'

- Legal risks for the company to be, either directly or indirectly, associated with human rights violations in a country

- Reputational risks of providing revenues and legitimacy to authorities whose practices are publicly and internationally questioned conflict as a factor of risk management." (2005:5)

The literature indicates that perceiving conflict as a risk is not the only aspect that influences how companies respond to conflict. There are also intrinsic characteristics to the nature of business that need to be considered.

2.2.2 Opportunities relate to the project cycle

Zandvliet explains that there is an inverse relationship between who and what the company can (and will) influence and the stage of its operations. Prior to investments there is greater leverage at macro-level with the leadership (usually governments). As implementation takes place, the corporation's impact on conflict increasingly shifts to the local context. Furthermore, "(t)he ability of a company to play a role in conflict transformation is lowest when the outside pressure to do so is the highest. This inverse relationship coincides with the phase companies are the most vulnerable" (Zandvliet 2005:7): i.e. during negotiations for a contract.

Therefore, business as a sector is not 'monolithic'. As Zandvliet (2005) notes, activities are determined by the stages of the project cycle of individual companies. A similar observation has also been made by Patey, (2007) in relation to the extractive industry in Sudan.

Furthermore, co-operation among businesses in responding to conflict occurring where they operate is not perceived as part of the immediate solution. In exploring when and how companies will collaborate on a common issue, the literature offers a few frameworks. Jamali and Mirshak (2010) build on the ones developed by Nelson (2000), Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert (2007), Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek (2007) and Gladwin and Walter (1980) to identify business' behaviour in situations of conflict. Their research finds that in Lebanon, the perceived degree of interdependence of interests by multinational companies (MNCs) was low. Even "perceptions of high outcome stakes are not sufficient to induce MNC engagement/active collaboration" (Jamali and Mirshak 2010:460). Other authors, for example Rettberg (2008) and Liberfeld (2002), relate how collaboration within the private

sector in Colombia, Northern Ireland and South Africa came after a process of awareness raising and mobilisation on behalf of other actors like informal and community leaders.

2.2.3 Legitimacy and bargaining power

As Tripathi and Gündüz (2008) say, the firm's ability to engage constructively in conflict dynamics depends on its perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy is closely linked to the nature of the individual firm. The degree of perceived legitimacy, Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek (2007) explain, is influenced by the "consistency of organisational goals with societal functions" (2007:349), the firm's behaviour, the reputation it has internationally and in the host country, as well as the type of industry it operates in (companies that are involved in natural resources tend to be disadvantaged).

Legitimacy will also determine a company's bargaining power. Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek (2007) add that the level of influence depends on the company's closeness/experience of the issues, region and investment size.

The implications deriving from the above sections should not be overlooked as they translate in real (and/or perceived) limitations that need to be managed. First, the evaluation of the impact of conflict depends on the perception of the individual firm itself. Second the ability to intervene and degree of influence that can be exercised by the company depends on its project cycle, perceived legitimacy, experience the particular issue, and size of investment.

2.3 Engagement with business beyond stakeholder activism

The next question is: how can business gain understanding and shift its perceptions and behaviour? How can a business change its way of working so that it minimises negative impacts and maximise positive ones (thus contributing to conflict transformation)?

A flourishing literature (see for example, Eesley (2006) Bakker, F. G. A. D. and Hond (2008), and Bakker, F. G. A. D. et al. (2009)) has been debating the role and activism of stakeholders. Stakeholder action has been able to change the operational context of companies across the world (Bakker, Frank G. A. D. and Hond 2008). Black (2009) offers an exhaustive account in relation to the oil and gas industry in Myanmar/Burma.

Since the beginning of the new millennia however, engaging with the private sector has become another strategy chosen by some NGOs with the result of the emergence of a new body of literature on cross-sector partnerships.

Seitanidi (Seitanidi and Ryan 2007, Seitanidi 2008, Seitanidi and Crane 2009) offers some of the few, recent and in-depth writings on the nature of partnerships. The author (Seitanidi 2008) identifies three levels of change that can occur as a result of partnerships: micro-level/individual reality, meso-level/organisational reality and macro-level/societal reality.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 2.7 – dimensions of change. (Seitanidi 2008)

Seitanidi also indicates two ways in which change occurs: intentionally (as part of identifiable desired outcomes) and unintentionally. (While almost peripheral in the change management literature, un-intentionality is also considered by De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004) when looking at alliances.) Such process is also observed by Wadham in her case study. "Thus, while partners may enter into a partnership for strategic reasons, over time their rationality changes and they become engaged in more profound discussions about the nature of the challenges themselves" (Wadham 2009:66).

However, according to Seitanidi (2008), unintentional change is not enough. "If there is no strategy in place, then change is primarily unintentional and takes place in a subtle way over a longer time period, unlike the intentional change that is intense and concentrated within a short period of time" (Seitanidi and Ryan 2007:60). Seitanidi expands her arguments in two

subsequent publications (Seitanidi 2010, Seitanidi, Koufopoulos and Palmer 2010). The author draws on the experience of two non-profit organisation (NPO) - business partnerships in the United Kingdom (UK) and concludes that change occurs both as a result of the process of interactions between the partners and as an outcome itself of the partnership. Change, continues Seitanidi, can also be distinguished in core (organisational genesis) and non-core/peripheral (organisational kinesis) to the organisation. This distinction is determined by factors like: how the partners came together, willingness to change, closeness of the two organisations, time. Non-core change is not sufficient for sustainable outcomes.

Seitanidi's work is extremely relevant to my research. I have used some elements that have been identified on what influences the nature of partnership and their success, in analysing the Total-CDA collaboration (*Chapter 6*). Seitanidi's writings, however, leave room to analyse: the role of contextual factors, consider in greater detail core and non-core change by applying the understanding on the dimension of change gained in conflict transformation (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) (see *Chapters , 8* and *10*); and exploring what it is about the enablers of change that enabled change (*Chapter 6*).

The notion of dialogue between business and civil society as well as NGOs emerges in the work of Heap (2000a, 2000b) in which the author warns against using 'dialogue' to engage with business in an undefined/woolly way. Engagement with business required clarity of aims. Overall, Heap believes that collaboration between organisations of the two sectors will be beneficial to both. Similar remarks are also made by Kanter (1999) from the organisational change perspective.

However, I have been unable to find writings that explore the use of dialogue as a means of engagement with an organisation.

Classics on dialogue like David Bohm's (1996) *On dialogue* and Martin Buber's (cited in Friedman (2002)) work, explore what it is about dialogue that sparks its transformative potential (I will refer to these principles in *Chapter 6*). According to Friedman the essence of dialogue for Buber is: "(t)he 'sphere of the between,' mutual confirmation, making the other present, overcoming appearance, genuine dialogue, experiencing the other side, personal wholeness, the Single One, responsibility, decision, direction, trust" (Friedman 2002:112). For Bohm, dialogue is about seeing each other as peers, sharing and creating new thoughts, suspending assumptions (Bohm 1996).

Buber's and Bohn's work has been the building block of other authors discussing communications (Isaacs 1999, Laszlo Katria and Lazlo 2004) conflict resolution (Saunders 1999, Yankelovich 1999), and organisational change (Isaacs 1999, Senge 2006).

Yankelovich (1999) highlights that in dialogue participants are equal, one listens with empathy and efforts are made to bring assumptions in the open. Isaacs talks about dialogue as a tool for "harnessing the collective intelligence" (1999:11).The author continues: "(i)n dialogue, (...) we try to create a context from which many new agreements might come. And we seek to uncover a base of shared meaning that can greatly help coordinate and align our actions with our values." (Isaacs 1999:13) "It [dialogue] attempts to bring about change at the source of our thoughts and feelings, rather than at the level of results our ways of thinking produce." (Isaacs 1999:20)

According to Saunders (1999), dialogue involves taking risks, as sensitive information is disclosed. Participants, however, maintain their own identity though at times challenging their own assumption. Similarly, Senge considers dialogue as the best tool in team learning as it encourages co-creation and allows to deal with the 'defensive routine' - entrenched mental models which conceal rooted assumptions, protect from pain, and the embarrassment of exposing out thinking and keep us from learning (Senge 2006). For Saunders, the aim of dialogue is a change in the relationship (Saunders 1999).

The key theme in all is that dialogue has the potential for fundamental change.

These work open to the possibility of exploring whether dialogue works as a way of influencing a corporation. Seitanidi (2010), for example, focuses on the partnership its nature and characteristics as the mean of change. I delve further and see what it is about those characteristics that foster change.

2.4   Concluding remarks

In my review of the literature I followed two main directions. The first to understand the relationship between conflict and business, whether business has a role in conflict

transformation and how it can contribute to it. The second focussed how business change practices and how much the engagement with civil society has contributed to this shift.

In this chapter I have discussed how business can contribute to conflict transformation and noted that more research on the topic is needed.

Building on contextual change initiated by stakeholder action calling for social responsibility of business, conflict transformation practitioners are promoting both conflict sensitivity in the private sector and constructive contributions to peacebuilding processes.

Academic research has just started to explore the potential and significance of constructive contributions to conflict dynamics by companies. In the main these studies take a conflict resolution perspective and/or focus on the impact of CSR. However, they are not enough. It is important to fully understand the potential and impact of such contributions to peacebuilding. Practitioners' reflections on the role of business in conflict transformation are available; however there is not yet a body of research that tests the frameworks developed against actual initiatives taken.

Just by their very presence, private enterprises become part of the conflict system. However, CSR per se is not sufficient to deal with the impact of business within that system. Avoiding negative impacts requires conflict sensitive principles. In reviewing the literature, I have not found academic research that takes this angle.

I have highlighted how conflict transformation and business differently perceive and view conflict. The former emphasises the potential of conflict as a constructive force and adopts a systemic approach. In business there is more a notion of having to manage conflict. Conflict within organisations is seen as arguments/disputes, denying its constructive potential. There is a tendency to deal with conflict through a symptomatic approach, instead of a systemic one, focussing on resolution.

More importantly the term conflict is associated with the idea of war: an external occurrence, where causes and dynamics are determined at macro political level, hence outside the company's control.

Such perceptions held by business, may reduce its ability/willingness to understand interdependencies in a conflict system, including the role of business in conflict areas. This may be one of the reasons why business conceives conflict as a risk and as such takes a risk management approach claiming to be politically neutral. From the systemic view point of conflict transformation, political neutrality is misleading as a stance.

Furthermore, determining the type of intervention business chose in a conflict area there other factors intrinsic to the nature of operations and the individual company. These are linked to the production cycle, reputation and legitimacy of the firm. Business in fact is not a monolithic sector.

The literature on cross-sector partnerships draws from collaborations initiated under the CSR umbrella, focussing mainly on understanding their nature and characteristics. Why specific factors work? What does a good fit between the partners imply? What lies beneath all these explanations that allow change? Other than that written by Seitanidi (2008, 2010), not much is available that explores what Seitanidi (2008, 2010) calls the micro and meso levels (individual and organisational realties).

Proactive (conscious) contribution to conflict transformation, in fact, requires change in practices on behalf of businesses. Hence it is important to consider change and how organisations change.

This research proposes to contribute to this new emerging body of knowledge by exploring (if and) how dialogue between an NPO and a corporation impacts on the corporations drive to change in adopting conflict sensitive approaches. It will contribute to the literature on business and conflict by cross referencing the arguments between conflict transformation and organisational change theory. The research will also add to cross-sector partnership literature by dissecting the breadth and depth of change in a company's practices and identifying how dialogue contributes to it.

Furthermore, the proposed case study is based in Myanmar/Burma. Studies on Myanmar/Burma have either focused on CSR (Bais and Juijser 2005) or on corporate citizenship (Black 2009). Given the recent opening of the country, definitely more learning is needed on the how business can contribute positively to the local context.

Chapter 3
Methodology

In the previous chapter I explained that the disciplines of conflict transformation and of organisational change are the foundations of this research. I have argued that this research aims to fill an apparent gap in the literature of both fields: few publications explore the impact of soft engagement, in particular through dialogue, with corporations on the practices of the corporations itself.

This chapter outlines the methodology chosen and the design of this research. In structuring the presentation, I will draw on the outline suggested by Creswell (2003) and summarised in the table below.

3.1   Summary of research design

Issue explored	Engagement between non-profit organisations and corporations, through dialogue, and its potential to foster change within the corporation.
Key question	Can dialogue between a non-profit organisation (NPO) and a corporation, nurture change in the corporation towards becoming more conflict sensitive?
Social unit	CDA (NPO) and Total (corporation)
Representativeness of case study	Position of organisations *vis a vis* their respective industries. Engagement/partnership between NPOs and business is increasing including in the oil industry.
Timeframe	Ten years (2002- 2012) (N.B. Time of writing is April 2012)
Space	Myanmar/Burma.
Methodology	Research design developed to: account for the influences of the context, the choices and action of individuals/the organisation. Research aims to understand and explore the complexity of relationships, processes, and dynamics of the dialogue between the two organisations. It is influenced by the following school of thoughts: postmodernism, social critical theory, hermeneutics, cognitive psychology, systems thinking and the notion of change as an emergent process.
Method	Qualitative longitudinal case study. Data collection through: interviews, site visit to Total's operational site in Myanmar and document review.
Replicability	Social unit, method and design are replicable. Context is too dynamic to be completely replicated.

Table 3.1 – summary of research design, developed building on Creswell (2003).

3.2   Issue explored and key question

This research explores the impact of dialogue as a tool for engagement between two organisations from different fields. It focuses on the operations of a company in the oil industry in a conflict area. As discussed in *Chapter 2*, the role of oil corporations is contentious and criticised by some as contributing to conflict dynamics. Civil society organisations like Global Witness, Earth Rights International (ERI) and Human Rights Watch, campaign the industry for greater social responsibility, and in some cases for divestment (see Black (2009) for an exhaustive portrayal of this controversy in Myanmar/Burma). Within the context of influencing corporations to consider the implications and issues of operating in a conflict area, the question prompting this research is therefore the following:

> **Can dialogue between a non-profit organisation (NPO) and a corporation nurture change in the corporation towards becoming more conflict sensitive?**

Box 3.1 – key question of the research.

3.2.1 Aims and objectives of the research

The specific remit of the study is to understand whether dialogue used as a means of the engagement between the two organisations fosters organisational change within the corporation, encouraging the adoption of conflict sensitive approaches.

The 'dialogue' referred to is a series of conversations, visits and exchanges (supported by written documents) as well as the participation in the collaborative learning project, Corporate Engagement Project (CEP), between the French oil corporation Total and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (also known as CDA), an non-profit organisation (NPO) based in the United States of America (USA).

> **'Dialogue': a series of conversations, visits and exchanges supported by written documents as well as the participation to the consultations of the collaborative learning project CEP.**

Box 3.2 – definition of dialogue.

There are two main objectives to the research. The first is to *identify whether the engagement has fostered change within the corporation, thereby leading to* greater conflict sensitivity in its way of working. Next, if it is possible to observe a shift, I will identify the

process, characteristics, dynamics and relationships underpinning the dialogue that enabled such change as well, as the degree to which such change is embedded in the corporation. If such shift is not observable, I propose to explore why this is not happening and consider what potential strategies could be implemented.

> **If there has been an observable change in the company's practices:**
> - **What was it about the dialogue that enabled change?**
> - **What is the process of change?**
> - **How embedded is the change?**
>
> **If there has been no observable change in the company's practices:**
> - **What are the possible explanation why change has not occurred?**
> - **What is the process and the characteristics of the engagement?**
> - **What are the potential strategies that could be adopted to foster change?**

Box 3.3 – questions underpinning the objectives of the research.

3.3   The case study - social unit, time and space

CDA and Total are involved in a long-term relationship aiming at enhancing Total's ability to work in a conflict sensitive manner in areas of conflict. The relationship began in 2002, under the auspices of the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) led by CDA (CDA 2008b) (see also *Chapter 4*).

Total initially approached CDA to conduct an impact assessment of Total's Socio Economic Programme (SEP) in Myanmar/Burma. Following a number of conversations, however, instead of commissioning the impact assessment Total agreed to join CEP. This project involves companies and practitioners. CEP is a learning project that draws on practical experiences made by project participants to synthesise lessons learnt, which are also shared with others. Currently about 60 companies contribute to CEP. Participation in CEP is voluntary and the intensity of involvement varies greatly from participant to participant. The range spans from informal involvement through occasional contacts and/or email exchanges to formal relationships as the one with Total. (I will go into greater detail in *Chapter 4* and *6*.)

As a result of Total joining CEP the two organisations engaged in a process of dialogue and interactions supported by CDA's field visits to Mauritania, Sudan, Nigeria and Myanmar/Burma (see CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b, CDA 2004, CDA 2005a, CDA 2005b, CDA 2006, CDA 2008a, CDA 2011). As mentioned earlier, I have loosely defined this process as dialogue. CDA sees its role as a critical friend to the corporation in its journey of conflict sensitivity.

The collaboration between CDA and Total has been extended in 2009 through a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) until 2012, making Myanmar/Burma the area where the two organisations have worked together for the longest time. This allowed observation of a ten year process of change (2002-2012) in a complex environment which demands sensitivity to relationship building and conflict dynamics.

Following a presentation in Cambodia by then CDA's Executive Director Mary Anderson on CDA's work with Total (*Business and Peace* Conference, Sunway Hotel, Phnom Penh, 19th March 2009), I became interested in the topic of corporate engagement in conflict areas. While scoping this PhD research, I approached both CDA and Total separately to gauge interest and willingness to participate in this study. The idea was well received and both organisations agreed to contribute to my work. The organisations have shared with me documentation and some of their staff/contributors have participated to the research as interviewees (see later *Section 3.6*).

The focus of this investigation is the organisation level: has the dialogue between CDA and Total fostered/enhanced the adoption of conflict sensitive approaches in the *organisation*? The study explores the impact on Total's operations in Myanmar/Burma. I have also made references and comparisons with changes occurred at group level and within the E&P (Exploration and Production) branch of the company.

Anticipating briefly what I mention in *Chapter 4*, Total is a French company which comprises of corporate level departments and five distinct branches. E&P, one of these branches, has taken the lead within the company in promoting societal concerns. Through the access I have been given, I have been able to interview people at corporate level, E&P regional level, and within the subsidiary operating in Myanmar/Burma. In Myanmar/Burma Total operates through a subsidiary of its E&P branch, Total E&P Myanmar (TEPM). Hence, I have insights from the corporate level, the E&P branch and TEPM. Furthermore, in Myanmar/Burma, the

operations are run as a joint venture project, the Yadana partnership, between TEPM, Chevron, the Thai company PTT-EP and the state owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). When I write about TEPM, therefore, all initiatives undertaken must be understood as initiatives of the Yadana project partnership. The only exception is the partnership with United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) which is an agreement between Total and UNITAR (*Chapter 4*).

Given the context, it is important to make a clarification. A large number of variables, both internal and external ones, influence the actions and decisions of a corporation. Internal ones include: operating paradigm (economic model, organisational values, culture, staff perception and motivation, attitude to risk, knowledge and skills, cultural specificity); way of working (policies, procedure, processes, funding and lending policies; international, local, industry regulations and standards; both contextual and operational constraints). External variables range from the political and economic factors (political direction taken by France where Total's headquarters are, local situation, geo-economic prospects, etc.) to relationships (with host government and authorities as well as those of the French government, with industry and other stakeholders). It is important to note that the principal focus of this research has been on the dynamics of the process of change *within* Total. However, through the interviews it will be possible to gain a sense of the relevance of some of broader external influences – I will outline these in *Chapter 8*.

This case study has been chosen for three reasons. Firstly, as I will argue in the next section, the two organisations are representative of their respective industries (see Datamonitor (2010) and Brusset et al (2007)). Secondly, the type of partnership is increasingly common (see Crane (2011), however its focus is still innovative. Thirdly, the access opportunity was offered by the two organisations.

3.4   Representativeness of the case study

The two partners are known and respected operators in their respective fields. Their work engages with most of the challenges and opportunities faced by others.

In 2010 Datamonitor placed Total as the fifth largest publicly-traded oil and gas company in the world (Datamonitor 2010). According to Datamonitor, its market position allows Total "a

significant bargaining power in the global oil and gas industry" (Datamonitor 2010:5). In 2010 Total sales were worth Euro 184,693 million (Total 2012a). It has an integrated business model: its activities span across the upstream, downstream and chemical sectors of the industry. The company employs 96,000 people (Total 2011a). It is present in 130 countries, with oil and gas exploration and production in 40 and oil and gas production in another 30. Total's products, are marketed in 150 countries (Datamonitor 2010, Total 2011a). (I will go into greater detail in *Chapter 4.*)

CDA is one of the leading no-profit organisations (NPOs) working in peacebuilding and development in the world. In addition to CEP, CDA runs another four major projects: two originating from the development field (*The Listening Project* and *Do No Harm*), the other two focussing on peacebuilding *(Reflecting on Peace Practice* and *Steps towards Conflict Prevention*). The projects are defined as 'learning projects' as they draw on the field experience of practitioners and organisations to identify shared lessons. CDA has worked across the five continents. Its work came to the forefront in the industry through the book *Do No Harm* (1999), by the then Executive Director Mary Anderson. (I will offer more background in *Chapter 4.*)

From this perspective, both organisations are representative of their own contexts. The dialogue the two are engaged in, however, is cutting-edge. There are a numerous partnerships centred on community investment implementation (corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities). Not many other oil corporations have engaged with civil society organisations focussing specifically on the corporations' way of working. CDA has engaged with other oil corporations like British Company BP and the American one Unocal; Jenny Pearce (Pearce 2004) of Bradford University has reported on BP in Colombia; and Channel Research, a small consultancy, works with businesses to train managers in tools and methods to work with communities. However, this form of interaction between NPOs and companies has been gradually increasing as the significance of CSR has taken hold. The experience from the Total-CDA engagement will be influential as others develop.

3.5   Methodology

The design and methodology of this research is shaped by the belief that there is no such thing as *the* truth. What can be known is influenced on the one hand by what our abilities,

methods and capacities allow us to know. As Kleining suggests "(n)ot everything is possible at all times and what is possible changes in specific ways." (Kleining 1988:3) Furthermore, as post-modernists uphold, our understanding and knowledge is influenced by multiple factors: paradigms, culture, experiences, values, etc. (Elliott 2009, Harvey, MacDonald and Hill 2000).

There may be 'facts' in terms of occurrences (think of 9/11) or as McGilchrist says, "there is something that exists apart from ourselves, but we play a vital role in bringing it to being." (McGilchrist 2009:5) The significance/interpretation of 'what exists' will depend on who we are and our heritage. Multiple 'realities' can therefore co-exist; 'truth' is often complex and non-linear (McGilchrist 2009). Two key implications follow.

The first relates to the applicability of universal theories. The validity of meta-narratives as Lyotard highlights (Elliott 2009) needs to be scrutinised for appropriateness. In doing so, and following what social critical researchers like Kleining (1988) propose, it is important to understand what the underpinnings of norms, structures, customs, beliefs, etc. of the context we are researching are.

The efforts to understand need also to include the relationship between individuals, social structures and human agency. If undoubtedly there is a strong bond between individuals and social structures, it is not, as Weber believes (cited in Harvey, MacDonald and Hill (2000)), one of subjugation of the former to the latter. Giddens (1984) explains that social structures are a result of the actions of individuals repeated over and over again. As such, they are also subject to the changes in behaviour and attitudes of the people. Since humans, as Giddens (1984) argues, are able to act on intent and follow a project, they have the power to alter the way things are. Actions and choices will also be influenced by the context of who takes them (see for example Nisbett's (2003) discussion on how different approaches to 'reading' the world have shaped the way Western and Asian people structure thought and society differently). However, the relationship between human agency and structure is more akin to a dance than subjugation.

The second implication relates to objectivity. Objectivity is difficult. If how we 'see' is influenced by what is socially constructed, (by paradigms and personal biases), as postmodernists have postulated (Harvey, MacDonald and Hill 2000), research is not value-

neutral. The researcher, as indicated by the Eisenberg principle, will also have an impact on the research itself.

Furthermore, understanding shifts with knowledge and experience. Drawing especially on cognitive psychology (see De Feo (2010)) and broadly on Habermas' hermeneutics (cited in Harvey, MacDonald and Hill (2000)), I believe that as our knowledge of something increases, so does our ability to view different perspectives.

The arguments, so far, imply that what we observe, as well as the process of researching, is characterised by dynamism and marked by interdependencies. A systems perspective then becomes a useful tool. A system is the whole of elements that interact with each other. These elements or parts, can be systems in their own right and their interaction have a dampening (negative feedback loop) or stimulating (positive feedback loop) effect on other elements (Coleman et al. 2007, Senge 2006). In this research a systems perspective supports understanding the process of change by pointing to: the complexity of relationships, patterns and dynamics characterising the elements of the unit of analysis; the long-term implications as well as the delays in observable outcomes of the engagement between Total and CDA; solution-orientated actions, including the role of business and the options available to it.

However, like Hoffmann (2007), Burnes (2005), and Ropers (2008), I believe that systems thinking, applied to society and human behaviour, offers a powerful metaphor: too many variables are involved. Ropers writes: "[system thinking] offers a practical tool to understand and explain non-linear developments and complex social and political change." (2008:6)

Building on systems and complexity theories, change can therefore be seen as an open-ended process, complex and unpredictable in nature (By 2005). This view is espoused by authors who believe that change is emergent. When applying the concept to organisational change, authors like Burnes (1996), Dunphy and Stace (1993), McNamara (2005) and By (2005) argue that change arises both from "the relationship of a multitude of variables within an organisation" (By 2005:375) and from driving factors like external challenges and opportunities (Dunphy and Stace 1993, McNamara 2005). Approaches to change therefore must be context specific (see Hailey and Balogun (2002)) and must address the long-term implications sparked by short-term action (Senge 2006). Similar arguments can also be

found in conflict transformation writings (Barnes 2003, Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz 2005, Lederach 1997, Miall 2004).

Although context is prime, it is still possible to derive generalisations from a particular situation. Equally generalisations, when applied, must be contextualised for the same reasons as above. Paraphrasing Bauman (1967) (cited in Leccardi (2009)), the aim of this study is, therefore, to offer an initial understanding about the situation, contributing to open the way for further action.

The research is designed to compare and contrast the findings with generally accepted frameworks in the field of conflict transformation and of organisational change. For example, some indicators of whether change has occurred can be drawn from the literature (see (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009)). However, these have been confirmed and validated, for significance, by the perceptions and experiences of those involved as well as the goals formally set and reported in documents (also see *Section 3.6.1*).

Building on the above premises, the research is structured as a longitudinal study focussing on understanding the process and enablers of change engendered by this particular dialogue. It is more about exploration than offering explanations and a universal theory (Creswell 2003). The findings will be determined by multiple contexts (the context of Myanmar/Burma, those of the two organisations as well as of the partnership itself). However, as mentioned earlier, given the position of the partners *vis a vis* their industries, it will be possible to draw principles applicable to other situations.

3.6   Method

The research relies on qualitative methods for its data collection: interviews, a visit to TEPM's operational site and document analysis.

3.6.1 Interviews

I have interviewed over 70 individuals and talked to many more. However, the findings of the research draw on the 54 interviews for which I received consent. Interviewees can be grouped in four categories as indicated in *Table 3.2*.

Group identifier: D	Group identifier: I	Group identifier: KT	Group identifier: C
Individuals who have direct knowledge of the dialogue between Total and CDA, either because they have participated in conversations/meetings or because they have been interviewed by CDA as part of their filed visits.	Individuals who have an indirect knowledge of the dialogue: i.e. they are aware of its existence ,but have not been involved in it.	Individuals who have knowledge of Total as a company, either because they have a working connection, or because they have been following it for some time, but who do not know of the dialogue.	Individuals who are experts in fields related to this research and can offer some contextual background.

Table 3.2 – summary of the interview categories.

Figure 3.1 – breakdown of the 54 interviewees according to the knowledge of the dialogue between Total and CDA.

Furthermore, I specifically chose to interview stakeholders as well as individuals linked to the two organisations. Given the number of variables noted earlier in *Section 3.3*, and the challenges in this research (see *Section 3.9*), stakeholder interviews have been conceived also as a form of triangulation (within the scope of a qualitative study) to assess the 'validity' of the findings (Seale 1999).

Participants from the two organisations have been selected according to their specific knowledge and/or experience of the situation as opposed to random selection, i.e. following a non-probability sampling approach. I have interviewed people connected to Total's corporate level, regional level, and the subsidiary in Myanmar/Burma.

Stakeholder interview participants have been selected for the particular perspective they can offer to this study. Keeping in mind the need to 'triangulate' the findings, stakeholders from

local communities, civil society, business, and other institutions have been contacted. Such range offers a rounded view of Total's journey of change.

Availability of interviewees is also a determining factor. A list of the code and provenance is in *Appendix 3.*

Figure 3.2 - breakdown of the 54 interviewees by sector.

Figure 3.3 – breakdown of the 54 interviewees by knowledge of the Total-CDA dialogue and provenance.

As this is a longitudinal study, the illustration below shows how long the interviewees have been following the dialogue or the French company, and/or have been involved in connected issues.

Group D

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total Employee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
TEPM Employee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
TEPM Former Employee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total Employee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total Former Employee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CDA contributor	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CDA contributor		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total Employee			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total Employee			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total Employee			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CDA contributor				X							
International Org						X	X	X	X	X	X
TEPM Employee							X	X	X	X	X
TEPM Employee								X	X	X	X
TEPM Former Employee								X	X	X	X
Contractor TEPM								X	X	X	X
TEPM Employee								X	X	X	X
CDA contributor									X	X	X
TEPM Employee										X	X

Group: I

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Contractor TEPM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Analyst industry	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Civil society Thai INGO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Business partner	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Finance sector			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Civil society YNG LNGO				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Finance sector					X	X	X	X	X	X	X
TEPM Former Employee						X	X	X	X	X	X
Business sector CSR						X	X	X	X	X	X
Civil Society YNG LNGO							X				
Civil Society YNG LNGO								X			
Civil Society YNG LNGO								X	X	X	
Contractor TEPM former								X	X	X	
Contractor TEPM Former									X		
Business Partner										X	
Business Partner										X	
Business Partner										X	X
TEPM Employee										X	X
TEPM Employee										X	X

Figure 3.4 – number of years interviewees have been connected to research themes (cont.)

Methodology – by F. Cerletti

Group: KT

Group: KT	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Media Intl	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Media Intl	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Total Employee	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Civil society YNG INGO	■	■	■	■	■	■					
Media Intl			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Media Intl				■	■	■	■				
Total Former Employee					■	■					
Diplomatic								■	■	■	■
Business sector CSR									■		

Group: C

Group: C	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Academia CSR	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Business Sector YNG	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Civil society YNG LNGO	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Business sector YNG					■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Business Sector						■	■	■	■	■	■
Civil society YNG INGO							■	■	■	■	■
Media Intl							■	■	■	■	■

Figure 3.4 – number of years interviewees have been connected to research themes.

Interviews have allowed the specificity of the context to emerge. It was possible to gain an understanding of rationale, perceptions and experience, decisions, choices, actions, as well as the structures and processes that have shaped the dialogue between the two organisations, the degree of change and its determinants (see Patton and Patton (2002) and Denscombe (2003)). The semi-structured format was chosen for the interviews; this allowed greater liberty to explore the topics covered and, at the same time, to gain a sense of priority/significance of emerging issues from the participants. I was in contact with some interviewees more than once.

As a test-run of the interview process, I held eight pilot interviews and multiple conversations with key informants which also offered useful contextual insights. Such conversations involved academics, businessmen and practitioners generally working in CSR in Asia, as well as members of civil society working on the broader issues that this research touches upon. Piloting the interview with participants from the organisations was not possible due to availability constraints.

3.6.2 Visit to the TEPM operational site

For the purposes of this research I went to Myanmar/Burma twice: in May – June 2011 and in January-February 2012. During the second trip I spent three days at TEPM's operational site in the south of the country – more information on the site is given in *Chapter 4.*

As part of this visit, in addition to meetings pre-arranged by TEPM's Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) team, I also visited four villages located near the area where the pipeline is. I walked about freely accompanied by my interpreter. We started conversations with people and/or people greeted us. We entered shops, met people in the street and were invited to people's houses. Conversations included social remarks and research topics. We always explained what I was doing and asked if they minded me asking questions. I always explained that I was doing a PhD research for Coventry University in Europe, which looked at the way that companies work and in particular the work of Total.

In the two villages West of the TEPM's compound, we were accompanied by a TEPM allocated driver who in both cases left us at beginning of the village and then moved away from us. We spoke to 14 people, and visited four houses and one shop. In the villages East of the compound we were accompanied by a Socio-Economic Team member. TEPM noted that the situation had been tense in the area and preferred that during our visit there was

someone known locally. We visited two shops and a house and talked to seven people. The person who accompanied us did not speak the local dialect; my interpreter did and that was the language used to communicate with people of Karen origin.

I will make more considerations in *Section 3.9,* however, there was no evident (or which we could tell) perception of discomfort among those who talked to us. The views we heard covered a wide range of comments from broad general observations about the oil companies to detailed remarks on Total, and from constructive criticisms, to enthusiastic appreciation. Through such conversations it was possible to gain a sense of the general perception of how TEPM is perceived and the nature of relationship between communities and the company.

3.6.3 Document analysis

Documents analysed came from two main sources. The first: publicly available documents from the internet, libraries, companies and trade associations. These included:

- Documentation and papers published on the topic by other researchers, scholars and others which will provide background information and secondary data.
- Documents, reports and analysis published specifically on the CDA and on Total by third party organizations and individuals.
- Reports and briefings specifically produced as a result of the partnership by either CDA or Total.

In the second instance, I have been given non-publicly available documents by Total and other organisations. Some of these I could reference, others were for my information only.

The analysis of the documents available aimed to identify indicators of whether a shift in practices has been occurring within Total. I have contrasted and compared document content to the indications given by the interviewees as well as the researcher's own reflections on key indicators deriving from the literature review. The document analysis has contributed to understanding the operating context including, opportunities and constraints, within the organisations. It has also helped to corroborate some of the findings from the interviews in terms of changes in practices, values, and beliefs within the corporation.

	Interview and site visit	Document analysis
Purpose	To gain understanding of the rationale, perceptions and experience, decisions, choices, actions, as well as the structures and processes, that have shaped the dialogue between the two organisations, the degree of change and its determinants. Groups D and I: to reflect a progression in time of the process and dynamics of the dialogue. Groups I, KT and C: to corroborate perceptions expressed by participants of the other groups on whether change has happened and how. (These interviews are inspired by the 360° feedback on leadership approach adopted in the business world, whereby individuals receive feedback from their peers, subordinates and superiors.)	To identify indicators that a more conflict sensitive approach is being streamlined/incorporated in the corporation. It will draw on the indications given by the interviewees as well as the researcher's own reflections on key indicators derived from the literature review.
Participants/ Sources	• Individuals who have been involved in the collaboration (in the past or in the present) • Individuals who have indirect knowledge of the collaboration in the partnership • Stakeholders who have direct or indirect knowledge of the dialogue or of Total • Stakeholders who can offer contextual views	• Publicly available • Non-publicly available

Topics/ Type of document	Interviews
	• Aims and objectives underpinning the partnership between the two organization
	• Nature and characteristics of relationship between the two organisations
	• Degree (if any) of change within the corporation: indicators, achievements, enablers, challenges, process, depth & breadth, impact on others
	• Specific role of CDA in change (or not) observed
	• What else could happen and who needs to be involved
	• Knowledge transfer
	
	Site visit
	• Has there been a change since 2002 in the way:
	    o the corporation relates/works with/engages with you
	    o implements its activities/operations
	• If so, what is the difference
		• CDA reports on field visits
		• Total reports on Myanmar/Burma operations
		• Total code of conduct, ethical charter, annual reports, operational guidelines
		• Reports commissioned by Total on Myanmar/Burma operations
		• Reports by trade associations, international organisations, NGOs, advocacy groups

Table 3.3 - summary of methods adopted.

Methodology – by F. Cerletti

3.6.4 Framework of interpretation

As I stated in *Chapter 2*, there are considerable parallels in how authors from both the conflict transformation field and from the organisational change field view the process of change. For the interpretation of the research findings, I have applied two frameworks (one by Lederach (2003) and one by Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson (2007)) which, as I argue below, synthesize the concepts expressed in both fields. I have also proposed a model which draws on conflict sensitivity and CSR literature to explore the potential reach in terms of relationship building potential of the initiatives undertaken by TEPM.

3.6.4.1 Change needs multi-level and multi-dimensional approaches

Authors from conflict transformation and organisational change disciplines believe that effective change requires the intervention of multiple actors across society/the organisation. For example, Kanter (1999c) and Lederach (1997) believe that given the different perspectives and focuses brought by the position in the organization/society people will have different roles, hence they consider change as being everyone's job. Initially proposed by Mintzberg in 1980 (Mintzberg 1980), also Kanter describes her arguments using the image of a triangle to illustrate the organisation. This is very much in line with Lederach's reference to society mentioned in *Chapter 2* and reproduced below for comparison.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 2.1 – the conflict transformation triangle (Lederach 1997).

Methodology – by F. Cerletti

To illustrate how conflict affects differently a population and the need for multi-level approach, Lederach (1997) explains how formal leaders, at the top of the triangle, have greater access to information and have a larger capacity in making decisions. These decisions affect the majority of the population. However, the leaders are less likely to be affected by the consequences of their decisions on a day-to-day basis. This implies that needs and perspectives should be shared and accounted for, in a continuous dynamic dialogue among the population. The middle, informal leadership, therefore, plays a pivotal role as a connector between top and bottom.

Echoes of the need for this fluidity can be found in Kanter's work (Kanter 1991, 2004). Kanter, of the emergent school of thinking, uses similar words in illustrating the role of innovation in change. At the vertex "a very small number of big bets about the future (...) In the middle (...) a larger portfolio with a number of ventures, innovation projects, experiments, and other projects that are promising but not yet proven. (...) At the bottom (...) a very broad base of ideas, experiments, incremental innovations, (...) proposed and acted on by people anywhere in the company, in any department." (Kanter 2004:40) This must be underpinned by top-down, bottom-up and horizontal and influence flows.

This sense of experimentation could also resonate from a peacebuilding perspective. If one considered the myriads of peacebuilding initiatives at community level as attempts to identify and formalize processes, tools and frameworks that could inform and influence structures, systems and policies across society, then one can see innovation and experimentation also in peacebuilding.

Conflict transformation and organisational change literature also affirm that the process of change requires interventions at different dimensions. Although these are conceptualised differently by the two disciplines, there is still a strong resonance. From an organisational change perspective, for example, Burke and Litwin (1992) propose a framework which highlights the following dimensions: external environment; strategy; leadership; organisational culture; structure; management practices; systems policies and procedures; work climate; tasks and skills; motivation; individual needs and values; individual and organisational performance. According to the authors, with the exception of individuals' motivation, change does not need to happen in all areas, however, repercussions will be felt throughout the 'system' due to the interactions between the dimensions.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 3.5 – a model of organisational performance and change (Burke and Litwin 1992).

Another example is Cope's (2003) high level model called the change ladder, which focuses on assets, blueprints (systems, processes and procedures), capabilities, desire (motivation) and existence (ethos). The author states that for change to be sustainable, interventions must revolve around at least three of the dimensions, one of which has to be in the top two. Whelan-Berry and Somerville echo this in their paper linking drivers of change to the change process concluding: "using a mix of drivers that leverage each of the steps in the change process seems important" (Whelan-Berry and Somerville 2010:188).

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 3.6– the change ladder (Cope 2003).

Lederach, Neufeld, and Culbertson's (2007) two-by-two matrix (*Figure 3.7*) of conflict transformation synthesizes the above discussion. According to the authors, sustainable change involves four dimensions: relational, personal, structural and cultural. At personal level change includes modification of attitudes and behaviours. At the relational one it involves changes in the interactions between individuals and groups as well as within the exchanges with institutions. At structural level the emphasis of change is put on the "present and historical dynamics between or among groups" (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007:22) and how they are formalised – including policies, norms, systems etc. At cultural level, change includes views of authority, decision making processes, perceptions, etc. which may also vary between groups in the same environment.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 3.7 – dimensions of conflict transformation (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007).

Reviewing the methods advocated for example by Kotter (2005), Kanter (1999b) Balogun and Hope Haley (2002), and Lederach (Lederach and Maiese 2003, Lederach 1997) there are no major differences. Options include: targeting behaviours, attitudes and values; improving relationships/way of working (cooperation, team building); changing systems, structures, policies. Underpinning these are considerations on empowerment, leadership, motivation,

readiness for change, participation, culture, coalition building, which resonate between the two disciplines. Authors all agree that interventions need to involve a combination of methods, being mindful of the need to be able to work with multiple timelines (Kotter 2005), with quick-wins while keeping a long term perspective.

I have chosen the models proposed by Lederach (1997) and Lederach et al (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) for my analysis of the process of change, as I feel they synthesise well the arguments made in both fields. I have analysed Total's journey of change towards adopting conflict sensitivity/CSR, though the triangle. Contrasting the findings to the dimensions of the matrix enabled me to gain a sense of the how far the conflict sensitivity/CSR is rooted in the company.

The guiding questions in the analysis and interpretation include:

If this change exists, can it be explained by the models? Are the dimensions envisaged by Lederach et al applicable? Is it possible to determine where is it finding/hinging its fundamentals: in individuals' behaviour and attitudes? In the relationships with its stakeholders? In cultural frames of the corporation? In the structures of the corporation?

3.6.4.2   Identifying the potential reach of CSR initiatives

In addition to Lederach and Lederach et al's models, I have also applied a model of my own formulation. In *Chapter 2* I noted the areas of contributions business can take in conflict areas identified by Nelson (2000) (core business, social investment and policy dialogue). Building on this suggestion, on the recent developments in the definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as on the conversations I had during the research, I suggest a model that facilitates understanding the potential influence in terms of relationship building of a company's activities on its stakeholders.

As Young (2010) states, what exactly the term CSR entails is not yet agreed upon. However in recent years there has been an increasing shift towards highlighting the relational and ethical dimension of CSR. The International Standards Organisation (ISO) through ISO 26000 presents an all-encompassing definition of social responsibility. "*Social responsibility* [is the] responsibility of an *organization* for the impacts of its decisions and activities [including products, services and processes] on society and the *environment* through transparent and *ethical behaviour* that contributes to *sustainable development*, including

health and the welfare of society; takes into account the expectations of *stakeholders*; is in compliance with applicable law and consistent with *international norms of behaviour*; and is integrated throughout the *organization* and practised in its relationships [an organization's activities within its sphere of influence]." (ISO 2010:3-4 – emphasis in the original) ISO 26000 blurs the separation between an organisation's internal/external relationships by stating that social responsible behaviour extends to all of the following aspects: organisational governance, human rights, labour practices, environment, fair operating practices, consuming issues, community involvement and development (ISO 2010). Despite the controversy on the ISO model for its potential political use (see Entine (2012)), I believe the shift to a relationship lens is noteworthy.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 3.8 – ISO Social Responsibility Framework (ISO 2010).

The academic Tan advocates for CSR to be driven by values and "a robust sense of ethics" (Tan 2011:61). Behaviours shaped by values and ethics would ensure that firms do not 'act' responsibly, but 'are' responsible. The recognition of the role of values and ethics seems to be percolating among business too. An example comes from Raymond Gilmartin's (former head of Merck) blog in which he argues that "shareholders benefit most when CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] and boards maximize value for society and act as agents of society rather than shareholders." (Gilmartin 2011:np) Porter and Kramer in a recent article also argue that companies must redefine their 'mission' from creating value to creating shared value.

"Shared value (...) is not about personal values. Nor it is about 'sharing' the value already created by firms – a redistribution approach. Instead it is about the total pool of social and economic value." (Porter and Kramer 2011:5)

Building on these views I argue that social responsibility is about *how* one does business and shapes relationships, whether internal relationships, in the way the organisation is guided and managed (through for instance employment policies) or external relationships, in the way the organisations engages with its environment and stakeholders (for example with contractors and local communities). As illustrated by the following diagram, there is a high degree of mutual influence among the types of a company's relationships. There is great fluidity in terms of 'ripple effects', between the two spheres (hence the intermittent lines and undetermined shapes). The human resource policy of a company may have implications outside the company itself. The reverse is also true: how a general manger engages with local authorities may have implications for example for internal company policies.

Figure 3.9 - company relationships.

Why the emphasis on relationships? This idea builds on conflict transformation theory which emphasises the quality of relationships (whether between individuals, or groups, or institutions or between individuals/groups and institutions) as agent for change (Lederach and Maiese 2003). As discussed in *Chapter 2*, the actual impact of one company's action on the environment as a whole is constrained by several factors, (the ability to see its

interdependencies with the context, how a company perceives risk, consistency in the company's actions, the degree of a company's legitimacy, the ability to communicate, leverage, and the fragmentation of the private sector). Given the limitations to impact the private sector can have, I believe, it is by shaping relationships that a company has the greatest potential for change. For instance, demanding that contractors abide by its code of conduct as part of the contractual agreements indicates the precise expectations Total has in terms of both technical *and* behavioural standards. If there is consistency in these expectations and they are accompanied by capacity building as TEPM is doing, the seed for change is planted (either through individual or organisational exposure or both). The model suggested, therefore, enables us to see the potential reach of a company's initiative in terms of its sphere of influence.

3.6.4.3   Indicators of change

I have drawn from indicators of change found in the literature. Zandvliet and Anderson (2009) offer interesting suggestions based on observations on their field experience. The authors identify indicators relating to aspects of structure, policies, attitudes and behaviours, the social investment and macro-level engagement of a company and its staff; these illustrate constructive 'forces'/drivers of a company's presence in an area. *Table 3.4* summarises Zandvliet and Anderson (2009) as well as personal observations.

Given the number of variables involved attributing how much of the change occurred can be directly linked to the dialogue with CDA has been challenging. I have used the indicators in *Table 3.4* as guidelines to analyse interviewees' comments as well as relying on their perceptions of what has changed. The longitudinal aspect of this research enabled observing how such aspects have developed over time.

Table 3.4 – examples of indicators drawn from Zandvliet and Anderson (2009).

3.7   Equipment

Recording equipment was used for the data collection phase. Dictation and transcription software was needed post-data collection.

3.8   Research timescales

The overall project has had a duration of three years: January 2010 to January 2013. 12 months were for field research March 2011 to February 2012. Field research was carried out in several countries: United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Singapore and Myanmar/Burma. Write-up began in April 2012.

	Task Name	Start	Finish	% Comp
0	□ PHDnov12	Mon 25/1/10	Mon 1/7/13	99%
1	⊞ Registration	Mon 25/1/10	Mon 23/1/12	100%
5	⊞ TAUGHT COURSES	Mon 1/2/10	Fri 30/3/12	100%
18	⊞ ADMINISTRATION	Thu 4/2/10	Mon 7/1/13	98%
60	□ ASSESED MILESTONES	Mon 25/1/10	Mon 1/7/13	96%
61	⊞ PRP1	Mon 25/1/10	Wed 1/12/10	100%
65	⊞ PRP 2	Thu 31/3/11	Fri 9/9/11	100%
69	⊞ Viva	Tue 5/3/13	Mon 1/7/13	0%
71	□ RESEARCH ACTIVITIES	Mon 25/1/10	Tue 30/10/12	100%
72	⊞ Buy-in from case study orgs.	Mon 25/1/10	Thu 2/12/10	100%
75	Schedule Interviews	Tue 1/2/11	Fri 30/3/12	100%
76	⊞ Data collection and analysis	Tue 15/3/11	Mon 30/4/12	100%
82	Document analysis	Mon 31/1/11	Fri 29/6/12	100%
83	Data analysis	Tue 5/4/11	Tue 30/10/12	100%
84	⊞ CONTINUOUS ACTIVITIES	Fri 12/11/10	Tue 23/10/12	100%
86	□ WRITTEN OUTPUT	Mon 25/1/10	Fri 11/1/13	95%
87	⊞ Lit review chapter	Mon 25/1/10	Fri 12/11/10	100%
94	⊞ Methodology chapter	Fri 1/10/10	Sat 25/6/11	100%
97	Paper NUS	Fri 1/7/11	Fri 30/9/11	100%
98	Paper Nottingham	Wed 15/2/12	Fri 30/3/12	100%
99	Paper Madrid	Thu 10/5/12	Fri 15/6/12	100%
100	Context setter (Descr. Case Study Orgs, Myanmar)	Wed 15/2/12	Thu 16/8/12	100%
101	Data analysis	Sun 15/7/12	Fri 28/9/12	100%
102	Findings discussion	Wed 29/8/12	Mon 3/9/12	100%
103	Introduction/Conclusion	Mon 1/10/12	Wed 31/10/12	100%
104	⊞ Final draft	Tue 1/1/13	Fri 11/1/13	26%

Figure 3.10 – research timescales.

Methodology – by F. Cerletti

3.9   Issues considered

There are several issues for this research emerging from the chosen methodological approach and from the location of the case study that needed to be considered. These include: ability to communicate messages as intended (both in terms of language and/or meaning – English is not the first language for most of the interviewees); ability to gain a shared understanding with participants of key concepts such as dialogue, conflict sensitivity, conflict transformation; reliance on retrospective recollections; inter-subjectivity; insider/outsider dynamics; staff rotation; safety; trust. The chosen methods and processes - developed in accordance with the University's ethical principles - aimed to address these.

Following the suggestions by Patton (Patton and Patton 2002) and Seale (1999) the interview process has included: affirmation of the academic and neutral (as far as possible) nature of the study; explanation of my role as a researcher; an explicit beginning, middle and end. The semi-structured format of the interviews has allowed room for checking on understanding were used. I was mindful to adopt an interview style that avoided collusion, distortions and judgements to minimise some of the pitfalls of inter-subjectivity. A transcript of the interview was offered to participants. Checking back with participants (as far as possible) also assisted in enhancing accuracy.

In the organisational setting, being an outsider has enabled me to ask for clarification of what seems obvious and encourage participants to think in detail about what they are conveying. These clarification questions may also have encouraged reflections that would not be otherwise done.

Staff rotation within the organisations is common. It posed logistical and budget challenges, as well as a loss of continuity, which has been addressed by interviewing a larger number of people and stakeholders who have been following the dialogue for a long time. However, it also offered the opportunity to gain several perspectives on how the collaboration has been unfolding with insights that can be drawn from other environments.

Doing research in a highly politicised context, like Myanmar/Burma, and on a controversial issue, as Total's presence in the country is, was interesting. It has been a process

characterised by multiple realities, opposing drivers influencing people's views, questionable data and an unexpectedly fast changing environment. The choice of using interviewees' perceptions and triangulating with documents and stakeholder interviews, proved a reliable tool for this project. Having said this, as I mentioned earlier in the chapter, I am conscious of providing a starting ground for further research.

Transparency of purpose, methods and process as well as sensitivity to favouring a comfortable environment for both participant and researcher, helped foster trust-building. I also kept a journal writing impressions and thoughts trying to be explicit about my assumptions and judgments.

A glossary of key concepts as they emerge from the interviews is added to the thesis.

Measures taken to safeguard the wellbeing of the participants have been developed following guidance from the ethics committee of the university. The following are some of the key measures mentioned. For safety reasons, all interviews are anonymous and coded. Codes and transcripts have been kept safely and separately from participants names. A procedure for informed consent has been defined as well as a process to follow in case of distress during (and for a limited time after) the interview. All interview participants, except local community stakeholders, have received a transcript (from recording or notes) for commenting.

With regards to the village visits I have briefed my interpreter beforehand on the nature and sensitivities of this research. I chose an independent interpreter who has experience both in the business sector and conflict transformation field. The interpreter is of Karen origins and speaks the local language as well as Burmese. I did not take notes on the spot. I would take notes out of sight and then would debrief with the interpreter and share the impression we had. We were obviously conspicuous, but in the Western villages this did not seem to cause surprise. It seems that they are used to foreigners. Villagers seemed at complete ease with our presence and the fact that there were foreigners around did not surprise them at all. In the Eastern villages I sensed a little bit more of surprise. The fact that the interpreter spoke the local Karen dialectic was very helpful and seemed to reassure individuals of Karen origin we spoke to. The Socio-Economic Team member who accompanied us did not speak the local language.

3.10   Replicability

As mentioned earlier, numerous variables have a role in this study. While the methods can be reproduced, the existence of these variables is problematic for the replicability of the space. The context in Myanmar/Burma is very dynamic. Despite an external appearance of unity within the regime, changes have and continue to occur. The ethnic question is evolving with some groups seemingly participating in the political process while others not. The economic outlook is mutating as privatization continues and China consolidates its presence. Broad-ranging influences are bound to change the context of the oil industry, for example as a result of what is happening in the Middle East, as demand varies, as stakeholder activism increases.

With regards to the social unit and time, there are other oil corporations present in Myanmar/Burma (for example the Malay company Petronas and more are entering the country). Others work in equally complex environments around the world: for example Shell in Nigeria and BP in Colombia. As mentioned in *Section 3.4*, some of these corporations have engaged with NPOs and civil society representatives. Even though process, goals and time of the engagements may be different, there can be scope to explore the impact of dialogue in those situations.

3.11   Concluding remarks

This research makes no positivist claims. The topic and case study were chosen with the awareness of the complexities involved. The aim of the study has been to explore whether dialogue can have an impact on organizational change, by understanding the underpinning relationships, process and dynamics. It focuses on the detail of how organizations change and what can be done to enhance their ability (and willingness) to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches. As such, it proposes to contribute to the knowledge on the potential of NPO-business partnerships to inspire change.

Furthermore, the particular case study chosen captures the unique opportunity to explore a ten year engagement, in Myanmar/Burma: a country that is beginning to open after many years of closure. While numerous documents and articles have been published criticizing the oil and gas industry in the country, as seen in the literature review *(Chapter 2)* not much

covers efforts of soft engagement. Despite the constraints and challenges, I am convinced that the study will offer a starting point for other researchers as the space opens, as well as insights for others wishing to influence corporations in the way they work.

Chapter 4
The protagonists: Total and CDA

In the following two chapters, *Chapter 4* and *5*, I will offer background and context to the research. *Chapter 4* provides some information relating to my case-study protagonists: Total and CDA. I will start by briefly describing Total and how the company that we know today has come to be. I will highlight several aspects concerning Total that I believe will be a useful context for the discussion in *Chapters 6* to *9* (the shareholder base, how the company is organised), and give a broad outline of its decisions making process. Next, I will describe the subsidiary of the company that operates in Myanmar/Burma. I will end the outline on Total by looking at its corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, both for Total and for TEPM. I will draw on the documentation analysed and interviews. As part of the analysis, I have also developed two broad timelines with key initiatives which I have included in *Appendix 4.*

The following part will be dedicated to CDA. There will be a brief history of the organisation followed an overview of its work. As CDA's work is based on the collaborative learning approach, the following paragraphs will briefly explain it. I conclude the overview on CDA by describing the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP), one of the five projects led by the organisation. It is under the auspices of this project that the relationship between Total and CDA falls.

In the *Chapter 5* I will give an overview of the situation in Myanmar/Burma as well as summarising the main criticisms levied against Total's operations in Myanmar/Burma.

The aim of these introductory chapters is to give the reader sufficient information to put into context my analysis and discussion (in the next chapters). I have therefore preferred to highlight the issues which I felt most relevant to this research. The overview will be particularly relevant to the discussion on how the relationship between CDA and Total has contributed to Total's way of working by showing when different approaches were taken. It will also be a guideline to notice developments in terms of institutionalisation (*Chapter 8-9*).

4.1   Total S.A.

Total SA (*Société Anonyme*) (Total) was established after World War I, in 1924, as the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles* (CFP). Two main concerns led to the formation of CFP: a desire to ensure French oil independence, and the need to manage the 25% Deutsche Bank shares of the Turkish Petroleum Company awarded to France at the San Remo Conference as compensation for war damages (Fundinguniverse nd).

Total, as we know it today, is the result of a number of mergers and acquisitions, the most notable of which were: with the Belgian company Petrofina in 1999, and with the French state controlled company Elf Aquitaine in 2000. Following the mergers, for a brief period of time the company was known first as TotalFina, and then TotalFinaElf. The name Total was readopted in 2003.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Table 4.1 – Total: key facts (Total 2012b).

Total has always been a private company and was first quoted on the Paris stock exchange in 1929. In 2010 it was listed in Paris, London New York and Brussels.

The graphs below illustrate who the major stakeholders were in 2011.

* based on the definition of employees pursuant to Art. L225-102 of the French Commercial Code

Figure 4.1 - Total's Shareholders (Total 2012b:5).

Table 4.2 - major shareholders of Total (Total 2012b:151).

Two points are worth highlighting here. Firstly, being quoted on the New York stock exchange makes the company subject to the United States' (US) Bill *Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act* (2010). According to this legislation, Total is required to disclose to the Securities Commission (SEC) all payments made to governments including taxes, royalties, bonuses, fees etc. The SEC will compile the data received and make the

The protagonists: Total and CDA – by F. Cerletti

information public. The French company will therefore be obliged to disclose payments made to the Myanmar/Burma government, something that has not been publicly available before.

Secondly, from the graphs above, it is possible to note that at least 37% of the shares of the company (27% in North America and 10% in the UK) are held in Anglo-Saxon countries (4% lower than in 2005). Given the high profile of the campaign on Myanmar/Burma issues in these countries many financial (and non) institutions are vigilant on the company's behaviour in terms of human rights. Concerns regarding appropriate corporate responsibility however go beyond the Anglo-Saxon world. For example in 2005, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, following the allegations made against Total in relation to human rights abuses in Myanmar/Burma, asked the Norwegian Petroleum Fund's Advisory Council on Ethics to investigate whether the investments made in by the Government in Total were against the Petroleum Fund's ethical guidelines. The Council published a critical report on its website, though concluding that given the Fund's ethical guidelines, there were no reasons to exclude the company from its portfolio.

Total has an integrated business model: its activities span across the upstream (exploration and production; gas and power), and downstream (refinery and marketing; trading and shipping and chemicals) sectors of the industry. Its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Christophe de Margerie stated in 2009 that this integrated model constitutes a competitive advantage in respect to other companies, as it contrasts the trend in the energy industry of specializing in one specific sector only. The CEO claims that having in-house experience enables the company to offer grounded in-depth knowledge of the industry; something that is increasingly needed in emerging countries which are developing the sector (De Margerie 2009).

4.1.1 Organisational structure and relevant decision making process

I will now touch upon how the company is structured and what are the key decision making processes. This overview has the sole purpose of offering useful background for my discussion in *Chapters 6* to *9.*

The parent company of the group is called Total S.A. As it is possible to see from the chart in the next pages, in addition to the corporate management structures, there are five branches that reflect the main areas of operations mentioned earlier: exploration and production; gas and power; refinery and chemicals; trading and shipping; supply and marketing. Each of the

five branches has its management structures, (assisted by the relevant divisions at corporate level). Two of the five branches also have regional offices: exploration and production, and supply and marketing.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.2 - Total's organizational chart (Total 2012b:54/5) (cont.)

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.2 - Total's organizational chart (Total 2012b:54/5) (cont.)

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.2 - Total's organizational chart (Total 2012b:54/5) (cont.)

The protagonists: Total and CDA – by F. Cerletti

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.2 - Total's organizational chart (Total 2012b:54/5).

There are two points of interest to this research in terms of the company's structure. The first is the Ethics Committee. The Committee, created in 2000, is directly responsible to the CEO. It is, therefore, an independent body from all other parts of the organization. Its role is to monitor company compliance to Total's Code of Conduct, offer advice to employees and respond to questions raised on ethics issues. Referrals to the Committee can be made by anyone. In 2009 the Committee handled 63 cases (Total 2010b, Total 2011b), almost twice as many as in 2002 (36, (Total 2003)). The second is that there is no CSR department. Total has in fact chosen to streamline CSR directly in its operations (Anon 10 2011, Anon 449 2011a). This choice was informed by the belief that those on the ground are in the best position to understand the context. There is a Sustainable Development and Environment Division within Corporate Affairs. The role of the Division is to support individuals and teams working locally on issues connected to sustainable development and the environment, just like there are Human Resources, Industrial Security, Legal etc. departments. It is also responsible for preparing relevant risk assessments and mitigation plans for new operations, organise training and develop applied methodology.

Locally/in-country, Total operates through subsidiaries. At the end of 2011, Total had "870 consolidated subsidiaries, of which 783 were fully consolidated and 87 were accounted for under the equity method." (Total 2012b:50)

Total describes its management system as centralized-decentralized model. "Each individual is responsible for what occurs in his or her profit centre, business sector or corporate organization. They must act and report in accordance with clearly established internal procedures." (Total 2008a:18) In terms of reporting within the Exploration and Production (E&P) branch, subsidiary staff reports to the local subsidiary General Manager (GM). He or she reports to the Regional Director, who reports to the E&P Director (Anon 449 2011b).

Total decides on new projects following a gateway approach marked by a number of committees/levels of approvals. The last three are the most important ones: COMAD, CORISK and COMEX (Anon 20 2011).

The main focus of the first one, COMAD, is the technical (design and development approach), aspects of the project. The following one is CORISK. At this level, the risks involved in the projects are discussed through a qualitative analysis. Integral to their analysis are ethical, technical financial, safety, environmental, societal and contextual aspects. Risks

are evaluated though a points system and are benchmarked against other projects of similar characteristic. In some cases some of the risks may turn out to be 'off-the–charts'. This may be due to, for example, contextual issues or different operational modes that influence the degree of risk. The committee analyses these 'off-the-chart' situations in detail and expects a solid justification with relevant mitigation plans (Anon 20 2011). COMEX will approve or reject a project. The CEO of the company is present at COMEX meetings and decisions are taken at this level (Anon 20 2011) (see also *Figure 4.3* and *4.4*).

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.3 – decision making process for investments (Total 2007).

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.4 - the gird used at CORISK for the evaluation of projects (de la Chevardière 2011).

4.1.2 The articulation of strategies and policies

Company strategies and policies are formulated by relevant committees working with the CEO. At branch level departments adapt/set their own specific policies in consultation with the branch Director. The same happens in the subsidiaries (Anon 449 2011b).

Company policies are articulated through a number of different documents which reflect the degree of specificity they cover. In *Chapters 6* to *9* I will refer to some of these documents.

Charters are statements of principles. They are the general principles which inform the company's work (Anon 20 2011). Charters can be developed at any level within the company - group, branch or subsidiary. However a subsidiary should have a management system compatible with the branch system which itself needs to be compatible with the group system (Anon 449 2011b).

Then there are company rules and company referential. These are internal guidelines, called *Guides* and *Manuals*, which cover in detail the steps and processes that must be taken into account/followed in a specific area of the operations. They are the basis for the strict internal compliance process within the company (Anon 20 2011, Anon 449 2011b).

Total also issues *General Specifications* (GS). These are guidelines for service/contract companies which outline the scope of the work for a particular type of work, for example an environmental and social assessment (Anon 449 2011b).

4.1.3 Total in Myanmar/Burma

In Myanmar/Burma Total operates through a subsidiary of its exploration and production branch, Total E&P Myanmar (TEPM). From here on I will refer to Total E&P Myanmar as TEPM, to the Exploration and Production branch as E&P, to Total the company, as Total.

The French oil company signed a 'Production Sharing Contract' in July 1992 for the Yadana gas fields in the Andaman Sea (Total 2010a) - before EU sanctions were passed. Today, Total is one of the few Western investors in the country (Bissinger 2011).

The Yadana project is a joint venture between four investors. TEPM is the operator company (31.2%). The others are: a subsidiary of Unocal, now Chevron (28.3%); Petroleum Authority

of Thailand-Exploration & Production (PTT-EP, 25.5%); and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE, 15%), a state owned enterprise.

Construction work occurred between 1995 and 1998. The map below shows the Yadana gas-field and the pipeline (in red). It is possible to see how the majority of the pipeline is underwater (347km) while only 63km are overland. It has been decided to build the onshore pipeline in the narrowest part of the country following a route that would minimise environmental impact (see Total (2010a) for a discussion on the other routes considered).

With regards to the on-shore part, the area in which the pipeline is built is referred to as 'pipeline area' or 'pipeline corridor'. It is 63km in length and 10-15km wide (CDA 2002). There are no physical demarcations and it is only visible on a map (see also *Figure 4.7* (CDA 2002). As *Figure 4.5* below shows, in the same area runs the Yetagun Pipeline operated by the Malaysian oil company Petronas (in blue). A third pipeline is being (April 2012) built nearby: the Zawtika project run by PTT-EP and MOGE.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.5 - the Yadana Pipeline (Total 2010a:8).

The majority of the gas is for export to Thailand and a minority is for internal consumption. In January 2012, about 750 million cubic feet were destined to Thailand and 200 million cubic feet to Myanmar/Burma – quantities vary depending on demand (Anon 305 2012).

Around 2500 people were involved in the construction phase (staff and contractors), 88% of whom were national. Today TEPM gives work to approximately 800 individuals, 90% of which are Myanmar/Burma nationals (Total 2010a).

4.1.4 Key CSR initiative in Total and TEPM

In this section I give an overview of some key initiatives undertaken by Total and TEPM that could be considered under the banner of CSR. For both Total and TEPM I have prepared a timeline for reference which I have included in *Appendix 4*. Below I start by commenting what I have considered as key highlights for Total. I will discuss TEPM in the following section.

4.1.4.1 Total

At Group level three categories of 'initiatives' can be identified: actions within the company, partnerships/collaborations, and listing on major socially responsible investment indices. Internally, Total seems to have focused on four areas: adapting its structure (colour coded blue in the timeline, *Appendix 4*), the adoption of policies and guidelines (colour coded red), capacity building (in light blue), assessing its efforts (in green) and the development of tools (in orange). Partnerships and collaborations cover a wide range of themes (from road safety to health) as well as participation in known international bodies as United Nations (UN) Global Compact and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Among the changes in structure, the most notable ones are the creation of the Ethics Committee and the Sustainable Development and Environment Division. In terms of policies, the backbone to the company's ethical behaviour is its Code of Conduct. Total is adamant that it will not operate in places where it cannot adhere to its Ethics principles and its Code of Conduct. The CEO De Margerie said in an interview: "(t)hat line [where we work or not] is drawn by our Ethics Charter." (Aujourd'hui en France 2009) The Code of Conduct has inspired other codes of conduct (on purchasing, for example) and it is not the only form of self-regulation that the company has adopted. Others include the endorsement of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human rights (VPs), and the environmental management system ISO 14001.

The creation of the *Societal Métier* (a professional figure within Total that focuses on societal issues and sustainable development) with its network and capacity building activities – seminars and workshops – has paved the way for a whole new range of professionals to be part of the Total workforce: ethnographers, anthropologists, agronomists etc. Some of the capacity building initiatives, like Total Prof, aim also at supporting the expansion of knowledge beyond Total through collaboration with other institutions around the world. Developing skills among contractors is a group-wide policy. "Our goal here is to bring more and more local contractors up to international standards in terms of quality, safety and working conditions" (Total 2010b:50). Guidelines have also been developed to ensure consistency in implementation.

Most of the practical tools like the *Practical Guide for Local Development Projects* have been developed internally (Total 2008b). They draw on the knowledge gained though the participation and collaboration with organisations like Global Compact, IPIECA (the oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues), IRAM (a French non-government organisation (NGO)), as well as the experience developed by implementing projects in the subsidiaries.

For illustration purposes below I reproduce a slide from a CSR presentation made to investors in 2007 which illustrates key processes relating to CSR: COMEX is the level where project risks are evaluated; key references for practices are the Code of Conduct and charters and relevant guides; monitoring and evaluation occurs through the Subsidiary Ethical Assessments Process.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.6 - COMEX evaluation of projects, documents of reference and approaches used for stakeholder engagement (Total 2007).

The protagonists: Total and CDA – by F. Cerletti

4.1.4.2 TEPM

Broadly speaking the CSR activities reported below for TEPM offer a good example of what Total's subsidiaries *may* be doing in terms of CSR. Initiatives are, in fact, determined by context. Having said this it is also worth noting that the work in Myanmar/Burma has been considered a special case within the company (Anon 155 2011, Anon 613 2012). A mixture of factors contributed to 'Myanmar/Burma' gaining this status: the intensity of the advocacy campaign, the contextual issues, the remarkable nature of the people of Myanmar/Burma, perceived as gentle, co-operative, understanding and committed. This view of the Myanmar/Burma people has also been portrayed by a civil society representative (Anon 6 2011).

As mentioned in the methodology chapter (*Chapter 3*), although I refer to the Myanmar/Burma CSR initiatives as TEPM's (as my research looks into the changes within Total as a company), all initiatives undertaken by TEPM must be understood as initiatives of the Yadana Consortium (TEPM, Unocal, PTT-EP and MOGE). The only exception is the partnership with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), which has been directly signed between Total and UNITAR.

Building on the argument presented in *Chapter 3* that CSR can also be seen as a way to build relationships; I have structured the overview in aspects that relate to internal stakeholders and those that concern external ones. In the first group are relevant expected standards, influencing behaviours and establishing good working relationships. In the second: influencing wider practices and being a good neighbour. The timeline I developed for TEPM is in *Appendix 4*.

Internal stakeholders

Behaviours and standards: TEPM is governed by its own Code of Conduct, tailored from the parent company's one. It was first adopted in 1995 and revised in 2005. The Code of Conduct is available also in Burmese. TEPM is one of the subsidiaries that adopt ISO 14001.

Influencing behaviours - cultural awareness: TEPM 'cultural awareness –raising' efforts for expats have been strengthened, adding (around 2008/9) yearly workshops to a longstanding publication aiming at orientating expat staff. Topics in the publication and workshops

include: the general socio-economic and cultural situation (with emphasis on the region where the pipeline is), advice and guidelines on local customs, how to interact with the local populations and forms of communication to improve mutual understanding (Total 2010a). The company implemented a policy of nationalization and the number of non-nationals is minimal (for example only three positions in the operations).

Establishing good working relationships - labour conditions: Merit, based on qualifications, is at the core of TEPM's hiring policy. However, at the time of construction (1995-1998) specific "targets were set for hiring local villagers" (Total 2010a:13). Local employment has been something that the company has to be particularly attentive to given the accusations of complicity in forced labour that international campaigners raised. Currently new local employees are hired following the recommendation of the Village Communication Committees (VCCs) indicating the most needy and deserving (CDA 2011).

Within TEPM employees are "able to bargain freely and collectively with management." (Tonkin 2010:4) This 'proto-union' was a rare exception in Myanmar/Burma as Trade Unions were banned until October 2011.

There is a minimum wage for each job category which is higher than local average pay scales, though takes into consideration potential inflationary effects. Workers are provided with appropriate safety equipment and clothing and training and awareness campaigns are on-going (Anon 23 2012, TEPM 2010b, Total 2010a).

Establishing good working relationships - language training: Myanmar/Burma language training is offered to all non-national staff and their spouses as well as contractors. English lessons are offered to all staff and local staff.

External stakeholders
Influencing practices - supply chain: TEPM's contractors and partners are required to abide by its Code of Conduct. Integral to each contract is the respect of the company's Code of conduct, Ethics Charter and Health, Safety & Environment (HSE) policy (Anon 23 2012, Caillaud 2011).

TEPM also audits contractors' HSE systems to understand and review the support they need. "HSE workshops and forums are regularly organized to allow for experience sharing between contractors and TEPM" (Caillaud 2011:9).

Influencing practices - sharing knowledge: TEPM convenes an informal forum with representatives of Daewoo, PTT-EP and Petronas working in the oil and gas sector in Myanmar/Burma. Its purpose is to share experiences and lessons learnt. The information sharing activities have intensified recently to an average of two a month meetings – one taking place in Yangon and another 'on the ground' in the pipeline area for the Socio-Economic Programme teams of the participating companies (Anon 613 2012). Manuals and procedure (for example land acquisition and compensation procedure) have been shared with PTT-EP (whose nearby Zawtika pipeline is at the initial phases) (Anon 613 2012). TEPM is also planning a number of workshops in conjunction with the Myanmar Chamber of Commerce on the different aspects of its CSR activities (Anon 809 2012).

Being a good neighbour - visits: In an attempt to break down barriers, TEPM has also opened its operations to visits from people of the surrounding villages and beyond by organizing open days at regular intervals. Site visits are also organized for people further afield internationally and nationally. This openness started as a way to build relationship with the local communities. Increasingly international visitors have been invited to visit the site in an attempt to counteract accusations. From this year (2012) it will be open to national visitors as well both in a public relation and an awareness raising effort of what it means to run such operations (and standards). With regards to the media, after an initial attempt by TEPM management to display to the international press its CSR work in Myanmar/Burma, contacts with journalists were scarce. According to a representative of the international media, the accounts from the visit did not turn out as the company had hoped: articles emphasized the negative aspects of the programme (Anon 724 2011).

Being a good neighbour - human rights: TEPM has an established process to deal with notifications from individuals living in the pipeline corridor of attempts and/or episodes of forced labour and other abuses. The company investigates reports and raises the issue to the military through its partner MOGE. This process was reviewed and formalised around 2006. The same year Total partnered with UNITAR. As part of this partnership TEPM has supported two courses jointly organised by UNITAR and the Myanmar/Burma Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in 2006 and in 2009) on "human rights, humanitarian, refugee, maritime and

environmental law, the United Nations system and multilateral relations" aimed at government officials (Total 2010b:57). In 2009-2010 TEPM piloted training sessions on relevant international human rights standards and consensus building with the Danish Institute of Human Rights (DIHR) and, later, with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These sessions involved TEPM employees, MOGE, as well as pipeline area local authorities, villagers and local entrepreneurs (Total 2010b).

Being a good neighbour - Socio-Economic Programme (SEP): TEPM started its Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) in 1995. It initially included only 13 villages, in 2001 ten more were added and another two in 2005. Today it covers a total of 25 villages located in the pipeline area (see map below) which include 31,000 people of Dawai (Burman subgroup), Karen and Mon origin (TEPM 2009a:11).

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.7 - villages in the SEP (TEPM 2009a:11).

As it is possible to see from the timeline, the range of initiatives within the Socio-Economic Programme is broad. They range from primary health care, education support and training, micro-finance, livestock and agricultural support. TEPM has also built much infrastructure (renovated buildings, roads and bridges).

Following the 2006 assessment of the programme, there has been a major shift in SEP's direction. The focus of the programme has changed from a service delivery approach to community development.

Since 2007/8, SEP uses a three prong work-frame to define its activities:

"1. Improve income of villagers

2. Enhance access to educational and professional skills

3. Reduce health vulnerability of the local populations." (TEPM 2009a:11)

Since its revision, SEP has been involving villagers more and more in its planning and implementation. The main activities still are: health, infrastructure, education, income generation initiatives. In 2009 it had budget of $2.65 million (Total 2010b). Overall "more than $20 million have been spent since 1995" (Total 2010b:56).

Currently the SEP team is developing the strategy for the withdrawal phase (foreseen for 2028). Included in this strategy is a monitoring and handover period (Anon 60 2012). Some of the activities will be in fact terminated and some 'handed-over' to communities, local institutions and/or NGOs as most appropriate (Anon 60 2012).

Being a good neighbour - national programmes: TEPM has partnered with NGOs to run a few programmes in other areas of Myanmar/Burma. In 2000 it partnered with the Hellen Keller Foundation for the Blind, and the French company sponsors an eye clinic. Three years later the company initiated an HIV programme with the NGO International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organisation. The programme contributes to the national HIV initiative though capacity building and works on increasing effectiveness. Initially entirely sponsored by the Yadana Consortium, today the Consortium is only a minority donor. TEPM also supports orphanages in Yangon.

The above comments on TEPM activities conclude my overview of Total and TEPM. I will now offer some background on CDA.

4.2   CDA

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) is a non-profit organisation in the humanitarian, peacebuilding and development fields with a good reputation across the world. It was established in 2003 as an off-shoot of the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. (CDA, Inc.) CDA Inc, is a consultancy set up in 1985 by two economists Mary Anderson and Catherine Overholt (www.cdainc.com).

However, as the nature of its work on the one hand increasingly steered towards collaborative learning projects and on the other it was funded by governments, it was felt that the non-profit status was better suited the type of work. CDA Inc continues to exist on a small scale (www.cdainc.com).

CDA has a small number of core staff who also draws on the experience of other professionals depending on the topic area and location. It does not have programmes. The main focus of its work revolves around five learning projects:

- "Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) - for international corporations.
- Do No Harm - for humanitarian and development agencies.
- Listening Project - with recipients of assistance.
- Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) - for peace practitioners.
- Steps Toward Conflict Prevention (STEPS) - for NGOs and others interested in supporting communities in their intention to avoid violent conflict" (www.cdainc.com).

Occasionally CDA also takes on assignments including training, evaluation, programme design and implementation consultancy, and facilitation of policy reviews.

4.2.1 CDA's approach

CDA's research approach is "field-based and experience-driven" (www.cdainc.com). A space is created for operational organisations and practitioners to come together and learn from each other about issues that have broad relevance to all (meetings/fora/workshops etc.). Building on the discussions that take place during such encounters, lessons are captured and tools developed. These are then shared with others. It could be described as a non-directive, consultative and participatory process to identify learning, concepts and tools.

The process described above involves several steps (www.cdainc.com). Initially case studies are realized by a number of participants located in different areas. When the case studies are ready, participants gather to discuss and analyse them. During these discussions cross-cutting issues and themes of broad concern are identified.

Following these meetings, an attempt is made to understand the issues that have emerged and preliminary lessons on how to deal with them are formulated. Next, 'feedback workshops' are organized in which participants test the preliminary lessons learnt *vis-a-vis* their experience. Through discussions, additional ideas and comments arise and what had previously been formulated is refined and improved. Finally, CDA disseminates the outputs and promotes their usage in the field, though training and the realization of books and manuals. However the learning process is on-going. Insights emerging from the dissemination of the tools, as well as CDA's own work with organizations to implement lessons learnt and tools are captured and feedback during the review of what has been produced to that time.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 4.8 - collaborative learning process (CDA 2008b:3).

From a 2007 evaluation of CDA by Brusset et al (Brusset et al 2007) made for the donor agency SIDA, it would appear that the participants appreciate the process and how it is conducted. The evaluation focused on three of the five learning projects (Do No Harm, RPP and STEPS). However there is a comment that may be more or less extended to the way CDA works: CDA's "strengths reflect a very competent focus on the process and dimensions of learning." (2007:7) Thus giving a sense of the strength of this approach.

4.2.2 The Corporate Engagement Project (CEP)

As mentioned in *Chapter 3,* the relationship between CDA and Total falls within the CEP. CEP began in 2000 with the objective of "to ensure that companies have positive, rather than

negative, impacts on communities in the areas where they operate." (CDA 2008a:2). CEP's participants are representatives of companies (60 companies have been involved with the project – July 2012). Similarly to the other learning projects, CEP involves a number of consultations among project participants who share and discuss their experiences. As part of the discussions the lessons emerging from evidence-based case studies derived from field visits undertaken by the CEP team. As of July 2012 there have been over 45 site visits in 24 countries in collaboration with ten corporations and various logging companies (www.cdainc.com).

During the field visits, evidence is gathered through interviews with company managers, as well as the broadest range of stakeholders possible (including advocacy groups, local communities, civil society groups, international organizations, diplomatic representatives, media, etc.). Building on the findings, a number of options for improving effectiveness are offered to the host company. The process of these visits in Myanmar/Burma will be discussed in greater detail in *Chapter 6.*

The degree of each company's involvement in CEP varies from company to company. The range of participation is broad. Minimum participation occurs in the form of informal contacts (correspondence, conversations and occasional meetings). Some companies participate in the group consultations/meetings mentioned in the previous section, but the CEP makes no field visits to their operational sites. Other companies participate in consultations and the CEP team makes one field visit. Maximum engagement usually includes consultations, multiple field visits and formal long-term relationships (Anon 31 2011). Total's involvement falls in the latter category.

CEP's funds come from a variety of sources including governments (for example the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Australia), international organizations (for example the World Bank) as well as participating companies. However, for companies there is no-predetermined contribution. Contributions range from none, to generous ones. Field visits are covered by CEP core funds. CEP aims to make all arrangements and meet all expenses unless for specific reasons (for example safety), the visiting CEP team needs to rely on company support (Anon 31 2011).

During my research the issues of funding sources was rarely raised by participants. In the few exceptional times it was raised, most people assumed there was a contractual

agreement between Total and CDA. A minority was broadly aware of the public-private provenance of the project's funding.

The framework developed as a result of the CEP work focuses on how benefits derived from company operations are distributed, on company behaviours, and how companies manage side effects. Given the broad spectrum of company practices and relationships taken in consideration, I feel it is possible to speculate that the concept of 'communities' could be intended beyond 'local communities'. The ideas behind the framework could apply to any type of stakeholder. Furthermore, there is a strong resonance between the more recent connotations of CSR, as discussed in *Chapter 3* and this framework. Both highlight the relational aspect and, the aspects covered include labour practices, working practices, community involvement, environment, supply-chain responsibility etc.

4.3   Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I provided a basic outlook of the two organisations involved in my case study: Total and CDA. For both I have related their origins, and provided few details on key aspects that I feel will facilitate the understanding of my discussion: organisational structure, decision-making process, and key initiatives. With regards to Total I also commented on initiatives that could be considered as CSR.

In terms of CSR, it is noteworthy that the Total has chosen to streamline it directly into its way of working and core company decision making process. The company has invested resources in detailing policy and procedures that account for social responsibility, in the realisation of tools, and in capacity building. The centralised-decentralised management system allows for a degree of local autonomy within the broad frameworks of company policy. This is reflected by the fact that local activities are bespoke according to context. In Myanmar/Burma what falls within the CSR umbrella can be grouped according to whether an activity/policy is primarily addressed to an internal or external stakeholder. In both cases includes aspects to influence practices and behaviours as well as establishing good relationships.

I will next offer an outline of the situation in Myanmar/Burma and of the criticisms made to Total.

Chapter 5
Context and background

In this chapter I give a broad-brush picture of Myanmar/Burma trying to simplify an entangled history without making it simplistic. Given the complexity of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, I will focus on the following issues: historical developments, the conflict, the economy, key social aspects, and the most recent political developments. All the aspects mentioned justify PhD researches in their own right. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I will only be able to provide a broad-brush picture on each, just enough to illustrate how the issues are connected. Furthermore, since March 2011 events in Myanmar/Burma have been evolving at an unprecedented rate. I would like to anticipate that there is a good possibility that by the time I present the thesis, the situation may well be radically different from the time I am writing – April 2012.

I conclude the chapter by highlighting the range of criticism that was levied against Total. I have chosen to include this section in my thesis as I felt it was important for the reader to have some background to be able to appreciate the complexity of the situation in which the relationship between CDA and Total emerged and progressed. In my discussion I will draw from the literature review chapter (*Chapter 2*). During the discussion of the findings, I will refer back to *Chapter 2* to offer possible explanations to some of the actions taken/choices made by the two partners.

5.1   Myanmar/Burma: an example of a complex environment

During the past 24 months Myanmar/Burma (also known as Burma) has been in the spotlight for the political transition it is going through. The speed of change in the country seems to be unprecedented.

Ruled by a military government since 1962, in November 2010 the people of Myanmar/Burma voted representatives to two houses of parliament as well as regional assemblies. This was the coronation of the Seven Step Roadmap designed in 2003 by the former governing council, the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council), towards 'disciplined democracy'. The aim was to gain legitimacy for those in power and end the 60

years old ethnic strife by offering some decentralisation via the regional assemblies, thus consolidating the semblance of stability achieved through the numerous ceasefire agreements during the 1990s.

The November 2010 elections were the first in 20 years. In March 2011 President Thein Sein was appointed and formal transfer of power between the military and the civilian government occurred. Since then a number of important reforms were announced and some approved by parliament. There has been an historical by-election in which the main democratic opposition party - the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, has won 43 of the 44 seats they contested out of a total of 45 (of the original 48 seats due for elections, three, in the conflict areas, were suspended for security reasons). The events have something of the incredible; however, the fundamentals have not changed. For this reason I have chosen the following structure for this section.

The main focus of the section is on events and issues that have characterised Myanmar/Burma until March 2011. I will start by offering an historical overview of the main events. Then will look at the conflict, followed by the economy and key social issues of pertinence. I will conclude the chapter with a review of the last 12 months (I am writing these words in April 2012). Much of what is discussed in this section, relies on media reports, the discussions I had during the time of the research, my field visits as well as what was raised by key informants. Overall in the main they represent my views and speculations made from the information at hand.

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry university.

Figure 5.1 - administrative map of Myanmar/Burma (http://www.dpsmap.com/gis/ 2010).

5.1.1 The events leading up to March 2011

In his 2007 book Thant Myint U elegantly describes the fluidity which has characterised the area known today as Myanmar/Burma in terms of migrations, reigns and rulers. The geographical area today known as Myanmar/Burma has been inhabited by a large number of ethnic people, including the: Burmans or Bamar (the name of the Burmese ethnic group), Mon, Karen, Shan, Arakan, Katchin. It has seen the changing fortunes of a number of different 'powers' (mainly Pyu, Mon, Shan, Burmese, Arakan) through a mixture of wars, political decline and invasion. Actors in these processes also involved neighbouring and distant reigns (Siam, China, France, and Britain). From the 16th Century to the mid-18th Century there were intermittent efforts by the Burmese Taungoo dynasty to rule over the majority of the area. As the dynasty declined, the last Burmese dynasty, Konbaung, rose to power in 1752. The Konbaungs fell by the hands of the British as a result of three wars

Context and background – by F. Cerletti

between 1824 and 1885 (Thant Myint-U 2007). The British administratively divided the conquered lands in Ministerial Burma, and the Frontier Areas. The former more or less covered the main areas inhabited by Burmese including the Delta Mon and Rakine. The latter referred to the lands on the border inhabited mainly by non-Burmese people. Some groups were left to rule their lands (Shan, Karenni Saophas, and Kachin Duwas). The Karenni states were not included in the colony. However, as well as for immigrant Chinese, Indian and Anglo-Burmese minorities, in parliament there were seats for the Karen (but not the Mon which lived in the same area).

Juxtapositions and rivalries of the past remained. During the Second World War (WWII) these were exploited by both the Japanese and the Allies. In an oversimplification, it could be said that both warring parties exploited sentiments of self-determination and liberation. First the Japanese tapped on the Burmese against British Rule and next the Allies drew on ethnic minorities like the Chindits, Karens and Katchins to fight the forces of the Rising Sun (Thant Myint-U 2007).

In the lead up to independence the political discourse was characterised by what assets the new country would have. I will use Smith's words to summarise. "Various ethnic groups, including Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Shan organizations, made demands for separation, and, at one stage, it was envisaged that Burma might have a two-stage independence for Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas so that a more equitable integration could be prepared. In the event, a general consensus was achieved by Aung San [Aung San Suu Kyi's father] with Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders at the Panglong conference in February 1947 (...) Against this backdrop, a democratic constitution, influenced by socialist ideals of state, was drawn up. (...) Many human rights and liberal freedoms, including the rights of ethnic minorities, religious-based groups, women and trade unions, were allowed. Federal in concept (although not in name), power was to be shared between the former Ministerial Burma and the ethnic nationality states. There would be a bicameral legislature, with both a 250-seat Chamber of Deputies and 125-seat Chamber of Nationalities." (Smith 2002:7)

Alas the success of the project was marked by serious challenges from the start. The dissatisfaction of some minority groups about the concessions made, led to the boycott of the Constitutional Assembly elections; General Aung San (a pivotal figure in the forging of the new state) was assassinated (1947); the communist waged armed violence against the government.

Following independence in 1948 the political class struggled to organise the country into a stable state: disputes soon turned violent. In a very short period of time (1948-1949) about 20 minority groups including the Karen and the Mons took up arms disillusioned by the slow progress made by the elected prime minister U Nu in terms of their demands. The communists rebelled (1948). The remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops invaded Shan state (1950s) (Ekeh and Smith 2007). (KMT forces were defeated in 1961 by a joint action of Chinese and Burmese troops (Steinberg 2010)). Infighting brought about the near collapse of the state - in 1949 U Nu's authority extended to only six miles from Rangoon (Smith 2002).

In this context, the Burmese military under General Ne Win, gradually took front stage as saviours of the union and peacemakers. Self-appointing themselves as carers of the nation state, in 1962 the military took power and ruled until 2010. General Ne Win who had led the coup ushered a governance approach underpinned by paranoia, secrecy and a strong drive toward isolation (ICG 2001).

Ne Win suddenly resigned in 1988 following the collapse of the economy (see later). His resignation ushered the renowned student protests of the same year against the military. However, by September these were crushed and the military regime created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to lead the country. The struggle for democracy culminated two years later, when elections for a constitutional assembly were overwhelmingly won by the NLD (Smith 2002).

Caught by the unexpected result, SLORC dismissed the outcome by selecting its own delegates to the National Convention (HRW 2008). General Ne Win and his entourage were arrested. The democracy movement was suppressed and in 1992 General Than Shwe became leader of SLORC. After a reshuffle, the council leading Myanmar/Burma was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (1997), Than Shwe remaining at its head until March 2011 when there was the handover to President Thein Sein.

From the ethnic angle, violent conflict had been continuing in parallel. During the 1990s a number of ceasefires were negotiated with the majority of the armed groups. Only the one with the Kachin Independence Army (KIO) resulted in an actual agreement (Ekeh and Smith 2007). Other groups like the Karen National Union have never stopped. However, the

renewed dissatisfaction of some ethnic groups on the post-cease fire stalemates and the lack of real political peace-dividends accompanied by disputable economic decision led to violence once again. The conflict with the KIO (Kachin Independence Organisation) resumed in 2010 and it is on-going as I write.

After the 2010 elections, political power has remained under the influence of the military. In addition to 25% of the seats in parliament granted to the military by the national constitution, most of the representatives elected are from former military background and/or members of the political party associated to the military, the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP). Furthermore, institutionally, much still had to be clarified, for example, the relationship between regional assemblies and parliament still need to be clarified (Horsey 2011a).

5.1.2 The conflict(s)

In very simplistic terms the conflict in Myanmar/Burma can be broadly summarised as a struggle for the structure and organisation of the state fought along two main lines: democracy *vs.* autocracy on the one hand; centralism vs. autonomy and self-determination on the other. At the forefront of the first is Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), while the other involves a number of the 135 different ethnic groups present in Myanmar/Burma. They claim recognition of their identity and varying degrees of power sharing (Smith 2002). However, the complexity of the conflict is overshadowed by the simplicity of such explanation.

It would be in fact easier to talk about the conflicts of Myanmar/Burma. The ramification of 'the conflict' intertwines among macro and micro dimensions and along political, religious and sub-ethnic divides. Its key dynamics evolved around the fragmentation of the groups involved; the divided position of the international community; the emasculation of civil society; skewed economic management and the ever increasing illicit economy and drug trade. Disastrous policies implemented by the consecutive military governments as well as socio-cultural norms and perceptions have further entrenched positions.

The result is a country that suffers from great inequalities and poverty, widespread corruption, poor levels of know-how and capacity, weak rule of law; persistent human rights abuses and a militarised society. (Data for Myanmar/Burma is often not available, and when there is, it is often controversial. For example there is no GINI coefficient, which measures

the degree of inequality; the numbers for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth are questioned by scholars; the figures for refugees are highly disputed. It is important, therefore, to read data in light of these considerations).

By far the biggest loser from the conflict has been the civilian population. Numbers are disputed; however, there are estimates of 500,000 or more Internally Displaced People (IDPs) (IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011, UNHCR 2011) and over 415,000 refugees (UNHCR 2011). Human Rights Watch claims that there 75,000 Katchin have fled their homes since June 2011 (HRW 2012). The fighting has been vicious: human rights abuses are attributed to all warring parties, though in particular to the military forces. Villages are militarised and the local populations are subject to exploitation as the army is expected to be self-sufficient (Ekeh and Smith 2007). Smith also adds: "forced labour continues to affect the lives of hundreds of people in ethnic areas working in 'model' or relocation villages and on small scale government-run infrastructure projects, despite Burma being a signatory to International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (1930), and repeated condemnation from the ILO". (Ekeh and Smith 2007:2)

Fragmentation of the opposition in particular and of civil society in general, has been one of the key dynamics of the conflict. Due to the very nature of the aims of those involved - democracy *vs* self-determination (albeit today is less about independence and more about a greater say on matters that concern the individual groups (ICG 2003) - historically there has never been a united opposition. The International Crisis Group (ICG) states: "(p)olitically, the ethnic minorities are divided over goals, strategy, and other issues, and have been unable to form any truly effective nationwide or even broadly inclusive fronts." (ICG 2003:ii)

The generals have further deepened lines of rupture through a divide-and-rule approach, a policy of small concessions to different groups and negotiating separate ceasefire agreements.

However, benefits from the 1990s ceasefires have been dubious for the population. Ceasefires have been viewed by the minority groups as a breather from protracted war. The situation improved only slightly. There was a decrease in the level of direct violence, though real economic development has not followed (Ekeh and Smith 2007, ICG 2003, Anon 2010a).

Collaboration between minorities and the democracy movement has been tenuous and left to individuals as the main position of the democracy movement was to postpone discussion of the issues until after the achievement of democracy.

The pro-democracy opposition groups aligned according to whether to work with the government, and, if so, on what terms, or reject any cooperation until demands were met. Until recently this was broadly reflected by an apparent divide between those based outside the country and those working from inside. Furthermore, due to the 2010 election, the pro-democracy opposition split among those who boycotted the elections (the NLD, National League for Democracy) and those who decided to engage in the process for example the National Democratic Force (Companies 2010a).

The military's view has been shaped by a strong sense of duty towards the nation, Myanmar/Burma, and the armed forces themselves. It is also the product of a patriarchal and hierarchical society where respect for elders is paramount. Opposition is therefore seen as unruly and disrespectful, that needs to be brought back into line (ICG 2001, Smith 2002).

Such perspective has nurtured a self-constructed view of reality in which the military considered themselves as the 'saviours' of the nation. They even deny their role in the downturn of the economy. Although in private some differing views can be heard, the military have presented a relatively unified public front. Having said this, loyalty to the leadership has also been reinforced by authoritarian approaches that discourage autonomous thinking and initiative, as well as purges. Furthermore, with over 40 years of rule the generals accumulated conspicuous wealth and maintained vested interests in defending the status quo and the privileges gained by them and their extended families (Thant Myint-U 2007).

5.1.3 The economy

From being one of the richest countries of the region post-WWII, Myanmar/Burma now ranks 149/187 on the UNDP's Human Development Indicator (UNDP 2011a). The dilapidation of prosperity was accelerated by Ne Win's socialist inspired reforms of the 1960s and by economic mismanagement by the military thereafter. Since Ne Win's reforms, illicit border economies and illegal logging have grown (Smith 2006). Even though Global Witness (Global Witness 2009) has reported improvements in recent years, the non-government organisation (NGO) states deforestation is still an issue. According to Smith "(n)arcotics and logging [were

in the 1990s and early 2000s] only the most controversial shadow economies thriving in modern Burma's 'get rich quick' environment" (Smith 2006:21). Such trade has fed into the conflict system and fuelled disputes, adding a layer of potential losers from stability and change.

Erratic policies therefore, together with economic sanctions, have led to economic regression. The economist Turnell in his review of the Myanmar/Burma economy (Turnell 2011a) believes the double digit GDP growth figures reported by the government in the past have no basis in reality. The overall picture that Turnell paints is bleak. The income generated by resource extraction is not adequately consolidated in the country accounts, and the taxation system is dysfunctional. According to the economist, the SPDC has therefore resorted to borrowing from the central bank to fund its spending (in 2009 the deficit was 3.5% of GDP). In addition to internal debt, the country owes the equivalent of nearly 30% of nominal GDP to other countries for loans from bilateral agreements and multilateral institutions (Turnell 2011a). In 2012 the BBC announced that the government had revealed a US$ 11 billion external debt, US$ 8.4 billion of which had been accumulated between 1960s and 1988. This figure is more than the US$ 7.34 bn estimated in 2009 (BBC 2012, BBC 2012).

Adding to the skewed benefit distribution in favour of those connected to the regime during the post-socialist era liberalisation of the 1990s (Thant Myint-U 2007), in the past two years there has been a process of privatization initiated by the SPDC (Anon 2010a, Anon 2010b). People connected to the then military ruling elite have been offered the possibility to purchase formerly nationalised industries resulting in oligopolistic/monopolistic structures of the sectors. Increasing inequality between 'haves' and 'have nots', rural and urban areas, is visible. In 2010 the national poverty incidence was 26% - the portion of the population unable to acquire a basic bundle of foods and non-foods (UNDP 2010): 29% in rural areas and 16% in urban ones (UNDP 2010).

Western countries first imposed sanctions in 1988 (by the United States of America (US)) and in 1990 (by the European Union (EU)). These were increasingly intensified until 2008-10 following the violent repression of the Saffron Revolution in 2007 (see *Table 5.1*).

Year	United States of America	European Union
1988	• Benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) revoked	
1990		• Arms embargo
1991	• Non-renewal of the bilateral textile agreement.	
1997	• Foreign Operations Act, prohibiting any new assistance to Myanmar • Prohibition of new investments in Myanmar and barred any modification or expansion of existing trade commitments	• GSP benefits revoked
2000		• Asset freeze for Burmese with governmental functions, and export ban of equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism –progressively expanded in time
2003	• The Bureau of Food and Drugs Analysis (BFDA) bans the importation of any goods produced, manufactured, grown or assembled in Myanmar	• Expansion of asset freeze and visa ban to people linked to the economic or political activities of the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) • Strengthening of the arms embargo
2006	• Extension of the BFDA for another 3 years	
2007	• Expansion of asset freeze	
2008	• JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act - mandatory blocking sanctions on certain categories of persons enumerated, prohibition of the importation of jadeite and rubies mined or extracted from Burma (as well as jewellery containing such gems)	• Ban on imports (round logs, timber, timber products, coal, certain metals and precious and semi-precious stones; and certain goods) • Restrictions on exports of equipment used in industries targeted by the import ban • Ban on exports of equipment for internal repression • Ban on provision of certain services (including financing and financial assistance related to equipment used in industries targeted by the import ban, with specific list of enterprises) • Freezing of funds and economic resources • Ban on certain investment
2010		• Ban on imports of certain goods • Embargo on arms and related material • Ban on exports of equipment for internal repression • Restrictions on exports of equipment used in industries targeted by the import ban • Ban on provision of certain services • Freezing of funds and economic resources • Restrictions on admission • Ban on certain investment • Suspension of certain aid and development programmes • Reduction of diplomatic relations

Table 5.1 - highlights of the sanctions imposed by the US and EU. The UK has imposed additional restrictions. Australia and Canada have also imposed sanctions. (Drawn from (Ewing-Chow 2007, US Treasury 2010, Network Myanmar nd).

According to Ewing-Chow's 2007 paper "(t)he US State Department estimates a loss of 60,000 jobs in the textile sector alone. The US State Department reports also suggest that per capita incomes in Myanmar fell from US$300 to US$225 from 2003 to 2004, a fall largely attributable to the BFDA [Bureau of Food and Drug Analysis]. Unofficial estimates of the per capita income in 2005 suggest an even greater fall to US$145 at a realistic exchange rate". (Ewing-Chow 2007:158) Furthermore "the EU also revoked Burma's benefits under the

Generalized System of Preferences, affecting US $30 million, or 5 percent, of Burmese exports" (Ewing-Chow 2007:159).

The effect of the sanctions was not as expected. As Thant Myint U argued: "(i)f Burma were a country where those in charge wanted to engage with the wider world or had much to lose by being isolated, then a policy of sanctions might make sense." (Ewing-Chow 2007:346) Furthermore, with the economic rise of Asian countries, sanctions only temporarily isolated the country economically.

China in the last five to six years has increasingly become a major investor in Myanmar/Burma. (Allan 2011) compiled Myanmar Central Statistical Organisation data on investment commitments showing that in 2011 China's investments were due to become the largest in Myanmar/Burma followed by Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea.

The last two decades have also witnessed a shift in type of investments to high income (for the state) but less productive industries. According to Bissinger's (2011) detailed analysis of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Myanmar/Burma since 1990, foreign investment has increasingly been in the extractive and power industry (99.6% of investment commitments 2005-2011). This trend has offset the decline in "internationally competitive and mobile sectors such as manufacturing and real estate" (Bissinger 2011:7) and that from countries like Japan and Singapore which traditionally invest in a range of different sectors (SIIA 2010, Bissinger 2011). A number of factors may explain this decline: poor returns (SIIA 2010), the dual-exchange rate system present in the country (an official exchange rate and one determined by trades in unofficial markets) (Turnell 2011a, Turnell 2011b) and the real possibility that successful foreign owned business may be expropriated (Bissinger 2011).

5.1.4 Social issues

The institutional infrastructure was brought to stagnation by the regime (Thant Myint-U 2007). Lacking the 'know-how' of running effective organisations and businesses, the military have fostered widespread clientelism, corruption and abuses of the law. In 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Myanmar/Burma is ranked 180 on 182 (Transparency International 2011). Furthermore, according to the Burma Environment Working Group (BEWG, Burma Environment Working Group 2011) even if there are laws and policies in place, the capacity to implement as well as the necessary administrative and legal structures is lacking.

Plagued by extremely low investment, the education and health systems are poor. In 31 years, the UNDP indicates that life expectancy has only grown from 55.1 to 65.2 years of age and that the mean years of schooling are today four (UNDP 2011b). Myanmar/Burma is also known as having one of the highest prevalence rates of HIV infection in Asia – 2009 estimate 0.6% (UNAIDS 2010).

The hold of the military on society is very strong. In addition to the political power balance (and the military machine), they have increasingly taken control of public life both directly and indirectly (Thant Myint-U 2007). An example is the use of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). The USDA is the largest civil society in the country with 11 million members. It is a pro-government (military). It is rallied by the military as and when needed (Smith 2002). From the USDA was formed the USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party), which in 2010 gained the majority of contestable seats in parliament.

Given the repression by the military, the pro-democracy movement has had no true leverage. Equally no other individual group has had the influence or capacity to mobilise the population to oust the junta, even the monks. The readiness with which the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) used violence, as happened during the Saffron Revolution in 2007, deeply rooted fears of reprisal. The population has adopted a 'lie low' strategy for survival. The younger generations have tended to avoid politics.

Diffidence and lack of trust are pervasive. Lucian Pye, wrote in 1999 that as a result of the lack of trust, social capital in Burmese society is poor (Pye and Pye 1999). According to the author there is a perverse mechanism which hinders its development: relationships are based on hierarchy and age and underpinned an expectation of abuse of position and low levels of fairness. During several conversations with people of Myanmar/Burma, I asked whether they agreed with Pye's view. Broadly, it would seem that although not agreeing wholly with Pye's arguments, there is recognition of some truth in his descriptions. Some of the same arguments are also reflected in Desaine's monograph *The Politics of Silence* which is quite critical of civil society in Myanmar/Burma (Desaine 2011).

Post-cyclone Nargis[6], however, civil society seems to have flourished. When I first visited Myanmar/Burma, in 2008 after the cyclone, there were local non-government organisations (NGOs) operating. Many were working without legal registration and kept a very low profile. During the following years, the space for opportunities and action that complements the government in its economic development efforts has widened, in particular in education, development and health.

Marginalisation of minority groups (ethnic and religious) increased with time due to discriminatory policies: for example education standards are poorer for other ethnicities, than for the Burmese majority. In addition, the inconsistent application of said policies led to inequalities in political status, educational and economic treatment/opportunities as well as relative 'legal' protection standards. Minority groups have felt excluded as they have not been involved in decision making processes on matters that directly impacted them, such as the reallocation of land. Ignorance of procedures, due to lack of institutional transparency, further exacerbated this feeling (Smith 2002).

Suspicion and mistrust are pervasive and go beyond the needs imposed by security. Even when the regime's intention was not one of discrimination, the outcome often resulted in it. Co-operation across ethnic and religious lines has been difficult. Furthermore, minority groups have looked at nationhood-building programmes and development projects with substantial diffidence, perceiving them as 'Burmesitisation' attempts (ICG 2003).

5.1.5 Developments since 2011

5.1.5.1   China: the times are changing

Over 50 years ago, Leach wrote: "the Chinese have never been interested in 'Burma' as a potential dominion - they have believed it to be too un-healthy. But they have had a persistent interest in overland routes to India and also in the natural resources" (Leach 1960:54). To some extent this may appear to be the case today albeit with softer tones. Sam Chambers, a writer for Ethical Corporation, argued that the main reason Chinese are investing in Myanmar/Burma is because labour is cheaper than in Yunan (Chambers 2010).

---

[6] Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar/Burma on 2nd May 2008. 84,500 people were killed and 53,800 went missing. (www.ifrc.org)

However the concern that Chinese investors are exploiting the low level of regulation existing in the country (and, in doing so, worsening environmental and social issues) is a current theme in advocacy literature (see for example (Global Witness 2009). While this has probably been the case in the past, there is an emerging recognition, as is possible to note from the writings of Chinese scholars, that attitudes are changing.

Guo (Guo 2007:49) writes: "(f)or both countries now, development and stability are the paramount concerns." And stability in this case is not only about lack of violent conflict. As Zhu (2011) argues in his review of the CNPC (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation) work on the Shwe gas pipeline (that connects the Andaman Sea to China), it is also about being sensitive to local issues. Events have also contributed to this shift in outlook.

In the last year there have been moments of tension between the two neighbours (for example as a result of the blockage of the Myitsone Dam project in Katchin State). Despite this, China is still an important ally (Tay and Chhoa-Howard 2012). (Word on the street says that China's big interest lies in the Shwe gas pipeline, and as long as it is protected from violence and relatively sheltered against possible action which will affect its completion, China's feathers will not be ruffled too much.) On their side, the Chinese are beginning to understand that behaviours and attitudes need changing. Zhu (2011) comments how within CNPC there is awareness that there is room for improvements on what they are doing. The company agreed with MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, a state owned company) that it would spend in the first year US$6 million on socio-economic issues (CDA 2011).

5.1.5.2   Principled engagement

The aftermath of cyclone Nargis led to questions being asked on whether there were ways in which the 'West' (and beyond) could engage with Myanmar/Burma in a way that could support gradual change in the country and help the civilian population at the same time (principled/constructive engagement). By 2011 both in the academic and journalistic discourse, there was a strong call for governments and companies to consider a principled engagement with Myanmar/Burma. Underpinning the 'engagement' idea were (and are) two main aspects.

The first concerns political considerations. Tay and Chhoa-Howard (2012:np) summarise: "(s)ome are chiefly concerned with the growth of democracy and greater protection of human rights in the country. (...) Others however look at the changes primarily in terms of

'the great game' - how the country can open up links to the US and the rest of the world, to lessen reliance on China."

The second is based on the belief that growing and opening the economy will support the process of reforms. Allan (2011), analysing the Myanmar/Burma Constitution, the President's 2011 Inaugural Speech and the National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS - 2009), argued that from those documents it would seem "that Myanmar wishes to pursue sustainable, responsible and accountable development. Ideas are clearly expressed about how this should take place, inclusively with the involvement of the citizens of Myanmar, ensuring that governance improvement and development should take place according to sustainability principles, with the rights of citizens guaranteed. This offers an ideal foundation on which to add the experience learnt in many other international arenas in practical ways to do just that." (Allan 2011:8) The author continues by suggesting that the private sector could be in a position to contribute to the realisation of such aspirations by supporting the development of the country though investments. However, Allan is adamant in pointing out that business needed to ensure that investments and operations were socially responsible. In doing so, the author highlights the numerous initiatives and frameworks that are available both from 'the West' and from China.

Box 5.1 – frameworks available to companies cited by (Allan 2011).

Following good practice and responsible behaviour, Allan argues, would also help to mitigate risk to companies of operating in a country like Myanmar/Burma (Allan 2011).

5.1.5.3 Reforms

What has been happening in Myanmar/Burma since March 2011 has taken most by surprise. Observers like Horsey (Horsey 2011a, 2011b) discouraged from taking completely a pessimistic view early on (June). However not even the most hopeful would have expected the speed at which reform has been occurring. In the past 12 months press restrictions have

been lifted, some previously banned websites can now be seen, a freedom of association law has been passed, there have been four amnesties (two in 2011 and two in 2012) which included political prisoners, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission has been set up and is operational, cease fires have been agreed (nine out of 16 groups) including with the KNU, the Shan State Army and Chin CFA, two major industrial projects the Myitsone Dam and the Dawaii coal power plant have been suspended over environmental concerns (Anon 2012a), Rakhine state will receive electricity from the gas from the Shwe project (Gaung 2012), the NLD has won all but two of the seats in the April by-election, Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the 43 people who will go to parliament.

Furthermore it is has been announced that Myanmar/Burma will float its currency against the US Dollar, the revenues from gas will be consolidated in the state's budget, and that sanctions are in the process of being lifted. (The currency was floated in April 2012).

Unexpectedly the military in parliament have not voted en-bloc, but have discerned on the merit of the bills proposed. Civil society has been pushing the boundaries of what it can do focusing on health, education, development, environment and capacity building. Environmental campaigning groups have been jubilant at the news that the industrial projects have been cancelled as a response, they feel, to their concerns. Local communities near the Shwe gas pipeline have talked about a real victory. Activists' political debate is lively varied and at points converging. For example there is an acknowledgment from that reforms are happening, though the motivation behind these is still debated (Aljazeera 2011). Many people in Myanmar/Burma have shifted from a wait and see position to optimism and taking opportunity of the space that has been created.

There has been much talk on the reasons behind the wave of reforms currently undertaken. Pundits have suggested that Than Shwe has actually realised a fail-safe retirement plan. By devolving power as broadly as possible through the new constitutional institutions and the privatisation process, the rise of a strong man who could then incarcerate him (as he had done with Ne Win), was made unlikely.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that "domestic considerations are driving these reforms" (ICG 2011:15). These considerations include: the seemingly real retirement of Than Shwe from the daily affairs of the country; an increase in the President's own confidence in his authority; and a favourable asset of power favouring change (the three key positions of

power are held by reformists - the president, the speaker of the lower house and the Chief of the army.) Alas ICG also indicated that much has to do "with jockeying for position in the post-2015 administration" (ICG 2011:14). In addition there is a genuine desire for greater international recognition and legitimacy; for example by taking the ASEAN presidential chair in 2014 (ICG 2011). Other possible explanations include: there is a 'new' generation within the military who has acted more as administrators than commanders in the field, and thus has genuine concern on how to improve the running of the country; in an attempt to revamp its image, the USDA presented a number of 'respectable' independent candidates at the November 2010 election, who are considering what the country needs.

Hope, however, is twinned with caution. The report by Human Rights Watch sadly shows how patterns of abuse and injustice in the war in Katchin State have continued (HRW 2012). The ICG report warns that "resistance can be expected from hardliners in the power structure and spoilers with a vested interest in the status quo." (ICG 2011:11) *The Economist* on the 7th of April has wondered how the NLD landslide victory will be received by the government and military (Anon 2012b). The extent of the victory has surprised also the NLD itself. Although in real terms these elections will not change the power-balance (the NLD has only 6% of the seats), they have raised people's interest in politics (Anon 2012b) and Channel News Asia Myanmar special 1st April 2012 evening broadcast).

Will hard-liners decide that reforms have gone too far? Will the President be able to sustain his authority? Is the motivation behind those who (from all sides of the globe) have supported reforms lasting? In my opinion, all that has been said by news reporters, observers and analysts has some truth. Reality is complex and there are multiple factors at play. Undeniable is the role that Myanmar/Burma has in the 'great game'. From a cynical perspective, a bigger cake can feed more and give a bigger share to those who are in the right positions. However, history may have taught the military a lesson, through the misfortunes of the corrupt KMT which was ousted by Mao. The war in Katchin State has highlighted deficiencies in the army's own capabilities and a severe need for reform.

Both President Thein Sien and Aung San Suu Kyi have stated that this is the time to be working together. Real change will require improvements in the military behaviour in relation to abuses as well as progress on conflict issues and minority rights (ICG 2011). Bissinger (2011) and Turnell (2011a) are of the opinion that change will demand widespread real reform including the economy, education, financial etc. The State administration needs to be

untwined from the military. Capacities at all levels will need to be built. The real test will come during implementation of present and future reforms.

Uncertainty about the future makes it difficult to make predictions. As I write, the US decision to ease sanctions is being reported... This news makes me ponder on a comment that I heard during my last visit to Myanmar/Burma in February: Myanmar/Burma is becoming the new 'El Dorado'. While I believe that lifting sanctions will bring benefits to the country, I pray that those investing do see it as a long-term opportunity to create, in the words of (Porter and Kramer 2011), 'shared value'.

One cannot but be hopeful with caution.

5.2   Overview of the lines of tensions around (and within) Total

This section explores the lines of tensions that can be found around Total's operations in Myanmar/Burma and act as a backdrop to the relationship between Total and CDA. I have chosen to include this part, as I feel it is important to understand the complexity of the situation in which the relationship between CDA and Total emerged and progressed.

Figure 5.2 – a complex context.

Figure 5.2 illustrates factors which had the potential to leading to tensions in relation to Total's work in Myanmar/Burma. Some I have mentioned in *Chapter 2* (macro-economic factors, governance, violence, local level impacts); others I have touched upon in the section on Myanmar/Burma earlier (politicization and militarisation); others still are connected to Total itself and in part mentioned in *Chapter 4* (reputational issues and organisational tensions). The discussion follows this sequence. For ease of reference, below, I have reproduced the table presented in *Chapter 2* with the list of issues discussed in that chapter.

Terms of trade	Disproportional exports of raw materials (in relation to other goods) distort the value of the exporting country's currency by increasing it. Other exports will become more expensive and imports cheaper, thus negatively impacting on the balance of payment and macro-economic dynamics. (This issue is also covered by Total in one of its internal guides, *A methodological guide: Developing Local Content and Industry Strategic Objective at Total*, (Total (2008)) to raise awareness about wider economic implications of the extractive industry.)
Income volatility	If the raw materials are subject to volatile prices, like oil is, this volatility will translate in fluctuations of income for the exporting country, rendering planning uncertain.
Weak economic development	Extractive industries, especially capital and knowledge intensive ones, have weak linkages to the rest of the economy. Given that they need to 'rely' on resources and know-how that usually lacks in the country where the raw materials are found, as well as being export orientated, extractive industries do not contribute to the country's overall development.
Regime entrenchment	Business offers a financial life-line to oppressive regimes (or armed actors who exercise control over a territory) through the payment for concessions, the revenues generated by taxation, the presentation of 'gifts' and other perks.
Rent-seeking behaviour and growth inequalities	The rent-seeking behaviour that maybe associated to the presence of resources like oil and gas, can have a negative impact on economic growth and distribution of resources/benefits. The bountiful presence of raw materials may lead those who are benefiting most, to maintaining the status that is generating the profits/benefits; thus contributing to a vicious cycle of poor governance, inequality and social exclusion. In order to maintain their privileges and status the beneficiaries may use their influence over the governance of a country to skew distribution of resources, legal protections, allocation of public funds etc. in their favour. Furthermore rent-seeking behaviour perpetuates itself, contributes to corruption and unproductive use of public resources on ambitious projects depriving critical economic sectors like education and health.
Labour issues	Companies are criticised for lack of transparency in their hiring policies, disadvantaging the local labour force; for relying on 'imported' labour and for applying lower standards to the treatment of the local labour force.
Violence/conflict human rights abuses.	Through revenues from natural resource extraction, provided by companies to governments/armed actors, business either perpetuate existing conflict cycles and with human rights abuses and/or created new ones arising as governments attempt to establish the operation of an enterprise.
Local impacts: exclusion of some groups, inflations	The arrival of corporations can have distortive effects on local dynamics in terms of inclusivity/exclusivity through, for example, the type of relationships held, the services provided, or the nature of access to jobs and opportunities. Foreign companies may also induce exceptional micro-economic systems characterised by inflated cost of living caused by their presence.

Table 2.1 – summary of the main criticisms levied against corporations.

The discussion below intends to be only a background or prologue to the following chapter. As mentioned earlier, the aim of the research is limited to understanding whether the relationship between Total and CDA has impacted the French company's way of working and if so how, and not to evaluate the impact of the company's presence in Myanmar/Burma.

5.2.1 Macro-economic factors: distorted terms of trade; income volatility; weak economic development

In his analyses of the macro-economic situation of the country, the economist Turnell (Turnell, Bradford and Vicary 2009, and Turnell 2010) discusses the impact of oil and gas

revenues on the current account of the country. (Turnell, Bradford and Vicary 2009) point to a trade surplus mostly due to increasing revenues from gas exports as well as a decline in imports. Since Turnell, Bradford and Vicary's 2009 article, there has been a relative appreciation of the Kyat against the US Dollar (also marginally reflected in the official exchange rate) and the relaxation of import duties in 2011/2012. However the authors' assertion on a positive balance of payment for Myanmar/Burma still stands. (Please note that these observations are based on official figures, which may not be accurate.)

With reference to income volatility, Turnell suggests that the impact has been relatively lenient for three reasons. Firstly, Turnell, Bradford and Vicary (2009) state that the trend of gas prices have been in Myanmar/Burma's favour. Secondly, Myanmar/Burma's economy is semi-dollarised - goods are traded and priced in US Dollars (Turnell 2010). (Though, during my last two visits to Myanmar/Burma, I have noticed that increasingly prices are expressed in Kyats, especially where nationals shop.) Thirdly, there is a dual exchange system that is present in the country (an official one which artificially sets approximately 5.5 Kyats to 1 US Dollar and a 'market' one see *Table 4.5* below).

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Kyat/USD	540	650	860	900	1000	1300	1450	1300	1250	1055	900	817	816

Table 5.2 - indicative exchange rate for the Myanmar/Burma Kyat to the USD. Sources: 2000: Turnell, Bradford and Vicary (2009); 2001-2010: Turnell (2010), Wikipedia; 2012: www.networkmyanmar.org 16 April 2012).

Turnell, Bradford and Vicary (2009) do raise the potential issue of volatility from the schedule of revenue payments from the oil and gas companies, though, the authors ascribe the negative impacts to financial inefficiencies of the relevant state institutions. There is no direct criticism on this issue to the Yadana project (whose revenues from production started in 1998) and to the Yetagun project (which started to deliver in 2000).

In the context of Myanmar/Burma's hap-hazardous industrial and skills capacity development, which had suffered from the nationalizations of the socialist era, support for economic development through linkages from the oil and gas industry would have been certainly welcome. Given the situation described earlier on the standards of education in Myanmar/Burma, it is something to which a company working in the country should certainly be sensitive. As discussed in *Chapter 4* TEPM has tried to address the situation in different

ways: establishing hiring quotas, putting in place a nationalisation plan, offering training and support to contractors and staff, supporting education locally etc.

Advocacy groups such as the Burma Campaign UK (BCUK 2005) and Earth Rights International (ERI) (ERI 2009c) did raise the issue that extractive industries do not favour local economic development. The groups alleged that TEPM operations did not benefit the development of Myanmar/Burma. Though, this point was never pursued much from an economic perspective, and not as constantly and persistently as those relating to human rights.

Most critics have pointed to the activities of Chinese companies (ERI 2009c, Marx 2011).These companies have been accused of relying mostly on imported resources (alas including sex-workers (ERI 2009c). Zhu (2011), though, argues that in the case of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which leads the Shwe gas pipeline project, such criticisms are unfounded.

5.2.2 Issues relating to governance: rent-seeking behaviour, inequalities in growth and distribution of resources; regime entrenchment

Given the history of the country it is not surprising that Total has been criticized for generating income for the military regime in Myanmar/Burma. An ERI report (ERI 2009c) 'follows the money' and claims that, taking advantage of the double exchange system (by declaring revenues received in US Dollars, in Kyats at the official rate and keeping the rest), those in power accumulated substantial personal fortunes.

Many people in Myanmar/Burma, as well as academics like Turnell (2010), speculate that income from the gas pipeline has been used by those in government, at the expense of education and health, on unproductive projects like fanciful archaeological projects, the construction of the new capital Na Pyi Daw, on vicious wars against minorities with conspicuous human rights abuses, and on the suppression of democratic forces as well as for their own personal enrichment. Such criticism are voiced also by all main advocacy groups which have been insisting on this point over the years alongside the allegations of human rights abused (see for example, (BCUK 2005, ERI 2002, ERI 2003, ERI 2009c, IB 2005, IB 2005).

LaFrance and Lehamann (2005) argue that this perception created a notable legitimacy gap between Total and a number of stakeholder groups. This gap widened further with emerging allegation of forced labour.

5.2.3 Violence/conflict

The company came into a country characterised by a highly politicised and militarised situation along distinct 'us' and 'them' lines. Furthermore, the conflict(s) were increasingly becoming at the centre of a vociferous campaign against the regime. The increasing international pressure for sanctions led by *émigrés* and advocacy groups, fuelled paranoid and xenophobic tendencies within members of the regime, At the same time, the prolonged conflict infused lack of trust towards institutions and 'the other' among the different groups of the Myanmar/Burma population.

The region where the pipeline was going to be built had been disputed between the government and Karen forces. The inhabitants are of mixed ethnic origin and profess different religions (Buddhists and Christians). As mentioned earlier, the nature of the conflict affected the local population with the 'usual' array of abuses and displacement. At the time Total signed the contract with the government (1992), the military had been able to (re)claim the land from Karen control just a few years earlier. To maintain control and security over the area, the government stationed locally two battalions. However, as a civil society representative reminds, some groups (affected by the conflict) perceived that Total was the reason for the extra security (Anon 24 2011).

Initially considered secure, the situation in the area changed in 1995: following an attack on a vehicle five people died and 11 were injured. The company increased the level of its security measures (Total 2010a).

However, the attack, presumed to be by the hand of Karen militia, was not the only 'consequence' of the conflict(s). The presence of military forces, put a strain on the local population as troops were (and still are) required to be entirely self-reliant. This resulted in human rights abuses and forced labour.

Strong allegations were made against Total as a result by advocacy groups. Most of the criticisms relate to alleged complicity in the abuses committed by the military in the area. At the base of these criticisms is the argument that as the army is there to protect the area and

Context and background – by F. Cerletti

the pipeline (and therefore company interests), the company is responsible, albeit indirectly for the abuses committed by the troops. With specific reference to the construction stage, advocacy groups stated and documented that the army had forcefully relocated villages to clear the area for the pipeline, had used forced labour while constructing the facilities there and committed an array of other serious abuses on the population including rape and killing (ERI 2003, Karen Human Rights Group, KHRG 1997).

Total refutes the argument that the military are there for the company's protection, and denies the allegations of forced labour and human rights abuse. The company conceded that in the early stages of the project some incidents of forced labour, may have escaped its attention (forced labour became illegal in Myanmar/Burma only in 1999). Company managers have stated that they did attempt to rectify known episodes of forced labour, for example by paying those involved (Assemblee Nationale 1999). Furthermore, Total states that it never relied on forced labour (nor did its contractors), and that there never was a contractual agreement with the army. The company also affirms that most of the instances of abuse 'attributed' to the presence of pipeline are in reality perpetuated by military involved in the maintenance of a railway nearby (Total 2010a).

As the controversy escalated, the two Western partners of the Yadana project were brought to court: Unocal in 1996 - the company settled in 2005; Total in 2002 both in Belgium and France - both cases were dismissed in 2007. However in 2005 the French company and Sherpa, the French NGO representing the Myanmar/Burma nationals who filed the complaint, reached a settlement agreement. A €5.2 million solidarity fund was created, to compensate the plaintiffs and any other individual who could demonstrate to have had similar experiences in the pipeline area (known also as corridor). The fund is administered by a committee appointed in 2006. About €4 million have been granted to both individuals and to organisations connected to refugees from the area along the Myanmar/Burma-Thai border and in Thailand. Individuals had to prove that they were present in the pipeline corridor between 1995 and 1997 and had been subjected to forced labour by the military. According to Total "none claimed to have worked on the Yadana." (Total 2010a:51)

Echo of the conflict(s) is reflected in three other examples. Firstly, in the visit report CDA (CDA 2002) related of a rumour among villagers living in the pipeline area that Total, as a French organisation would hire only Christians. CDA, though, was careful counter-balancing the statement with: "(h)owever, most people with whom we spoke agreed that such

rumours find little fertile ground and that [TEPM]'s hiring practices show no preference for Christians." (CDA 2002:5) Secondly, the following year (2003) CDA suggested to the company to be transparent to dispel any rumour that the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) is used by the government for political reasons (CDA 2003a). Thirdly, a former TEPM employee notes: "(t)here are tensions between ethnic groups in our country. Karen were really reluctant towards Total, they did not welcome Total. But Total wanted to start build relationships with them; (...) they built a good relationship: Total started to pay attention to Karen villages and things improved." (Anon 165 2011)

5.2.4 Local level impacts

With regards to the Yadana pipeline, concerns on the potentially negative environmental impacts of the project were raised (ERI 1996, Rajesh 1997). However, soon after the focus of the criticisms fixed on human rights issues and connivance with the regime.

A number of campaigning organisations reported cases of forced relocation in the 1990s (IB 2005, KHRG, Karen Human Rights Group 1997). Allegations were made that Total was complicit in these abuses. The French company denied such accusations claiming that they had occurred before the arrival of the company in the area (in 1991); in its statement Total affirmed that, on the contrary, it had contributed to resettlement (Total 2010a).

As the area is one of restricted access because of the 'conflict', immigration has been minimal. On the contrary, the area is characterised by strong emigration to Thailand for job opportunities.

One person raised the issue of higher salaries. Bernard Kouchner, co-founder of *Médecins Sans Frontières*, who visited the pipeline area in 2003 and whose report was published by Total, pointed to the relatively high salaries of doctors employed as part of the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) compared to local physicians (Kouchner 2003).

Kouchner also made other observations for improving SEP including greater participation from villagers, greater external communication, expanding the reach of programme to other parts of the area and nationally. He also advocated for a stronger affirmation of Total's position in relation to the political situation. While reaffirming its commitment to the Myanmar/Burma people shown through the national level programmes, to the last point made by Kouchner, Total responded confirming its policy of non-interference (Total 2010a).

Context and background – by F. Cerletti

CDA too throughout the years has remarked on SEP, the national initiatives and the relationship with local communities (CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b, CDA 2005a, CDA 2008a, CDA 2011). The overall stance was based on constructive criticism. I will discuss the nature of these comments and how they were received in the following chapter.

5.2.5 Factors of tension within Total

5.2.5.1 Reputational issues

As Total's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Christophe De Margerie admits himself, (De Margerie 2009) Total is a company that has experienced its fair share of negative media spotlight. There were the legacies from Elf involvement in a number of scandals: in 1994 concerning political meddling in Africa (Assemblee Nationale 1999), political favours, mistresses, jewels and slush funds; and the one connected to the Oil for Food Programme (which broke out in 2007).

At the end of the last millennia there was the oil spillage off the coast of Brittany from the oil tanker Erika (1999). The same year a French Parliamentary enquiry on the role of oil companies (Elf and Total - the merger had not yet occurred) in international politics and socio-environmental impacts (Assemblee Nationale 1999) took place. During the enquiry, Total managers did acknowledge awareness of the human rights situation in Myanmar/Burma, but refuted their involvement in them. In 2001 the AZF fertiliser plant exploded near Toulouse. This was followed by two legal proceedings for complicity in human rights abuses (2002). In 2008 there was the scandal for bribery in Italy (2008).

Total in France has more often than not tended to tread a fine line. There is a vociferous section of the French population in fact who is greatly disillusioned/disenfranchised by the company. Former French presidential candidate Ségolène Royal, who commented on morning TV that "(Ce sont des cyniques qui se moquent du peuple Français" (These people [Total people] are cynics, who mock the French people) (Royal 2012) is not a lonely voice. In 2009 Total's popularity ratings in France had dropped by 11% on the previous three years (Fournier 2009, Royal 2012).

Total's efforts in dealing with the media and public opinion often have been unfortunate. Kouchner's visit to Myanmar, for example, was followed by loud criticisms in the French press calling it a whitewash (Anon.2003). On other occasions, they have just been *gauche*. For example De Margerie has been cited to have said to a Newsweek reporter: "(w)e will talk

more, even if people don't like it because it is easier to go and say nasty things on Total when we don't speak. Today, they are trying to tell us you have no right to speak. They can go to hell"[7] (McNicoll 2009).

Three interviewees suggest that as a result of the difficult relationship with the media, a specific choice was made in Total to reduce contact with media to a minimum and restrict the number of those entitled to speak for the company, especially on Myanmar/Burma issues to a few individuals. (Anon 155 2011, Anon 29 2011, Anon 724 2011)

5.2.5.2 Organisational tensions

In *Chapter 2* I mentioned how external pressure was mounting for companies to become socially responsible. The fact that the company adopted a code of conduct in Myanmar/Burma in 1995, five years prior to the one at group level seems to suggest that Total/TEPM was becoming sensitive to these demands. By 2000 the adoption and implementation of a socially responsible approach was underway in Total and the process of change building momentum. During a process of change, tensions may arise also within organisations. Organisational change literature identifies three of sources of internal tension during times of change.

Firstly, Cope (2003) alerts that individuals who are involved in a process of change may face an array of emotions while going through the process of internalising the need for change: denial, defensiveness, anger, frustration, acceptance etc. Secondly the author notes that, just like in a conflict there are spoilers, within an organisation some individuals will resist change for a number of reasons including loss of status, not believing in the new course, fear, etc. (Cope 2003). Thirdly, in a period of change uncertainty and lack of knowledge of what is happening can be a source of tension. Management practitioners advise companies to have a well devised communication plan with multiple levels of information for their staff. Communication is needed to inform, give rationale, direction, and to making sense of what is happening thus supporting those involved in the process of change to find their way in the new course (Cope 2003).

---

[7] "You cannot say, I am a player in the industry and I only go where I'm told to go. In Burma, I am bringing gas to Thailand. Bangkok was the world's most polluted city. They switched from oil fuel to gas. Bangkok is clean now. We are proud of being part of this. We will talk more, even if people don't like it because it is easier to go and say nasty things on Total when we don't speak. Today, they are trying to tell us you have no right to speak. They can go to hell. If you want to ask somebody, don't ask Total. Ask the government of Thailand, which buys Burmese gas."

Context and background – by F. Cerletti

Some of the points mentioned above have emerged from my interviews with Total employees. For example, when the partnership with Total and CDA was beginning (2002), a lively debate was occurring within the company on whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) was part of 'core business' or not (Anon 809 2012). People were discussing whether it was part of Total's remit to 'be socially responsible' or not. Other participants mentioned that some individuals needed to be convinced about the value of paying attention of societal issues (Anon 10 2011, Anon 7 2011). Another example given was that the Human Resources department had initially been perplexed about the feasibility of hiring personnel from different backgrounds to the traditional professions (geologist, engineers, sales etc.) (Anon 7 2011). A former Total employee remarked that Total could have been stronger in its communication both internal and external. Total could have been more effective in communicating information to its own staff to enable them to dispel the noise and unease created by the media reports on the scandals and presence in Myanmar/Burma (Anon 155 2011).

5.3   Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have tried to paint a picture of the situation in Myanmar/Burma. I have run thorough historical events, and superficially looked at the conflict(s), the economy, social issues, the relationship with China and the call for principled engagement on behalf of governments and the private sector.

Alas the picture is grainy as it is not possible to delve into detail in this dissertation. I have argued that there are multiple sources of tension and conflict. These are exacerbated by socio-economic issues which include a wide range of inequalities (social, economic, education, health) and discriminations (ethnic and religious).

Drawing from the range of issues discussed in *Section 5.2* it is possible to imagine the degree of pressure Total was under. General criticisms were and continue to be made by academics, media and advocacy groups to the extractive industry in terms of 'resource curse'. Adding to these were (and to some extent still are) specific allegations of complicity in human rights abuses, of ineffectiveness of the socio-economic activities initiated by the French company, of weak economic development and of financial support to the authoritarian regime. The ripple effects of the conflict which had characterised

Myanmar/Burma for decades raised issues as well as the controversy (politicisation and militarisation), left Total in a balancing act on what to do with the operations in the country. Furthermore, such external pressure fed into the challenges of managing its reputation and, I speculate, into internal tensions. The rise of CSR demanded change in the ways of the company: what may have been standard practice in the 20th century, was highly questioned in the 21st. Imagine, beyond those who believed social responsibility was not part of a company's mandate, the reaction of those who felt their professionalism judged; or of those who intended to do something but did not know how to; or of those who had tried and had negative feedback. A potential quagmire of forces pulling in different directions.

Overall, in light of the findings from my interviews, it does seem that the seed of change, towards a different understanding of the role of companies within society had definitely been planted. In 1999 the French Parliamentary enquiry commission stated: 'La mission a observé que les grands groupes pétroliers prenaient progressivement conscience de leur vulnérabilité face aux opinions publiques de leurs Etats d'origine et aux habitants des zones d'exploitation. Obligés de composer non plus avec les seuls Etats mais avec la société civile, certaines compagnies pétrolières ont compris que leur intérêt était de participer au développement des régions où elles étaient implantées."[8]

---

[8] The commission has observed that the big oil companies are progressively becoming conscious of their vulnerability *vis a vis* public opinion of both the country of origin and that of the host country. Compelled to deal not only uniquely with State but also with civil society, some oil companies have understood that it is in their interest to participate in the development of the areas where they are located. (Assemblée Nationale 1999:204-5)

Chapter 6

The dialogue between CDA and Total and its impact on Total's way of working

In this chapter I will present the first part of the research findings. I will briefly describe the dialogue between Total and CDA and attempt to address the initial question of my thesis: can dialogue as a form of engagement impact the way of working of an organisation? As mentioned in *Chapter 3*, I use the term dialogue loosely referring to the series of conversations, visits and exchanges - supported by written documents - and participation in the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) consultations, which have characterised the relationship between CDA and Total (See *Chapter 4*).

I do not refer to the collaboration between Total and CDA as partnership, to emphasise the voluntary and non-contractual nature of the agreement between the two organisations. I will interchangeably refer to the dialogue as relationship or engagement.

The chapter is organised in two parts. In the first I outline and describe how the dialogue between the two organisations is structured. Next I will build on the general description of the CEP process offered in *Chapter 4* to explain how CDA works and the steps followed during CDA's six visits to Myanmar/Burma. I will conclude by touching on the controversy that has marked the approach used by CDA during the site visits.

In the second part of the chapter, I examine the first question of the research: can dialogue as a form of engagement impact the way of working of an organisation? I will argue that it has: it has been a vital lever of transformation. However, it is difficult to identify the impact in quantifiable terms. The changes in Total's practices are a result of a number of variables which have contributed to building learning and understanding within the company leading it to where it is today. I will explore the most important ones arguing that there have been contextual and internal drivers at play as well as a process of socialisation. I then round off this discussion by exploring what research participants have identified as the dialogue's direct contribution to Total's (and TEPM's) way of working.

The discussion in this chapter uses interviews I did and company/organisation documentation as source for the findings. In particular I have drawn on a number of specific

interviews with CDA contributors as well as with Total and TEPM personnel in various positions within the French Company. Where applicable, I will contrast and compare findings with the observations/perceptions of interviewees who have an indirect experience of the relationship or knowledge of Total as a company. As I mentioned in *Chapter 3*, my findings rely on the perceptions of the research participants and what has been stated in company and other organisations' documents and reports. This study does not claim to be an empirical or quantitative study.

6.1   Goals and motivations which led the two organisations to work together

The history of how the two organisations came together is consistent among interviewees, whether from Total or from CDA (for example Anon 31 2011, Anon 5 2012, Anon 57 2011). Total approached CDA to see if they were willing to write a report on the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) in Myanmar/Burma. CDA, instead, offered Total to join the CEP explaining the process and approach it adopted in CEP as outlined in *Chapter 4*: site visits to identify trends and patterns, public release of reports from the visits, consultations with other project participants to examine key finding emerging from visits with the aim of developing tools and management systems which can be applied on the ground by project participants and beyond. The French company accepted. This was 2002.

The two companies signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as part of the CEP protocol. The MOU itself reflects the voluntary participation of Total to CEP, the methodology followed in CEP and specifies that there is no obligation for the company to participate in the consultations organised as part of the learning process (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011). The first three visits to Myanmar/Burma were agreed as part of the 2002 MOU. The following two visits to Myanmar/Burma (2005 and 2008) had separate agreements. The last visit, in 2011, followed the signing of new MOU in 2010 (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011). There were also visits to Mauritania, Sudan and Nigeria under separate MOUs.

What motivated the two organisations to come together? With regards to CDA, its interest is explained in the CEP presentation and covered in *Chapter4*: "the Corporate Engagement Program (CEP) collaborates with companies to help them ensure they have positive rather than negative impacts on the communities where they operate." (www.cdainc.com) This is the primary goal of CEP; the statements made by CDA contributors (for example Anon 31

2011, Anon 57 2011, Anon 58 2011) during the research interviews are consistent with this affirmation. CDA aims to improve the lives of those impacted by business operations, directly or indirectly. To do so, CDA works with companies and stakeholders to develop, promote and implement tools and management systems which address the patterns identified by the CEP team site investigations and consultations with project participants (Anon 31 2011). As a result in CDA's eyes, as a contributor explains, organisational change (change within participating companies) is of secondary importance: "this is what we want: not so much change in the company or in the person, but we want change in the impact on people." (Anon 31 2011) I have emphasised this distinction because organisational change for CDA becomes a by-product of a wider goal, making it an 'unintentional outcome' reflecting what authors like (Seitanidi and Ryan 2007) identify, as I will discuss in *Chapter 7.*

From Total's side the situation is more nuanced. Originally prompted by the criticisms levied against the company by advocacy groups (described in *Chapter 3*) the French group set out to find an organisation which could validate its community work. This is not only confirmed by a number of sources within Total (for example Anon 5 (2012) and Anon 7 (2011)); it is also the perception of external observers from a range of perspective: media (Anon 128 2012), civil society (Anon 17 2011, Anon 434 2011), and business partners (Anon 72 2011), as well as academic authors (LaFrance and Lehamann 2005).

Two aspects of particular interest and of relevance to this research, however, emerge from the insights of the interviewees directly involved in the CDA-Total dialogue. These are important in understanding why the two organisations came together. The first requires an understanding of the context in which Total's decision to work with CDA was made. The second is connected to the personalities involved: the willingness to take risks.

6.1.1 The context

As mentioned in *Chapter 4*, Total's global role had drastically changed as a result of its merger with Elf and Fina: with the merger Total had become one of the key players in the private sector in the oil and gas industry. However, with the merger came the legacy of a number of scandals (see Shaxon (2012) in relation to the Elf scandals). As a Total employee suggests (Anon 7 2011), at the forefront of the company's executives minds was a concern that the new group would not follow suit. "You have to be aware that Total is the result of the merger between Total and Elf [Aquitaine in 2000]. Elf had several murky stories in its past linked to state ownership and the French government. That made the people in charge

of privatising Elf very sensitive and aware of these issues. Many of the rules that we still have now [in place] were discussed at a bit earlier than other companies because we had this history. So there already were all the ingredients for the code of conduct at the time of the merger. The Myanmar case pushed things a bit faster probably." (Anon 7 2011)

Attention and stress was put on company governance and on ethical behaviour through new structures and policies (for example, the Ethics Committee - directly answerable to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) - was put in place as the new group was taking shape (in 2000).

At the same time, as mentioned in the literature review in *Chapter 2*, corporate social responsibility (CSR) was gaining ground across business, following pressure from stakeholders and the initiatives led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), United Nations (UN) Global Compact, etc. A TEPM employee (Anon 809 2012) recalls how, early in the new millennium, the debate on the relevance of CSR was lively within the French company. At headquarters in Paris there were individuals conscious of the importance of ensuring a move towards sustainability happened within the company. A former Total employee states: "I had mixed feelings on how the environment was considered, both in terms of human environment and in terms of physical environment. CSR combines good business with the protection of the environment and the livelihood of communities." (Anon 5 2012) However, much had to be learnt. The same interviewee remembers: "(d)uring the early 2000s, with the expansion of CSR as a concept, I travelled and talked to many people. (...) there was a strong belief that Total was in the energy business and as such did not look into societal aspects. CSR did not seem obvious to everybody." (Anon 5 2012)

Within a few years the wheels of change had begun to turn. In its 2002 CSR report the French company was highlighting a sustainable development focus for the year 2003:

- "Continue to identify issues, challenges and dilemmas faced by TotalFinaElf companies and units.
- Test the dissemination of best practice through pilot projects and develop appropriate guidelines and management and reporting systems.
- Strengthen our partnership approach in our initiatives to support local communities in developing countries.
- Extend and broaden dialogue with people living near our facilities in Europe.

- Step up initiatives taken in response to climate change issues and challenges related to our operations.

- Systematically build employee awareness of and training in sustainable development." (Total 2002:7)

A couple of external observers, one from the civil society (Anon 434 2011) and the other from the business sector (Anon 747 2011), also note how at the time company personnel had to broaden its exposure to concepts (CSR related). According to the interviewee from the business sector (Anon 747 2011), companies of Anglo-Saxon origin had been exposed to these issues for a much longer time.

Overall, however, despite needing to go through a steep learning curve, within the company there was the willingness to change. A CDA contributor states with reference to the Sudan operations: "Total had moved from fire-fighting approach to a more proactive approach." (Anon 31 2011) Another CDA contributor adds: "When Total asked us to look at their work in Myanmar/Burma, they already wanted very much to be changing and to be seen to be changing. There was a commitment to be more transparent and open both with their critics and the communities where they work." (Anon 504 2011)

The decision to work with CDA, therefore, seems to have been taken with the consciousness that different times were coming, requiring a genuine change in practices, and that much had to be learnt.

6.1.2 A risk-taking attitude

The second aspect which emerges from the interviews of relevance to this research is the fact that the key people involved in beginning the relationship, both from CDA and from Total's side, were prepared to take risks. Several interviewees with direct experience of the relationship have raised this aspect: at the time, deciding to collaborate implied risks (Anon 31 2011, Anon 504 2011, Anon 5 2012, Anon 57 2011, Anon 613 2012, Anon 7 2011).

On one hand Total was taking the risk of working with a civil society organisation, without the *a priori* knowledge of what the outcome of the CDA visits would be and what would be published in the reports. CDA could have made statements that could have damaged the French company's reputation, basing them on the direct knowledge gained from the visits in Myanmar/Burma and elsewhere.

On the other, CDA was putting its reputation at risk by working with a multinational which could have led them to being perceived by other civil society and international organisations as co-opted by Total. Ten years ago the context was very different from now: business-NPO (not-for-profit organisation) partnerships were limited. Non—government organisations (NGOs) and advocacy groups had been quite vocal against Total (as discussed in *Chapter 4*). Although risk was in some way managed (by the company persuaded that it was on the right track, albeit there being room for improvements (Anon 5 2012, Anon 7 2011) and CDA was very rigorous in terms of implementing its methodology (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011), it was still there.

This risk taking attitude also contributed to giving Total the perception that they had found a good partner to work with. A former Total employee recalls what happened at a conference where Total's work in Myanmar/Burma was being presented. Total "was attacked harshly by a representative of an NGO. I was quite surprised, because [a CDA representative] came on the stage and testified that he believed what the person was saying was not true, commenting on what he had seen. I was surprised as it is difficult to find someone who was prepared to take the risk and contradict what the NGO person was saying." (Anon 5 2012) And, as CDA contributor states, the organisation is aware of this: CDA put its "reputation on the line (that was no small feat), that counts. (...) This has enabled Total to see that we were for real." (Anon 31 2011)

Although the aims for each organisation seemed clear (as Heap (2000a) perorates), organisational change was the explicit and immediate goal of the relationship, for neither organisation. *Figure 6.1* summarises CDA and Total come together.

Figure 6.1 – what motivated the beginning of the dialogue.

6.2   Process and methodology

In *Chapter 4*, I described the general process followed by CEP: identification of patterns and trends emerging from site visits to the operations of different companies, in different parts of the world; discussion of findings in open consultations with project participants, followed by the development of tools and management systems to address shared issues and concerns with the aim of reducing negative impacts and enhance positive ones; testing of the these tools and systems by sharing the trial results with project participants and revisiting them.

I will now describe the process and methodology followed by CDA during the visits to Myanmar/Burma. It is important to note that what I have classified as process and as methodology are two integral aspects of one unified approach that underpins CEP. I have defined as process the sequence of events that occurs during CDA visits in Myanmar/Burma, and named methodology the way in which issues are identified.

This approach (process and methodology) broadly reflects the one followed in other site visits. What may change is the nature of stakeholders consulted and the sequence of events. I emphasise: the site visits must be seen as an integral part of the CEP and can be

considered the 'design' or structure that informs the dialogue. Although distinct in terms of time and location, the findings in Myanmar/Burma and from other Total operational sites, will inform the broader discussions during project consultations as well as tools and systems developed. In a similar way findings from visits to other companies' inform the investigation in Myanmar/Burma and other visits to Total.

The description of the approach draws heavily on interviews with CDA contributors and TEPM and Total employees (Anon 31 2011, Anon 58 2011, Anon 7 2011, Anon 73 2011). In the interviews, there is great consistency in the way the process and methodology are described. It also draws from the six CEP visit reports (CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b, CDA 2005a, CDA 2008a, CDA 2011).

6.2.1 Process

Interviewees from both CDA and Total relate visits are independently arranged and organised by the CDA CEP team. Each team is composed of at least two people and team members are selected so that there is some continuity with previous visits (see *Table 6.1* in the following page).

Visit	Dates	CDA Team	Location of visit	Meetings with
1	18-30 October 2002 30 Oct. – 2 November 2002	Mary Anderson, Doug Fraser, Luc Zandvliet	Yangon, pipeline area Bangkok	Yangon: Total staff, civil society organizations (including staff of international NGOs), government representatives, diplomatic missions and other corporations working in the country Pipeline area: local community members (visiting 10 villages), religious leaders, company staff, contractors, government representatives (including navy commander of the region), and NGO representatives, Premier Oil staff. Bangkok: representatives from human rights organizations, concerned shareholders, large financial institutions, and pro-democracy groups
2	22 April 22 – 2 May 2003	Luc Zandvliet Doug Fraser	Yangon, pipeline area	Yangon: Total staff, civil society organizations (including staff of international NGOs), religious leaders, political analysts, government representatives, a member of Parliament, diplomatic missions and other corporations working in the country. Pipeline area: local community members (visited 16 villages), Total staff, contractors, government representatives, and NGO representatives.
3	16 - 22November 2003 22 November – 6 December 2003	Luc Zandvliet Doug Fraser	Thai-Burmese border (Thailand), Bangkok Yangon area, pipeline area	Thailand: international NGOs and concerned stakeholder groups, groups representing ethnic minorities, Thai-Myanmar/Burma border refugees and internally displaced people NGOs Yangon area: civil society organizations (including, local and international staff of international NGOs), political analysts, government representatives, a member of Parliament, leaders of ethnic minority groups, diplomatic missions and UN missions. Pipeline area: visited 8 villages

Table 6.1 - summary of the six CDA visits (cont.)

The enablers of change – by F. Cerletti

Visit	Dates	CDA Team	Location of visit	Meetings with
4	17 April– 6 May 2005	Luc Zandvliet, Ana Paula do Nascimento	Bangkok, Chang Mai Yangon, Mandalay.	Thailand: foreign and Myanmar/Burmese journalists, joint-venture partners, international, regional and Myanmar/Burmese advocacy NGOs and human rights organizations, (international) NGOs favouring Total's divestment from Myanmar/Burma. Pipeline area: Total staff, Petronas, the army, religious groups and local communities both inside and outside the pipeline corridor, visited 11 Villages and one village outside of the pipeline area that is not part of SEP. Yangon area: representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health, Western and Asian Embassies, political and economic analysts, business owners, leaders of ethnic minority groups, UN agencies, Total staff, international and local NGOs. Mandalay: Eye Clinic / Hellen Keller Foundation. HIV Programme at Mandalay hospital.
5	9-17 February 2008 18 February 2008	Mary B. Anderson, Brian Ganson	Yangon area, pipeline area Bangkok	Villagers, doctors, workers, business people, religious leaders, diplomats, NGO staff, UN agency representatives, educators, government personnel, and intellectuals, Total staff, joint venture partners. No meeting with observers and advocates outside Myanmar/Burma.
6	28 March – 8 April 2011	Dost Bardouille-Crema, Luc Zandvliet	Bangkok Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, pipeline area	Bangkok: joint-venture partners, multi-lateral organizations, international researchers, regional and advocacy NGOs. Yangon: Total staff, various oil companies, staff, Yadana contractors, Embassies, UN Agencies, political and economic analysts, social impact research organizations, international NGOs, and local civil society and advocacy groups. Nay Pyi Taw: MOGE, Ministries of Energy, Health, and Social Welfare. Pipeline area: Yadana staff, Yadana contractors, Socio-Eco Program doctors, army and navy commanders, representatives of religious groups, business people, educators, community leaders and local community members (visited 9 villages).

Table 5.1 - summary of the six CDA visits (drawn from (CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b, CDA 2005a, CDA 2008a, CDA 2011)).

The enablers of change – by F. Cerletti

The scope of the visits is broadly designed by contacting relevant people and organisations that have a view on the country and on the company's operations, requesting input and building on that (see for example CDA (2002)). As part of the preparations, stakeholders (civil society, diplomatic corps, relevant institutions, etc.) are contacted and conversations are arranged with them (see *Table 6.1*). A CDA contributor states: "(f)or CDA talking to everybody is important, so there is no one side of the story." (Anon 58 2011)

Company assistance is requested only when indispensable: an example given is how the CDA team reaches TEPM operations in southern Myanmar/Burma. The pipeline being a brown zone - an area controlled by the military, but contested by Karen armed groups - travel to the area is restricted and foreigners are not allowed; the team therefore travels with the invitation of Total and uses the company plane to reach the pipeline area (CDA 2003b).

Once in country, the team has an initial meeting (a kick-off meeting) with the local TEPM General Manager and key SEP (Socio-Economic Programme) team members. During these meetings there is an exchange about what has been happening at contextual level, about SEP's activities, opportunities and challenges. Following the very first visit, each kick-off meeting includes feedback on the options chosen as a result of the previous visit. Total staff have an opportunity to raise questions, and/or areas they are particularly interested in hearing about.

The components of the visits (how to divide the time and whom to speak to) is shared for feedback though the final decision on how to pursue the visit is taken by CDA. If other stakeholders are identified during the meeting, these are also contacted. With all the information and initial feedback from Total, CDA then finalises its plan.

Another TEPM employee adds that CDA hires an independent interpreter (somebody who has no connection, direct or indirect, to the company or stakeholders involved) who will accompany the team to meetings and village visits which take place (Anon 212 2012). During all of the meetings and exchanges with people, CDA emphasises that it is acting independently of the French company, stating the purpose of the visit, and that there will be a public report.

When visiting the villages in the Yadana project pipeline area, the CDA team removes any identification that could associate them with Total, and clearly state to villagers their independence from the company, welcoming any type of feedback (Anon 57 2011).

Comments and input received during the visit is analysed by the CDA team and trends and issues are identified. CDA contributors adamantly clarify that findings are always referred back to what people have said (Anon 31 2011, Anon 58 2011).

Before the end of the visit, the CDA team holds a debriefing meeting with the local General Manager and members of the SEP team to talk about what has emerged, hear the observations by company staff, and conclude by discussing together potential ways/options available to Total to enhance positive, and decrease negative, impact. A TEPM participant to the meetings has described the manner that characterises them as "very participatory and consultative the way they deal with issues." (Anon 73 2011)

Following the visits, the report is drawn up by a CDA team member. It is shared with the French company in order to ensure that the way in which statements are made do not endanger anyone concerned. If there is the concern that a sentence or paragraph may lead to harm, a CDA contributor affirms (Anon 31 2011), such sentence or paragraph is written is modified, however the point is still made.

"Reports are not negotiated. They are fact checked and we evaluate the risk that what we write may put people in danger. Total said in few occasions: 'we do not want to challenge the point, if you write the point in the way you have written it might be inflammatory (create conflict).' So in one or two occasions the language has been changed but the point has remained." (Anon 31 2011)

Reports are then published on CDA's website and feedback is sought from anyone who may be interested in providing it.

Gathering information from stakeholders

↓

Set up meetings

↓

Kick-off meeting

↓

Meetings and village visits

↓

Identifying emerging issues and patterns

↓

Debriefing meeting/identification of options

↓

Report preparation

↓

Report shared with company

↓

Published on website

↑

Feedback and comments from anyone interested

Figure 6.2 – an illustration of the process of engagement.

6.2.2 Methodology

I will now describe the methodology used by CDA and will draw heavily on the interviews with CDA contributors in particular (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011, Anon 58 2011).

CDA follows an inductive method (Anon 31 2011) to identify patterns and emerging issues across industries. As stated in *Getting It Right* (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009), the 2009 book which captures the experience and insights gained by the CEP project, "as the

gathering of experience turns up patterns that are repeated in quite divergent circumstances, those provide insights and clues about how things too often go wrong in company-community relations and, also, about ways of improving future company-community interactions." (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009:7) The authors also emphasise that as patterns and trend emerge from visits, these are checked and counter-checked in a variety of contexts and industries.

CDA takes a bottom-up approach that draws on the experience of those directly involved/impacted by the company's presence; it is an approach that starts by identifying impacts and issues from the company's presence on the ground by directly drawing on the experience of local communities and stakeholders. A CDA contributor suggests that the basis of their investigation can be summarised in three main questions:

- "How does the individual feel he/she is being impacted by the company?
- What is the experience this individual bases this perspective on?
- How would the individual prefer see the company behave?" (Anon 31 2011)

From the replies it receives, CDA works 'backwards', identifying policies, behaviours, attitudes etc. that may lead to such perceptions. Hence the approach's inductive nature. This approach opens a wide spectrum of possibilities, according to CDA contributors, because it allows the most heart-felt issues by the individuals engaged to emerge, without relying on, or being constrained by, pre-designed checklists (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011).

Through this inductive approach CDA identifies those issues and patterns of behaviour that are grounded on peoples' (both individuals and groups) experience. This is valid for anyone's experience: that of company staff, that of communities or of any other stakeholder. During conversations with companies, CEP project participants, and others the CDA team is able to corroborate a point with the example supplied by those they talk to. (See for example how the book *Getting it Right* (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009) is structured: points made are illustrated with field experience.)

As two CDA contributors observed, on the one hand this approach is simple, and easily understood by those working for the companies: "it is practical, logical and no-nonsense" (Anon 57 2011). On the other it is a limitation as some companies are not comfortable with this approach and as a result will not work with CDA (Anon 57 2011). Overall, however, the

approach is what differentiates the relationship between Total and CDA from one between commissioner and consultant (something that, as I will mention in *Chapter 7*, has played an important role in supporting change in Total's practices). CDA contributors believe that with a consultancy agreement, the consultant would begin by looking at company policies, operations, behaviours, etc. and work to identify what is the impact they have on the local communities – the reverse process followed in CEP (Anon 31 2011, Anon 57 2011, Zandvliet and Anderson 2009).

CDA's way of working, however, has raised perplexities and criticisms, which I will highlight in the next section. In order to be transparent about my views I will conclude the account with a comment on my personal stand in terms of the criticisms raised.

6.3   The CDA-Total relationship under scrutiny

While there is clarity on the purpose and approach among individuals associated to the two organisations involved in this dialogue (Total and CDA), the intent of the visits and in particular of the reports has been critically viewed by some. An advocacy group, Earth Rights International (ERI), has been particularly vocal. I will now outline the controversy and the views expressed by those interviewees who have indirect knowledge of the CDA-Total relationship. These voices show how the relationship itself has been under scrutiny and is considered in certain environments.

As mentioned earlier, the most vocal and direct criticism came from ERI through its 2009 report *Getting it Wrong* (ERI 2009a). The detail of the report is beyond the scope of this research. However, the broad criticisms made by ERI are noteworthy as they have found faint echoes in other interviewees. Criticisms concern the difficulties of doing independent and verifiable research in a deeply divided context marked by violence, like Myanmar/Burma; the scope of the chosen work-strand and methodology used; the indirect consequences of the reports themselves.

Given the difficulty of "conducting open interviews in a closed society" (ERI 2009a:14), the advocacy group, ERI, raises doubts that the CDA reports reflect a reliable view of the situation in pipeline area and more broadly of Myanmar/Burma, where mistrust is pervasive, where much time is needed to gain the confidence of people, where there is an oppressive

regime, and where villagers are propped up by the military. ERI also questions the approach followed by CDA, arguing that the non-profit organisation (NPO) has failed to include in its interviews people from the army as well as sufficient voices outside the pipeline area. Emphasis is also put on the fact that CDA's methodology does not focus on human rights and does not use the internationally accepted definitions of forced labour, and as such, does not reveal the true extent of the abuses that have and are occurring in the pipeline area.

ERI states: "CDA intentionally does not adopt a rights-based approach to its work. The organization does not evaluate the conditions in the Yadana corridor against internationally-accepted human rights norms. In fact, CDA is not and does not claim to be a human rights monitoring group and does not claim to have any expertise in human rights fact-finding. Clearly, CDA's brief and intermittent visits in no way constitute a monitoring regime. Nonetheless, CDA reports on human rights abuses, stating that, 'our review inevitably also included a consideration of the corporation's effects on the human rights situation in the region of the pipeline and beyond in the country at large.'" (ERI 2009a:28)

The advocacy group, as the extract above and the one below indicate, is concerned that given the fact that CDA reports do talk about human rights aspects, they may mislead readers into seeing a situation that does not reflect reality.

"While CDA's analysis may be useful for corporations seeking to better understand and manage certain perceptions of their local impact, their methodology is a completely inappropriate way to address or monitor the human rights impacts of a project over time." (ERI 2009a:29)

ERI continues: "(t)he reports have been consulted by, and presumably influenced, other oil companies seeking to implement large scale oil and gas projects in Burma, at great risk to the livelihoods and human rights of local communities. The reports have been widely cited within the investment community, particularly within the ethical investment community, as an indication to investors that Total is a responsible company." (ERI 2009a:9)

As mentioned earlier, faint echoes of similar issues also emerge in some of the interviews I had with individuals with indirect knowledge of the CDA-Total relationship (interviewees Anon 102 (2011), Anon 165 (2011), Anon 72 (2011)). However, those who express such points, raise them in the context of the value of CDA's work. A Total business partner, for

example, stated that despite the personal reservations on the use of 'subjective' definitions of forced labour in CDA's approach, "I think the emphasis that CDA put both in the way that they do the research and in their reports on the individual people's perceptions and stories I think it's extremely relevant, I value that aspect very much." (Anon 196 2011) Or, as a former TEPM employee (Anon 165 2011) suggested, there is the need to do more investigation outside the pipeline area, in order to be able to compare the two realities.

In my opinion, if ERI's statements reflect an aspect of reality, they also seem tangential to CDA's purpose of work. Firstly, it is true that Myanmar/Burma offers a challenging context for independent research. As I noted in the context chapter (*Chapter 4*), the country's history in terms of human rights abuses is distressing and, even today, with all the changes taking place, business needs to be extremely clear about the challenges and precautions needed to operate in such an environment. However, CDA has always been clear about the purpose of its visits and reports. It does not claim that the visits made to company operations sites are equivalent to impact assessments. For example in the report on the CDA second visit to Myanmar/Burma states: "(t)he Corporate Engagement Project is not an audit in the sense that it 'endorses' or 'condemns' certain company policies. (...) The aim of the visit and the options developed are to assist the Joint Venture Partners [Yadana Project partners] to better deal with the social and political challenges they encounter working in the Myanmar/Burmese context." (CDA 2003a:4) The spirit of these sentences is reaffirmed in most of the reports written by CDA (for example CDA (2003a) and CDA (2008a)) its response to the report, CDA states: "(w)e are neither a consulting firm, nor an auditing firm, nor a think tank, nor an academic research group, nor a human rights monitor, nor an operational NGO." (CDA 2009:2)

Secondly, it is also true that in such complex environments, (as in any process of change) there is the need to take multiple approaches to ensuring that injustice and suffering are stopped and/or do not happen. Advocacy roles, as the one undertaken by ERI are useful and needed. However, engagement with companies is also very necessary. (As I shall argue in *Section 6.4.1*, it is the combination of approaches, strategies and initiatives that has supported change in Total's way of working). Hence, some of the concerns expressed by ERI seem to discard CDA's chosen strategy. Through CEP, CDA, as the organisation points in its response to ERI, "has chosen to work with (not for) corporations around the world to generate lessons, tools and approaches that can help companies ensure that they have positive, rather than negative, impacts on the communities in which they work, including (but not limited to) Myanmar/Burma." (CDA 2009:1)

The purpose of this section was to illustrate the main criticisms made on the approach used and relationship between CDA and Total. I also took the opportunity to state my position in the matter - one which derives from the belief that multiple approaches are needed in a process of change. The research, as I will highlight in the following part of the chapter, has in fact highlighted that no quantifiable measure can be established between the dialogue and changes occurred. Multiple factors have been at play: the dialogue being a critical one.

6.4   Has the dialogue between CDA and Total impacted on Total's way of working?

Up to this point I have drawn on data collected as part of the research to build a descriptive picture of the background (*Chapter 4 and 5)* and of how the two organisations begun working together (*6.1*). In this part of *Chapter 6*, I will start to address the first two of the key questions that underpin my research. Has the dialogue between CDA-Total impacted on the company's way of working? What was it about the dialogue that enabled change? From this point onwards my writing will increasingly reflect my analysis and interpretation of the data and findings. As I mentioned in *Chapter 3* this interpretation is done through my own eyes and as such may be perceived as an extrapolation of what research participants have said.

As it is possible to see from the way I have formulated the second question, I will argue that the dialogue between the two organisations has had an impact. However I will qualify this positive affirmation with the following remarks. It is impossible to establish a quantifiable measure of the impact between the dialogue and the company's way of working. The impact of dialogue has to be read in terms of a contribution to a complex interaction between a number influences. A number of factors have supported change in Total's practices: these include contextual factors, internal drivers and a process of socialisation in which the company has been involved.

Interviewees have identified aspects that have been attributed to the dialogue as enablers of change which I have arranged in two categories. The first group includes aspects related to CDA and the type of organisation it is (including the approach and skills used). The second refers to characteristics of the relationship between Total and CDA itself.

This basic categorisation offers an initial level of analysis. In the concluding part of this chapter I will suggest that the enablers can be explored further. In fact, it is possible to draw on the one hand on cross-sector partnership literature and focus on descriptors of the relationship. On the other, the change management and conflict transformation literature also offer insights which explain what it is about the identified factors that facilitate change.

6.4.1 Yes …. and

The dialogue has impacted Total's way of working. However, as interviewees from both organisations recognise, the dialogue was an important factor among others that fostered change in the French company's practices and attitudes. A CDA contributor states: "CDA was, I think, quite involved in these changes, but we were not the cause of them."(Anon 504 2011) A statement that echoes in the words of a Total employee: "(w)e are not outside this world i.e. we have been able to listen to change happening and respond to it." (Anon 10 2011) There have been a number of influencing factors, as a result it has been impossible to establish a quantitative measure of impact. In the words of a civil society representative in Yangon: "(h)ow do you break down the impact that CDA has had?" (Anon 8 2011) It is not possible.

The dialogue between CDA and Total was a critical influence within a complex dynamic which resulted in changing practices. The factors involved, may have not necessarily acted in planned synergy, and have occurred in different stages, though all helped fostering change in the way the company works. The main factors that have contributed to foster change identified by interviewees can be grouped as:

- Contextual influences like: stakeholder action both at global and local level; guidelines and principles developed by some international organizations as well as high profile initiatives; changes in Myanmar/Burma itself;
- Internal drivers like: the legacy of the merger, willingness to change, development of an effective narrative for change, generational change, recognition of the benefits of CSR;
- A socialization process seen both at macro-level (headquarters) and micro-level (Myanmar/Burma).

6.4.1.1 Contextual influences

Paradigm Shift

In *Chapter 2* I have mentioned the role of stakeholders in shifting paradigm towards social responsibility. This role is acknowledged by a Total employee. "The real thing is that our stakeholders moved. They asked more of us; to do more than what was our expertise; to do more for the global economic and environment situation of the country we are in." (Anon 10 2011)

Myanmar/Burma

The French company's presence in Myanmar/Burma also played a role. In the view of a CDA contributor: "Total has come a long way, Myanmar was the kick they needed to start changing." (Anon 31 2011) Also a Total employee acknowledges its relevance. "The company started moving in its CSR approach, like most companies, at the beginning of 2000. It was not linked to the Myanmar case; however, certainly Myanmar was a big push toward this end." (Anon 7 2011)

ERI

Some interviewees point to ERI's action in contributing to the pressure for change. A civil society representative in Yangon says adamantly: "(a) critical mass of pressure from ERI and others like the French campaigners Info-Birmanie, enabled Total to hear. " (Anon 434 2011) The influence of such pressure is also recognised by a TEPM employee. "The ERI reports have also had a positive impact in terms of monitoring of human rights. We have [strengthened] our internal [reporting] procedure [around 2006-2008]. This was also to be able to know what happens in the area. Total understood, maybe through CDA's reports that it does not want to see in ERI's reports what we are not aware of. Even if this happens outside the so called 'corridor'. When we know of something, we document it. It is important for us to know, beyond what ERI may say." (Anon 613 2012)

6.4.1.2 Internal drivers

Willingness to change and to implement change

As I mentioned in *Section 6.1* there was already the willingness to change in Total (at least among a few).

Total's readiness to open up helped the interplay of influences from various directions occur and translate into action. As a CDA contributor recognises: "(w)hat has really worked is that

it has been very receptive to our feedback and comments. And sometimes it hasn't come easy to them." (Anon 31 2011)

As I will discuss in greater detail in *Chapter 7,* willingness/resistance to change is a topic well covered in change management (see Cope (2003)). In broad terms people do not want to be changed. Hence, speaking from personal experience, in organizational interventions processes are usually put in place to support individuals though times of change.

Furthermore, from an organizational perspective, the willingness to change needs to be backed up by resources too. For example, Total has been training its people in the various aspects of corporate citizenship since the early 2000s. It has also developed guidelines and manuals to assist employees in their work: The *Human Rights the Internal Guide* and *Guide to Local Dialogue* (Total 2009b, Total 2011d)*,* for instance, are manuals that put together aim to offer a broad perspective as well as detailed tools to appreciate and address the complexities relating to the company's work and the relationships with the host communities. Employees do recognize that some of these handbooks need improvement and some have already been revised. This indicates that there is the will and intent to improve.

Generational change

The generational change within the company was also important, as a TEPM employee notes: "(w)hat is also helping establishing CSR, is the emergence of a new generation; a generation that is more keen and interested in these issues. We want it to do it right and we are enjoying it. In this sense it can only become more ingrained in the company." (Anon 809 2012)

'Acceptability'

The development of a narrative which explained the need for change i.e. the need to be socially responsible has proved to be very effective in amplifying the process of change. In the words of a TEPM employee: "I think Christophe de Margerie [Total's CEO] has struck a chord with the concept of acceptability. His view is that Total is not here to be loved by everyone. However even if we will not be loved by everyone, it does not mean that we cannot do things the right way. Furthermore, if things are done in the right way and we can get something out of it, so much the better. The reality is that you do get something out of it. There are definitely benefits in terms of motivation (of both staff and people outside the

company); of improved relationships (people are more prepared to help when we need it)."
(Anon 809 2012)

With 'acceptability' Total is rooting CSR into the business. A Total employee notes: "(w)e understood that acceptability is key to a business". (Anon 7 2011) Another example from Total's *Practical Guide for Local Development Projects*: "Acceptability of the Group's presence in countries hosting our operations has multiple facets. One of these is the effectiveness of our contribution to social and economic development in these countries, particularly in the communities neighbouring our facilities or projects. This is particularly true in non-OECD countries." (Total 2008b:1)

'Acceptability', however is not only about ways of working: it is also about values. The CEO writes: "(w)e are keen to stress that human rights are a set of principles that contribute to improving our social 'acceptability' (...). With that in mind, human rights should be understood as a set of ethical values, and not as risks to be managed." (Total 2011c:3)

6.4.1.3 Socialisation process

By socialisation I refer to the process of acquiring knowledge of the norms and skills needed to operate in an environment as seen by Carola Kantz (Kantz 2007). Kantz believes that socialisation process is not exclusively one-way: all parties involved in this process can play the role of the socialising agent and target. The author argues that in a negotiation situation knowledge is "used and shaped by actors to maximise their socialising impact." (Kantz 2007:8) Albeit strictly not involved in negotiations, it could be said that Total went through a socialisation process by participating various international platforms both acquiring new knowledge and sharing its own towards an understanding of what corporate responsibility entailed, working with guidelines set by international organisations, and generally being exposed to other points of view. I illustrate below what has led me to reach this conclusion.

Global initiatives

The relevance of international platforms is remarked by interviewees who have an indirect knowledge of the dialogue. A business partner comments: "John Ruggie's work has also made a difference. It raised the profile of certain issues and of CSR and highlighted the responsibility that companies had." (Anon 102 2011) An industry analyst adds "(t)he experience of working with other companies and organisations within Global Compact has made an impact. The company has started to work more proactively and is not talking about

CSR in terms of window-dressing, but management really believes in it. Their involvement has been, and is, motivated by the belief that CSR is at the centre of the way of operating. They have realised it's a critical element of the licence to operate." (Anon 112 2011)

Principles and guidelines

In its 2009 CSR report, Total wrote: "(t)he Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights [VPs] is an especially important reference for us in balancing personal and property safety with respect for fundamental liberties. A number of initiatives help drive our thinking about this key issue, including our involvement in the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association's (IPIECA) work, the Global Business Initiative on Human Rights (GBI), of which we are a founding member, the consultation process organized by the United Nations' special representative and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects". (Total 2010b:38)

A Total employee points to the role of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). "We also work closely with what has been done at the IFC. They have given us some rules to follow. If you mix what we have learned from CDA, from IFC and also from our own experience, then we have created our own methodology." (Anon 449 2011a)

Exposure to NGOs

"CDA helped us - but not only CDA, other NGOs as well, [for example] IRAM and Entrepreneurs du Monde helped us. In terms of methodology CDA and IRAM taught us tools of common use in NGOs" (Anon 156 2011).

Changing expectations from governments

Changing expectations from governments have also contributed to socialising the oil and gas industry. A business partner notes: "(i)ncreasingly in relation to the oil and gas industry, governments are demanding companies to demonstrate that they have a responsible way of working. This is also because of where the resources are: in areas characterised by societies that have huge social problems. Companies have therefore shifted from technical excellence, and brought to the forefront community issues." (Anon 72 2011)

The 'forum' in Myanmar/Burma

Socialisation occurred also at local level with micro level interactions with other oil companies, for example, through the forum in Myanmar/Burma between other gas

companies: the South Korean Daewoo, The Thai PTT-EP, and the Malaysian Petronas (see *Chapter 4*). "Our sharing at the forum and beyond that has influenced the way we perceive our SEP" (Anon 613 2012).

Working with villagers

Interaction with villagers is important too. Two comments, one from a TEPM employee and the other from a civil society representative, are very illustrative. "The villagers have also helped the change. (...) When we moved towards community development and sustainability, the villages have supported us and were very happy to help us, even if it meant more work for them" (Anon 613 2012).

"When you work on the ground, you start caring about people. Total is also a more humane organisation because it started to relate to the Burmese people in a different way. 15 years ago there was this documentary made by Canal Plus in '98/99, called 90 min. When you see the behaviour of Total's engineers in the jungle, it is the worst colonial experience you can have. You really feel like seeing a French farmer in Algeria in the 1920s. People in Total now, are not like that. I think it's not just the pressure [from advocacy groups], not just CDA, it's also spending time with the villagers because they actually run schools, clinics. They actually engage with villagers. How often does [the General Manager] speak to a farmer compared to somebody who was there ten years ago. I'm pretty sure [the General Manager] speaks to farmers much, much more often than the person ten years ago." (Anon 434 2011)

CSR: a non-competitive issue

A key 'driver of success' has been the fact that in the industry social responsibility is considered a non-competitive issue. A Total employee comments: "(s)ometimes we partner with companies that may not have processes that consider societal issues. Even if we are not the operator, in these situations we tend to share our processes as well as the models we use for evaluating societal issues, and we can also second personnel to that partner to help with the implementation of these aspects. (...) We feel that by virtue of working together in these areas there is something to gain for all." (Anon 20 2011)

Another Total employee states: "these subjects are non-competitive, and that at the end of the day it's in the interest of all companies to share best practice."(Anon 156 2011)

CDA's role

CDA has played a pivotal role in this socialisation process, both as a signal of its readiness to engage and as a facilitator of the process itself. An employee from Total recalls: "(s)tarting to collaborate with CDA was an important signal for the company. It was a very strong signal within the company and outside the company that we were really ready to have another view about ourselves that we wanted to develop more on these issue, to make an investment on societal matters. It was one of the real concrete signals" (Anon 10 2011).

Another Total employee mentioned the importance of CEP. "Each year there is a gathering of partners - of mining companies, oil companies etc. – and the main reason for the meeting is to learn." (Anon 142 2011) "(T)hey run collaborative projects in which they share the learning with participating partners - on an anonymous basis of course - but it's interesting to benefit from that." (Anon 142 2011)

Participation and multi-stakeholder engagement worked for Total as the statement on the process to follow with regards to the inclusion of human rights in investment law indicates; "(t)he taking into account of human rights by investment law would, however, be more effective within a multilateral framework." (Total 2011c:31) More from the same publication: "Total fully supports this approach for several reasons. First, because it provides a fair and clear division of the respective roles and responsibilities of states and companies. Taking a consensual approach, it also ensures the broad support of all stakeholders, i.e. states, companies and NGOs. Based on a risk analysis and management systems similar to those practised, in particular, in the safety and environment fields, it is above all operational. Lastly, it is universal, because the countries in which we operate are members of the UN." (Total 2011c:3)

CDA, as a contributor mentions, acknowledges the influence that the participative process has had on Total. "Our approach has been an enabler. Total has been by far the biggest participating company in our conversations. (...) It's not the individual visits, they really value the collaborative learning process. If there is something that CDA should be doing, [it] is having more collaborative learning projects rather than more Myanmar visits." (Anon 31 2011)

Summarising the discussion so far in this chapter, I have argued that the dialogue between CDA and Total has had an impact on the company's practice. However, it is difficult to

establish a quantifiable measure; other factors were at play all contributing to a shift in Total's attitudes and behaviours. These factors can be groups as contextual drivers, internal drivers, and a socialisation process.

Having made this qualification, it is now time to discuss where the dialogue has had an impact.

6.5   What impact has the dialogue had?

Total has benefited from the collaboration with CDA. A CDA contributor states: "Total saw the value the assessment we had been doing and started being much more forward looking." (Anon 31 2011) Two business partners make the following comments: "(m)y perception is that the feedback has been valued and acted upon. There is a genuine desire to run this program effectively and help the people in the communities." (Anon 33 2011) "CDA makes a constructive critique of Total with the aim that the recommendations and critiques would be taken seriously." (Anon 196 2011)

Interviewees have acknowledged the dialogue's influence in several areas. However, the words 'conflict sensitivity' have rarely been mentioned. I will therefore begin this section by arguing that the dialogue has impacted on the way of working of the company, though the notion of conflict sensitivity seems to be implicit rather than explicit. I will continue by highlighting the learning and activities engendered by the dialogue, as identified by interviewees.

6.5.1 Conflict sensitivity is implied

Conflict sensitivity seems to be implicit in the way business documents talk about CSR. As I argued in *Chapter 2* by citing three company documents, that some concepts are recognisable (mindfulness about the negative impacts of business operations; drive to build shared value, relationship building through dialogue and participation, inclusion of all relevant stakeholders; build on what works and develop what is needed), though conflict sensitivity is not explicitly articulated. Such themes also emerge from interviews with Total and TEPM staff in the following pages.

The experience of this research has left me wondering whether there should be greater emphasis on distinguishing between conflict sensitivity and CSR. On the one hand, sophisticated distinctions may not be needed within a business environment, as long as the following aspects are clearly understood. Firstly, that there are interdependencies between business and its context. Secondly that to appreciate the implications of these interdependencies requires analysing the nature of the relationships. (As mentioned in *Chapter 1*, I use the term relationships as conceived in conflict transformation: the interactions between individual and groups but also between individuals, groups, institutions, processes etc.) On the other hand, it may be useful, at least in the learning environment to be specific about differences.

Furthermore for what concerns this research, I do not believe that the fact that Total does not explicitly talk about conflict sensitivity, lessens the impact that the dialogue has had. I will illustrate why in the following sections. I will start by highlighting the impact that interviewees have identified. I will continue, in *Chapter 7* with a discussion on why the relationship has been so important: the dialogue has ignited transformational levers which may lead to sustainable change.

6.5.2 Learning

Making sense of what is political and not

Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005) explain, as I mentioned in *Chapter 2*, that the degree of intervention by a company also depends on the perception of what is 'political' and its belief of the degree they can influence the environment. This is an area of dilemma for Total. The dialogue between Total and CDA, as the following comments indicate, has had an important impact in this sense.

"CDA also helped us (and others) to find a position between what is written in our Code of Conduct [in which it is written] that we are not supposed to influence or interfere in politics – (...) and how to have partnerships and deal with national affairs, for example in education, which are supposed to be the responsibility of the government. We have to work with them: we are not a substitute [of government]. The question is: what is our role, don't go too far. Try and find the right position. Which is not very simple..." (Anon 10 (2011); a Total employee).

"Probably CDA has made Total aware that we have a role at political level. We cannot simply say we are doing our job well, we're respecting our employee, we're respecting environment etc. We have to look a little bit beyond ourselves." (Anon 73 (2011); a TEPM employee)

Kouchner in 2003 commented "(m)ost of all the Company needs to open its mind. Like it or not, this is what is known as having a political vision of the world." (Kouchner 2003:14) Six years later the company was talking about using its leverage (Total 2010a); locally, for example, for TEPM this has translated in shifting from service delivery to community development, introducing International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Danish Institute of Human Rights (DIHR) training, and leading the forum with PTT-EP, Petronas and Daewoo.

Learning to anticipate

CDA helped Total understand that taking time in analysing and understanding the context, working *with* people and learning from the experience is not wasting time. As examples, I will cite the comments of two Total employees. "The keyword here is to anticipate. This is (...) very simple, and at the same time it is not (...) easy to discuss with people. For example - we're going to launch a project. The project has not yet started. [Some of the responses to what we suggest are]: 'why I should pay for you for a mission to understand how people work?' [even before the project starts]". (Anon 449 2011a)

"If we take the time [to explain that it is important] to follow the projects and, in a sense, to measure the success (or not) and [to understand] why the project has failed or succeeded ... This notion is the one that makes the difference." (Anon 10 2011) "We can say we've have mainly learned this from CDA." (Anon 449 2011a). In this dialogue the two employees refer to the value of monitoring and evaluating social projects in order to capitalise on experience.

Understanding the importance of not working alone

Total recognised CDA's contribution in appreciating the importance of working in synergy with others in matters of societal issues, as this exchange between two employees shows. "We also learnt not to do things alone..."(Anon 10 2011) "...being a catalyst and not the main actor..." (Anon 449 2011a) "... not being any more at the centre of the world, but we are part of the world with other partners for example NGOs, local population..." (Anon 10 2011) "... local authorities, institutions, associations." (Anon 449 2011a)

Such approach is also reflected in internal company documents, for example in *Developing Local Content:* "Economic and Social Development projects cover all facets of development (i.e., human, social and economic) in communities and aim to improve their living conditions. Such projects are based on a process through which communities take ownership of the initiatives undertaken, as well as an active participation by local authorities, NGOs, bodies of the UN etc." (Total 2008c:10) I have also cited other documents in the previous sections which would illustrate this point.

Integrate people of different skills into the business and work as a team
The dialogue seems also to have stimulated the emergence of multi-talented teams. "Yes because here at E&P [Exploration and Production] we are mainly engineers and we recruit people coming from.... ethnology social sciences, agriculture..... They are different people coming from different strand of knowledge and we try to work with them." (Anon 449 2011a) "In 2008 we launched the '*societal métier*' (...) the *métier* for us is a global process: from selecting and hiring the right people, training them and giving perspectives for the future. We learnt from CDA, and not only from CDA, that it's not good to hire people from the NGOs, put them in an office and produce very good methodologies and PowerPoint presentation, and 'keep them out' of the structure. So we decided to never let people coming from NGOs be alone, but to create multi-talented teams which include people from other parts of the oil business." (Anon 156 2011) These were comments from Total employees.

6.5.3 Initiatives and activities

Total's internal methodology and tools
The dialogue has made a tangible contribution by influencing methodology and tools. A couple of comments from two Total employees as evidence: "(a) (...) pragmatic approach and methodology this is what we get from CDA." (Anon 156 2011) "[Total's] methodology is very much in line with what has been provided to us and what is reflected in the book *Getting it Right.* We do not share all the principles which are in this book, but we respect most of what it says". (Anon 449 2011a)

The dialogue's impact on tools is also recognised by a CDA contributor. "We have been helpful in terms of giving them pragmatic, doable ideas and tools to implement the ideas they were already committed to (greater transparency, greater engagement with the world around them, greater respect for the communities, greater say from communities)." (Anon 504 2011)

Opening the operational site in Myanmar/Burma to visits

Opening the Pipeline Centre (the operations site) has been one of the first results from the dialogue. A former TEPM employee recalls: "(a)t the time of the first [CDA] assessment one of the findings was that the organisation was closed, and that the villagers were interested in coming to visit the factory. They had three layers of fences. After the assessment Total opened to visits. University students were also invited to visit." (Anon 165 2011)

The ILO workshop (2010 – see Chapter 4)

"Another thing we are very proud of, because it also addresses many of the criticisms, (is) the workshop with ILO. CDA in its reports had suggested cooperation with the ILO." (Anon 613 2012) The ILO has acknowledged the workshop (ILO 2010a, ILO 2010b) and it has been reported in Total's documentation. "It can be difficult to differentiate between forced labour and community work on the ground, where public works and minor voluntary service can overlap and sometimes appear very similar. To address these tricky questions, Total tapped the expertise of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to train our employees in the relevant standards. After advance discussion and consensus-building work with the Burmese authorities, three training sessions were held in September 2010: one for our teams based in the Yadana gas pipeline area, another for local authorities, and the third for villagers and local entrepreneurs. National oil company MOGE, our local partner, was also involved in the initiative, which will be repeated regularly in the years ahead." (Total 2010b:7)

The forum (began around 2008 – see Chapter 4)

"Another initiative that has been sparked by CDA is the oil and gas forum, where best practices are shared. (…) We have shared documents on land acquisition procedure, compensation procedure…" (Anon 613 2012). These were the words of a TEPM employee. A civil society members states: "I personally think it is a positive thing, assuming they are trying to advise companies on preventing human rights violations (…). If the company can positively influence the way of thinking and behaviours of other companies in Asia and if this boils down to an initial recommendation that CDA gave Total, it is good." (Anon 17 2011)

Recruiting a CSR coordinator for Myanmar

A Total employee states: "after the CDA analysis we hired a person from the NGO field" (Anon 156 2011). This was in 2008. Previously the responsibility of SEP lay with the General

Manager. Recruiting a dedicated person, restructuring the SEP team and issuing new SEP procedures was extremely important for the programme.

Community development

Contributing to the relationship with communities and the development of the programmes has been noted most frequently as an impact of the dialogue. As an example I cite a TEPM employee and a CDA contributor. "CDA certainly has made us aware that we need to put local communities at the centre of our work and not be the key deliverer. When you're a company like Total, the natural tendency will be to provide things, to build things for people. Since CDA came, we have understood that the most important thing is the communication with the people to establish rapport, to listen to them to talk to them. Here in Myanmar this, partly to CDA, has become the key concept of our community development programme: involving people and stakeholders. I spend a lot of time talking to people and building relationships and I have to because we wouldn't be able to operate if we didn't build good relationships." (Anon 73 2011) "I think (...) that CDA helped Total become much more comfortable in listening to what people in local communities say and to learn from them. Also, they became better at setting up protocols and procedures for responding to community issues."(Anon 504 2011)

The following TEPM employee details:

1. "With reference to the suggestions made on capacity building, we have extended the scope of our work and we have increased the community development team. (...)

2. With reference to increasing ownership, we have developed a good way of working, to the extent that in one case one person forgot to mention a clinic we had supported, saying that he did that as he really considered it a result of the village's efforts. This shows real ownership, villagers really think that what we do together is really something of the village." (Anon 64 2012)

The dialogue's contribution is also recognised by a former TEPM contractor. "Total's community development work, has definitely changed as a result of CDA." (Anon 894 2011)

Figure 6.3 – The shift to community development as illustrated by TEPM (TEPM 2011c).

Reaching the poor and vulnerable

A TEPM employee credits the dialogue with CDA to have encouraged SEP to re-think how the activities could better reach the poor and vulnerable." When CDA came they advised on a new direction and to change the design of the programme and do something for the very vulnerable. This is one of the examples. I appreciate the range of things they look at and the detail of their assessment." (Anon 64 2012)

6.6   Concluding remarks

I started this chapter by presenting how the two organisations, CDA and Total, came together. The outline I provided of the motivations that led to the dialogue between them illustrated that the goals of the two organisations did not explicitly include organisational change. The company was searching for validation of its work in Myanmar/Burma; however, there was already an appreciation of needing to pursue a journey towards corporate social responsibility - at least among a few. Stakeholder action and the legacy coming from the merger with Elf had opened the door to a new direction for the company. By the time Total had approached CDA there was willingness to change and adapt its practices within the company.

Furthermore those who initiated the relationship, including within CDA, were ready to take a risk. Total could have been 'exposed' in a negative light by CDA, drawing on the fact that it had been to the company site. Equally, CDA's reputation could have been tarnished being perceived as being co-opted by 'big-business'. However, CDA primarily saw the collaboration

with Total as an opportunity to learn *with* a company about ways of working and what could be done differently, and it tried to manage its risks by rigorously applying their methodology. Total, for its side, was quite confident that its work with communities in Myanmar/Burma was 'on the right track'. Furthermore, it was reassured by CDA's collaborative approach and the fact that the NPO was putting its reputation at risk too.

I then described the approach that underpins CEP. For ease of explanation I have described the sequence of events that occurs during CDA visits in Myanmar/Burma, as process. The way with which issues are identified, I have called methodology. In the main, interviewees have found that CDA's inductive method of inquiry which begins by asking stakeholders about their perceptions of the impact of the company's presence and then works backwards to identify policy and behaviours that may lead to such perceptions, provide valuable insights. Interviews have also stated that this method delivers a sound base for discussion grounded on real evidence.

The approach is particular: the mix of broad consultations and visits foreseen as part of CEP is what differentiates the relationship between Total and CDA from one between commissioner and consultant. The main connotations of this approach lie in the voluntary nature of Total's participation in CEP, the focus on collaborative learning, and the consultative and participatory form of the engagement.

I rounded-off this part of the discussion with a brief account of the criticisms that have been levied against CDA and its methodology. The advocacy group ERI has been particularly vocal emphasising that the visits and the reports produced by CDA are not assessments of the human rights situation in the area where the pipeline is. I personally believe that while some of the observations may reflect an aspect of reality, criticisms seem to be tangential to the actual aim and scope of the dialogue. The strategy that underpins the engagement is one of collaboration and not denunciation nor of an impact evaluation.

Ending the descriptive part of my writing, I began to address the first two questions that have driven the inquiry. Has the dialogue between CDA-Total impacted on the company's way of working? What was it about the dialogue that enabled change?

The dialogue between the two organisations has had an impact, though a quantifiable measure cannot be established. The dialogue was a critical influence among others that

contributed to change. Contextual factors, internal drivers and a process of socialisation have supported the shift in Total's practices.

Interviewees explicitly identified areas which have directly benefited from the dialogue: making sense of what is political and what is not, a greater understanding of the importance of anticipating issues, of working together with other stakeholders, and of working as multitalented teams. The dialogue has also influenced initiatives and activities both at the company's group level (Total's methodology) and in Myanmar/Burma (the ILO workshop, the Forum and the community development approach).

Overall, the areas of impact identified by interviewees have important repercussions (as mentioned in *Chapter 2*) on how a company engages with its environment, even if the dialogue has not resulted in an explicit awareness of conflict sensitivity. I have argued, in fact, that there are strong indications in company documents and in the activities undertaken that the concept is implicitly understood. The areas of learning reported by interviewees and mentioned above are part of the basis of being conflict sensitive.

My next steps will be to examine, in order to be able to replicate successes, how the impact has occurred and why.

Chapter 7

The enablers of change

In the following section I will explore the second question that underpins this research: what is it about dialogue that has enabled change? I will structure my answer in two parts. To begin with, I have classified the factors identified as enablers by interviewees. What emerged from the data collected can be grouped in: attributes particular to CDA and characteristics pertinent to the relationship itself. Examples of the former are: professionalism, knowledge and experience, strategic perspective, way of engaging. In the latter group aspects like independence, trust and continuity can be found.

I will follow the above discussion by delving deeper in my analysis, drawing on the literature on cross-sector partnerships, dialogue, change management and conflict transformation. I will argue that the enablers identified by research participants were effective because there was a good fit between the two organisations, no power asymmetries were perceived, trust was strong and the design of the dialogue was suitable to the open ended nature of emergent change.

I also argue that the dialogue between the two organisations sparked interventions that connect to transformational levers within an organization clearly identified both in the conflict transformation organisational literature. These interventions touch both the individual and the organisational level and are based on empowerment and recognition. Furthermore, the dialogue has engendered a 'safe environment' which has allowed Total to learn and to some degree internalise the new concepts and reality it was coming to grips with.

7.1   What was it about the relationship that enabled change?

7.1.1 About CDA as an organisation

Knowledge, experience, professionalism, reputation, approach
CDA's knowledge and experience, its professionalism, approach and reputation, have been identified as sources of legitimacy for its observations and work. This has been noted by a number of interviewees who have a direct experience of the relationship.

I have discussed CDA's approach at length in *Chapter 6.* Below are illustrations of the other factors. A Total employee explains: "(w)hat attracted us was their credibility and the fact that they are really professional - they are not too naïve. These are the two main reasons why we decided to work with them." (Anon 7 2011) A TEPM staff member adds: "[the CDA person who came] has an amazing background in the oil and gas sector [and] much experience in the corporate sector for comparison." (Anon 613 2012)

A Total contractor also notices the value of CDA's experience: "(c)ompared to other organizations they have a lot of experience in societal issues. It may therefore be easier for them to sketch the overall plan, because they may already be able to anticipate the effect/output of a particular activity." (Anon 289 2012)

The relevance of CDA's experience is also acknowledged by a business partner who has an indirect knowledge of the relationship. "Total saw that CDA was regarded by others as being experts on community dialogue and they thought they were in the right organisation." (Anon 72 2011)

Personalities
Personalities have their relevance too. Even if this is not frequently mentioned, personalities have been important as the words of a TEPM employee show. "The personality that you have in front of you plays a big role. All the people who met [the former head of CDA] are enthusiastic about her. They are 'quality' people." (Anon 613 2012)

The way of engaging with the company
The way CDA engaged with Total was also very important in fostering different ways of working.

Of great importance is the focus on mutual learning which puts both organisations on the same learning. Both CDA and Total talk about the "willingness to improve and learn on both sides" (Anon 73 2011). A CDA contributor adds: "We learned an enormous amount by working with them to. They were the right people for us at the right time. We were a very good match for learning some important lessons about corporate-community relations." (Anon 504 2011)

As mentioned in *Chapter 6,* interviewees have described the approach as consultative. CDA contributors highlight that their way of engaging with companies, including Total, is straight forward with no hidden agendas and at the same time humble (as the NPO always refers back to what has been raised by individuals). It is also non-threatening as it is guided by the belief that people are driven by good intentions. (Anon 31 2011, Anon 504 2011, Anon 58 2011)

"[Also because of their experience] they [CDA] do not question whether it is a good or not to be a company. They do not question whether doing business in Myanmar is a good or bad thing. They understand and share the company culture, thus making communication easier." (Anon 613 (2012), a TEPM employee)

Furthermore, a former Total employee recalls the realisation of the gulf that existed between NGOs and business perspectives about a decade ago, adding... "CDA on the other hand believed that big business can contribute to social development. It has a lot of money but it can also be a player." (Anon 5 2012)

Ability to connect

"CDA speaks both the language of the company, and of the communities and listens to all stakeholders involved" (Anon 58 2011). The words of a TEPM contractor show that this is true "CDA is an organization that is industrial oriented, they take into account the operations, the work that is performed by the enterprise and all aspects related to the enterprise (health, safety and environment, local content...). During their last mission they highlighted that we could do more in terms of developing local content, and they are right." (Anon 289 2012)

Strategic perspective

The ability to take a strategic long-term view is highlighted by a TEPM employee "CDA is more strategic, they do not only focus on facts and figures." (Anon 49 2012)

Bringing a different perspective

The above characteristics have been perceived as a practical and stimulating contribution to the company's work in particular because they raise different perspectives. TEPM employees for example state: "(w)e work on our own with our objectives, but CDA made look at things with different eyes, it makes us more productive." (Anon 212 2012) "They can see from a different perspective and this is very helpful for us. (...) When CDA came they advised on a

new direction and to change the design of the [SEP] programme and do something for the very vulnerable. This is one of the examples. I appreciate the range of things they look at and the detail of their assessment." (Anon 60 2012)

Being an intermediary

CDA is also valued for the role it plays in the relationship with Total: that of an intermediary, a "*port-parole*, the go-between; this is why sometimes it feels a little bit confusing." (Anon 31 (2011), a CDA contributor) "They are able to talk to a lot of people at different levels, in a very transparent manner. We talk to a lot of people, but when I am meeting with an NGO [non-government organisation] representative, the ILO [International Labour organisation] etc., I am Total. Probably, I cannot be sure of this, the feedback that I will get is influenced by the fact that I represent Total. When CDA meets people the perceptions that they get, the recommendations and the ideas will be fairly objective. Some organisations will speak to CDA, and say that 'the issue is no longer that Total is present in Myanmar, because we are aware that they're doing good things. But they should be working on this subject or on that issue.' If I meet with the same people, they will not say that the issue is not any longer that we are working in the country. They will not express their concerns or their recommendations in the same genuine manner. This is why the independence of CDA is very important for us. It is important that they are perceived as independent and not as a Total consultant." (Anon 73 (2011), a TEPM employee)

CDA seems also to be appreciated as a vehicle to transmit ideas both from external stakeholders and internal ones. A TEPM contractor clarifies: "(t)hey have been very useful as we have seen that sometime some of the ideas we have are not taken into account by [TEPM's] management, but if CDA suggests them, then, the management thinks they are very good ideas and that they should be implemented immediately. For this reason, CDA has been a good tool to relay messages to the management." (Anon 289 2012) A TEPM employee expresses the same feeling: "CDA recommendations have a lot more weight and, it is taken into consideration by the management as something we should do." (Anon 50 2012)

7.1.2 About the nature of the relationship

Independence

The aspect that was raised by CDA and Total interviewees with most emphasis as an enabler of the relationship was independence. With independence, interviewees meant a lack of

contractual or consultancy based agreement that informed the relationship. The fact that visits to Myanmar/Burma and other company sites occur under the auspices of the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) and are not paid/commissioned by Total, underpins and maintains the independence/distinctiveness of the dialog.

In the words of a TEPM employee: "(t)he relationship with CDA is not exactly a client-consultant relationship. CDA is very clear and specific in this, and you can see this in the memorandum of agreement." (Anon 73 2011) "[CDA] thinks it is interesting to work with Total. They see some value for CEP to understand the challenges of working in a country like Myanmar. On our side, we also see some value in working with them and to benefit from their experience gained in other countries. But it's very important for CDA to keep their independence." (Anon 73 2011)

A CDA contributor explains that the organisation's independence is grounded in: "the funding structure – [the public private] mixture of funding [upon which CEP relies (see *Chapter 4*)]; [CEP's] approach; [the] independent approach we take in the field, travel independently, speak with a wide range of stakeholder; [and that] reporting is public." (Anon 57 2011) The same CDA contributor notes: "Total is one of the organisations that values our independence most. They have a number of consultants that work with them. However they feel it is important that CDA maintains its independence." (Anon 31 2011)

Respect for each other

Respect for each other is also high on the list of enablers of change. A TEPM employee points out: [this is a] "relationship where there is a lot of mutual respect. We respect the work that CDA does. They respect what we do: they're not here to criticise. They have a lot of experience and offer us options. In fact, in their reports, they offer mostly 'options' and not 'recommendations'. They recognise the changes in the context. They also understand what is possible, what is challenging, what kind of target we can put ourselves. This is a very particular feature of this relationship." (Anon 73 2011) The same feeling is summarised by a CDA contributor: [this is a] "good relationship based on trust, reputation, on experience and knowledge." (Anon 58 2011)

Trust

A business partner who has an indirect experience of the dialogue acknowledges the degree of trust that exists. "Although CDA's reports were critical in some places, they also showed

the value of the programme and the efforts of the company: people in Total saw this and trusted the organisation, and asked CDA to come back." (Anon 72 2011) I will discuss trust also later in *Section 7.3.1*.

Continuity

The fact that the relationship has and is continuing after many years is proving to be of great effectiveness and usefulness, as the following comment from a Total employee shows. "Now they probably know our activities in Myanmar very well, as this is the sixth evaluation. We have seen the evaluation running over the last years, how it [the work in Myanmar/Burma] has changed, because there has been change." (Anon 449 2011a) I continue with the words of a TEPM employee which illustrated what the duration of the engagement means for the company. "This is continuity. I can measure very clear against the last assessment. They started working around February 2002. There is a whole background and we have been progressing together with them. They know where we're coming from, they know where we are today. They can measure the progress. They can acknowledge it. They have very good knowledge of the context. We would never get the same result if we were to hire a consultant for a one-time assessment. We have a lot of continuity of the relationship even if we don't meet very often." (Anon 73 2011)

These were the factors pertinent to the Total-CDA relationship that were identified as enablers of change by interviewees. At this point in the discussion, I would like to start to bring the key points of my arguments together. The description of the motivation that brought the two organisations together (*6.1*), started to highlight that there were factors beyond the dialogue itself that contributed to change, for example the history of the company or its willingness to change. In addition to internal drivers there were external factors that contributed to Total's shift in work practices. Among the ones I have named: the advancement of CSR, global initiatives such as UN Global Compact, and the development of guidelines and principles for corporate behaviour by international organisations (*6.4.1*). Even though conflict sensitivity has rarely been mentioned, interviewees, however, have pointed to several areas where dialogue has had an impact. The examples made (making sense of what is political and the ability to anticipate, to name a couple) do, however, point to aspects needed to *be* conflict sensitive. The findings of this research therefore indicate that dialogue has had an impact on company practices, but not explicitly in terms of conflict sensitivity. Interviewees have also been able to identify certain characteristics of the dialogue that acted as enablers.

The process and methodology of the dialogue (*6.2*) are greatly valued, for example it's participatory and consultative nature, and its role as an enabler of trust. Other aspects supportive of change highlighted are mutual respect, continuity and independence. Last but not least, there are a number of facilitators of change that are connected to CDA itself: the ability to connect, the ability to bring different perspectives, its knowledge and experience and others (*7.1.1*).

Putting together the pieces of the puzzle I have illustrated all the enablers in the picture below.

Figure 7.1 – a summary of the enablers for change discussed.

This basic analysis can be taken a step further in order to examine why these factors are important. I will do this in the following section.

7.2   Why are the enablers enablers?

In this section I explore what is it about the aspects identified by interviewees, so far, as enablers that can explain their importance in facilitating a change in practices within Total. I will first draw on the insights of other researchers. I will start by comparing, my findings with four descriptors of partnerships found in the cross-sector partnership literature: fit, design, power dynamics and trust. In all four cases this research reinforces what has been identified by other authors. The good fit between CDA and Total, a perceived lack of power asymmetries, the high level of trust made the engagement effective. Furthermore, like previously observed, what changed was mostly unintended (i.e. it was not planned for at the beginning).

I will continue by building on principles identified in change management and conflict transformation literature to argue that the factors identified as enablers by interviewees have touched upon levers that contribute to organisational transformation: empowerment and motivation, as well as creating a space for experimentation and innovation.

7.2.1 Fit, power dynamics, trust, and design

The cross-sector partnerships literature has been proposing a number of lenses though which explore the impact of business-NPO (non-profit organisation) partnership. I have chosen four of these descriptors and compared other authors' findings to my own. The findings from this case-study broadly confirm what is argued in the literature. Furthermore, they connect to fundamental aspects of conflict resolution, organisational change and dialogue (which I will highlight as appropriate) suggesting that partnerships, and specifically the relationship between CDA and Total, are effective when they are guided by dialogue principles.

Fit

Millar, Choi and Chen (2004)and Dahan et al (2010) suggest that cultural fit is a prerequisite of "the type of interaction that ensures that the MNC [multinational company] is able to absorb and benefit from the experience of the NGO and that the NGO is able to work with the MNC without suspicion that its objectives are being compromised." (Millar, Chong and Chen 2004:409) A similar point is also made by Seitanidi (2010).

As the extracts from the interviews illustrate, it is possible to assume that there is a good cultural fit between the two organisations. Both organisations took a risk in working together. Both respect each other's work and professionalism. CDA's ability to connect with Total by using language and perspectives that the company can hear also ensured that the fit was good. I also believe that this 'fit' was strengthened by the openness in both organisations to learn from each other.

The evidence I used above reflects what emerges from the writings of conflict resolution authors on dialogue. For example, in 1999 while commenting on his experience as a mediator, Saunders wrote: "(i)n dialogue (...) one's mind opens to absorb new views, enlarge perspectives, rethink assumptions and modify judgments. In debate, one listens to find flaws in others' points so as to attack them and to defend one's own point of view. In dialogue, one puts forward ideas while suspending judgment on them in the expectation that others' thoughts will deepen them; together, two sides assume many approaches to an answer and work toward common ground." (Saunders 1999:82) Saunders also adds: (d)ialogue is dangerous; it often involves risks. Unlike negotiation, in which delegates often withhold such information, dialogue requires participants to reveal to others their deepest interests, hopes and fears." (Saunders 1999:84)

Power dynamics

Seitanidi and Ryan (2007) highlight the limitations that power asymmetries may bring to the development of partnerships. This is a point well known and extensively covered (albeit from different perspectives) both in the organisational behaviour one (see Reed (1999)) and the conflict transformation literature (see Francis (2001)).

Extrapolating from their analysis on sponsorships, Seitanidi and Ryan comment how the relationship between partners often did not reflect "the transactional and symmetrical relationship that its rhetoric was associated with initially." (2007:256)

Participants to this research indicate change has occurred. It is also possible to extrapolate from the interviews that perceived power asymmetries between the two organisations lack; thus, albeit by offering a counter-case, the finding of the research are in line with the findings of Seitanidi and Ryan (2007). I suggest, in fact, that between Total and CDA there were no power asymmetries in their relationship. Given the great emphasis on each other's independence and on the voluntary nature of this collaboration, I would speculate that the

relationship is underpinned by the two parties' strong perception of having the freedom to walk away at any time. Not only walking away: but also a greater freedom on behalf of Total to choose whether to implement the options resulting from the visits or not. The working style is collaborative and consultative; options are generated in joint discussions; they are not formulated as recommendations from a consultancy assignment. I would speculate further: Total is in a psychologically different space to that of a commissioner, who may feel pressure to implement the suggestions made by the consultant. CDA's humility, Total's appreciation of the NPO's experience, mutual learning and openness to being challenged also facilitated the perception of a fair distribution of power. (Comments regarding the importance of the independence of the organisation are also made by Seitanidi (2010) who states that financial dependency of the NPO to the company hinders externalisation of conflict.)

Writing on dialogue Saunders states: "(i)f power is the capacity to change the course of events, one product of sustained dialogue is to create power. Members of a dialogue group can design together a scenario of interactive steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions and to augment the possibilities of working together toward objectives that meet shared needs." (1999:81-82). The mediator continues later on: "(n)o participant gives up her or his identity, but each recognizes enough of the other's valid human claims that he or she will act differently toward the other" (Saunders 1999:82). These words seem to correspond to what happened in the relationship between Total and CDA in terms of generation of ideas and independence.

Trust

Millar, Chong and Chen (2004) point to the degree of trust that exists between partners as determinant of success. However, there are divergent pulls that undermine trust. NGOs and NPOs have a dual voice: that of partner and that of advocate. This is a source of uncertainty for business. Seitanidi and Ryan (2007) add that this is not the only tension in the partnership. Corporations experience diverging pulls from stakeholder and shareholder interests. Both are, using Murphy's (Murphy and Bendell 1999) words, paradoxes that need to be managed in the relationship.

In this case study these pulls were absent. Total did perceive the relationship as a potential risk during its early stages, however, the fact that CDA was also taking a risk favoured trust-building as interviewees suggest. Furthermore, the fact that CDA does not have an advocacy

role, but a record of experience of working with other companies (see the emphasis by key informants on the NPO's knowledge and the comments on its ability to see business as a player and to connect), most likely contributed to the trust building process between the two organisations. The respect for each other's work and professionalism further reinforced trust-building. Hence, the tensions described by Millar, Chong and Chen (2004) are non-existent as distinct actors play the two roles in this context. Even if not in synergy (see the Earth Rights International (ERI)'s public report on CDA's work (ERI 2009a) the advocacy strategy and the collaborative one seem to have had an element of complementarity.

I also believe that the momentum for *change* was also maintained by discussing the importance of CSR at shareholders level right from 2002 onwards (see AGM minutes - http://www.total.com/en/individual-shareholders/shareholders-meetings/annual-shareholders-meeting-archives-940666.html). This, combined with the development of the 'acceptability' narrative has catalysed synergies of interests in the direction of change.

There is a second dimension of trust that has been identified by authors as influencing the outcome of business-NPO partnerships: that of society towards the partnership. Seitanidi warns that the degree of trust others have in the partnerships may have substantial impact on their actual successful implementation. "(W)hen the motivation associated with the practice of CCI [corporate community involvement] fails to deliver on the implementation; (...) it appears to serve rhetoric rather than reality" (Seitanidi 2008:257). Eweje indirectly supports this view in his review of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in the Niger Delta: "no matter how laudable the CSR initiatives are – if the host communities do not feel that the projects will create a sustainable economic, social and environmental development the conflict and unrest in the Niger Delta will continue." (Eweje 2007:231)

The findings of this case study seem to align with other researches in this instance. As mentioned *in Chapter 6,* the communities in the pipeline area in Myanmar/Burma have been, in the main, receptive to Total's efforts, contributing to the virtuous cycle of learning that has characterised Total's journey to date (see also the evidence used in *Section 7.3*).

It is also true that advocacy groups have criticised the partnership (*Section 6.3*). I would speculate, that, on the one hand, the impact of this on the dialogue was 'kept at bay' by the solidity of the relationship itself and on the other, it probably has strengthened CDA's image (see comments on being different from other NGOs).

Design

By 'design', I refer to how a partnership/collaboration is structured, its aim and objectives. As mentioned on several occasions, between CDA and Total, there was not a design that could be compared to a formal partnership or contractual agreement: focus is on learning through participation in multiple components. Authors like Seitanidi (2008) and (Wadham 2009) observe that profound change in the practices of one or both partners are an unintentional by-product of the initial partnership design. Wadham observes of her case study: "while partners may enter into a partnership for strategic reasons, over time their rationality changes and they become engaged in more profound discussions about the nature of the challenges themselves" (2009:66). An explanation of why this happens can be found in Saunders' words: "sustained dialogue systematically puts a second item on the agenda: the underlying relationships that daily interactions reveal if we probe them." (1999:87)

As mentioned in *Chapter 2,* from her analysis of a NPO-business partnership in the UK, Seitanidi (2008) concluded that unintentional change is likely to occur when there is no strategy in place and it will happen in the long run at slow pace. Also, in the Total-CDA case study, change has been largely an outcome of the depth and breadth of the process of interactions as well as the existing readiness for change, as the discussion on the motivations of the two organisations (*Section 7.1.1* and *7.1.2*) would seem to confirm. The initial motivations that brought the two organisations together did not conceive the degree of change that has occurred as a result of the dialogue.

I would like to add to what has been said in the literature. It is my opinion that the original 'design' of the collaboration, for the time it was envisioned, was fit for purpose: I sincerely doubt that, had Total been presented with a picture of itself today, it would have considered the risk of working with CDA to the same level as it did.

In the table below I have summarised the descriptors used by authors and the aspects from this case study that I have used as evidence.

Descriptor	
Fit	Risk-takers, respect for each other's work, professionalism, ability to connect, willingness to change and work with the other.
Power Dynamics	Independence, collaborative and consultative approach, humility, respect for knowledge and experience, mutual learning, openness to be challenged.
Trust	Knowledge and experience, ability to connect, risk-taking, support from villagers.
Design	Motivations, learning focus, CEP structure, continuity.

Table 7.1 – why there was good fit, a perception of equality, trust and appropriate design.

I have drawn from the cross-sector partnership literature to analyse what it was about the enablers that made them enablers. The relationship was effective because there was a good fit between the two organisations. There also was a perception of equal standing in the relationship and trust. They built on a flexible design that has allowed working with emergent change.

Furthermore, by linking the research findings to what is written on dialogue, I have argued that effectiveness of relationships/partnership is closely connected to the degree of dialogue that informs them.

In addition, the open scope of the objectives and the focus on learning, enabled both parties to 'work with' the open ended and unpredictable nature of emergent change (see *Chapters 2 and 3*). Emergent change requires flexibility, creativity and the ability to act at multiple levels through the participation of a wide range of stakeholders as I will illustrate in *Chapter 8*. The continuity offered by the length of the engagement should not be underestimated: it has enabled progression in development and strengthening of new practices.

7.2.2 Intervention type

In this section I continue to explore why are the enablers enablers. I will take a different perspective to that adopted previously. Building on principles found in organisational change and conflict transformation literature, I focus on what the intervention sparked: empowerment, motivation and creation of a safe space for experimentation and innovation. I will argue the dialogue between CDA and Total hooked on to key transformational levers within the company. However, I begin by discussing the levels of intervention.

7.2.2.1 An intervention both at individual and organisational level

As mentioned in *Chapters 3* and *4*, what I defined as dialogue is a process which comprises several types of activities. Each of these activities can be seen as an intervention in itself. A CDA contributor says: "(i)t is fair to say that our visits are interventions in their own right." (Anon 31 2011)

CDA acknowledges that the intervention with Total and other companies was successful because it always occurs on two levels. "The key to what has facilitated whatever change has been, is in the levels in which we are trying to affect change (...): individual and organisational. We work at both of these levels" (Anon 57 2011), a CDA contributor states.

Figure 7.2 – the levels of CDA's intervention.

An intervention focuses on, using the words of a CDA contributor, "developing a lens to understand how to be conflict sensitive" (Anon 57 2011). These lenses can be applied both at an individual and an organisation level as the same contributor explains: "[the lens] refers to viewing your actions and your corporate actions through conflict sensiti(vity) (...). The actions taken as an individual, as a manager in the field: are they exacerbating existing tensions? Or, is what I am doing going to foster cohesion? etc." (Anon 57 2011) There are tools which can be used but then these questions gradually lead to "how do I turn this into a system or process?" (Anon 57 2011) (This double level of where change needs to occur is also observed by Seitanidi 2010).

In *Section 6.4.1* I noted the dialogue's contribution to Total's methodology. Within the French company there is also a clear awareness of the influence that CDA has had with individuals. CDA's ability to push the boundaries and spark personal change within people has being greatly valued. A TEPM employee notes: "CDA has also helped us to push the limits a little bit further. (...) For example we have now been able to develop good relationships with many stakeholders. So CDA asked us 'what is the next step? What about creating an advisory council to set the strategy for the CSR programme with stakeholders including the government?' This is something quite bold for us because it is we who would like to set the strategy for ourselves. This is not an easy step: there will be a lot of stakeholders involved. CDA has helped us think about the importance to discuss this with stakeholders." (Anon 73 2011)

The same employee adds: "(c)ertainly at a personal level, CDA has helped change the convictions and beliefs and, perhaps, those of the company." (Anon 73 2011)

The question for me is how has CDA been able to spark change that leads to a profound transformation in people? I believe this was possible because the dialogue ignited transformational levers: empowerment and motivation, and created a space for experimentation and innovation.

7.2.2.2 Empowerment and motivation

Empowerment in organisational change broadly refers to the practice of building staff knowledge, skills and confidence to contribute to the growth of the organisation; while developing 'power' and liberty of action with staff within specific frameworks of responsibilities (Bowen 1992). I have already mentioned how Saunders (1999) sees dialogue as 'creating power'. Baruch Bush and Folger (2005) go further when discussing 'empowerment' in the context of transformative mediation. The mediator's role is to support the process of empowerment of the parties in conflict, and shift from a position of weakness and vulnerability by (re)connecting to their ability of making choices and act. Although with slightly different connotations these definitions imply that empowerment involves enabling individuals to make decisions and take action (Bowen 1992, Saunders 1999 and Folger and Barush Bush 1996).

Given the possibility, people will contribute to the development of their environment, including the work one. In the 1960s Bandura (Bandura 2001, Bandura 2006) argued that the degree with which individuals will be inclined to act will depend on their perception of

their own abilities and potential to exert influence on the environment. The greater the perception of the ability to influence the situation, the greater will be the inclination to act – what Bandura called self-efficacy. Doing a good job, achieving goals and objective, contributing and participating to the growth of the company all can appeal to the sense of self-worth and give meaning to what we do. If empowerment increases self-efficacy why do people need to be motivated to change?

Change can be seen as a departure from an accepted status of affairs. Some individuals will experience it as a breach of a psychological contract, and thus respond negatively. Cope suggests that individuals will experience a sequence of emotions and behaviours (denial, defence, discard, anger and frustration, adaptation, internalisation) which can be worked with, but not ignored (Cope 2003). (Referring to more extreme circumstances, Elworthy and Rifkind broadly identify similar occurrences which lead to the cycle of violence – after an atrocity follow: shock, fear grief, anger, bitterness revenge, retaliation (Elworthy and Rifkind 2005)). However people change all the time, they do not want to be changed. According to Burnes in fact "[Lewin] believed and demonstrated that successful behavioural change could be achieved, but only through a democratic–participative learning process where people changed of their own volition rather than by coercion or manipulation". (Burnes 2009:375) By involving people and connecting to their higher-level needs it is possible to motivate individuals to change and commit to the process and outcome. This however can only be achieved when genuinely done. Motivating people, gaining their commitment and lessening resistance, may facilitate and speed up the process of change.

What drives people to act? In order to motivate individuals, it is important to appeal to their understanding and higher-level needs. Using Gilmartin's words, (Raymond Gilmartin is the former CEO of Merck) "people work for money and even more for meaning in their life" (Gilmartin 2011). Burnes elucidates more: "(h)uman needs are far more diverse and complex than the one-dimensional image painted by Taylor and his supporters. People's emotional and social needs can have more influence on their behaviour at work than financial incentives." (2009:363)

Drawing on the interviewees' comments I argue that the dialogue has had an empowering effect on individuals within Total. Dialogue went beyond the transmission of knowledge. As I argued earlier, the degree of mutual respect and the perception of equal standing facilitated, openness towards each other. The way CDA engaged with the French company generated genuine exchanges of views. It fostered ownership and motivation through its participatory

and consultative approach, encouraging action (see also the next section on experimentation). Furthermore, in addition to increasing understanding, by acting as a witness of headquarters' determination of pursuing a learning journey, CDA signalled that there was room for changing the work environment.

Dialogue, in fact, softens what Senge, citing Argyris, calls 'defensive routines' (Senge 2006). Senge, writing about organisational learning, argues that defensive routines are "habits we use to protect ourselves from the embarrassment and threat that come from exposing our thoughts. Defensive routines form a sort of protective shell around our deepest assumptions, defending us against pain, but also keeping us from learning about the causes of the pain." (2006:232-3) Hence, by its very nature, dialogue contributes to bridge the process needed to go from denial to internalisation, mentioned earlier.

According to Saunders in fact: "(i)n dialogue, thought and communication are often at the tacit level; fundamental change will come at that tacit level. Inherent in dialogue is the potential for growth, change, movement and direction. As individuals incorporate others' views into their pictures of a situation, their own perspectives are enlarged. By working to get into the minds, interests and feelings of others, each participant changes. The ultimate purpose is finding some common ground, not domination of one view over another or even total agreement. As partners in dialogue enlarge common ground, they thereby change their relationships." (1999:83-4)

At more explicit level the dialogue contributed to the development of tools and methodology which could support further action by employees.

Below I illustrate how I have reached this conclusion.

Being on the same level, learning together and respecting each other
In *Section 7.1.1* I discussed how it is probable that the strong feeling of independence recognised by the two organisations, with the approach used, led to a perception of being on the same level. Considering also that CEP has been structured as a learning experience that involves every participant (including CDA) (*Section 7.1.2*), and the mutual respect for each other's work, I speculate that this perception of being on a par strengthened the degree of knowledge acquisition and willingness to act.

The way ideas are generated

In the previous sections of this chapter I have noted the value put by Total and TEPM staff on CDA's knowledge and experience. I also indicated that interviewees acknowledge that the dialogue between the two organisations had contributed to the development of the Total methodology, as well as a greater understanding of, for example what was political. However, I feel the empowering aspect of the dialogue does not lie solely on imparting knowledge, but also on how its transmission occurs. Hence the relevance of how ideas are generated.

A former Total employee notes how constructive approaches are important for companies. "Constructive approaches include those based on dialogue and listening. Such approaches lead to positive engagement. Companies want their position to be heard." (Anon 155 2011) As mentioned in *Sections 6.2* and *7.1* CDA tries to be that (Anon 31 2011), through openness and taking a consultative approach. A TEPM former employee notes: "CDA does not come with a set of recommendations. They discuss with us in a very particular manner: 'did you ever think about doing...' and then open the discussion. At the end of the discussion we find that yes it is a good idea, we may consider together what the implications are, or that may not be a good idea or not practical. In this process there is a lot of appropriation by Total of the ideas. When I mean Total I mean me obviously, but also the organisation." (Anon 73 2011)

As a result there is strong sense of ownership of the ideas generated. While examining the CDA reports and what had happened in TEPM, the same former employee comments that he "saw that a lot of the options we had implemented, not because they were CDA's but because they were a natural evolution of our discussions with CDA. Such discussions helped us to formulate Total's strategy." (Anon 73 2011)

Furthermore, CDA has always been careful to recognise achievements. For example a TEPM employee states: "These improvements have also been highlighted on the last few reports by CDA." (Anon 50 2012)

Acting as a witness

CDA was invited to participate in company's internal forums and conventions, with the purpose of relaying a 'message'. It acted as a witness of Total headquarters' seriousness about improving community relationships, by internally promoting the importance of societal

issues: "[CDA] went to different affiliates to explain, to dialogue with them, to share experiences, to share methodology, give examples. And this was important. Very often, people from outside [the company] are very helpful." (Anon 10 2011) Hence, signalling a license to behave differently.

Empowerment and motivation alone, however, are not sufficient to support change. Transforming behaviours and attitudes requires that people experiment with 'the new'.

7.2.2.3 Creating a safe space for experimentation and innovation

Changing a belief, attitude and/or behaviour implies letting go of something that is known and adopting something that is relatively unknown. The perception of what it will mean for an individual will depend from person to person as well as for the specific situations. In Theory U, Scharmer (2007) suggests that individuals need to be able to 'prototype' a new behaviour, way of working etc. by enacting it. Prototyping involves simultaneously 'letting go' of previous behaviours, attitudes, practices etc. and appreciating the needs of the time. This form of 'experimentation' empowers people to 'explore the future by doing'. In a similar way to Senge (2006) and Saunders (1999), Scharmer believes that if this process occurs in a group, it is more powerful: "the members of a group see together with depth and clarity, they become aware of their own collective potential—almost as if a new, collective organ of sight was opening". (2007:6) Engendering an environment where individuals feel comfortable with such experimentation is possible, opening spaces where people can test new ways of working and/or behaviours, without fear of repercussions, therefore will support the process of change.

Taking experimentation a step further, when it becomes a part of the way people work, when it is integrated into how people feel about their responsibilities involved in their role and not only when it happens ad-hoc, then this 'permission to experiment' forms the basis of innovation. By 'innovation' authors do not only refer to product development. For example, drawing from the experiences of companies like Toyota and Google, (Sehested and Sonnenberg 2011) explain that by setting shared standards across the organisation that allow people to develop their own system to innovate, it will enable the implementation of changes (innovations) where and when they are needed. (Burnes 2004:75) cites Weick mirroring this statement: "emergent change consists of on-going accommodations, adaptations, and alterations that produce fundamental change without a priori intentions to do so. Emergent change occurs when people re-accomplish routines and when they deal

with contingencies, breakdowns, and opportunities in everyday work." Innovation then becomes a key enabler of change.

This sense of experimentation could also resonate from a peacebuilding perspective, if one considered the myriads of peacebuilding initiatives at community level as ground for innovation and experimentation in identifying and formalizing processes, tools and frameworks that could inform and influence those structures, systems and policies across society.

I suggest that the safe space for experimenting and then innovating was created in four ways. Firstly, in addition to the empowering nature of the engagement as discussed in the previous section, I believe that the type of ideas that emerged from discussion were such that individuals felt comfortable in implementing. Secondly, CDA played the role of a critical friend, balanced and constructive in its feedback. Thirdly, the CEP visit reports as well as the consultation created a 'space' for learning. Fourthly, the reports were a significant point of reference to which sceptics could be referred to. I illustrate how I have reached this conclusion below.

The type of ideas generated

CDA did not only bring knowledge and experience. The nature of suggestions made by the NPO was perceived as feasible: "(t)he advice is relevant and realistic" notes a TEPM employee (Anon 73 2011). This CDA contributor is even clearer "(t)he ideas brought to the table were of the type that Total could feel comfortable trying". (Anon 504 2011)

As this CDA contributor observes: "(w)e were of course challenging but, also, if I may say so, we had interesting ideas. If we had seemed naive or uninteresting, I think we would have turned them off." (Anon 73 2011) Ideas generated were not only 'feasible' and comfortable to implement (see *Section 7.1.2*). They also led to results. A Total employee states: through ideas generated as part of the dialogue "we could see that things were improving. If they [CDA] gave advice, and this advice proves to be successful and you are rewarded by the situation - the villagers themselves praise the company for its good behaviour, the critics become fewer and fewer - all this contributes to disseminate the image within the company that CDA is positive." (Anon 7 2011)

Such views are echoed also by a TEPM employee "because of the recommendations from those visits, we are able to identify better ways to do our work and choose the correct direction. CDA has given us a lot of points on how we're doing, where we are strong and where we need to improve." (Anon 50 2012)

Being a good critical friend

CDA's balanced approach in analysing situations strengthens trust in people enabling challenges to be heard. A couple of comments from Total employees: "(w)e think CDA has a very neutral [impartial] evaluation of what we are doing." (Anon 449 2011a) "They are good, good critical friends. For me, in this type work they are the best. Most of the time they find fine-tuning [a balance] between criticising and advising us." (Anon 156 2011)

As a CDA contributor states "(t)he fact that we assumed they were capable and intelligent and really cared about the issue probably helped." (Anon 504 2011) Evidence of its usefulness emerges from these words of a TEPM employee. "They do not question, even if they ask about the business case, that our intention is genuine. It does not mean it is an intention from the heart, even if, as a matter of fact, our staff here, our doctors for example, are the same as those who work in the NGOs, and are not here for profit. CDA knows that we are not cynical. They know that companies have an interest in having good relationships with their neighbours, but the fact that they have an interest, does not make it necessarily cynical. Most people, if they start to think about 'interest', would start to think about a [vested] interest [i.e. in a negative way]. CDA does not see it [our interest] as cynical. They have this focus on the business case and they do think that giving money to a beggar on the street and building a community development programme is not the same." (Anon 613 2012)

And because there is trust, in addition to listening to and valuing new concepts, people are prepared to accept being challenged, as a CDA contributor notes. "When we had disagreements with some people, we could see that they were thinking things through." (Anon 504 2011) The suggestions in the reports are, as a result, considered and valued as this TEPM employee states "Their reports are good and fair and give interesting insights on the work we do with communities." (Anon 64 2012)

CEP

The fact that the visits are part of a wider consultative project, CEP, seems also to have encouraged innovation, by offering opportunities of exchange with other companies. Building on what has been noted about the socialising aspect of CEP (*Section 6.4.1.3*) its meetings are perceived as a place to share ideas and information with others with similar experience and to innovate. For example two comments: one from a Total employee, the other from a CDA contributor.

"CDA have a project called Collaborative Learning Project [CEP]. In this collaborative learning project first of all they organised meetings. At this meeting there would be like 20 people coming from the mining industry, the oil industry, international institutions like the IFC [International Finance Corporation] or Global Compact. This is one way of sharing information." (Anon 449 2011a)

"CEP did that [helped companies to have a positive impact] through a number of suggestions and options that were developed together with companies to provide some guidance to companies on how they could strengthen their relationships with the local communities." (Anon 58 2011)

The role of the reports

I believe the reports played an important role too. The reports on the one hand reassured the French company that it was on the right track, as this Total business partner indicates. "CDA has enabled Total to better understand (...); that there is an actual value in the social economic problem programme and it is well regarded, and it is having a positive contribution." (Anon 72 2011)

On the other hand, the reports enabled Total to address criticisms and 'create' time and space for the process of learning. A TEPM employee states: CDA "The fact that there have been negative remarks and suggestions for possible improvements by CDA, for example in Nigeria, is useful to point to people who mention the ERI reports; the CDA's report is another reference they could look into. As ERI has also been doing, CDA has been doing this monitoring for about 10 year. CDA is not an organisation that has come here only once. You can look at the CDA through time, it has a historical record." (Anon 613 2012)

One more TEPM voice: "(i)t is also good that they put their reports on the web. So we are not hiding anything. In this, there is a risk as well, but so far the reports have been saying that we have been doing good things for the community. In any case, whatever the feedback is, the good thing is that the reposts are out in the open and we cannot say we are hiding anything. Those are their findings.... And so far, we are very proud of ourselves." (Anon 212 2012)

Evidence of Total's journey in attitudes can be seen in a shift in the tone of language used, for example, while referring to the CDA reports in company documentation. In 2002, Total announced it had opened its Myanmar/Burma operations to an external organisation and was prepared to being looked at. "The organization, whose president is Mary B. Anderson, is an acknowledged authority on humanitarian initiatives, development aid and corporate operations in countries affected by socio-political tension. Accompanied by two colleagues, Ms Anderson examined the impact of our operations during a 12-day visit to Myanmar in October 2002. The team interviewed 63 residents in ten of the 23 villages (total population: 43,000) in the pipeline corridor that have benefited from the development program launched by TotalFinaElf. Two further visits are planned in 2003." (Total 2002:89)

Seven years later the company had shifted from the dryness of the comment above to an acknowledgement of being in an open process of learning. For example: "(t)he CDA reports offer constructive criticism of Total's actions in Myanmar. Their observations, some of which concerned areas that were already in the process of being improved, will be taken into account. The CDA usefully encourages the Group to both continue and broaden its dialogue with civil society on its rules of conduct and its methods of operation in countries in crisis." (Total 2009a:39)

During this time learning also resulted in practical actions by the company to improve it practices like publishing the internal guides – for example human rights, local content, stakeholder dialogue and integrity (Total 2008b, Total 2009b, Total 2011d, Total 2008d) - and the adoption of the community development approach in Myanmar/Burma indicates (see timelines in *Appendix 4*.)

The table below summarises the evidence I have used to argue that the dialogue sparked transformational dynamics in the French company.

Lever	
Dual intervention levels	Individual and organisational
Empowerment and motivation	Being on the same level, how ideas are generated, acting as a witness
Experimentation and innovation	Nature of ideas, being a good critical friend, CEP, role of reports

Table 7.2 – levers of change sparked by the dialogue.

As I argued for the flexibility in the design of the dialogue, fostering empowerment and motivation, marries well with the emergent nature of change which, more often than not, relies on incremental steps hence needs 'constant adaptation'. Both a Total employee and a business partner confirm that the company shifted its practices incrementally. "This was built not in one sudden leap. It has been progressively developing to the level we are today. Probably there is still a margin to do more. It is a step-by-step process." (Anon 449 2011a) "Total has made incremental changes in the way that they operate." (Anon 196 2011)

Furthermore, empowerment and motivation, on the one hand, and experimentation and innovation on the other, are in line with the dual level of the intervention. Fostering empowerment and motivation, an action mainly relevant to individuals, capitalises on capturing positive influences form the other change drivers in the context (*Section 6.2*).

Learning and internalisation

Stakeholder action

Development of guidelines (IFC, OECD, VPs, etc)

UN Global Compact

GBI HR

Investor scrutiny

Legislation e.g. Dodd Frank

Changing attitudes towards what is acceptable corporate behaviors

Direct exposure to communities

Socialization process

CDA

Audits

Work with other NPO

Reinforcing stimulus from: experimentation, and innovation of practices; company normative drives (policy, procedures, methodologies etc.) ;capacity building; communities of practice;

Time

Figure 7.3 - Total's change as an incremental process.

The following statement from a Total employee who has no direct knowledge of the Total-CDA dialogue illustrates what has happened.

"In terms of CSR, the change was incremental. CSR is something that the company has done, but it has become more professional and more formalised. Part of this is because increasingly projects have become bigger. This means that they bring bigger revenue but they also have a larger footprint. This creates expectations of the benefits that might be shared with the wider community. Today there are definite expectations of the benefits that are to be are shared with the community where we operate. It is something that has

become a 'must' and has given rise to robust processes that look into societal issues. Investments tend to be long-term and so is the commitment to communities. So, whatever is proposed is checked in terms of expenditures but also in terms of benefits and opportunities, options, stakeholder involvement and so on." (Anon 20 2011)

7.3   Concluding remarks

Building on the findings discussed in *Chapter 6* regarding the dialogue's contribution to a shift in practices within Total, in this chapter I have analysed the enablers of change.

Starting from what had begun to emerge early on in the discussion while describing the process and the methodology which characterised the dialogue (for example to the participatory and consultative nature, and its role as an enabler of trust) I completed the picture by adding two factors. The first relates to CDA and the type of organisation it is. It includes its reputation, knowledge and experience, professionalism, way of engaging, its ability to listen, to connect to be strategic, to bring different perspective and being an intermediary. The personalities of those involved in CEP also played a role.

The second group refers to characteristics of the relationship between Total and CDA. Here I have included the participation and consultation, the independence that exists between the two organisations, the respect for each other's work, the degree of trust and the continuity of the engagement. However, it is important to remember that these need to be put in the context of other initiatives and influences that were occurring at the same time.

I then delved deeper in the analysis by discussing the relevance of my finding to four descriptors of partnerships identified by Millar, Chong and Chen (2004) and Dahan et al (2010) (fit and trust) Seitanidi and Ryan, (power dynamics and trust) and Seitanidi (2008) and Wadham (2009) (design), I argued that the factors identified as enablers were effective for several reasons. There was a good fit between the two organisations. There also was a perception of equal standing in the relationship and trust. Furthermore and importantly, the design of the relationship allowed working with the emergent nature of change. I believe, in fact that it was because the process of dialogue connected to levers of organisational change that it was possible to spark profound change in the organisation.

In the above discussion I highlighted the resonances that can be found with fundamentals of dialogue, affirming that the relationship was/is successful because of it reflected such foundations.

There were two levels at which the dialogue operated: the individual and the organisational one. At individual focus was on fostering greater understanding and different behaviour/attitudes; at the organisational one, contributions were made to processes and methodologies. Thus, enabling change at tacit level (deep profound change) as well as explicit level.

I have continued my argument by noting that the dialogue critically contributed to the process of change by supporting the 'willingness' to do so by triggering transformational levers within the organisation (and individuals): empowerment and motivation as well as creating a safe space for experimentation and innovation. It is for this reason that I believe the relationship between CDA and Total was extremely important. The dialogue not only provided an opportunity to share and acquire knowledge. The consultative and participatory nature of the dialogue engendered ownership of the ideas created and readiness to act. Ideas generated in this process were perceived as feasible and realistic, encouraging implementation. What was implemented resulted in positive feedback and results, motivating further action and belief in the company's own direction. Through a constructive and balanced criticism, CDA acted as a good critical friend supporting Total in going further. The company's learning journey and process of change was able to occur in the environment provided by CEP consultations. The visit reports also contributed to building a safe space. On the one hand they could be referred to counterbalance allegations and criticisms made by advocacy groups; on the other, the reports acknowledged improvements and reassuring Total of its efforts.

Overall, as I will argue in detail in my conclusions, the intrinsic roots in dialogue make an engagement powerful because it works at tacit as well as explicit level. However, the ability to drive to sustainability, depend on the transformational levers it engages and the overall process of change. I will discuss the latter in the next chapter.

Chapter 8

An interpretation of the process of change experienced by Total

In the previous two chapters I began to address the initial question that underpins this thesis: can dialogue as a form of engagement impact the way of working of an organisation? Dialogue does contribute to a change in practices in an organisation. However, in this particular case, an explicit articulation of conflict sensitivity within Total has not emerged. Furthermore, the dialogue has been and extremely important influence, but not the only one. The Total-CDA relationship occurred in a context where other initiatives, pressures and drivers were also at play. It was both the interaction and cumulative effect that supported the organisation in its journey to where it is now. Research participants have pointed to specific enablers fostered by the relationship which in my opinion, together with the socialisation process, were essential in the French company's change of practices. The perception of equal standing, the degree of mutual trust as well as the consultative and participative character of the dialogue, flexibility in 'design', and the duration of the engagement, activated levers that are recognised in conflict transformation, organisational change and dialogue literature as powerful factors of transformation: empowerment, motivation, and creation of a safe space for experimentation and innovation.

In this chapter I will consider the process with which change has occurred. As mentioned in *Chapters 3, 6* and *7*, I will broadly refer to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and not exclusively to conflict sensitivity. The concept of conflict sensitivity in fact is not 'spelled out' within the company; however, its principles and basis are encompassed in the notion of CSR.

As outlined in *Chapter 3,* for my analysis I will draw on the framework developed by Lederach (Lederach 2003): the triangle. Although originally developed to illustrate transformation dynamics in conflict, the two frameworks also find echoes in organisational change. I have chosen to use Lederach's as I feel it best synthesise the arguments.

Organisational systems (in the broadest sense) can be represented by the image of a triangle as Lederach (Lederach 2003) has done for situations of conflict and Kanter (Kanter 1999a) for firms. Although one triangle refers to a specific 'system' it should be noted that in reality there are multiple triangles existing at any one time, both within and beyond the one

depicted. For example, in *Figure 8.1* I illustrate the system 'Total'. At the top are the corporate/group functions. In the middle branch HQs and their regional offices; at the bottom are the subsidiaries.

However, within this system there are others as well. For example, within the TEPM subsidiary there are informal systems, like a project team (the smaller triangle within TEPM) that can also be depicted with the same image and so on. Conversely the Total triangle can be placed within a broader system as *Figure 8.2* indicates. The French company is one of the many businesses which have undergone pressures to adopt CSR. This 'system' sees high-level initiatives and stakeholder action targeting business as a sector.

Figure 8.1 - the 'Total' system.   Figure 8.2 - shifting the paradigm towards CSR.

Specific references to particular systems, therefore, must be read in the light that there are interactions, dependencies and feedback loops with other systems too.

Lederach (2003) illustrates how a sustainable process of transformation needs to include all parts of a community, with communication flows running across sectors and strata of society. However, given the specificity in focus and reach of each sector, a variety of interventions, which enhance the transformation potential of each group, is needed. A similar

argument is also found in the works of organisational change authors, for example Kanter (1999a) and Manz et al (2011), who see the key to sustainable change the involvement of all in the organisation including customers and suppliers (and key stakeholders according to Manz et al (2011). The authors mentioned, like Lederach (2003), argue that sustainable change will require a variety of interventions which enhance the role and potential of those involved. Communication/influence flows both horizontally and vertically through the triangle are equally important for sharing needs, vision, challenges and opportunities which the process of change may present. The research findings support this view of how change occurs.

I will start by using the triangle to illustrate the internal process of change experienced by Total and TEPM and secondly the relationship between the parent company, and the subsidiary, with the pressures and flows of interactions that were present in the context. As part of the discussion I will highlight what I identified in *Chapter 7* in terms of empowerment, motivation, experimentation and innovation and how they are connected to the process of change. I will offer two snap-shots for each, a decade apart: 2002 and 2012.

8.1 Drivers within the company

8.1.1 Total

*Figure 8.3 - Total's process of internal change.*

The triangle above represents Total. At the top there are the corporate functions (Group).
The middle represents Exploration and Production's (E&P) headquarters and regional offices.
At the bottom are E&P's subsidiaries. Analysing the research data, I have formulated the
following interpretation of what has occurred (please note that although the description

seems to suggest a chronological sequence, more often than not the processes described occur in parallel/interacting loops).

As I mentioned in *Chapter 6*, when Total approached CDA, there was already an awareness of the need for change in the way business in general, and the company in particular, related to the environment and society. At the same time there was also the determination to ensure that the new group, after the merger with Fina and Elf, would operate with integrity and in a transparent manner. Furthermore the advocacy campaign against the company's presence in Myanmar/Burma was putting much pressure on the company to act differently. Hence, while measures were being taken at corporate level in terms of governance and ethics, there were also moves to address the situation in Myanmar/Burma.

During this time, there is a strong push from Group towards ensuring ethical practices in the way of working of the organisation, for example the engagement with international initiatives like John Ruggie's and the initial agreement with CDA. This drive is represented by the downward arrow on the left. With regards to TEPM and some other subsidiaries, for example in Nigeria (Idemudia 2009, Wadham 2009), there already were initiatives in terms of social investment. A TEPM employee comments on how the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) was initially conceived in Myanmar/Burma. "This is the genius of two people (...) who have built and structured the programme since the beginning as a programme. (...) (F)rom the beginning the principles behind the programme were not about answering to a crisis, but to set up something lasting." (Anon 613 2012) The drive from Group, therefore, found in some subsidiaries fertile ground: these initiatives represented by the blue stars to the left of the diagram. In *Chapter 3,* while explaining the frameworks, I highlighted how in Kanter's (Kanter 1999a) triangle of organisational change experimentation and innovation at the bottom of the triangle play a very important role in ensuring sustainability of the firm. These CSR initiatives taken by subsidiaries like TEPM could therefore be considered as initial forms of experimentation; like small local peace initiatives/activities which occur at grassroots level in a situation of conflict, these experimental initiatives are, as Lederach (Lederach 2003) points out, grounded in the immediacy of the direct effects of a conflict.

The dialogue with CDA, as I illustrated in *Chapter 6*, did inspire TEPM and other subsidiary managers to review existing ways of working (I have noted earlier in *Chapter 6* the following comment by a CDA contributor: "Total saw the value of the assessment we had been doing and started being much more forward looking." (Anon 31 2011) This led to wider

experimentation and innovation of practices as I have argued in *Section 7.1*. As positive feedback from the actions taken emerged, it encouraged further change, hence starting a virtuous cycle at local level (in the diagram represented by the pale blue circle near the bottom left hand corner of the triangle), and momentum for further change and learning. For example, a TEPM employee recalls the benefits of programme evaluations and of improved relationship with the authorities. "Late 2006/early 2007 we had a major review of our programme [SEP] from experts. (...) Both CDA and that [evaluation were] influential in changing the way [we] work." (Anon 50 2012) "Having improved relationships with local authorities and ministries, for example Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Health and MOGE [Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise], helped us to coordinate better and we can implement our work much more easily." (Anon 50 2012) Change occurs in an incremental way.

This positive stimulus grew with time and through the further engagements with CDA. Furthermore, it was not only localised. Feedback flows were also working across the organisation; for example at meetings, internal conferences and seminars that saw the participation of subsidiaries' general managers, branch headquarters personnel and regional staff. These informal connections were also important. Such dynamics are represented by the two dashed crosses in the triangle. The crosses are in two sectors, to illustrate that information was flowing across subsidiaries and between subsidiaries and headquarters/regional offices. A couple of comments by a Total employee show the 'process in action'. The first I noted in *Chapter 6,* illustrates the impact at local level: "the way that we could see that things were improving. If they [CDA] gave advice, and this advice proves to be successful and you are rewarded by the situation - the villagers themselves praise the company for its good behaviour, the critics become fewer and fewer" (Anon 7 2011). The second shows how it worked across subsidiaries. "When we decided to restart the exploration which had been interrupted for 25 years in Sudan, we decided that we could 'copy' what had been done in Myanmar/Burma and that's what we're trying to do at the moment." (Anon 7 2011)

Such cross fertilisation also occurred through the internal professional networks, as for example that of the *Societal Mètier,* which meet regularly (at least once a year). These networks are analogous of the communities of practice identified by Theodorakopoulos et al (2009) as essential in spreading innovation and different practices across organisational functions. Communities of practice in fact bring together people from different parts of the company who work on similar issues regardless of rank and position. In the peacebuilding

field such networks are also present and enable people with a range of experiences to meet, as the practitioners' network Committee for Conflict Transformation Support and the biannual practitioner association Action Asia conference did/do.

Furthermore, from each subsidiary there was direct feedback to Group through the reporting lines, which in turn fed into policies and procedures, contributing, as noted in *Chapter 6,* to the development of Total's methodology. A parallel in the peace field can be found in *Semana por la paz*, a peace initiative in Colombia which started as a low key event, first launched by a local non-government organisation (NGO) Redepaz and has become a yearly national event. Another example is the work sparked by the peace builder Dekha Ibrahim Abdi in relation to the Wajir conflict in Kenya.

At the same time that experimentation and innovation were occurring at the bottom of the triangle, representatives of Total, both at branch headquarters and the Group, as noted in *Chapter 7*, were engaged in several global initiatives and influenced by guidelines set by international organisations such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC). I argued that these contributed to the socialisation that Total experienced in the last ten years. Through this socialisation process, Total's people expanded their understanding of social responsibility which in turn built knowledge and influenced policies. An example regards the VPs (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights): the company has subscribed to them since 2004 despite having become a formal signatory only in 2012. As it is possible to see from the timeline in *Appendix 4*, the VPs were incorporated in the security policy of the company (2004) and a directive was issued prioritising the areas covered by the VPs (2005). In *Figure 8.3* I have noted the positive influence from practical implementation with an upward blue arrow on the right of the vertex. The influence from international initiatives is indicated with a circular at the triangle's vertex.

Methodologies, policies and procedures, (for instance the inclusion of the societal aspect as part of the CORISK assessment panel described in *Chapter 4* or the question relating to the code of conduct in the annual appraisal of employees) formalise new practices and send a direct message for compliance to subsidiaries and company personnel in general - this drive is indicated by a downward blue arrow in the right side of the triangle. A comment from a Total employee elucidates how these flows create synergies.

"We hope that top management has a vision. It is their job. But it is our [Group departments] job to help them have some elements for this vision. It is also our job to give them information of what is happening. We often go to the field to see, to listen, to have opinions. Everything does not come from the top management. But a strong signal from the top management is very helpful for us. A General Manager of a company [subsidiaries] has tons of things to do. If from headquarters we say to him: 'yes we know you have thousands of things to do, but communications, health, societal issue and security matters are part of your job too…' And if the top management says the same thing, it is very useful. It is not sufficient, but it's helpful." (Anon 10 2011)

In addition, such messages are regularly reinforced through direct input from high level personnel, for example from the Ethics Committee or Group. In the words of a TEPM employee: "[A person] who has now retired, has been a strong motor in the move towards sustainability. He came from headquarters in 2006 and that was before the 2007 general assessment started. I saw his report and it seems that he gave a significant impulse. So through him a big impulse came from headquarters. At that time he also gave direction." (Anon 613 2012) The same employee offers another example: "[two people from headquarters] gave a presentation in an awareness raising workshop on SEP. It focused on why it is integrated in the strategy of the company and it is not like a cherry on the cake." (See also the workshop on sustainable development reported in the TEPM Gazettes – (TEPM TEPM 2009b, TEPM 2010a, and TEPM 2010a).) This communication flow is represented in the diagram by the blue arc on the right of the triangle.

Furthermore, influence from the 'top' comes through the development of narratives to explain the need for change. In *Chapter 6* I related how the notion of 'acceptability' developed by Total's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has struck a chord within the company. This is one of the examples that Weick and Quinn (1999) call 'sense-making' i.e. the ability of a person/leader to give plausible explanations to events characterised by uncertainty especially in times of change when the future is unknown. It is a powerful and needed tool for change which helps to bridge discomfort/anxiety created in some people by change. A parallel can be drawn with Ian Paisley's emphasis on the relevance and direction of the electoral mandate on his decision to sit at a negotiating table with Sinn Féin (RTE 2012).

The process of change is also supported by a range of capacity building efforts like awareness raising sessions, training (see the training highlighted in the timeline – *Appendix*

4) and exposure visits. (For instance, during one of my research trips a group of Yemeni SEP staff and a member of the Sustainable Development team were touring the pipeline area).

I would now like explore what the internal process of change for TEPM may have been. Unlike the analysis concerning Total, this explanation is more speculative than interpretative: interviewees, with the exception of what has been mentioned earlier, focussed more on the content of change than its process. However there are sufficient leads for me to be able to offer a suggestion.

8.1.2 TEPM

Figure 8.4 - TEPM internal process of change.

An interpretation of the process of change... – by F. Cerletti

In *Figure 8.4* I have placed TEPM in the context of the relationship with Group functions and E&P headquarters, which are at the top of the triangle. The middle represents TEPM senior management and the bottom TEPM staff (it is a very broad categorisation). Within the triangle there is another triangle: this represents the Socio-Economic Programme. The reason for this will become apparent in a moment.

As already mentioned for *Figure 8.3,* there was an existing awareness that attention needed to be paid to social issues, hence the TEPM management had started a number of initiatives towards that direction since the beginning of operations – the first downward blue arrow to the left of the triangle. There also have been drives for change from Group/headquarters and within TEPM (represented by the next downward blue arrow, which is in two stages from Group/headquarters to TEPM senior management and down again to TEPM staff). Instances of the former are: policies and toolkits (Total 2008c, Total 2008d, Total 2009b); visits (TEPM 2011b); the relationship with CDA; visit from Bernard Kouchner (Kouchner 2003). The assessments in 2006/7 and in 2010 are also good examples, as well as the regular capacity building initiatives. Progress and results, as mentioned for Total, were shared with Group/headquarters and fed back to the company wide process of change (the upward blue arrow also in two stages). Building on what I pointed out earlier in *Section 8.1.1* for Total, further reinforcements come from engagement with CDA as well as from Group/headquarters to TEPM SEP *and* operational staff.

I have in fact highlighted SEP as a triangle within the triangle as there is a perception among some SEP staff (at least until February 2012) that more awareness is needed of its *raison d'etre* within the rest of TEPM. An employee of the subsidiary comments: "(f)rom the very beginning there were those who really took an interest in [SEP] (...), others less. [The fact that CSR is integrated to business] is not well understood by both nationals and expats. It really depends on the individual. Another factor is that there are no road blockades, as there are in Yemen, and people are not violent. Therefore some individuals do not see the point in SEP. Some people see the link, others not enough, [they] do not see it." (Anon 613 2012)

The SEP team and Total personnel are making efforts to respond to this situation and raise awareness (represented by navy blue horizontal dashed and non-dashed arrows). Examples of these efforts are: the shift of the SEP offices to Pipeline Centre (PLC - the main operational site near Kanbauk); the visits of TEPM staff to the programme with subsequent

commentary in the TEPM Gazette (for example TEPM 2012), the presentation given by the Head of the Ethics committee in February 2011 on CSR as an integrated strategy to Total business model (Anon 613 2012).

Other contributors to change, as mentioned were local communities. As noted in *Chapter 5,* this contribution manifested both through greater participation in SEP and through the insights sparked in individuals when exposed to villagers. This is indicated in the diagram by the circular blue arrow at the bottom of the triangle and the arc on the right.

In conclusion, the internal process of change that occurred within Total and TEPM re-affirms what is argued by Lederach (Lederach 2003) and Kanter (Kanter 1999a) in terms of transformation/change of conflicts/organisations. Change has involved people at multiple levels with different interventions specifically targeted to need and role (capacity building, networks, tools and methods, policies and processes). Those from headquarters and Group have been engaged in strategic initiatives and shaped the infrastructure of the organisation. Within the French company new practices have been developed, tried and tested at ground level as well as policies and processes developed by Group and headquarters. Cross-organisational flows have fostered the sharing of experiences which in turn has resulted in other activities.

CDA played an important role, as discussed in *Chapter 7* and mentioned earlier in this chapter, in conjunction with external factors that put pressure for change on the French company (as well as other businesses) aiming at a wider paradigm shift. I will now discuss how these external dynamics related to Total and TEPM and have changed over time.

8.1.3 The dialogue's levels of engagement

Before considering the relationship of the company to its external context, I would like to extrapolate from the discussion above and highlight the level of engagement. It is possible to note (*Figure 8.5*) how the dialogue engaged with people in different positions within the French company. The focus of conversations was different depending on where the interaction was occurring. This is very much in line with Lederach's (2003) view of the process of change and reflects the nature of activities exemplified by Kanter (1999a). At the top of the triangle strategic perspectives underpin the encounters with senior management and key influential people, as this interviewee working in the financial sector recognises: "engaging key individuals who can bring change in the company has been positive". (Anon

102 2011) The focus becomes more 'pragmatic' lower down, where the engagement sees CDA having a key role in relaying the message of senior management to the organisation of its seriousness about societal issues. Conversations also contribute to vital infrastructure (for example the methodology and policies) which informs the company's way of working. Patterns emerging from site visits are discussed in the broader context of company operations. At the bottom of the triangle is the engagement with the day-to-day activities looking at practices and initiatives and their impact on the ground. Visits and reports become tools for change at local level.

Figure 8.5 – engagement level of the dialogue between CDA and Total (left) and between CDA and TEPM (right).

A very similar trend can also be seen in the engagement with TEPM. There is a shift of focus from strategic to operative aspects as the engagement moves from the top to the bottom of the triangle. The orientation of the conversations changes from infrastructural frameworks (approach and methodology) to the identification of options and possible strategies for

increasing positive impact in the future specifically for the subsidiary, to considerations of daily activities.

Furthermore, two aspects have a multiplier effect. Firstly, the attention paid by CDA to where change needs to occur, both at the individual and the organisational level (*Chapter 7*). Secondly, continuity over time of the dialogue, ensures a constructive dynamism in the dialogue as it allows capturing opportunities, and dealing with challenges, arising from learning and contextual influences (something which scholars who believe in the emergent nature of change as Kanter (1999a), Burnes (1996), and Senge (2006) advocate). Which leads me to speculate that, in the process of change, the engagement between CDA and Total becomes that 'space' or opportunity for reflection that allows making sense of what is happening and the journey made.

8.2   Drivers external to company

I will begin this section by looking at how Total related to the pressures on companies to change its practices towards social responsibility. I will show how the dynamics and relationships have changed over time. I continue with a similar analysis for TEPM. Overall I argue that the situation in the broader system or context for both Total and TEPM has created opportunities which facilitate a shift in practices in the organisation(s).

8.2.1 Total in 2002

'Consultative efforts' from international initiatives
like UN Global Compact; Regulatory conditions
from international organisations like IFC. OECD

INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVES TOWARDS
CSR

Some initiatives include
governments as well e.g.
VPs

GOVERNMENTS

Total closure &
defensiveness towards
outside, with pockets of
awareness of the need to
change (stars)

BUSINESS SECTOR

STAKEHOLDER
ACTION

Pressure on governments
from stakeholder action and
civil society

Pressure from 'civil society'
though international advocacy
groups to disinvest, change
practices

Figure 8.6 - Total and the pressures for CSR – 2002.

At the beginning of the millennium, as mentioned in *Chapter 5,* stakeholder action was
strong. Activists where campaigning against companies directly (the upwards red arrows at
the bottom of the triangle) and/or exerting pressure on governments to regulate business
(the red arrow to the left of the triangle for instance). The NGO Karen Human Rights Group
had written about forced labour in the pipeline area in 1997 (KHRG 1997); in 1999 there had
been a French parliamentary enquiry into French oil companies (Assemblée Nationale 1999).
Earth Rights International (ERI), for example, had published two condemning reports, (ERI
2002, ERI 2003); a CDA representative recalls "they had court cases, received thousands of
e-mails every day, there was a campaign for divestment" (Anon 31 2011). Pressure for
change was also coming from global initiatives, albeit separate (represented by the
downward red arrow). As I mentioned in *Chapter 2* and *Chapter 6*, these covered a wide
range. Those which took a consultative approach (e.g. John Ruggie's work), those pushing

for self-regulation (e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines), or demanding compliance to certain standards for economic/financial participation (IFC Performance Standards); those aiming for binding agreements involving the states, companies and NGOs (the VPs), and those launched by business (for example the Caux roundtable).

As mentioned in *Chapter 6* while discussing the motivations which led the French company to join the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP), there were some people within the company who already were aware of the need for change in the way the organisation related to the environment and society. Around this time, the company began making its first steps by joining initiatives like the United Nations (UN) Global Compact (blue dashed upwards arrow) and at subsidiary level, as mentioned earlier in *Section 8.1.1,* managers were also taking actions (the blue stars). However, much had to be done and the general attitude towards the outside was of defensiveness and closure. A former employee recalls how still in 2006 internal communications were poor, especially with regards to the situation in Myanmar/Burma. "Internal communications were (...) not very good. There was nothing about Myanmar on the intranet. As the employees, any information we would get would be the same as the one given to the media. Maybe because of the fear that information would be shared outside the company." (Anon 155 2011)

Overall the predominant forces were of pressure towards the company to which the company responded in a defensive position, with some openings occurring, but not in a systematic way. As the company learned and opened in time, greater fluidity occurred in the flows for change across the triangle as whole, across the sectors: there is more sharing, participation and commitment to global initiatives. Engagement with non-government organisations (NGOs) increased and the relationship with local communities changed.

8.2.2 Total 2012 (April)

MYANMAR GOVERNMENT

Contractual relationship between GOM and Yadana Project Partners

Requests from government through MOGE on CSR and SEP

TEPM: Sharing information with MOGE on CSR and SEP; soft influencing

TEPM

Potential pressure from international investors on TEPM because it 'stayed' in the country

TEPM: Sharing information with other oil and gas companies; CSR workshops for local business; support local NGOs; influencing local government through training; building local capacities through contractor development.

TEPM: realisation that NGOs are needed for their expertise

CIVIL SOCIETY

Pressure from 'civil society' though int.l advocacy groups (decreased for TEPM)

Realisation by some NGOs that collaboration with TEPM may lead to achievement of own broader objectives

Potential pressure from civil society due to (potentially) lower social responsibility standards in other companies' operations close to Yadana area

Figure 8.7 - Total and the pressures for CSR – 2012.

The diagram illustrates a more dynamic situation that a decade earlier. In terms of pressure for change, the flow is still both from the top and the bottom of the triangle (red arrows). In *Chapter 6* I have mentioned the changing expectations of governments as part of Total's socialisation process: in 2012 a clearer and direct 'ask' from governments for CSR is emerging This takes the form of legislation adopted in countries like the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) (e.g. the Dodd-Frank act mentioned in *Chapter 4),* and as requests of development contributions to extractive industries. In the case of

Myanmar/Burma, the political intervention for the electrification of the communities in Rakhine state is an example of the latter (Gaung 2012). Pressure on companies continues to exist also from international initiatives, for example the UN Global contact guidelines, the updating of the Equator III Principles and IFC Performance Standards. However, as the consultative nature of global initiatives has broadened, I have added a blue arrow as well to illustrate the stronger participation of business. With regard to stakeholder action, it is still present and louder towards business as a whole; though for Total and its operations in Myanmar/Burma it has decreased (Chinese and other Asian companies have come to the forefront of activists' attention).

Because of the greater openness to civil society and cooperation with NGOs (for example IRAM, Entrepreneurs du Monde (Anon 156 2011) there is a blue arrow that represents a channel of learning and change from stakeholders to the French company and *vice-versa*. I have mentioned, in fact, in *Chapter 6* the acknowledgment Total employees make of the influence that working with NGOS has brought: "CDA helped us - but not only CDA, other NGOs as well (IRAM and Entrepreneurs du Monde) helped us". (Anon 156 2011) I also remarked how the interaction with Total has also influenced change within the NPO (blue arrow at the bottom right of the triangle). I would speculate therefore that a similar process has occurred with other organisations: the association with Total has also led to changes within the NGOs/institutions, the company works with (tip of the downward crossed blue arrow).

Furthermore, Total influences change across the business sector – horizontal part of the blue cross arrow. Consider for example the partnerships with institutions to develop new ideas (for example the partnership with the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) for the development of the business and human rights country portal (2011), or with the *Institut Francaise Petrole* (IFP) for development of training on societal issue (TEPM 2011b, TEPM 2011b, TEPM 2011b, TEPM 2012). Initiatives like these add to the soft influencing that occurs with other companies on CSR at international *fora* and industry associations, or more directly through its joint ventures. The following comments from two Total employees on the company's *modus operandi* in establishing joint ventures (in this case with reference to Chinese companies) illustrates how this happens. "We have very few joint ventures with the Chinese yet, but we know that others are going to come, for example in Uganda or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Within the company we have a clear view that it is easier if we are the operator. Still, as non-operator, if we partner with an operator with lower

standards, we will make it very clear to this partner that we intend to work within our Code of Conduct. If they want Total as a partner, whether as an operator or a non-operator they have to go through the regulations of Code of Conduct. We make it very clear from the beginning. We hope that this will influence their behaviour in other operations, and show to be beneficial for both and then develop further joint ventures with them. They are important partners and players now. If on top of that they behave the same, that's great. It is the only way to change companies' approach to CSR. It is not by enforcing practices but by saying: if you want to be a partner with us, this is how we work". (Anon 7 2011) "The timescale is very important, because before we did not have a solid methodology or actions to share: we just had words. Now we have a lot more to share with them. We have a number of guides as well as the experience. So that timescale is good." (Anon 156 2011)

Last but not least, Total is proactively involved in testing a leading work on CSR (UN Global Compact *Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-risk Areas* (UN Global Compact 2010) and leading on international and cross-sectorial initiatives (e.g. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)).

Similar patterns in the process of change in terms of development of communication interactions and influence flows occurring within the period 2002-2012 for Total can also be seen in relation to TEPM context.

8.2.3 TEPM 2002

Figure 8.8 - TEPM and the pressures for CSR -2002.

Figure 8.8 is a snapshot of 2002 from the perspective of TEPM as an independent operational unit of the French company. At the top of the triangle I have placed the Government of Myanmar. The Ministry of Energy is the linchpin of Myanmar/Burma's oil and gas industry. It has oversight over MOGE, the state owned energy company. The 1992 Production Sharing Contract was signed with MOGE (Total 2010a). The main company referent is MOGE, however there are links with the Ministry as wells (blue bidirectional arrow). It would also be possible to add Total E&P HQ at the vertex, as there were influence, also from E&P headquarters. However I have shown them separately as I discussed the internal perspective earlier.

Similarly to the parent company, the subsidiary kept a very low public profile to guard itself against the numerous allegations made by advocacy groups, and to ensure political

neutrality. According to a media representative (Anon 724 2011), in 2002, after a visit to the operational site in Myanmar/Burma organised for journalists back lashed in heavy criticisms against the company, TEPM closed the site to media visits thenceforth keeping its head down about its work in the country. The French company put forward its views on the Myanmar/Burma operations by opening a dedicated website about the work there the following year. However, keeping a low profile also had advantages. A TEPM employees states: "(a)s a company we do not interfere with the political situation and have been low key. This has also been an opportunity as we were in a position to develop our socio-economic programme as we felt it was appropriate." (Anon 809 2012)

Stakeholder action was strong; as explained in *Chapters 5* and *6,* TEPM entered a highly politicised environment. Civil society and advocacy groups (mainly based outside Myanmar/Burma) were involved in a harsh campaign against the military regime and western companies that had invested in the country (the two upwards red arrows and red arc).

8.2.4 TEPM 2012

Figure 8.9 - TEPM and the pressures for CSR – 2012.

Ten years later, *Figure 8.9* it is possible to note greater exchanges and influence across the triangle sectors. There are a number of different initiatives that the company is involved/connected with and these are diversified according to whom it is engaging with. The formal contractual relationship is still with MOGE. Through MOGE, TEPM has the opportunity to influence the government's understanding of what oil and gas companies could be doing in terms of CSR and social investment (I mentioned earlier the agreement between the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and MOGE on CNPC's socio-

economic programme) - hence the two blue arrows: one downward from the vertex, indicating requests for information from government, the other upward next to it, to show the soft influencing that TEPM has been able to do in recent years, as mentioned in *Chapter 4*.

In the middle range of the triangle the horizontal blue arrow indicates TEPM's efforts to reach out to business and local authorities. Examples are: the forum and workshops with Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), contributing to local capacity building through contractor training and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) training. The downward tip of the blue vertical arrow illustrates the company's dialogue with NGOs and some advocacy groups. In this regard an interviewee from civil society in Myanmar/Burma points to an important shift in attitude that he believes is beginning to take form: the realisation by TEPM and advocacy groups that they have interests in common. "It's very fascinating for me to realise that Total is actually realising how much ERI is vital for their interest, and how, at the same time, ERI is realising that Total is a partner they cannot work without. In both cases it is probably a radical shift in mind-set." (Anon 434 2011) I have represented this with a dashed blue line, upwards to indicate the possibility of NGOs influencing government via influencing companies, and downwards to show the possibility of Total being able to strengthen its work with the knowledge of NGOs. The same interviewee continues: "(w)e are now in a situation where the frame is there, and the actors are realising that they need each other. They are complementary to each other." (Anon 434 2011) "This is the three layer cake. It is a cake where the government is at top, and those people in the middle say 'we talk to the government, but we also need to talk to the people with the expertise and discourse. Talking to these people is what we need to talk to the government.' The people at the bottom now realise that the only way their expertise and discourse can reach the government is through the people in the middle." (Anon 434 2011)

Pressure drives, mainly from civil society, are still present although decreased. For example ERI writes in 2010: "(s)ince releasing our latest reports in 2009, third parties have confirmed to Earth Rights International that Total has in principle agreed to cooperate with the International Labour Organization (ILO) to facilitate local complaints of forced labour to the ILO complaints mechanism, per Earth Rights International's 2009 recommendation. This is very reassuring, and represents a positive step for Total". (ERI 2010:8)

However, there could be two potentially additional lines of pressure which may arise with the opening of the country to other investors. On the one hand other companies that have not yet invested in Myanmar/Burma could argue that new contracts should go to them because they have waited for Myanmar/Burma to embark on the democratic route. On the other there could be negative repercussions in terms of allegations of human rights abuses from advocacy groups, due to lower standards of social responsibility adopted by other companies, with less public image. These two aspects are represented by dashed red arrows.

As I have argued for the six triangles – three for Total and three for TEPM – the process of change has involved (and continues to do so) a mixture of solutions brought from the 'outside' and/or generated internally the French company. The company is learning and adjusting behaviours and practices through reinforcing initiatives which target different groups and individuals (at organisational level through policies, processes and methodology, workshops by Ethics Committee members etc.; at individual level through capacity building, exposure visits, annual appraisals etc.).

8.3   Concluding remarks

Drawing on Lederach's (2003) triangle for my analysis, I began this chapter by exploring the process of change that occurred within Total and TEPM and how the relationship with their respective contexts changed in time. I then continued by looking at the relationship potential of TEPM's initiatives using a model I proposed in *Chapter 3*. (I have not been able to discuss Total as a whole as the contexts in which it operates are too varied and because I had limited resources for this research).

Through the use of the triangles I have tried to illustrate that change is a complex process for organisations. In *Chapter 3* I discussed the nature of emergent change as an open-ended and unpredictable process: a process that involves multiple actors, initiatives, drives and levers. Like in conflict situations, many stakeholders are involved. Separation of the organisation from its context is artificial and unhelpful (see also contingency theory (Hailey and Balogun 2002)). I discussed in *Chapter 6* that the dialogue between CDA and Total occurred while a number of other initiatives were also contributing to change. (The sets of diagram included in the text are inserted as a reminder.)

The semi-structured design which underpinned the Total-CDA relationship was an effective way to work with the complex and multi-faceted nature of change. The design enabled to capitalise opportunities arising from shift in the context, from the socialisation process the company was experiencing, and from evolving internal dynamics. The dialogue supported a process of incremental change.

What I have described above is from the perspective of the company, so how did the changes in practices and way of working reflect in terms of relationship building with its stakeholders? I will address this question in the next chapter and argue that the influencing and relationship building potential of TEPM has grown with the changes that occurred.

Chapter 9

## TEPM's interactions with the context: reach of its activities

In *Chapter 3* I introduced the idea that CSR could also be understood in terms of relationships with a company's stakeholders. I would like to build on this concept and illustrate how the influencing and relationship building potential of the initiatives and policies adopted by TEPM has changed over time. I will map the evolution of TEPM's key initiatives to the diagram presented in *Chapter 3*. In the diagram I have placed at the centre the company's internal stakeholders; external stakeholders are represented in the subsequent outward layer; beyond that I have put the wider context. The diagram is characterised by intermittent lines and undefined shapes to illustrate the fluidity and mutual influences that exist between the sectors.

I have chosen to map change only for TEPM for the following reasons. Firstly, the main focus of the research is Total's work in Myanmar/Burma and given the time and resources available I have not been able to visit other subsidiaries. Secondly, given the diversity of contexts which the subsidiaries face, creating a map for Total as a whole would be too abstract. For this section I have drawn on company documents (Total 2010a), the CDA reports (CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b, CDA 2005a, CDA 2008a, CDA 2011), the report by Kouchner (Kouchner 2003), the timelines, Earth Rights International (ERI) (ERI 2009a, ERI 2009b, ERI 2009c) reports and the research interviews to build what could be plausible scenarios. Please note, I have mentioned the majority of the examples and facts earlier in the dissertation.

9.1 A decade of change

9.1.1 2002 - 2003

In *Figure 9.1* I have mapped the situation in 2002/2003.

Figure 9.1 - Reach of TEPM's CSR initiatives in 2002 – 2003.

Company policies

From the beginning of the operations, working conditions are of better standards than most in Myanmar/Burma. Safety equipment and training is given to staff. There is collective bargaining, medical insurance and pensions (Total 2010a:23).

There are some company policies which benefit external stakeholders to varying degrees. Some are explicitly conceived to do so, such as the Code of Conduct and the human rights abuse reporting process (in a separate ellipse in the diagram). The speed limit of 50km/h (adopted companywide in 2004 - see for example Total (2010c)) gives a sense of reassurance and respect to villagers (CDA 2002). The contractor policy includes quota for

local hiring. There is also a cultural awareness raising effort and language training for expats. In addition, policies which unexpectedly bring benefits to the local communities; for example CDA notes the environmental policy where recycling benefits local communities (CDA 2002). Throughout the CDA reports, the teams report that villagers link the presence of the company to security in the area. (This is disputed by ERI).

In its first reports (CDA 2002, CDA 2003a, CDA 2003b) CDA does highlight that there is also room for improvement: there is limited local spend by the company, the company uses few local contractors and local content could be improved. There are also behaviours that may send mixed messages to the local communities (for example during village visits staff are accompanied by safety and/or security people, and the engine of the car is left running).

The Socio-Economic Programme (SEP)

SEP employees 29 people and includes 23 villages. However, CDA notes in its first reports that there is a need to develop a vision and strategy for its work in Myanmar/Burma; there is also dependency on the company and divergence between haves and have nots, as most of those who benefit from the programme are from middle income range. The Village Communication Committee (VCCs) (set up to facilitate dialogue between communities and the TEPM) are relatively unknown and their role is unclear.

Communications/transparency

CDA notes that local people are interested in visiting the operations site, and this is an opportunity for building relationships. The dedicated website for Myanmar/Burma is launched in 2003. However, because the media visit described earlier back lashed, the operational site company will not be open to journalists until 2011 (Anon 724 2011).

Broader engagement

With regards to broader engagement with the Myanmar/Burma context TEPM is supporting the Eye clinic. CDA suggests that TEPM could engage with non-government organisations (NGOs)/international organisation and/or clarify definitions, discuss how the company could demonstrate its commitment (by the end 2003 the first openings were initiated). The company may also wish to consider engaging with government, which in 2003 is perceived by TEPM staff as monolithic, with no possibility of being influenced, although CDA argues that this is not the case (by the end of 2003 there is acknowledgement that there could be possibilities for engagement (CDA 2003a)).

Considering the nature of observations made by CDA and others, I have therefore mapped the initiatives as just reaching beyond the internal stakeholders. The work conditions seem to foster favourable relationships with internal stakeholders. However externally the company has created dependency and is working in isolation. The intent is there; its effect and impact needs to be strengthened.

9.1.2 2005 - 2006

Figure 9.2 depicts the situation in 2005 – 2006.

Figure 9.2 - reach of TEPM's CSR initiatives in 2005 – 2006.

By 2005, it is possible to see that reach is expanding (unless explicitly mentioned a continuation of what occurred previously can be assumed). TEPM has revised its Code of Conduct. The revision reflects, on the one hand, some of issues raised by the controversy around its presence in Myanmar/Burma (environment and human rights); on the other, it

shows the acquisition of a greater appreciation of the local stakeholders (a detailed definition of local communities) and extent of the commitment to the community (states the Socio-Economic Programme priorities). There are now 25 villages in SEP and the team has been reorganised. The approach to working with local communities is shifting towards community development (which will be first piloted in 2008 in six villages). SEP activities begin to integrate with national institutions, in particular the national HIV initiative with the NGO the Union. The human rights abuse procedure is strengthened. At personal level small steps are taken to enhance opportunities for employment of individuals from the local communities (for example language lessons given by individual employees to the security guards). A few international NGOs begin to acknowledge the value of SEP. Some contacts are made with government and the first United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) training is held (2006).

The intention to improve its impact and develop its relationships is there within the company. For example it has increased the engagement with NGOs, it has strengthened its human rights abuse reporting system, it has shifted towards community development; however most are in embryonic form yet. As a result, I have extended the reach of the initiatives including the 'national' ones. The most significant shift, according to interviewees, occurs in TEPM following the 2006/7 SEP assessment, with a real turning point being 2008. The changes are reflected in the following diagram *Figure 9.3,* which illustrates what has been happening in the last four years 2008 - 2012.

Figure 9.3 - reach of TEPM's CSR initiatives in 2008 – 2012.

Company policies

TEPM standards are strengthened for example with the adoption of the environmental management standard ISO 14001 (the ISO certificate was gained in 2010). A new Burmese version of the Code of Conduct is launched (2009). The aim, according to the company is to "reaffirm(...) and explain(...) our rules of professional conduct, both internally and to our partners." (Total 2010b:54)

Efforts are made to increase understanding among non-nationals, local staff and villagers. Cultural awareness for expats is strengthened with the introduction of a workshop. English language training is offered to interested staff. There is training for staff on human rights delivered by the DIHR (2009) (N.B. the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) is always aware of the activities within the company and reports to the Ministry. Hence it is unlikely that the authorities did not have knowledge of this training). Contractor audit and training is systematic. A grievance mechanism, against unwarranted behaviours/effects from TEPM

operations is piloted (2011). However there is a need to ensure more transparency in local level hiring policies as they are unclear and may be perceived as unfair (CDA 2011).

Work conditions

A former TEPM contractor summarises: "(i)t can be fair to say that Total is a significant source of employment for locals and people from outside the local area, important given the limited labour market in that area. Codes of Conduct, various company regulations are posted and work and living conditions appear to be good. Public boards allow for regular and open communications and there is a sense of cooperation and efficiency among the staff." (Anon 15 2012)

SEP

A SEP coordinator is hired in 2008 (before the programme was direct responsibility of the General Manager in Yangon (CDA 2002)). Visitors to the pipeline areas note: "we were very impressed because we could see that Total's efforts to keep peace and security in the area." (Anon 128 2012) This is also acknowledged by a former TEPM contractor. "It seems that communities perceive their presence as providing a certain amount of stability in areas where they may have faced harassment, and even temporary evictions, before. The average local resident credits Total for providing support in a range of areas including education, health, and income-generation." (Anon 15 2012)

New SEP operating guidelines are issued (2009). By 2010 the SEP team has reached 113 individuals. Projects have been expanded to reach the vulnerable (2008-2009). A media representative adds "(s)ince then [2002] Total has been very impressive in terms of changing its ways. The villages in the Total [SEP] are three times better off as compared with those in the Petronas one." (Anon 950 2011)

Room for improvement is still there. A business partner suggests that "(t)here is a need for a more thorough, objective needs and impact analysis/assessment to understand the company's impact on human rights [and that] (...) associated [with the] economic program on the ground. The two must not be conflated." (Anon 196 2011) A representative of an international organisation believes that there could be more collaboration with the government. "The question is how far Total's CSR has to go. Locally (in the pipeline) it seems to me that Total is getting close to replacing the government. CSR is not meant to do so. The people in the pipeline have relatively good lifestyles: they have local clinics, there is

a doctor every three villages and there are ambulances. If children do not pass the 10th grade they can have a second chance by attending the educational facilities offered by Total. However, Total could have involved the government more, for example by asking the government to pay teachers' salaries. In this way the government would still have responsibilities." (Anon 239 2011)

The assessment made by a Myanmar/Burma research company MMRD (MMRD 2011) team notes, among other points, that resource allocation and targeting beneficiaries (for example the poorest) needs to be improved; developing local content and supporting local productive activities requires deepening linkage with local markets. Following its sixth visit, CDA (CDA 2011) has the perception that the programme benefits most people in area. The sense of dependency has decreased. The responsibility for setting priorities and managing implementation lies with the villagers.

Some of the MMRD observations find echo in the CDA report which notes that there is a need to strengthen the community development approach and focus on the sustainability of impact adding to the sustainability of programmes; clinics are still parallel to the government scheme CDA (2011). TEPM is urged to develop a strategy for the future – this was being prepared during my visit in February 2012.

However, national level programmes see a greater integration with other actors. TEPM involvement with the Nargis support – at the time through a donation to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and logistical cooperation with some NGOs - continues with support to the reforestation programme (TEPM 2010d, TEPM 2011a). The HIV programme expanded its donor base with the participation of the Global Fund (TEPM 2010c).

Communication/transparency
The operations site has been open to visits from local villagers; there have been visits from investors (2008/9) and journalists (2011) as well as many international visits (including Total union representatives who belong to a union that is against Total's presence in Myanmar/Burma (Anon 239 2011)).

From being considered a special case – an isolated experience and/or something to keep a low profile about (Anon 155 2011), now the company seems more comfortable in opening to

visitors. These are the words of a former TEPM employee. "We're trying to organise the maximum number of visits to the pipeline. I have tried to organise 50 or 60 external visits from NGOs, from ambassadors, from the ethics committee, from the trade unions, and all people's perceptions have been transformed. If you read some reports from certain advocacy groups, the idea that you get is this pipeline is secured by armed people; in reality the pipeline is underground and it's nothing like that. The second thing that they realise is the value of the engagement in this country. This country has huge potential but needs help. What Total is doing in its own way is helping a little bit. The more there is a debate on the issues the better it is for the country, the better for Total. The reality is that very few people know this country. Information that exists is highly contradictory. I understand there can be some debate regarding the presence of a company like Total, even if I strongly believe that our presence makes a positive impact. What I don't understand is that there is criticism when it comes to visiting the country, communicating with the country etc. I think things are starting to change. Civil society is starting to be much more active." (Anon 73 2011) In 2012 the site will also be open for visits from national institutions.

Last but not least, communication with villagers has improved through the revitalised role of VCCs.

Broader engagement/soft influencing
In terms of broader engagement, conversations with NGOs continue and collaborations with some have started. A civil society representative notes: "Total's SEP did not have the community development approach for example adopted by NGOs. They did not have the exposure. By engaging more with NGOs they have gained in exposure and understanding and this has enabled the re-conceptualization of their approach." (Anon 24 2011)

In 2009 the second UNITAR workshop was held; permission obtained at national level for an International Labour Organisation (ILO) training delivered at local level and the local authorities invited (2010). An invitation to participate in the Asian meeting of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was sent to the government (2010). However, as noted earlier, there is still room to expand engagement with government and institutions (Anon 57 2011).

Influencing business

The forum started in 2008; in 2011 it expanded to include meetings at local level (pipeline areas). TEPM actively shares standards and procedures with other companies and holds CSR workshops with Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) agrees to spend US$6m on social investment based on Yadana model (2011). There could be opportunities to increase coordination with other companies with regards to socio-economic activities; however, this still proves a challenge. (Anon 613 2012) At the time of my visit the SEP team mentioned that coordination efforts were being made, however these were in some way dampened by the desire of newest operators to establish their own visibility. New approaches will be adopted.

On the basis of what I mentioned above, I have expanded the blue bubble *(Figure 9.2* to *Figure 9.3*) that indicates the reach of TEPM's activities in relation to the stakeholders. As mentioned in *Chapter 4*, through the course of time TEPM seems to have repositioned itself as a resource for government and business in Myanmar/Burma. Its activities seem to be aiming as influencing the (wide) nature of relationships that characterise the French company's local context. Company policies define the nature of the relationship it wishes to establish by formalising expected behaviours, attitudes, standards and procedures (relevant to both firms and individuals). Soft influencing government and business is a mild way of offering alternatives of how business can relate to their own context and stakeholders. Capacity building, for example, (in the diagram the human rights and ILO training or the cultural awareness programmes), contributes to the development of new/different perspectives in an individual's mind hence influencing the way he/she will relate with others. The way social investment is conceived also determines the nature of relationships the company has with the local communities it engages. (Is it empowering or does it create dependency? Does it ensure sustainable legacy or undermine local institutions? What message does it convey to local communities about what they are to expect from business?) So far it seems that the sustainability drive of projects continues to be strengthened, though more can be done in terms of sustainability of impact (CDA 2011).

Before I conclude this chapter I would like to briefly look at what enabled the company to shift its relationship with stakeholders. In *Chapters 6 to 8* I have explored the factors that have facilitated Total and TEPM's journey towards socially responsible practices. In addition to the process of socialisation (through global initiatives, guidelines and principles set by

international organisations, exposure to NGOs, changing expectations from governments, working with villagers, the Forum, CSR being a non-competitive issue), there were contextual factors (paradigm shift towards CSR, Myanmar/Burma, ERI), and internal drivers (willingness to change and to implement change, generational change, development of the notion of 'acceptability'). I also mentioned that the dialogue with CDA sparked transformational levers. The French company learnt crucial aspects which in their turn enhanced the process of change (making sense of what is political and what is not, learning to anticipate, understanding the importance of integrating people with different skills into the business and work as a team). I would like now to build on that discussion and link to what I introduced in *Chapter 2,* regarding enablers/constraints to the interaction of companies with their contexts, to consider what may have supported TEPM to interact differently with the context and strengthen its relationship building efforts towards its stakeholders.

9.2   An interpretation of the shift observed

Figures 8.9 and *Figure 9.3* indicate that there was a significant shift in TEPM's approach in relating to its stakeholders. As discussed earlier, this shift did not start then: change was incremental. It just became more visible and with greater impetus. It has taken time, experimentation and confidence gained from positive feedback that it was on the right track, for TEPM to be where it is now. In *Chapter 7* I discussed that interviewees highlighted how dialogue brought different perspectives, encouraged individuals to push their boundaries, and engendered ownership. I also outlined what learning interviewees felt they gained from the engagement (making sense of what is political; learning to anticipate, to work together, and to integrate people). Remarks by Total employees on the journey towards socially responsible practices being one of a step at a time (Anon 10 2011, Anon 142 2011) indicate that learning was (and still is) accumulated over time. As the discussion in the previous section illustrated, in Myanmar/Burma this accumulated learning bloomed around 2007-2008. On the one hand, by observing the timelines in *Appendix 4*, it is possible to see a surge in the output of tools, guidelines and initiatives on CSR/societal issues around that time in Total. The company approach was being detailed then. On the other, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, for what concerns Myanmar/Burma, interviewees point to the confluence of three factors: the maturity of the dialogue with CDA, the SEP assessments and the appointment to the post of General Manager in Myanmar/Burma of people with different sensitivities.

Overall, however, from the research findings, I infer that this blooming is a manifestation of a shift in those factors influencing a company's interaction with its environment identified in *Chapter 2*; a shift that has meant a greater conscious effort of improving the nature of TEPM's impact.

From the discussion below it will be possible to see, in fact, that the people appointed from the mid-2000s are seen as having a greater sensitivity to understand the interdependencies between company action and the context. It can be argued that a shift in the perception of risk also occurred, which fostered building on the increased perception of legitimacy of the company both within and outside it. In turn these shifts have enabled TEPM to seize the openings engendered by changes in the country's situation, and foster bigger propensity for using its leverage.

9.2.1 Ability to see interdependencies

In the literature review I noted how the degree of willingness and/or ability of management to see the interdependencies within the system in which the enterprise operates is the first critical step that informs corporate engagement. Such ability seems to be evident in the General Manager of that time. The account of the Total employee of what that General Manager told him is revealing: she was clearly able to acknowledge the impact that the company was having on local communities. "[The General Manager who was in place around 2005/2008] wanted to rethink the process, the whole process before she left the company in 2008. She has been thinking about how to further empower the local population. I think she had a shock in seeing that the villagers were very dependent on the company. They were becoming affluent and this affluence was creating rejects, garbage that they didn't have before. The villages were becoming dirty and when they were asked to do something about it, the villagers' reaction was to reply 'Total will provide'. This was a shock for her: 'we're doing the contrary of what we're supposed to do for them.' She set in place a program to empower people with their own development. So there was a full tactical and strategic change in Total Myanmar" (Anon 7 2011).

Such change is also recognised by staff. A TEPM employees adds: "(t)he change of people is important. (...). [General Managers] who come here are selected for their interest and ability to involve in 'political' (with the small 'p') activities. What we do is about having good relationship with your neighbours; it is about having the responsibility of a stakeholder who

handles a lot of money towards social needs, education... It is about discussing with people about what it means to be a good neighbour. This is what I mean by political. It is about managing relationship. It refers to the social sphere, not to 'party politics'. It is social, and, more than social; when we are involved as a strong stakeholder in a community that is demanding, and when as a matter of fact we are doing many things that usually the public services provide in this sense 'social' is not enough. It is about speaking to people having opinions about how a health system should work in the area, and the choices the company makes." (Anon 613 2012)

This shift is also acknowledged by a civil society representative. "Also for me Total was for a long time a corporate leviathan. Then one day I saw something really different, that I never saw before. This is the day when the [General Manager] with the greatest sincerity in the world said, clearly, 'well you know I am married and I have kids, people around me and ask me if I am responsible for the deaths of children. I go to dinners to meet people in France and they asked me if I kill people'". (Anon 434 2011)

9.2.2   Different perception of risk

In *Chapter 2* I cited Zandvliet ("companies weigh the risks and opportunities of one context against the risks and opportunities of another" (Zandvliet 2005:5) to illustrate that companies analyse their decisions through a 'risk' lens. It is indicative, for example, that in Total 'CSR issues' have been fully integrated in the risk assessment procedures of the company up to the second highest decision making committee in the company. (Anon 20 2011)

I argue that the perception of risk has also changed. This is demonstrated by the fact that TEPM has been able to run workshops on sensitive topics (human rights/forced labour) including the Myanmar/Burma authorities. Another example is the fact that the company collaborates more with NGOs (Anon 7 2011). The forum led by TEPM shows that the company is more confident of its own practices. A Total employee notes: "(t)hings that were unthinkable five years ago and now part of our practices. For example, five years ago when we were criticised, we thought some NGOs were not trustworthy and they were doing this to gain funding. It was no use talking to them because whatever we did they would still criticise, just to get the funding. Our position has evolved and we are now looking for dialogue on this issue with everyone." (Anon 7 2011)

Another example from Total's internal guide *Developing Local Content an Industry Strategic Objective at Total*: "Change perceptions and behaviours - accepting a certain degree of Local Content-related risks will pay off in the medium and long terms." (Total 2008c:16)

9.2.3 Legitimacy

In the literature review I looked at the firm's ability to influence its environment. Authors like Tripathi and Gündüz (2008) and Oetzel, Getz and Ladek (2007) have argued that the ability to influence the environment depends on its perceived legitimacy, which is linked to the nature of the individual firm, the company's closeness/experience of the issues, region and investment size.

Comments on the French company offer a good example of how much the issue of legitimacy can be multifaceted and this has changed in time with regards to the French company. On the one hand, the company is considered as trusted by the former government; on the other, an NGO worker comments on the dilemmas of the Nargis aftermath. Some local organisations were reluctant to accept money from TEPM, because they did not trust it as a result of the campaign by advocacy groups, and because they were concerned that if they did, international donors would not work with them in the future. Communication too, as seen earlier, plays a crucial role. My interview with another NGO worker highlighted how the perceived lack of communication with local groups perpetuates this mistrust (2011) (Anon 215 2011). Having said this, in more recent times TEPM's perceived legitimacy has increased. In earlier chapters I mentioned the interest in TEPM's CSR by the Myanmar/Burma government and by UMFCCI. I also noted the interest of other oil and gas companies, demonstrated by the expansion of the Forum to include meetings at social programmes implementation level. Also, in terms of social investment, there is an acknowledgement that TEPM is in a position to make a difference. A TEPM employee states: "I think we can now be ambitious. Building on the experience we have gained, (...) (w)e could pick 'a dream' project and think how to realise it." (Anon 809 2012)

9.2.4 Leverage

Zandvliet (2005) explains that there is a clear relationship between who and what the company can (and will) influence and the stage of its operations. Prior to investments there is greater leverage at macro-level with the leadership (usually governments). As implementation takes place, the corporation's impact on the environment increasingly shifts

to the local/micro context. TEPM's experience, however, also shows that political events, such as those occurring in Myanmar/Burma since 2011, can open new opportunities. Whether these opportunities can be realised depends on the perceptions and decisions of company managers – which leads back to the ability and willingness to act. General Managers since the mid-2000s, as the shift of approach with local communities as well as the type and nature of initiatives undertaken indicate, have recognised the mutual influences between company and context and have seized opportunities as they arose to improve relationships, in the broadest sense.

The discussion in this section brings me back to why the enablers were enablers (*Chapter 7*). I would like to suggest that the process of change was coming to a visible fruition. The greater range of initiatives, the pushing the boundaries, seem to be illustrations of a shift in the perception in what the company could do (empowerment and motivation) supported by the experience gained in trying new approaches (experimentation and innovation).

9.3   Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have discussed how the relationship building potential of CSR initiatives has grown in the period between 2002 and 2012. Albeit incremental, the change in practices has become more visible since 2008. I noted that around that time the confluence of several factors opened new possibilities. As understanding of societal issues increased, people with different qualities have been chosen for the post of General Manager. The key difference that they brought is an aptitude for understanding relationships (N.B. I have mentioned I am referring this term in the sense that Lederach (2003) is using it). Beyond understanding the relational aspect between individuals, they were able to see the interdependencies between the company's presence and the context. Furthermore, as the understanding of what is political and what is not deepened across the company (and these individuals), the perception of manageable risk changed. At the same time events in Myanmar were turning in a way that meant the company has been increasingly gaining in legitimacy and leverage. General Managers and their staff have been increasingly, since 2008, seizing opportunities offered and pushing the boundaries of what is possible gently, but surely.

Considering the whole picture discussed until now, one could argue that the Total-CDA dialogue has mobilised drivers that have contributed to a change in the company's view. The

outcomes of such mobilisation are points discussed in the previous section (ability to see interdependencies, different perception of risk, greater ability to use leverage) and in *Chapter 6* (greater openness, greater understanding of what is political, learning to work together, learning to integrate people, learning to anticipate) - in *Figure 9.4* in red those attributed to CDA and in yellow those I observed. The outcomes then manifest in tangible initiatives/activities (outputs).

Figure 9.4 - the role of the dialogue within Total's journey of change.

The picture would not be complete if I did not attempt to explore the depth of change. I will do so in the next chapter.

Chapter 10
How embedded is this way of working?

The degree of change in the way of working, its consistency and influence can vary considerably depending on context, organisational and individual perceptions, skills, culture and personalities. At the heart of the process of change are: behaviours, attitudes, communications, interactions between individuals and groups, strategies, policies, procedures and culture. Most of what emerged from the findings of this research indicated that change has occurred. If change in practices within Total has been observable, how embedded is this change in Total? This is the last question underpinning this research.

I will use the matrix developed by Lederach et al (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) to consider how embedded are the new/different practices within Total and TEPM. Lederach et al identify four dimensions in which transformation is embedded: personal, relational, structural and cultural. As discussed in *Chapter 3,* organisational change authors covering the same dimensions, segment these dimensions further; for example Burke Letwin (1992) identified the following: external environment; strategy; leadership; organisational culture; structure; management practices; systems policies and procedures; work climate; tasks and skills; motivation; individual needs and values; individual and organisational performance. However I believe that for the scope of this research, the matrix offers a sufficient synthesis even for an organisational system.

The findings of the research can be mapped in all four dimensions. It is possible to observe that structural aspects strongly drive the implementation of new practices. New attitudes and behaviours are wide-spread among individuals within the company and relationships are also different. However, as a few interviewees point out, I believe that the new way of working still needs to be embedded in the company culture. Total has come a long way and is pointing in the right direction. If current efforts will continue, corporate social responsibility (CSR) will be part of the company's culture, though not yet.

As in earlier chapters, where applicable, comments from those who have direct experience of the relationship between CDA and Total will be compared with comments by interviewees who have an 'outsider' perspective.

In addressing the answer, I will begin by mapping the interviewees' perceptions of where change has happened, personal observations from my research trip and what emerges from the document analysis to Lederach et al's (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) matrix of the dimensions of transformation. I will develop two matrices: one for Total and one for TEPM. However, I shall discuss them jointly, highlighting what is relevant for Total and what is relevant for TEPM.

10.1   Interviewees' perceptions of where change is embedded

The fact that Total and TEPM have changed their practices has been recognised by interviewees with direct and indirect knowledge of the Total-CDA dialogue. Below are a few comments which give an overview.

The first two comments are from a former TEPM contractor and a current TEPM contractor. "In general, there are indications to say that change for the better is happening in Total's operations in Myanmar." (Anon 15 2012) "Implementing this program [SEP] was extremely tough in the beginning, but looking back after many years it does give a strong sense of joy and satisfaction, especially to see that even the insurgences have slowly, but surely, diminished as everyone eventually realized the positive benefit that the project has brought about in the general development of the area and the country." (Anon 23 2012)

This comment from a representative of an international organisation gives a flavour of what has happened and what is still possible. "There has been a change in the past ten years in Total. Total has put a greater emphasis on the CSR side. (...) Definitely things are not perfect. There are things that could be better. However, Total has opened up much more recently in terms of attitudes and in terms of recognizing that, in effect, they can have some influence in terms of broader policy. They do not realize or do not want to realize that they could have more impact and influence on long-term policy than they think they have. We have a new government and there have been lots of little signs that there is change. Total could do more to encourage different, more positive approaches in both policy development and in its application." (Anon 239 2011)

Some of the points that I will discuss in the following section have been raised earlier in *Chapter 9*. As I will continue, in fact, some parts will be familiar (hence I will spend little time on them) and some are new. I will now summarise the main points through the matrixes.

Personal	Relational
• Understanding of what is political • Understanding of what is CSR (of what is socially acceptable, of needing to take time, of needing to be sustainable, of needing to anticipate, of needing to be a catalyst) • Commitment	• Professionalization • Improved communications: CSR reports, CSR presentations for investors, CSR in AGMs, dedicated CSR section on website • Greater openness (dialogue with NGOs and advocacy groups, more partnerships with a wider range of stakeholders, proactivity in international initiatives and industry associations, sharing of knowledge and experiences with other companies, contribution to development of new/different standards) • Shift in language (from impersonal to personal, reflects understanding of societal issues)
Structural	**Cultural**
• Organisational design: new structure to support CSR (Ethics Committee, Sustainable Development Team, Societal Lab, Societal Metier Network, local content correspondent etc.) • Organisational governance: new structures of governance (Code of Conduct, Financial Ethics Code). • Organisational practice: CSR/societal issues in strategies and policies (Ethics Charter, Societal Charter, HSEQ Charter, company strategy, decision making process, risk management, labour issues, human resources, security policy, appointments selection, contractor policies, ISO 14001, safety guidelines); Development of methodology, impact assessments, SMR+, ethics assessments; Capacity building structures (Total Prof, training on societal issues, Ethics, Code of conduct etc. development of supporting tools guidelines and manuals) • Human capital development: new professional figures (Societal metier, multi-talented teams); Question on Code of Conduct in annual appraisal Building local skills (contractors' capacity development, focus on development of local content)	

Figure 10.1 – dimension in which change has occurred – Total.

Personal	Relational
• Understanding of what is political • Greater understanding of CSR (understanding of what SEP needs, understanding of role of company) • Professionalization • Attitude change • Commitment • Confidence in work done	• Improved relationships with stakeholders: with villagers (shift to community development and greater ownership of initiatives by villagers) other companies and between SEP and operations; Greater engagement and collaborations with NGOs • Different personalities appointed • Capacity building: community development training for villagers, contractor capacity building • Communications: greater openness, invitation to media, diplomatic representatives, investors, union representatives, villagers, dedicated website • Proactive soft influencing: influencing business (forum, UMFCCI workshops, through MOGE); Influencing government: through MOGE by being a different model of operations, during conversations, through initiatives - UNITAR, invitations, trough capacity building)Working with institutions/other organisations/partnerships
Structural	**Cultural**
• Organisational policies: Policy changes (Code of conduct, security, human resources, nationalisation plans, human rights abuse reporting, contractor policy) • Organisational design: SEP reorganisation • Organisational practice: community development, new micro-finance programme; Assessments (programme assessments, ethics assessments) • Structures to support relationship development (Forum, community development, revitalisation of VCCs, grievance mechanism) • Human capital development: Capacity building (in addition to what identified for Total: cultural awareness, language training, human rights training, training on forced labour); VCCs capacity building; Contractor capacity building	

Figure 10.2 – dimension of where change has occurred – TEPM.

At a first glance, it is possible to see that there is greater understanding among individuals of a number of facets concerning CSR/societal issues in both matrices. The French company is investing resources to ensure consistency of practice in its staff, and there is commitment among a number of individuals. Relationships are changing too (mainly driven by company policies and different behaviours by individuals). There is definitely change at structural level. If they maintain the current drive and investment, the 'new' way of working is likely to be embedded in the culture of the company too. However, irreversibility is not ensured yet and 'critical mass' is not gained yet.

I will now look in more detail at each of the quadrants.

Personal dimension

I noted in *Chapters 6* and *9* the impact that the dialogue between CDA and Total has had on the understanding of what is 'political' and of what is 'socially acceptable'. This has been identified both in Total and TEPM. Similarly I highlighted the shift in Total to multi-talented teams (*Chapter 6*) and appointments to the post of General Managers (*Chapter 9*). For both Total and TEPM, buy-in from individuals has certainly made a difference (Anon 20 2011, Anon 73 2011). Without hesitation, Total employees stated that at the highest levels of the company people are fully committed (Anon 64 2012, Anon 73 2011). Furthermore Total and TEPM are making considerable investments in developing the skills both of its employees and contractors in terms of issues connected to social responsibility. A non-government organisation (NGO) worker emphasises the difference that an improved understanding among national staff in Myanmar/Burma of CSR made on the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP). "I was invited to train staff. I realized then that national staff did not understand CSR and why ERI was writing such reports. National staff thought that these were all Western accusations. If expatriate management was becoming more sensitive to CSR issues, they had neglected to educate their national staff. Total's SEP had then the value of a token act. However national staff were keen to understand and change. They gradually built trust with local communities. Their efforts paid off and today they are secure and there is a good relationship." (Anon 24 2011)

A former TEPM employee notes: "(a)t personal level change also happened. Total employees when they read the [CDA] report they were serious. When they hired me, they clearly said that 'you are hired because you have to do capacity building for the VCCs [village communication committees], you have to do training, you have to try to work toward sustainability, you have to encourage change in actors (VCCs) of the community.' People's thoughts also changed." (Anon 165 2011)

Relational dimension

The company's three core values are: "(r)espect, which is the necessary conditions for trust-based operations and relations. Responsibility towards others and in our jobs. Exemplary behaviour, that underpins the internal and external credibility of our actions and initiative." (TEPM 2009b) With time there has been greater awareness of the need to appreciate interdependencies between its operations and local context: "(b)y understanding local challenges, focusing on the development of capabilities and limiting the negative impacts of

our operations, we solidify our local roots a little more each day, a prerequisite for sustainable, shared growth." (Total 2010b:10)

The language used is more inclusive than earlier and focuses on engagement with stakeholders, drawing on the experience of others and sharing knowledge (Total 2010b, Total 2011b). For example, the difference in tone is noticeable between the following two extracts from CSR reports.

"Responsibility is reflected by a positive contribution, as illustrated by advances in new energies and local development. Our responsibilities are assumed within a sustainable development process, deployed in line with a method based on dialogue, exchanges and direct application of our ethical values." (Total 2002)

"In other words, a key determinant will be our ability to listen, explain and take into account — in short, to have transparent, constructive conversations with our stakeholders. That is, everyone directly and indirectly concerned by our projects, including employees, neighbours, customers, authorities, associations and shareholders.

The human factor is critical to this conversation. Through our personal conduct and people skills, we can lay the groundwork for balanced relationships, convince producing countries and their national oil companies that we add value, and in general demonstrate, in every host country, that our projects stimulate economies while respecting people's rights and protecting the environment." (Total 2010b:1)

The improvement of relationships is particularly noticeable at local level. A business partner notes: "(w)e have had very strong feedback on this program. We spoke with Total staff and it seems that Total is working very effectively on building relationships with local communities. This is based on a very limited dataset, on my perceptions of the people involved in the programme. They are extremely passionate to improve the well-being of the people in the pipeline. It's headed up by a Burmese national who obviously has a lot of empathy for the people of the area. There are some foreign people working in the programs and they are very committed and enthusiastic. I was impressed by the frequency of the interaction that they seem to have with the people in the area. I think their relationships are very strong." (Anon 33 2011)

In my own conversations with villagers I found that most knew Total and acknowledge that things have improved since Total's arrival. A minority was uncertain which company was doing what (confusion between the different operators in the area TEPM, the Malaysian Petronas and the Thai PTT-EP). When asked if they have contact with TEPM villagers said yes. The company has done much and they talked about the clinic and nursery. The microcredit projects assist local initiatives (one of the villagers said that there are also two other organizations doing microcredit loan programmes but TEPM's is the one with the lowest interest rate and has a saving programme too).

Relationships can be very volatile and difficult to maintain. For example, in *Chapter 5* I mentioned the impact of the political context on the relationship with villages inhabited by Karen. In addition to political pressures (that are likely to change with a change of authorities), there is the issue of livelihoods for some. Recently a natural park was established in the area. Some villagers relied on hunting and logging for livelihood. With the establishment of the park these activities are no longer possible. As Total supported the park project, some villagers attribute the loss of livelihood opportunities to the company. The SEP team is aware that particular attention needs to be paid to maintain the relationship and is looking for alternative solutions in terms of livelihood to propose in these areas.

TEPM's efforts to engage with external stakeholders are being recognised. A civil society representative states: "Total does recognise, particularly with respect to Burma (which is a sore issue in the company's side since they started), that it is in their best interest to engage with outsiders on issues of importance beyond their bottom line. There is more thinking on this throughout the industry now, paying attention to the social impacts and that it does affect the bottom line." (Anon 17 2011)

I have mentioned the earlier chapter, the greater openness of the company. This is reiterated by a former TEPM employee: "(w)e have everything to gain from transparency." (Anon 73 2011)

Improvement in communications and openness has also been noted by interviewees with an indirect knowledge of the dialogue, as this former TEPM contractor explains "(i)t appears that Total has a strong awareness of how it is perceived both in Myanmar/Burma and throughout the world, and being strategic in maintaining its access in this charged

environment, has made efforts in the last decade to improve this perception." (Anon 15 2012)

"Total in the past has not been communicating well about its initiatives. Total seems to be more confident and their ability to communicate has increased. Maybe this is related to the fact that there are new operators in the industry, for example the Chinese or Daewoo. The spot light is therefore moving away from Total to the Chinese and to Daewoo." (Anon 894 2011)

In fact, this shift in ability to build relationships, as suggested in the last comment, is due to greater self-confidence on the part of the company as well as its capacity building efforts. I mentioned the impact that the dialogue between CDA and Total has had in terms of recognition (*Chapters 6-9*). Earlier in this chapter I also noted the numerous measures undertaken by the company to strengthen the skills of staff, villagers, and contractors. This professionalization is acknowledged by a Total business partner: "the professionalization that had been happening at global level has also happened at micro level. Total has professionalised the SEP and it has managed it in a way that it is more professional and more sustainable and better." (Anon 72 2011)

Shifts in approach both from an organisational perspective (for example personnel selection) and in connection to stakeholders (for example community development) have been conducive to the development of constructive relationships. As seen in *Chapter 9*, relationship building efforts in Myanmar/Burma have extended to other businesses and the government. However, even if the efforts made by TEPM have been acknowledged by some as noteworthy, there are individuals such as the representative of the international organisation (Anon 289 2012), cited in the previous part of this chapter, who believe that more is possible.

Structural dimension

By looking at Total and TEPM's matrices, it is possible to see that from a structural perspective, new bodies have been set up in Total (Ethics Committee, the Sustainable Development and Environment team). Policies have changed too: the code of conduct, ethics charter and the introduction of the ethics process are an example. Other examples are the shift toward multi-talented teams, the newly created professional position responsible for societal concerns, and a relevant internal network.

As mentioned in *Chapter 4*, Total has streamlined CSR into core processes and functions. *Figure 10.3* illustrates how the company has integrated its approach.

Addressing CSR at key steps of our projects

This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.

Figure 10.3 – CSR in Total's projects (de la Chevardière 2011).

According to a Total employee, change has occurred in this dimension since "everything is linked together. For example, we have recently issued a Human Rights internal guide." (Anon 142 2011) This statement is clarified in the 2010 CSR reports: "(w)e have a body of regularly updated, primary guidance structuring our governance that deals with everything from corporate governance to risk management and stakeholder dialogue." (CSR 2010:6)

Structure has been strengthened not only through policies, process methodologies and toolkits but also through assessments, as mentioned in *Chapter 8*, and the constant adjustment of the SEP programme. *Figure 10.4* illustrates the shift that has occurred in terms of SEP in Indonesia: an indication that the different way of working is spreading across Total.

Figure 10.4 – the approach shift in Indonesia (Proust 2011).

A business partner notes in this respect: "(w)hen you meet with the people involved in the programme and talk about the results of the program, they are very impressive. When you see these results it reflects how structured the whole programme has been. There are specific objectives. They work in a very structured manner and in different phases. This is a very difficult job and it is a long corridor". (Anon 637 2011) The impact of programme reorganisations has been acknowledged by a TEPM employee and a CDA contributor. "In the past (five or six years ago) for a lot of the projects we had to go through a number of levels of approvals. Sometimes the projects are delayed unnecessarily. When we needed to give feedback to the community, there was a gap in communication, between management and the team and the villagers. However in the last couple of years communication has improved a lot. We are communicating more appropriately and clearly with the villagers and with the communities on what our plans are and ask their feedback on what they think about it." (Anon 50 2012) "I think also that CDA helped Total become much more comfortable in listening to what people in local communities say and to learn from them. Also, they became

better at setting up protocols and procedures for responding to community issues." (Anon 504 2011)

Cultural dimension

I have left the culture quadrants empty. When asked about how far social responsibility is embedded in the culture, Total employees suggest that it is work in progress (Anon 10 2011, Anon 7 2011, Anon 73 2011). Interviewees have identified the individual, relationship and structural dimensions as seats of change. The company's strategic guidelines are clear that is it a vital characteristic of the business model (www.total.com). An industry analyst notes how "(t)he importance of CSR is drummed across the company." (Anon 112 2011) On the day of the interview, a former TEPM employee noted: "(t)oday we had a very clear message from the top management that CSR activities are a key part of our business model." (Anon 73 2011) Total is investing resources so that different practices may root in the company. At this time the code of conduct is included in the formal performance review. Still, some feel that in order to consolidate this new modus operandi into Total's culture, formal managerial accountability needs to specifically include social responsibility (Anon 73 2011). Others suggest that although CSR is embedded in company core processes, a change of emphasis from the leadership of the company may affect the focus in work implementation (Anon 20 2011) away from CSR.

Here is the picture given by a Total employee. "In terms of the drivers for change (...) there are people who feel strongly about the subject, and work towards its appropriate adoption and implementation throughout the company. But there is no one who is extremely passionate in a tree hugging way about societal issues. The majority of people see it as something that is part and parcel of what needs to be done as a part of our work. We are a petroleum company. In a similar way, I do not think there is a cultural dimension that drives CSR. I think the key drivers are at structural level and relationships. I see the external relationships the company has with stakeholders, governments, other companies etc. as driving the expectations that are placed on a company like ours. From the structural aspect, with streamlining and strengthening of the operational process in the company, these aspects are being accepted as things that need to be done as part of our jobs." (Anon 20 2011)

The need for institutionalisation is also perceived by outsiders. A media representative says: "(t)he impression that I have, however, is that change is not institutionalised." (Anon 950 2011)

As a personal observation, I believe that embedding social responsibility in the culture of the company is Total's next summit to conquer. If the drive and momentum is maintained, it will be very likely that this will be achieved. Company employees recognise that there are deeply committed people, those who comply and those who still need convincing (for example Anon 7 (2011)).

10.2   Concluding remarks

This chapter concludes the discussion of the findings from my research. I explored how embedded the change in practice is within Total and TEMP, relying on Lederach et al's matrix of the dimensions of transformation.

Transformation has begun to root itself in the organisation. There is an extremely strong transformation at structural level, i.e. it the design, systems and procedures of the company, supported by human capital development. Such process has contributed to a shift in how the company relates with its stakeholders. A manifestation of such a shift is in the tone of language used by the company in its communication and the range of audiences it engages with regarding societal issues: NGOs, institutions, international organisations, business sector at multiple levels, government and local authorities. There have been clear improvements in the relationships with local communities in Myanmar/Burma and a reaching out to the wider context. Total and TEPM have come out of isolation. This has been possible by a greater confidence in what it is doing and the increasing recognition that the company is getting. Change has also happened at individual level. There are committed individuals, understanding is greater in the role of the company in society, and attitudes have changed. However, critical mass has not yet been achieved. In numerous conversations I have I heard that Total is a company driven by excellence: extremely high standards of engineering, strict processes of internal quality control. The impression I developed while researching is a commitment amongst some key people to take on board CSR and societal issues with the eagerness (self-awareness of the areas of needed improvement addressed by constant updating of knowledge, material, training etc.) of spreading know-how with the same level

of standards the company is known for. If the trend continues, this summit will be conquered: now it is still at base station, with the key drivers being of structural nature.

Chapter 11
Conclusions

The aim of this research was to investigate whether dialogue as a form of engaging a company can influence the company's working practices towards being more conflict sensitive. If dialogue had a positive impact, I was interested in finding out what it was about the dialogue that enabled change, what was the process of change that could be observed and how embedded such change was.

Can dialogue between a non-profit organisation (NPO) and a corporation nurture change in the corporation towards becoming more conflict sensitive?

- What was it about the dialogue that enabled change?
- What is the process of change?
- How embedded is the change?

Box 11.1 - key research questions.

If, on the other hand, such shift was not observable, I intended to analyse why this was not happening and what strategies could have been put in place to foster impact.

I chose to observe the relationship between the French oil and gas company, Total S.A. (Total), and the US based non-profit organisation (NPO), CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA). The relationship began in 2002 and it is on-going.

Searching for validation of its work in Myanmar/Burma, the French company approached CDA in the early 2000s to conduct an impact assessment of Total's corporate social responsibility (CSR) programme in Myanmar/Burma. Strong stakeholder action over the company's presence in Myanmar/Burma, and the legacy from the merger with scandal ridden Elf had put pressure on Total executives to ensure and demonstrate the company's ethical behaviour. For CDA, which had initiated the Corporate Engagement Project (CEP), this was an opportunity to work with a corporation and learn from it. CEP's aim in fact was (and still is) to work with companies to minimise the negative impacts, that they have on local communities, while maximising positive ones. CEP encouraged companies and practitioners to draw on practical experience in order to identify patterns and issues emerging from business presence in complex environments and to develop tools.

Total joined CEP in 2002: participation in CEP is voluntary and based on a Memorandum of Agreement. As a result of Total joining, the two organisations engaged in the process I loosely defined as 'dialogue': a series of conversations, visits and exchanges supported by written documents as well as the participation in CEP consultations. Since 2002, CDA visited Mauritania, Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda and Myanmar/Burma. However, given resource constraints, this research focussed in particular on the dialogue concerned with the Myanmar/Burma operations, with reflections of practices in the company as a whole.

'Dialogue': a series of conversations, visits and exchanges supported by written documents as well as the participation in the consultations of the collaborative learning project CEP.

Box 11.2 - definition of dialogue.

In order to address the questions that underpinned the research, my objectives were to gauge whether dialogue had an impact, and to identify *the process of dialogue adopted by the two organizations as well as the characteristics of the relationship. Process and characteristics would allow me to understand the enablers that fostered change of practices in Total.*

• Gauge whether dialogue had an impact
• Identify the process of dialogue adopted by the two organizations
• Identify the characteristics of the relationship

Box 11.3 – research objectives.

The research was a longitudinal case study (2002-2012) situated across conflict transformation and organisational change theories. Through the review of the literature, I noted strong commonalities in how authors from both disciplines, for example Burnes (1997, 2009), Kanter (1999a), Lederach (1999, 2003), Ropers (2008), and Senge (2006), perceive the process of change. Furthermore, as indicated in *Chapter 2,* I identified a gap. Examining writings on conflict, organisational change, dialogue, cross-sector partnerships and corporate social responsibility, I found that there are abundant publications on the role of business in conflict. There is also a relatively smaller body of work available on business and peacebuilding. The role of CSR in conflict resolution/transformation is only covered by a few authors (Jamali and Mirshak 2010, Oetzel, Getz and Ladek 2007). Business and conflict sensitivity is discussed mainly by practitioners (International Alert 2005, IPIECA 2008, OECD

2002, UN Global Compact 2010). In my review, I have not identified work that connects conflict transformation to organisational change. Hence, there is a need for more academic research on conflict sensitivity in general, in particular, with relation to business and impact on local communities, which takes into account the company perspective. With the aim of contributing to filling this gap, I drew parallels between frameworks of conflict transformation and organisational change authors, namely Burke and Litwin (1992), Burnes (2009), Cope (2003), Kanter (1991, 2008), Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson (2007), and synthesised these parallels through Lederach's triangle (Lederach 2003) and Lederach et al's (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) matrix of the dimensions of conflict transformation. Furthermore, building on the insights derived from the literature and research, I proposed that CSR could also be viewed as a way by which the company could build relationships with its stakeholders.

The research has been heavily influenced by post-modern thinking, systems theory and the notion that change is an emergent process. As the basis of my analysis, I have used three frameworks: Lederach's triangle (Lederach 2003), Lederach et al's matrix (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007) and the diagram I developed to illustrate the reach and influence CSR activities may have on company stakeholders and beyond. The findings draw from 54 semi-structured interviews, two field trips to Myanmar/Burma, conversations I held with villagers who live in the pipeline area, documents by Total, CDA and other organisations as primary sources. Interviewees include individuals based in Myanmar/Burma, the United States (US), Europe and South East Asia. They are: Total and CDA employees, former Total employees, Total contractors in Myanmar/Burma, representatives of organisations that work with Total (business partners), civil society representatives, academics, business people, and representatives of international organisations, media and diplomatic services.

I have specifically chosen to examine a case-study with a successful outcome: corporations have been much scrutinised for the impact they have on economies and societies. These criticisms are raised both in academia and by civil society. However, I believe that it is also important to explore what works, how and why. The significance of Total's experience lies in the learning journey the company has made. It demonstrates that companies are social actors and can contribute constructively to the environments they operate in, should they wish to do so. The principal focus of this research has been on the dynamics of the process of change *within* Total and the contribution *to this change by* contextual factors and local communities.

Conclusions – by F. Cerletti

Following the literature review *Chapter 2* and the methodology outline, *Chapter 3*, I offered the reader some background to the research: a sketch of both Total and CDA, their histories and broad lines of operation in *Chapter 4*; and an outline of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, how it relates to Total's operations in the country and the criticisms levied to the company (*Chapter 5*).

I started *Chapter 6* with an outline of the approach followed by CDA in its visits to Myanmar/Burma, categorising it in methodology and process for ease of explanation. I continued by discussing my findings.

Can dialogue between a non-profit organisation (NPO) and a corporation nurture change in the corporation towards becoming more conflict sensitive? Yes.
However:
- conflict sensitivity is only implied in company's approach and writings
- the dialogue had crucial impact though it was one of a number of contributors to the change in practices

---

Box 11.4 – finding n. 1: dialogue can influence a change in practices.

Interviewees and acknowledgements in company documentation indicate that the dialogue played an important role in Total's journey towards *socially responsible practices*. Specifically, interviewees identified four areas of learning (making sense of what is political, learning to anticipate, learning to integrate people, understanding the importance of not working alone) and seven initiatives (tools and methodology, opening the Myanmar/Burma operational site to villagers, workshop with International Labour Organisation, the Forum in Myanmar/Burma, recruiting a Socio-Economic Programme coordinator for Myanmar/Burma, community development approach, programmes to reach the vulnerable) to which the dialogue contributed directly.

Although the impact of the dialogue on the company's learning clearly emerged, the notion of conflict sensitivity was not evident at explicit level. For this reason in the previous paragraph I have emphasised socially responsible practices, and I have continued to refer to them as such throughout the thesis. I have argued, however, that some of its main principles can be found in company writings. Conflict sensitivity is encompassed in the broader notion of social responsibility. Furthermore, as anticipated in *Chapter 3*, it was not possible to identify the degree of impact in a quantifiable measure. In addition to the

numerous organisational and contextual variables anticipated, in the course of the research it became apparent that specific internal and contextual drivers as well as a socialisation process (as intended by Kantz (2007)) actively contributed to the process of change within Total.

> What was it about the dialogue that enabled change? The relationship between Total and CDA was rooted in trust, equal standing, cultural fit and flexible design, truly reflecting fundamental principles of dialogue. As such, the dialogue was able to spark transformational levers within the company (empowerment, motivation and creating a safe space for experimentation and innovation)

Box 11.5 – finding n.2: dialogue sparked transformational levers.

In *Chapter 7*, building on the enablers for change identified by interviewees, I argued that dialogue was a critical contribution to the process of change towards socially responsible practices, as it sparked transformational levers within Total. In addition to the internal drivers for change (legacy of the merger, willingness to change and implement change, generational change, 'acceptability', risk taking), interviewees identified two sets of factors which facilitated the process of change within the French company. The first related to characteristics of CDA as an organisation: its way of working (reputation, knowledge and experience, professionalism, personalities, way of engaging, risk taking, ability to listen and connect, strategic perspective, bring a different perspective, being an intermediary); the other referred to characteristics of the relationship itself (participatory and consultative approach, independence, mutual respect, trust, continuity).

Figure 7.1 – summary of the enablers of change.

By comparing what emerged from the research to four descriptors (design, fit, power dynamics, and trust) reported by cross-sector partnerships authors (Dahan et al 2010, Millar, Choi and Chen 2004, Seitanidi 2008, Wadham 2009), I have argued that the findings of my research are in line with those the authors mentioned above. By analysing the aspects raised by interviewees, in fact, it was possible to see that the enablers were effective for several reasons: the design of the dialogue was effective in working with emergent change; there was a good fit between the two organisations; a clear perception of equal standing between the two organisations emerged; and trust, which had strengthened through time and was a critical element in the dialogue. At the same time I noted how most of the evidence that I had used for the comparison with the cross-sector partnership descriptors also reflected fundamental principles of dialogue discussed by organisational change and conflict resolution authors (Saunders 1999, Senge 2006). I therefore concluded that, because the dialogue was rooted in such fundamental principles, it was able to spark transformational levers within the

organisation, and in doing so significantly contributed to the wider journey of change that Total was experiencing.

The dialogue operated at two levels. It interacted with individuals, focusing on their understanding, behaviours, attitudes and choices. At the same time it encouraged those involved in the dialogue to translate the learning and experience into organisational systems/procedures. This double focus allowed change to happen at tacit level, as well as the explicit one, which is usually where change occurs more immediately, though is not sufficient to be sustainable.

Fostering greater understanding, bringing different perspectives, participatory and consultative approach, empowerment and recognition.

Individual level

Focus of intervention

Supporting the development of tools, methodology, policies; fostering engagement with other companies; acting as a witness of the organisation's intention to change

Organisational level

Figure 7.2 – the double focus of the dialogue.

The dialogue in fact sparked transformational levers of change, acknowledged both by conflict transformation and organisational change authors (Baruch Bush and Folger 2005, Burnes 2009, Cope 2003, Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007, Lederach 2003), which are a key driver towards sustainability. It supported and enhanced the willingness towards change through empowerment and motivation and by creating a safe space for experimentation and innovation. This is where the dialogue's added value lies. Through dialogue, Total and CDA both shared and acquired knowledge. However, there was more. The consultative and participatory character of the process and the nature of what were identified as possible options (feasible and realistic ideas) engendered ownership and readiness to act (self-efficacy). Constructive feedback created additional momentum for further incremental change and increased confidence, on the part of the company, of the direction it had taken. CDA became a trusted critical friend (with no immediate and direct stake, as a consultant would have) which *supported* Total in its journey. The public visit reports were a means of reassurance and direction, as well as important references to counterbalance allegations, thus creating time for learning. Continuity in time as well as the way the dialogue was designed were very favourable in working *with* the emergent nature of

change, to work with shifts in context (internal and external to the company), to work with learning developed as part of the socialisation process.

In *Chapters 8-10* I completed my analysis by looking at the process of change, at how the relationship building potential of TEPM's initiatives shifted over time, and at how embedded the change was.

What is the process of change? The research findings indicate that the process of change involved, as Lederach (2007) and Kanter (1999) anticipated:
- a number of different influences working at different levels in the organisation
- mutual influences across the sectors of the organisations aided by good communication flows.

Box 11.6 - finding n.3: the process of change involves multi-level and multi-dimensional interventions and can be explained though Lederach's (2003) triangle.

Figures 8.3 and 8.4 – Total's and TEPM process of change

By mapping the process of change that occurred within both Total and TEPM it is possible to see that change is a complex process that requires the involvement of many stakeholders and a number of different actors across the organisation. As Lederach (2003) noted, each contributes according to the focus and reach they have in the organisation. Vertical and horizontal flows of communication enable challenges, opportunities and needs to be shared, and mutual influences to occur. The number of people involved and the communication flows allow dealing with shifts in the context as they emerge. By extrapolating the levels of engagement of the dialogue, it becomes evident that it not only operated at individual and organisational level but it also included people with different perspectives and functions within the company in different ways, ensuring that everyone had a role to play.


Figure 8.5 – the different levels of engagement of the dialogue.

Change for Total has been incremental; however, as I argued in *Chapter 9*, it seems to have bloomed around 2007/2008. Drawing on my suggestion made in *Chapter 3* that CSR initiatives can also be seen as a way of building relationships, I illustrated how TEPM's efforts to build relationships with the environment strengthened and expanded in the last four to five years. (I did not feel I had enough information to do a similar exercise for Total).

Figures 9.1 and Figure 9.3 – TEPM's CSR initiatives relationship building potential in 2002-3 and in 2008-12.

I have argued that it is due to the incremental steps taken by the French company coming to fruition then. In particular I observed a shift in the factors identified by Killick, Srikantha and Gündüz (2005), Tripathi and Gündüz (2008) and Zandvliet (2005) and noted in *Chapter 2* that influence the way companies interact with their environment. General Managers appointed recognised the interdependencies between the company's presence and the context and began pushing the boundaries of what they could be doing. A change in the perception of risk occurred, allowing for initiatives, that previously were viewed as unthinkable, to occur. TEPM's own perceived confidence in what it was doing in terms of relationship building and social investment, as well as its perceived legitimacy by some local stakeholders, increased in a time when the changes in Myanmar/Burma were opening opportunities for action. The willingness of TEPM to draw on its leverage, enabled the company to seize these opportunities. Learning, time and a safe-space allowed attitudes to mature and manifest overtly into actions.

These shifts in perceptions and willingness to act differently, I suggested, were made possible by the dialogue fostering essential transformative factors (empowerment and motivation as well as creating a safe space for experimentation and innovation). As a result specific outcomes are observable: greater understanding of what is political, learning to anticipate, learning to work together, learning to integrate people (in the diagram below in red are those attributed to CDA and in yellow those I observed), different perception of risk,

Conclusions – by F. Cerletti

greater openness, greater ability to use leverage, increased willingness to experiment and innovate. These outcomes, then manifest in a number of tangible initiatives/activities (outputs).


Figure 9.4 - the role of the dialogue within Total's journey of change.

> How embedded is the change? In Total's and TEPM journey of change there are visible changes at personal, relational and structural dimension. Changes in the culture may be occurring however they are mostly driven by structural drivers and the current trend is still not yet irreversible.

Box 11.7 - finding n. 4: if current efforts are maintained and continued, socially responsible practices are likely to be embedded in Total.

The change in practices is beginning to root itself in the French company. In mapping some of the most visible changes that occurred both in Total and TEPM to Lederach et al's matrix (Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007), it is possible to see that change is occurring in at least three dimensions: individual, relational and structural. The French company has put much effort in reviewing and updating its system, policies, procedures, etc. It has also put in place structures to facilitate behaviour change and improve relationships (for example training and policies). A strong difference is noticeable on how it relates to its stakeholders (including local communities) especially for what concerns TEPM. At the individual level understanding, behaviours and attitudes are changing, though the main driver seems to be the shift in processes and procedures. Some Total/TEPM employees have suggested that there is room to do more in terms of personal accountability in these issues. Change is probably simmering at cultural level, though in the main it is driven by structural factors. Total staff, as mentioned in *Chapter 10*, talk about institutionalisation as being a step by step process which will take time. If current efforts are maintained and continued, socially responsible practices are likely to be embedded in Total. However, the attention and pressure must not diminish in order to conquer this next summit.

What lessons can be drawn from this case study? I will start by discussing the implications for future research. Next I will highlight useful points for consideration when engaging with business and in particular in relation to dialogue as a form of engagement. I will conclude by exploring a couple of specific questions that the research has highlighted in terms of replicability of the study and on the degree conflict sensitivity should be embedded as a notion in the company.

The research does offer a starting point for further studies in several directions. By exploring the underpinning relationships, process and dynamics, in this research I was able to draw the attention to what it is about dialogue that enables change. Most of the findings emerge from people's perceptions which I tried to corroborate by interviewing individuals not directly

involved in the Total-CDA relationship. As such, I am conscious it is an initial attempt to fill a gap and to open the road for others.

Firstly, there is a need for more research in the conflict transformation-business arena that takes into consideration the characteristics, operations and limitations of the private sector. In this, it is important to be able to understand the perspective of business, and a cross-disciplinary approach would facilitate this bridging between the two worlds. In fact, as discussed in *Chapter 2*, business is seen as monolithic (Zandvliet 2005). As Rettberg (2012) notes, there is the need to understand business as a sector, but also to be clear about the challenges and opportunities that each company faces. In doing so it is useful to: take a systemic perspective, build on the work that Senge (2006) proposed, focussing on the interdependencies with the context from a number of different angles including the organisation's, and emphasising the value of intangibles such as relationships.

Secondly, there is room for exploring the role and effectiveness of soft-engagement. As noted in *Chapter 2*, there are classics on the nature of dialogue (Bohm 1996, Isaacs 1999) which have focussed on dialogue as a process/method in conversations, and obviously there are writings from conflict studies authors (see Saunders (1999)). Soft-engagement with the business sector is still relatively unexplored. This is not about *multi-stakeholder* dialogue; it is more akin to peacebuilding i.e. how to hold constructive conversations between those who have different world views.

Thirdly, current events in Myanmar/Burma create new opportunities for much needed quantitative and qualitative research across the board in the country. Corporate engagement is still a delicate issue as many companies feel the pressure of stakeholder action. For example, I tried to contact other oil and gas companies there and only a local one, in addition to Total, received me. Additional know-how is much needed. I believe that the actors with the greatest potential for change are businesses. The direction of change could be positive or negative; it is all yet to be decided. There is now the opportunity to prove that constructive engagement is beneficial for all and a critical strategy for business to prosper.

My research offers high-level pointers for consideration when engaging with corporations. These draw on the key principles of dialogue, conflict transformation and organisational change and show that applicability of the learning goes well beyond the single disciplines.

Engaging with business requires differentiating the sector from the single unit. Composite action is needed that approaches the sector as a whole, but also the individual companies. When engaging with an organisation it is important to understand it well - business model, operations, way of working, management and working culture, communication flows, etc. Such knowledge will offer insights on the business' aspirations and also on its limitations.

Businesses are communities. They are social units made of individuals. As such opportunities and limitations will be at double level: the organisational and the individual one. On the one hand, companies work as systems and are part of other systems; they have their own working mechanisms *and* they cannot be isolated from their contexts and the complexity that surrounds them. On the other hand, a company is driven by people with their own knowledge, perceptions of risk fears, incentive mechanisms etc. A change in course will therefore need to consider the needs of the individuals, the nature of the organisation and the specific levers that will foster change.

This is even more relevant when the engagement is in regard to issues that are far from a business' habitual patterns of behaviours, as societal issues were when CDA and Total began their journey. Most likely a shift will be required by those concerned, starting from the simple premise of why they should be addressing such issues.

As the thesis illustrated, multiple factors contributed to Total's journey. Transformation needs to be supported by involving and mobilising actors at all levels of the organisation with a variety of interventions as appropriate. This is why a differentiated multi-level and multi-dimensional approach are required: shifts need to occur in structures (systems, political, procedures, etc.), in how relationships (as intended by Lederach (Lederach and Maiese 2003, Lederach 2003)) are managed, in behaviours and attitudes, and eventually in the culture of the organisation (Kanter 1991, Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007, Lederach, Neufeld and Culbertson 2007). Furthermore, it is important to create the space for change as well as understand and connect to what can have a multiplier effect, for example linking to facilitators of constructive internal communications flows (Kanter 1999a, Lederach 2003) existing within the organisation, such as internal cross-functional networks/communities of practice (Theodorakopoulos et al 2009).

Whichever the approach, dialogue is a necessary strategy: it opens the transformational potential in individuals and hence in organisations. Working *with* implies consultation,

flexibility, mutual influence, and recognition. Dialogue empowers participants to make different decisions (Saunders 1999); though it has to be based on the principles that make dialogue effective: perceived symmetries of power, mutual respect, mutual learning, openness to listening and curiosity about what is being said (i.e. a good fit between the parties) - see Bohm (1996) and Saunders (1999).

Dialogue also becomes an essential part in engendering the willingness to change. Rettberg (2012) mentions the need to broaden the engagement beyond the converted: there is no formula. People do not want to be changed but they change all the time: how one is engaged makes a huge difference. The case study clearly shows that Total's degree of willingness was increased thorough time and range of strategies and interactions. There is no formula; however, dialogue has the greatest potential in planting the seeds of change by allowing people to engage with their beliefs and world views and explore different views.

Finally, could the Total-CDA dialogue be initiated today? I believe so. The two organisations definitely trod new ground at the time. However, the context today is such that the shift in paradigm in terms of corporate social responsibility has gained more ground. Hence, it should be easier to engage in dialogue, although if the transformational element is neglected, it also makes it easier for people to 'window dress' without thinking about long term consequences. More of a challenge, as I see from personal experience, is convincing donors of the long-term investment that is needed, often with unpredictable and intangible results, to guarantee the independence of who engages with the corporation.

Should more efforts and resources be invested to ensure that understanding of what conflict sensitivity is becomes explicit? Perhaps. On the one hand, being conflict sensitive is an integral part of being socially responsible. A clear understanding of what conflict sensitivity entails is needed to practice and implement responsible ways of working. To this purpose, I would suggest that the dialogue between Total and CDA should focus more on this aspect. On the other hand, because it is an integral part of being socially responsible, I feel that it is not important to differentiate between conflict sensitivity and CSR in the company's statements and writings. A company should *act* in a conflict sensitive manner; whether it articulates the notion or not is less important.

I conclude my discussion with the above consideration. I hope I have contributed to a greater understanding of conflict sensitivity from a business perspective and how businesses can be engaged to influence a change in practices in that direction.

Conclusions – by F. Cerletti

Appendix 1 – Acronyms

BFDA	Bureau of Food and Drug Analysis
CDA	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEP	Corporate Engagement Project
CFP	Compagnie Française des Pétroles
CNPC	Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
E&P	Exploration and Production
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency initiative
ERI	Earth Rights International
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
GBI	Global Business Initiative on Human Rights
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GM	General Manager
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
IA	International Alert
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFP	Institut Français du Pétrole
IHRB	Institute for Human Rights and Business
INGO	International NGO
IPIECA	international Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
IRAM	a French NGO working the the areas of development and microfinance
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
JADE	Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts
KIO	Kachin Independence Organisation
KMT	Kuomintang
LNGO	Local NGO
MNC	Multinational Company
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOGE	Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-government organisation
NGOs	Non-government organisations
NLD	National League for Democracy
NPO	Non-profit organisation
NPOs	Non-profit organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PETRONAS	Petroliam Nasional Berhad
PLC	Pipeline Centre
PRI	Principles for Responsible Investment

PTT-EP	Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SEP	Socio-Eco Programme
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
STEP	Steps Towards Conflict Prevention
TEPM	Total E&P Myanmar
TNC	Transnational Company
Total	Total S.A.
UK	United Kingdom
UMFCCI	Union of Myanmar Federation Chambers of Commerce and Industry
UN	United Nations
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
Unocal	A subsidiary of Chevron
US	United States
USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party
VCCs	Village Communication Committees
VPs	Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights
WWII	World War II
YNG	Yangon

Appendix 1 – by F. Cerletti

Appendix 2 - Glossary

360' Leadership review process - The 360' Leadership review process is a personal development assessment used in business to evaluate employees. The evaluation is the result of feedback from superiors, peers and subordinates as well as a self-assessment.

Complex environment - I use the term 'complex environment' to refer to an area, characterised by multiple coexisting lines of tension. Usually such tensions involve most of the following: instability, conflict (violent and/or societal), lack of institutional mechanisms for fair resolution of socio-economic and political issues, uncertainty about the rule of law, human rights abuses, endemic and pervasive social issues like discrimination, inequalities.

Conflict sensitivity – Conflict sensitivity is defined as "the ability of your organisation to: understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts." (Africa Peace Forum et al 2004:1)

Conflict Transformation – Lederach has defined conflict transformation as: "(c)onflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships." (http://www.restorativejustice.org/10fulltext/lederach)

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) - I refer to Corporate Social Responsibility as described by ISO 26000: "responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour that:

- takes into account the expectations of stakeholders;
- contributes to sustainable development, including health and the welfare of society;
- is in compliance with applicable law and consistent with international norms of behaviour; and
- is integrated throughout the organization and practiced in its relationships" (ISO 2010:3).

Dialogue between Total and CDA – For the purpose of this research, by dialogue between CDA and Total I refer to a series of conversations, exchanges and visits between the two organisations, supported by written documents as well as the participation in the consultations of the collaborative learning project CEP.

GINI Coefficient – a statistical coefficient to measure inequalities between a list of related numbers. It is often used to calculate inequalities in the distribution of income. 0 is perfect equality, 1 is most unequal.

GSP – The Generalized System of Preferences allows making exemptions from the most favoured nation principle which imposes a World Trade Organisation member country to offer equal treatment as its favoured trading partner to all other members. GSP permits a reduction in tariffs for imports from developing countries.

ISO 14000 – Refers to a group of standards set by the International Organisation for Standardisation relating to environmental management. The purpose is to ensure that though these systems the company minimises its negative impacts on the environment.

ISO 26000 – Guidance developed by the International Organisation for Standardisation for businesses to work in a socially responsible way.

Myanmar or Burma – The name of the country is still today a delicate issue. The website Network Myanmar states: "(i)n the Burmese language, 'Myanma' has long been the more formal name of the country. It is the name used in the Burmese-language version of the 1947 Constitution enacted in the last year of British rule. It has existed side by side for centuries with the more colloquial 'Bama'. However, a leading nationalist association in the 1930s called *Do Bama Asia* Yon ('We Burmese Association'), of which [General] Aung San was a founder member, chose the name 'Bama' on the grounds that 'Myanma' only represented the traditional territory of the Burman Kings and did not include the non-Burman peoples." (Network Myanmar 2012) The dual co-existence of the name is also confirmed by the anthropologist Gustaaf Houtman, who has been cited in the BBC website: "(t)here's a formal term which is Myanmar and the informal, everyday term which is Burma." (BBC 2007) Burma is the anglicised version of Bama/Bumah. In 1989 the then government changed the English version of the country's name from Burma to Myanmar (Network Myanmar). The UN

has used this term since then. Pro-democracy activists and those with strong anti-military regime feelings tend to use the word Burma, protesting that the change to Myanmar/Burma was a typical example of authoritarian decision-making by the Generals and that is was done to whitewash the grievances of the past. During my encounters in these circles I have heard agreement for the term 'Union of the People of Myanmar'. I have chosen to use both: Myanmar/Burma.

Peacebuilding – Lederach defines peacebuilding as: "a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct." (Lederach 1997:20)

Relationships – I have used the term relationships as Lederach intends, i.e. not only between individuals, but also between groups and institutions. "(R)elationships represent a web of connections that form the larger context, the human-ecosystem, from which particular issues arise and are given life." (Lederach 2003)

Shwe project - This project is still in development. It consists of two parallel pipelines: one to transport oil coming from the Middle East to be refined in Sichuan and Yunnan and the other gas from the offshore fields of Myanmar to China. The joint venture consists of: CNPC (50.9%) and MOGE (49.1%). Other companies involved are: Daewoo International Corp, GAIL and Korea Gas Corporation.

Societal - Total uses the term societal to refer to matters concerning society/community. This is specifically to avoid potential confusion with the direct translation of society in French. *Société*, or society, within the business environments is commonly referred to the company, as in *Société* Anonime).

Total, E&P and TEPM – Total S.A. is a corporation with group/corporate level functions and five branches. One of these branches is called Exploration & Production (E&P). In Myanmar/Burma, Total operates through an E&P subsidiary: Total E&P Myanmar or TEPM. As mentioned earlier, I have interviewed people from Total Group level and from TEPM. Although company documentation refers to the groups as a whole, I am uncomfortable,

given the restricted pool of interviews, to state that change is observable across the whole organisation. I therefore have used the term Total to indicate group level and E&P.

Track II - Track II refers to dialogue efforts between actors who do not officially represent the parties in conflict: for example between business sector leaders and religious representatives.

Transnational (TNC) or multinational company (MNC) - There is no universally accepted definition for a transnational or a multinational company. The latter broadly refers to a company that has its headquarters in one country (home) and runs subsidiaries in other countries (host). When differentiation in terms of geographic location blurs, a company is usually referred to as transnational. Total defines itself as an integrated international oil and gas company (www.total.com).

Yadana Project – Yadana is a gas field in the Andaman Sea about 60km off-shore Myanmar. The pipelines run eastward towards Thailand and North-East towards Yangon. The joint venture that operates the pipelines is composed by Total, which is the operator company (31.2%), Chevron (28.3%), PTT (25.5%), and MOGE (15%). This was the first off-shore gas field to be exploited in Myanmar.

Yetagun Project – This is the second off-shore gas field to be exploited in Myanmar. The joint venture partners are: Petronas (40.9%) the operating company, PTT Exploration & Production (19.3%), Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (20.5%), Nippon Oil (19.3%). It is located in the Taninthayi offshore area and its pipeline runs parallel to the Yadana pipeline to Thailand.

Zawtika Project – The pipeline is in construction. It will take gas from the Zawtika off-shore gas field (300kn South of Yangon and 240km East of Dawai) to Thailand. The pipeline will run in the same area of the Yadana and Yetagun projects. It is a joint venture between PTT-EP and MOGE.

The Yadana, Yetagun and Zawtika gas pipelines. Adapted from MOGE presentation July 11, http://www.slideshare.net/myanmarbusiness/myanmar-oil-gas-enterprise-moge, accessed 15.11.12

Appendix 2 – by F. Cerletti

The Shwe gas and oil pipelines project. Source: www.shwe.org image from Reuters graphic/Catherine Treventhan. Accessed 7.1.13

Appendix 3 – List of interviewees

INTERVIEWEE	CATEGORY	EXPERIENCE	YEARS
2	Media Intl	KT	2004-2012
3	Diplomatic	KT	2009-2012
5	Total Former Employee	D	2001-2008
6	Civil society YNG INGO	C	2008-2012
7	Total Employee	D	2004-2012
8	Civil Society YNG LNGO	I	2009-2011
10	Total Employee	D	2000-2012
15	Contractor TEPM Former	I	2010
17	Civil society Thai INGO	I	2002-2010
20	Total Employee	KT	2002-2012
23	Contractor TEPM	I	2002-2012
24	Civil Society YNG LNGO	I	2009
28	Media Intl	C	2008-2012
29	Media Intl	KT	2002-2012
31	CDA contributor	D	2002-2012
33	Business Partner	I	2011
39	Business Sector YNG	C	2002-2012
49	TEPM Employee	I	2011-2012
50	TEPM Employee	D	2007-2012
51	Civil society YNG LNGO	C	2002-2012
57	CDA contributor	D	2009-2012
58	CDA contributor	D	2005
60	TEPM Former Employee	D	2002-2012
64	TEPM Employee	D	2002-2012
72	Business partner	I	2002-2012
73	TEPM Former Employee	D	2008-2011
80	Civil society YNG INGO	KT	2002-2007
101	Business Sector	C	2007-2012
102	Finance sector	I	2005-2012
105	Academia CSR	C	2002-2012
112	Analyst industry	I	2000-2012
128	Finance sector	I	2006-2012
142	Total Employee	D	2004-2012
155	Total Former Employee	KT	2006-2007
156	Total Employee	D	2003-2012
165	TEPM Former Employee	I	2007-2010
196	Business Partner	I	2011-2012
201	Business sector CSR	KT	2010
212	TEPM Employee	D	2006-2012
215	Civil Society YNG LNGO	I	2008
239	Intermational Org	D	2006-2012
289	Contractor TEPM	D	2008-2012
305	TEPM Employee	D	2010-2012

434 Civil society YNG LNGO	I	2006-2012
449 Total Employee	D	2002-2012
504 CDA contributor	D	2002-2009
551 Business sector YNG	C	2006-2012
613 TEPM Employee	D	2008-2012
637 Business Partner	I	2011
724 Media Intl	KT	2005-2008
747 Business sector CSR	I	2007-2012
809 TEPM Employee	I	2011-2012
894 Contractor TEPM former	I	2009-2011
950 Media Intl	KT	2002-2012

4.1   Some of the main CSR initiatives by Total

I have grouped initiatives in: policies (red), structures (blue) capacity building (green), communications (orange) and the development of tools (in orange), partnerships and collaborations cover a wide range of themes, as well as participation in known international bodies as Global Compact and EITI. I have developed the timeline drawing from documents have analysed and the interviews made. The timeline do not mean to be exhaustive. Furthermore their accuracy depends on my reading of documents and on people's memories. They are for illustration purposes only.

Year	Policies (red)	Structure (blue)	Capacity building (tools, training, M&E - green)	Communications (orange)	Co-operations/partnerships	Index presence
2000	Code of Conduct Ethics Charter	Ethics Committee				
2001	HSEQ Charter ISO 14001 implementation across group	Total Prof (Retired personnel collaborates with universities)		First CSR report		FTSE4Good Index - and every subsequent year
2002		Establishment of Sustainable Development and Environment Division Societal Metier Network	Ethics assessments - and subsequent years Societal Metier Network: yearly seminar in France (Group level)		Joined EITI Joined Global Compact and participation to Ruggie's initiatives Partnership with Good Corporation (ethics assessments) Joined CEP, CDA visit Myanmar Joined Institute of Business Ethics	
2003	Adoption of *International Safety Rating System A8000* by Marketing and Refining branch Group *Safety Guidelines on Contractor Safety and Safety Behaviour*		Social and societal impact assessments introduced Ethics seminars- and subsequent years	CSR on AGM agenda - and every year since then	Participation to road safety campaign in France CDA visit Myanmar x 2	

Appendix 4 – by F. Cerletti

Year	Policies (red)	Structure (blue)	Capacity building (tools, training, M&E - green)	Communications (orange)	Co-operations/partnerships	Index presence
2004	Corporate security policy includes VPs Code of Conduct adapted *Financial Ethics Code* ; *E&P Purchasing Code* E&P health care plan		*Safety Behaviour Guide* Local Community Guide VPs operational guide distribution Group *Safety Guidelines of Driving Safely* ; *Occupational Health and Hygiene Health Guidelines*		CDA visit Elf Petroleum Nigeria	DJSI World Index - and every subsequent year Vigeo's ASPI Index - and every subsequent year
2005	Group *Safety Guideline: Technological Risk Analysis* Application of IFC standards	Total University' launched	EIA (annual appraisals) - adapted to include question on CoC Societal Metier Network: Beijing seminar (Regional level) New Vision Programme, shift from philanthropy to societal issues 58% of environmental sites achieved ISO14001 cert. VPs dedicated training developed and rolled out Introduction of SRM+		Agreement with Eco Maires Association CDA visit Sudan, Myanmar	DJSI Europe Index - and every subsequent year
2006	New Total directive which builds on the VPs		Societal Metier Network: Libreville seminar (Regional level)		Partnership with UNITAR Funding agreement with Institute Pasteur CDA visit Mauritania	Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index
2007			Societal Metier Network: Caracas seminar (Regional level) *Integrity Guide* *Sustainable Development* *233 words in context*	Investor relations CSR presentations - and subsequent years	Partnership with DIHR Total on the EITI Board	Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index

Appendix 4 – by F. Cerletti

Year	Policies (red)	Structure (blue)	Capacity building (tools, training, M&E - green)	Communications (orange)	Co-operations/partnerships	Index presence
2008	Compliance department works on new programme New directive prioritising the 5 areas covered by VPs AFEP-MEDEF code of governance (targets for Women participation)	Local Content organisation and correspondent put in place	Societal Metier Network: Jakarta seminar (Regional level) Developing Local Content Internal Guide' Practical Guide for Local Development Projects'	Dedicated web section to CSR	CDA visit Myanmar	Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index
2009			*Guide du dialogue local* Development of 'Bases of Societal Engineering' - 1 day training for E&P Development of 'Advanced Societal Engineering' - 3-5 days training for subsidiaries Societal Metier Network: Johannesburg seminar (Regional level) Societal Metier E&P Workshop		Joined GBI for HR Testing of Human Rights country assessment developed with DIHR in Angola	Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index
2010	New compliance programme launched	Societal Lab	*Safety at work 10 golden rules* guidelines		Participation to development of UN GC 'Guide for Investing in Conflict Zone' + Testing some of its recommendations Participation to Ruggie's PRR	Oekom Research: Total gains 'B' and 'Prime' status

Appendix 4 – by F. Cerletti

Year	Policies (red)	Structure (blue)	Capacity building (tools, training, M&E - green)	Communications (orange)	Co-operations/partnerships	Index presence
2011	Societal Charter' in development		Development of 1 day group-wide training on societal issues Development of 2hrs E&P awareness training on Societal issues Development training for Community Liaison Officers Societal Metier E&P Workshop Human Rights' internal guide		Collaboration with IFP Training to develop a course *Societal for Projects* UN GC LEAD New consolidated partnership with DIHR and support to develop *HR and Business Country Portal* CDA visit Uganda, Myanmar Good Corporation audits 8 subsidiaries	
2012			*Practical Guide for Local Development Projects* new edition Societal Metier E&P Workshop			

4.2   TEPM CSR activities

The timeline below is grouped in the following categories. The first relates to activities in the Yadana pipeline area. The second refers to initiatives set up by TEPM in other parts of the country; these are mainly run in partnership with NGOs. The third refers to internal policies structures and capacity building. In the fourth category I have listed key visits made by organisations/individuals to TEPM's initiatives. As mentioned earlier, I have based the timeline on interviews and documentation available. Although this timeline heavily draws on the Socio-Economic Programme (SEP) 2010 Report (TEPM 2010b), some of the information may still be imprecise, as it relies on individual's memories. This timeline is for illustration purposes only.

Year	Yadana pipeline area	National	Internal policies, structures and capacity building	Visits/Assessments
1995	Socio-economic study Infrastructure programme		TEPM Code of Conduct	
1996	Yadana Socio-Eco Programme Development - Activities in 13 Villages			
1997	Micro-finance programme as part of Yadana Socio-Eco activities Agricultural development			
1998		Yangon orphanages programme		
1999	Poultry Farming			
2000	Yadana Tuition school Development of perennial crops			
2001	10 villages added to Socio-Eco Programme Computer training	Hellen Keller Foundation Blindness Prevention Programme Yadana foster care home		
2002	Development of horticultural crops			CDA visit
2003			Dedicated website (Total) for Myanmar	Kouchner visit Journalists and diplomatic reps visits to Myanmar CDA visit x 2
2004	Scholarship programme Expansion of micro-finance programme			

Appendix 4 – by F. Cerletti

Year	Yadana pipeline area	National	Internal policies, structures and capacity building	Visits/Assessments
2005	Tree nursery Expansion of Socio-Eco Programme to a total of 25 villages	Integrated HIV Care Project (IHC) Mandalay	Revised Code of Conduct	CDA visit
2006		UNITAR training	Re-organisation of Socio-Eco programme team Shift to community development	Assessment of Socio-Eco Programme Good Corporation assessment
2007	Community Development approach in 6 villages Mother and Child pilot programme New Yadana tuition school New micro-finance programme Farmers field training School			
2008	Extension of Mother and Child programme Animal feed plants transferred to local entrepreneurs First Village Agricultural Input Store	HIV Project (IHC) Pakokku Forum	SEP coordinator hired	Visits from investors CDA visit
2009	New micro-finance programme extended to all villages Another computer training school opened Second Village Agricultural Input Store Rice intensification programme	UNITAR training IFP training	New Burmese version of the Code of Conduct DIHR training New SEP programme guidelines	Visits from investors
2010	ILO training Mother and Child Programme extended to all villages Goat breeding programme for very poor families	Integrated HIV Care Project (IHC) Mandalay HIV Project (IHC) Taungyi		Impact Assessment MMRD
2011	Grievance process launched	CSR workshop with UMFCCI		CDA visit, Good Corporation Assessment, Journalist visit
2012	Local level Forum	Themed workshops with UMFCCI		

Appendix 4 – by F. Cerletti

References

Africa Peace Forum et Al. (2004) Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack: Africa Peace Forum, Centre For Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Saferworld

Aguilera, R., Rupp, D. E., Williams, C. A., and Ganapathi, I. (2007) 'Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations'. Academy of Management Review 32 (3), 863-863

Alexander, N. (2008) The Mediation Meta-Model: Understanding Practice [online]

Aljazeera (2011) Aljazeera inside Story 2.12.11

Allan, D. (2011) Myanmar 2011: Governance, Development and Dialogue. 'Pathways for a More Peaceful National Development Process: – Different Approaches to Investment Projects in Myanmar, and the Role of Dialogue', held 20-22 June 2011 at Hong Kong: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong

Allen, C. T. (2009) 'The Mediation Process: Navigating the Quagmire. (Cover Story)'. Conflict Management 13 (3), 1-15

Anderson, M. B., (1999) Do no Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - Or War. Lynne Rienner

Anon (2003) 'Travail Forcé Payé Par Total, Kouchner Blanchit Total En Birmanie'. Le Nouvel Observateur jeudi 11 décembre 2003

Anon (2010b) 'Myanmar Moves to Privatize Key State Enterprises'. Wall Street Journal [online] February 18, 2010. Available from <http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704269004575073021237781744-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwNjEyNDYyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email> [28 August 2011]

Anon (2012a) 'Ital-Thai to "Renegotiate" After Govt Cuts Coal Plant'. The Myanmar Times January 16 - 22, 2012

Anon (nd) Volunatary Principles on Security and Human Rights [online] available from <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary_principles_english.pdf> [November 28 2012]

Anon 10 (2011) Interview 10 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [October 2011]

Anon 102 (2011) Interview 102 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 112 (2011) Interview 112 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 128 (2012) Interview 128 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 142 (2011) Interview 142 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 15 (2012) Interview 15 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [February 2012]

Anon 155 (2011) Interview 155 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [August 2011]

Anon 156 (2011) Interview 156 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 165 (2011) Interview 165 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 17 (2011) Interview 17 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 196 (2011) Interview 196 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 20 (2011) Interview 20 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [December 2011]

Anon 212 (2012) Interview 212 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [February 2012]

Anon 215 (2011) Interview 215 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [June 2011]

Anon 23 (2012) Interview 23 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 239 (2011) Interview 239 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 24 (2011) Interview 24 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 289 (2012) Interview 289 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 29 (2011) Interview 29 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [December 2011]

Anon 305 (2012) Interview 305 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 31 (2011) Interview 31 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [March 2011]

Anon 33 (2011) Interview 33 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 434 (2011) Interview 434 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 449 (2011a) Interview 449 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [October 2011]

Anon 449 (2011b) Interview 449a [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [November 2011]

Anon 49 (2012) Interview 49 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [February 2012]

Anon 5 (2012) Interview 5 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [March 2012]

Anon 50 (2012) Interview 50 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [February 2012]

Anon 504 (2011) Interview 504 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 57 (2011) Interview 57 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [March 2011]

Anon 58 (2011) Interview 58 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 6 (2011) Interview 6 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 60 (2012) Interview 60 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 613 (2012) Interview 613 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 637 (2011) Interview 637 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 64 (2012) Interview 64 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 7 (2011) Interview 7 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 72 (2011) Interview 72 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [September 2011]

Anon 724 (2011) Interview 724 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [December 2011]

Anon 73 (2011) Interview 73 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 747 (2011) Interview 747 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [October 2011]

Anon 8 (2011) Interview 8 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 809 (2012) Interview 809 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [January 2012]

Anon 894 (2011) Interview 894 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [May 2011]

Anon 950 (2011) Interview 950 [type of communication] to Cerletti, F. [December 2011]

Arezki, R., Van Der Ploeg, F., Arezki, R., and Van, d. P. (2011) 'Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?'. Review of Development Economics 15 (3), 504

Assemblée Nationale (1999) Assemblée Nationale rapport d'information n° 1859 onzième législature Enregistré à La Présidence De l'Assemblée Nationale Le 13 Octobre 1999. PAR LA COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES (1) Sur Le Rôle Des compagnies pétrolières Dans La Politique internationale Et Son Impact social Et Environnemental et présenté Par Mme Marie-Hélène Aubert, et Mm. Pierre Brana Et Roland Blum, Rapporteurs TOME I. Paris: Assemblee Nationale

Aujourd'hui en France (2009) Total is neither a Political Tool nor an NGO [online]. trans. by Total. Available from <http://www.ng.total.com/media/features/0607_11Sep2009_features_1/interview_cdm _parisien_110909_1_va.pdf> [14 September 2011]

Avant, D. and Haufler, V. (eds.) (2010) American Political Science Association. 'Diffusion and Governance Beyond the State: Security Policies and Governance Roles for NGOs and Corporations', held 2-5 September, at Washington, DC.

Bais, K. (2008) Corporate Social Responsibility. Whose Voice is Heard? [online] [12.1.10]

Bais, K. and Juijser, M. (2005) The Profit of Peace: Corporate Responsibility in Conflict Regions. Sheffield, U.K.: Greenleaf Publishing Ltd

Bakker, F. G. A. D. and Hond, F. D. (2008) 'Activists' Influence Tactics and Corporate Policies'. Business Communication Quarterly 71 (1), 107-111

Bakker, F. G. A. D. and Hond, F. d. (2008) 'Introducing the Politics of Stakeholder Influence: A Review Essay'. Business & Society 47 (1), 8-20

Bakker, F. G. A. D., Hond, F. d., King, B., and Weber, K. (2009) 'The Fifth Organization Studies Workshop: "Social Movements, Civil Societies, and Corporation" 26-28 may 2010, Margaux, France'. Organization Studies [online] 30, 685-2 [12.1.10]

Bandura, A. (2001) 'SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY: An Agentic Perspective'. Annual Review of Psychology 52 (1), 1

Bandura, A. (2006) 'Toward a Psychology of Human Agency'. Perspectives on Psychological Science (Wiley-Blackwell) 1 (2), 164-180

Banfield, J., Haufler, V., and Lilly, D. (2003) Operating in High Risks Zones. Transnational Corporations in Conflict Prone Zones: Public Policy Responses and a Framework for Action [online] available from <www.international-alert.org>

Barbolet, A., Goldwyn, R., Groenewald, H., and Sherrif, A. (2005) 'The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity'. in Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. ed. by Anon: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Barnes, C. (2003) The Living Document: A Framework for Substantive Exploration of the Opportunities, Challenges and Dilemmas for Civil Society Engagement in Preventing Armed Conflict. European Centre for Conflict Prevention / CSP International Secretariat

Baruch Bush, R. A. and Folger, J. P. (2005) The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition. Jossey-Bass

Bauman, Z. (1967) 'Image of Man in the Modern Society – some Methodological Remarks'. Polish Sociological Bulletin 7 (1), 12-21

BBC (2007) Should it be Burma Or Myanmar? [online] available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7013943.stm> [October 15 2012]

BBC (2012) Burma 'Begins Talks' After Revealing $11bn Foreign Debt [online] available from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16859904> [March 30 2012]

BCUK, (2005) TOTAL Oil: Fuelling the Oppression in Burma. London: BCUK

Bennet, J. (ed.) (2001) Paper Presented at the UN Global Compact Policy Dialogues. 'Business in Zones of Conflict: The Role of the Multinational in Promoting Regional Stability.'

BEWG, Burma Environment Working Group (2011) Burmese Regime Neglecting Environmental Protection: New Report Highlights Need for Sound Environment and Development Policy Framework in Postelection Burma. Thailand: BEWG

Bissinger, J. (ed.) (2011) Myanmar 2011: Governance, Development and Dialogue. 'Foreign Investment Trends in Myanmar', held 20-22 June 2011 at Hong Kong: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong

Black, N. (2009) Blood Money. A Grounded Theory of Corporate Citizenship, Myanmar (Burma) as a Case in Point. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis. New Zeeland: The University of Waikato

Blanton, S. L. and Blanton, R. G. (2006) 'Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment'. Business & Society 45 (4), 464-485

Boge, V., Fitzpatrick, C., Jaspers, W., and Paes, W. C. (2007) Who's Minding the Store? the Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict, BICC Bonn International Centre for Conversion

Bohm, D. (1996) On Dialogue. London, New York. Routledge

Bowen, D. E. (1992) 'The Empowerment of Service Workers: What, Why, How, And When'. Sloan Management Review 33 (3), 31

Brusset, E., Brett, J., Vaux, T., Bryld, E., and Olesen, N. (2007) Sida Evaluation of CDA, Collaborative Learning Projects, Final Report [online] available from <http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Ai4RIZcUi_AJ:www.channelresearch.com/file_download/87/270607_Evaluation_CDA_Final_Report_2.pdf+CDA+evaluation+channel+research&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESj8tXue2JEb0zo9FImQLxtkpdTOXw9pelChV75mAzbGVmZvj8FKWuuNcfGaCNhRMxFaY9tcx0jwR_cU_oA34H8Grf9aCq8T2k6QNRPUI8mgFAsjzmWnQmvKv2nc7Fp-yuxgbWzD&sig=AHIEtbSEFQtQweuufm5rBPdpNpWTnPUtaQ>

Burchell, J. and Cook, J. (2006) 'Assessing the Impact of Stakeholder Dialogue: Changing Relationships between NGOs and Companies'. Journal of Public Affairs (14723891) 6 (3), 210-227

Burke, W. W. and Litwin, G. H. (1992) 'A Causal of Organisation Performance and Change'. Journal of Management [online] 18 (3)

Burnes, B. (1996) 'No such Thing as...a `one Best Way' to Manage Organizational Change'. Management Decision 34 (10), 11

Burnes, B. (1997) 'Organizational Choice and Organizational Change'. Management Decision 35 (10), 753-759

Burnes, B. (2004) 'Emergent Change and Planned Change - Competitors Or Allies?'. International Journal of Operations & Production Management 24 (9), 886-902

Burnes, B. (2005) 'Complexity Theories and Organizational Change'. International Journal of Management Reviews 7 (2), 73-90

Burnes, B. (2009) 'Reflections: Ethics and Organizational Change - Time for a Return to Lewinian Values'. Journal of Change Management 9 (4), 359-381

By, R. T. (2005) 'Organisational Change Management: A Critical Review'. Journal of Change Management 5 (4), 369-380

Caillaud, R. (2011) Beyond Sanctions the Impact of Responsible Investments in Myanmar, Presenation at the Myanmar 2011. Governance, Development and Dialogue [online] Hong Kong edn: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong

Caroll, T. and Sovacol, B. (2010) 'Pipelines, Crisis and Capital: Understanding the Contested Regionalism of Southeast Asia'. The Pacific Review 23 (5), 625-647

CDA (2002) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Yadana Gas Transportation Project, Moattama Gas Transportation Company, Operator TotalFinaElf, Myanmar/Burma, October 18-30, 2002 (First Visit) [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2003a) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Yadana Gas Transportation Project, Moattama Gas Transportation Company, Operator Total, Myanmar/Burma, April 2 – May 2, 2003 (Second Visit) [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2003b) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Yadana Gas Transportation Project, Moattama Gas Transportation Company, Operator Total, Myanmar/Burma, November 22 – December 6, 2003 (Third Visit) [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2004) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Operator Elf Petroleum Nigerial Limited, Nigeria (EPNL), June 30 – July 13, 2004 [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2005a) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Yadana Gas Transportation Project, Moattama Gas Transportation Company, Operator Total, Myanmar/Burma, April 17 – May 6, 2005 (Fourth Visit) [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2005b) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, Notes from the Total Sudan Trip, Operator Total, Sudan, September 4-9, 2005 [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2006) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report, New Operations in a Country at a Crossroads, Operator Total E&P Mauritania (TEPM), Mauritania, March 28 – April 11, 2006 [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2008a) Corporate Engagement Project Field Visit Report. Report of Fifth CDA/CEP Visit to the Yadana Pipeline Myanmar/Burma February 9-17 2008 in Myanmar/Burma February 18 in Bangkok, Thailand [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [12.1.10]

CDA (2008b) The Corporate Engagement Project, how Companies can Get it Right with Local Communities [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/other/cep20brochure1_Pdf.pdf> [12.1.10]

CDA (2009) Response to Earth Rights International Report, September 14, 2009 [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/other/response_to_earth_rights_international_re port_20090914_Pdf.pdf> [12.1.10]

CDA (2011) Corporate Engagement Project Report of Sixth CEP Visit to the Yadana Pipeline, March 28 – April 8, 2011 [online] available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20 Engagement%20Project> [20.8.11]

Chambers, S. (2010) China, Pirates and the Oil Supply Chain, Ethical Corporation Podcast. Ethical Corporation

Clements, K. (2004) 'Towards Conflict Transformation and a just Peace'. in Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. ed. by Anon: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Cohen, N. and Ben-Porat, G. (2008) 'Business Communities and Peace: The Cost-Benefit Calculations of Political Involvement'. Peace & Change 33 (3), 426-446

Coleman, P. T., Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A., and Lab Bui-Wrzosinska (2007) 'Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict Escalation and Intractability'. American Behavioral Scientist 50 (11), 1454-1475

Collier, P. and Gunning, J. W. (1995) 'War, Peace and Private Portfolios'. World Development 23 (2), 233-241

Companies aren't charities (2010a) in The Economist [online] October 21st 2010. Available from <http://www.economist.com/node/17305554> [20 August 2011]

Cope, M. (2003) The Seven Cs of Consulting: The Definitive Guide to the Consulting Process. 2nd edn. London: FT Prentice Hall

Crane, A. (2011) 'Reflections on Researching Partnerships ... and some Free Downloads!'. Annual Review of Social Partnerships [online] (6), 14-15

Creswell, J. W. (2003) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Sage

Dahan, N. M., Doh, J. P., Oetzel, J., and Yaziji, M. (2010) 'Corporate-NGO Collaboration: Co-Creating New Business Models for Developing Markets'. Long Range Planning 43 (2), 326-342

Datamonitor (2010) Total S.A. Company Profile [online] available from <www.datamonitor.com>

De Feo, L. (2010) Psicologia. Napoli: EdiSES

de la Chevardière, P. (2011) Linking CSR and Financial Performance CSR Day for Investor 25.6.11 [online] available from <http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/4721/FR/01-Finance-PdLC.pdf> [October, 30 2012]

De Margerie, C. (2009) A Conversation with Christophe De Margerie CEO of Total, November 12, 2009. The Alliance Programme and the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia [online] available from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVRm1rDwey4&feature=related;> [July, 30 2012]

De Rond, M. and Bouchikhi, H. (2004) 'On the Dialectics of Strategic Alliances'. Organization Science 15 (1), 56-69

den Hond, F. and de Bakker, Frank G. A. (2007) 'Ideologically Motivated Activism: How Activist Groups Influence Corporate Social Change Activities'. Academy of Management Review 32 (3), 901-924

Denscombe, M. (2003) The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects. Open University Press

Desaine, L. (2011) The Policitcs of Silence, Carnet De l'Irasec, Occasional Paper n°17. Irasec

Duffield, M. (2000) 'Globalisation Transborder Trade and War Economies'. In Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. ed. by Berdal, M. R., Malone, D., and International, P. A.. Lynne Rienner

Dunphy, D. and Stace, D. (1993) 'The Strategic Management of Corporate Change'. Human Relations 46 (8), 905-920

Eesley, C. E. and Lenox, M. J. (2006) Secondary Stakeholder Actions and the Selection of Firm Targets. Academy of Management. B1-B6

Ekeh, C. and Smith, M. (2007) Minorities in Burma, Briefing. London. Minority Rights Group International

Elliott, A. (2009) Qualitative Methods in Social Sciences. New York. Rutledge

Elworthy, S. and Rifkind, G. (2005) Hearts and Minds. Human Security Approaches to Political Violence. Demos

ERI (1996) Total Denial A Report on the Yadana Pipeline Project in Burma. Chiang Mai, Thailand. ERI

ERI (2002) Fuelling Abuse: Unocal, Premier, and TotalFinaElf's Gas Pipelines in Burma. Chiang Mai, Thailand. ERI

ERI (2003) Total Denial Continues. Chiang Mai, Thailand. ERI

ERI (2009a) Getting it Wrong: Flawed "Social Corporate Responsibility" and Misrepresentations Surrounding Total and Chevron Yadana's Gas Pipeline in Military Ruled Burma (Myanmar) [online]

ERI (2009b) Total Impact: The Human Rights, Environmental, and Financial Impacts of Total and Chevron's Yadana Gas Project in Military- Ruled Burma (Myanmar) [online] available from <www.earthrights.org> [20 august 2011]

ERI (2009c) Total Impact. Chiang Mai, Thailand. ERI

ERI (2010) Energy Insecurity. How Total, Chevron, and PTTEP Contribute to Human Rights Violations, Financial Secrecy, and Nuclear Proliferation in Burma (Myanmar) [online] available from <www.earthrights.org> [20 august 2011]

Eweje, G. (2007) 'Multinational Oil Companies' CSR Initiatives in Nigeria: The Scepticism of Stakeholders in Host Communities'. Managerial Law [online] 49 (5/6), 218

Ewing-Chow, M. (2007) 'First do no Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights'. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights [online] 5 (2), 153-180. Available from <http://heinonline.org> [16th July 2011]

Fjelde, H. (2009) 'Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War'. Journal of Peace Research 46, 19

Folger, J. and Barush Bush, R. (1996) 'Constructing the World we Want - Plenary Address by Joseph Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush at the Interaction/Network for Conflict Resolution (Canada) Conference, May 1996. As Summarized by Rosemarie Schmidt (Guest Editor). Interaction (Special Issue, Summer)

Fournier, A. (2009) 'L'Image De Total s'Est Fortement Dégradée En 2009 '. Le Monde 07.10.2009 à 20h41

Francis, D. (2001) 'Culture Power Asymmetries and Gender in Conflict Transformation'. in Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. ed. by Anon: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Friedman, M. S. (1960) Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. New York: Routledge

Fundinguniverse (nd) Total FIna Elf S.A. [online] available from <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Total-Fina-Elf-SA-Company-History.html> [23.12 2011]

Gaung, J. S. (2012) 'Shwe Gas to Power Rakhine State: Minister'. The Myanmar Times January 23-29, 2012: 12

Ghimire, S. and Upreti, B. R. (2012) 'Corporate Engagement for Conflict Transformation: Conceptualising the Business-Peace Interface'. Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security 2 (1), 77-100

Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Polity Press

Gilmartin, R. (2011) CEOs Need a New Set of Beliefs. [26 September 2011]. Available from <HTTP://BLOGS.HBR.ORG/HBSFACULTY/2011/09/CEOS-NEED-A-NEW-SET-OF-BELIEFS.HTML?UTM_SOURCE=FEEDBURNER&UTM_MEDIUM=FEED&UTM_CAMPAIGN= FEED%3A+HARVARDBUSINESS+%28HBR.ORG%29> [10.10.11]

Gitsham, M. (2007) 'How do You Measure the Impact of Corporate Citizenship at the Local Level in a Zone of Conflict?'. Journal of Corporate Citizenship (28), 31-42

Gladwin, T. N. and Walter, I. (1980) 'How Multinationals can Manage Social and Political Forces'. Journal of Business Strategy 1 (1), 54

Glasbergen, P. (2011) 'Understanding Partnerships for Sustainable Development Analytically. The Ladder of Partnership Activity as a Methodological Tool'. Environmental Policy and Governance 21 (1), 1-13

Global Witness (2003) A Conflict of Interest - the Uncertain Future of Burma's Forests. Global Witness

Global Witness (2009) A Disharmonious Trade [online] available from <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/disharmonious-trade-china-and-continued-destruction-burmas-northern-frontier-forests> [20.8.11]

Guesnet, L., Schure, J., and Paes, W. C. (eds.) (2008) Report of the Fatal Transactions Conference. 'Digging for Peace Private Companies and Emerging Economies in Zones of Conflict'. Held 21–22 November 2008 at Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion

Guo, X. (2007) Towards Resolution: China in the Myanmar Issue. Silk Road Paper edn. Massachusetts, USA. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies

Gylfason, T. (2001) 'Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development'. European Economic Review 45 (4-6), 847-859

Hailey, V. H. and Balogun, J. (2002) 'Devising Context Sensitive Approaches to Change: The Example of Glaxo Wellcome'. Long Range Planning 35 (2), 153-178

Harvey, L., MacDonald, M., and Hill, J. (2000) Theories and Methods. London. Hodder & Stoughton

Haselip, J. (2011) 'Transparency, Consultation and Conflict: Assessing the Micro-Level Risks Surrounding the Drive to Develop Peru's Amazonian Oil and Gas Resources'. Natural Resources Forum 35, 283-292

Heap, S. (2000a) NGOs Engaging with Business: A World of Difference and a Difference to the World. Oxford. Intrack

Heap, S. (2000b) 'NGO-Business Partnerships: Research-in-Progress'. Public Management Review 2 (4), 555-563

Hillman, A. J. and Hitt, M. A. (1999) 'Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions'. Academy of Management Review 24 (4), 825-84

Hoffmann, M. G. (ed.) (2007) IACM. 'Power and Limits of Dynamical Systems Theory in Conflict Analysis' at Budapest

Horsey, R. (2011b) The First Hundred Days of the New Myanmar Government [online]

Horsey, R. (ed.) (2011a) Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. 'The Initial Functioning of the Myanmar Legislatures', held 17 May 2011. SSRC

HRW (2008) Vote to Nowhere the May 2008 Constitutional Referendum in Burma. USA. HRW

HRW (2012) "Untold Miseries" Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Kachin State. USA. HRW

IB (2005) Total Pollutes Democracy – Stop TOTALitarianism in Burma . Paris, France. Info Birmanie

ICG (2001) Myanmar: The Military Regime's View Of the World. ICG Asia Report 28. ICG Asia

ICG (2003) Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic, Minority Politics. Report 52. ICG Asia

ICG (2011) Myanmar's Post-Election Landscape. Asia Briefing n.118. ICG

Idemudia, U. (2009) 'Oil Extraction and Poverty Reduction in the Niger Delta: A Critical Examination of Partnership Initiatives'. Journal of Business Ethics 90, 91-116

Idemudia, U., Cragg, W., and Best, B. (2010) 'The Challenges and Opportunities of Implementing the Integrity Pact as a Strategy for Combating Corruption in Nigeria's Oil Rich Niger Delta Region'. Public Administration & Development 30 (4), 277-290

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011) Myanmar Numbers of IDPs. IDMC

IHRB, Institute Human Rights and Business (2011) From Red to Green Flags the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in High-Risk Countries. London. IHRB

ILO (2010a) Governing Body 309th Session, Geneva, November 2010, 6th Item On the Agenda: Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (no. 29). GB.309/6 edn. Geneva. ILO

ILO (2010b) INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 99th Session, Geneva, June 2010, Committee on the Application of Standards, Report of the ILO Liaison Officer in Myanmar to the Committee on the Application of Standards. C. App./D.XX edn. Geneva. ILO

International Alert (2005) Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries [online] available from <http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/conflict_sensitive_business_practice_all.pdf>

International Alert (2008) Red Flags: Liability Risk for Companies Operating in High Risk Zones. London. International Alert

IPIECA (2008) Operating in Areas of Conflict, an IPIECA Guide for the Oil and Gas Industry [online]. Available from <http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=CEP&pname=Corporate%20Engagement%20Project>

Isaacs, W. (1999) Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together. New York. Random House

ISO (2010) Guidance on Social Responsibility - ISO/FDIS 26000:2010(E) [online] Final Draft edn. Geneva. ISO. Available from <http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546> [20.8.11]

ISO 26000: Sustainability as standard? (2012) in Ethical Corporation. 11 July 2012

Jamali, D. and Mirshak, R. (2010) 'Business-Conflict Linkages: Revisiting MNCs, CSR, and Conflict'. Journal of Business Ethics 93 (3), 443-464

Kanter, R. M. (1991) 'Change Where to Begin'. Harvard Business Review [online] July-August

Kanter, R. M. (1999a) 'Change is Everyone's Job: Managing the Extended Enterprise in a Globally Connected World'. Organizational Dynamics 28 (1), 6-22

Kanter, R. M. (1999b) 'The Enduring Skills of Change Leaders'. Leader to Leader (13), 15-22

Kanter, R. M. (1999c) 'From Spare Change to Real Change '. Harvard Business Review May-June, 122-132

Kanter, R. M. (2004) 'The Middle Manager as Innovator'. Harvard Business Review 82 (7), 150-161

Kanter, R. M. (2008) 'Transforming Giants'. Harvard Business Review 86 (1), 43-52

Kantz, C. (2007) 'The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process'. Business and Politics 9 (3)

KHRG, Karen Human Rights Group (1997) Relocations In The Gas Pipeline Area: an Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group April 20, 1997 / KHRG #97-06. Thailand. KHRG

Killick, N., Srikantha, V., and Gündüz, C. (2005) 'The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding'. in Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. Ed. by Anon. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Kleining, G. (1988) 'Wie Ist Kritische Sozialforschung Möglich?'. in Formen Und Möglichkeiten Des Sozialen. Eine Gedenkschrift Für Janpeter Kob. (Forms and Possibilities for the

Social World. A Commemorative Volume for Janpeter Kob). ed. by Deichsel, A. and Thuns, B. Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv, 235-249

Kotter, J. P. (2005) 'Leading Change'. Leadership Excellence 22 (11), 5-6

Kouchner, B. (2003) Report on a Trip to Myanmar and the Discovery of a Silent Industry [online]. Paris. Available from <www.total.com> [20 August 2011]

LaFrance, J. and Lehamann, M. (2005) 'Corporate Awakening – Why (some) Corporations Embrace Public–Private Partnerships'. Business Strategy and the Environment 14, 216-229

Laszlo K, C. and Lazlo, A. (2004) 'The Conditions for Thirving Conversations'. In Dialogue a Means for Colletive Communication. Ed. by Banathy, B. and Jenlink, P. M.. Kluwer Academic, 357

Leach, E. R. (1960) 'The Frontiers of "Burma"'. Comparative Studies in Society and History 3 (1), 49-68

Leccardi, C. (2009) 'Zygmunt Bauman: Sociologia Critica e Impegno Etico nell'epoca Della Globalizzazione'. in Sociologie Contemporanee. ed. by Ghisleni, M. and Privitera, W. Novara. DeAgostini.

Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies [online]. Washington DC. USIP

Lederach, J. P. (1999) The Journey Toward Reconciliation. John Paul Lederach; Foreword by Harold H. Saunders. Herald Press

Lederach, J. P. (2003) The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. John Paul Lederach. Good Books

Lederach, J. P. and Maiese, M. (2003) Conflict Transformation [online]. Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado. Available from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation/>

Lederach, J. P., Neufeld, R., and Culbertson, H. (2007) Reflective Peacebuilding, A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit [online]. The Joan Kroc Institute For International Peace Studies, University Of Notre Dame And Catholic Relief Services Southeast East Asia Regional Office. Available from <http://www.crs.org>

Lieberfeld, D. (2002) 'Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90'. Journal of Peace Research 39 (3), 355-372

Manz, C., Manz, K., Adams, S., and Shipper, F. (2011) 'Sustainable Performance with Values-Based Shared Leadership: A Case Study of a Virtuous Organization'. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 28 (3), 284-296

Martin, M. (2011) Conflicted Corporates: Rethinking the Role of Business in Global Security. Global Policy October edn. London. LSE and John Whiley

McGilchrist, I. (2009) The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World. New Haven; London. Yale University Press

McNamara, C. (2005) Basic Context for Organizational Change [online] available from <http://managementhelp.org/mgmnt/orgchnge.htm#anchor493930>

Miall, H. (2004) 'Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task, in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation'. in Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. Ed. by Anon. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Millar, C. C. J. M., Choi, C. J., and Chen, S. (2004) 'Global Strategic Partnerships between MNEs and NGOs: Drivers of Change and Ethical Issues'. Business & Society Review (00453609) 109 (4), 395-414

Mintzberg, H. (1980) 'Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization Design'. Management Science 26 (3), 322-341

Mitchell, C. (2002) 'Beyond Resolution: What does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform?'. Peace and Conflict Studies [online] 9 (1), 1-23

MMRD (2011) Outcome and Impact Assessment of Yadana Socio-Economic Programme. Yangon. MMRD

Murphy, D. F. and Bendell, J. (1999) Partners in Time? Business, NGOs and Sustainable Development. Discussion Paper No. 109. UNRISD

Nelson, J. (2000) The Business of Peace : The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict and Resolution. Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum

Network Myanmar (2012) Burma Or Myanmar? [online]. Available from <http://www.networkmyanmar.org/political-myths> [November, 19 2012]

Network Myanmar (nd) Sanctions [online]. Available from <http://www.networkmyanmar.org/sanctions> [November 29 2012]

Nisbett, R. E., (2003) The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … and Why.: Nicholas Brealey

Nolte, I. M., Martin, E. C., and Boenigk, S. (2012) 'Cross-Sectoral Coordination of Disaster Relief'. Public Management Review 14 (6), 707-730

OECD (2002) Multinational Enterprises in Situations of Violent Conflict and Widespread Human Rights Abuses [online] May 2002 edn. Paris. OECD. Available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/31/2757771.pdf> [10.10.10]

Oetzel, J., Getz, K. A., and Ladek, S. (2007) 'The Role of Multinational Enterprises in Responding to Violent Conflict: A Conceptual Model and Framework for Research'. American Business Law Journal 44 (2), 331-358

Patey, L. A. (2007) 'State Rules: Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan'. Third World Quarterly [online] 28 (5), 997-1016

Patton, M. Q. and Patton, M. Q. (2002) Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods. Sage

Pearce, J. (2004) Beyond the Perimeter Fence: Oil and Armed Conflict in Casanare, Colombia. Discussion papers, Centre for the Study of Global Governance edn. London. London School of Economics and Political Science

Pegg, S. and Wilson, A. (2003) 'Corporations, Conscience and Conflict: Assessing NGO Reports on the Private Sector Role in African Resource Conflicts'. Third World Quarterly [online] 24 (6), 1179-1189

Porter, M., and Kramer, M. (2011) 'Creating Shared Value'. Harvard Business Review (January)

Pye, L. W. and Pye, L. W. (1999) 'Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia.(Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Comparative Perspective, Part 2)'. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (4), 763

Quaedvilieg, W. (2011) An insider's perspective on the OECD Guidelines (2011) in Ethical Corporation. October 2011, 39-43

Rajesh, N. (1997) 'Thailand's Yadana Pipeline: Proposed Route Starts Controversy'. Watershed People's Forum on Ecology 2 (2)

Reed, B. D. (1999) 'Organisational Transformation: Concepts of Person, System, Boundary, Role, Authority and Power'. in Leading, Managing, Ministering: Challenging Questions. ed. by Nelson, J. Norwich. Canterbury Press, 243-262

Rettberg, A. (2008) Explorando El Dividendo De La Paz: Percepción De Los Impactos Del Conflicto Armado En El Sector Privado Colombiano Resultados De Una Encuesta Nacional [online]. Available from <www.ruefferundrub.ch>

Rettberg, A. (ed.) (2012) 22nd International Political Science Association (IPSA) World Congress . 'Peace, Business, and the Business of Peace: Addressing the Private Sector's Role in Peacebuilding and Economic Recovery', Held July 8 – 12, 2012 at Madrid, Spain

Ropers, N. (2008) Systemic Conflict Transformation: Reflections on the Conflict and Peace Process in Sri Lanka. Berghof Handbook Dialogue. 6 edn. Berlin. Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management

Royal, S. (2012) Ségolène Royal Le Mercredi 20 Avril 2011 Au Micro De Jean-Michel Apathie [online]. Available from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZIZIAbcc3k;> [April, 4]

RTE (2012) Ian Paisly - from Protest to Power (26'37"), RTE One Documentary [online]. Available from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkNNUCsf_hQ&feature=related> [November, 19 2011]

Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995) Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper 5398. edn NBER.

Saunders, H. H. (1999) A "Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts". New York. St Martins' Press

References – by F. Cerletti

Scharmer, C. O. (2007) Theory U: Leading from the Future as it Emerges. SoL

Seale, C. (1999) The Quality of Qualitative Research. SAGE

Sehested, C. and Sonnenberg, H. (2011) Lean Innovation: A Fast Path from Knowledge to
Value. London, New York. Springer

Seitanidi, M. and Crane, A. (2009) 'Implementing CSR through Partnerships: Understanding
the Selection, Design and Institutionalisation of Nonprofit-Business Partnerships'.
Journal of Business Ethics 85, 413-429

Seitanidi, M. M. (2008) 'Adaptive Responsibilities: Nonlinear Interactions in Cross Sector
Social Partnerships'. Emergence: Complexity & Organization 10 (3), 51-64

Seitanidi, M. M. (2010) The Politics of Partnerships. Dordrecht, London. Springer

Seitanidi, M. M. and Ryan, A. (2007) 'A Critical Review of Forms of Corporate Community
Involvement: From Philanthropy to Partnerships'. International Journal of Nonprofit &
Voluntary Sector Marketing 12 (3), 247-266

Seitanidi, M., Koufopoulos, D., and Palmer, P. (2010) Partnership Formation for Change:
Indicators for Transformative Potential in Cross Sector Social Partnerships. Springer
Science & Business Media B.V

Senge, P. M. (2006) The Fith Disclipline. London. Random House

Shankleman, J. and Myers, J. (2007) Oil, Profits, and Peace: Does Business have a Role in
Peacemaking? [online]. Seminar Transcript edn. Available from
<http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5430.html>

Shaxon, N. (2007) 'Oil, Corruption and the Resource Course'. International Affairs 83 (6),
1123-1140

Shaxon, N. (2012) Trasure Islands. London. Vintage

Shifting Sands (2011) in Ethical Corporation. June, 12-14

SIIA (2010) From Proxy to Principle: Singapore's Myanmar Policy [online]. Available from
<http://www.siiaonline.org/files/SIIA.Special.Report-10-1-MYANMAR.pdf> [20 August
2011]

Smith, M. (2002) Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change. London. Minority Rights Group
International

Smith, M. (2006) 'The Paradox of Burma Conflict and Illegality as a Way of Life'. IISS N e w s
l e t t e r 42 (Autumn 2)

Sovacol, B. (2011) 'Cursed by Crude: The Corporatist Resource Curse and the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan Pipeline'. Environmental Policy and Governance 21, 42-57

Steinberg, D. I. (2010) 'Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy Toward Burma/Myanmar'. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29 (3), 35

Tan, E. K. B. (2011) The State of Play in CSR in Singapore. July edn. Singapore. Lien Centre for Social Innovation

Tay, S. and Chhoa-Howard, R. (2012) 'What's really Behind Myanmar's Reforms'. Today 12 December

TEPM (2009a) Yadana Socio-Economic Program Annual Report 2009. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2009b) TEPM Gazette 2. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2010a) TEPM Gazette 3. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2010b) Yadana Socio-Economic Program Annual Report 2010. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2010c) TEPM Gazette 4. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2010d) TEPM Gazette 5. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2011a) TEPM Gazette 9. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2011b) TEPM Gazette 10. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

TEPM (2011c) Socio-Economic Programmes (Visitor Presentation). Yangon. TEPM

TEPM (2012) TEPM Gazette 11. Company Document edn. Yangon. Total

Thant Myint-U (2007) The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma. New York. Farrar, Sraus and Giraux

The Critics Can 'Go To Hell.' (2009) in Newsweek. July, 25

The Lady of All Landslides (2012b) in The Economist. April 7-14, 29

Theodorakopoulos, N., Kakabadse, A., Kakabadse, N., and Figueira, C. (2009) 'Developing Strategic Learning Capabilities under Entrepreneurial Leadership: Lessons from a Knowledge-Intensive, Growth-Oriented Small Firm'. Proceedings of the European Conference on Management, Leadership & Governance, 250-258

Tonkin, D. (2010) Infrequently Asked Questions about the Operations of Total and Chevron in Myanmar (Burma) [online] 24.11.10 edn. UK [20.8.11]

Total (2002) Sharing our Energies, Corporate Social Responsibility Report [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com>

Total (2003) Sharing our Energies, Corporate Social Responsibility Report [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com>

References – by F. Cerletti

Total (2007) Total's Contribution to Sustainable Development, how CSR is Integrated in Total's Business Model, Investor Relation London 15.7.2007 [online]. Available from <http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/921/FR/CSR-Londres-fev-2007-gb.pdf> [November 10 2012]

Total (2008a) Environment and Society Report, our Corporate Social Responsibilities [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com> [20 August 2011]

Total (2008b) Practical Guide for Local Development Projects. Paris. Total

Total (2008c) Developing Local Content, an Industry Strategic Objective at Total. Paris. Total

Total (2008d) Business Integrity Guide. Paris. Total.

Total (2009a) Total in Myanmar Update September 2009 [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com> [20 August 2011]

Total (2009b) Guide Du Dialogue Local. Paris. Total

Total (2010a) Total in Myanmar a Sustained Commitment [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com> [20 August 2011]

Total (2010b) Society and Environment Report 2009 [online]. Paris. Total. Available from <www.total.com>

Total (2010c) Safety at Work Total's Golden Rules. Company Document edn. Paris. Total

Total (2011a) At a Glance 2010-2011. Company Document edn. Paris. Total.

Total (2011b) Society and Environment Report 2010 [online]. Paris: Total. Available from <www.total.com>

Total (2011c) Juridix Special Edition. Human Rights and Oil & Gas Investments. France. Total

Total (2011d) Human Rights Internal Guide. Paris. Total

Total (2012a) Factbook 2011-2012. Company Document edn. Paris. Total

Total (2012b) Registration Document 2011-2012. Company Document edn. Paris. Total

Transparency International (2011) Corruption Perception Index 2011. Transparency International

Tripathi, S. (2007) 'Best Intentions Cannot Go Far enough'. In Human Security and Business. ed. by Leisinger, B. K. and Probst, M. London. International Alert

Tripathi, S. and Gündüz, C. (2008) A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples and Implications for Third-Party Mediation [online]. Available from <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/pub.php?p=385>

Tripathi, S., Godnick, W., and Klein, D. (2008) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: Performance Indicators [online]. Available from www.international-alert.org

Turnell, S. (2010) 'Fundamentals of Myanmar's Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective. (Report)'. Asian Economic Policy Review 6 (1), 136

Turnell, S. (2011a) 'Fundamentals of Myanmar's Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective'. Asian Economic Policy Review 6 (1), 136-153

Turnell, S. (2011b) 'Myanmar in 2010: Doors Open, Doors Close'. Asian Survey 51 (1), 148-154

Turnell, S., Bradford, W., and Vicary, A. (2009) 'Burma's Economy 2009: Disaster, Recovery and Reform?'. Asian Politics and Policy 1 (4), 631-659

UN (2010) The UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights. UN

UN Global Compact (2010) Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High - Risk Areas: A Resource for Companies and Investors [online]. New York: UN Global Compact - PRI. Available from <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/conflict_prevention/guidance_material.html> [20.8.11]

UNAIDS (2010) Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010. UNAIDS.

UNDP (2010) Human Development Index [online] available from <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/49806.html> [20 August 2011]

UNDP (2011a) Human Development Report. UNDP

UNDP (2011b) Human Development Report 2011 Myanmar HDI Values and Rank Changes in the 2011 Human Development Report. UNDP

UNHCR (2011) Country Operations Profile – Myanmar. UNHCR

US Treasury (2010) US Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, an Overview of the Burmese Sanctions Regulations Title 31 Part 537 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. US Treasury

Wadham, H. (2009) 'Talking Across Boundaries: Business and NGO Perspectives on CSR, Sustainable Development and Partnership'. Journal of Corporate Citizenship (34), 57-68

Weick, K. E. and Quinn, R. E., (1999) 'Organizational Change and Development'. Annual Review of Psychology 50, 361-386

Whelan-Berry, K. S. and Somerville, K. (2010) 'Linking Change Drivers and the Organisational Change Process: A Review and Synthesis'. Journal of Change Management [online] 10 (2), 175-193

Wikipedia Burmese Kyat [online] available from
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burmese_kyat> [16.4 2012]

Wolf, K. D., Deitelhoff, N., and Engert, S. (2007) 'Corporate Security Responsibility: Towards
    a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda'. Cooperation & Conflict
    42 (3), 294-320

Yankelovich, D. (1999) The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation. New
    York. Simon and Shuster

Young, S. (2010) 'Corporate Social Responsibility. Toward Moral Capitalism'. in The World
    that Changes the World. Ed. by Cheng, W. and Sharifah, M. Singapore: Jossey Bass,
    209-223

Zandvliet, L. (2005) 'Assessing Company Behavior in Conflict Environments'. In Profiting from
    Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War. Ed. by Ballentine, K. and
    Nitzschke, H. Boulder CO. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zandvliet, L. and Anderson, M. (2009) Getting it Right Making Corporate-Community
    Relations Work. Greenleaf Publishing.

Zhu, X. (ed.) (2011) Myanmar 2011: Governance, Development and Dialogue. 'Do the
    Myanmar-China Pipelines Put Myanmar at Risk? A New Perspective on the Power
    Corridor', held 20-22 June 2011 at Hong Kong: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of
    Hong Kong

Zollo, M. (2004) 'Philanthropy Or CSR: A Strategic Choice '. European Business Forum, 18-19