

## DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

### **Political pace, identities livelihoods, food (in) security, and famine the case of the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia**

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# **POLITICAL SPACE, IDENTITIES LIVELIHOODS, FOOD (IN) SECURITY, AND FAMINE: THE CASE OF THE SIDAMA OF SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA**

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**April 2015**

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*To*



The Department of Geography, Environment & Disaster Management  
Faculty of Business, Environment and Society. United Kingdom.

## Abstract

*The rural livelihoods of the Sidama stem from a combination of crop production, and livestock rearing. Although seasonal hunger was prevalent among the Sidama, the full scale famine that had stricken northern parts of Ethiopia for a long time did not hit the Sidama area until the late 1990s. This research set out to understand why after the successful prevention of seasonal food insecurity progressing into famine for centuries, the Sidaman small holders and semi-pastoralists failed to do this from 1999/2000 onwards.*

*This research used ethnographic methodology: a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods. This helped to capture how the disengaging political space culminated in famine and response failure among the Sidama of southern Ethiopia in 1999-2003 and how the political space also conditioned the resilience, security and sustainability of the livelihoods held by those who are integrated and loyalists to the political system on one hand, stagnation and deterioration of the livelihoods of sceptics and the marginalised in the performance of the Productive Safety Net programme.*

*A new livelihood framework is designed and tested. The Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA) is about freedom of conviction, expression and action. LEPSA illustrates the political space of conflicting and conditioned political identities and its effects on livelihood asset access. Food and livelihood insecurity that leads to famine is the culmination of generational poverty that emerges as cumulative effect of the inner socio-political dynamics of given society, whose resilience, (in) security (un)sustainability is linked to engagement or disengagement in political space.*

*The “Political Space” was found to provide a more helpful analysis than “Political Capital” which obscured developing hazard by over-trusting those with powers from the above to decide on the lives and livelihoods of citizens from below. A better understanding of the trajectories of livelihood resilience, security and sustainability is made through engaging in an analysis of political space to be included in diverse development policies. Thus, the LEPSA helps to map out that is food and livelihood resilient or vulnerable and in (secure) in the face of the drivers of the interests of diverse identities’ interests on our planet.*

## Acknowledgment

I did not know what would await me when I prepared to leave the Sidama-land on 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2009 after completing the final phase of field research. Nevertheless, I found closed door of matrimonial home. Shocked, refused to accept what happened at least for six months, after six month accepted and after a year revived and finally passed through painful life experience before reaching the level of fitness to write this thesis. The moment gave me an opportunity to learn life lesson through processes, which will be another dimension to reflect for future.

I could not have done this alone. I would like to thank Almighty God who gave me patience and wisdom to pass through difficult moments. Thank you Dr Marion and professor Moya for your patience and intellectual far-sightedness to shaped me to this level. I would like to thank Dr Peter and family of Newcastle Upon Tyne University, for your emotional and other supports at difficult moments. Thank you very much key informants, participants of survey and focus group discussions. I would like to thank also Melkamu Genale and Mebrat Degife my research assistants.

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<b>Table of content</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>Abstract</b>	
<b>Acknowledgment</b>	
<b>Table of content</b>	i
Table of Figures	iv
Table of tables	
<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	<b>1</b>
1 Introduction	1
<b>CHAPTER TWO: FOOD (IN)SECURITY, FAMINE, IDENTITIES AND THE NOTION OF POLITICAL SPACE</b>	<b>16</b>
2 Introduction	16
2.1 Defining food (in) security	17
2.2 Famine and its prevention	20
2.3 The evolution of sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF)	24
2.4 Insufficiently politicized Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF)	25
2.5 First politicized Sustainable Livelihood Framework	44
2.6 The notion of political capital and more politicization of the SLF	45
2.7 Constraints of Political –Capital	47
2.8 Political space and access to livelihood assets	49
2.8.1 Defining Political space	49
2.8.2 Institutions and institutional channels	51
2.8.3 The political discourse of actors	52
2.8.4 The actions and performances of political actors	53
2.9 Understanding political identity in context	57
2.10 Political identities formation and the engagement	58
2.11 Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA)	64
2.12 The link between political identity and livelihood asset access	72
Summary	73
<b>CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>75</b>
3 Introduction	75
3.1 Justification for selecting this case study	77
3.2 Research philosophy	80
3.3 Methods	82
3.4 The study area for 2000-2001 research	83
3.5 The study area for 2008-2009 research	84
3.6 Location and geographical features of Dale District	86

3.7	Location and geographical features of Lokka Abbaya	88
3.8	Conducting the field research	90
3.8.1	Pilot phase (2000-2001)	90
3.8.2	The main data Collection (2000-2001)	92
3.8.3	The main data Collection (2000-2001 and 2008-2009)	97
3.8.4	Political identities and local perception of accessing livelihood assets	100
3.9	Positionality and understanding	107
3.10	Data entry and analysis	113
	Summary	114
	CHAPTER FOUR: THE SIDAMA ETHNO-NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL IDENTITY	115
4	Introduction	115
4.1	Understanding ethno-nationalism in African and in Sidaman context	116
4.2	Family-hood <i>Ayiidooma</i> Sidaman indigenous structure	121
4.3	The Sidama's institutional structures and governance	123
4.4	The Sidama Social capital and access to livelihood assets	130
4.5	Social capital and food sharing among the Sidama	131
4.6	Livelihood Asset sharing practice	134
4.7	Natural capital and the Sidama way of accessing	138
4.8	Indigenous Sidaman land tenure	139
4.9	Human capital among the Sidaman	144
4.10	The indigenous knowledge of growing Drought-resistant crops	147
	Summary	157
	CHAPTER FIVE: CONFLICTIVE IDENTITIES AND LIVELIHOODS	159
5	Introduction	159
5.1	The genesis of conflictive political identity	161
5.2	The conquest of Sidama and institutional channels from 'above'	163
5.3	A discourse from 'above': Amharization and forced Christianization	178
5.4	The action from 'above': creating unitary State	185
5.5	'Self' within state, discourse and actions from 'below': the effect on Livelihoods	188
5.6	Relative political space widening and the character of Citizen's Engagement (1970-1977)	192
5.7	The narrowing of the political space and its negative effects	196
5.8	Reactions from 'below'	202
	Summary	209
	CHAPTER SIX: CONDITIONED POLITICAL IDENTITIES AND ITS LINK TO FAMIN	211
6	Introduction	211
6.1	Genesis and the trend of conditioned political identities in the Sidama	211

6.2	The political space in Sidama and the trend of engagement (1991 to 1994)	225
6.3	Sidama's 1999-2003 Famine as the product of narrowing the political space	237
	Summary	251
	CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS ON CONDITIONED IDENTITIES' LIVELIHOOD ASSET ACCESS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAM	252
7	Introduction	252
7.1	Trust and interest in political setting conditions political identities	252
7.2	Conditioned political identities' access to livelihood assets	255
7.2.1	Results of field study on accessing natural capital	256
7.2.2.	Results on human capital	259
7.2.3	Result on accessing social capital: Party membership as social capital	272
7.2.4	Results on accessing financial capital	278
	Summary	288
	CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSIONS	291
8	Introduction	291
8.1	Donors' dilemma and the evolution of the Productive Safety Net	291
8.2	Access to livelihood assets	294
8.2.1	Access to natural capital (land tenure)	295
8.2.2	Access to human capital	300
8.2.3	Accessing social capital	307
8.2.4.	Accessing Financial Capital	309
8.2.5	Accessing physical capital	312
	CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION	323
9	Introduction	323
9.1	Achieving the aims and objectives of the research	323
9.2	Concluding remarks on the research findings.	328
9.2.1	On political space: historical trend of political space in Ethiopia	328
9.2.2	On political identity: historical trends of conflictive and conditioned identities	335
9.2.3	On livelihood and food security	338
9.3	Policy Recommendations	339
9.3.1	on Political Space	339
9.3.2	On conflictive and conditioned identities	342
9.3.3	On food and livelihood security	343
	Summary and the contribution of this thesis to the knowledge	349
	Bibliography	351
	Appendix 1: Interview for key informants and focus group discussion in 2000/2001 Research	367
	Appendix2: Semi structured interview for 2000-2001 research	367
	Appendix 3: Survey on Identity formation conditioned identities and access to livelihood assets for 2008- 2009 research	369

Appendix 4 : Larger tables	379
Research Ethics Approval	386

## **Table of Figures**

Figure 2-1 The original IDS framework.	27
Figure 2-2 DFID's insufficiently politicised SLF	27
Figure 2-3 Livelihood assets pentagon	30
Figure 2-4 Politicization of the SLF	45
Figure 3-1 four famine prone districts in former Sidama zone 1995-2007	84
Figure 3-2 Sidama zone districts after 2007	85
Figure 3-3 Dale district after restructuring of 2007	87
Figure 3-4 Administrative map of Lokka Abbaya district	89
Figure 5-1 Map of Historical processes of Abyssinian expansion	192
Figure 6-1 Map of Proposed Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia after London Conference	227
Figure 6-2 Federal Administration map that adopt a mixture of ethnicity and administrative suitability after 1994	234
Figure 6-3 land use pattern in Dale by percent	224
Figure 6-4 Land use in Loka Abaya in percent	224
Figure 6-5 Agro-ecology as natural capital and the bases of livelihoods	223
Figure 7-1 Local perception on the level accessing natural capital by political identities	259
Figure 7-2 Local perception on accessing human capital by political identities	272
Figure 7-3 Local perception on accessing social capital per conditioned political identities	278
Figure 7-4 Local perception on accessing financial capital per conditioned political Identities	282
Figure 7-5 Sidaman perception of food security and asset creating chain	284
Figure 7-6 Local perception on accessing Physical capital per conditioned political Identities	288
Figure 7-7 LEPSA as effective mapping tool differential access to livelihood assets by political identity	290

## **Table of tables**

Table 1-1 Total Sidama population, Density per/ km2 by 21 districts in 2010	379
Table 1-2 The drought risk scale	381
Table 1-3 The lowest and highest drought Risk Zones rankings in Ethiopia	7
Table 4-1 Examples of social capital against crises among the Sidama	137
Table 4-2 Land use in Sidama by size and percentage	138
Table 4-3 Agro- ecologically, the Sidama	139
Table 4-4 Land tenure and land use among the Sidama	143
Table 4-5 Human capital and the livelihoods of the research participants	146
Table 6-1 Numbers of vulnerable and destitute Sidama in the 1999-2000 famine	242
Table 6-2 Vulnerable and destitute people by agro-ecology in the Shabadino district	243
Table 6-3 Vulnerable and destitute people by agro-ecology in Dale district	244
Table 7-1 Political identity formation by trust and interest of the sample of study	254
Table 7-2 Land size by the political identities in percentage	257
Table 7-3 Soil Fertility Status as perceived by sample households by percentage	257
Table 7-4 Local perception on differential access to land as natural capital by political identities.	258
Table 7-5 The circumstances of PSNP beneficiaries by political identities	261
Table 7-6 The level of satisfaction to PSNP by its beneficiaries.	262
Table 7-7 Coping mechanism when PSNP did not cover food needs	262
Table 7-8 Spreading PSNP transfers by marginalised households	264



Table 7-9 Spreading PSNP transfers by sceptic households	267
Table 7-10 Spreading of OFSP loan by labour power sufficient sceptic households	268
Table 7-11 Spreading of PSNP transfer by integrated households	269
Table 7-12 local perception on accessing human capital by political identities	270
Table 7-13 The contentment level in the presence of the outsider while the meal is being served	274
Table 7-14 The percentage of the annual income share given to those who are in need in the community	275
Table 7-15 the level of happiness in sharing available farm tools among by political identities.	275
Table 7-16 the level of willingness to share livelihood strategy information	276
Table 7-17 Local perception on conditioned political identities and the level of their access to in social capital	276
Table 7-18 The extent of using food security loan for unintended purpose by political identity of household	279
Table 7-19 Priority of spending loans by political identity	280
Table 7-20 Local perception on accessing financial capital by political identities	281
Table 7-21 Livestock purchase by household's political identities	285
Table 7-22 Access to different types of loans by political identities.	286
Table 7-23 Local perception on the level of their access to physical capital by political identity	286
Table 7-24 the summary of conditioned political identities and their livelihood status	289
Table 8-1 Graduation benchmark in the SNNPRS.	318



# CHAPTER ONE

## 1 Introduction

The number of Ethiopians affected by the threat of food insecurity and famine has grown considerably. For instance, in 1973, during the imperial period 3.5 million people were affected (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 1984), Gebre-Medihin and Vahlquist (1976: 1016) raises this figure to 4.2 million in Wollo and Tigray province alone, while Wolde-Mariam (1984:58) estimates ‘between two and five million’ people died between 1958 and 1977 as a cumulative result of the destitution induced by drought, bad harvests and famine.

A decade later during the communist regime of the Dergue, 7.8-8 million Ethiopians were affected (Relief and Rehabilitation commission, 1985, 1986). In the years 1999/2000, 2000/2001, 2001/2002 of the current Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime, amidst the Ethiopian government claims of “double digit” economic growth, the figure not only rose to 8 to 12 million and more, (ReliefWeb, 2000<sup>1</sup>; Afro-news, 2003<sup>2</sup> ), but many others, who are not yet identified were found struggling for survival as they were living on the edge of food insecurity.

Primarily, instead of disappearing, famine shifted its location from the northern part of Ethiopia to regions that hitherto appeared relatively resilient, like the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia.

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<sup>1</sup>Relief web is united Nations’ website providing information to humanitarian relief Organization. This web site on its publication on 08 Sep 2000 ‘Horn and East Africa Food Crisis’ quoting The DPPC (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness commission) says ‘Ethiopian Government’s Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission revised estimate of the number of requiring food Aid. In addition to 8.1 million people identified in the January appeal there are now 3 million additional needy people mainly due to the failure of this year’s belg rains’

<sup>2</sup> Afro news updates the situation based on the US Agency Famine Early warning System (FEWS) several areas of the country have reached a critical situation, when the study found additional 1.2 million Ethiopians will be in need of food Aid between May and October 2003, thus reaching a total of over 12 million affected persons in Ethiopia’s Worst-ever food crises.

The Sidama territory has been regarded by outsiders as an island surrounded to the South and West by areas under threat of drought and recurrent food insecurity. Arne Tulo, (1998:2) explaining the survival of the Sidama People in relation to that of the rest of Ethiopia writes: “The drought-famine of the early 1970s and the early 1983-4 did not hit Sidama. Compared to the other areas in Ethiopia, Sidama has enjoyed a relatively stable dietary situation”. When one visits the Sidama one can observe the evergreen nature of the land compared with the brownish colour related to drought and food insecurity.

It is paradoxical how this evergreen area of the Sidama land failed to resist famine encroachment. In March 2000, the then Sidama Zone Government Administration Council declared that about 19.5 per cent of the Sidama people were affected by famine. Once their vulnerability had been aggravated, by drought, the support of the destitute exceeded the carrying capacity of the traditional kinship ties. At that time, the relatives of migrants were forced to appeal to concerned government bodies in their respective districts (*woredas*) (Yitayewu *et al* 2000:1-5).

According to the information collected from the archives of the Sidama Zone Government Administration Council, the chairperson of each district government councils reported to the zone government council. Instead of responding, the Sidama zone government council established a team that would assess the magnitude of the famine and suggest possible action. The team of experts was drawn from the Departments of Planning and Economic Development, Agricultural Development, Health and Water Mining and Energy in the Sidama Zone.

In March 2000, the team visited a few of the Peasant Associations that were severely affected by the famine in the Shabadino and Dale Districts (Yitayehu *et al*, 2000: 6). According to the sources in government and nongovernment organizations (Hawassa Catholic Church and Mekaneyesus South Central Synod) it is estimated that the famine had already taken about 5000 people and 50,000 cattle before government officials responded to it in 2002.

Although there was no proper registration of deaths, just as there were no feeding camps throughout the famine, most of the deaths were observed to occur at the end of 1999 and the first quarter of 2000. Most of the victims of that famine were old people and children, according the information obtained from the health officers of four districts.

The Sidama zone Government Administration Council recorded 88 Peasant Associations in six out of nine rural districts, with a population of 387, 178 who needed emergency water supply 99,744 people needed emergency food supply for four months from March 2000 onwards and serious follow up after that.<sup>3</sup> (Sidama zone Government Administration Council archives). Government officials blamed only nature, and failed to address the root causes, and the sequence of consequences. For instance, the translation of the report written in Amharic says:

Out of seven districts in Sidama Zone that were severely affected by drought we only observed Shabadino and Dale. In the Peasant Associations in which we conducted a sample survey, more than 85% of plants were burnt by severe drought, all of the springs, ponds, and most of the rivers were dried up. Most residents in these Peasants Associations left their homes and migrated to relatives in the highlands in search of food for themselves and their remaining cattle. (Yitayehu et al 2000: 1)

While the report drew attention to the existence of the famine, it lacks detailed information about the famine's extent, depth, causes and consequences. Instead of responding to disaster, it took almost a year to establish a team of experts drawn from the European Union, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), SNNPRS Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau and Sidama Zone Line Departments to conduct an assessment on the food situation at the end of April 2002. It was this assessment that rushed the distribution of food to affected areas of the Zone.

Dechassa Lemessa of the United Nation-Emergency Unit for Ethiopia who authored a field assessment Mission from 7-12 May 2002 observed the cases of acute but also chronic malnutrition such as kwashiorkor and Marasmus in many children under five (Lemessa 2002). The same report

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<sup>3</sup> Ganale Hidana (the then secretary of the Sidama Zone Government Administration Council ) Official letter from Sidama zone Government Administration Council to Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State Council, March 2000.

uncovered response failure, when it asserted that: “the absence of a clear emergency and disaster focal point and office because from 1999 to July 2001 the SNNP Region did not have Zonal [Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Departments] DPPDs” as it was dismantled in the summer of 1998 by the order of the then vice prime minister in the face of encroaching famine that lasted up to 2003.

The Sidama zone is found in southern region of Ethiopia, known by the name Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). The Sidama zone is located to the northeast of Lake Abaya and South of Lake Hawassa with a population around 3.5 million see table 1.1.in appendix four. (Central Statistics Authority, 2012) who speaks the Cushitic language known as Sidaamu affoo.

The Sidama zone is bordered by the Arsi Oromos in the north, by the Bale Oromos in the east, the Guji Oromos in the south, and in the southwest, the Gedeo in the south; and the Wolaita in the west. (See the map of the Sidama zone in Chapter Three figure 3.1).

As far as infrastructure development is concerned, the World Bank memorandum (2004:12) indicates that out of the Sidama inhabitants, only 8 percent have access to electricity. The Sidama zone had a road density of 137.4 kilometres per 1000 square kilometres, compared to the national average of 30 kilometres (World Bank Project Appraisal Document 2003:3). The average rural Sidama household has 0.3 hectares of land compared to the national average of 1.01 hectare of land and average of 0.89 percent - for SNNPR and the equivalent of 0.5 heads of livestock. 15.4 percent of the Sidama population are in non-farm related jobs, compared to the national average of 25 percent and a regional average of 32 percent. 68 percent of all eligible children are enrolled in primary school, and 18 percent in secondary schools.

According to same World Bank memorandum, the Sidama zone was given, a drought risk of 329 and categorised as “areas of low potential and high risk “World Bank memorandum (2004:12). The

World Bank (2004:8) assessed ‘the development status, potential and opportunities for growth in Ethiopia based upon the examination of 51 indicators in all of country’s administrative zones.’

Accordingly, the World Bank divided the entire country in to four parts<sup>4</sup> among the indicators that differentiate each zone includes drought risk scale. “Official” portrayals presented the immediate cause of the 1999 Sidama famine as drought. However if we look at closely the data of the World Bank, the Sidama zone is among the lowest drought risk group zones.

Table 1.2 in the appendix four shows four parts of Ethiopia, the zone each part denoted and the drought risk scale given to them by the World Bank. The Sidama zone is among the lowest drought risk group zones. Ranking according to drought scale may help to rule-out the degree to which drought caused 1999-2003 famine in the Sidama. See the table 1.3 below for the ranking drawn from the Data of the World Bank.

Table 1.3 in the next page suggests that the Sidama is categorised as 9<sup>th</sup> of the ten lowest drought risk zones of the World Bank. Therefore blaming nature does not help to come up with holistic solution. Moreover, this research examines the extent to which the political space of struggle between the- power dynamics -from above and below enhances or retards access to livelihood assets, livelihood strategies, livelihood activities and livelihood outcomes.

As contrast to the contemporary accounts, on the causes of that famine, this research provides a critical, historically grounded analysis of the causes of livelihood insecurity and famine using political space as an overall framing concept. Political space may be defined as a freedom for individual(s) or a

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<sup>4</sup> Ethiopia one:-This comprises the largely high risk-low potential contextualised with low rainfall, land deficit and high vulnerability, and the highlands with considerable surplus of labour that needs to be engaged with job opportunities; Ethiopia two:- consists the areas mainly with low –risk –medium potential characterised with the higher rainfall and more fertile reaches of the highlands, has both surplus labour and potential for increased production if the necessary infrastructure is made available; Ethiopia Three:- The high risk-medium potential entails medium potential zones of both high lands and low lands, where medium levels of potential are accompanied by high risk factor; Ethiopia Four:- comprises the high-risk high potential regions includes zones of high potential and high risk ,largely lying in the Western, southern and eastern lowlands.

group, of thought, belief, expression and action to win public opinion, emotional and practical support to the causes of diverse identities that range from human made such as policy tragedies to natural disasters. It is also freedom for individual(s) or group(s) from worries of livelihood asset access impediments imposed by power holders as the consequence of thought, belief, expression and action held by those who are disempowered.

**Table 1-3 The lowest and highest drought Risk Zones rankings in Ethiopia.**

Zones with lowest risk scale and their Rank		Zones with Highest drought scale and their rank	
1st Iluababor	296	1st Warder	788
2nd Jimma	298	2nd Korahe	761
3rd Bench Maji	303	3rd Gode	726
4th Hadiya	318	4th Adref	660
5th Gurage	319	5th Debubawi	627
6th Kenbata Alaba	320	6th Wag Himra	622
7th North Omo	322	7th Maiklegna	616
8th Kaficho Sheka	324	8th Degahbur	614
9th Sidama	329	9th Fiq	588
10th Gedeo	342	10th N. Wello	577
		S.Wello	577

Source: The Author ranked from the data of World Bank 2004.

Thus, famine in this context is a long process and a slow onset disaster. This thesis builds upon the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF). The SLF evolved from the continuous search to prevent



food and livelihood insecurity and famine. This framework gained popularity after Robert Chambers changed the focus of the famine prevention debate from food security to livelihood security.

With the evolution of the SLF (Scoones 1998, Carney 1998) famine can be seen as the result of livelihood failure. Moreover, food insecurity and famine are no longer viewed as the result of agriculture's failure to produce sufficient food alone, but rather as the consequence of the failure of livelihood systems to guarantee access to sufficient food at the household level (Devereux & Maxwell 2001).

The Household Livelihood Security (HHLS) framework grew out of a food security perspective but is based on the observation that food is not the only basic need. Other needs include political engagements and negotiating power with power-holders on the issues that affect lives and livelihoods. However, people's power to negotiate depends first on the political space within which they live and their identities. Their identities may be related to particular livelihood systems, to wealth status, to social status that finally forms the political identity.

The political space involves the level of freedom in the processes of interaction between the power holders who can decide on the lives and livelihoods of citizens on one hand, the power of citizens, to negotiate, to resist (if the decisions hurts) or what Chambers (1989:1) calls “defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss.” Seen in this perspective, the SLF is negatively affected by “omission” and “commission”.

The term “omission”, was used by Macrae & Zwi (1994:11) to mean governments’ “failure to act” in the context of food insecurity regression into famine. In this thesis, “omission” refers to the failure of the designers of the SLF to recognise clearly the role of power dynamics in political settings and its implication in accessing livelihood assets, devising livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes. In contrast to ‘omission’, the term ‘commission’ was used by Macrae & Zwi (1994:13) to mean the governments’ “attack on the means of production and procuring food.” In this research, however, the

term “commission”:- refers to the recognition of the role of “politics” or the “political” and including it in the SLF. Inappropriate placing of the “Political” that leads to over-trust of the power holders, whilst neglect of the “political” would pose a blind -spot to developing hazards as the consequences of the power dynamics within the society.

From the evolution of the SLF we learn that there are at least two main SLFs:- less- politicised and politicised ones. (See figure 2.2. in the following chapter). The construction of the SLF in less-politicised and more technocratic ways of observing and understanding social problems may be associated with political change in the United Kingdom, a pioneer nation in crafting and popularising the framework itself.

The political change was the landslide victory of Labour and the defeat of the Conservative party in 1997. The New Labour government designed a set of distinct policies to build a ‘neutral-path’ between its ideology of the past and the neo-liberal ideology of the preceding Conservative administration. Sustainable Livelihoods became the focus of Department for International Development’s (DfID’s) Government of United Kingdom poverty alleviation policy (Solesbury 2003a, b). To this effect, DfID commenced several mechanisms to encourage the design of research projects and programmes, evaluating their ongoing and time specific projects in the contexts of new emerging SLF. In collaboration with a number of British academics and research groups, it started to finance development interventions based on the SLF (de Haan and Zoomers 2005: 30–31).

However, critics have argued that as one of the suppliers of huge financial donations to the political partners in developing countries, DfID has not emphasized the width or narrowness of the political spaces of the aid recipient countries, as long as they are strategic allies of the national interest. Nor, does it pay much attention to the processes of inclusion of the poor (the focus of SLF) in aid benefits and the extent to which aid changes the lives and livelihoods of the poor (Mosley, 1987, Moyo, 2009).

Paul Mosley (1987) asserts the impossibility of establishing a correlation between aid flows and growth rate of the GNP of the recipient counties. However, at the local level aid implementers regularly report the success of their projects and programmes. This dichotomy between the absence of growth generated by aid flow at national level and success stories at the local level can be seen as a “micro-macro paradox,” (Mosley 1987:139).

This more pessimistic view of aid is reflected in the recent work of Moyo (2009) with the title “Dead Aid”. Nevertheless this assertion is contrary to what American Aid did through the Marshall Plan to war devastated Europe at the end of World War II. The point here is not denying the context whereby that aid was from wealthy country to wealthy country, but to emphasise that if aid is used efficiently by recipients, it has potential to change lives and livelihoods.

Furthermore, international aid has helped to actualise the green- revolution in famine prone India. For Mosley (1987), the reasons for aid inefficiency are fungibility and the leakage of the aid into unproductive expenditure in the public sector. For Moyo (2009), aid has encouraged kleptocracies, corruption, aid- dependency, and downward spirals of development in Africa.

If what those writers have identified is accepted, one can sense problems at two levels. On the donor side, the problem seems to be that little or no emphasis is paid to understanding the inner power dynamics of the aid recipient countries, in which the winner takes all. On the recipient side, the narrowness of the political space takes away the right to trust (distrust), in power holders, to be interested or disinterested in political systems, freedom of expression and action of those who are sceptics and marginalised. This leads to the emergence of a politicized SLF.

Politicization of the SLF refers to magnifying the role of politics in the process of accessing livelihood assets. Researchers and organizations reacted against DfID’s neglect of “politics” and “political” as well as the role of power dynamics in the process of accessing livelihood assets.

Taking the political issue further, the challengers coined the phrase ‘Political capital’ (Rakodi 1999: 318, Booth et al, 1998:790). Political capital has become increasingly recognised as the missing dimension of the SLF, and as one potential remedy to the limited use of political analysis in studies of sustainability or deterioration of livelihoods.

The challengers of earlier versions of the SLF opted to add “political capital” as a sixth livelihood asset (Baumann and Sinha 2001:3), however the ‘political capital’ in the words of Hickey (2005:6) ‘lacks the historical elaboration that has been afforded social capital...also the same semblance of analytical nuance with regards the different forms it might take (e.g. bridging, bonding).’ In addition to this the evidence that led Bauman and Sinha to come up with ‘political capital’ better fits the “social capital”. For instance Baumann and Sinah (2001:3) elaborating evidence state that:

the Gram Panchayat in Kondkitunda has no independent financial base and has to pay officials up to 20% in informal commissions to gain access to grants which is rightly theirs. In this way, the relation between villagers and rent-seeking officials diverts capital away from livelihood pursuits.

This shows strategic reciprocity between the Gram Panchayat in Kondkitunda and grant holding officials whereby the former pays 20% commission in exchange for getting favour in accessing grants. This more likely depicts, the elements of ‘social capital’ in narrow or no political space to engage, transparently, understand the rights, the obligations of each actor; weak institutional or organizational capacity, weak discourse and action for citizens from below; whose encounters, bad impression derived from such encounters of exploitative relations are laying foundation for conviction, expression and action in the future, by utilising social capital strategically to tackle present bottlenecks of accessing the grant.

Furthermore, the phrase Political Capital lost its uniformity in use and meanings. For instance Rakodi, sees political capital as “access to decision-making” (Rakodi 1999: 318); Booth et al define political capital “as a gate keeper” in the processes of accessing other livelihood assets (Booth et al, 1998:790).

This thesis argues that placing “Political Capital” as a sixth capital asset or as “a gate keeper” might impede proper understanding of the “politics” and “Political”; it may isolate broader historical, socio-political forces from the consequences. For examples, livelihoods disruptions and livelihood asset deterioration by long historical and policy processes that creates livelihood, food insecurity and famine. Such isolation, if unchecked properly, will have potential to accept policy harm on humanity as a norm; set free the culprits from the effects of their action, accountability and responsibility, for a policy tragedy that is claiming lives and livelihood.

The linkage among political space, political identities, complex socio-historical processes, access to livelihood assets and subsequent security or vulnerabilities can be mapped out through new analytical frame designed, Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA) developed out of the literature review in this thesis has its origin from SLF, (Scoones 1998, Carney 1998); (Bond 1998); (World Bank 1997 a); (DfID 1995), (Hulme and Taylor 2000), (Baumann and Sinha 2001); LAST (Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix (Bond and Mukherjee 2002); (Webster, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002), (Hickey 2006).

LEPSA provides insights on the impediments that works against the wellbeing of citizens when they react or being critical or having low trust and interest to the institutions, discourses and actions of the authorities whenever the latter seems hurting the interests, lives and livelihoods of the former.

This requires political space for comfortable engagement. Understanding, the nature and the level of engagement of the authorities, from ‘above’ and the citizens from ‘below’ that were directly and indirectly, affected by particular intervention and the nature of interests of diverse identities can be seen as an extension of public accountability to citizens and stakeholders (World Bank 1997a), (DFID, 1995), as such helps generating knowledge of the circumstances of each identities in a given society.

LEPSA helps to capture the political and social value of diverse identities. More importantly in the process of understanding the root causes of insecurities and vulnerabilities those who are affected by

human-made disasters: - such as famine, war, food and livelihood insecurity which are observed without dramatic forces of the nature like bad weather (drought, flood, and hurricane) earthquake and more.

It also has instrumental advantages for example, by drawing on local or specialist knowledge to improve designs and to reduce uncertainty on the root causes of insecurity. It also will lay foundation for negotiation among the diverse identities for positive changes. By building political consensus and ownership of ideas, discourses and actions of those citizens, otherwise excluded distrusted or marginalised. Finally helps to identify the link between political spaces and accessing livelihood assets to deepen our understanding beyond the surface- politics.

The aims of this research are:

- To explore the political spaces of conflicting political identities between successive Ethiopian governments and Sidama and its effect on livelihood and food insecurities.
- To examine the role of political space in the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework with particular reference to political spaces of successive Ethiopian governments and conditioned political identities in Sidama and its impact on accessing livelihood assets.

The objectives to achieve those aims are:

**First:-** to critically review the literature on the evolution of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, and to examine the extent to which SLF helps to map out who is food and Livelihood and food (in) secure and to explore other possibilities if SLF fails.

**Second:-** to investigate the sources of political identity conflicts and the political space of struggle between successive Ethiopian governments policies and their consequences for Sidama Livelihoods, through the lens of either the SLF or the improved SLF

**Third:-** to evaluate the extent to which engaging political space conditioned the resilience, food and livelihood security in productive safety nets programme of the Ethiopian government.

**Fourth:-**to offer policy recommendations to future stakeholders in development initiatives within the parameters of the Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis.

This thesis is organised as follows:

Chapter two addresses research objective one, by critically reviewing the literature on famine and its prevention and examining the conceptualisation of famine and its causes and the emergence of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. It presents a critical review of the latter, arguing that it has ignored political and historical aspects. It proposes the concept of ‘political space’ as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The struggles are between political institutions (from ‘above’) and citizens sharing different political identities from “below”.

Chapter three deals with research methodology and provides a justification for why the Sidama case was selected; it introduces the general philosophical foundation for the research, explaining why critical realism is appropriate to the research question, and introduces the study area; It also deals with how field research was organised in temporal and spatial extensions; Integrating reflections on my positionality with how the research was conducted in two main periods: 2000-2001 and 2008-2009.

Chapter four begins to address objective two, by presenting the genesis of the Sidama ethno-nationalism as political identity. It lays the ground work for an understanding of the sources of political identity conflict by explaining how Sidama ethno-nationalism was inherited from pre-conquest socio-political institutions and how indigenous governance was used to mediate access to livelihood assets. Sidama ethno-nationalism has also, existed informally without being mainstreamed into political settings whilst also shaping the political conviction and political discourse of the Sidama ethno-nationalists.

Building on chapter four, and continuing to address objective two, Chapter five describes how a political setting of conflictive identity emerged; and analyse historical and political trends that paved the way for conflictive political identities. It also presents the root causes, the processes and cumulative effects

of non-violent and violent engagement on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama. Then it argues that those impacts of recurrent suffocating political spaces and violent engagements between institutions, discourses, and actions from 'above' and 'below' created direct and indirect cumulative effects that contributed to the 1999/2003 famine.

Chapter six presents the evidence on the links between conditioned political identities and the processes that create famine. It also continues the analysis of comparative political spaces in two successive regimes. It argues wider political spaces, increases effective engagements, and creates fertile grounds for sustainable livelihood initiatives and narrower political space leads to disengagement or negative engagements that led to war of liberations, loss of lives, livelihood disruption, food insecurity and famine.

Moving on to address objective three, Chapter seven presents the findings of the survey on the political Space of Conditioned identity: its impact on access to livelihood assets and famine prevention. It examines how the political space of conditioned identity enhances or retards access to available livelihood assets and aid resources. By doing so created conditioned identities of those integrated, loyalists, sceptics and the marginalised Sidama; and their subsequent differential access to livelihood asset and other aid resources such as Productive Safety Net led to failure without achieving its purpose.

Chapter eight discusses further the findings of the thesis and addresses objective three by building on the results of Chapter seven.

Chapter nine concludes and offers policy recommendations to achieve security and sustainability of livelihoods. It argues that in order to prevent livelihood asset access failure there must be freedom of conviction, expression and action. Secondly, contextual recommendations are also given on how to prevent famine and livelihood asset access failure and finally the impact of aid for the struggle between the power holders from 'above' and citizens from 'below'

It also concludes by arguing that the wider the political space, the freer the political discourse; and action; the lesser the political tensions. This leads to the wider peace and complete engagement in politics.



This in-turn allows negotiation that efficiently lays the foundation for local initiatives to work on the security and sustainability of livelihoods.

Finally, it suggests reconsidering the inclusion of historical processes that created the marginalisation of many and the integration and sustainability of the livelihoods of the few which is sidelined by the SLF. Moreover, it recommends Livelihoods of Engaging political Space Analysis (LEPSA) that includes the political space of complete engagement among various identities (from individual to the group) in the state in which they are living side by side supplying the mechanisms of accessing livelihood assets with freedom and liberty using (LEPSA) as a means of mapping out vulnerability, or resilience and sustainability.

## **CHAPTER TWO: FOOD (IN)SECURITY, FAMINE, IDENTITIES AND THE NOTION OF POLITICAL SPACE**

### **2 Introduction**

This literature review examines the conceptualisation of famine and its causes and the emergence of the sustainable livelihoods framework. It presents a critical review of the latter, arguing that it has ignored political and historical aspects. It proposes the concept of political space as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The struggles are between political institutions from ‘above’ and citizens sharing different political identities from “below”.

Famine is a slow moving disaster. It grows from food insecurity if the latter is allowed to continue unabated. Famine occurrence reflects few or no effective prevention systems. An understanding of famine itself influences famine prevention. This chapter explores some schools of thought on cause(s) of famine, as well as on famine prevention and investigates what is still missing.

The chapter is structured as follows: the following section defines food (in)security and famine, and its prevention. The second section deals with how the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) evolved from the search for food and livelihood security; it argues that after over two decades of the debate on security and the sustainability of livelihoods, the framework still suffers from the omission and commission of the political aspects of food and livelihood security and sustainability. Omission refers to refraining from mentioning explicitly “politics” and the “political” in the (SLF). Commission refers to the inclusion of “political capital” in the SLF as a remedy for the neglect of politically motivated marginalization, which has a tendency to over-trust in the political settings and the style of governance in the processes of accessing available livelihood assets by all citizens in non-democratic countries.

It is fundamentally builds on the argument that the SLF missed out the political aspects of food and livelihood security, and coined the phrase “political capital” as a sixth asset in the SLF to fill the gap of understanding. However, this approach poses a blind spot that prevents us from seeing hazards developing to damage livelihood security and sustainability.

The third section introduces the concept of political space and the way in which it creates continuous struggles between political or social movements from below and how political institutions from above use access to livelihood assets as a means of deterring the struggle from below.

This research is a modest attempt to show how the breadth or limitations of political spaces exercised in a given settings affect positively or negatively the conviction, expression and action of individuals and groups as agents of transformation. Subsequently, this size of the political space either facilitates or suffocates initiatives and; intervention to facilitate access to livelihood assets for ordinary and marginalised citizens.

## **2.1 Defining food (in) security**

There are at least three aspects of food insecurity: primarily, food insecurity can be seen as a temporary, complete lack of and or decline in access to productive resources; secondly, a deterioration of household assets over time, a decline in resource production as a result of environmental degradation; thirdly, a lack of alternative technologies (Maxwell and Frankenbereger, 1992). Food insecurity is thus far from mono-causal, and stems, in the words of Vogel &Smith (2002:316) from ‘combinations of political instability, environmental marginality and economic powerlessness’. Food insecurity may occur as an acute or chronic problem, enduring for varying time periods and differing in degrees of severity.

A population suffering from chronic food insecurity is more vulnerable to full-blown famine, and small fluctuations can lead to emergencies. Factors such as volatile food price swings, limited government capacity, to provide food and agricultural support, and the politicisation of land ownership create conditions in which people have little resistance to disruptions of normal activities by drought, poor harvests, economic crises, and price inflation that may quickly create conditions for famine.

Several major shifts in food security studies and policies have occurred since the 1970s. First, the unit of analysis has moved from the global/national level to the local/household level. Second, the scope of analysis has shifted from a “food first” approach to an emphasis on the performance and sustainability of household livelihoods. Third, subjective perceptions of food security among local populations now complement objectively measurable indicators of food security (Devereux & Maxwell 2001).

Thus this shows that the definition of food (in) security is evolving. This evolution began with the World Food Conference of 1975 that defined food security as “the availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption” (Maxwell & Watkins 2003). After Sen’s (1981) break-through work, the emphasis shifted from “food availability” to “food access”. Then the World Bank defined food security as “access by all people at all times to the food required for them to lead a healthy and productive life” (von Braun et al. 1999: 34). Food security at the family level, is conceptualized as access by all members at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life, sharing the same concepts from the general definition including - sufficiency, nutrition, and preference (Maxwell and Frankenberger, 1992).

This shows a transformation in the understanding of food security from the perspective of ‘food availability’ to ‘food accesses’. General definitions also combine both ‘food availability’ and ‘access to food’, by defining food security as ‘the availability of ‘food resources’; ‘access to those resources’ ; ‘sufficient consumption’; ‘appropriate utilization in a sanitary and nutritious manner’ (Hussein 2002,

Coates et al 2007). Furthermore those authors assert that food security cannot be assured, if one or more is missing from the four following elements:- 1) temporal, 'all the time'; 2) sufficiency, 'physically, socially, and economically must be accessible; 3) safe ; and 4) nutritious (having no damaging side effect on the health of individuals).

There are two views on measuring food insecurity. The first view contends that food insecurity can be measured by the amount of grain per capita and daily energy intake, as an indicator or risk factor. The second and more advanced approach suggests that, because food insecurity is a multidimensional phenomenon, it is difficult to measure, and measurement requires examination of a combination of related indicators (Frankenberger & Coyle 1993).

Some of the indicators used in food (in)security evaluation include, the amount of produce from crop growing and livestock rearing; the size of landholdings; the level of diversity in income sources to lean on in case of agricultural production failure; daily food consumption in terms of quantity, quality, preference and diversity; the level of fluctuation in local food prices; assessing wasting and stunting by using anthropometric measurements of children under five (weight for body mass) and the extent to which households are using coping strategies, such as wild plant consumption; seasonal migration and wage labour, and asset liquidation (Watts 1983; deGaine and Harrison 1988; Reardon, Matlon and Delgado 1988; de Waal 1989, Dreze and Sen 1989; Moris 1989; Frankenberger and Goldstein 1990; Leonard 1991; Ramato 1991; Chambers 1989; Watts and Bohle 1993; Eele 1994).

By combining quantitative and qualitative indicators, food security studies have thus improved in accuracy and validity. For example, food security assessments have begun to rely on local knowledge of household vulnerability by asking local populations to rank the vulnerability status of individual households and communities. Participation by individuals, transparency in the management of resources, and vulnerability reduction must figure among the primary goals to fight against famine and hunger in its last strong holds such as the horn of Africa. Food insecurity can progress to hunger and

famine if it is allowed to or if concerned organisations fail to respond (Maxwell, 1996, Hendriks, 2005).

## **2.2 Famine and its prevention**

There are at least five basic beliefs about the nature and causes of famine. The first, from early sources, relates famine to over-population. This school of thought was heavily influenced by Malthus. He proposed that famine followed excessive population growth and served to keep carrying capacity in check by reducing populations to a level consistent with food production.

This perception of famine is based on the assumption that famine is the result of food shortage, or in the words of Sen (1981) “Food Availability Decline” (FAD 1981). This may be related to the earlier definition of food insecurity, as a “risk factor” measured by the amount of grain per capita and daily energy intake. Secondly, famine has been seen as a sudden event, which grabs its victims unexpectedly. Thirdly, famine has been attached to the image of mass death. Fourthly, it is associated with the supply of food from somewhere else (i.e. food aid). Finally, famine is defined by its causation and regarded as mono-causal event, such as drought or, demographic pressure.

Nutritional scientists define famine in terms of food nutrients and see it as the result of the failure to provide sufficient requirements such as enough protein, calories, and vitamins (Nube *et al* 2003, Kistof 2009).

For advocates of ecology, the extreme growth of human society beyond the carrying capacity of land results in indiscriminate use of earth’s resources (Ehrlich, 1975, Paul and Anne Ehrlich 2009).

Sociologists tend to analyze the problem in terms of cultural attitudes, customs and taboos that are often responsible for the inefficient use of available resources and resistance to change, or the breakdown of local solidarity and systems of reciprocity (Scott, 1976).

For some Demographers, famine is seen as a consequential problem stemming from the economic relationships between countries, particularly between colonizer and colonised nations for instance (Singh, 2002:12) accuses British rule in India for famines as it was bad enough to have a remarkable impact on the long term population growth of the country particularly in the half century between 1871-1921.

While political scientists and some of economists tended to analyze the problem of famine as the result of political systems, their thesis is that political systems contribute to famine occurrence by a failure of political institutions to prevent it (Ravallion 1996:3). Or by allowing it to happen to punish those who are regarded as a threat to the existing political system (Clay and Holcombe 1985); Pankhurst (1986:4-5); (Jansson (1987:26)

Modernizers perceive famine in terms of a lack of advance in technologies for producing and distributing food (Ellis and Biggs 2001; Smith 1973:61; Coetze et al 2007:31).

It is imperative to summarise, how understanding of famine has been challenged. In 1981, Sen challenged the first belief, contending that famine resulted not from “food availability decline”, or food shortage, but from the entitlement failure, that is lack of ability to command, access and obtain food.

In 1987, Watts challenged the second belief. He argued that famine is not a sudden event, but a long process that pushes its victims gradually into the vulnerability zone. In 1989, de Waal challenged the third perception and found that death during famine was caused not by famine *per se* but by diseases. In addition to this, he further developed the concept of political contract.

In 1996, Davies argued against the fourth belief by saying the so called famine victims have hidden potential that is capable of adapting to declining living condition what is expected from the donors is not last minute intervention to save lives, but early support against deterioration of livelihood.

The mono-causal approach for instance suggested by (Cox, 1981:8); (Glantz 1987:15) was challenged by the emergency of Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (Scoones 1998, Carney 1998) who argued that famine causation is multi-causal.

Across the various disciplines, two common definitions cut across all approaches: They are famine as food shortage, and famine as mass starvation. Proponents of food shortage definitions characteristically define famine as Watts (1983:13, 17-18) does here:

Famine is food shortage leading to widespread death from starvation; [alternatively, a famine is] a societal crises induced by the dissolution of the accustomed availability of access to, staple foods on scale sufficient to cause starvation among a significant number of individuals.

Watts' definition does not explain why a food shortage in one area might not be balanced out by imports of food from elsewhere. It implies the market collapse, and non-arrival of food aid is either the grounds of the famine, or else is linked with a breakdown of food production before the famine occurred. Food shortage may be intimately related to production and distribution as, Cox (1981:5) explicitly recognizes: 'Famine may be defined as the regional failure of food production or distribution systems, leading to sharply increased mortality and associated disease.'

At the same time, if a researcher were to ask someone in the non academic community about the term 'famine', he or she might define famine on the basis of familiar images of famine victims. Informants in the West might think of famine in terms of mass starvation caused primarily by drought, flood and other natural phenomenon that lead to food insecurity. Such an attitude is also characteristic of some academics. For instance, Aykroyd (1974:2) argues: "Mass starvation and famine means much the same thing." For Rivers et al (1976: 355) "starvation is a semantic prerequisite for the definition of famine." Woldemariam (1984:9) describes famine as:

[A] general and widespread, prolonged and persistent, extraordinary and insufferable hunger lasting for several months and affecting the majority of the rural population over a more or less extensive area, resulting in a total and economic disorganization and mass death by starvation.



These definitions do not differentiate precisely between starvation and famine. Although these terms are often used as if they were synonymous, Sen (1981:39) clearly distinguished between the two: Famine implies starvation, but not vice versa... starvation is a normal feature in many parts of the world, but this phenomenon 'regular' starvation has to be distinguished from violent outburst of famines.

Woldemariam (1984:9) similarly posited a distinction between hunger and famine "Ordinary hunger is not famine, under nourishment is not famine."

Sen (1981:40) introduced further distinctions:

In analysing starvation in general', he wrote, ' it is important to make clear distinctions between three different issues (1) low level of food consumption (2) decline in food consumption and (3) sudden collapse of the level of food consumption. Famine is chiefly a problem of the third kind

As Sen (1981:137) noted, it is possible for famine to occur even in a period when food production has not declined, such as in Bangladesh in 1974: " 1974 was a local peak year in terms of both total output and per capita output of rice. Nevertheless a famine occurred. "

Excess mortality can also be associated with famine, but this might be caused by factors other than starvation, as deWaal (1989:192) points out: "famine mortality in Darfur ...was mostly or wholly disease- driven and not starvation driven." Therefore, neither the food shortage definition nor the mass starvation approach is entirely sufficient.

These definitions perceive famine in terms of its immediate causes and consequences, yet neither the causes nor consequences are the same universally. Famine may also be viewed as an event that affects an entire society in the locality or in the region that is prone to natural or man- made disasters. Yet famines never occur as a sudden unexpected event. Famine is a socio-political and historical process that selects the defenceless, powerless and marginalized groups in the society living in the disaster prone areas. Walker (1989:39) stresses this in defining famine as:

Socio-economic process, which causes accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and less powerful groups in the community to the point they can no longer as the group, maintain a sustainable livelihood.

Famine is, then, a process which gradually encroaches on the capacities of specific groups of people in the society affected by triggering factors. Despite external pressures every healthy person has capacities of his or her own (emotional, physical, intellectual, social) that are conditioned and governed by the accepted socio-economic context of any society. Anderson and Woodrow (1993: 34-6) have identified 'physical/material', 'social/organizational' and 'motivational/attitudinal' capacities and vulnerabilities explaining how those groups of societies under the threat of famine or other disaster can retain their capacities, they write :

No matter how poor people are or how much they have lost through a disaster, they still have some material capacities. Even if they have lost all material possessions, they have their own abilities to work and the skills and knowledge with which to produce. In addition, societies have social/organizational capacities, including such things as leadership, governance and decision making systems, and clan and family ties and loyalties. Societies also have attitudinal/motivational capacities. They have shared belief systems, religious or ideological.

These social capacities are associated with different ways of handling external shocks, whether natural (drought, flood, seasonality) or man-made (marketization, war, political institutions and practices). If these large –scale forces overwhelm the defending capacities of the individuals, those groups may be pushed into the 'negative zone' of their capacities: in other words they become vulnerable to famine. Individuals, groups, communities, regions or nations can be pushed into the vulnerability zone if they fail to resist the effects of these external forces, but the implication is that this vulnerability can be combated if the appropriate social and political defensive capacities are sustained

### **2.3 The evolution of sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF)**

The emergence, evolution and expansion of the SLF challenged, holistically, specialist discipline defence controversies and mono-causality perspectives of food insecurity and famine studies. According to Chambers (1981:1), the vulnerability of households or population groups to particular disasters has two dimensions. The first is external shock and the second is people's capacity to cope

with the shock. Vulnerability and resilience may be related to particular livelihood systems, to wealth status, or people's social or political religious identity and status.

With the introduction of the Sustainable livelihood Framework, food insecurity and famine are no longer viewed as the result of agriculture's failure to produce sufficient food alone, but rather as the consequence of the failure of livelihood systems to guarantee access to sufficient food at the household level (Devereux & Maxwell 2001).

The Household Livelihood Security (HHLS) framework grew out of a food security perspective and the SLF but is based on the observation that food is not the only basic need. Other needs include peoples' political participation in identifying the problems, setting priorities, planning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and the impact assessment of the programs or projects designed to enhance the best access and use of livelihood assets to pursue livelihood strategies and activities.

## **2.4 Insufficiently politicized Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF)**

The introduction and evolution of the SLF enhanced the understanding of the situation of people under threat of food insecurity and famine. This thesis argues DFID's SLF is insufficiently politicised. Solesbury (2003) traces back the origin of the SLF in "IDS brainstorming in 1996, during preparation of their bid for DfID's research programme on Sustainable Livelihoods." For the same bid, The Overseas Development Group (ODG) proposed:

a different version, with some similarities to the IDS framework, but independently developed from the same set of ideas. These frameworks were discussed in 1998 by the DFID Rural Livelihoods Advisory group....A framework diagram was eventually adopted by the Group, discussed at the NRAC Conference and published by DFID ( Solesbury 2003:9).

In light of this development, it is imperative to investigate the significance of IDS's original thought on livelihood studies. Ian Scoones (1998:1) reflected the basics for anyone who intends to explore sustainable livelihoods, when he asked the following questions.

... Who assesses who achieves a sustainable livelihood and who doesn't? In other words: what are relevant outcome indicators? What are the livelihood resources, institutional processes and livelihood strategies which are important in enabling or constraining the achievement of sustainable livelihoods for different groups of people? What are the practical, operational and policy implications of adopting a sustainable livelihood approach?


The original IDS's framework provided the answers for the questions raised. It is understandable how Scoones 1998 presentation of original thought was developed by IDS as it, contains most of the perspectives that should be taken into consideration in the livelihood studies. This includes "politics", "history" "social differentiation" and others had it not been squeezed out by DfID's Rural Livelihoods Advisory group to produce an insufficiently politicised technocratic SLF. (See Figure 2.1, the framework below).

This image has been removed

Figure 2-1 the original IDS frame work

Source: Scoones, 1998

The SLF was also useful, because it had a unique lens for mapping the wider context in which the poor organised their way of life. Had it not been for its neglect of the “politics” and “political space” the original SLF would have come up with the best way of understanding, identifying the needs of the poor, setting priority, planning, implementing, evaluating and impact assessment with slightest modification to enhance its applicability.



**Figure 2-2 DFID’s insufficiently politicised SLF.**

**Source:** Adapted from Carney, 1998.

For Ferguson, (1994:178), the birth of SLF ‘taking politics out of ‘Development’, whose argument was supported by empirical evidences from Lesotho, made his contention strong as he noticed that the SLF was not more than repeating the same earlier technocratic approach in the development discourse. Elaborating further, how the development agency like The World Bank ruled out the analysis of ‘politics’ and ‘political’ he explains:

Excluded from the [World] Bank's analysis are the political character of the state and its class basis, the uses of official positions and state power by the bureaucratic elite and other individuals, clique and factions and the advantages to them of bureaucratic "inefficiency" and corruption. The state represents "the people", and mention of the undemocratic nature of the ruling government or of political opposition is studiously avoided (Ferguson (1994:178).

In the same manner the SLF's designers carefully avoided mentioning the 'political' and 'politics' from DfID's framework as depicted in the figure 2.2 above. This avoidance of 'politics' and 'political' from SLF can be seen as the return to the earlier technocratic approach to development.

O'Laughlin (2002:511) further contends that 'the concept of livelihood is an ideological mask rather than a useful analytical tool.' O'Laughlin (2002:511) also uttered this shift '.... also reflects a troubling retreat from history, politics and class analysis in current livelihoods frameworks.' Although O'Laughlin is obsessed with 'class struggle', he has a grain of truth in identifying that something very important is missing. In fact the framework should have a place for understanding the way of engagement for diverse identities, and its consequences in lives and livelihoods.

His concentration on 'class struggle' however depicts his Marxist position in analysing the root-causes of poverty. However seemed biased towards Marxists' way of analysing the the root causes of poverty, while it is very complex. Because Marxian class analysis in Colonial Africa has less significance than the context where full developed capitalism is observed. Secondly, even if he perceives those part time 'peasants' and 'proletariat' as fixed identities, those identities were fluid even in his own standards, and missed the totality of identify when he reduced them to the class struggle alone. However he has credit in pointing out how the SLF missed important elements such us history, politics and 'class' in lieu of identity.

Subsequently, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework depicted above was adopted as DfID's official tool to understand livelihood security, sustainability, or insecurity or vulnerability; to inform policy, and the practical implementation of various projects and programmes in more technocratic and insufficiently

politicised ways.

By doing so it posed a “blind spot” to mask chronic poverty that results from the political marginalization of those who are not trusted by the political system within which they live. On the positive side as Gillard et al (2009:121) pointed out ‘livelihood rarely refers to a single activity. It includes complex, contextual diverse and dynamic strategies developed by households to meet their needs.’

If they had taken the original framework of IDS presented by Scoones(1998), that captured the political setting seriously, it would have provided the mechanism of mapping who are integrated, loyalist, sceptic and marginalised, in a non- inclusive political context, that is characterised by social struggles of conflictive and conditioned political identities. Additionally it would have demonstrated the way some are allowed access to and the rest prevented from accessing livelihood assets and how they would help investigators to suggest all inclusive strategies of accessing livelihood assets.

What distinguishes, the SLF from earlier development frameworks and aid models, is that primarily, the former focused very much on how people organised their lives, more on opportunities and more on agency, rather than concentrating on the household and survival studies of impoverishment of the 1980s used to do. Secondly, it was also strongly motivated by the need to develop more effective poverty alleviation policies. Thirdly, its strong belief that more effectiveness was expected to come from bottom-up and participatory methods, i.e., putting emphasis on poor people’s lives and daily needs, rather than on the top-down interventionist methods practised so widely up until then.

This clearly depicts that the livelihood approach was much indebted to the work and inspiration of Sen (1981) on entitlements and of Chambers (1983) Chambers et al. (1989); Chambers (1994a, b, c) Chambers also co-authored with Conway the first paper on Sustainable Livelihoods (1992). That paper became the pillar of livelihood framework including its definition of livelihood, is frequently referred to as the Sustainable Livelihoods reference paper:

a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with or recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contribute to net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long term. (Chambers and Conway 1992: 6)

Building on the definition of Sustainable Livelihoods of Chambers and Conway, DFID's Carney defines Sustainable livelihoods as follows, with slight modifications :

a set of ideas in the centre of the SLF, to demonstrate how people place vital resources within the processes of making a living by devising livelihood strategies based on a set of vital resources called capitals, usually arranged in the form of a pentagon. These livelihood assets, according to the improved SLF, interact with policies, institutions and processes to shape the choice of livelihood strategies (Carney 1998:9).

Theoretically, the pentagon shape represents five livelihood assets with each line that goes from the centre of pentagon outward. Livelihood asset pentagon as depicted in the following Figure 2.3 consists human capital, natural capital, financial capital, physical capital, and social capital.

This image has been removed

Key : Where H=Human Capital, N= Natural Capital, F= Financial Capital, P=physical Capital and S=social Capital

**Figure 2-3 Livelihood assets pentagon**

**Source: Carney, 1998.**



***Human Capital:*** For DfID's Sustainable Livelihood Framework (Carney 1998:9) human capital means "skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives." Ellis (2000) also defines it in similar to DFID's definition. Framed in this way, human capital entails fitness to do work, i.e. healthiness, being equipped with know how to do things, cumulative skills and knowledge that leads to human capability. Labour is the chief resource available for the households. Labour is a readily available asset for those who are poor at accessing or owning other assets, but utilization of their labour depends on the sufficiency of energy derived from food.

This is particularly evident during food production crisis that may be associated with reduced income and higher food prices as pointed out by Devereux (1988). This suggests that food insecure and malnourished people may find it difficult to use their labour as a human capital, even without any dramatic health issues such as illness or affected by any diseases.

This fact was identified by Joy (1973) more than two decades before the emergence of Sustainable Livelihood Framework. Joy developed the idea of a "functional classification" that will help to identify not only the time of the "food gap" but also affected people: "food and nutrition planning starts not from the measurement of nutrient and food supply "gaps" but from the identification of who it is that is poorly nourished and why?" Joy (1973:170). Identifying "who is poorly nourished and why" may lead to the discovery of the identity of those who are affected by root causes that may be attached to socio-political and economic settings within which those people live. The non-politicised nature of the framework refrained from clearly stating those leading questions, beyond 'opening the Pandora's box' of the vulnerability context.

Access to both formal education and health services is very expensive due to the inputs invested in it, quality standards and the monetization of the value to measure those qualities. In the field of formal

education, employability value given for qualifications obtained from the higher education system, and unequal access to the system creates those who can afford it financially, temporally and those who cannot. Therefore human capital and human capability formation is not cost free as is suggested in insufficiently politicised sustainable Livelihood Framework. Ultimately it is the political settings that fix who will or will not be able to afford access human capability formation.

***Natural capital:*** an asset used in the SLF to show natural resource stocks from which renewable and non-renewable resource flows and services useful for livelihoods are derived. Substances like all metallic and non-metallic minerals taking millions of years to form and now fixed in supply fall into the latter category. On the other hand, resources such as water, forest, soil, solar radiation, tidal and wind energy; animal and plant lives that replenish naturally within short time spans represent renewable resources. However, these resources could deplete when the exploitation rate exceeds the rate at which they renew themselves. Nature does not define capital per se; rather it is people who do so.

Natural substances in the environment remain 'neutral' if people do not appraise their usefulness. The "basic preconditions" to be met to consider any element as capital or asset are the presence of people with knowledge, technical skills and cultural development to permit its "extraction and utilization", and the existence of "demand for goods and services produced" from them. Therefore, natural capital is a component of the physical environment, which is used to produce goods and services to meet human demand. In general, it is the ability and demand of people that create resource, not the simple physical presence of substances (Zimmermann, 1951).

Many people in developing countries base their livelihoods on flow resources like land. They derive their basics like food, water, fire and construction woods from the same resources. These very resources that sustain millions of people, however, are under greater pressure, which has brought degradation and even depletion to them.

Cliff and Lawrence (1979:1-2), identified political forces behind disturbances and deterioration of natural resources that led to the spread of hunger: The commercialization of African agriculture, encouraged by factors such as the imposition of taxes and the promotion of cash cropping during colonialism, led to sometimes fatal over- exploitation of natural resources for individual profit-resources which once used to be conserved for the community's benefit.

Climatic phenomena such as drought, flood, seasonality, cold and shortened growing seasons are precipitating factors which can create unfavourable conditions that may cause crop failure. However, such crop failure cannot of itself explain famine, unless socio-economic and political context of the given area has failed to prevent it.

No matter how severe the drought situation in a given area, the consequent possibility of famine depends on the people's capabilities and level of political vulnerability. Famines are not common occurrences in the other areas of the Middle East, even though these have the same climatic aridity as the countries of the Horn of Africa and Sahel, because their political and social conditions are so different.

Both drought and flood can create food shortages and pave the way for famine in the rain fed rural areas of Africa and South Asia. Large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa face severe ecological crises. The threat of drought and consequent famine for farmers in Sahel, as well as in the countries in the Horn of Africa, is real as desertification spreads to areas where rain-fed agriculture is common, irrigation is not practiced and rainfall apparently becomes more unreliable.

Although drought leading to food scarcity may negatively affect a household's access to food it is possible to identify a number of mechanisms and strategies via which affected households manage to survive tremendous difficulties. To escape starvation, many agrarian communities gather wild foods, utilize commons, borrow, share resources with relatives send children to live with relatives dwelling outside the drought prone areas, and draw on societal obligation of reciprocity during the periods when

food is scarce.

Drought is not something that unexpectedly grabs the vulnerable groups of society. Watts (1987:180), describes early warning systems that the local community possesses as follows: “ to the extent that the drought is recurrent throughout the Sudanic savannas and the rain fall variability is part of the climatic order of events, it is to be expected that those who depend directly on the land for their livelihood demonstrate sound knowledge and judgment of climatic variability and environmental risk.”

However, these early- awareness strategies and survival mechanisms of the community who live in drought-prone area will be exhausted if drought is prolonged for several years, since these communities will use their existing resources up until the last moment to prevent people from dying. For instance, in Ethiopia the drought of 1974 was preceded by six consecutive years of poor harvest that wore out the coping ability of the population living in North Eastern Wollo. Even if local capacities are severely exhausted, famines are preventable if food distribution can be altered, either by redistributing food among the population or by securing increased food surpluses from non- drought areas.

While it appears true that climatic change results in food shortages, and if the decline in food provisions remains constant for a long period of time, without any active interventions being undertaken against the consequences of drought, famine will occur. Yet as Woldemariam (1984:127) puts it, “what begs for explanation is the period between the time when the drought is recognized and the commencement of the period of starvation.

It is this period of waiting passively that allows the process of famine to its full capacity of destruction.” If the population living in drought prone areas is already vulnerable as a result of poverty, drought might jeopardise the ability of the agrarian community to resist the onset of famine. In the words of Lemma (1985:45) “Starvation, therefore, must be seen as an economic, social and political problem and not only as a problem of food production and drought. It has been evident that

what were generally considered ‘natural disasters’ are not strictly natural anymore.”

The emphasis on natural resources degradation cannot explain why one small group of individuals might have better access than another. Bush (1985b: 59) correctly understands that “it is the poor who suffer most from drought ... we need to explain why drought becomes famine and why certain sections of the population and why some communities rather than others suffer most from it.” While those arguments suggest, the root problems of poverty stem from less access to natural capital in the context of this section, access to land and its resources is strongly associated with the power dynamics of a given society, reflected by the amount of the political space within that society an argument the SLF omits to explicitly mention and the point at which alternative analyses are necessary.

***Social Capital:*** defined by Carney (1998): [T]he social resource upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihood objectives. These are developed through networks and connectedness, either vertical (Patron/client) or horizontal (between individuals with shared interests ) that increase people’s trust and ability to work together and expand their access to wider institutions, such as political or civic bodies; membership of more formalised groups which often entails adherence to mutually-agreed or commonly accepted rules, norms, and sanctions and relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchanges that facilitate co-operation, reduce transaction costs and may provide the basis for informal safety nets amongst the poor

It is understandable that the notion of social capital is presented in the sustainable Livelihood Framework, in the context of mutual trust and interest and mutual appreciation. However this notion of social capital can rapidly disappear due to the rent seeking attitudes of those who are supposed to be patrons, and reciprocal and subsequent mistrust from those who are supposed to be clients.

Therefore the social capital may be exaggerated resources or dependent on the level of reciprocal trust and interest between patron and clients. Secondly, insufficiently politicized SLF does not take into consideration how social capital can be a liability, rather than an asset, when the obligation to

fulfil membership rules and criteria deprives some members of fulfilling their personal needs. This may happen in “spoils-oriented” political settings (Dorman 2006).

A “Spoils oriented “ political setting is the relational system where patrons are prepared to sacrifice the relationship they have with clients for maximization of spoils, particularly in a political settings characterised by neo-patrimonial regimes in developing countries. Neo-patrimonialism is evolved from Weber’s concept of patrimonialism. The patrimonialism governance for (Weber 1978:1028-9): ‘lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the “private” and the “official” sphere. For the political administration is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler and political power is considered part of his personal property...’

This is a traditional form of political domination characterised by a chief’s or hereditary royal household’s exercise formally arbitrary ,personal and bureaucratic power through an administrative apparatus ‘staffed by slaves ,mercenaries, conscripts, or some other group’ without independent power-base (Weber, 1978: 1029). In this political setting loyalty and honour giving from clients exchanged for protection and resource provision from patrons.

However neo-patrimonialism is a distinctly characterised by ‘patrimonialism combined with a modern state bureaucracy’ (Medard 1982:179, Budd 2004:2). In neo-patrimonial political settings, where politics tends to become ‘a kind of business with two modes of exchange: connection [for] money [or money for connection.] The state is a pie that everyone greedily wants to eat’ (Medard 1982:182). This argument may come to light when one critically analyses, the relationship between supposed patrons who come to the centre of power by any means and end up serving ‘self- interest’, favouring and rewarding those integrated into the system and the loyalists, despite, being entrusted to govern citizens of all sorts not only loyalist, but also sceptics whose trust in the system is low, and those citizens whom the system tends to marginalise.

In fact in some political settings where corruption is rampant and the opportunities are so limited,

favour in provision of resources and opportunity is not limited to simple exchange favour for money, but the favour is restricted only to those who pay more. For instance Jeffery and Lerche (2001:97-98) described the situation in North India: there are 'going rates' for employment as police constable (Rs 40,000 to 75,000 army sepoy (30,000 to 50,000) bus conductor (Rs 20,000 and 60,000) to be paid under the table to officials of state recruitment bodies and the 'brokers' through whom they typically 'work' in this situation there seems the recruitment position holders do the favour for those who pay them more.

Secondly, the type of social capital framed in the SLF may exist in peripheries, far from the reach of modern state and its bureaucracy, where traditional ways of exchange and building relationships have not been disrupted or successfully maintained their identity and their traditional value. In this context the supposed social capital is being observed as fast disappearing due to commercialization and profit motives that do not take into consideration the relations among the people but loyalties to firms and companies that are organised for profit generation.

Thirdly, neo-patrimonial political settings which is characterised by extraction not beyond exchange, by a predatory economy beyond moral economy, by bureaucratic clientelism beyond state-society clientelism, and redistribution to those that 'matter' politically not distribution to the less resourceful, those who trusted their patrons or members of their social organization may go to extreme levels to fulfil their obligations to the extent of not having enough to meet their needs.

Patrons or friends to whom they committed themselves can betray those types of loyalists. In fact, it is quite commonly accepted as the prevalent form of contemporary politics across the developing world (Clapham 1992:48:49). Therefore the type of political system should be examined before our understanding of the social capital is enabled by an insufficiently politicised SLF. Because it is imperative to examine whose interests, the social capital is serving?

***Physical Capital:*** defined as "basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support

livelihoods. Infrastructure consists of changes to the physical environment that help people to meet their basic needs and to be more productive. Producer goods are the tools and equipment people use to function more productively.” (Sustainable Livelihood guidance sheet). Similarly, Carney (1998) includes man-made produced goods, e.g. infrastructure, machines, equipment and the like, livelihood assets such as houses, tools and machinery, food stocks or livestock, jewellery and farm equipment. Moreover, in urban livelihood studies, basic infrastructure like transport, water and energy are mostly included in physical capital together with shelter and production equipment (de Haan 2000: 344).

Producer goods may be owned on an individual or group basis or accessed through rental or ‘fee for service’ markets, the latter being common with more sophisticated equipment. The producer goods in the context of agrarian livelihoods are farm tools. Principal power sources to operate farm tools in farming activities are human, animals and machines.

*Hand tools Technology:-* This is the dominant feature of hoe cultivation. Hoe cultivation is characterised by low productivity, resulting in smaller areas under cultivation, reduced total output, reduced cash cropping, increased food insecurity, reduced farm incomes, and a higher incidence of poverty where households are unable to meet their basic needs from their own cash and in-kind resources. This process started in prehistoric times when early civilizations developed stick and stone tools which were the only means to enhance labour productivity. In many parts of the world, hand-tools are the only technology used in agriculture, and even in highly mechanized agricultural systems, improved hand-tools are still important.

*Human power and hand tools:-* The household asset base lies at the heart of the farm power system and is a major determinant of livelihood outcomes. Household composition and group membership determine the labour available for farm work. Social assets play a vital role in enabling poorer households to address their farm power constraints. Some households tackle farm power shortages on an individual basis through reciprocal labour or by pooling their human power and implements. Others



draw strength by working in groups to improve their motivation; some groups also include a welfare dimension offering assistance to members in time of need.

*Draft animal power application:* - This evolved as the second stage, when animal muscle power is substituted for human power, a process which started in ancient civilizations. A large variety of implements and machines have been developed which use animals as the principle power source. (Rijk 1989) This can be regarded as a primary introduction of appropriate technology to substitute for human labour or primary labour saving mechanism in the evolution of appropriate technology. This paved the way to relative increases in labour productivity, and can help to release labour for employment in other sectors of the livelihood, to facilitate cultivation of a larger area with the same labour force and may increase production.

Households with access to draft animal power derive significant benefits. They generally cultivate larger areas than hoe cultivators, realise greater yields, improve household food security, and produce a marketable surplus. However, the ability to reap the full benefits of using draft animal power for cultivating a larger area than is possible by family labour is only achievable where there is an abundance of labour within the community, especially for weeding. (Rijk 1989, Pearson 1998, Starkey, 1994).

*Motor power:* - This is the third stage in the processes of evolution in producer goods in agrarian livelihoods. Motor power provides more power with less effort compared to manual or animal power. It is sustainable in the regions where good markets for cash crops exist, and spare parts and fuel is readily available (Pearson, 1998). However in many areas of the world, mechanization to motor power remains unaffordable or inaccessible for many (Starkey, 1994).

Due to international relations and diplomacy donors, like DfID, USID and SIDA cannot always monitor and evaluate at the beneficiary level to assess the extent to which donated materials or funds have changed the lives of the proposed poorest targets. In fact, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework

promoted by donors was crafted as a remedy for the past errors committed by the direct interventionist developmental approach.

If we examine retrospective literature, on aid conditionality for the promotion of good governance and democracy in its western style, its success has been muted in developing countries in general, and Africa in particular, perhaps for three main reasons. Primarily, a structural impediment that operates in a quite different socio-economic context hampers democratization and the evolution of 'good governance' to the expected standard by aid donors and critical thinkers. (Ake 1996:135, Joseph, 1997: 363, Bienen and Herbert, 1996; Lewis 1996, Makinda, 1996: 555).

Secondly, donors lack the necessary understanding and commitment (Crawford, 1997:69, Geisler 1993, Brown 2001) to pressurise the recipient countries use their potential for political reforms, when the donors have other foreign policy priorities. (Schraeder et al 1998:321-322, Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 45).

Thirdly, perceiving the aid misuse and abuse as an internal affairs and dilemma of donors not to infringe the sovereignty of the aid recipient countries if they fully monitor and audit whether aid resource reach intended beneficiaries, diplomatic and other national interest priorities of donors (Harbeson, 1999:52-53, Young, 2004:20, Hook 1998, Olsen 1998:366-367, Peceny, 1999), can make aid fail to achieve the primary purpose it promise, as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) states:

Recent years have seen growing criticism of rural development strategies followed, with only minor adjustments, for the past three decades. These conventional strategies have seen development primarily as a series of technical transfers aimed at boosting production and generating wealth. In practice, conventional projects usually target medium to large scale "progressive" producers, supporting them with technology, credit and extension advice in the hope that improvements will gradually extend to more "backward" strata of rural society. In many cases however, the channeling of development assistance to the better-off has led to concentration of land and capital marginalization of small farmers and alarming growth in the number of landless laborers (FAO, 1996: 1).

This suggests that the basic fault in the conventional approach has been that the rural poor are rarely consulted in development planning and usually have no active role in the issues that are vital for their lives and livelihoods. The emergence and evolution of SLF was basically to overcome past aid delivery mistakes from need identification to impact assessments when it centred the poor at the core of its presentation. However, some evidence from the field suggests that the proposal of DfID and the intention of the SLF did not fully achieve the purpose intended. These challenges have continued to prevail two decades after the promotion of the SLF due to: primarily inadequate extension strategies and services, and secondly, inadequacies with trained extension workers with updated information about the intention of the SLF.

***Financial Capital:*** - as defined by the Sustainable Livelihoods guidance sheet this signifies “financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives”. The guidance sheet further elaborates its two sources as “[a]vailable stocks” and “[r]egular inflows of money.” The former denotes “[s]avings are the preferred type of financial capital because they do not have liabilities attached and usually do not entail reliance on others. They can be held in several forms: cash, bank deposits or liquid assets such as livestock and jewellery” the latter comprises the income outside “earned income, the most common types of inflows are pensions, or other transfers from the state, and remittances” (DfID guidance sheet 1999).

There is an increasing need for financial services to cater for a wide variety of applications such as food, education and clothes as well as shocks like illnesses, theft, fire and deaths but the formal financial sector is not appropriately structured to satisfy the rapid growth in the need for financial services by the poor communities. They are, therefore, pushed further away from accessing these services and are marginalised. This, according to Baumann and Sinha (2001:2), results in the heavy dependence of most households on the formal micro-lenders and informal local moneylenders for the provision of credit. They regard these as responsive to their financial needs and act as lenders of last

resort (The World Bank 2002:133).

However, the households are exploited by the lenders who lend to them more than they can afford. Socio-economic factors such as unemployment, low levels of education, income and asset inequality contribute to poverty. This implies that many poor households do not have any choice but to incur multiple debts and are exposed to a debt spiral or over-indebtedness. Debt spiral or over indebtedness means using loans to pay off other loans and allocating more than fifty percent of monthly net income to loan repayments.

An insufficiently politicised Sustainable Livelihood Framework does not indicate the discrepancies of the distribution of formal financial services providing firms between urban and rural areas. This is relevant when one considers the concentration of the financial sector in urban areas in terms of services available and the volume of transactions. In addition to this one can observe that banks compete for clients with ownership of the assets that can be used as collateral; they also target clients with payslips, as proof of employment and collateral as a security for loans that most of the rural poor households cannot afford. In addition to this the rural poor households are perceived as not trust worthy for banking and denied the service of the profit driven banking system (Baydas et al. 1997:2).

Essentially, the emergence of micro finance institutions seems a preferable strategy to make finance accessible to those in rural settings which the earlier aid model and recipient countries did not consider as their priorities. Micro finance or credit involves the distribution of small-scale loans to the poor households (Smit et al. 1996:591). The industry, like the banks, also targets clients with proof of employment and is characterised by large disparities in access, cost and types of credit provided based on income levels. The operation and regulation of the industry, which is aimed at protecting both borrowers and lenders from exploitation, allows lenders to charge interest rates that exploited poor households who end up not having access under a controlled interest rate and being marginalised. Furthermore, lack of access to financial services by poor households makes them to look for alternative

sources of finance and heavily depend on the financial services of their local informal moneylenders who are regarded as responsive to their financial needs. Lindholm (1958:150) refers to these as “loan sharks” who provide lending of an emergency type and are usually operating outside the legal provision for lending. Greene and Berroth (2002:2) point out that these loan sharks offer vulnerable clients loans of various amounts at exorbitant interest rates.

In summary, the insufficiently politicised SLF has omitted the role of power dynamics in political settings within which the targets of study live. Subsequently, this omission disguises who does and does not access livelihood assets; and for whom enabling and disabling policy conditions working for and against devising livelihood strategies and the type of livelihood outcomes :- (un)sustainability or (in) security. If the original SLF presented by Scoones, that captured the political setting seriously had been core, it would have provided the mechanism of mapping, who is integrated into the political setting, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalised not only in the process of political engagement , but also from accessing livelihood assets. This could have helped investigators to identify the root problem of poverty and come up with appropriate suggestion(s).

Although reluctant to mention the role of politics in the processes of livelihood asset access, in the strict sense of the term, earlier versions of the SLF acknowledged that livelihood strategies of the poor are embedded in structures and governed by institutions. However the wider context of structures and governance are the reflection of the type of politics within which the poor reside. As pointed out by (Geiser et al. 2011b : 258) DfID explicitly aimed at “a refocus on assistance to the poor”

To this effect DfID initiated a range of mechanisms to encourage the design of research projects and programmes, evaluating their ongoing and time specific projects in the contexts of new the emerging sustainable livelihood framework in collaboration with a number of British academics and research groups and started to finance development interventions based on the sustainable livelihood Framework (de Haan and Zoomers2005: 30–31).

At the beginning, the explanation of the basics of Sustainable Livelihoods was so popular that it was supported by almost all International Aid Donors. However, gradually after a few years several variants were circulating. Many of these variants can be associated with developmental organisations, displaying their own version of the SLF.

The second problem of an insufficiently politicised SLF lies in the extent of Aid efficiency. Due to the fact that the SLF informs policy, intervention and implementation by supplying aid, omitting the political aspect of poverty will have an impact on the efficiency of donation and aid. As one of the suppliers of a huge proportion of the aid to its political partners in the developing countries, DfID's framework is neither focusing on the width or narrowness of the political spaces of the recipient countries, the extent to which aid reaches intended targets nor the level of success.


## **2.5 First politicized Sustainable Livelihood Framework**

The later version of the SLF opted not to mention the role of “political” or “politics” in the processes of accessing livelihood assets, in choosing livelihood strategies and the livelihood outcomes. Politicization of the framework refers to magnifying the role of politics in the process of accessing livelihood assets.

Researchers and organizations reacting to DfID's neglect of the “politics” and “political” as well as the role of power dynamics in the process of accessing livelihood assets, started to modify and make the sense of “politics” and “political” in the framework by replacing the box that contains the concept of “Transforming Structures and Processes” (Carney, 1998) with “Policies Institutions and Processes (PIP)” and defining policies, institutions and processes and what the vulnerability context entails.

These modifications seemed to be a response to the omission of “politics” and “political” in the

SLF, and the difficulties faced by serious researchers to distinguish “politics” and “political” from entire livelihood settings within which people live (See Baumann 2000 and the modified sustainable Livelihood framework in figure 2.4)



**Figure 2-4 Politicization of the SLF**


**Source: Adapted from Baumann 2000:9**

## 2.6 The notion of political capital and more politicization of the SLF

The challengers coined a phrase known as ‘Political capital’. Political capital has become increasingly recognised as the missing dimension of the SLF and as one potential remedy to the limited use of political analysis in studies of sustainability or deterioration of livelihoods.

The sustainable livelihood framework was challenged because it had never stated explicitly the role

of political power in the processes of enhancing or retarding access to livelihood assets, as it has been discussed above. Challengers of the earlier version of the sustainable livelihood framework again opted to add “political capital” as a sixth livelihood asset. See Figure 2.5



**Figure 2-5** More Politicised SLF

By introducing political capital to the sustainable livelihood framework Bauman and Sinha (2001) added a sixth capital and subsequently the asset pentagon became an asset hexagon. Bauman and Sinha (2001) rendering of the phrase “political capital” for their finding was based on empirical evidence that fit best for the concept of “Social capital”.

The phrase political-capital, meant different things for different researchers, for instance, Rakodi who sees political capital as “access to decision-making” (Rakodi 1999: 318); Booth et al who define political capital “as a gate keeper” in the processes of accessing other livelihood assets



(Booth et al, 1998:790); However those writers who present “political capital” as “a gate keeper” fail to see the facts on the ground, where those who come to political power in modern political settings by persuasion or coercion decide on the fate of lives and livelihood of the citizens that live in their territory

The findings of Baumann and Sinha (2001:3) are a positive development towards recognizing the role of “politics” and “Political” in sustainable Livelihoods Framework and development discourse of 1990s instead of shying away like DfID’s earlier version of Sustainable Livelihood framework.

## **2.7 Constraints of Political –Capital**

There are two basic issues still to be addressed as far as their findings are concerned. First, their empirical evidence from an evaluation of Micro-watershed development in India suggests that it is rather “social capital” that connects the power-holder as patron and clients in reciprocal manner. This is true when local watershed committee, bureaucrats on one hand, use their “Financial Capital” to gain favours of bid and promotion of their job position and the villagers on the other have “to pay officials up to 20% in informal commissions to gain access to grants which are rightly theirs” (Baumann and Sinha 2001:3).

The findings are corruption-informative, and may be best understood as a call for corrective measures. The discovery of inappropriate behaviours of interactions among individuals in the absence of infringing the law or inadequacy of moral authority of individuals involved in such activities.

However, it is very hard to substantiate the assertion of Baumann and Sinha (2001) to qualify as a “Political Capital” or the phrase “political capital” synonymous with “Social Capital” as their empirical evidence suggests reciprocal give and take.

Secondly, even if their findings were understood as “political capital”, situating it as a “sixth capital asset” with other ordinary livelihood assets, will further confuses the term “politics” and “political” and their relationship with resources. In fact, the “politics” and “political” may have elements of devising the way of accessing the livelihood assets, when and how. But situating “political-capital” among the livelihood assets will definitely derails its appropriate position in social settings.

When one looks closer at the entire evolution of development studies since the 1980s and 1990s, the SLF seems the battlefield for an ideological war between neo-liberalists and post-Marxists. The former contend that the power should be inherent in individual members of a group and can be promoted with its relevance to the collective goals of the group. This suggests that the empowerment of those who are in need of power or “powerless” could be achieved without any dramatic change that might affect negatively the power of the power holders (Craig and Mayo 1995).

The latter, strive to reverse the formers’ perspectives, and propose a bottom- up approach to the development to challenge the unbridled ride of both state and market through awareness creation of collective identity formation by extracting a common economic and political experience of marginalisation in mobilization processes (Freire, 1996). In the words of Mahon and Stokke, (2000:249) “the studies of local development should pay more attention to the politics of the local, i[.]e the hegemonic production and representation of the ‘local’ in counter-hegemonic collective mobilization.”

However, both (shying away from stating clearly the role of politics and “Political Capital” as a sixth capital asset or a gate-keeper) will pose a blind spot that prevents us seeing developing hazards to damage livelihood security and sustainability. First, failing to recognise properly the role of politics in

the process of accessing livelihood assets will lay the foundation for false confidence in power holders or political settings in the face of encountering harms for the basics of humanity.

Secondly, coining the concept of “politics” as the sixth capital or as “a gate keeper” might impede proper understanding of the “politics” and “Political”. Thirdly, derailing of “politics” and “political” from its right position may occur, thus preventing appropriate reflection on inequalities and power relations from the household to global level. Fourthly, it isolates political forces that create livelihoods disruptions and livelihood asset deterioration by the long historical and policy processes that created livelihood and food insecurity or famine; and subsequently lead to a withdrawal from accountability and responsibility, for policy side effect that is claiming lives and livelihood. Such isolation, if unchecked properly, will have the potential to take it as a norm.

## **2.8 Political space and access to livelihood assets**

Investigating the role of inclusion and exclusion the concept of “politics” and “political” in any aid modality and frameworks facilitates an exploration of the root causes of livelihood and food insecurity, and helps identify hazards against the security of lives and sustainability of livelihoods.

### **2.8.1 Defining Political space**

Before discussing the various conceptual approaches to political space, it is important first to define the term. There is lack of clarity in the phrase political-space. Doyle (2009:122) noticed this lack of clarity in the phrase “political-space” when she writes:

“Political space is not neatly defined in the way that the international state system suggests. It is chimerical and incoherent, shifting form depending on which activities and whose identities are recognized as political. Looking at political space from the perspective of a figure who finds him/herself on the margins of the international state system reveals both its instability and the violence with which its position of monopoly on political space is asserted.”

Political space can be understood as the positions of actors, and relational dynamics that range from

internal ‘nations’ or ‘states’ to external international relations among global political systems. Similarly, (Lakoff and Jonson 1980:455) see the metaphor of political space as conceptualizing the relationships: ‘understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of another’.

Because ‘the shape of the political space –the number of dimensions, the policy content of these dimensions, and the location of actors in this space is a central determinant of political competition and outcomes...’ (Gabel and Hix 2002:934). (Benoit and Laver 2012:195) relate the term space with political competition when they assert that ‘ it is more or less impossible to describe policy-based political competition without referring to agents’ ‘positions’ and ‘ movements’ on key issues.’ These augments suggest how political spaces regulate the interaction of actors through institutional channels, political discourse and activities and performances.

This part of the chapter deals with the conceptualization of political space within sovereign states to challenge the “blind spot” in the SLF that masks the role of political space in enhancing or impeding citizens’ access to livelihood assets within, the state they live.

Normally, politics, in the broadest sense, is the activities, through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live, while political space contains context specific institutions, terms, and the way those terms are implemented, within the borders of institutions. Political space is seen by Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002:8) in three forms: institutional channels; political discourses, and the social and political practices of the poor. It is this understanding of political space which will be drawn upon.

While Webster and Engberg-Pedersen’s approach focuses on monolithic institutional channels; political discourse and social and political practices of the poor, implying the struggle from the “below” the approach presented in this research is dualistic adding institutional channel, political discourse and political action from the “above” and the historical processes of struggle between the two which led to the formation of the Livelihoods of Engaging Political space Analysis (LEPSA) as

an improved SLF.

### **2.8.2 Institutions and institutional channels**

In order to understand the institutional channels; from the perspective of political space within national or at the nation-state level, it is imperative to capture what the term institutions means. “Institutions” in the words of North (1990:3) are “rules of the game” that entails formal and informal rules laws, rights, customs and sanctions applied to regulate the interactions of individuals in a society. Institutions for North (1991:97) “are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions code of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).”

The difference between formal and informal institutions is vague. In this research formal institutions are explicitly written in the forms of regulation that govern the extent of operation designed by organisations in their political life span. The informal institutions, on the other hand, are implicit and internalised without any written code; and pass from generation to generation by conviction, verbal expression and manifest themselves as ‘unwritten rules in use’( Hyden 2006).

There seem to be similarities and differences between the term “organizations” and “institutions”. They are similar when the organizations created to carry out specific activities are called institutions. For the sake of clarity while the institutions are the entire framework, the organizations are the actors that strive to get things done within the set of institutional framework.

Organisations become institutions when they are characterised as the sources of value and norms. Thelen (2004) explored the evolution of valued institutional arrangements in the context of Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan. Institutional arrangements are also associated with incentives to reward those who accept the pace of change, and disincentives to punish those who are left behind for various reasons. Those rewards and punishments will reinforce the power dynamics and the types of

relationship that individuals or groups of individuals will have with institutions. This fact was explicitly expressed by the IMF in its world outlook in (2005:126-127) as follows:

Political institutions determine the distribution of political power, which includes the ability, to shape economic institutions and the distribution of resources... As groups grow wealthier they can use their economic power to influence political institutions in their favour...changing institutions can be slow, requiring both significant domestic political will and more fundamental measures to reduce the opportunity and incentives for particular groups to capture economic rents.

It is this determination of the institutional arrangements that provide meanings for the range of choices and decide the consequences that might follow the conviction, expression and performances of individuals, which shape the identity of the individuals, or groups of individuals.

One aspect of political space is the means through which identified groups with homogenous identity can or cannot access and control the need identification; setting priorities; design policy, programmes/projects; monitor and evaluate implementation and progress, whether the programme/project is achieving the purpose intended at the program/project formulation; learn from success and failure; the power to amend and seek the best way of avoiding failure; and generally decide on available options and issues that affect the lives and livelihood of the identified groups.

### **2.8.3 The political discourse of actors**

The purpose of this section is not to detail deep theoretical analysis of the political discourse, but to stress the extent to which the concern and needs of citizens are addressed or not addressed in political rhetoric and reality of the society. One of the interpretations of political discourse is transformation and representation (Jhon 1992).

Transformation is about how synonymous terms, phrases and sentences can be interpreted for the sources and recipients of message and how the same messages can be reinterpreted within diverse ideological settings. As pointed out by Jhon (1992:470) “political talk plays a vital role in shaping and

transforming political reality”. Although, John reduced political discourse to “talk” the political discourse entails expressions of convictions through various forms of communication media:- such as verbal expression by word of mouth, sharing the ideas with others by simple talk, and more powerful media to touch the attention of the receivers, such as song, poetry, drama, which can be generalised in the forms of oral and written literature transmitted by hard copy (print form) or electronically, to audiences conveying the message of the source. The source of the message can be political identity representing memories of encounters, or the encounters of the group. The messages can be generated either from life experience or observations and understanding and recognising the surrounding environment in depth.

Representation means how the language transmitted from the sources conveys the mental framework of the sender of the message such as internal conviction, imagination and understandings. Taken in this sense, political discourse can be seen partially as how one’s conviction and its expression will or will not impact on the understanding of the audience. Montgomery (1992) distinguishes between universalist and relativists views of representation. The former believe that the world can be understood in relation to a universal conceptual framework and assert that language is a means for expressing one’s mental framework which is independent of the language itself, relativist contend that the language and the mental framework are interwoven.

Therefore the world outlook from a relativist perspective depends on available linguistic wealth. Consequently, in order to be trusted by the recipients of the message, it is not only the message; the messenger should live and perform in line with the message content, in order to achieve the purpose intended effectively. The vitality of the political space in relation to political discourse is that the size of political space should be free enough to accommodate freedom of conviction, expression and action.

#### **2.8.4 The actions and performances of political actors**

For the action and performances of those who are marginalised to take place, there must be strong self and group awareness, organizational frameworks that represent self and group interest and the interest to involve, participate, contribute time, skills, knowledge and material resources needed to achieve an agreed upon plan. This emanates not simply, from understanding personal circumstance and striving for temporary solutions at individual level, but from fully, comprehending how personal circumstances are part and parcel of the entire political framework that created the problems which situate individuals in personal positions. Therefore it is imperative to understand the stages of evolution, successes and failures of group, social and political movements.

This lays the foundation for internal conviction, which may force members of society to share their personal circumstances with others to get sympathy or practical support. If both are successful in creating common understanding this will lay the foundations gradually for group formation. The networks of similar circumstances can lay the foundations for similar ideology of social movements. Social movements pass various stages from formation to disintegration. Disintegration may result from success or failure in achieving the purpose intended or transformation of social movement into political movements (Freeman and Johnson, 1999).

Therefore group actions and performance can be seen in the way the objectives and aims of the group are defined. If the group's interests are identified as part of a social movement, they can be seen in the definition of the social movement as the collection of group networks "involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; share a distinct collective identity" (De la Porta and Daiani, 2006:20).

Regarding the evolution of the social movement Blumer,( 1969 : 67-121) discerned four stages- "preliminary stage", "coalescence stage", "institutionalization stage" and "decline stage". The first stage can be characterised by self and group awareness and the interest, and emergence of initiative to give directions and leadership (Macionis 2001, Hoper 1950). The second stage can be characterised by



the dissemination of ideas to attract the attention of the broader public and recruitment of members.

The third stage can be characterised by organizational transformation from volunteerism to bureaucratic handling and actions done by paid staff. This stage is also characterised by the replacement of voluntary people of vision by people who understand the vision but do the job only if they are paid for their performance. If the purpose intended is achieved at this stage, Blumer suggests that this stage is followed by the declining stage. Miller (1999) identified repression, co-option, success and failure as important way of declining social movements. This depends on the sympathisers of the organization.

Using convenient means, this can be armed or violent struggle or non-violent struggle to change the regime. However this is also entirely dependent on the way the dominant group interacts with the excluded groups and the political space that allows the interactions between the two. The following figure in the next page can help to understand the progress of the interactions between the two to win the support of public. (See figure 2.6. in the next page).




Figure 2-6 Engaging Political Space.

Source: Author's own diagram.

Framed in this way, political space may be defined as a freedom for individual(s) or a group, of thought, belief, expression and action to win public opinion, emotional and practical support to the causes of individual and group identities that ranges from economic, social and political integration to marginalization, within the processes of political engagement in a given society. It is also freedom for individual(s) or group(s) from worries of livelihood asset access impediments imposed by power holders as a consequence of thought, belief, expression and action. In order to act in political space, actors should shape their political identities. In order to understand what political identities denote it is imperative to capture just what identity signifies at first place.

## **2.9 Understanding political identity in context**

Two common definitions cut across all approaches to defining identities: they are - identity as group or social category and identity as an individual or personal. In the sense of the former, people may identify themselves or be identified by others for instance by “national” identities as a “British,” but there are other identifiers such as naturalised British, born British or indigenous British from English, Scottish, Irish, descents.

Other examples are Christians associated with religious identity within which however there are Roman Catholics, Protestants in various forms, and Orthodox Christianity. This suggests a declaration by the group themselves or by others to be more specific. Wendit (1994:395) defines group identities as “sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others”. Similarly, Herrigel (1993:371) denotes group identity as “the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place within historically specific discourses or frames of understanding about the character, structure and boundaries of the polity and the economy.” Associating identity with political space, Taylor (1989:27) defines individual or personal identity in terms of “the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable.”

From these two crude definitions of identities emerges the idea that identity is related to the roles individuals or groups play, and types that distinguish groups or individuals. The role may help to distinguish identity by occupation such as pastoralist, peasant, merchant, civil servant, police, metal worker and engineer, which figure among the identities given to individuals by their role. Political identity in this thesis is defined by the type of politics followed by an individual(s) or group (s) in the words of Kowert and Lergo (1996:453) “as perspective representation of political actors themselves and of their relationships to each other.” When one translates this in political space it can best fit what Hall (1989) says as “a kind of unsettled space, or an unresolved question in that space between a numbers of interesting discourses”.

Persistent with political space as it is defined above, identity signifies what White (1992:6) states as “ any source of action not explicable from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning”

Therefore if identity contains conviction and belief, discourse, and action it can be used with in the processes of engagement in political space. The wider the political space, the lesser the worries over the consequences of engagement. The narrower the political space the greater the worries over the consequences of political engagement. These consequences may even cost lives and livelihoods.

Livelihood insecurity that causes food insecurity and famine sometimes results from narrow political space which does not offer enough freedom to accommodate the needs of those who are neither interested nor trust in the political settings. In the light of this potential, it is imperative to understand political trust and political interest as two dimensions of political engagement, in the process of creating at least four forms of citizens’ political identities

## **2.10 Political identities formation and the engagement**

Political identities are formed from citizens’ trust and interest in the political framework within

which they live. Trust can be seen from instrumental and normative angles. The former can be traced back to David Easton's 1965 classic work which distinguished between supports at three levels of political objects: the political community, the regime, and the authorities; and the regime level can be further divided into principles, norms and procedures, and institutions (Dalton; 1994, Easton, 1975, Norris, 1999b). The support (or lack of support) for these different political objects is usually seen as either based on actual performance at the level in question (evaluative or specific support), or based on more generalized or affective orientations (affective or diffuse support).

Specific support is naturally closely linked to actual performance, and thus to whoever is incumbent. Affective support is vaguer, and generally seen as rooted in political socialization and values (Norris, 1999a, Dalton, 1994, 2004). For the second, political support is derived irrespective of performance, but from the citizens' desire to perpetuate unity. (Fukuyama, 1995). Whether the source of trust derives from instrumental or normative, the politician or political system will be able to attain the purpose they intend to achieve, when they draw on the support of the citizens. The second dimension of political engagement is political interest. It is the psychological and emotional "link" between the individual and politics.

It could be said to point to the psychological aspects of political citizenship, and relate to the psychological feeling of being incorporated into the level of participating in the political space. Usually, political involvement is linked to interest or motivation for actual participation or the like.

Political interest usually means "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity" (van Deth, 1989). Self-reported political interest, participation in discussions of politics, media usage, and, possibly, political information are considered to be main components of the internal aspect of political involvement (van Deth and Elff, 2004, Goul Andersen and Hoff, 2001, Verba et al., 1995). The following figure 2.7. Conceptualises how political identity formation comes from interest and trust.




Figure 2-7 The link between political identity formation and Citizen's trust and interest

Source : Author's conceptualization

Variations in political interest among citizens and different social groups, as well as any increase over time within one country, is commonly explained by “push theories,” that is, psychological and socio-psychological theories, stating that variations are due to different individual resources and skills. That political interest co-varies with social characteristics such as education, age, and gender has been thoroughly examined (Verba and Nie, 1972, van Deth and Elff, 2004, van Deth, 1989, Verba

et al., 1995).

Variations in the level of political interest among the regimes of the countries, on the other hand, are often attributed to “pull theories,” that is, the level of political interest in a country depends on the relevance of political and social arrangements (van Deth and Elff, 2004, van Deth, 1989). This means that the more interventionist politics are in daily life, the more visible and salient politics become, and political interest is thus aroused (Rothstein, 1998, Goul Andersen and Hoff, 2001).

Political interest is consequently seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for involvement. The argument is that the combination of both dimensions better describes different qualities in political involvement, and that the full citizen engagement builds on both interest and trust. The combination of the two dimensions forms four categories of political identities and the relations between the individual citizen and the political space. as shown in figures 2.6 and 2.7 above. .

Political identities are the marker of the group of people with differing degrees of political capabilities that reflects the nature of political space and the level of freedom for individuals to engage in the political dynamics. This can contain ethnicity, gender, class, occupation, party membership, and diverse identities. Accordingly, four basic political identities are discerned as follows:

***Integrated Citizens:-*** are political identities of ordinary people with high interest in politics and who also highly trust politicians and their political conviction, principles, information, expression and performances of promises. This two-dimensional concept of political alienation enables us to make a distinction between the pessimistic with low political trust but high political interest, and the estranged who report neither political trust nor interest. The post-materialistic “low trusters” found by Dalton and others tend to be highly educated and to have high efficacy, even if they tend to sometimes choose unconventional political channels for participation (Dalton, 2004, Inglehart, 1999)

***Loyal Citizens***:- Comprises the political identities of citizens who report political trust ,but take a low interest in politics. Due to their low interest in politics, they simply accept and obey what the politicians and political institutions offer them. By doing so they have a tendency to be at the safest side and in some cases they may achieve political favour, particularly in the processes of accessing livelihood assets in a deficient democracy.

There seems to be no discrepancies between integrated and loyal citizens as far as the way political games are played, the nature of political space, and the way they distribute the riches/profit incentives and rewards are distributed among themselves,(the power holding institutions, or individuals that symbolise the institutions, the integrated citizens and the loyal citizens)

This might be contradictory with what (Boone's) Centre –periphery political topography of African states analysis depicts that the rural elite enjoy more freedom of access to the market than to the central state can build their economic capacity to the extent of breaching their loyalty to the extent of confrontation. 'The greater rural elites' reliance on the market as a mechanism of surplus extraction and labour control, the greater their potential for political independence vis-a- vis the state and thus for confrontation with the regime bent on centralizing power.'( Boone 2003:23)

This is in the African context, where there is 'no free market' in the strict sense of the phrase, and where the state is understood as solo provider access to livelihood assets and where there seems to be cohesion and understanding for those two political identities and the serving regime reciprocate the provision of opportunity access to livelihood assets for loyalty and obedience. However incomplete political engagement can be observed from the sceptics.

A lack of political engagement or pursuing an alternative political engagement may emerge from marginalised citizens. Low political engagement comes when the citizens are forced to internalise their situation and opt not to do nothing during hard times but accept their situation. This temporary acceptance does not mean they are not aware of their situation; rather they are strategically



postponing possible actions for a favourable time. In the words of Boone (2003:29) ‘rural elites which did not appropriate their own share of the surplus directly, relying instead on the state intermediation, would interested in aligning with new regimes.

While those divisions within single community that can be identified in the form of ethnicity, language, tribe, clan, religious forms create hierarchies of beneficiaries and losers Boone (2003:27) asserts that ‘communal hierarchy determined notables’ political clout in their dealings with governments’ in West Africa. In some contexts, alternative political engagement is the action of politically marginalised citizens in their total rejection of their circumstances but with definite aims, objectives and strategies to achieve those ends. Khan, argues:

The only viable redistributive strategy for (such) developing country political entrepreneurs in the absence of any fiscal or regulatory space is to organise enough muscle to be able to capture resources through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even illegal means...and ..Factional membership and activity is rational at all levels of the faction since the pay-offs available from the faction are always higher than those, available from alternative types of political activity given the non-existence of budgetary resources.’ (Khan 2005:719)

***Sceptical Citizens:-*** citizens who are highly interested in politics, but report low trust in politicians and political institutions. Because of this, they are feared as challengers and seen as competitors, and consequently in some instances they may gain political favour as a bribe to make them retreat back from confronting politicians and political systems (Southwell, 1985, Craig, 1990 Kabashima *et al* 2000). In other cases particularly in a political system that is characterised with bad governance they face less political favours in the processes of accessing livelihood assets.

***Marginalized Citizens:-*** citizens with low interest and low trust in politicians and political institutions who internalise the way they are marginalised, and strive for alternatives that may offer them the way out of marginalization. Increasing the livelihood outcome differences between those who are politically favoured and politically marginalized might resulted from increasing social differences (Solt, 2008, Van Deth and Elff, 2004, Dalton, 2004).

Conversely, the processes of state's institutional building variations in local 'political topographies' Boone (2003) or more specifically 'patterns of spatial de-concentration of the state apparatus and the extent of devolution of authority to chiefs and other rural elites' even within the same state (holding to the same administrative principle takes the following common sense.

The institutional character of non-integration is observed in areas within the state, that are not endowed with rich livelihood assets, in which local chiefs and elites are left to exercise their power and authorities. Secondly, '*administrative occupation*': this is institutional pattern of authority that is experienced in areas within the state that are endowed with rich livelihood assets, but lack strong social hierarchy of local elites. Thirdly, '*power-sharing*' between central state and local elites:- this is a state's institutional arrangement in areas within state endowed with rich livelihood assets and strong social hierarchy, in which rural elites rely economically upon the provision of the state. Fourthly, '*grabbing of local power*': - is the characteristic of state institution in areas endowed with rich livelihood assets, marked with strong social hierarchy, in which rural elites are able to accumulate without relying on the state (Boone, 2003: 23, 27 and 29).

Political space in this context seems an amphitheatre of conflict and compromise between the state's uneven institutions that is originated at the centre and flow downwards on one hand 'citizens' who resist the states' encroachment against citizen's power claimed by the virtue of being 'the sons and daughters of the soil' in the periphery.

## **2.11 Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA)**

Livelihoods of Engaging political Space Analysis evolved from the literature review for this thesis and built upon Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF). It is developed from the concern why the citizens of modern nation states have become increasingly disengaged not only the traditional channels of political participation (Skocpol and Firorina, 1999, Dalton 1998, 2006; Norris 1999), but

also from the political space that claims to address the issues that affect their lives and livelihood.

Putnam's (2000) 'Bowling Alone' and other concerned voice (Kaase and Newton 1995; Norris 2002) have contributed to this debate. Some argue this disengagement of the citizen is the emergency of 'critical citizen' but should not be equated with the assumption of the decline and fall of civic engagement. Thus, the term disengagement is at best premature to be utilized in political discourse. (Norris 2000:5-7; Stolle and Hooghe 2005; Berger 2009).

However citizens' decline to engage while the political space occupied by the power holders is wide enough and welcoming is not the same as the disengagements that is observed in narrow political space. The former according to (Putnam 1995, 1997; 2000) tends to correlate with a functioning democracy and market economy. The latter is about non-democratic nation states or malfunctioning democracy, which suffocates conviction, expression and the action of the citizens.

Basic difference between the democratic and non democratic government, is that the former contains individual and group freedom to think, to believe, express and act in parallel to power holding state institutions or machineries from 'above' such as legitimate rules and procedures, written constitutions, one person/one vote, political parties, free and fair elections, representative government, check and balances independent judiciaries etc....

Democratic political space allows the institutions from 'below' that entails the citizen's forums of ancient Greece and Rome and in any community in which citizens come together to talk about their issues and their-plans for future. We rarely observe such freedoms for institutions from 'below' in non-democratic nation states or malfunctioning democracy. This thesis contends that the narrowness of the political space and the lack of freedom in non democratic nation states or in malfunctioning democracy contribute for livelihood and food insecurity in worst cases leads to famine.

Thus, to prevent and respond to livelihood and food insecurity that is caused by narrowness or the

political space and unfreedom (Sen, 1999, 2000). The concept of engaging citizens helps to combat famine, food and livelihood insecurity. Thus, engaging political space, in this thesis is creating conducive ground for empowering citizens oriented towards the politics of self-rule.

This involves, identifying and naming livelihood problems in terms of what is most touching and relevant to the encounters of the citizens; framing life and livelihood affecting issues to identify all the options; deliberating publicly to make sound decisions on option(s), in order to move citizens or a community beyond first and rush reactions and popular opinion; to work through moral disagreements; to create an environment for community problem solving; to make progress when consensus is unreachable; to inform officeholders; to complement planning with mutual commitments; adding individual action to institutional actions; to monitor and evaluating the implementation of commonly designed actions; identifying the lessons from success and failure, transforming evaluation into communal learning geared towards perfection and precisions.

***Identifying and naming livelihoods problems:*** - is the first step in the processes of need identification. The vitality of identifying and naming livelihood problem stems from the understanding that it shapes all processes and acts the follows. Although, naming the livelihood problems might take various ways, at least, it should contain the notion of citizen's deepest concerns, which stems from their encounters and experiences.

It is vital to take into consideration calling meetings or public gathering for those who are affected by the problems or their honest representatives in the processes of naming the livelihood problems, this helps making every one stake holder and it is initial step to opening the door of politics for citizens to engage where the citizens contribute or seriously, follow the processes of coining the term(s) that are meaningful to them.

Because naming the livelihood problems is not merely describing it in daily discourse, but the names that citizens give to livelihood problems reflect concerns that are deeply embedded in socio-

political context. It also encourages citizens to own their problems and the way how to solve it. The feeling of ownership by itself is the source of political energy and self-worth. Naming livelihood security problems by professionals might reflect the solutions that can be obtained from the expertise of their field of specialization. However the way citizens perceive the same problem and solution in different perspectives and context. Naming livelihoods problems with concerned citizens fills this gap of understanding.

***Framing the issues arising from livelihood problems:-*** It is the processes of creating framework for all identified options and approaches to tackle livelihood problems. (Goffman 1974:21) defines frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enables individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences or life experiences. He further elaborates how our common sense knowledge performs its constructive role in our daily life.

It is also the processes of clustering of actions responses geared towards underling concerns that is affecting citizens. Similarly, (Druckman 2001:1042) defines framing as ‘a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.’ Furthermore it helps the discussants build on metaphors, analogies, symbols and narratives. (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Nelson and Kinder, 1996).

Framing might be understood as an inevitable part of political strategy. For institutions from below, frames facilitate the essential task of identifying a problematic setting, making attributions of blame, articulating alternatives and urging others to act ( Benford and Snow 2000:615). To make it fair each identified option has to be presented with its advantage and disadvantage, strength and weakness, the opportunities and the threat that affects its movements in the processes of implementation should be analyzed together in this framing stage.

To ensure the discussants the problems are framed in ways that support their interests, and they deploy sound-bites, slogans , analogies and imagery to that end ( Nelson *et al* 1997), by ‘ making new

beliefs available about and issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable or ‘strong’ in people’s evaluation’ (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 111); ‘alter[ing] the weight given to different considerations’ (Nelson et al 1997:226); ‘connec[ing] core values with decisions’ (Brewer 2001:46-47).

These availability, accessibility and applicability of particular beliefs influence both individual judgment and interpersonal deliberation (Brewer and Gross 2005). However, framing the options would not be free from disagreements where domination, polarization and inner groups divided by thought can emerge.

Because, deliberative politics resounds with different opinions and everyone may share many of the same concerns yet weigh them differently; more importantly citizens not only differ with other citizens but also differ within themselves as they have more than one concern. It is at this stage the political space should be widened even more. As framings need to capture these tensions and set the stage for sorting out what is valuable to people in community- not valuable in the abstract, but valuable in specific situation.

***Deliberating decisions in setting priorities with affected citizens:-*** is the discussions to be carried out to equip discussants with necessary wisdom of handling the issues before planning and implementing. There are two major schools of thought in deliberative decision making processes. The first one tends to see deliberation as a substantive ‘device for detecting and solving social problems’ (Eriksen 2007:39).

The second school contends the ‘procedural’ approach offers legitimacy for any action resulted from deliberative practices. In the words of (Habermass 1996:360) ‘the procedure from which correct decisional procedures draws their legitimacy’. He elaborates further the degree of legitimacy and the influence exercised by public opinion on the political system depends on the procedural and generative properties of public opinion itself (Habermas 1996: 360).

Legitimacy can be seen into two. The first pre-action deliberation that entails, the key information identified or named at the first step, arguments over how to tackle it; transformation after passing through procedure of controversy; in the phrase of (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007) 'input legitimacy' and the consequences that comes after the implementation of agreed upon plans; in the phrase of (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007), again, 'out-put legitimacy'.

From this approach we can understand that those democratic institutional actors, both from 'above' and 'below' involve the stakeholders in communal decision making processes that should be opened to the stakeholders and citizens to give them an opportunities to address common concerns. Particularly, for the institutional actors from 'below' who are taking risks deliberative decision making gives an opportunity for weighing the likely consequences of various solutions to identified problems. It enhances the probability that a decision will be sound by helping the stake holders determine whether the actions being considered are consistent with identified problems and collective wellbeing.

One cannot be certain the correctness of the decisions until it is implemented the deliberation forces the discussants to anticipate costs and benefits, to ask how high a price they would be willing to pay in order to get what they want. In this respect there must be the majority rule and the minority right. However, as it is demonstrated by (Manin 1987), the principle of majority rule, despite being the supreme expression of the will 'of the largest number', cannot be an essentially self-legitimizing principle, where the will of minority suppressed and reduced to complete irrelevance, but is bound to the participation of the citizens or (at least of those who wish to participate) in deliberative process in a way (Elster 1998:1) defined democracy.

For (Elister 1998:1) 'the idea that democracy revolves around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of preferences.' Thus deliberation is a natural act it does not necessarily require specialist skill. Every day is full of decisions where citizens deliberate on personal issues with

family members and friends. Therefore citizens are attracted to deliberative decision making due to their experiences and concerns count as much as professional experts.

Public deliberation assumes that citizens can be well informed; even though political issues may deal with some issues for which most people have little expert information. Such information is unquestionably important, and opportunities to deliberate have prompted citizens to be more diligent.

Even political decisions which lie outside expert knowledge must be informed with what is the the worries and concerns of citizens. Because there is more than one kind of knowledge particularly for the questions citizens face which can be answered more than one way. Understanding what response is best for a community requires a knowledge that cannot be found in books alone because the questions are not just about facts.

***Setting priorities:-*** is selecting actions that can be done within the capacity, position and resources available among the members of the organization. Deliberating decisions with stake holders helps setting priorities according to urgency, capability and capacity of performance. It helps discussants who are at crossroad and remained at odd even after gaining a better understanding of why others held contrary views. Altering the original perceptions of discussants and the nature of the livelihood problems they face together can unlock a sense of possibility conquering livelihood problems step by step which is a driving force behind progress.

***Planning:-*** is identifying time frame, the way, and the resources both human, technical, and financial resources for actions and implementation of the solution in the naming, framing and deliberating processes. Identifying when, who, how, requires the commitment and the price that should be paid to achieve the purpose intended.

***Implementing:-*** is the course of actions where efforts are geared towards intended aims and objectives. Even in the context where citizens have deliberated over an issue and made decisions



about what they think should be done, even at this stage there is risk of sidelining the stakeholders and citizens because implementing might require the skills to carry out the job, and the job carried out at this stage might not involve vision holders, but those who sell their skill for money.

To keep eye on performance requires periodic monitoring in the process of actions by stake holding visionaries or their representative to watch whether the things are performed as planned. After the end of the action there must be evaluation to learn from success and failure finally the impact should be assessed whether the change desired by citizens achieved and whether those change impacted the lives and livelihoods of the citizens. The types of political identities and their respective engagement and disengagement as it is depicted the following table on the next page

**Table 2.1 The level of engagement and disengment matrix by political identities**

	High interest	Low interest
High Trust	<b>Integrated</b> = Engaged in wider political settings Individual engagement      Collective engagement Voting in election and referendum *deliberate act of non-voting and blank paper * Contacting political representatives and civil servants * Running or holding public office. * Donating money for political parties and organizations	<b>loyalist</b> * voting and supporting the political authority but avoiding any confrontation even they face unacceptable fate . * complete obedience and dependence on the political settings and authorities. Perceiving any struggle in passivity.
Low trust	<b>Sceptic</b> = Engaged in narrower political settings Individual engagement      Collective engagement Taking interest in politics and society. * perceiving politics as important	<b>Marginalized</b> Those who resist their marginalization Engaged in narrow political settings Individual engagement Taking interest in politics and society. * perceiving politics as important
	Legally *Boycotting and political	Those who internalise their marginalization disengaged from any political activities Individual disengagement
	*Involving in new political	

consumption .	movement or forum.	
* Signing petition and handing out political leaflets.	* Demonstrating in Protest and Participating in strikes and other actions. E.g. street festivals with strict political agenda	*Non-voting
	Illegally	*Actively avoiding reading news papers or watching TVs when it comes to political issues.
Civil disobedience and politically motivated attacks on properties.	* Organised civil disobedience actions	*Avoid talking about politics.
	* Sabotaging and obstructing roads and railways	*Perceiving politics as disgusting
	* Squatting buildings	* political dissatisfaction
	* Participating in violent demonstrations	fear and suspicions and rejection of any political authorities and self exclusion from social and political life.
	* Violent confrontation with political opponents or police	They do not have a way of expressing their Agony and suffering. This lay foundation For vulnerability to victimization of various Social problems including food insecurity In the worst case to famine.
	*Armed struggle, guerrilla and conventional war against the political setting and interest.	

Source:-authors understanding the political space and engagement and disengagement.


## 2.12 The link between political identity and livelihood asset access

The link between livelihood asset access and political identity can be established, from a series of observations of the regimes that reward power-holders or their supporters and loyalists for their contribution in the struggle to make the political system a reality, and fail to take into consideration the contribution of sceptics and the alienated, with other alternatives in their mind.

There are specific contexts where the power holders violate the rule they stipulated when they want to reward the political identities they favour. This favour and disfavour create trust/distrust and interest/disinterest dynamics that shapes further identities. There is also a general tendency to believe that favour and disfavour manifest itself in accessing livelihood assets and opportunities.

Livelihood and Food insecurity can be converted into famine, when the political space becomes too narrow, for those who are marginalised to the extent of silencing their voice, hindering their right to organise to express and to act, in the words of Clay and Schaffer (1986) ‘room for manoeuvre’, or impeding the conviction, expression and the action for those who would like take the cause of the marginalised to the public within the state or at the global level, by implicit or explicit legislations or

miss-interpretation of the legal framework to restrict the freedom of marginalised and or their representatives within the state they are living, this dynamism requires the framing of Livelihood of Engaging or Disengaging Political Space Analysis built on the SLF by the researcher. See following figure 2.8. in the following page



Source: authors LEPSA diagram built on SLF and Literature review.

**Figure 2-8 Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA ).**

Source: Author's diagram.

## Summary

This chapter told us the conceptualisation of food in (security), famine its causes and the

emergence of the sustainable livelihoods framework. It has also critically reviewed the literature on the evolution and side effects of the latter. It has argued that Sustainable Livelihood Frameworks have ignored political and historical aspects that lay foundations for political identity formation. It has proposed the concept of political space as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The struggles are between political institutions (from ‘above’) and citizens sharing different political identities from “below”. It has also showed how the political institutions creates conditioned political identities, such as integrated, loyalists, sceptics and marginalised exchanging access to controlled livelihood assets for trusts and interest of citizens, and finally it this critical approach on the literature helped to design LEPSA framework to understand and mapping out social problems and democratic way of tackling them.

The next chapter will discuss the methodology through which the LEPSA will be tested in the field study in Sidama of Southern Ethiopia.

## CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

### 3 Introduction

This research used Critical Realism as a guiding philosophy, and ethnography as the research methodology, and combines qualitative methods, including life histories of key informants who could have direct or indirect links with events which positively or negatively affected their lives and livelihoods with quantitative methods in its second phase.

The reason critical realism is chosen from positivism and social constructionist as an appropriate research philosophy for this research is grounded on the theme of the study and the applicability of critical realism as a moulder of research strategy, devising methods and techniques, implementation in the field, monitoring effectiveness or the lack of it, to generate data and to arrive at some sort of conclusion. Among other things, critical realism is compatible with a wide range of social theories and the livelihood framework proposed by this study. In the words of Archer *et al* (1998:377) critical realism:

is committed to an explanatory framework which acknowledges and incorporates (a) pre-existent structures as generative mechanisms, (b) their interplay with other objects possessing causal powers and liabilities proper to them in what is a stratified social world, and (c) non predictable but less explicable outcomes arising from interaction between the above, which take place in the open system that is society.

Such a commitment of critical realism, helps to investigate the political space of the struggle between conflictive identities from above (successive Ethiopian governing élites and the structures that contain them); and below (the existing Sidama indigenous ways of life and their inherent structures); and conditioned political identities (stratified social settings of political identities such as the integrated, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalised) and how interaction between and

among them will have impact on accessing livelihood assets which in turn affects livelihood strategies and outcomes.

Similarly, ethnography is used as research method, because it entails more of qualitative and less of quantitative methods and the level of the engagement of a researcher in the words of Bryman (2004:539) ‘ in a social setting for an extended period of time observing behaviour, listening to what is said...and asking questions.’

In the same way, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:1) point out strong link between the research and the researcher when they define ethnography as the way of investigation that ‘involves.... an extended period of time, overtly watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions- in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research.’

This research was conducted in two main periods. The first, from July 2000 to September 2001 and which was dominantly qualitative consisted of 54 semi-structured interviews on socio-historical context of political space that shaped vulnerability and capacities. The second, from October 2008 to June 2009 was a quantitative survey, used to test 120 Sidama participants interest and trust in political institutions of successive Ethiopian governments.

In the same period, monthly interviews were held with selected case study households. At the same time, a livelihood asset status tracking matrix (Bond & Mukherjee, 2002, Bond, & Hulme, 1992) was applied to understand local perceptions of their situation using qualitative methods.

The next part of this chapter justifies why the Sidama case was selected. The second part of the chapter will discuss general philosophical approaches and show how particular philosophical approach is relevant to the research question. The third part of the chapter will introduce the study area.

The fourth section deals with how field research was organised in temporal and spatial extensions, including how it was conducted in three phases from 2000-2001 and 2008-2009. in four former districts and the former Dale district respectively. While the former Dale district was divided into three, namely Lokka Abbaya, Dale and Wonsho, the 2008-2009 field research concentrated only on Lokka Abbaya and Dale.

The fifth section, deals with capturing the political identity of the sample for 2008-2009 using the survey method related to trust and interests of respondents relevant to the political systems within which they have been living, The sixth section emphasises on how political identities are translated into differential accessing livelihood assets based on local perceptions highlighting the methods and personnel involved in devising the Livelihood Asset status Tracking methods.

### **3.1 Justification for selecting this case study**

Historically, the Sidama had developed strategies to prevent seasonal food insecurity and famine. Moreover, the Sidama-land has good natural resources. So the key question and the reason for selecting this case study is to understand how such a historically resilient people, and the region they inhabit, came to lose their food security. In simple words why did the Sidama's successful prevention of seasonal food insecurity conversion into famine for centuries failed in 1999/2000 onwards?

It is argued that drought alone does not automatically lead to famine, unless socio-political settings have pushed a society into economic and livelihood vulnerability, or else that society lacks or being victim of institutional disruption that reduces societal capacity to cope with famine encroachment.

Famine is the last stage in the process of socio-economic deterioration leading to the disruption of access to food by vulnerable groups in the society facing threats from both natural and human-made forces. If this assertion is taken for granted, famine did not occur in Sidama until 1999. This, however, does not mean that the Sidama has never faced drought and occasional food insecurity.

In fact there are parts of the Sidama from which seasonal shortages and food insecurity for both individual and groups have over the last fifty years rarely been absent. Just to mention the recent past for instance (Penrose 1987:92) explaining how the 1972-1974 drought in Ethiopia also affected the Sidama writes: 'In all areas of eastern Eritrea, Tigre, Wollo, parts of Hararge and Sidamo, all marginal areas inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists, annual rainfall is so low that a few millimetres a year can make a difference.'

Sidamo, according to the administrative framework applying at the time was a region that included the current Gedeo, Amaro, Guji and Borana Oromos, Burji, and Western Somali. That drought also might have affected the Sidaman lowland pastoralists who inhabiting in the same altitudes as the rest of those who were included in the Sidamo Province.

The drought that pushed northern Ethiopia towards famine in 1984-1985 also hit the lowland of the Sidamo. As Web *et al*, point out:

....in the Pastoral regions of Sidamo, many herders ate the hide of the fallen livestock to stay alive ... the effects of the 1984/85 crises are still being felt...After relatively good harvest in 1991 estimates of food needs for 1992 still exceed 1 million tones... The world food Programme launched an emergency programme (worth of US\$ 11 million) to reach 600,000 in special need of assistance in Sidamo, Hararge and GamoGoffa as well as wollo. Web *et al* 1992:28-29

One might argue that the people affected by these recurrent droughts in Sidamo were not the Sidama proper, but the Boranas and Somali. However according to the administrative arrangements in force in 1991 in the closing period of the Dergue regime, the Sidamo region included only Sidama, Gedeo and Burji, excluding the Oromos of Guji and Borana and Somali became separate region called Borana.

Both Historical facts and social perceptions may explain these threats of drought and food insecurity. In historical terms, one reason for the failure of the Sidaman resistance against Northern



aggression in the 1890s was not only for the advantage of modern guns obtained from the western powers the latter leaned on, but also food insecurity faced by the former followed the catastrophic render-pest in 1889-1891 that killed most of the Sidama cattle, worsened by the outbreak of a smallpox epidemic and the spread of cholera (Braukamper 1980:430).

The Socio-historical pattern of persistent drought is abundantly recognized in Sidama culture. There is the Sidama proverb, ‘ *dureesu mittu arriho, bareedu mittu barriho* ’ This means ‘The wealthy man’s assets will disappear within one severe dry season- a brave man dies in one day’s battle’ but according the legend the proverb was originated from a girl to who had to choose between three men with three qualities wealth, bravery, and wisdom. In the tale the girl opted for the wise man, which reflects the mentality of the most of the Sidama farmers, along with the vulnerability of a subsistence livelihood to drought (79 years key informant 17/10/2000 Aleta wondo).

Ethnographic study among the Sidama helped the researcher to understand why these recurrent droughts were not regarded, either by the Sidama or by successive Ethiopian governments as bringing famine, which it was beyond the capacity of its victims to address. The problem was not the absence of suffering from severe drought, but the absence of mutual trust between successive Ethiopian governments and the Sidama. This distrust damaged the latter’s ‘entitlement’ or expectation that they would be assisted, during times of crises by the former.

This mentality forced the Sidama community that were affected by drought to depend completely on kinship reciprocity rather than on the government food relief. Furthermore, the Sidama highlands with their unbroken traditional ethics of mutual assistance (social capital, owing to the lack of effective penetration of modernization to lowland Sidama peripheries), as well as the relative livelihood strength of the highlanders due to diversification created the capacity to host their drought affected lowlanders during severe drought. This accommodation enabled those who were affected by drought to avoid looking for outside grain aid either from government or non-government

organizations.

In addition to this, the lack of efficient incorporation of the Ethiopian state the low land peripheries of the Sidama, administrative occupation of cash growing midlands and power sharing to the Sidama urban centres and usurping of local power from coffee growing rural Sidama.

Therefore, the food insecurity situation in the Sidama lowlands since 1999 provides the best case study to explore the core –periphery model that was created on one hand by the political space of conflicting and conditioned identities, such as the integrated, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalized in the periphery; on other, what Boone (2003) calls ‘uneven’ strategies of the states such as ‘non-incorporation’, ‘administrative occupation’ ‘power-sharing’ and ‘usurping of local power’ at the centre and its impact on food and livelihood insecurity conversion into famine for certain segments of the societies.

### **3.2 Research philosophy**

Identifying the research philosophy is crucial before carrying out any research. This is because the research philosophy will affect research method, strategies and the outcomes from the beginning to the end of the research and consequently the validity of findings. Secondly, what is believed to be true will be substantiated or else challenged by the discovery of the research.

By doing so the researchers convert beliefs to knowledge, or challenge beliefs by the discovery of truth or reality. The problem here is the type of truth and reality discovered by research is influenced by the research philosophy which can be divided at least into: positivism, social constructivism and critical realism.

Positivists try to understand phenomenon or events objectively. For them the object of study

should be separated from the “disturbance” of the researcher. The objects of study should be characterised by regularity inherent from the internal dynamics of the object not by external intervention of the researcher. This suggests how positivists are highly influenced by natural science or physical science and try to apply the same methodology of understanding, to social science and social phenomena.

Positivists’ attempts to apply the methods used to understand natural objects to social phenomena were challenged by Burawoy (1998) in three basic ways. The first is that assumed objectivity from the positivist tradition will marginalise the impact of the interviewer’s background on data generation. Burawoy contends that trust between interviewer and interviewee will have an effect on the generation of data.

True information sharing between outsiders and insiders is not that simple, it depends on many things that shape the mentality of society from which the data is gathered. Second, the level of mutual understanding between the interviewer and interviewee enhances smooth data collections. Whenever there are language and cultural barriers there are possibilities of discrepancies between the message sent by the interviewer and the responses to that misunderstood message could have devastating effect on data generation.

Third, the separation of study objects ignores the extent to which the mentality of humans is affected by social, economic, political contexts. Those contexts shape the way of communications and the types of data generated.

Social Constructivism: - is the research philosophy that distinguishes between research methodologies of natural science and social science, and asserts that all types of knowledge are built within cognitive frameworks even before the formulation of any theory. It also asserts that knowledge is about the way a person perceives her/ his surroundings and the way their surrounding world is interpreted.

Social constructivists have been accused of ‘judgmental relativism’ because they fail to offer any standard of validating the truth; rather, they depend on the cognitive ability and the interpretation of external world through the norms, value and beliefs of an individual giving data. (Schwandit, 2000; Baert 1998; Denermark *et al* 2002)

Critical Realism:- disagrees with both positivism and social constructivism and contends that social science must be able to come up with some conclusive claims whilst recognising the subjectivities of individuals and acknowledging that the actions emanating from those subjectivities are the central to our knowledge of external world. As pointed out by Bhaskar (1978:13). Critical realists ask ‘what properties do society and people possess that might make them possible objects of knowledge’

### **3.3 Methods**

As a methodology, ethnography considers that social order is created through people’s reflection about their social world. Whenever there is reflection in the processes of understanding, it contains the element of growth in depth of the knowledge about the issue under consideration. This also entails the reflexivity of the researcher’s belief, and pre-existing knowledge about the issue under investigation has potential to colour the style of analysis and the findings.

This kind of reflexivity occurs at two levels: first, among the host community as the source of knowledge and secondly, the researcher’s identity that is not immune from bias. Thus, reflexivity at both levels leads to continual analysis and evaluation of one’s conviction, expression and action, as the point of departure. This will lay the foundations for refining and distilling the knowledge for better.

The appropriateness of reflexivity that exists in ethnography is beyond question for the researcher. As he intended to study the ethnic group that he was born into, brought up in, lived in, worked with, on one hand, his identity and sense of belonging to the study group enhanced his immersion to the beliefs held by study community. On other hand, being educated and socialised in Ethiopian system, working for the government of Ethiopia that holds other values, beliefs, discourses and actions different from those of the community under study presented him as different from the ethnic group he was born into and intended to understand.


This created some sort of critical thinking to situate the knowledge in its perspective: be it ethnocentric or wider and composite. This can be seen in what Gilbert (2008:512) asserts ‘ style of research that makes clear the researcher’s own beliefs and objectivity.’ Although this might help to enhance the attitude of freedom from bias, this however cannot guarantee freedom from value relevance due to the position of the researcher.

### **3.4 The study area for 2000-2001 research**

The field study conducted twice from 2000-2001 and 2008-2009. During the former period it was conducted in pilot and main phases in four out of nine districts famine prone districts<sup>5</sup> Sidama zone, namely Hawaasa Zuriya, Shabadino, Dale and Aleta wondo. See the following figure 3.1

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<sup>5</sup> Districts in Ethiopian Centre- periphery administrative arrangement is the fourth layer: Federal, Regional, Zonal, District and Peasant Association. Woreda is the Amharic name for district administrative unit




**Figure 3-1** four famine prone districts in former Sidama zone 1995-2007

### 3.5 The study area for 2008-2009 research

This study was conducted in former Dale district that was divided in to three in 2007. Lokka Abbaya, Dale and Wonsho. Only Dale and Lokka Abbaya were selected, mainly people in two districts were amongst seven districts affected by 1999/2003 famine and beneficiaries of Productive Safety Net Programme since 2005 and as the purpose of 2008-2009 study was to assess the impact of government intervention in the Productive Safety Net Programme on the lives and Livelihoods of the beneficiaries.

Moreover Dale was one of four districts where the former research was conducted in 2000-2001. It helps to investigate positive or negative change the might have occurred by government intervention through Productive safety net programme in livelihood of those who have been affected by chronic food insecurity. Wonsho was excluded from the study for two reasons.

Primarily, due to its higher altitude it has different forms of livelihood activities that are not liable to drought shock. Because in tropics the higher the altitude the cooler the temperature and the lesser the effect of drought, that made Wonsho and its environs to cultivate drought resistant crop such as *weese* in Sidaamu affoo, *enset* in Amharic. Secondly, the population of Wonsho were not among those who were affected by famine of 1999-2003 famine in the Sidama.



**Figure 3-2 Sidama zone districts after 2007**

### **3.6 Location and geographical features of Dale District**

Presently, Dale district is dissected by the Addis- Moyale Highway, leaving the majority of Peasant Associations (PAs) in the East, located 45 km south of Hawaasa, the capital of both the Sidama zone and SNNPR State, and 320 km south of Addis Ababa.

Dale has a 231,322 people, spread over 36 Peasant Associations<sup>6</sup>, with a population density of 765.7 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. Seventeen of the Peasant Associations are Productive Safety net programme (PSNP) beneficiaries. The District Office for Agriculture and Rural Development report indicates that there are about 36,445 households in Dale district and an average family size of 6.09 which is equivalent to the national average.

Yirgalem town serves as a capital of the district. See the following figure 3.3 in the next page. According to agro-ecological classification, the district is divided into three climatic zones: Mid-land, mid-lowland and lowland agro-ecologies, which range in altitude from 1100 meters above sea level: in the low lands, to over 3000 meters above sea level the highest points.

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<sup>6</sup> Peasant Associations are the fifth and the last Administrative arrangement of Ethiopian centre-periphery arrangement since 1975, the Amharic term kebele is used to call Peasant Associations



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**Figure 3-3 Dale district after restructuring of 2007.**

**Source: SNNPRS Finance and Economic Development Bureau**

This district hosted the total of 60 study households, out of which 30 were selected from Soyama Peasant Association particularly at the locality called Halacha market and 30 were from the Debub Masenkala Peasant Association particularly the village called Boriyo Bora .

As the objective of the study was to understand the impact of Productive safety net programme of Ethiopian government, the selection of the sample should be from the register of PSNP beneficiaries purposively. Furthermore Soyama and Debub Masingqala Peasant Associations are dissected by Addis -Moyale highway, they were selected to understand the impact of access to this public physical asset will have on their lives and livelihoods.

### **3.7 Location and geographical features of Lokka Abbaya**

Lokka Abbaya is also one of the 19 districts in the Sidama zone of the SNNPR state and its capital city, Hantate, is located about 56 km South-west of the regional capital city, Hawassa and about 22 km south west of Yirgalem. The Lokka Abbaya district is neighbouring Borricha in the North, Abbaya Lake and Oromia districts in the South, in South West, Dale and Chuko woredas in the East, Woleayita and Abbaya Lake in the West.

This district hosted a total of 60 study households, 30 of which came from the locality called Bedena in Muticha Gorbe Peasant Association (PA) and 30 households from Adawa market Village in the Kutayo Peasant Association. Furthermore Muticha Gorbe and Kutayo Peasant Associations are located in periphery far from public physical assets such as highway near semi-arid geographical environment. These two Peasant Associations were also selected purposively to understand the impact of having no or less access to the public physical asset such as road and high way will have on their lives and livelihoods.

The 2010 report of the district Office of Agriculture and Rural Development revealed that Lokka Abaya district has a total population of 109,521, of which 57,947 are male and 51,574 are female. Out of the total 17,865 households, 16,752 and 1,113 were male-headed and female-headed households, respectively. The population density is 92 persons per km<sup>2</sup> which is about half of the population density in Dale district. See the following figure 3.4. Administrative map of Lokka Abbaya district.

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**Figure 3-4 Administrative map of Lokka Abbaya district.**

**Source: SNNPRS Finance and Economic Development Bureau GIS unit.**

It has 26 Kebeles where 24 of them are PSNP beneficiaries. The district has a privilege of all-whether roads, which benefits the majority of the Kebeles. According to a document provided by the district Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Lokka Abbaya has a total land size of 119,000 ha (1,190 km<sup>2</sup>).

The same document indicated that the district has three major agro-ecologies; namely, mild midland (*Woina Dega*) arid low land (*Kola*), and desert (*Berehama*) which accounts for 5%, 16%, 79% of the whole area respectively. The average altitude of the district is 1,630 meters above sea levels, which is the altitude of the district capital city, Hantate. The altitude decreases towards the West of Hantate town and increases towards the East of the town. The landscape comprises of 68% flat, 30% slope and 2% mountainous lands. Three permanent and six seasonal rivers cross the

district of which three rivers namely Gidabo, Chala and Bilatie can be used for agricultural irrigation.

### **3.8 Conducting the field research**

This section deals with how the research was conducted; the temporal and spatial sequences shall be described. As the earlier field work was ethnographic it needed a detailed description of the sample, an analysis of the group in terms of the study objective and theme and the researcher's own interpretation of the study group as to meanings and generalization about their social life Wolcott (1999), required. It also depicts how participants were selected, in relation to various phases of field research.

This helped to take into consideration temporal and spatial livelihood asset access changes as crucial indicators for finding out whether those changes bring something acceptable/positive or not. This means how outsiders' intervention in the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama resulted in positive outcomes which are to the betterment or deterioration of livelihoods. Secondary data was collected from district and Zonal agricultural bureaux and other relevant offices to support the primary data.

#### **3.8.1 Pilot phase (2000-2001)**

A pilot study was needed to grasp the general picture of the political dynamics that paved the way for famine occurrence; to explore the deep political space of conflictive and conditioned identities and its impact on accessing livelihood assets, in shaping livelihood strategies, the type of livelihood outcomes; how the historical processes and political space affected different identities differentially.

The pilot study was helpful primarily, to identify key resource people and to guide the criteria for selecting the study villages, and for logistical planning purposes. Secondly, it was useful to test the level of communication between the researcher and participants. In other words, whether the researchers' message contained in interview sent to participants was in a form they could understand and gave feedback relevant to the reality of their situation. Interview questions were refined after the pilot study. Thirdly, there was a need to establish contact with the people and develop some initial trust.

During the initial stages of the research, particular attention was therefore given to develop good relations with the villagers, as this is an important pre-condition for conducting an ethnographic research. Trust allows better communication and transparency between researcher and research participants.

In this research, it was decided to capture the perspective of grassroots, which makes peasants and Agro-pastoralists free to speak and express their opinions. In Sidama, peasants<sup>7</sup> who till the land and agro-pastoralists (who tend to combine land tilling and rearing of animals: cattle, goats sheep, donkeys horses) are the main livelihood activities. This can be reflected in the Ethiopian governments' rural administrative structure, which since the 1974 revolution opted to call the lowest administrative structure, 'Peasant Association' (PA).

The priority of this research was to let the peasants participate in the issue of their livelihood circumstance from the beginning. It was very important to put the farmers' agenda first as emphasised by Chambers *et al* (1989:55): 'Most professionals assume they know what the farmers

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<sup>7</sup> Small holder farmers who conduct mixed farming of land tilling with rearing animals: they are different from Agro-pastoralists whose dominant livelihood activities are rearing animals to land tilling, while the opposite is true for Peasants.

want and need but they are often wrong. Not knowing farmers' priorities and not putting farmers' agendas first means that professionals are likely to address the wrong problems in their research.

The research was designed in a systematic way. An important aspect of the methodology was to interview a selected group of households once every two weeks, to gain in-depth understanding of their livelihoods. These regular visits were also instrumental to further strengthen trust. In that stage the researcher intended to understand how villagers perceived the government, by asking them to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements on trust and interest in the political systems within which they are living.

Those statements are a key to understanding the relationship between the villagers and the government, which is symbolised by local authorities and officials of government departments. The purpose of those statements are to identify those who are the supporters, sceptical and opponents of the government and establish the level of their trust in political systems and the level of interest by probing participants further. The findings of those statements enriched semi-structured interview on the role of political power and political space.

In order to get reliable information, villagers were informed about the purpose of the research and the origin and background of the researcher. To ensure the independence of the research, all participants were assured that their information would be treated confidentially. The presence of the researcher using clan and marriage relationship networks also helped to become fully accepted by the community which, no doubt, helped in obtaining credible information.

### **3.8.2 The main data Collection (2000-2001)**

This phase consisted of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and participant

observation. The field research furthermore consisted of household surveys, with all households in the selected villages being asked an identical set of questions on a wide variety of topics. Since the household is the main unit of analysis in this research, primary data were collected from household heads. Spouses and young adult household members were also included in the qualitative data collection process. While administering the monthly interviews and the household survey, direct observation was important to develop a deeper understanding of people's lives and their livelihoods.

The primary data were divided into three: primarily, the data collected in December 2000 to mid-September 2001 from peasants and agro-pastoralists who were living in livelihood or food insecure and famine prone areas of the Sidama Zone in four districts of that time namely, the low lands of Awassa Zuria district, Shabadino, Dale and Aleta Wondo.

Secondly, data from the key players who played an important role in the livelihood and food (in)security in preventing before it occurs and responding to famine when it occurred - various departments such as Agriculture, and natural resource, Health, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, Planning and Economic Development and Education. Thirdly, data gathered from the decision makers, such as leaders of governing party, who hold the decisive position and the opposition to the ruling government.

The research findings are primarily based on information obtained from the local population. Therefore, adequate attention was given to make sure that people were telling their whole story and not only particular parts of it. In this regard, the researcher's in-depth knowledge of the local language and culture was an important asset.

Studying food insecurity and livelihoods in an integrated manner requires the use of different research methodologies to obtain different types of data at various levels. Primary data collection in particular requires a variety of research techniques designed to obtain complementary information. Accordingly, four main techniques of data collection were used for the collection of primary data:

in-depth interview with key informants, focus group discussions, observation and the use of structured household surveys. The table 3.1 in the appendix four, shows the entire research plan, that entails all of the parties who provided data for this research, the number of interviews, focus group discussion, and how the research was conducted

**Interviews:** - both monthly in-depth interviews with selected 40 households and 14 key informant interviews were undertaken. These formed the main methods to collect qualitative data for in-depth understanding of people's livelihood and food insecurity situation. Peoples' knowledge, experiences and perceptions were discussed in individual interviews as well as in the focus groups. The monthly interviews consisted of two parts: a recurrent part on livelihoods and a thematic part.

**Recurrent interviews:-** the recurrent interview deals with aspects of rural livelihoods. It repeated the same type of question every month and was designed to solicit information regarding basic household characteristics such as crop production, sources of income and gifts, expenditure, health situation as well as social interaction and participation in local organisations and religious and ritual activities. The information obtained through the recurrent interview was used to understand the nature and dynamics of livelihoods throughout the fieldwork period.

**Thematic interviews:** - the thematic part of the interview, on the other hand, was undertaken in the form of in-depth interviews. The thematic interview was designed to collect information on a wide variety of topics that included household assets, food security situation and coping mechanisms. But also on government interventions, in particular the PSNP and OFSP programmes, the impact of credit and issues related to food aid and dependency syndrome. Interviews were conducted by using interview guides. Some interviews were also tape recorded with the permission of the interviewees and deleted after taking full notes to assure further participants peace of mind.

The qualitative data-base that was collected by employing both recurrent and thematic interviews was not used for statistical analysis. The selection of sample households was not done on the basis of



their statistical representativeness. The sample size was small as the emphasis was on the collection of in-depth information to explore the diversity of livelihood patterns and dynamics at the household level.

This was because it was only through such an approach that in-depth investigation of complex dynamics and interrelations could be understood and interpreted adequately, particularly when dealing with peoples' perceptions. The case description of such an approach is often more telling, insightful and convincing than statistical associations as one deal with perceptions reflecting personal opinions, attitudes and assumptions.

***Key informant interviews:-***key informant interviews were conducted with community leaders, development agents, health workers and Kebele administrators as well as with the district safety net coordinator, head of the agricultural office and administrator of the district. Apart from these, other knowledgeable people were interviewed at the district and regional level.

In total about twenty one key informant interviews were conducted throughout the fieldwork period. Moreover, in order to assess the way people perceive aid and the way aid has influenced peoples' lives, life histories were recorded to gain a better understanding of how food aid has influenced households through time.

***Focus group discussions:-***small groups of six to ten people were selected by the researcher out of the nominees suggested by -key informants for their specific knowledge on the variety of the themes would help the researcher gain depth of understanding on the sub- topics (such as livelihood assets, the trend of access through times, the perceived impediments in the processes of accessing, strategies of overcoming such impediments) that might be feeder to the main topic.

Then those individuals were approached to obtain their willingness, depending on availability and interest on the topic they were informed most of the time by word of mouth the time and place where the group discussions were held. After venue and discussant are identified, the decision was made

whether to repeat the same question raised to key informant if there seems a gap of understanding or verifying the authenticity of information relevant to the participants situation if there appear doubt what the key informants informed.

Then the facilitator of discussion selected. About eighteen focus groups discussions were carried out. The researcher is a native Sidamuafoo speaker so there was no need for an interpreter. In order to counter any possible bias regarding the views of discussants the researcher and his assistants allowed ideas to be generated by probing in connection with his fundamental questions and asking the speaker's relation with events as well as by trying to understand discussants' intention and to assess their motives before what was being said.

***Participant observation:-*** Participant observation was carried out among the study communities in four districts of the Sidama zone at four levels. Being born and raised as the Sidama, the researcher was able to know what ethnic, affiliation, clan belongingness and integration of different clans means. Secondly, the schooling and socialization into Ethiopian way of life enabled him to reflect how the second identities that came across through schooling and socialization overlays and buries the primary identity.

He encountered that 'Ethiopian identity' that is equivalent of Amharization is the way of socialization with no incentive to keep one's ethnic identity, the values, norms and ethnocentric knowledge. Thirdly working among the Sidama, in various departments as government civil servant helped him to understand the perspectives of the government in its relation to the Sidama.

Fourthly and more importantly observation during the field research helped him to evaluate re-evaluate and challenge his knowledge, his beliefs, understanding, and commitments in more systematic ways by getting into the location of the communities identified for their being victims of slow onset disaster that is conversion of seasonal food insecurity into famine. Other point is that belonging to the Sidama Ethnic group did not give him the totality of the knowledge on the Sidama

way of life but it is closer trust between the participants and him helped to have better understanding through participant observation through extended period of the time until preliminary conclusion reached and re-evaluate this conclusions through time and space on the scope of the project and his research questions for a period of more than two years

### **3.8.3 The main data Collection (2000-2001 and 2008-2009)**

To grasp the situation within which the study sample was living at the final field study a survey was conducted on 120 sample households in Dale and Lokka Abbaya districts of the Sidama Zone. This survey was intended first to identify the level of the samples' interest and trust with the political system of Ethiopian government, through which coding the political identity of integrated, loyalists, sceptics and marginalised can be spotted. This is in effect became the sampling frame for more in depth study.

**Trust:-** statements on trust and interest should be simple and understood by the respondents to judge their level of trust in the political system and the level of trust they have given to the political authorities. While the highest political trust is equivalent to 6-7 “yes” out of seven statements medium trust ranges from 3-5 “yes” and below 3 “yes” is the lowest trust on political institutions. ( see the table in the following page)

**Table 3-2 Statement s on trust and componenets relevant to trust**

	Yes	No
1 Government services meet citizens needs. (Relevant to fulfilling election promise)		
2 Government officials treat every citizen equally. (Relevant to Communities will to live together (community cohesion)		
3 Government officials do not take advantage of citizens. (Relevant to Communities will to live together and community cohesion )		
4 Government Officials are competent. (Relevant to performance)		
5 Government officials are fulfilling their promises. (Relevant to promise)		
6 Government officials understand citizen needs. (Relevant Fulfilling the promise & setting priority on the needs of the citizen)		
7 Government officials can be trusted. (Relevant to Performance prescribed works during election campaign and during the struggle against previous regime.)		

Source: derived from researchers survey questions.

Statements on Political Interest: - in order to evaluate the level of interest on the government activities the degree of interest considered as it is depicted on the following table.

**Table 3-3** Sample survey: Levels of political interest

Are you interested in political system of the government?	Yes	No
Very interested		
To some degree		
Not so much		
Never at all.		

Source: derived from own survey questions during 2008-2009 field research

The response for the study samples to the above statements depends on the encounters, and impressions that generate the memory of good or bad related to specific political system. In oppressive political system however, their response may not represent what is in the mind of respondents as far as the general interest in politics is concerned. Therefore, extra care should be taken before documenting either exaggeration or underestimation particularly for the statements collected before establishing strong trust between the researcher and the sample of the study.

General interest in politics may be seen in the context, of conviction, belief, expression, discourse, and commitment and sacrifice to perform what is believed and expressed. There are competing political convictions, beliefs, discourse, and commitment to perform in pluralist multi-party democracy. This cannot be realised in some context where democratic rights to express their mind is suppressed by coercion or persuasion and scaring respondents. The respondents who experience bad encounters and impressions may not express their true feelings due to worry of the consequences, which may range from deprivation of access to livelihood assets and opportunities, and in the worst cases, physical abuse.

Therefore knowing the historical, cultural, religious background of the respondents is critical before documenting the response as final findings. To overcome some communication barriers, which may arise between the researcher and his sample, wording and presenting research question in a way the respondents would understand clearly and respond to it accordingly is crucial (Converse and Presser 1986, Fowler Jr. 1991).

Interest in politics may be measured by the way respondents express their thoughts about specific political settings, the way they express themselves in political discourse, the way they commit their time, knowledge and other resources. For instance how they exchange daily news regarding how their locality is being administered through word of mouth, following media such as listening to Radio, Television, Internet news-paper depending on accessibility. How much of their time is spent in attending political meetings, and discussion about emerging policies, programmes, projects.

After identifying the type of the questions relevant to political trust and interest. It is possible to synchronise the respondents' report in a way that locates political identities of the respondents in relation to their political trust and interest as portrayed in Table 3.4.

### 3.8.4 Political identities and local perception of accessing livelihood assets

Identifying political identities of the citizens helped to inform the issues of political space that entails, their political movements, through formal and informal institutions, their political discourses and their political actions. The second step will understand “freedom” or the lack of it.

**Table 3-4 Political Identity formation and position code**

	<b>High political interest</b>	<b>Low political interest</b>	<b>Close connection to the institutions from</b>
<b>High political trust</b>	<b>Integration (Integrated citizen)</b>	<b>Loyalty (loyal citizens)</b>	<b>Above</b>
<b>Low political trust</b>	<b>Scepticism (sceptical citizen)</b>	<b>Marginalization (marginalized citizen)</b>	<b>Below</b>

Source: Author's conceptualisation of political identity of respondents by political trust and interest.

Deterring the citizens from accessing livelihood assets is one of the manifestations of narrow political space and lack of freedom. The level of access to livelihood assets can be attained by using a monitoring tool known as Livelihood Asset Status Tracking method developed by Bond and

Mukherjee (2002 : 805-815). This is the method that has its root : First, in wealth ranking of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), that generates indicators from local perceptions on the circumstances with- in which the households are living (Mukherjee 1993); Second, it has some elements from quality of life indices that describes household's situation from worst known to best known or best known to worst known in a way it is understood locally and produces quantitative scores by converting qualitative judgment (Bond and Hulme 1992). Thirdly, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework of DfID (Carney, 1998, 1999) that symbolizes livelihood assets endowments with a pentagon of assets or capitals (human, natural, social, physical and financial). Fourthly, the evolution of sustainable development that crosses economic bounded assumptions to incorporate social access inclusion and intra-generational equity as well as environmental perspective of preservation of natural resources and inter-generational equity (Bond and Mukherjee 2002:807).

The Livelihood Asset Status tracking method was originally used as quick monitoring and evaluation tools by implementing and donor agencies to check the progress whether the programmes or projects achieved the purpose intended, it was tested in various projects in Uganda, South Africa and Asia as well.

This research used the Livelihood Asset Status Tracking method as a means of capturing samples asset status during the time of field research as the starting point to understand the level of asset access by different political identities. This helped to investigate and trace back the extent to which their political stands trust and interest has been affecting access of citizens to livelihood assets positively or negatively. This was substantiated or challenged by extended case methods of ethnography, life stories, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions with various stake holders.

From two districts, four Peasant Associations (PAs)<sup>8</sup> were selected. Households were first categorised into two groups based on their PSNP status; that is PSNP beneficiary households and non-beneficiary households. This was identified by the focus group discussion with Development Agents and Peasant Associations authorities such as the chairperson or Secretary of the PAs.

From the registration list of PSNP beneficiaries, 30 households were picked randomly, by drawing a lottery from the total beneficiaries' lists; PSNP beneficiary households receiving Direct Support were treated as a separate household category in order to study the differential impact of the PSNP on Public Works beneficiary households.

The research thus distinguished four groups of safety net beneficiary households and three groups of non-beneficiary households. From each of these seven groups a sample of four households was selected at random by making an alphabetical list and using a lottery system to select the study households in each Peasant Association or village.

Each household in a category had, therefore, an equal probability of being selected. The total sample size was thus 120 households. These 120 households were studied in-depth to explore their livelihoods and the impact of the food security interventions on the household's food security status.

The name selected was given its own code for security reasons - only the researcher and his assistant knew the name of the respondent household heads, and they were approached to respond to the survey questions on trust and interest in the political system. The responses obtained from the respondents laid foundations for the identification of political identities of each household head.

These political identities were substantiated or challenged by further probing on the attitudes of the respondents to indigenous or informal political structure or formal political structures, to the authorities symbolising each structure, or religious authorities. This will help to prove or disprove exactly, the political identity of the respondents.

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<sup>8</sup> The smallest administrative unit in Ethiopian government.



Then the samples were categorised by their political identities divided into three groups based on their connection to government, and classified as marginalised, sceptical and integrated households, and the level of asset ownership livestock ownership, land size and labour availability were found to be the key features of wealth in the district and thus used as the main criteria for determining a household's asset access status.

This was further substantiated by Livelihood asset status tracking (LAST) method that will extract the local perception on each political identity. This exercise by a group of community representatives and critically analysed how this will reinforce the report given by each respondents and approve or disapprove the level of trust and interest to the government, and the way they are treated.

Identifying samples' political identities, their livelihood asset status, gave the researcher the first picture and prepared me for in-depth study of historical events and policy processes that had positively or negatively affected the earlier generations or forefathers of the respondents. This can be done by life story narration, that can be triangulated with recorded time and space of events that has been unfolding

In Sidama land since their encounter with successive Ethiopian governments, that can be seen as policy tragedy for many and policy blessing for few and how this has been revolving for generations to shape political identities and livelihood and food security status present respondents as cumulative effect of generational integration or marginalization based on trust and interest to successive Ethiopian governments policies that fixed whose sustainability or insecurities.

After translating the questions into Sidamuaffooo, training was given to the research assistants on how to administer the question to the local population. During the training, the assistants were strictly informed to take care not to misinterpret the questions while administering the questionnaire. Assistants were trained how to introduce themselves, ask the selected case study households for their

participation in the research and explained that the data collected would be used in a strictly confidential matter for the purpose of research only. In this regard the use of assistants knowing the local language and culture of the area has contributed to the collection of credible information.

Both male and female research assistants were used to administer the survey and household interviews. Accordingly, household interviews were undertaken by one male and one female assistant. Research assistants were trained to undertake the survey by shadowing: first observing and discussing how I was conducting the survey. After the research assistants gained confidence, they undertook a number of surveys under my supervision. Then the research assistants continued to conduct survey on their own while I was monitoring the quality of surveying process at regular intervals.

***Household Survey:-***The household survey was used to generate quantitative data regarding household characteristics and provided important insights into people's livelihoods, food security status, and coping strategies as well as about the government food security interventions. The general household survey was instrumental in providing insight into the livelihoods of the case study households in the two research villages.

The survey questions were designed to solicit different types of information including on demography, household characteristics, socio-economic status, household assets, household production and consumption and the PSNP and OFSPs. Part of this information was used in the focus group discussions to validate the findings and contrast these across different household categories and stakeholders.

The structured survey questionnaires included open-ended questions to enable respondents to express their opinions and views in a comprehensive manner with an attempt to collect adequate information. The closed-ended questions, on the other hand, were designed to obtain factual information as relevant to the objectives of the study and the research questions.

The respondents of the questionnaire were the household heads, spouses and other adult members of the household. All 120 households living in the selected villages were included in the survey. The survey was conducted from May 2008 to June 2009.

The semi-structured interview was initially prepared in English. Selected research participants were briefed on the objectives of the research and the instruments used. During the briefing, all the questions were explained one by one so as to ensure that all research participants had a clear understanding of each of the questions. The questionnaire was then translated into *Sidaamu affo* (the local language) by the researcher. Differential interpretations of the questions and un-clarities were discussed till common agreement was reached. Answers were documented in writing and translated back into English for data entry and analysis.

***Focus Group Discussions***:-during the course of the field work, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted to explore peasants' perception of their livelihood, food security situation and impact of past and present food security programmes.

In total eighteen focus group discussions were held with selected male and female-headed case study households, Kebele administrators, and the Kebele and village food security task forces, village elders and with representatives of the local communities.

Participants of the FGDs were purposely selected on the basis of their knowledge of the study area and attention was paid for these groups to be representative for the local institutions and the community. Various topics were raised for discussion including people's perceptions, attitudes and practices with regard to the food security situation, coping mechanisms, dependence on food aid, the role of the safety net and other food security interventions including the provision of credit.

Clear difference in opinion, experiences and knowledge amongst focus group participants were observed and this helped to explore particular issues as relevant to the research. In particular,

discussions relating to agricultural productivity, wealth status of households, food aid dependency and the impact of the food security programme were key issues of debate.

***Observation:-*** observation was conducted to supplement the data acquired by in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and household surveys. Direct observation was done while administering the in-depth interviews and household survey. Data collected through observation was used to better understand and be able to explain what is happening socially, environmentally, culturally and economically among the households and communities in the study area. Observation was particularly important as it provided a chance to observe important community based activities and issues under research in their natural setting that cannot be captured by interviews and household surveys.

Generally, observation in the field can be categorised into two types. The first one was general observation conducted by walking around the village, and observing people's daily practices and their interactions. This was particularly useful in observing things like the biophysical environment, peoples' life style and community relations. The second type was the observation of special events in particular those related to tradition, religion and culture. This kind of observation provides in-depth understanding of the cultural and social aspects of the community.

***Secondary sources of data:-*** secondary sources of data were collected at various international institutions, the Forum for Social Studies in Addis Ababa and government offices in district and zone and region Yirgalem, Hantate the capital of Dale, Lokka Abbaya and In Hawassa the centre of both for Sidama Zone Administration and regional state .

Moreover, books, official published and unpublished documents, PSNP manuals, reports and policy papers were used as a source of information. Published census reports from the Central Statistical Authority were helpful to access data on the demographic characteristics of the population. Unpublished reports and other archival documents from the district and regional offices

provided interesting background information on issues of food insecurity and important government initiatives including on its food security programmes.

### **3.9 Positionality and understanding**

This research used a combination of qualitative research methods with quantitative survey and Livelihood Asset Status Tracing matrices. This combination allowed a stratification of the Sidama into various political identities. Moreover, it informed the link between this stratification and access to livelihood assets.

Using an extended case method of ethnography related to critical realism helped the research to trace the root causes that have been shaped Sidama's present livelihood circumstances. Ethnography was used to extract data on the economic, socio-cultural and political settings in which the study sample live. Life stories from some of the sample helped the researcher to understand the sequence of dramatic events that affected the lives and livelihood.

Thus, qualitative methods facilitated capturing a clearer picture of how unitary Ethiopian nationalism on one hand and Sidama ethno-nationalism on the other has created the political space of conflictive identities. The struggle between the two identities to dominate and to survive created livelihood disruption, perpetuating generational poverty with cumulative effect that culminated in 1999 famine.

In the third phase of the research from middle of October 2008 to middle of June 2009 quantitative data was collected through a survey of 120 beneficiaries of Productive Safety Net Programme of the Ethiopian governments. This phase as well aimed at testing trust and interests in political institutions of successive Ethiopian governments, including the current regime, i.e. the extent to which the trust and interest in political institutions and authorities of the Ethiopian government shaped my samples' political identities, which in turn conditioned their access to

Productive Safety net Programme as a resources and their resilience from livelihood asset depletion.

To attain this aim the researcher also used 9 focus group discussions and 8 key informant interviews in four, Peasant Associations in two districts:- Dale and Lokka Abbaya. Livelihood asset status tracking matrix (Bond & Mukherjee, 2002, Bond, & Hulme, 1992) to quantify local perception of their livelihood asset access circumstances. The adoption of research methods well established as described above is to promote confidence and that the researcher have accurately recorded the phenomena under study and to overcome the colouring effect that may encroach through his positionality, or As (Lincoln and Guba 1985) pointed out the compatibility of the finding with reality.

In order to eliminate the side effect of postionality and ensuring the trust-worthiness, (Shenton 2004:65) recommended ‘the development of an early familiarity with culture of participating...before the first data collection dialogues take place.’ As the strategy of qualitative research, in this regard, the researcher reflects on his interest in the subject of this study is a great deal more than simply an academic exercise.

The first part of the research, was coincided with fresh memory of dealing with such problems for more than eight years through his work in the Culture and Sports Affairs Department in region eight that included the Sidama, the Gedeo, the Burji and the Amaro; in the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State in Sidama zone. The positions he held included Head, Department of Culture and Sports affairs; Team leader in the aid programmes co-ordination section and posts in the Early warning systems, Bilateral, multilateral Aid, and Non- Governmental Organization in Planning and Economic Development Department.

These jobs provided him with insights into how government can be more effective in lessening vulnerability and in protecting its people from disasters such as famine. He learnt how NGOs could invest necessary efforts and funds in preventing livelihood asset depletion before disaster occurs,

rather than putting all their energies into relief efforts after the event, and how policy makers were placing too much emphasis on growth at any price, a policy, which may leave more and more people on the margins dangerously vulnerable to famine.

Throughout these periods, he maintained a keen interest, on the one hand in those indigenous socio-political structures, governance, and practice that of themselves enabled the Sidama to prevent the encroachment of famine, and on the other, how government early warning statistics were exaggerated, and there were times when he was critical of how figures were collected and how statistics could regularly be manipulated to distort the truth.

He knew, for instance, that the senior government officials in the regional state both underestimated the number of victims and the levels of vulnerability, in order to hide their poor performance in the agricultural extension programme (which is a top priority of the rural-centered development programme of the ruling party). But on other occasions, they exaggerated the number of victims, so that they could receive more grain and money payments from the central authorities that could be used for purposes other than famine relief.

This specialist knowledge caused him to monitor the performance of ‘experts’ (who were employed) in his department on account not of their ability, but due to their loyalty to the decision makers) in a more critical manner than someone else might have done. This was not without paying a price, since he faced harassment of various kinds as a result of his challenge to the way policy was being implemented in accordance with the guidelines and the mandate given to the office.

He also began to reflect on his ambition of implementing national policy regarding disaster prevention and preparedness according to the official guideline. For him it was right to implement the national policy in accordance with the guidelines and code of conduct as might be expected of every civil servant. But, lack of freedom of conviction, freedom of expression, freedom of action outside governing party line, that led to mis- informing or dis informing, division, and presenting

unattainable hopes, within a narrow political space featuring weak governance, nepotism, corruption and poor group dynamics constituted obstacles to effective implementation.

His challenging of officials was not taken as constructive criticism aimed at improving the manner of the entire implementation, but as a threat to the senior officials. This made him think about how to investigate the entire issues of the political space of conflicting and conditioned political identity, how those who are sceptical and critical of the power dynamics are pushed away despite the fact that they hold the truth in their version and according what it is meant to be.

In this context, he had predicted that the Sidama famine of 1999-2003, would occur when the then vice Prime Minister, disbanded all offices of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, causing them to cease to be functional at the Zonal level, in the face of growing vulnerability throughout the summer of 1998.

In addition to this, (Guba and Lincoln 1989) suggested ‘progressive subjectivity’ or monitoring of the researcher’s own developing constructions what (Shenton 2004:68) calls ‘the researchers’ ‘reflective commentary’ plays key role in increasing trustworthiness of the qualitative research.

In this context, the researcher is Sidama by birth and thus socialized to the Sidama values and norms in his childhood. However, his Ethiopian identity, acquired through formal schooling, through working for the Ethiopian government as a civil servant has a tendency to distort his Sidamanness, and overlays what he got from his parents, communities and childhood peers. In early 1980s, he worked as a research assistant for Father, Dr. Norberto Vecciatto an anthropologist.

This coupled with his study of History in Addis Ababa University in the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s gave him a chance to reflect on his identity as Sidama in relation to Abyssinian culture and the processes of Amharization. This happened in the way, Abyssinian historiography treated the Sidama and the rest of the Nationality in Ethiopia gave him an incentive to focus on cultural and identity politics critically to challenge or negotiate what Ethiopian historiography or



media says or does not say about the identity politics and its impact on accessing livelihood assets, livelihood strategies, livelihood activities and finally livelihood outcomes.

Returning to the Sidama in 2008-2009 to conduct field work in addition to what he had done from June 2000 to September 2001 in four famine prone districts of Sidama, posed several dilemmas. For example what is the meaning of the “field” versus “home”? Going back to Sidama to do “field work” was not the same as returning “home”. The areas selected for research were all rural areas, with a dramatically different way of life from Hawassa the Capital of Sidama, let alone the United Kingdom where he was naturalised and reading to challenge his understanding and perception about the world. Yet strong family ties to rural areas (where many of his clan members still live) made him feel very comfortable with such settings. While the same historical and political processes might situate him with, his research participants, and locate him as “other” too. He clearly knew his access to educational, employment history, while he was in Ethiopia and travelling abroad “beyond the sea” in the phrase of his research participants “*baara- wido*” through material and dressing, privilege in having access to comfortable life, holding a British passport set him apart.

These reflections gave him a feeling of being an insider, outsider, both, and his academic exercise and commitment situated him as a “neither” as well. He was in subjective positions of tension and discomfort and negotiating not only with his research participants but also mild conflict of self that positioned him in-between in every context that he had to reconcile constantly during the field work.

The Sidaman research participants of 2008-2009, “othered” him more than his research participants of 2000 although some of them are the same people. In 2000, he was both civil servant and the Sidama working with them and for them: that created closer relationship and exposure to the internal dynamics of the lives and livelihoods of his research participants.

In 2008-2009, although his rural participants did not notice his nationality and citizenship, the

participants from the government offices regarded him as a foreigner and were conscious of his citizenship of United Kingdom. Nevertheless his “Sidamaness”, ability to engage in constant conversation in the Sidama language and live in rural areas, eat what they eat; sleep in the house of his host enabled him to bridge the gap over the time. He was after all a (Sidancho) by birth (even if he is regarded as a person from beyond the sea), many people knew him as a Sidama. However he was conscious of his difference and the power dynamics contained in that and exerted maximum effort to negotiate as much as he could.

He developed a confidence that whoever he was, the most important thing to achieve the purpose intended was the way he interacted and behaved with people, which helped him in establishing relationships of trust. He was also conscious of that he was only accessing part of the lives of research participants.

Clear differences in his position was in his relation to rural participants were that he is educated, from the city, in local context, could read and write that situated him in different location and immediately in one of power hierarchy whereby the rural people distinguish themselves from the urbanite. The fact that he rode a motor cycle, wore shoes, had a mobile phone, and carried a notebook constantly writing after the end of conversation placed him in a vividly different position.

Amazing, however, was the will of people to talk freely, and to be very welcoming into their home. His presence among the host household “ewelloo mine” and “ewelli qaccha” in the household and neighbourhood became the head of the news sharing moment in the Waare (evening time spent by matured men in the household headed by respected, honoured man in the neighbourhood). Local children, following him en masse, competed among each other to touch him and his motor cycle. The warmth and hospitality shown even from the poorest of the poor to provide him with coffee, light food (bunu-qurse), and a stool to sit on.

This generous accommodation gave him an ambivalence of discomfort as he thought that was a

good treatment more than they treat each other. While indulging and enjoying such treatment set him in moral dilemma as he want to be simple and friend on one hand, yet retreating and refusing to accept hospitality is considered as offensive. Therefore, he had to negotiate his position through daily, encounters, impression, expression and action, choosing the action that makes him friendier to his research participants.

Using what knew as a Sidama, from his childhood, in the way of talking, eating, the distance of space and where to sit, the body language he used. He also observed the curiosity of those who newly join the focus group discussions at the middle of session, who asked why he was there? To which ethnic group and clan he belong? Who are his nearest relatives? gave him an opportunity to be part of collective positioning of privilege as an acceptable outsider who is attempting to know Sidama's lives and livelihood, and historical process that shaped their present situation through this research.

These reflections might give the context of the research and the researcher's reflection on what happened exactly at the moment of the research. In order to increase the objectivity of this research, random sampling, triangulation, tactics to help ensure honesty in informants; iterative questioning, negative case analysis were used to overcome the effects of postionality.

### **3.10 Data entry and analysis**

After the survey result and livelihood asset statutracking matrix filled by participants to understand the way they perceive their situation. Life stories on each shock from the food insecurity and famine victims were collected. Then those who had been integrated into successive Ethiopian government policy implementation machinery will be asked to extract what was it really, happened? Was it intentional policy tragedy? Was it the side effect of the policy intended for good turned into negative and affected the victims in the way they expressed? Then secondary sources were also consulted before entering the data by triangulating the facts, events with time and places, to

substantiate or else challenge what is said or not said in the field studies relevant to the research question.

The qualitative data collected by the in-depth household interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and observations were transcribed, coded and entered into a computer. Outputs generated in this way were used to describe the food insecurity and livelihood situation of the people as well as their perceptions about the recurrent situation of food insecurity and the impact of the food security interventions on household food security. The quantitative survey data was also coded and entered for data analysis. With the research being exploratory by nature, data analysis and presentation of the research results is mainly based on descriptive approaches.

In general, the process of data entry and analysis included the coding of the interview responses and observations, tabulation of the data and utilising the qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques. Moreover, selected anecdotes that have been recorded during the interview process and focus group discussions were also presented in different parts of the analysis whenever deemed necessary.

## **Summary**

This chapter told us about the research methodology. It provided us a justification for why the Sidama case was selected; it presented general philosophical foundation for the research, explained why critical realism is appropriate to the research question, introduced the study area; it also dealt with how the field research was organised in temporal and spatial extensions; integrating reflections on the researcher's positionality with how the research was conducted in two main periods: 2000-2001 and 2008-2009.

## CHAPTER FOUR: THE SIDAMA ETHNO-NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL IDENTITY

### 4 Introduction

This chapter aims to show the political space (institutional framework, discourses and the actions from ‘below’ in the Sidama context. Specifically, how indigenous institutions, governance and the knowledge attached to them is sidelined by mainstream institutions, yet they are serving as safety net, during insecurity, refuge when the Ethiopian system fails the Sidama, in the processes of meeting their basic needs.

Indigenous institutions, governance and knowledge are not mainstreamed by successive Ethiopian governments’ political, social and economic policies and are sustained as major informal code of conduct for majority of the Sidama today. Furthermore, strong psychological, social bond which links the Sidama to their ancestral values may suggest the type of ideological war fought to preserve their uniqueness; this has frozen their ethnic identity without it being transformed into Abyssinian project of assimilation; and the value of fighting to retain it and perpetuate it for generations to come at any cost.

This can be seen through what other scholars argued and what similarities and differences can be seen. This can be seen extrapolated with the Sidama context, with the use of ethnographic research tools from institutional heritage and this legacy has survived severe pressure and co-exists in parallel with Abyssinian institutions; though reduced to informal structures, the family hood Sidaman indigenous structures, governance and knowledge *Gashootena Ayiidooma* remain still influential to the lives and livelihood of each Sidama.

It also unpacks three main livelihood assets or (capitals) : by exploring the social capital and its impact in securing and accessing food and other livelihood assets in Sidama; by presenting the

natural capital and the Sidaman way of accessing natural capital with particular reference to land tenure; by discussing the Human capital among the Sidama and how it has helped to generate wealth, through agro –pastoralist activities; and the sources of income diversification to make other physical assets and to design coping strategies against drought particularly developing specialist skills and knowledge on plant cultivation.

This chapter also discusses how specialist knowledge and skills of the Sidama in growing drought resistant crop called *enset* ( Amharic) or *weese* (*Sidaamu Affoo*) commonly called false banana what recently hailed by researchers as “a tree against hunger” helped the Sidama to be self-sufficient until 1999. Investigating in this way help deepening our understanding how old ways of life have been disrupted, but full assimilation into the new culture has not been achieved and it is this which has laid the foundation for conflictive political identity.

This chapter is organised as follows: - the next section explores understanding ethno-nationalism in African and in Sidaman context. Section three deals with family hood Sidaman indigenous structures, governance and knowledge *Gashootena Ayiidooma*. Section four, examines how the Sidama Social capital and how its roles in accessing to livelihood assets. Section five presents the social capital and food sharing among the Sidama. Section six adds further livelihood asset sharing practice. Section seven reveals, the natural capital such as climate and Agro-ecology, land in Sidama and the Sidama way of accessing to them or indigenous Sidaman land tenure. Section eight explores the Human capital among the Sidama, including the indigenous knowledge of Drought-resistant crops, and the final section summarises.

#### **4.1 Understanding ethno-nationalism in African and in Sidaman context**

Looking back to the pre-conquest Sidaman way of life can deepen our understanding of the rise

of Sidaman ethno-nationalism as political identity. Pre conquest the Sidaman' way of life with its distinct features; can be traced back from the surviving Sidaman socio-economic and political institutions which remained as parallel institutions to the Abyssinian political institutions.

These parallel institutions have their distinct indigenous knowledge, values, principles and indigenous governances. This indigenous knowledge has helped the Sidama to secure their food and livelihoods and shaped their identities as peasants, pastoralist, within the main areas of livelihood diversifications, within these two exist there are other types which originated from their occupations or livelihoods such as tanning, pot making, iron forging, trade , etc. However, in all indigenous institutions, the knowledge inherent and the livelihoods derived from have been reshaping the Sidama ethno-nationalism.

The phrase ethno-nationalism derived from two terms ethnicity and nation. Peter Ekeh (1975) understands the dichotomy between the notion of ethno- nationalism and modern nation state as 'primordial-public' and 'civic- public. For Ekeh, the former is that related to communal, kinship and ethnic groups. The latter is that related to modern state apparatus comprising the civil service, schools, police and so on, observed in urban and semi-urban areas of Africa.

Some demonised the potential of ethnicity as backward evil of tribalism against the cohesion of diversity within the state, in the phrase of Lonsdale, (1994:132) (shared also by Bruce) 'political tribalism' referring to ethno -nationalism and to the claims of ethnocentric elites to represent and speak for a community in relation to both the state and other ethnic groups. Echoing the same understanding, (Berman, 2004:51 writes :

With distressing frequency, the rhizome of ethnic factionalism and patron-client politics reproduces themselves within these parties and associations rendering them, like so much of the apparatus of the state, into ideological and institutional facades covering the reality of business as usual.

Similarly, (Page, *et al* 2010:347) asserted a politics of belonging as 'divisive and dystopian'.

Others blame ethnicity and ethnic diversity for Africa's 'growth tragedy' (Easterly and Levine 1997 :1204-05, 1230-31), asserting that ethnic fragmentation and higher level of ethnic diversity encourage poor state policies and a virtual war on public goods, have weaker governments and are less likely to have democratic institutions. (Easterly and Levine 1997: 1232).

In contrary, there are also who recognised the power of ethnicity as having a progressive developmental function (Mercer et al 2008), but also play a politically progressive role in terms of promoting processes of citizenship formation to extent of nation building (Evans 2010). Among those who admired the power of ethnicity in Africa, as nation building vehicle, Markakis (1996:299) asserts:

The first phase in the modern political history of Africa is over. The era of African nationalism with its promise of nation building, socio-economic development and democracy is over its promise unfulfilled. As twentieth century draws to a close, the most potent political force throughout the continent draws its strength from ethnicity.

The idea 'African Nationalism with its promise of nation building' is flawed; it is flawed, because it is hardly based on African realities. Hammeso (1997:2) explains how the idea of nation building in Africa is flawed:

Because the term is widely bantered without reference to what the nation constitute. The origin of nations, as Anthony Smith [1981] would explain lies in ethnic communality; but such communality is not the bases upon which contemporary states in Africa were formed. In reality, Africa's postcolonial states were inherited, as it were colonial territories and people. It is on this basis, which the now-failed project juxtaposed. 'Nation building' as such is, therefore a metaphor state building.

Similarly, Van de Berghe (1994: 12) further refines the term nationalism:

What is termed as nationalism [in Africa] is nothing like the term has conventionally meant elsewhere. How can the term nationalism be applied to such multinational states as Senegal, Nigeria, or zaire? Conversely, what is called tribalism in Africa is often genuine nationalism. The real nations of Africa are the Igbo, the Kikuyu and the Ewe not Nigeria, Kenya, and Togo, only the few of these nations like Somali and Swazi, have their State; the overwhelming majority are part of multinational states or even worse, are split between several states.



This suggests the potential of ethno-nationalism to be an instrument of mobilization of kin members, whom ethnocentric elites think obliged to carry mutual burden of blood tie. However, ethnicities are dynamic and they are ‘ambiguous, constantly contested and the changing results of cultural politics’ (Berman 1998:311-312). Berman and Lonsdale have understandably focused on the dynamics of how ethnicity gets politicised ‘from above’ within the struggle for state power.

While (Markakis 1996, Hammeso 1997, Van de Berghe 1994) tried to shed light on less scrutinised resistance movements ‘from below’ designed to counter the ravages of political tribalism and related less transparent transfers of national wealth into patronage and the reciprocity of allowing access to livelihood assets for legitimizing the will of kin members.

On striking the balance on the discrepancy between the views from ‘above’ and views from ‘below’, (Berman 1998 and Lonsdale 1994:131) resonating the value of ethnicity coined the phrase ‘morale -ethnicity’ and elaborating what the actual ethnic identity and the political dynamics contained in the ethnicity, argued as follows: Primarily, underlying the internal politics of ‘morale ethnicity’ and external ‘political tribalism’ are strong material interests regarding access to the fundamental resources of livelihood and family, both the traditional ones of marriage, land and livestock and increasingly, the social and economic resources of modernity available through the state and market.

Secondly, the focus of conflicts of morale ethnicity on the authority and responsibility of elites reinforces traditional forms of ‘Big Man –Small Boy’ Patron- client relations, especially with regard to access to the resources of state. This, and the competition with other ethnic communities for those resources is the actual source of corruption and ‘bad policies’ that Easterly and Levine (1997) as well as their followers blame ethnicity and ethnic diversity for Africa’s ‘growth tragedy’.

Further research also has reinforced the conclusions of Easterly and Levine. For instance,

(Okediji 2011:78) finds ‘in heterogeneous societies there is a greater likelihood for competition among interest (ethnic) groups for the provisions of public goods, leading to poor public policy decisions’ and that ‘it is well established in economics literature that ethnic fractionalization on economic growth in Africa in the 1990s due to ‘adverse governance’ and that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of conflict, especially in ethnically ‘polarized societies’. (Schuler and Weisbrod 2010:458-59).

Those findings assert that, ethnic heterogeneity is the source of underdevelopment, and poverty, conversely they are saying that ethnic homogeneity enhances development. However, they did not confirm that even ethnic homogeneity guarantee poverty reduction, economic growth, food security and livelihood sustainability. However the instrumentalist view of (Eyoh 1999:292) ethnicity based identity politics as ‘belonging’ and ‘autochthony’ as an advantageous ladder for local elites to climb to the position of power, and accessing livelihood assets. And how ‘belonging’ or ‘autochthony’ employed by local elites, who also understood and used the colonial construction of citizenship.

However,(Eyoh 1999) seems reluctant to recognise how the politics of ‘belonging’ and ‘autochthony’ was a means of reclaiming lost loyalty to local hierarchies by citizens who are marginalised or mistreated within multiethnic state and to guarantee not only the privilege but also fair share in political , social and economic life for ‘the sons and daughters of the soil ‘ without necessarily being against the access of ‘strangers’ or non-natives to livelihood assets.

Using The LEPSA framework and ethnography of critical realism in Sidama of southern Ethiopia this thesis shade different light on autochthons and non-autochthon controversy in the processes of accessing livelihood assets .in three ways. The first is the historical analysis that shows, from 1890s to 1974, and to some extent from 1974-1991, in Sidama and in most of conquered and controlled territories of southern, western, and eastern Ethiopia it was not the autochthons who had been in privileged position in accessing the political power and through it accessing livelihood assets particularly the land, other livelihood assets, and opportunities, but the non- autochthons.

Secondly, from 1991-to date it is not ‘autochthony’ (having more privilege of accessing livelihood assets by virtue of being the son and daughter of the soil than non natives) *per se*, but affiliation to the ruling party that gives more privilege of accessing livelihood assets than non-party members no matter how autochthons they may claim to access livelihood assets.

Thirdly, the state ownership of the land and monopoly of other educational and employment opportunity by state, combined with the fusion of party and state structure suffocated the access of non-party members to those useful resources of livelihoods. These suggest that the Ethiopian system of integration and marginalization is unique compared to the rest of Africa. While those who are loyalist and integrated into the political settings of the northern elite can access the political power and livelihood assets, reciprocating to the degree of loyalty to and trust in northerners will be discussed in details in chapters five, six and seven).

Those whose loyalty to and trust in northern ruling elites are under question are marginalised and excluded regardless their claim to autochthony. The marginalised can be divided in to two. Those who internalised their situation and neither trust the ruling elites nor interested in the politics consequently disengaged. Second groups are those who do not trust the politicians, but somehow interested in politics, and engaged in political affairs to resist the political system that prevented them from accessing the political power and livelihood assets. However both of them are observed leaning on indigenous institutions as a safety net and refuge during hard times, such as as conflict, war, injustice, food insecurity and famine the following section examines the essence of those indigenous institutions and safety net role it provides.

#### **4.2 Family-hood Ayiidooma Sidaman indigenous structure**

Indigenous institutional structures, governance and knowledge have various definitions. However, those various definitions have some common traits which are indigenous institutions and

knowledge. For instance for Agrawal, (1995:416) indigenous knowledge and institution are ‘generated within community ... and the basis for decision making and survival strategies’. For Ahmed (1994) is location and culture specific; for Sundamari and Rangathan (2003) indigenous knowledge is an unwritten body of Knowledge, it is held in different brains, languages, and skills in as many groups, cultures and environment as are available today.

The concept of *ayiidooma* (family-hood) according to key informants in Sidama field study arises from the term *ayiide*, which literally means ‘family’. This means Sidama’s socio-political practices and institutions are based and built on blood ties as well as proximity of residence. Socio-political institutions, here means a chain of social structures incorporating obligations to perform activities designed and planned within the framework of the objectives and goals entrusted to a particular office by the various levels of community within Sidaman society.

This suggests the Sidaman concept of family is quite different from the conventional concept of family as constructed by Murdock: ‘The family as a social group is characterized by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship and one or more children own or adopted, of sexually cohabiting adults’ (Murdock, 1949:1).

The findings on familyhood and governance concept in Sidama are consistent with that of Giblin (2005). He explored Family hood governance in Tanzania. The consistency of the Sidama field study and (Giblin 2005) based on that people may seek refugee from the state in their home or kin communities, and yet simultaneously seek to break down their marginalization from their state.

While (Murdock 1949) restricts strong bond and connectedness only to household members, The Sidama field study and Giblin (2005) extend the strong bond and connection outward to non-household members. This outward extension of bonds and connectedness from household to kinship was asserted by Fox (1975:83). He writes that ‘[k]inship is about social relationships rather than

biological relationships, even though in most instances they overlap. Thus the existence of a kin relationship depends on how the society defines kinship ... It is not simply the existence of consanguinity, or “common blood”, that makes for a kinship bond, but the use to which the society puts – or does not put – the fact of biological relatedness.’

This kind of bond reflects the social cohesion among the Sidama that is meant by kinship ties, mutual assistance among the Sidama during crises does not necessarily reflect only blood ties, but also ‘neighbourliness’, which depends on the proximity or distance of the place residences. If individuals are facing difficulties such as sickness or food shortages, it is neighbours, with whom those individuals may or may not have a blood bond, that provide assistance of various kinds. One key informant referring to Sidama stated *‘Xeertote fiixinni muli olliichi qarraho rahe iillano’* reflects this fact. A rough translation might be: ‘A neighbour is quicker than a distant relative in hard times.’

Hard times include those there is food insecurity and shortages. Seasonal food shortage, for instance, can be induced by drought, or by people not having enough money, and in this case neighbours and relatives share whatever they have with those who are in need. But it is those who are physically or spatially nearer to the victims who can react first to such problems.

To substantiate what (Giblin 2005) says, it is imperative to explore the concept of familyhood governance, its organisational-structures, hierarchies, the processes of governance and how it helps in preventing livelihood and food insecurity when the state fails the sceptic and the marginalised in the context of the Sidama.

#### **4.3 The Sidama’s institutional structures and governance**

The basic unit in Sidaman institutional structure is the *bosallo*, which literally means ‘fireplace’, where the household cooks and shares heating by sitting in a circle around the fire. The *bosallo* is

also an assembling of the household, whose members are descended from common ancestors on the father's side. Many *bosallo* form a *mine*, which literally means 'house'. Many *mine* form an *ayiide*, which literally means 'family' (79 years old key informant in Dale 17/09/2000).

The next unit above the household is *kacha*, which is a kind of hamlet. The hamlet is the assembly of elders (*chimeeye*), including kinsmen and non-kinsmen (those related by proximity of their dwellings and neighbourhood). The duties and responsibilities of this office include settling quarrels over garden boundaries, appeal over of disputes (*Qattaro*) or (*qaxxaro*) between husband and wife, and other issues which are not solved at household level, but which represent matters of policy affecting the whole community: organizing and mobilizing members of the community to participate in paving paths; putting small bridges across streams and small rivers; cleaning communal springs, wells and ponds; and informing other community members of abnormalities or crises affecting others. (Focus group discussion in Dale 19/09/2000).

The assembly level above the hamlet is that of the neighbourhood (*ollaa*). The duties and responsibilities of the office at this level are organizing assistance for those who are in need, particularly during crises such as death, settling cases of theft, addressing other deviant behaviours such as insults and physical abuse that may arise from interpersonal conflict, settling land disputes, and organizing and mobilizing people to participate in works for the communal good, such as the construction of bridging paths, if they are beyond the capacity of the hamlet. (79 years old key informant in Dale 17/09/2000). This finding is consistent with that of Hamer (1987: 112–13). The *olla* is the primary institutional level that co-ordinates sharing practices.

The third council above the *ollaa* is that of lineage: the council of sub-clans (*bosaalo*). This consists mainly of those sharing kinship that are dominant in a specific area. Others, who do not partake in that lineage but who share the common areas, are treated in just the same way as those who do belong to the area and clan in the processes of accessing livelihood assets and opportunities. Those individuals violating the rights of access of others by virtue of their dominance will be

punished. This punishment is known as *boka*, and is a kind of excommunication and exclusion. (81 years old key informant interviewed on 20/09/2000) This suggests that the Sidama justice system protect the rights of non-autochthons have the room and to integrate and accommodate ‘others’.

The fourth type of council next to that of lineage or *bosaalo* is that of the clan (*ga're*). This consists of the leading elders from each local community of *bosaalos*. The duties and responsibilities of this assembly involve reconsidering the judicial verdicts given at the lower levels of assembly in situations where someone feels their case has been misjudged and appeals against the judgment.

In addition to the councils of elders, there is the office of *mote*. This literally means ‘king’, but in the context of Sidama society the *mote* is a kind of clan chief, appointed by the council of clan elders. The similarity of this office with that of a king is that the nomination for the office is hereditary and connected with only one *bosaalo* (lineage and sub-lineage), while the difference is that the *mote* is not regarded as different from other elders, but simply as a first among equals. Because he has not the authority to arbitrate on an issue that requires a decision without the consent of the council of elders, we can say that the council of elders has more power than the *mote*. Unless the council of elders has demanded his presence, he does not necessarily participate in its discussions. The important functions of the *mote* office are: symbolizing unity and solidarity in inter- and intra-clan relationships, mediating disputes between conflicting parties, and peace-making in relation to problems that are not been not solved at the lower levels. (81 years old key informant interviewed on 20/09/2000).

Kinship ties among the Sidama are concerned with cementing social relations in both good and hard times. ‘Good’ times include the celebration of various successes, while hard times entail crises such as sickness, death and other crises which are unbearable for victimized individuals. Participant observations while the councils of elders performing their public and religious duties indicated how governance in Sidaman society emanates from three basic values that each Sidama gives to other. Primarily respect and tolerance among peers; secondly veneration to individuals those who have

(had performed) duties to humanity, their spirit and ghost, like ancestral tomb; thirdly worship to one Almighty supreme God. (81 years old key informant interviewed on 20/09/2000).

This indicates the Sidaman institutional structures, governance, and justice system stems from the respect for fellow human and the fear of God that leads to critically searching to discover the “truth” through careful listening, assuring with care through the procedure of asking “*diaffinni?*” meanings “have you all listened and understood?” that can be extended to those who are attending the hearing after long listening to the presentation of cases from the victim and the offender.

The fear of God ensures the case will not be manipulated. Respect for humanity is shown through patient listening and transparent sharing. This Sidama elders and leaders who hear appeals (*qaxxaro*) appear very careful in delivering justice. Because miscarriage of justice and manipulation are regarded as a sin (*hilo*, or *chubbo*) and feared by the Sidama as it brings calamity and misfortune from their God. This helped the Sidaman justice system and governance to survive and was sustained despite severe pressure from Abyssinian police and court system which seem to the Sidama to be corrupt and inconsistent (81 years old key informant interviewed on 20/09/2000).

A participant observation and focus group discussion held at Wonsho in the former Dale district in October 7, 2000 revealed that all of the participants preferred the Sidama way of discovering the truth to the Abyssinian police and court system. When asked why most of the Sidama preferred the indigenous way of probing the truth? The response was that the absence of bribes, respect for all the attendees, patient listing, and fear of God are core reasons. This preference and commitment to adhere to these ways by most of the Sidama helped this way of governance to exist parallel to Abyssinian governance as informal, yet influential for the lives and livelihood of the Sidama.

This suggests that Sidama’s governance and political structures are related to the prevention of livelihood failure for the victims by settling the appeals related to mistreatment, theft, and robbery, physical and mental abuses among the citizens, starting from household to national level, treating



every individual as a member of one family (ayiidooma) without discrimination.

The similarity (Giblin's 2005) findings and this field research is both Bena and the Sidama were not allowed to exercise the power that originated from loyalty of those who were governed, and legitimacy that comes from 'below'. (Giblin 2005) also examines the gap between normative understandings of social groupings (family, clans) and the individual experiences of negotiations of positions, status and the functions in Bena society in Njombe province of Southern Tanzania. He observes a dialectic process of the search for political authority by group leaders. On the one hand, colonial administrators and ethnographers found among chiefs a discourse that presented their society as a rigid hierarchy of clans and patrilineal descent. However on the other hand, foreign observers participated in the construction of the legitimacy of these chiefs by putting the latter's normative discourse into words. Written documents and colonial knowledge then became the source of group leaders' power.

The field research finding in the Sidama is consistent with some of the findings (Giblin 2005) on how those indigenous institutions offer an alternative bases for food production, distribution and consumption at a time and under a situations where the state fails the provision of livelihood and food security. Similarly, Osagahe (1996:11) clearly depicts how those indigenous social institutions serves as shock absorber:

As government[s] ha[ve] failed to live up to [communities] expectation, a failure which dates back to the colonial regime the people have taken their own development initiatives in furtherance of their constitutive interests. The famous ethnic unions are arose in this milieu as a parallel structure to provide public goods. They awarded scholarships, built schools, and churches, town halls and hospitals and provided within their limits loans to small scale traders and artisans and engaged in other self-help projects.

This shows how ethnically, based institutions are offering the space for complete engagement to tackle livelihood insecurity that is either lacking or deliberately prevented from the reach of marginalised rural dwellers. In the past while the kinship ties helped to resist the conquest, slave trade and harassment of the Abyssinian rules and rulers law enforcement agencies such as court and

police, recently ethnicity became an instrument of complete engagement that serve as insurance against livelihood and food insecurity occasioned by Abyssinian state. Ethnic based communities provided their members with smoothing hard times. With proper burial of deceased and taking care of families after members death. Ekeh (1990:680).

Moreover by promoting communication and trust among the members of an ethnic group, ethnicity cuts transaction costs. On individual bases, the tendency for honesty emanating from trust and care are greater among fellow members than would be expected from the strangers. The concept of trust and honesty may also minimize or avoid the occurrence of corruption and may consequently leads to performance efficiency and livelihood and food security.

The striking difference between (Giblin 2005) and the finding of this thesis is that the source of the power for the Sidama clan chiefs was dependent on the level of loyalty and integration into Abyssinian political system that reciprocate nominal power of serving the interest of Abyssinian elite for trust and and obedience of the Sidama local chiefs.

This notion of familyhood (*ayiidooma*) has strong link to internal community cohesion and developing belonging that moulds both communal and individual identity as the Sidama. There are further similarity and difference between the Sidama's familyhood *Ayidooma* and Tanzanian *Ujamaa* that was adopted by Julius Nyerere. The similarity between them is both contain the concept of equality, respect for human dignity and sharing of the resources (livelihood assets) and non-exploitative and caring for one another.

The difference is that while Nyerere, attempted to integrate those traditional institutions and values into modern state governance in post-colonial nation state of Tanzania, the Sidamas' *Ayiidoma* however remained as a parallel and competing institution in Ethiopian governance, after the Sidama was became part of Ethiopian State.

For Nyerere *Ujamaa* was regarded as practical expression of the doctrine of African socialism

that stands against the adoption of Marxist communism and European capitalism, The Sidamas' *aydooma* however remained unnoticed let alone, being mainstreamed in governance system of the state. Furthermore *Ujamaa* was developed further to be claimed a socialist of African version. To build a society on the traditional African value of Family-hood, Nyerere (1968:27) urged Africans not to convert to socialism or to a European understanding of democracy, since Africa's own traditional experience is socialist and democratic:

The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the 'brethren' for the extermination of the 'non-brethren'. He regards all men as his brethren as members of his ever-extending family. *Ujamaa*, then, or 'family-hood' describes our socialism.

Similarly, for Nkruma the aim of African socialists is to reshape African society in such a manner that the quintessence of the humanist purpose of traditional African societies is re-enacted in modern society, Nkruma (1967:2) also encourages the socialist trend of development for Africa based on human value as follows:

Consequently, Socialism in Africa introduces a new social synthesis in which modern technology is reconciled with human values, in which the advanced technical society i.e. realised without staggering social malefactions and deep schisms of capitalist society.

There is consensus amongst a number of African philosophers such as Ajei (2001:19), Bujo, (1998), Gyeke (1997), Ramose, (2002), that the communitarian ethic underlies social organizational principles and practices in indigenous African settings.

This suggests some of the heads of post-colonial nations in Africa and academics has attempted to integrate African indigenous governance into modern nation states that emerged after decolonization. In Ethiopia however the traditional governance of non integrated ethnic groups remained marginalised, but served as parallel and alternative governance for marginalised and sceptic groups of people to seek refuge whenever they face injustice in the Ethiopian Empire.

Although, the founders of post -colonial nations attempted to integrate indigenous African governance value into their nations, it seems they were not successful in achieving their purpose.

Familyhood governance still remained without being mainstreamed.

#### **4.4 The Sidama Social capital and access to livelihood assets**

Social capital is one of five fundamental livelihood assets. This section uses social- capital as a phrase to better understand the social ties of Sidama society and the impact of its disruption on food (in) security and famine creation.

It is important to distinguish among different concepts of social ties. One useful conceptualization was forwarded by Gitell (1998) and expanded by Szreter and Woolcock (2004). These scholars identified three kinds of social capital: bonding, bridging, and linking. *Bonding* social capital refers to relationships among members of a group or network who see themselves as relatively equal, for example, neighbours or schoolmates. *Bridging* social capital refers to relationships among people and groups of people who are fundamentally different in age, socio-economic status, race/ethnicity, or education (Szreter& Woolcock, 2004). *Linking* social capital represents the extent to which individuals build relationships with the institutions and people who have relative power over them (e.g., to provide access to services or jobs) (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).

This section, illustrates how Sidaman indigenous social capital enhanced the ethic of co-operation and mutual assistance among the Sidama. A further role played by Sidaman religious thinking in livelihood failure prevention relates to the spiritual value that inspires the offering of support to those who are suffering problems. This creates not only a moral obligation, but also a kind of reciprocity not between those who are being helped, but between the helper and God on behalf of the helped.

When Sidaman religious observers assist those who are experiencing problems they do not Social capital is one of five fundamental livelihood assets. This section uses social- capital as a phrase to better understand the social ties of Sidama society and the impact of its disruption on food (in)

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This creates not only a moral obligation, but also a kind of reciprocity not between those who are being helped, but between the helper and God on behalf of the helped. When Sidaman religious observers assist those who are experiencing problems they do not expect anything, except for blessings and abundance of wealth from God.

#### **4.5 Social capital and food sharing among the Sidama**

This research suggests that food sharing practice is one of the elements of Sidaman social capital. It is also the mechanism through which people's entitlement to food is assured during various crises. This section tries to substantiate or challenge what the literature says, about the role of organic social

practice and institutions in preventing the encroachment of famine.

Famine is one of the abnormalities and crises faced by vulnerable groups in society. If intervention by an external body during such crises does not materialized, the degrees of suffering and of survival of these vulnerable groups depends on the ethic of co-operation operative in the society to which they belong and their coping strategies against the threat of famine (Becker 1986: 73; Fox 1975: 82; Sahlins 1965: 141,148; Scott 1976: 2,4,5,9,27). The following section discusses how communal consumption and those forms of reciprocity and sharing among the Sidama prevented drought being converted into famine in the Sidama for centuries.

The term 'sharing' is associated with the ethics of co-operation and assistance aimed at mitigating crises and abnormal occurrences that go beyond the capacities of the victims. In the words of Rahmato: (1991:30) 'The spirit of co-operation, of sharing assets, resources and services and reciprocal support shown in the rural communities during food shortages plays a vital role in peasant survival strategies.'

Sharing habits that are deeply rooted during normal times as a way of life can be extended and intensified during times of crisis. Such habits may originate in the very practice of the communal consumption of food. This was evident during the field research in 2000-2001, in four districts of Sidama.

It was observed that whenever a meal is served, the members of a household may be grouped together in a circle or row, according to their age and sex. Children of both sexes may be grouped together. The father, as the head of the family, and young boys eat together, while the mother and young girls also eat together.

In each group, every member takes from the same plate (*tittle*, *safe*, *hokkicho*) and drinks milk in turn from the same cup (*qooncho*, *finincho*). If someone outside the household arrives while a meal is being served, he or she will join the group in the position according with his or her age and sex.

The second example that helps to elaborate the way of sharing to explain how the communal entitlement for cooked food among the traditional Sidama is associated with the time food is served. Every morning there is a coffee ceremony, in which the mature members of neighbouring households join together for coffee (*buna*) and light food (*bunu, qurse*). In this ceremony each household calls on another, depending on the proximity of their houses, regardless of the wealth and status of the individuals. Everyone attending the ceremony takes light food from the same plate, known as *gabate* or *staffs*, which are passed round by a child from the host household. In the evening, every mature male is expected to pass time with a family headed by a reputable male elder, to chat and exchange information (*oddoo*) and ideas about issues of different kinds.

This occasion is called *waare*. This visit to an elder always concludes with a dinner, some of the informants who are facing food shortage at their home come to the *waare* (gathering) not only for information sharing, but also to have access to cooked food at the end of gathering.

This suggests the *waare* occasion provides an opportunity for those hungry to have access to food. Furthermore even those who are not hungry reported that they postpone their dinner at their home to the next meal. This postponement creates rudimentary concept of saving. The host was asked whether the cost of feeding is a burden to be shared. He responded:

I feel honoured never felt that they are burden, but they are my assets. Those people provided me a lots of their labour, time and accompany whenever I need them, such as during land preparation, weeding *weese* plant, maize harvest, they are eating not my food but what they have had contributed in the processes of food production in my farm. (79 years old informant in Aleta Wondo)

For traditional Sidama, using the same plate and cup means, assisting with access to food for those who might be facing a food shortage. For those who do not have enough food in their home, eating from the same plate and drinking from the same cup enables them, first of all, to get through hard times. Secondly, it is highly associated with the notion of the covenant that binds people

together in normal and abnormal times.

Sidaman women always keep prepared foods (*boqicho*) for unexpected hungry outsiders. The ethics of caring for those who are hungry is deeply inscribed in everyday discourse in the Sidama language itself. For outsiders, the very words of greeting they may give a host are linked to the question of food availability.

If it is morning, he or she will call those inside and say '*Ayiide! Magalo?*', meaning 'What is left over from the night?'. If it is evening, the outsider will say '*Ayiide mahonso?*', meaning 'What is the left over from the day?'. The host will respond to the greetings by saying '*Wo'mino*', meaning 'Abundant', 'Plenty', or 'Our house is full of food', and then the guest will be invited to enter and share what is available.

During periods of crisis and abnormal times, this spirit of sharing is extended in more consolidated and organized ways. The Sidama have various systems of intervention for various types of crisis and abnormality faced by individuals or groups of individuals.

#### **4.6 Livelihood Asset sharing practice**

***Eewo- (Livestock sharing Practice):-*** refers rearing others' livestock, taking care and sharing some benefits negotiated between owner and caretaker. Key informant interviews and observation reveals that this practice is mainly the job of poor households who took the livestock of the richer neighbours to share the benefits and/or jointly owning livestock shared the benefits. Sample households who cared for others' livestock are considered as participant in livestock sharing.

This implies that, the means of accessing livestock sharing in the study area, the concentration of livestock ownership in the hands of the better-off than the poor. In line with results, the survey data found, that many poor households in sidama take care of livestock which are either not their own (hence they are "care takers" or are jointly owned and (shared) with another family. Several joint



ownership and sharing breeding arrangements practiced between people of different wealth status with negotiated sharing of benefits. These are based on kinship ties and other social networks.

***Guto loosa share cropping Practice:-*** refers to those households who shared their land for those who can afford input (seed fertiliser and farm equipments) and labour to share yield based on negotiation or those who worked on others' farm to share their labour to share negotiated amount of harvest.

Sharecropping is found to be one of the strategies to cope with household's food deficit situation among the poorer households. Accordingly poorer households are forced to have all or a portion of their land share cropped. Although they may receive part of their harvest, they do not control the selection of crops, nor the amount of input used. As a result, benefits from share cropping are usually very small. Therefore the poor who own relatively more arable land will benefit from this strategy.

***Ollima indigenous Insurance co-operatives:-***Focus group discussion and key informants asserted that in Sidama almost everyone is a member of traditional local institutions such as *Ollima or seera*, in which the community help families (especially the poor) to cope with funerals, house construction and saving.

Membership of such institutions increases the social network of the household and enables it to obtain pooled labour and cash in credit, where individual households would be incapable. Further examination of the result shows that the proportion of participation increases along the wealth continuum from the poor to the better off. The observed reason for this difference is attributed to the existence of some potential entry barriers that hinder the poor from participating.

***Elto gift exchange and support:-***There are strong kinship ties which are important alignments in arrangements for share cropping, share breeding, labour exchange and security during crises. With in larger kin groups and between households, risk can be shared by the transfer of goods between

households in time of need. This strategy covers a vast range of situations and methods of transfer but there are three basic types. 1) Gift, whether food or some other items transformed freely and without obligation from one household to another. 2) Reciprocity where the transfer imposes an obligation on the recipient to return the goods or some other services at a later time, 3) where the giver is obliged to relinquish some item under specified circumstances.

This section has presented few examples of social institutions related to social capital based on the ethics of co-operation that operate in Sidaman society. Those forms of social capital are inherent in Sidaman culture. However, there are individuals and group of individuals whose economic capabilities are deteriorating, and who consequently are not in a position to practice those traditional values accepted by Sidama society. Those groups, however, are not excluded from Sidama society as a whole on account of their failure to meet the criteria of reciprocity.

One can expect social conflict when vulnerable groups fail to give back what they have taken, economically or materially, owing to the circumstances in which they find themselves. However, they give back, to those who have helped them during times of crisis, honours and prestige. It is this exchange of economic, material and social status that maintains the ties of reciprocity between those who render visible economic material assistance during times of crisis such as food insecurity and shortages, those who take invisible social status (prestige, honours from this and those who are vulnerable. Table 4.1 in the following page shows some of the Sidama names for the various types of crisis and the various forms of intervention and action.

**Table 4-1 Examples of social capital against crises among the Sidama**

<u>No</u>	<u>Sidama Name</u>	Type of crises and abnormalities faced by individuals	Actions that community takes to assist individuals in difficulties
1	<u>Kayisha</u>	Unexpected death of cow, ox, bull, heifer not by diseases but by other accidents	The meat of animal divided among neighbouring households, then money is raised for the owner to replace animal
2	<u>Foocho</u>	Crop failure	The household that faces crop failure is entitled to a small amount of crop from each of those who have had a good harvest when they collect their crops from the fields
3	<u>Aewo</u>	Massive cattle loss by diseases or raids	The household facing such a crisis will be given lactating animals by those who have many cattle on condition that offspring are returned to the donors
4	<u>Jirte</u>	Human death	The community has a responsibility to bury the dead body ( <u>madarasha</u> ), to feed surviving members of the household until they recover from stress, and to feed the guests who join the mourning ceremony
5	<u>Dhiwamoho la'a</u>	Sickness	Neighbours visit and give money, food and other basic needs
6	<u>Dartu mana adha</u>	Refugee	Sharing displaced people among society and giving them accommodation, food and other basic needs
7	<u>Seera</u>	Homelessness	Those people whose houses are ruined are helped to construct a new one by the community, which is divided into teams to construct walls and roof and cover the roof with grass
8	<u>Xaarel Sicho</u>	Crop theft	Rituals are performed to protect the crops of individuals. Putting specific leaves and grasses on the property of someone symbolizes that is should be left untouched

Source: Author's field study in 2000-2001 & 2008-2009

#### 4.7 Natural capital and the Sidama way of accessing

This section presents what natural capital entails among the Sidama, and the Sidama way of accessing natural capital with particular reference to the land tenure. Natural capital is also a gate way to other forms of livelihood assets. Access to this livelihood asset enables the Sidama to succeed in building livelihoods, to enhance food security and prevent famine in an agrarian society like that of Sidama, access to natural capital is crucial.

As most of the Sidama depends on agriculture and agro- pastoralist livelihood activities, land, water forest and agro ecology are the major natural capitals that affects the type of livelihood activities. According to the Sidama Zone Finance and Economic Development Department officials the total area of the Sidaman is 6976.8 Km<sup>2</sup> land mass. In addition to this there is land covered by Water, body 229 sq. km. Major lakes Hawassa, in the North, Abbya in South West, and chalalaba in the east of Lake Hawassa. Furthermore there are several rivers which originate or pass through Sidama land. . Furthermore the Sidama Land is endowed with other water bodies such as rivers that could have been used for hydro-electric power generation and irrigation. See the following table 4.2 for summary

Table 4-2 Land use in Sidama by size and percentage

Land cover by	Size, in Km <sup>2</sup>	% tage.
Crop cultivation	3400.1	48.70
Grazing and browsing	1214.8	17.47
Uncultivated but arable	1258.1	18.02
Unproductive	445.4	6.38
Forest land	159.9	2.29
Shrubs and bush land	351.9	5.04
Other	146.6	2.10
Total	6,976.8	100

Source: interview with Sidama Zone Finance and Economic Development Department officials 2008-2009.

***Climate and Agro-ecology in Sidama:-***Climate and Agro-ecology are two of the elements of natural capital. Sidama is endowed with different altitudes that affect agro-ecological variations. The altitude variation ranges between the highest peak of Garamba mountains at 3500 metres above

sea level to low lands 1190 m around Bilaate river in Lokka-Abbaya and Borchha woredas. Most parts of the zone have relatively lower altitude ranging from 1501-2000 metres above sea level containing 46.34 percent. While the high land contains a lower portion which is 0.6 and ranging from 3001-3500 metres above sea level. The remaining 20.57 percent and 20.43 percent is covered with altitudes ranging from 2001-2500 and 2501 –3000 metres above sea level respectively. This variation affects agro-ecology, which in turn influences the type of livelihood strategies, activities and outcomes as Table 4.3. Depicts.

**Table 4-3 Agro- ecologically, the Sidama**

Agro Ecological Zone		Area(Km <sup>2</sup> )	Percentage	areas covered with such features.
Sidamu affoo	English			
Moola halaala	Arid zone	600.6	8.63	Areas adjacent to river bilate, the western part Boriicha and Lokka Abya.
Halaala	Semi-arid zone	1008.7	14.49	Kebeles of Situated central part of Borich Lokka Abbaya Low lands of Chuko, Dara a horooressa. Districts.
Horrichocho	Wet Moist midland	256.7	3.687	The Eastern part of Borricha, Lokka Abaya a Low land of Hawaasa, west of Hwaasa Moy Highway
Qiidado allichio	Wet/Moist highland	1929.3	27.71	Most of the highland of Aletawondo, De Shabdino Gorche Wondogenet , Wonsho Bo Bansa chire
Haqa Allichio	Freezing highland	3167.1	45.49	Hagereselam, Bursa Harbagona and Malga

Source: Author's Observation and key informant interview with the Staff of Sidama Zone planning and Finance department. From 2009 in the Sidama land.

## 4.8 Indigenous Sidaman land tenure

Land is one of the elements that constitute natural capital, whilst tenure refers to the system of accessing this natural capital. Before it had been disrupted a century ago, the Sidama had been using land tenure for their agrarian and agro-pastoralist livelihood. While participant observation

shows that Sidaman land tenure still exists despite, pressure from successive Ethiopian government land use policies, in order to explore how it works, key informant interview, focus group discussions and observation during two field research periods. Key informants preferred the Sidaman indigenous land tenure as a way that facilitates fair access to the land.

The Sidama council of elders believes still that the land among the Sidama belongs to various clans who trace common ancestors. However, clan members use two types of landholding system: they employ a mixture of the private (*uttuwa* or *xiinxo*) and the communal (*dannawa*).

***Private Land ownership Utuwa or Xiinxo***:-in the private landholding system the key informant who describes the way, how and who accesses land and the type of crops as follows:

It is only men who have recognized land inheritance rights, derived from the household in which they are born. This does not mean that females do not have any inheritance rights at all. A woman's inheritance rights are associated with her husband and his family, not with the family into which she was born. Her right of inheritance is fully respected when her husband dies.

( Interview 62 years old Key informant on September 27, 2000)

The Sidaman women have respected right of inheritance of her husband's land when he dies. She also has the power to decide over the land of food crops, to take decisions concerning food, because it is their duty to control food during the processes of preparation and consumption; they have very limited power regarding the land of cash crops and cash itself. This powerlessness in relation to cash crops and cash enhances their vulnerability during food crises induced by drought, since such hard times require the purchasing of food from somewhere else.

In order to ascertain whether the private landholding system in the Sidama enhances vulnerability to famine or not, it is important to understand how private land passes from one generation to another, from ancestors to descendants. The bases of private landholding in the Sidama are inheritances and the allocation of land to those who do have not enough land to cultivate from communal land. A key informant elaborated the types of inheritance in the following :

The first kind of inheritance is known as *iqqa*. It is a sharing of small plots of land and cattle owned by a household when the son marries, as a result of which the son establishes his own *xiinxo*. At this time the son acquires not only the pieces of land, but also cattle. The size of the land and the number of cattle depend on the size of the land and the cattle originally owned by the household as a whole, as well as on the number of male heirs, in particular, who will share the same land in future. After making sure that enough land is left for themselves and for future heirs, the father and mother will decide on the size of the land and the number of cattle that will be shared with their married son. The land given to the married son will be large enough for the construction on it of a hut, as well as for the planting various crops such as *weese*, which is the most important drought-resistant crop and the staple food of the Sidama. The second form of inheritance within family land holdings occurs after the deaths of both the father and mother of the household. At this time, the brothers invite neighbouring elders (who are related to them) to ensure a fair division of land and other property between them. These elders then divide the land and the other property between all the brothers. Another way of access to private ownership of land among the Sidama comes about through the allocation of a portion of communal land to those who do not have enough. According to this arrangement, Sidama living far away their own clan will have a right of access to private landholdings and to the communal use of land that belongs to the clan among whom they live. This is facilitated by the system of adoption.

(Interview 62 years old Key informant on September 27, 2000, it is also verified by focus group discussion held on October 7 2000).

Although individuals among the traditional Sidama have access to private landholdings, the sale or transfer of land to an outsider without the agreement and recognition of family and clan members is a shameful act (although this does not mean the selling of land is forbidden entirely). This is due to a fear of two important consequences that might follow for individuals and for the community.

The first consequence is the destitution that might follow from the removal of those who are selling land from their basic and most important sources of income, which might push them into poverty; the concern is, in the words of Buchanan, to prevent ‘rural unemployment’ (Buchanan 1982: 56). The belief also exists that selling one’s land to outsiders threatens organic social practices and social structures, as well as communal solidarity, particularly if those outsiders do not know the social norms of the community. The transferring of land to relatives is not forbidden. This is the means by which the Sidama pass on their private land to their descendants.

The principal factors that determine private-land-use strategies among the Sidama are holding size and capacity. The capacity of the land to provide more yields is the basic factor in allocating different types of crop on available parcels of land, and is directly related to the fertility status of the farmland. The crops grown around a homestead differ in type from those grown on a main field.

Although this type of access to land can provide people with the entitlement to own land, there is a potential danger of it increasing land fragmentation, particularly since, when population growth exceeds the carrying capacity of the land; it becomes very difficult to conduct mechanized farming using modern technologies to boost production.

It has been well- recognized in the literature on the rural areas that the continual subdivision of land can have a detrimental effect on food production: over time, plots become so small that they are basically unsustainable, or so small that innovative farming practices which require larger holdings, cannot be introduced. This may lead to conflicts occurring when people transgress the boundaries of each other's land, damaging social cohesion and social safety networks.

Such a weakening may pave the way not only for individual vulnerability, but also for social vulnerability to food crises (Amsale 2010; Taye 2002; Pavenello and Leine 2011).

***Communal Land (uttuwa):-*** Such land is used by all the members of the community for grazing, forestry and cemeteries (*maasoola*). Allocation of a portion of communal land to those who do not have enough is also common. In order to expand their communal land, the traditional Sidama have had to fight with the neighbouring Guji and Arisi Oromos, who have a large amount of land but who have traditionally preferred a nomadic way of life to sedentary agriculture.

The Sidama, by contrast, have preferred a sedentary agricultural existence, as well as the establishment of villages known as *qa'e*. Every able-bodied person, then, is entitled to have access to land, and such access is basic as regards food and other more livelihood security-related benefits and



disadvantages. This entitlement has, of itself, the potential to prevent famine, and also the potential to create environmental disorder by deforestation.

Although the Sidama possess mechanisms for avoiding environmental crises that stem from their religious thinking – in practical terms by imposing social sanctions on those misusing the resources of communal land – these can create conflict between those desperate land-users who attempt to solve their own problems now and those who preserve the land at any cost for future generations. For example, those facing immediate cash shortages may go to communal land forests in order to cut down trees and sell them to urban dwellers as fuel or construction materials without the consent of the community.

This not only has a devastating effect on the environment, but also affects social cohesion, since the community elders do not tolerate such misuse of resources on communal land. They impose sanctions on those who are found guilty of violating the communal convention of using communal land, sanctions which might result in a person's exclusion from those social activities and reciprocities which represent the basic means of avoiding the risk of starvation during food crises. See the following table 4.4. in the following page that summarises the examples of natural capital and how indigenous sidaman institutions facilitates access to it and how it is used for their livelihoods.

**Table 4-4 Land tenure and land use among the Sidama**

Sidama Name	Type of tenure	The way of accessing	Used for.
<b>Land</b> <b>Xiinxo (tiintto)</b>	Private	The first kind of inheritance is known as <i>iqqa</i> . Sharing the portion of parents or guardians land in consultation with elders, when the son marries.	Enough to, construct house, to plant weese, (banana like plant) coffee tree, back yard garden to horticulture such as vegetables (cabage, onion, pepper.
<b>Gatee</b>			

<b>Uttuwa land</b>	<b>Family</b>	Private	The second kind of inheritance after the death of both parents and guardians, Shared among legitimate heirs. under supervision of clan elders when the need arise from the communal land.	
<b>Hoxxe (hottee)</b>			All residents have access to this land Supervised by clan elders	Far away field for maize, teeff, Haricot bean, (chaat) coffee, fruit trees , such as orange, lemon,
<b>Dannawa</b>		Communal	.	Burial land used for resting the dead bodies and burial of the deceased
<b>Forest and grazing land</b>		Communal	Forest land accessed by all residents supervised for by clan elders.	for fuel wood, construction wood, and grazing for goats
<b>Masoola</b>				
<b>Dubbo</b>		Communal	Accessed by all residents supervised by clan heads	Grazing for agro-pastoralists, pastoralists
<b>Lalu galte</b>			Accessed by all	
<b>Wayi bale Water Buiccho</b>		private	Bore hole Accessed by family members dug near the house	Water for drinking and washing
<b>Wayilaga</b>		Private and communal	Accessed by those who Cleans and protects supervised by household heads	Water for drinking and washing.
<b>Kooficho</b>		communal	Accessed by all	Water for domestic and wiled animals
<b>Garba</b>		Communal	Ponds and water points in dry low lands	Used by pastoralist for drinking both for their animals and human.
		Communal	Lakes like Hawassa and Abbaya	For fishing, recreational and sports like sweaming.

Source: authors' observation and key informant interview from 2009 in the Sidama land

## 4.9 Human capital among the Sidama

Human Capital entails skills, knowledge, physical and mental fitness required to do a job as a livelihood activity; devise livelihood strategies and to manage livelihood outcomes. The field research shows that the majority of the Sidamas are engaged mainly in mixed farming activities for their livelihood.

This however does not mean there are no other activities. This section shows how mainstream livelihood activities combined with indigenous livelihood activities other than farming constitutes

human capital among the Sidama; what are the impediments that cause dilemmas and conflictive mentality hindering the effective integration of indigenous human capital with new education among the smallholder farmers and its impact on livelihood activities, strategies and outcomes.

In order to overcome crises arising from food shortages, as well to increase their income during normal times, Sidaman farmers have diversified their income base by involving in non-farm activities such as cottage industries.

Cottage industry means any livelihood activity that entails the skills and knowledge to convert raw materials into usable form for the benefit of human society. These livelihood activities among the traditional Sidama include tanning, pot-making, and the forging of iron, weaving and jewel-making. Each of these livelihood activities not only provide those who have the skills and knowledge with opportunities to diversify sources of income during periods of food and livelihood insecurity, but also meet the needs of those who are unskilled by supplying items of farm tools and equipments.

The same farmers who are involved in sedentary agriculture – mixed farming involving both crop-growing and the rearing of cattle and other domestic animals- also run these cottage industries. Diversification of the income base helps to prevent livelihood failure: those who have diversified their income base cannot fall automatically into the vulnerability zone as can those who have specialized in one field of agriculture or mono-crops, whether food crops or cash crops.

The group discussion, participant observation and key informant interviews revealed that deterioration and discouragement of the local knowledge, and skills as part of the human capital among the Sidama are the consequences of the political marginalization of the value given to local knowledge and skills.

The political marginalization of local knowledge and skills may be transmitted from the value of the knowledge and skill holders to their trainees if there have been incentives offered. The power dynamics and mutual perceptions between the natives and settlers, reduces something useful in the

body and mind of each other to nothing.

The reappearance of domination by altering its faces and shifting the position of alliances has helped only the survival and perpetuation of the relative power of traditional leaders. But the skills knowledge and wisdom of those who are reduced to invisibility and vulnerability continually kept apart, although those skills knowledge may be useful for everybody involved in the processes of production and consumption.

The extracts from key informants, focus group discussion and observation of the field research on human capital and the types of livelihoods made from it is summarised on Table 4.5. In addition to the knowledge and skills mentioned in this table 4.4, Sidaman small holders have specialist knowledge of agronomy with drought resistant crops.

**Table 4-5 Human capital and the livelihoods of the research participants**

<b>The sidama name</b>	<b>Type of knowledge and skills</b>	<b>The way it transmitted</b>	<b>How it helps to sustain livelihoods</b>
<b>Baato loosire gala</b>	Farming skills such as when to plant, how deeply to sow seeds, how to prepare the soil, and how to tend and harvest it	Words of mouth, observation, frequent action, mastering it under the supervision of parents, guardians, peers, siblings.	The production of basic needs such as food crops and cash crops.
<b>Laluunni gala</b>	Pastoral skills such as timing, and seasonality, to find the best grazing land, water points, the types of herds, for meat, butter, milk and for cash. Conflict management	Words of mouth, observation, following the instruction of elders,	The production of basic needs for food and cash.
<b>oggimma.</b>	Nonfarm skills and knowledge. <u>Artisanship</u> such as black smith, pot making and tanning	Observation and practicing under the supervision of trainers but require to be the member of cast clans.	To diversify livelihood income, in addition to farming. Provision of farm equipment , and household utensils.

	Handicrafts such as carpenter, spinning, weaving, basket making, roof thatching, mat making, lumber, charcoal making, construction pole making, grass cutting	Observation and practicing under the supervision of trainers without being the member of cast group	To diversify livelihood income, provision of basic needs such as cloth, shelter
<b>Daddalo</b>	Trade:- To buy goods from where they are cheap and sell them where they are expensive, and making money from margin of profit	Observation practicing under the supervision of parents, friends, peer	The money earned from the margin of the profit helps to sustain their livelihood.

Source: Author's field research 2000, 2008-2009.

#### 4.10 The indigenous knowledge of growing Drought-resistant crops

Theoretically, current development efforts focus on building institutional capacity through the encouragement of local self-reliance. These efforts raise the expectation of local empowering the hitherto excluded and encouraging individual or communal entrepreneurial strategies and activities. Framed in this way, the purpose of sustainable livelihoods thought converge on the assumption that if progress is to be achieved it cannot be imposed from the outside and has to be built on small locally-based initiatives. It is this expectation that increases the importance of indigenous knowledge.

The term indigenous defined by Illich (1982:108) as a vernacular culture, with the notion of isolation: - 'Each village does its own dance to the tune of its own regional music' referring to the action of indigenous people. This isolation may lead to marginalization. Evolving interest in indigenous people and their knowledge is linked with unfulfilled promise of top-down interventionist approach and the focus on the vulnerability that indigenous groups exhibit in their relationships to neighbouring dominant cultures which threatens to overwhelm them. This vulnerability may be resulted from the homogenization processes of modernist approach. Their plight is linked to similar concerns about environmental destruction and conserving bio-diversity and adopting 'greener' development.

The focus of this section is to show how such an isolation may lead to limited knowledge on food crop plants. Crops with such localised knowledge and uses are primarily grown in subsistence farming systems among many indigenous peoples including the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia, yet those less scrutinized food crops substantially, contribute to food and nutrition security of small-scale farming households (Dansi et al 2012:1-19, Hall et al 2013,25-27).

These drought-resistant crops include weese (enset), boyiina and golchoma. They require very little rain once they have been planted, and will grow and mature with very little attention being paid to them. Among those root crops, weese, (*Sidamu-Afoo*) or enset, (*Amharic*) *Ensete ventricosum* is a monocarp perennial herb of the Musaceae family originated in Ethiopia (Vavilov 1951).

Geographically, distributed as a wild species in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. (Cheesman, 1947, Simonds, 1962). Most of the study samples confirmed that the specialist knowledge of *ensete* crop domestication, cultivation, production and processing is one of the relative economic strengths that have prevented famine in the Sidama for centuries. The people who live in the highly famine-prone areas of northern Ethiopia by contrast regard this drought resistant crop of the Sidama, as wild plant. 81 years old Key informant on 20/10/2000 explaining the vitality of *weese* or *enset* among the says:

Sidaman farmers give priority to perennial crops like weese (enset) and boyiina in planting around homesteads. This is the only kind of plot that will benefit from natural fertilization, since livestock are kept in the homesteads that provide manure which can be applied to the crops in the compound. Crops around homesteads are also better watered, as water from washing and similar activities is thrown out in the compound. Traditional Sidaman farmers use neither chemical nor natural fertilizers (manure) to enrich the soil of their main field. Instead they use straw from previous harvests, as well as following and intercropping. 81 years old Key informant on 20/10/2000 Dale.

Indigenous knowledge of the Sidama in taming and growing and food processing of weese or enset is rich and diverse. It is cultivated as perennial plantation in homestead ring in association with other companion crop species. The findings of field study are consistent with that of (Tsegaye and Struik 2002). Field observation shows that the study samples grow on their main field certain short-

cycle crops like barley, sorghum, wheat, haricot beans, *gaashe (tef)* and sweet potatoes. Intercropping is practiced more around homesteads than in main fields.

This suggests that the traditional Sidama maintained self-sufficiency in food via *weese*, which is hailed by (Brandit *et al*, 1997) as “a tree against hunger”. This plant is also known as ‘false banana’, since it looks like the banana plant.

**Weese /enset and Environment:-**the field observations in Sidama, indicates that the land that have been planted with *weese/enset* for many years compared to neighbouring farm land that have not been similarly treated, shows that the soils in which *weese/enset* have been altered positively by long-term application of manure. These modified soils are likely to be more fertile and have more suitable properties, such as water holding capacity. In addition to this, *weese's* perennial canopy of leaves and abundant accumulation of litter reduce soil erosion and organic matter decomposition to a minimum.

The worries of the sample study households is that significant increases in human population and decrease in animals and manure, the discouragement of the extension workers to grow *weese* in favour of fast maturing crops causing the reduction of *weese/enset* growing and consequently its yield, soil fertility, thereby reducing the long-term *weese/ enset* farming system. Even if the study samples were advised by extension workers or by DAs (Development Agents) to increase the utilisation of artificial fertilizers, the study households confirm that increased fertilisers with fast growing and maturing crops may not compensate for the manure loss because of the multiple roles that manure plays in improving soils biologically, chemically, and physically. Furthermore, they complain that they cannot afford rocketing prices of artificial fertilizer and improved high yielding variety seeds offered by the DAs.

**Weese/enset's ecological effect:** - field observation reveals that the *Weese/enset* tree has positive and protective role, *weese/ enset* provides protection for other food and non-food plants from strong

sun light and winds. For instance the coffee trees that intercropped with weese/enset gives more coffee yields, although, it takes long maturity time for coffee beans.

Weese/enset has also aesthetically value desirable for sedentary lives and livelihoods, for enset based societies such as the Sidama, the Guragie, the Gedeo, the Wolaita and the kambata societies of Southern Ethiopia. The Sidama poets sung a song for weese/enset trees of praising its role in sedentary life. ‘Hi weese, weese!!! Weesete anni offole teese!!!’ Rough meaning in English ‘O, weesse weese!!! Your owner is settled in peace of mind’ implies the freedom from worries of food insecurity and migration in search of food and livelihood for weese/enset growers. It is also the praise for weese/ enset because it provides beautification for rural landscape by its thick dark green foliage.

It is also observed that drought resistance role of weese/enset species. This is linked with deep roots and leaf canopies of long duration improve the hydrological dynamics of the watershed of weese/enset growing areas. As proportion of weese/enset trees increases and surface runoff decrease, resulting in more water in the soil and aquifers, this results in increased water availability and greater volume and duration of discharge to springs decreasing the effective length of the dry season.

***Weese /enset food use:-***field observation for this thesis shows the ordinary foods obtained from weese ranges from fast food to the food that requires long and laborious processes. In the former category we find hamm’chcho just directly cooked from the corm of premature two and half years old weese/enset group called qaxalo, read as qatalo (sidamu affoo) that usually practiced during hungry season. In this practice, the hungry household just uproots weese/enset tress cut the stems of weese/enset tree and clean the roots and cook the corm and cabbage together for household meals. In the latter category we observe, waasa, bull’a. Furfuraame, deleqqe, and qarxxa. While, ordinary Sidama consumes waasa frequently, bull’a is the food of the better offs. Furfurame and deleqqe are the food of poor households. Those who are in extreme food poverty feed their infants with qarxxa, the bi-product of waasa processing. Normally, sold to poor urban dwellers who could not afford to



buy *teff*, to mix it with other grain flour to make *enjera* (the food of urbanite). *Furfurame* and *delegge* are also the bi-product foods which are consumed by poor households whenever they could not afford to get *waasa* in hungry season.

***Weese /enset food processing:-*** the field observation also shows the variety of different foods produced from *weese* are commonly known as *waasa*. *Waaasa* and *bull'a* food from *weese/enset* requires long and laborious processes which is the burden of the Sidama women. While cultivation and growing is the duties of the Sidama men. In this laborious and long processes the mature usually three and above years old *weese/enset* trees are uprooted and its stem and the corm is separated by big knife. Then the outer layers of its trunk and corm are rendered edible by a laborious process of fermentation known as *hoqa*.

There are different kinds *waasa*. The least fermented is known as *haaro waasa*, and the most fermented as *hogado* or *udee*. *Bull'a*, the most important by-product of the process of mixing and fermentation, is mostly consumed by the rich. *Qarxa* is the by-product of preparing fermented *waasa*; it is the least consumed, and is mostly given to cattle although it is consumed by people during food crises. *Delege* is the product of mature *weese*, which is consumed mostly by poor people. All these varieties of food are produced from *weese*.

They are rich in carbohydrate. To make a balance diet, the Sidama mix it with cabbage, beans, pumpkin, milk, meat, butter, etc. Next to *weese*, barely and sorghum are the most important sources of food for the traditional Sidama.

***Weese /enset's use beyond food:-***The *weese/enset* plant is highly useful in that not only is it drought-resistant, but also different parts of it can be used for a number of different purposes. The findings field research on *weese/enset's* use beyond food is consistent with that of (Brandt et al 1997:11) 'Every part of the *enset* plant is used. Farmers say that '[*Enset*] is our food, our cloth, our beds, our houses our cattle feed, and our plates.'

Its dried leaves (*hashuwa*) are used for making mattresses, its dried trunk (*xushsho*) for making string for tying together different wooden frames in the construction of houses and fences; the by-products of the trunk are known as *haanxincho*, and are used to make sacks, ropes and comfortable mats. The different parts of this plant are used for different daily routines.

Despite all actual and potential roles played by *weese/enset*; the taming, cultivating and management indigenous knowledge that kept orally and observation, passed from generation to generation with accuracy.

Unfortunately, successive governments of Ethiopia paid very little attention not only for the study of this crop but also to the knowledge holders. Explaining the reasons why successive Ethiopian governments' neglect (Brandit et al 1997:2) writes: - '1) the majority of *enset* farmers live in one of the least developed regions of Ethiopia, making access and logistics difficult; 2) the system is unique when compared to cereal farming; 3) Production processes are complex and 4) there is the that it is eminently successful, sustainable and trouble free.'

However (Brandit *et al* 1997) seem shying away from focussing on the fundamental policy tragedies that posed a threat to the existence of *enset* crop, and pushing the knowledge holders to vulnerability to food insecurity and famine. For instance, the cash-crop orientated agricultural policies of Emperor Haile Sellassie since 1941 (Clapham 1985:259 ), that displaced food crop like *enset*; The conversion of northern settlers who became absentee land lords in the south since the time of conquest, into commercial elite since 1960s what Lefort (1986: 20) calls 'mechanised feudalism' that evicted peasants from their land, earlier used for *enset* and food crop cultivation; Forced resettlement of policy of the communist regime that was in power ( 1974-1991) disrupted *enset* growing system, by establishing new villages that separate *ensets* from its growers by force whereby the *enset* growing knowledge became useless, (Scott 1998: 248).

The government that holds power since 1991, in its bid for Accelerated Agriculture Development

Led Industrialization with its Food Security Strategy (FSS) issued in November 1996, showed the government's plan to address causality and effect of food insecurity in Ethiopia

The regional food security programmes and projects were subsequently designed on the bases of that strategy, The ADLI formulated in 1994. Views Agriculture as the driving force of the economy and argues for investment in Agriculture as both an engine for economic growth and a means of ensuring household and national food Security.

ADLI aims to promote the adoption of improved technological inputs and practices, in order to raise agricultural productivity and generate savings for investment in other sectors. The major components of ADLI include: Input provision to peasants, promotion of small scale irrigation, improved livestock herds, environmental protection and natural resource management, grain marketing efficiency, promotion of farmers' organisations and women's participation in agriculture, expanding rural roads (Holt and Rahamato 1999:2) .

However, critics, like (Nega 2004, Nega *et al* 2005) says that the ADLI strategy will not overcome Ethiopia's food insecurity problems primarily, due to the rising population; secondly, lack of alternative of off farm employment strategies that could absorb growing rural unemployment; thirdly, declining farm hold size, poor growth of demand due to declining income for the marginalised rural poor even in normal time and bumper harvest. Fourthly, the negligence of development in other non-farm sectors, growing rural unemployment.

The strategy generally envisages an agriculture –based economy by raising farm productivity and income. However the ADLI relies heavily on the distribution of farm inputs, such as chemical fertilizer and improved seeds which are not affordable and less accessible to small holders in rural Sidama. The intervention strategy in this system involves a package approach geared towards three different agro-ecologies: namely: reliable moisture, moisture stress, and nomadic pastoral areas (FDRE 2006).

ADLI forms the basis of government's Foods Security Strategy as the engine for poverty reduction in the country. However, the finding of this research, detailed in chapter 6 and 7 of this thesis shows that, how like most policy and strategy documents the ADLI is strong on rhetoric but low in implementation and has not been implemented as it is stipulated or mis-implemented its policy's mission, by paying more attention to advising peasants through its extension workers and Development Agents to grow cash and fast maturing food crops by marginalising drought resistant food crops like *enset*. This marginalization has actually sowed the seeds of food insecurity that culminated to the 1999/2000 famine in Sidama.

Indigenous knowledge of livelihood diversification of the Sidama thus disrupted by successive Ethiopian government's policies. The Sidama livelihoods seem already diversified, prior to government policy intervention. Whereas in Africa in general, and southern and eastern Ethiopia in particular, pastoral livelihoods (e.g. the rearing of cattle, sheep, goats, camels, etc.) represents a specialized economic activity engaged in by people who have dedicated their lives to it, with the Sidama such livelihood activities are performed by the same people who have land to till somewhere in central Sidama. One of the key informants from drought affected district of Lokka Abaya, states how they manage two livelihood activities at the same time:

We Sidama combine two categorically different livelihood activities. They are cultivating cash and food crops in midland of Sidama, on the land we inherited from our ancestors in Shabdino, Dale and Aleta wondo and Hula. The plots of land are becoming so small to accommodate our cattle, sheep goats. Therefore we must move to open land in search of grass and shrubs for our livestock. By dividing our family labour into two or we must create two households that means marrying extra wives to carry out both livelihood activities smoothly. (Key informant interview October 17 2008 in Lokka Abbaya)

Participant observation shows that intense pastoral activities are located in the north-western, western, eastern and south-eastern peripheries, owing to rapid population growth having brought about a lack of grazing land in central Sidama. It is those pastoral communities who are involved in one single activity such as only rearing livestock who have been affected most by recurrent drought

as they do not have alternative livelihood to lean on, if their livestock are affected by prolonged dry seasons and drought.

One key informant stated that: “The reason why we are facing food production deficit and hunger is not lack of technology alone, but due to inability and discouragement to apply and build on existing knowledge and skills on one hand, less access to new opportunities that come through education and literacy. ” His dilemma helps explain one of the fundamental characteristics of knowledge systems with enormous communication gap between the governing elite and villagers. While the villagers’ knowledge is based on the lore and logic of nature, there exists an alternative knowledge base for modifying the environment for human’s benefit at high and rising level of productivity.

Essentially, the static world view on life inherent in this knowledge base of small-holder agriculture is encouraged by both ruling elites and small holder villagers among the rural Sidama. To the villagers, innovation is risky. People living at the level of or just above worrying for next meal are reluctant to experiment with new methods when failure could mean hunger or even starvation and famine, which shall be explained in coming chapter. On the other hand the ruling elites discourage innovation because it can alter the power relationships within the village and hence the whole basis of traditional stability. Furthermore, a smallholder farmer, who exercises his own initiative and who may for example, grow a better crop, or do livelihood activities such as pot making , Iron forging, leather work better than his neighbour may find himself the target of envy and traditional sanctions such as fabricated stories, not to be fitting to be married and other sorts of marginalisation. Key informants also suggest that while, education and literacy is a basic element of a whole knowledge system among the villagers, they had to fight hard to attain it. The most important element of literacy and education seem not to be the availability of the educational programme itself, but having equal access to opportunity and the incentive to become literate.

The comment of the key informant suggests that first, people are able to believe and know they can improve their lives through their efforts, by enhancing their skills of reading different symbols of literacy and numeracy. Then they will learn how to read, write and count. In the same, focus group discussion most of the participant agreed that the main reason for wanting to become literate is “so that the government officials will no longer be able to cheat us.” Particularly, they felt they should be able to read the land tax records as one way of protecting themselves from the petty extortion of land and tax officials who may levy unofficial taxes, if people cannot read official records, as focus group discussion has revealed.

Another suggestion is that they have indigenous skills and knowledge that might be used for their livelihood, which have been regarded as backward and put aside as if they are not worthy of mainstreaming and integration.

One of the strategies for developing livelihood and food security for rural dwellers through agricultural sector is to harness the potentials of indigenous knowledge, which has gained recognition through many initiatives including the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmental Development. Particularly the elements combating poverty, livelihood and food insecurity, hunger have been acknowledged. This can be promoted through the documentation and dissemination of indigenous knowledge. The documentation and dissemination of indigenous knowledge therefore constitute a critical challenge facing in Sidama of Southern Ethiopia, as it is fast disappearing.

The findings of field work in the Sidama suggests that the indigenous knowledge is the body of knowledge that is not systematically documented; yet it involved with critical issues of human and animal lives; primary production distribution, consumption, natural capital management; dynamic and based on innovation, adaptation and experimentation; and oral and rural in nature.

## Summary

This chapter has shown that the Sidama has its own distinct political, social and economic structures and institutions. The institutional structures mediate access to livelihood assets. The way of governance that enhanced the access of individuals and communities to those livelihood assets; and prevented livelihoods failure also has created norms and values to adhere through observing rights and obligations, which in turn created sense of belonging, the core of identity.

This chapter also indicated how to trace the pre conquest Sidaman way of life starting from the surviving political, social, and economic institutions. The Sidamas' pre conquest way of life can be traced back from the surviving pre-conquest Sidaman socio-economic and political institutions remained as parallel institutions to the new political institutions; with its distinct features; without being mainstreamed by successive Ethiopian governments' political, social and economic policies and sustained as major informal code of conduct for majority of the Sidama today.

This chapter, laid foundation for our understanding ,how strong psychological, social bond of the Sidama nationals linked to their ancestral values may suggest the type of ideological war fought to preserve their uniqueness; has frozen their ethnic identity without being transformed into Abyssinian project of assimilation; and the value worth of fighting to retain it and perpetuate it for generations to come by any cost. Doing so may help deepening our understanding how old ways of life have been disrupted, but full assimilation into the new culture has not been achieved that laid foundation for conflictive political identity

More importantly this chapter laid foundation for undertaking for institutional organizations and governance, indigenous knowledge skills wisdom of food production, distribution and consumption which have had prevented seasonal food shortage land insecurity conversion into famine. This will lay foundation for understanding how disruption of the indigenous institutions, governance, and knowledge without replacing it with better one will create livelihood and food insecurity that shall

be discussed in the following chapters.



## CHAPTER FIVE: CONFLICTIVE IDENTITIES AND LIVELIHOODS

### 5 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to portray the political space from ‘above’ in Ethiopian context. By analysing historical and political trends, it shows the root causes that paved the way for conflictive political identities. It also presents the root causes, the processes and cumulative effects of non-violent and violent engagement on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama. Then it argues that those impacts of recurrent suffocating political spaces and violent engagements between institutions, discourses, and actions from ‘above’ and ‘below’ created direct and indirect cumulative effects that contributed to the 1999/2003 famine.

The first section presents, how the Abyssinian conquest, consolidation and administrative control of the Sidama and the rest of ethnicities in the south, created two conflictive political identities: Pan-Ethiopianist and Ethno-nationalist political identities. The former constituted conquerors who controlled the political space in Ethiopia for a century and made themselves as the political identity from the ‘above’. The latter, encompassed the conquered who lost their political autonomy; and reduced to the status of serfs; and those who used their ethnic identities as a means of political mobilization to reclaim their lost self governance, and can be seen as the political identities from ‘below’.

The political space followed the occupation of the Sidama land was not wider enough to accommodate the interests and the engagement of the identities from ‘below’. On the contrary, it was characterised by land tenure change; that produced generational poverty, inheritance of land tenure insecurity, reduced production incentives and long term investment.

It shows how this exploitative relationship and devoid of fair share in accessing livelihood assets among the ‘citizens’ created conflictive identities. It presents evidences that suggest how, whenever

the political space is widened, this corresponds with better engagements of the identities from ‘below’. The engagements of the identities from ‘below’ in turn pave the way for negotiation of accommodating their interests and their livelihood strategies in the processes of policymaking. The examples of such negotiation manifested in the early years of 1974 revolution in the Sidama.

It portrays how the discourse from ‘above’ (Amharization and forced Christianization) created not only cultural disorientation, for the Sidama, but also, changed the focus on the type of crops produced by the Sidama. (For instance the cash crop *teff* displaced *weese*). *Weese*, the staple food crop of the Sidama is environmentally friend, accommodative of other plants in its growth and drought resistant, while *teff* requires much soil preparation and the elimination of other plants for its growth which is disadvantageous for biodiversity. Historically, the Sidama were forced to grow *teff* to meet the food taste of the landlords. The landlords from the north prefer *Injera* made from *teff* to *waasa* made from *weese*.

After 1974 revolution, however, the need for cash forced the Sidama to grow *teff* as its demand in the urban area is very high. This displacement of drought resistant food crop such as *weese* by cash crop had contributed to present food insecurity and finally, actions from ‘above’ entails the strategies followed by successive governments to form and keep Unitary state of Ethiopia,

Section two deals, with non-violent and violent political engagements between the two conflictive political identities in three successive Ethiopian governments. It explores , the impact of political engagements from non-violent religious struggle to secular organised ethnocentric armed struggle on the lives and livelihood of the Sidama, by showing how food insecurity and famine were a consequences of further identity conflict between the Sidama who expected a restoration of their transformed identities with in autonomous regional state and self-government on one hand, the establishment of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) by current regime in Ethiopia.

Failure to achieve this expectation led to conflictive identity on the Sidama side; and to the response failure from the Ethiopian government side, can be seen as the last stage of institutional disruption and deterioration in successive three governments that undermined the coping strategies from below culminated in 1999-2003 famine.

## **5.1 The genesis of conflictive political identity**

It is imperative to offer a conceptualisation of political identity from 'above' in the Ethiopian context and defining conflictive political identities before embarking on a detailed analysis. It creates an important point of reference for our understanding of the creation of the Ethiopian state with single ethno-religious domination over multi-ethnic and diverse religious political communities since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and its impacts on inclusion and exclusion in the processes of accessing livelihood assets and consequently the back-ground of food and livelihood security and insecurity.

The state of Ethiopia was formed from the extension of the twin ethno-nations of the Amhara-Tigrayan in former Abyssinia state including the linguistic, cultural and religious commonality of over more than eighty ethnic groups in eastern, western and southern parts of present Ethiopia. Its roots can be traced back to its history of empire building that had begun in the 1880s. It was not only the Sidama, but also more than 80 ethnic groups who had been in this situation of conflicting political identity.

The Ethiopian state was created by the Abyssinians and its ideological underpinning has been Abyssinian national identity based as it was on the Christian Orthodox Church; the monarchy and the solidarity of Abyssinians. Abyssinians are those Amhara and Tigrians who regard themselves as "true Ethiopians" Levine (1974:8). They speak closely related Semitic languages.

They also share the same political cultural and religious institutions. Of the two groups, the Amhara of Shewa created the modern Ethiopian Empire starting from 1880s. The Amhara ruling elite not only

created an empire but also transformed Abyssinian political identity into Ethiopian identity, however, according to Greek historian the term Ethiopia encompass Africa sub-Sahara. Claiming Ethiopian identity, while it is in fact the domination of single ethnic group Amhara (Amharization<sup>9</sup>.) seems controversial.

Chernetsov (1993:102) shows that the Amhara ethnic identity transformation to pan-Ethiopian identity started from the military class seeking access to land through their military service to the imperial throne. This means, that Ethiopian political identity is the product of Abyssinian cultural heritage and not based on the loyalty and devotion of all peoples to the Ethiopian State and a feeling of solidarity with fellow citizens.

Thus, conflictive political Identity:-is a state of mind that may arise when a person who belongs to a subjugated ethnic group is at the cross-roads of choice, either to resist and pay sacrifice to retain self-identity or to accept imposed identity to live albeit accessing opportunities and livelihood assets controlled and administered by Pan-Ethiopian conquerors. Framed in this way, the political space of Ethiopia is full of conflicting political identities starting with the conquest of southern, western and eastern parts of the present Ethiopian territories in late 19<sup>th</sup> century. This effectively laid the foundation for political space in the words of Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002:8) ‘institutional channels... political discourses..., and the social and political practices...’ for a Pan-Ethiopian nationalist political identity from ‘above’.

Ethiopian political identity from ‘above’ has been the identity of the ruling elites. From the 1890s up to 1991 it was the Amhara elites who dominated the political, military, cultural, religious and social life that is highly characterized by controlling the vital livelihood asset of land and the resources it contains to legitimize their power by reciprocating the provision of these livelihood assets to its

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<sup>9</sup> The processes of Assimilation into culture and language of Amhara ethnic group from Shewa area who were the masterminds of the conquest of present Southern, western and Eastern Ethiopia that has began in 1880s.

subjects for trust and interest. The contention here is that Ethiopia from the 1890s to 1991 was an empire. After 1991, it is a combination of weak regional states that have nominal autonomy based on the mixture of ethnic federalism and administrative suitability under Tigrean elite domination. This polarisation of the identities in Ethiopia however does not fit the definition of the political space suggested by Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002:10) as, ‘the possibility of moving from a situation of political exclusion to one of political inclusion.’ Because Ethiopian political landscape is featured by single Ethno-religious domination from ‘above’ that suffocates significant engagement for identities from ‘below’.

## **5.2 The conquest of Sidama and institutional channels from ‘above’**

It is useful to introduce an examination of the political space between the conquerors and the conquered. The architect of the expansion and conquest was Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913). He designed the conquests from the Shewan province over which he enjoyed autonomous rule under the reigning Tigrayan Monarch, Yohannes IV (1872-1889). For Gebru (1991:20), the political space that followed the conquest in the south was ‘dispossessive, extortionist and very repressive’ where; non-integrated and non-loyalist groups were subjected to brute force at the hands of settlers and landlords with no legal or traditional alternative protection.

Large-scale looting of property, both in the Sidama and in the neighboring territories conquered by the Abyssinians, exacerbated the uprooting and other negative consequences of the conquest. Even within its own territory, the Abyssinian state was always predatory; its kings, nobles and soldiers thrived on looting rather than on legal taxation of their peasants. Similarly, (Alem 2004: 100), notes that the multi-ethnic Ethiopian empire that emerged after the conquest was characterized by ethnic inequality, livelihood asset monopolization by the ruling Amharas and Amharized ruling class and exploitation of the indigenous southern, western, and eastern ethnic groups. For Keller Ethiopia is an empire state: the “state constructed as a result of a unique case of African Imperialism” (Keller

1991:45) the same empire is described by (Gellner 1994:85) as the “prison-house of nations”.

The livelihood assets he exploited from the conquered ethnic groups enabled Emperor Menelik II to build up his socio-economic hegemony over the leaders of the rest of the ethnic groups; and enhanced his purchasing power of modern firearms from Europeans and stand as a major player of the political games of the time. This ability helped him to emerge powerful after the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, in 1889, to further extend the conquests to create a vast empire state (Adhana 1994:24). The possession of firearms boosted Menelik’s position against the resistance posed by the leaders of other ethnic groups, disrupting their lives and livelihoods.

Menelik II’s first attempt to conquer the Sidama; faced stiff resistance, led by Baalicha Woraawo, and failed. Because, the latter, defeated Bashah Aboye Menelik’s general. Ras Lulseged, who emerged victorious, led the second attempt of the conquest by Menelik II. In this connection, Pauswang (1991: 159) wrote:

It is not true that Ethiopia is the only African country that escaped European colonialism. The truth is Emperor Menelik claimed a place among the colonial power for his Ethiopia which became the only African colonial power the Europeans hesitatingly recognized [and] the weapons Menelik used to conquer the areas in the south and later defend against the Italian invasion – came from Europe ... It subjugated pastoral or peasant communities to a centralized political structure which follows the principles of European colonialism

The strategic submission of the conquered ethnic groups to the new political institution that is different from their institutional norms and values laid foundation for value related conflictive political identity: The value related to ethno-nationalism and pan-Ethiopiansim. While the former represent transparent sidama ethno- nationalism. The latter symbolises Abyssinian (Amhara and Tigrean) nationalism disguised by composite Ethiopian nationalism.

***Imperial governance and institutional channels:-***following (North, 1991), Tridico (2004,:6) defined formalised institutions, as ‘The Law sphere,...constitutions and regulations[and their reinforcement that ] is guaranteed by the legal system.’ This definition suggests that formal

institutions are linked to political, social and economic structures such as governance; property rights judiciaries and reinforcement institutions such as the police dependent on the context.

The institutional channel highlighted in the framework of this thesis is one of three components of the political spaces. This section presents the institutional channel from 'above' which is formalised after the conquest of the Sidama territory. To ensure loyalty and to reinforce effective occupation the conquerors initiated new institutional channels in occupied Sidama territory. Differential imperial incorporation policies and practices were followed, because colonial policy underlined the political supremacy over conquered people, livelihood assets control as well as conquered people were ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, different from the Amhara-Tigre ruling class, this led to a 'class structure with distinctive ethnic undertones.' (Keller 1988:45). This distinctiveness also observed by (Dereje, 2008, Markakis 2011, Young 1999). The degree of punishment depended on the level of resistance. The stiffer the resistance, the harsher the punishment and the loss of human dignity thus sowing the seeds of conflictive political identities.

Donham (2002:37), identifies three main ways for how peripheral areas inhabited by diverse ethnic groups and their livelihoods were connected to the centre of the Empire –State: (1) semi-independent enclaves, which were made tribute payer to the crown, in recognition to semi-autonomous status. (2) *Gabbar* areas where northern governors were appointed and local people made into near serfs; and (3) fringe peripheries, mainly the lowlands occupied by hunters and pastoralists.

This, suggests, that there was no concept of equality and genuine citizenship within the Ethiopian political space, but only that of the subjects on one hand characterised by political space of fear, suspicion and single ethnic domination among the identities from 'below', alternating image on the sides of identities from 'above', according to global political changes and fashions on the other.

This meant resistance from the conquered ethnic groups led to retaliation by disruption and burning of their country, merciless killings or enslavement and looting animals (Tronvoll, 2000:13, Marcus

1969). Most of historical literature suggests that the focuses of imperial government of Ethiopia from 1890s to 1974 was establishing unitary state, with institutionalised land tenure, that made the northern settlers landlords and violated the land ownership right of the indigenous population. The political discourse of the ruling elite in the imperial government was assimilation into the Amhara culture and forced Christianisation.

***Land tenure change institutionalization and its effects on Sidama's lives and livelihoods:-***Land tenure security and market prices of agricultural products are regulated by laws and policies of government. The legal institutions and policies affect peasants' and pastoralists' land use decisions and their profit margins. Specifically, the land tenure plays one of the vital roles in shaping farmers' lives, livelihoods and livelihood strategies (Gavian *et al* 1999, Feder and Noronha, 1987; Pandit and Thapa 2003; Rasul *et al* 2004).

Where shifting cultivation is practised, peasants need much more investment in land development. But, their efforts and decisions to invest and develop the land may be influenced by the level of certainty on how long they would be allowed to use or own that land. This ethnographic research in Sidama shows the tenant cultivators were reluctant to make long term investments if they were not sure of securing land use rights or ownership rights, because they were in constant fear of eviction by the landlords or the government.

This implies that if land rights were not secure tenant cultivators would not care much about the long-term investment initiatives beyond short terms survival strategies. This can have long term negative effects not only on food and livelihoods, but also on the cost of accelerated degradation of land and other natural capital (Angeles, 1988, Feder and Nisho, 1999, Crains 2003).

The fact that lack of land ownership rights restricts the peasants' from accessing other livelihood assets such as access to financial capital for instance, consequently, the lack of access to credit forces them to revert to traditional land use, even if their preference is to use improved physical capital and



improved technologies (Feder *et al*, 1988, Rasul, 2003). Therefore governments' institutional arrangements and policies on land-use and marketing facilities have a direct relationship to food production distribution and consumption which itself has direct link to food and livelihood security. This means secured land use or ownership rights give the users or the owners' sufficient incentives to increase their efficiencies in terms of productivity and ensure environmental sustainability.

Therefore, in the political space of Ethiopia, the land tenure as an institution from the 'above' paved the way for food insecurity as the generational inheritance of tenure insecurity for the majority of the rural poor; polarization of conflicts between ethno-nationalists and Pan-Ethiopianists produced ongoing tension, destabilised peace and security of the neutral citizens reduced incentives for long term investment in the livelihoods of their choice. Inequality among citizens, thus sustaining the livelihoods of few and the insecurity of majority, detailed as follows.

***Generational inheritance of land tenure insecurity:-*** The occupation of the Sidama land and the disruption of the indigenous way of access to land have both had a profound impact on the Sidama's livelihood. It damaged the Sidama livelihood during the initial stage of the conquest, through looting and taking home those goods which were transportable; it has confiscated land and redistributed it among northern settlers; it has denied Sidama entitlements to land ownership; it has exploited Sidama labour via absentee Ahmara landlords (Interviewee 85 years old on 10/10.2000 in Aleta wondo).

While this shows clearly the immediate impact of the conquest on the conquered people, the long-term suffering started when Abyssinians confiscated land from the rightful owners and distributed it among the armed settlers, thus denying the conquered people their entitlement to land, which was their only livelihood base. Most of conquered people in the current southern Ethiopian area were denied the right to own or access one of most important natural capital bases for their livelihood.

The institutionalisation of the land tenure change project was linked to rewarding loyal soldiers of the imperial army with land property rights in Sidama. For Abyssinian conquerors, gaining new fertile

territory made it possible to remunerate loyal servants and troops with grants of land, to provide much needed agrarian surplus, and significantly to increase the taxable revenue of the imperial state. This suggests that the political space characterised by new relationships of domination and submission that characterized the south, west and east were distinctively different from those applied in Abyssinia, where rist (the inheriting of land on a hereditary basis) was the prevailing condition in the landholding system.

Those settlers were allowed to sell and exchange land titles, but in contrast to the European concept of the freehold system had no absolute rights as the state could at anytime confiscate and reallocate land, when the settlers fell into disgrace with Emperor. This institutionalization of land rights became known as the gult (Crummeey 2000, Kebede 2003).

The institutionalization of the land tenure change project giving the northern settlers land rights, paved the way for lordship over Sidama peasants. Crummey (2000:223) notes that the affiliations of peasants to northern lords were hereditary. The northern land-lords administered their rights over ‘their’ land not by themselves but through an intermediary sub-district (*Atbya woreda*) officer known as chiqashum who might be the integrated or loyal Sidama. Then the chiqashum allocated plots’ of land to the Sidama peasant who received usage rights to meet their cultivation, livestock rearing needs and other water point accessing facilities. Usage rights were given only on time bounded bases and could be revoked by chiqashum by the order of the landlords (78 years old interviewee 27/10/2000 in Hawassa).

***Decreased production incentives and long term investment:*** - From the time of conquest until the mid-1930s, the predatory habit of the Abyssinian state and soldiers became the most destructive instruments against the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama and other nations in the south, west and east. Secondly, while, this minority ruling class disrupted existing institutional capacities in the Sidama and other people in the south, this laid the foundation for decreased production incentives and

reduced long term investment. Unlike other forms of colonialism, which extract economic resources from colonized regions and peoples to enrich their own people in their original homeland, for long term investments, the Amhara rulers among the Sidama did not attempt to minimize the vulnerability of the majority of their kinsmen in the north to famine, let alone enrich them.

***Exploitative relationship and inequality among the citizens:-*** Thus in Sidama, from 1941 to 1960 the land without tribute paying tenants *gabbar* (Amharic) was considered by the Abyssinian occupiers to be waste land, *tef meret* (Amharic) irrespective of whether it was arable or not, and such land was considered to be lacking in value. As a result, when the imperial government made land grants, what was dispensed was not just any portions of land, but fertile land *lem meret* (Amharic) that is, land with *gabbar* or peasant cultivators (Interviewee 85 years old on 10/10.2000 in Aleta Wondo). This suggests that in rural areas, the granting of land was measured not in units such as square meters or hectares, but according to the number of the *gabbar* or peasants cultivating it. Since the Abyssinian occupiers did not farm by themselves, the grantees were often the absentee landlords to whom the *gabbar* were required to hand over the bulk of their crops, as well as render personal services.

The peasant had only weekends to work in their plots of land. The rest of the week they had to work on the farm of their landlords. Mahitmeselasie (162 E.C<sup>10</sup> :122-134) in his book written in Amharic identified the amount of tribute the peasants had to pay to the landlords ‘five *kuna*<sup>11</sup> of *teff* or barley, one *kuna* of *geshsho*,<sup>12</sup> the bundle of firewood, four birr for salary, three birr for grazing land per month, and additional fattened male goat or sheep during three main Christian holidays such as Christmas, Epiphany, and Easter.’

This clearly shows how the livelihoods of the peasants were deteriorating and those of landlords

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<sup>10</sup> Ethiopian Calendar

<sup>11</sup> Traditional container equivalent of 3-5 kgs.

<sup>12</sup> A plant that is used to make local alcohol such as *Areeqe, tella and teji*

were booming at the expense of the peasants. In this way the Northern settlers established the (*gult*) system, absentee landlordism which gave them the right to collect tributes in the form of agricultural produce. This could be anything from one-third to three-quarters of farmers' crops. Furthermore, the farmer paid one tenth of his produce as a tax to the Northern settlers. There were yet further obligations for Sidama. They were expected to provide the landlord with honey, meat, firewood, and grass for his cattle, horses, mules and donkeys.

The Sidama had to grind the landlord's share of the grain, which was transported to his residence in 'town' ('town' not in the strict sense of the word, but meaning the military camp which laid the foundation for future towns), build his house, maintain his fences, care for his animals by cleaning their pens, and act as porters, escorts or messengers. This *gult* system was not applied in the original homeland in the north (Hussein 1976: 14), Mahitmeselasie (162 E.C:122-134).

As the result of these persistent demands, the Sidama people and others in the south were kept in a state of starvation. Their obligation to feed others took-away their right to feed themselves (Woldemariam 1984; 11). Sidama people at that time were left without a surplus to store for times of adversity or to sell at market. Quite apart from the sheer volume of produce being paid as tribute, the amount of time spent working for the landlords resulted in heavy production losses.

Although this may have created seasonal food insecurity, famine in the strict sense of the word never occurred. This was because of the survival of organic social institutions and structures, itself a consequence of the struggle to resist assimilation and of a total rejection of the occupiers' way of life. Furthermore the occupiers had implanted corrupt ways of governance and chronically weak social policies into the Amhara way of life. This in turn laid the foundation for conflictive political identity in order to gain collective security.

From 1941 onwards, the emperor furthered the processes, the centralisation of taxation and institutionalisation of police and court systems. (Zewudie, 1994:34-35). He also used those institutions

to control the nobilities who had become rich and powerful at the expense of the Sidama. However, the institutions helped only in consolidation of his personal power that was already sanctioned in the first constitution he introduced in 1931 (Clapham, 1969:113).

The twin policies were claimed by ras Teferi Mekonen, later Emperor HaileSellasie as a modernisation project. However, Clapham (1985:259) argues that modernisation meant control of occupied territories and promotion of:

a cash-crop economy whose products were channelled through the capital and government controlled ports, whence they could be sold to raise government revenue ;a communication network which radiates from Addis Ababa; a central bureaucracy and the educational system to man it; and most obvious of all , a large standing army.

This project however, faced several challenges from different corners of Ethiopia. That led to the downfall of the imperial regime. Key informant interviews collected from both Sidama and non-Sidama informants indicate that by the 1930s the Silte, the Gurage and Amhara feudal settlers dominated the cash crop economy, for instance coffee markets, and established trade routes up to Addis Ababa. While the former two engaged directly with the coffee business, the latter provided security of the trade route against the attack of the Sidama and other “bandits” (disorganised freedom fighters).

In order to explore how the coffee business had been dominated by Silte, Gurage and Amharas it is imperative to consider the historical settings. Prior to the Minilk II’s expansion to the Sidama-land, the northern neighbours’ alliance such as Qebena, Silte and Sebat bet Gurage failed to resist Ras Gobana Dache of Oromo working for Menelik. Armed northern settlers built garrisons (military camps) that were transformed into towns through the newly conquered south to exercise administrative and economic control over indigenous people. Indirectly, this conquest provided the northern neighbours particularly the Silte and Gurage with opportunities to expand the space of their livelihood. The Gurage and Silte started to coordinate coffee and other business networks connecting

the capital of the newly built empire with newly transformed military camp into towns in the south. The fertility of Sidama and its coffee attracted many Silte and Guragie to leave their home land for good and to settle in Sidama particularly in Aleta Dande in early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

***Market chain:*** There are two primary ways of coffee collection from Sidama peasants. Firstly, on market days Silte and Guragie were stationed in the marketplace with scales to buy coffee from the Sidaman peasants. Secondly Guragie and Silte merchants spread throughout rural Sidama to buy coffee from the farm gate. Those who collected coffee from market places and rural areas resold the coffee to secondary coffee collectors or (*Jimla sebsabwoch*) with a fixed margin of profit.

The secondary collectors had to improve coffee qualities by pounding the coffee beans with traditional hand tools or grind the coffee with stone against the earth, then they transport “quality” coffee and finally sell it to coffee exporters in Addis Ababa, with good margin of profit.

***Sustaining the livelihoods of the few and the insecurity of the majority.*** One of the important factors that brought about a deterioration in the Sidama capacity to resist livelihood insecurity, started to manifest itself in the 1960s during Emperor Haile Sellassie’s rule. From the mid-1960s onwards the Amhara, who having formerly been land-lords were now reconstituting themselves as a governing commercial elite, began to sell the northern lowlands surrounding Lake Hawassa and River Bilate in the Western Valleys to foreign companies.

This new trend, which Lefort (1986: 20) calls ‘mechanized feudalism’, made the *gabbar* dispensable, and took away the little land security which they had had under the previous system. The result was that thousands of *gabbar* households were forcibly evicted from the land which they had cultivated for generations. This development affected even poor peasants who owned their plots of land, and pastoralists too became the victims of eviction. In these capitalist projects, land was converted into large-scale mechanized farms, typically linked to foreign corporations (owned by Italians, Greeks, Arabs), which also monopolized the non-agricultural sector of the economy,

especially the export and wholesale trade.

The Sidama were forcibly evicted from their land to facilitate commercial farms. They demonstrated their ill feeling and their resentment at losing their pastoral land through their popular song and dance known as *faaro*: See the following table 5.1.in the next page

**Table 5-1 The chant and its rough translation**

<b>The chant in Sidamu affoo</b>	<b>Rough English translation.</b>
Adaare lalu chaale	The tree-shades of the cattle In Adare (Adaare is the original name of Hawassa)
Mootichu assi adabaabe	Had been converted into public square by the emperor.
Adabaabe assena Adaare	He made it public square- we lost our pastoral land even if
Hooguummona raare raar	shout loud, and urge you to shout loud enough.
Kin'nenno raarra raarre.	

Source: Author's field research 2000

As a result of these evictions, many Sidama were pushed into the highlands with their cattle, which created significant population pressure in the highlands. Land could no longer be left fallow, and marginal land on steep slopes was often cultivated, with the result that soil erosion was accelerated. (Interviewee extension expert 20/11/2000 Hawassa)

The increased population required more cooking fuel, thus placing pressure on forest reserves. Cattle dung, previously used to enrich the soil, had to be used for fuel, further impoverishing the soil. The absence of water and soil conservation measures meant that heavy rains could do great damage, by washing away topsoil which had been secured by tree roots.

Poor soil fertility meant that no matter how large the expanse of land cultivated, yield decreased below what was needed to cover household consumption, let alone pay taxes or purchase essential household items, all of which led to greater food insecurity (Interviewee extension expert 20/11/2000 Hawassa).

In addition to being evicted, the Sidama people were excluded from employment opportunities in these newly-established commercial farms owned either by the Amhara elite or by foreign shareholders. Most daily labourers were brought in from other regions. The government-sponsored drive for commercial farming accelerated the vulnerability of the Sidama peasants and cattle herders by denying them access to the land, the backbone of the subsistence agrarian economy and by facilitating the processes that created vulnerability.

Most elderly people who served as informants for this research were displaced and forced to live with their relatives. They saw this period as one of heightened instability and destitution. One of these informants narrated what he and the people living with him experienced as follows:

The first event that shocked me happened during *Adaare ba'ie waro* (the disappearance of Adaare). At that time, the policemen filling two lorries came from Addis Ababa to our village in Adaare and ordered us to leave our home and pastoral land. Then notable elders from Hawella and Yanasses gathered to discuss what was going on. On the second day while our elders were in the middle of *songo* (meeting) under the shade of the tree, the third lorry full of policemen came and they started shooting and shouting in Amharic. Our notable elders continued their discussion, but they were finally rounded up, taken to Yirgalem, the then capital of Sidama province, and imprisoned by policemen. Other policemen started to set our houses on fire. Some elderly people were burnt in their houses. Then we started to migrate to the Sidama highland. Thanks to our *ayiide* (kinsmen) we faced no problem with finding accommodation and food. The problem was for these who had huge numbers of cattle. As we had only two *hoowe* (compounds, each able to contain about 60 cows at night) there was not enough grazing in the highlands. People like us started to migrate to the other corner of the country. Finally we reached Hooko in Aroressa. We established our residence in a place called Weele adjacent to the Buluta River. At that time area was occupied by Guji Oromos. We lost most of our cattle on the long journey. Some were lost in rivers when we crossed big rivers like the Logita and Gambelto. After seven months we were told that some of our elders were dead in prison. The entire *ayiide* mourned for them. It took us a long time to recover from the destitution that we suffered after displacement, when we lost our property and our cattle in the long journey which took more than two months. The reflection of (80 year old key interviewee in Hwassa 20/10/ 2000).

The account of this informant explains how the cumulative effects of eviction led, for the Sidama, to livelihoods ruin, through land tenure insecurity, which in turn caused livelihood insecurity perpetuating the generational poverty of those who are marginalised by the institutionalization of land tenure change in Sidama. Most of those who were the victims of 1999/2003 famine in the Sidama, confirmed the inheritance of their land insecurity from their fathers and grand fathers of land tenure



change institutionalization.

To summarise, during the imperial regime, the institutionalization of the land tenure types referred mainly to the imperial administrative classification, which is commonly distinguished between communal (*rist*), grant land (*gult*), freehold or sometimes referred to as private (*gebbbar*) tenures, Church land (*sisso*) and state (materia mengst) tenure regimes. This type of land tenure system accommodated by the Ethiopian empire is described as one of the most complex compilation of different land use systems in Africa. The overall picture of the imperial regime can be grouped as 70% of the fertile land was owned only by 1% of the entire population in Ethiopia (Breitzke 1976).

During the socialist Dergue regime (1974-1991) that had overthrown the imperial state of Haile Sellasie the land tenure institution, agrarian structure and the system of access to land was radically changed. This was due to the nationalization of rural land through the 'Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation'; redistribution of the land to the tillers and to organise the peasants in associations and cooperatives; and altering the exploitative landlord –tenant relations so pertinent under the imperial regime. This was coupled with the collectivization of small –scale farms and the establishment of state farms.

Land reform among the Sidama tended to equalize access to land, and increased it for those whose landholdings were caused by evictions during the earlier regime, and those who had become a burden to their kinsmen. Such measures were welcomed among the Sidama, since landholdings had formerly been characterized by extensive absentee ownership and tribute farming, particularly in Hawassa, Western Shabadino and the Dale lowlands, where large-scale commercial farming had been conducted by the absentee land lords and their foreign allies.

The introduction of the land reform of 1975 which was a response to one of the fundamental questions of the revolutionary discourses of 1974 was a pillar in the contemporary history of Ethiopia. The provisional military government introduced a shift in basic land tenure. Thus, the proclamation of

March 4, 1975 changed the land ownership of all rural lands from private to public by article NO. 31, 1975. Provisional Military Administrative Council (1975, 93-101).

This action changed the patterns of relationships between the northern settlers who became absentee land lords and the majority of the Sidama tenants or peasants by ‘making the land to the tiller for the first times a reality in Ethiopia’ (Ellis, 1992: 254). The proclamation also banned the transfer of land by sale, lease, or mortgage (article 5). The act dismantled tenancy (article 4, sub-article 5) and liberated the marginalised Sidama peasants from all types of obligations to the landowners (article 6, sub – article 3). Practically; this was a radical departure from the pre-land reform dominant –subordinate relationship between the land usurpers and the Sidama peasants. However, the reform act provided the latter, with only rights of use and not private ownership rights. Furthermore only individuals who were willing to farm personally were entitled to possess land. Hired labour was totally banned.

The EPRDF’s (Ethiopian Peoples, Revolutionary Democratic Front) government that overthrew the communist regime in Ethiopia, announced the continuation of the land policy of its predecessor, and new constitution of 1995 approved and confirmed the state ownership of land in Ethiopia and only usufruct right bestowed upon land holders. The usufruct rights exclude the right to sell or mortgage the land. For the EPRDF government to follow this line was to protect the rural peasants from selling off their land to wealthy individuals leaving them landless and without source of income.

The government built this argument, on the premises of social and historical justice that is based on two principles: primarily justice understood as egalitarianism –guaranteeing every farmer in need of agricultural land equal rights of access to such land, and secondly historical justice-granting tenure security to the Ethiopian peasants who had experienced land deprivation and land expropriation through complex land tenure system during the imperial period. In order to enhance tenure security and reduce border conflict the government introduced the idea of issuing certificate (Deininger et al 2006).

Theoretically, tenure security is expected to enhance investment and vice versa (Beley, K., and

Manig, W., 2004, Sjaasstad and Bromley 1997). The fact that, land remains state owned with strong restrictions on transfers, certificate document only inheritable right by core family members does not guarantee the ownership of the land, but usufruct (use) right. Even this issuing of the certificate is conditional and dependent on the residence of the holder of the certificate in the Peasant Association not less than five years. This long residence requirement deprives the right, of those who migrated to relatives and to urban areas during critical period.

Investigating historical pattern in land tenure in Ethiopia showed that successive governments of Ethiopia are reluctant to hand-over the power of natural capital redistribution to individuals. The last two regimes have legitimised this with the historical legacy of the imperial oppression of the rural peasantry although the degree and scale of oppression differed significantly between the north and south.

It is evident that the quest for state control over land is ongoing processes in Ethiopian history (Crummey 2000). This control paved a way for an inheritance of generational and genealogical land tenure insecurity which in turn paved the way for recurrent food insecurities culminating in 1999-2003 famine in Sidama.

This sub-section depicted that in agrarian society land tenure institutions directly affect food access at the household by controlling access of resource endowments and indirectly affects food security at various levels through food availability and its prices. Access to natural capital is an important catalyst of access to food. It can be understood as a function of food availability, access and utilization, which has three important dimensions like sufficiency, sustainability, and vulnerability (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998). Land tenure and food security are linked in a dynamic way in which decisions about production marketing consumption and investment generate structural changes in the distribution of resources among the households and finally among the individual members of the household.

### 5.3 A discourse from ‘above’: Amharization and forced Christianization

The second aspect of the political space in this thesis is a discourse from ‘above’. This may help in analysing and understanding the style of communication between the conqueror and conquered people and the effect it may have had on perusing livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes.

The style of communication is vital in perusing the livelihood strategies but also it cultivates trust and interest, which lays foundation for inclusion and exclusion in the processes of sharing the livelihood assets or resources. Framed in this way, Amharization and the forced Christianization discourse in Ethiopia refers to the imposition of the Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity by Amhara ruling elite, on conquered ethnic groups as an embodiment of the Ethiopian state after the conquest (Gudina 2003:62).

Thus, the discourse from ‘above’ became an instrument of value inculcation. Clapham (1988:195) points out this value inculcation as a means of assimilation of diverse ethnic groups to the culture, language and religion of the dominant Amhara rulers. The imperial government also prohibited the publication of non-Amharic languages including Tigrigna and other larger languages Oromifaa, (the language of the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia) Sidaamu afoo (the largest ethnic group in the southern Ethiopia) Markakis 2003b, Bulcha, 1997a, Tubiana 1983). The Amharic language became a medium of instruction in elementary schools in 1941, in addition to be the language of administration and court (Markakis 2003:12-13).

Moreover the Orthodox church was declared as state religion, while Islam and other Indigenous monotheistic (*Waaqeeefata*) of Oromo and (*Maganaanchoheesho*) of the Sidama and polytheistic religions in the periphery were not recognised by the state. Furthermore, of the values, culture, and

identities of the Sidama were stereotyped like the rest of the ethnic groups in southern, western and eastern Ethiopia (Blackhurst 1980:55). This stereotyping produced different derogatory labels, which in most cases had colour and racial tones like *shanqilla* referring to all darker black skinned people living on the Ethio-Sudan border; Galla referring to the Oromo ethnic group, Sidamo referring to Sidama; Darasa to the Gedeo; Gudella to the Hadiya; Wolamo to the Wolaita; Kulo to the Dawuro; Janero to the Yem.

Thus Amharization and forced Christianization discourses created a conflictive political identity that situated the conquered ethnic groups at a crossroads of choice between loyalty to either ethno-nationalism or pan-Ethiopianism. This was due to their indigenous value being disrupted because of the inculcation of the Amhara's values (Orthodox Christianity, social, custom, ideology and Amharic language) as having better value than the Sidama's values and practices.

The stereotypes and discourses about most of these indigenous ethnic groups in the south persist and are also being used by people who were victims of such labels against each other. This was accelerated with the wide scale resettlement of northerners, in the Sidama territory which continued for decades to come, and shaped the construction of the two identities in the same Sidama territory, with the spread of the Amharic language spoken chiefly in towns and used as a single language of court and administration as well as the language to be learned and the medium of instruction for the students below secondary level.

Thus, the empire builders created two conflicting identities in Sidama. The first was understood by the empire builders as carriers of Amhara and Amharised Sidama identity living in towns as urbanite "civilised" and "modern", while the second was attached to rural areas as carriers of Sidama identity, perceived as backward, uncivilized and destined to be Amharised in the 'modernized' version of Ethiopia.

Amharization and forced Christianisation into Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity increased its intensity in the post Italian period. Successive Abyssinian leaders have exerted maximum effort to impose Amharan values onto other ethnic groups like the Sidama; On the other hand they have not been confident of the validity and rationality of their institutions. It is observed that they have been trying to import and implement institutions and values from the west to east without realizing the social-economic context under which they have been operating their harsh system.

This imposition of alien institutions and values has corrupted the existing values and systems including their own. Because they were not in a position to solve the contradiction that may arise between imported systems and their ambition to be master race in the region, as well as their failure to learn, understand and recognize the validity and rationality of conquered nations values and systems consecutive Ethiopian governments have prevented the development of non- Amharan centred knowledge.

An example is forced Christianisation as an attempt to imitate European colonizers which also served as the pretext for the conquest of independent nations. It was also the fashion of the day to destroy indigenous political, social and economic system and people's identity. Yet Amharazation and Coptic Christianization have been far from containing the incentives for transferring loyalty from indigenous cultural, religious and socio-political structures and practices to Abyssinian values. Abyssinian conquerors found the social, economic and political systems of conquered Sidama, such as seera, (unwritten law) luwa, (periodically alternating military and Administrative structure) Akaako ayaaana (Veneration of ancestors spirit) Ayidooma (Social bond just like family-hood) of the sidama to be negative and constrictive.

Amharisation under the cover of Pan-Ethiopian nationalism was constructed in a context where different ethnic groups were brought into the empire to live under unequal terms. Non-Amharized ethnic groups were not allowed to have schools of their own to teach their culture, history, values and

language to their children. This finding is consistent with (Keller 1991:140). Key informants stressed that, whenever the natives spoke their mother language they were bullied. The few children from non-Amhara origin who attended the schools in Ethiopia were forced to learn a lesson that undermines the values of their own identity. Key informants in government offices told the author that they had to change their original names to be accepted by the schools and employers after school. One of them narrated the situation as follows:

In the School, the Sidama child was not only mobbed, but was fed negative bias against everything that was Sidama. Mixed in with the Amhara language and Abyssinian history was taught many of the Amhara prejudices against the Sidama. The Sidama people were depicted as subjects and dependent in relation in the Empire's rulers where the Amhara and Tigriyans were presented as citizens. The Sidama name, language and culture were reduced to worthlessness, shame and backwardness as the school pressed the Sidama children to conform to Amhara culture. Those who were completely overwhelmed by unmitigated assault on Sidama culture, language, history dropped or (forced to drop) Sidama identity. Consequently, the Sidama student were forced to despise their identity, for instance they had to change their names as I had done. The name that reflected the meanings and values of their identity for Amhara names and developed pretentious attitude if they want to be accepted by the Amharas. (62 years old interviewee 20/11/2000 Hawassa.)

This suggests that the concept of equal treatment of citizens contained in nation state building processes in the west in an inclusive sense were almost non-existent in Ethiopia. Despite, the absence of fair treatment of the citizens, the imperial system ingratiated itself among the Sidama, inducing reverence to the Emperor, governors and associates.

There are direct and indirect impacts of assimilation discourses on the lives, livelihoods: among those the direct impact refers to the food production and consumption culture. The assimilation of the Sidama into northern culture brought a long lasting impact on food production and consumption. That is the transformation of food consumption culture from perennial root-crop such as *enset* (Amahric) or its scientific name (*Ensete ventricosum*), *weese* (Sidaamuafoo) into seasonal crop such as *teff* (Amharic) *gaashe* (Sidaamuafoo), (*Eragrostis abyssinica tef*) scientific name, ('love-grass')

While it is used for human food in Ethiopia, it is used as fodder spices in South Africa, Australia, India and USA.) This was because the food consumption culture of the northern settlers was different from the Sidama. While the northern settlers prefer enjeera made of teff the Sidama's stable food is waasa (Sidaamu affoo) koocho (Amharic) form Weese or enset. Key informants underline that teff is good for cash generation it is not as good as enset for food security.

Teff grain is used used for making enjeera, spongy flat bread, the main national dish in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Teff is a major staple food crop in Ethiopia, which is grown at middle altitude between 1,800 and 2,200 meters above sea level and in regions that have adequate rainfall.

During the imperial regime, the Sidama peasants were forced to produce teff, because the enjeera made of teff was preferred food to other food for the landlords. Reflecting this fact the Amharised Sidama peasants who were serving land lords said to to have sung the following song for teff crop.

**Table 5-3** peasants' poem for teff

**Amharic**

Yeshewa nechi teef yegeetoochu missa

Yet Agegnishalewu wodiqe Binnessaa.

**Rough translation in English.**

The white tef of shewa the lunch of lords

I have no way getting you even failing  
down and standing up.

Source: Author's field research 2000

This poem reflects the discourse of the Sidama peasants, and suggests the white teff crop brought from Shewa province with conquerors and how the teff was far from the reach of ordinary Sidama peasants, though it was produced by peasants themselves. The poem also suggests widespread distinction used in the teff value chain in Ethiopia relates to the colour of the grain. The distinction between magna (super-white), while, mixed, and red teff is widely used and well known by peasants, traders as well as consumers. While white is most expensive (£ 35-60/100 kg) the red and brown is (£20-35/100 kg) high prices around festive season such as Easter, Christmas, Epiphany and the days of



Saints and Angels venerated in Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

The poem also reflects how the evolution of *teff* consumption culture by urban households than by rural households. Because the residences of the absentee land lords were military garrisons that evolved into modern towns, while most of the Sidaman peasants have been rural dwellers. This was noticed by (Brahane *et al* 2011) who show that urban consumption per capita is as high as 61 kg per year compared to 20 kg per capita per year for rural residents. This suggests that *teff* is economically superior commodity that is relatively more consumed by the rich than the poor. The lower consumption by the poor is also partly explained by high prices of *teff* which are typically twice as high as the cheapest cereals, i.e. maize, (Minten *et al* 2012).

The interviewees complained against *teff* crop production, for two main reasons. During the imperial era their fathers were forced to produce *teff* against their will to feed the landlords, now, the need for cash forced them to allocate more land for *teff* crop, while the cash they earned from the sale of *teff* was not enough to cover their food and other needs. In addition to this, they noticed comparative advantage of allocating more land for *enset* for food security and sustainability.

The second area of complaint against *teff* was that it is labour intensive: early manual weeding at 7-10 days after sowing, 6-10 days prior to harvest, sickle harvest which is laborious and time consuming, the small seed size requires attentive handling, as it will be lost as one cannot pick it up, threshed using cattle, using cattle who also feed on straw and needs professional people who can manage the behaviour of cattle.

Furthermore, many of the rural peasants complained against *teff* as a crop that causes *baashe* which means scarcity, as well as it is more vulnerable to drought than the *enset*. This finding contradicts with that of (Fufa *et al* 2011) who regarded *teff* as a lower risk crop as it can withstand adverse weather conditions, the data from key informants from four districts of the Sidama suggest that *teff* has much lower capacity to resist drought compared to *enset*. The suggestions of interviewees were consistent

with the findings of (Brandit *et al* 1997:1) who understood the capacity of enset to resist drought, and named it as a ‘tree against hunger’.

As this section has tried to describe the impact of Amharization and forced Christianization brought long term effect by disrupting indigenous ways of life, language, religious thought, conflictive identity, and the transformation of livelihoods and food production and consumption patterns, and the types of crops grown. The disruption of enset growing system and the reduction of the size of plots of for enset to feed the land-lords and later on the need for cash, forced the rural Sidama for cash crops like teff which diverted the attention of peasants from enset a drought resistant crop. This led to cumulative effect of the sowing the seeds of vulnerabilities to food insecurity of the rural Sidama that culminated in famine in 1999-2003.

Care should be taken in differentiating between the Amharization discourse of the southern ethnic groups and the betterment of the lives and livelihood of indigenous Amhara peasants in the north. In fact HaileSellasies’ rule was marked by the worsening of life for the northern peasants despite their relative degree of autonomy compared with southern counterparts. In the words of John Markakis (1973:370)

...the northern Christian group is commonly referred to as being dominant in Ethiopia, a fair statement as far as it goes. To include the northern peasant masses in the designation ‘dominant’ is a gross distortion: however, they belong to this group in cultural and psychological terms only.

This depicts clearly that the processes of Amharization was not the betterment of the lives and livelihoods of indigenous Amhara peasants. In fact, they were victims of recurrent famine, and livelihood insecurity that led the Amharan peasants to be forerunners in defying the authoritarian rule of the monarch. The Amharan ruling classes were a minority group among indigenous Amharas who have used the creation of the Ethiopian empire to increase their hold over the Sidama, the Oromo, and other southern, eastern and western conquered people.

#### 5.4 The action from ‘above’: creating unitary State

Using the political space framework, the last two sub-sections above, depicted how successive imperial governments attempted to form modern Ethiopian state by conquest. The political space framework, as the institutional channels of land tenure and its impact on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama peasants; the discourse from previous section has also helped to analyse two imperial governments’ attempt to forge cultural homogenization through the ‘one language- religion’ policy during most of the twentieth century. We have also understood its impact on the lives and livelihood of the conquered people. The third component of the political space framework in this thesis is the action from ‘above’.

This component helps to analyse and understand the vital action taken from above in the processes of building forced unitary state. This section also helps to understand the nature of political space and three action strategies used by successive Ethiopian governments to keep the unitary state and its sovereign territorial integrity at the same time as dealing with the discontents of ethno-nationalism.

***The first strategy was creating Ethiopian National identity:-***designed by Emperor Menelik (1889-1913) and continued in a highly structured manner by Emperor Haile Sellassie (1930-36, 1941-174), by forging a unitary state through the discourse of the cultural assimilation of other ethnic groups into the Abyssinian core in non-equal terms, by the policy of Amharization, and forced Christianization and then converting Abyssinian Nationalism into Ethiopian Nationalism. Related to this, Gashaw (1993:138) writes: ‘Abyssinian nationalism, whose traditional organic core was the Tigre/Amhara segment of the population, was hegemonic doctrine with relation to other ethnic groups.’ This pan-Ethiopianist strategy from above exhibited cultural and structural inequalities of the imperial governments had to face ethnic discontent that overthrew the monarchy in 1974.

***The second strategy perpetuating Ethiopian identity reluctantly recognising ethnic identity:*** This strategy was designed by the military government (1974-1991) and it involves the perpetuation of the unitary state with an attempt to address 'the nationality question' within the Marxist political framework. This was well established in 1987 constitution that defined Ethiopia as unitary state. Article 2, of the constitution states 'shall ensure the equality of nationalities, combat chauvinism and narrow nationalism.'

Brietzke (1995:3), pointed out that how the military government's addressing ethnic identity was linked to Marxist and Leninist framework. Gashaw (1993:154) took the point further when he writes:

In true Leninist fashion and apart from celebrations of local music and dances, Mengistu's style of governance was universalist and unitarist in the extreme: through popular mobilizations the masses were to be emancipated from their nationalities as well as their class.' On other hand, the regime seemed to reluctantly recognise the importance of ethnic identity in the political actions taken by the military regime such as: the 1979 National Literacy Campaign in fifteen ethnic languages including *Sidaamuafao*; and the establishment of the Institute for the Study of Nationalities in 1983.

In the processes of tackling forced Christianization, and in its attempt to recognize the equality of religious identity, the regime, disestablished the supremacy of the Orthodox church from its status as a state religion after the 1974 revolution. Furthermore, to ensure religious equality military government recognised the most important Islamic holidays as national holidays, but persecuted the Jehovah's witnesses and Protestant denominations of Christianity, suspected of having links with capitalist countries., The narrowness of the political space in the military regime fuelled identity conflicts more than its predecessors. In the words of Brietzeke (1993:2)

the legal unaccountability of senior officials that was pioneered by HaileSelassie took [an] even more authoritarian direction under Mengistu and this helped to fuel regional rebellions and increased ethnic consciousness.

This suggests, the actions from above in the political space of Ethiopia, both imperial and the military regimes were not interested in accommodating any conception of Ethiopia other than a united country under the framework of the 'great tradition' without paying much attention to the potential of

ethnicity. It stressed the enhancement of Ethiopian nationalism under the slogan “Ethiopian first *“ityiophaya tiqdem”*” to mobilize, what Clapham (1989:12) calls ‘composite nationalism’ as a source of popular unity the struggle based on one united Ethiopian national identity.

The impact of unitary state formation created two divergent perspectives that fuelled conflictive political identities that range from internalization to resistance. Resistance also also ranges from peaceful to violent that claims lives and livelihoods; and destabilizing peace and security of ordinary citizens. Violent resistance gave birth to armed political organization to carry out their struggle based on ethnicity, such as the Tigray people Liberation Front(TPLF) the Oromo Liberated Front(OLF), Western Somali People Liberation front (WSLF), that later evolved into the Ogaden National Liberation Movement (ONLF) and the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM). Despite, few positive actions to wards both ethnic and religious identity, the military regime was intolerant of ethnically, based political organizations and launched a military campaign against ethno-nationalist armed groups that facilitated its downfall in 1991.

***The third strategy is recognizing the ethnic identity and struggling to keep Ethiopian territorial integrity.***

It is the EPRDF’s government strategy from May 1991 to date, whereby, the EPRDF, struggles to maintain the Ethiopian state on the basis of mixing ethnic federalism and administrative suitability as well as cultural, language and political autonomy at regional and zonal levels, but with centre of political power kept under one of former Abyssinian twine ethnic groups, the Tigrians. This is due to the TPLF’s strategy of integrating the members of other ethnic groups into its political ideology that is evolved into the formation of EPRDF. Thus the TPLF engineered balancing the perpetuation of the Ethiopian State without Eritrea, and created relative breathing space for ethno-nationalism for the first time in Ethiopian socio-political history.

Despite all its manipulation, to merge those whom the EPRDF considers ‘non-threat posing’ ethnic

groups, the TPLF's idea of restructuring Ethiopia's government administration on the basis of an ethnic federation shows a positive understanding of the root causes of war and consequent poverty and vulnerability to food and livelihood insecurity.

The importance of a federal structure based on ethnicity for preventing and responding to food and livelihood insecurity is in the emphasis it gives to local empowerment and allowing people to solve their problems through their own indigenous knowledge, skills and practices, rather than having unsustainable solutions imposed upon them. It is highly centralized and unitary political systems of successive governments of Ethiopia that led to conflicts and consequent wars which have been an obstacle to development and justice, as well as to security and the sustainability of livelihoods. Had a true federal structure been created, it would have removed some of the underlining causes.

The EPRDF government established a sound constitution and federal structure – an aim which has, however, been hindered by a lack of effective practical implementation. The nationality question in Ethiopia is very important, for it was one ethnic group's quest for dominance and the resistance to that dominance by others that led to war and hence to poverty and famine as governments and opposition groups diverted all their resources to the conflict.

## **5.5 'Self' within state, discourse and actions from 'below': the effect on Livelihoods**

This section shows the type of debates over self, within the Ethiopian state as discourse from 'below' and 'above', and the vitality of those debates as direction indicators for the type of engagement, actions and reactions between two political identities from below and above.

Many scholars concluded that Ethiopia avoided colonialism because its leaders engaged in it. This conclusion extended to become one of the issues of the current political debate between ethno-nationalists and pan-Ethiopianists. The former interpreted the conquest as colonization and proposed withdrawal from union as a solution (Hassen, 1990, Bulcha 1994, Keller, 1998, Mamadani, 1996,

Jalata, 1998, Zitelmann, 1996, Hammeso, 2006).

Ethno-nationalist scholars argue that the Abyssinians colonised the southern, eastern and western ethnic groups in Ethiopia in a manner similar to the European occupation of Africa in the end of the nineteenth century. Among ethno-nationalist scholars, Bulcha (1994, 1-2) provides an argument in support of this line of thought. He uses evidence from governmental decrees and policies enacted by two emperors to suppress non-Amharic languages as proof of Abyssinian colonialism. He relates the deficiency in Oromo literacy as ‘mainly attributable to Amharization policy of consecutive Ethiopian governments over the last one hundred years.’ His analysis of material that shows an intensive effort by the ruling Amhara to undermine and weaken non-Amharic ethnic group resembles the same type of evidence that Mamadani uses to critique British colonialism in Nigeria and Uganda (Mamadani 1996:37).

Bulcha and Mamadani identify the assaults on cultural traits such as language as one means by which colonial regimes maintained power in Africa. Keller (1998:111) supporting the depiction of Bulcha and Mamadani, says ‘Bulcha and Mamadani both articulate how the colonial governments implemented language programme to force the colonized groups to give up their native language.’ Keller states clearly the belief that, ‘the State [Ethiopia] was held together mainly by the ethnic hegemony of Shewan Amhara and other ethnic elites who had been assimilated into ‘Ethiopian’ culture the myth of unified Ethiopian nation state’ Keller (1998:111). Keller’s emphasis is on the Ethiopian government’s creation of an artificial state held together by force.

Nevertheless, this depiction is mixed. While, Emperor Haileselassie’s attempt to create a stratified bureaucratic state, where regional governors ruled the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia was similar to the governance style imitated by Lord Lugard in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, the difference between the indirect rule of Lugard and Haileselassie’s is at least in Sidama. While the former’s governance seemed a kind of re-empowering local chiefs, the latter’s rule was not uniform and

conditioned by the nature of reaction of the conquered ethnic groups. Most of the provincial governors were from *Shewa* as the field study from Sidama indicates, for instance (Luielseged, Balcha, Ras Teferi (later emperor) Nadew, Ras Birru, and Ras Desta) were not Ethnic Sidaman and were appointed directly from Shewa.

In fact, ethnonationalist scholars argue that Amharization as having negative impact on non-Amharic ethnic groups, such as cultural disorientation, livelihood and governance disruption. *Secondly*, when one compares and contrasts the European colonialism, with that of Ethiopia, European colonialism, unlike in Ethiopia, it was preceded by capitalism and industrial revolution, as well as by technical and military advancement, that may have attracted the natives of colonies to view colonizers as transferors of betterment. Contrary, to that, up until the 1890s, Ethiopia had not been capitalist, nor had it evinced signs of advanced technology.

Pan-Ethiopianists demonise the ethno-nationalists intention as the evil of tribalism against unity and harmony built in long historical processes (Ullendorff 1973, Marcus 1991, Locket, 1968, Gashaw, 1993,). Among those scholars, Marcus and Ullendorff downplay the negative impact of Abyssinian conquest and consolidation on other ethnic groups. They took the position that the Amhara and Tigreans acted as a civilizing and beneficent influence on the other ethnic groups and ignores the notion of suffering under Abyssinian colonization in the periphery. Ullendorff depicts Abyssinian culture as inclusive and representative of Ethiopia as a whole. Depending exclusively on Abyssinian sources he excludes the contributions of other ethnic groups to the evolution of present Ethiopia when he says:

‘we shall mainly confine ourselves in this survey to the Semitic language of Ethiopia, since they express the ‘real’ Abyssinia as we know it and are the vitally exclusive carriers of Ethiopian civilization and intellectual prestige’ Ullendorff (1973:111-112).

Furthermore, he uses the term ‘people’ in his book title instead of ‘peoples’ suggests that he ignores



diversity, he may have seen other ethnic groups of Ethiopia as unworthy of attention and thus excludes them from study. Similarly, Marcus bases his opinion of Abyssinian imperialism on Abyssinian sources as well, both of them may have clearly been impressed by societies with monarchical institutions than those without.

The neutral path on the understanding of the evolution of Ethiopia was identified by (Abir 1968:95). He portrays a different perspective of Ethiopian history, in which Oromo, Amhara, and Tigrean principalities competed for control over each other. Unlike Jalata (1998), he does not simply, portray the Oromo as a passive people, oppressed by neither Abyssinians nor does he deny the power and influence of the Oromo, as in the case of Marcus and Ullendorff. He uses a wide variety of sources including Oromo, and Amhara ones to show how an Oromo Principality under Ras Ali constantly battled the Amhara and Tigreans kingdom during the Era of princes (*zemene Mesfaint*). Similarly, Zewudie (1991:11) asserts that the modern Ethiopian state emerged at the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a country out of two centuries of decline and endless squabble between provincial rulers.

However the long historical processes in Ethiopia did not create genuine citizenship, fair share of access to livelihood assets, fair treatment before the law, and corresponding trust and loyalty to Ethiopian government authorities. That is where conflictive political identity is situated with the conquered ethnic groups at a crossroads of choice between loyalty to either ethno-nationalism or pan-Ethiopianism. See the following figure 5.1. that shows the summary of historical trends on making modern Ethiopian state.



Figure 5-1 Map of Historical processes of Abyssinian expansion

Source: the authors' understanding of historical process.

## 5.6 Relative political space widening and the character of Citizen's Engagement (1970-1977)

The period between the end of the imperial regime and the beginning of the Dergue regime were characterised by relative width of the political space. This allowed to some extent the engagement of the citizens from 'below'. The field study findings suggests that whenever there prevails wider political space for the engagement of the marginalised, it has motivated more self-awareness and action that created a high level of political engagement and corresponding access to livelihood assets and freedom of choice to livelihood strategies and activities that led to better security and sustainability. This

section discusses such evidences in Sidama from Geographical and historical perspectives. Geographically, it focuses on rural livelihoods and agro-pastoralist activities. Historically, the discussion is more connected to dramatic changes and events that took places in distinct period ranging from 1970 to 1977. This suggests how relative freedom and its impact on livelihood security and sustainability.

It is imperative to look closer at the political discourse and action of the Sidama at the eve of the 1974 revolution. A key informant interview in the following description suggests the climax of engagement between rural peasants and the land lord settlers in urban area. This happened In Aleta wondo:

In the month of January 1974; there was massive student and teachers led demonstration against the regime of Emperor Haile Sellasie in Aleta wondo. The slogans carried by the demonstrators were “land to the tiller”, “equality of the nationalities”. Threatened by the notion of demonstration and the leaders of landlords and urban settlers organised counter demonstration demanding removal teachers who allegedly “miss-led” their children to demonstrate against government. The rural Sidama of Aleta reacted against the allegation of the teachers. They organised counter demonstration saying teacher are teaching not only the children of the urban dwellers but also the children of rural people and selective allegation is baseless and they declared to protect teachers. The rural Sidama support given to the teachers had provided the leaders of gun –holder northern settlers with pretext to report the event to the then prime- Minister Endalkachewu Mekonnen. They urged the prime minister and persuaded him to take the issue seriously and demanded 20, 000 solders to smash rural Sidama struggle who were allegedly behind demonstration against the government. The prime Minister suspected the nature of this demand and replied “it is possible to send you what you requested but it needs investigation” and gave them appointment to come back. After they left prime ministers office, the Sidama young intellectuals led by Assefa Balango who was the then member of parliament went to Prime Mister Endalkachewu and explained the allegation was unfounded and false, and Assefa Balngo asserted that the fact of the matter was class conflict between tenants and landlords or Urban landlords and rural peasants, when the leaders of gun –holders northern settlers association came back with conviction of securing 20.000 soldiers to smash rural Sidama , the response of Prime minister was unexpected He mockingly said “ okay, I will give you 20,000 soldiers on condition that I will also give rural Sidama 20,000 to balance the power I will work on it go and rest until I will notice you.” (74 years Key informant 10 December 2000).

This shows the political space at eve of the transitional period and the political discourse between the rural Sidama and urban non-Sidama who are struggling for power. Finally, the pressure was so high the government of Endalkachew was toppled and the Emperor deposed. This was

followed by land tenure reforms. An expanded political space for rural Sidamans and better livelihood became a fundamental reason why the Sidama showed full support for the new government at its embryonic stage and the government reciprocating this support organised a national literacy and social development campaign called “*Edget Behibret Zemecha*”- to educate and to organise, the rural marginalised Sidama.

***Positive effect of the relative width of the political space on livelihood asset access:*** - the impact of this dramatic change in political space had empowered the marginalised rural Sidama. This relative widening of the political space, had given marginalised Sidamans an incentive to engage in organised business (the case of (Peasants Cooperative Coffee Business)). Encouraged by the relative expansion of political space, marginalised Sidama peasants start to involve in coffee business.

The pioneer in this proposal was the Peasant Associations in Aleta wondo district. Initially their proposal was not encouraged by the provisional military government fearing that the Peasant Associations would not be able to run the machines as they were not equipped with necessary skills which would reduce the qualities and quantities of coffee exports the main earner of hard currency for the country. However, due to pressure from the organisers of the Peasant Association the government did not turn down their proposal but organised the team from concerned different departments that are linked to the peasants and Agriculture to study feasibility and sustainability of the business plan taking into consideration the legal aspects of how to compensate the original owners. Those team of experts came up with suggestion approving the proposal of peasant business plan, to be effective on condition that the peasant association should be given long time to generate profit; to compensate the original owners of the plant from the income generated from their business activities; and the peasants should be provided with skills and expertise from concerned authorities. Accordingly, the government approved and allowed the Peasant Association to run washed coffee business.

(78 years old informant 27/10/2000 Aletawondo)

The same informant confirms that:

This was a blatant blow for the original owners of the washed coffee machineries. But disappointed by the decision of the government, the original owners of the machines plotted how to set an obstacle to discourage the success of the peasant association's involvement in coffee business. This was paying the coffee farmers more even for low quality coffee to divert chain of market and dry up the source of coffee for the business of Peasant Association. However, the experts and concerned authorities worked hard to make conscious the coffee farmers not to sell their coffee except to the newly created cooperatives of the peasants even if the farmers were paid less for their coffee, and assuring them in long run the farmers would gain sustainable benefit if the farmers supplied the newly established coffee

business with good quality of coffee no matter how little they were paid for their coffee.

This all-rounded support for Peasant Associations made them very profitable in spite of pressure from competing wealthy coffee merchants who stood against their success. At the end of the business year, most of the Peasant Associations who were involved in the coffee business were able to generate the profit of equivalent to one million US dollars at current exchange rate (67 accountant who worked for Peasant Cooperatives 27/10 2000 Aleta wondo) . The lesson for Peasant Associations was if they gained such a huge profit from a business that was started so late, with huge threat and less preparedness, what will be if they could start on time and with good preparedness and using their full potential? This laid foundation for their confidence for the next coffee business season. In the next coffee season 1977, the Peasant Association generated the equivalent twenty five million US dollar profit.

One can ask how the Peasant Associations spent money that came to communal account through their Association. The answer is, investing in lots of infrastructures such as: schools from primary to comprehensive secondary schools. ( the author was educated in one of the secondary schools built by the Peasant Association in Aleta wondo town), clinics, feeder roads; bridges; rural shopping stores; huge public and cultural meeting halls; powerful vehicles to enhance transport and business. This strongly suggests how relative freedom enhances complete engagement in politics taking various initiatives that enables those who are marginalised not only to participate but also risk taking initiatives to decide on their destiny, as the success stories of peasant associations from one key informant's narration in October 10, 2000 clearly depicts.

An expanded political space for rural Sidamans and better livelihoods became fundamental reasons why the Sidama showed full support for the new government at its embryonic stage and the government reciprocating this support organised a national literacy and social development campaign called '*Edget Behibret Zemecha*'- to educate and to organise, the rural marginalised Sidama. They

expressed support for the Provisional Military Council in their public discourse called *qeetala* (*qeexxala*), one of which is expressed in the following table.

**Table 5-2 Public discourse expressed through chant**

<b>The chant</b>	<b>Rough English translation</b>
Sokkena Derge; Zamache Dagge; Assitu dhagge.	Sent by the Dergue, Campaigners came and made history.
Sidama buna; Shawa shumbra Qorqaazhe Dee'ishshohe Chuma.	Sidama for coffee, Shewa for chik pea. May the stomach of oppressors got sick and may the oppressors infected with dysentery and gastrointestinal disorder to reflect how the oppressors were not in position to control them. !!!!
Gobba Haweelite Malgate Qorqazse loose itti gawaree saate wodhi angate.	The Land belongs to Sidama sub-clans such as Haweela, Maalga, Oppressors work and eat the fruit of your labour instead of eating the fruit of others, and peasants decorate your hand with watch and relax.

Source: Author's field research 2000.

## **5.7 The narrowing of the political space and its negative effects**

Economic legislation in 1975 preserved the right of private merchants to engage in the wholesale retail grain trade. Then, and subsequently, however, a licence was formally needed to trade, and merchants were required to deliver a stipulated share of their purchases from peasants to the Agriculture Marketing Corporation (AMC).

The main instrument of state intervention was the (AMC). According to government claims, this was set up in 1976 to stabilize produce and consumer prices, to reduce marketing margins for the advantage of producers, and to ensure a timely and efficient supply of farm inputs and an adequate supply for public distribution. However, according to Webb et al. (1992: 74) the reason behind the establishment of AMC was not the advantage of producers. Rather it was 'the government's first response to rising urban prices' because the Planning Commission and AMC planned to purchase from

the peasant sector.

Quotas were then allocated to the region and the conventional categories 'grain surplus' and 'grain deficit' were applied. The compulsory quota was seen as a way of eliminating price competition between the AMC and the private traders and as an instrument for extracting sufficient grain from producing areas to provide for urban and military consumption.

In its early years, the corporation's operations were modest and the prices at which it purchased were rather arbitrary. Its major objectives were, however, restated in 1979. Planned quota delivery, fixed and uniform producer prices and the control of the private grain trade, with a corresponding increase in the role of the public sector, became prominent. The state farms and the producer's co-operatives delivered their entire marketed output to the AMC at prices higher than those paid to the peasants

Licences were issued yearly and could be withdrawn for breaking of the market prices regulations. They were granted, renewed, and withdrawn by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, but on the recommendation of regional or district authorities. All merchants who collected grains from peasants were obliged to deliver at least 50 per cent of their purchase to the AMC (Holemborg 1977; Lirensen 1983: 72-85). There were, moreover, restrictions on grain movements so that merchants could sometimes not trade outside their own areas. The criteria used in the onward transmission of quotas varied across regions, awrajas, and woredas, and within Peasant Associations. Some required identical deliveries from all households and others discriminated according to such variables as income, wealth, farm size and ownership of oxen.

There was virtually a ban on private trading in some woredas, such as Hula, Harbagoona and Bansa. These woredas were known for their surplus cereal production and reserved for the AMC only. The experience of the AMC confirms that the bureaucracy of the totalitarian regime was ill-fitted to the task of setting prices and found it difficult to run commercial operations efficiently. Producer prices

were relatively stable, but only because the normal economic forces were frozen, and farmers had no incentive to increase production in the short or the long run. Production could paradoxically have expanded if the profit in parallel markets had been sufficiently high. This indicates how the political space suffocated the rural poor denying them slightest freedom where to sell their products.

The economy would have been improved only if such markets had been functioning well and if the peasants had had the freedom to sell in the free market. The system was designed, however, to impede rather than facilitate the unofficial markets, which were strictly speaking illegal. No doubt peasants did try to sell as little as possible to the AMC and as much as possible of the 'free market with poorer-quality grain being offered to the former. They did their best to maximize their returns (Love 1989: 18-23).

There can be no return to the view that production was as high as it would have been if all prices had been freely determined in a free market. For the policymakers and analysts, these co-operatives appeared to provide the basis for rapid gains in rural productivity. However, their contribution to their intended purpose was insignificant in the context of Sidama.

This was mainly because the principle of producer co-operatives did not fit the indigenous Sidaman way of sharing, according to the Chairman of the Galma Co-operative Association (7 September 2000). He admitted that 'producer co-operative associations are based on the principle of dividing the output of any work according the contribution of individuals in the process of production'. This denied the traditional Sidaman value of sharing whatever is available, regardless of the contributions of individuals. This contradiction between the new principle of producer co-operatives and the indigenous Sidaman way of sharing was an important factor in making the Sidama vulnerable to famine, for the destruction of their traditional way of sharing deprived those who were not involved in the processes of production of sympathy or those involved in the production processes were not given the opportunity to share to those who are disabled or elderly.



According to one informant, who had been working in various department of the state farm and at the time of the interview was working as the head of extension service of the Sidaman Agricultural and Rural Development Department, despite large investments and running costs, the contribution of these state farms to the total main season cereal production was insignificant (i.e. less than 2.5 percent), mainly as a result of inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption.

The justification for major policy experiments during the military regime was that it would improve the welfare of rural households by revitalizing the agricultural economy of the country. Theoretically, most of them were targeted at fundamentally changing the structure of productive relationships between land, labour, capital and output. Yet the results of such policy changes on agricultural economic activities in general and on food self-sufficiency in particular did not achieve the purpose intended. Although land reform and co-operativization introduced a new relationship with the state by the elimination of the feudal land ownership system, these measures did little to remove long-standing constraints on improved productivity (Brune 1990: 24-9). Consequently, a positive effect on output was not observed among the Sidama.

The overall impact was discouraging. The result of the centralised economic policy of the totalitarian regime that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 was reflected in the trends of economic growth. The rate of economic growth between 1974 and 1980 was 2.6 percent, by the period 1980-7 it had slowed to 0.9, and it further deteriorated, to – 7 per cent, in 1991 (Economic Intelligence Unit 1996: 6).

The impact of the land reform on the Sidama has been small. Because the quality of land and the degree of land fragmentation were rarely considered, production has remained low. Redistribution was not supported by increased security of tenure, and the incentives given to the members of producer co-operatives were discriminatory in that non-members were regarded as the opponents of this policy. These policies were formulated by central government and aimed to provide a single solution for

diverse problems without taking into consideration the socio-economic context of an area like that of the Sidama. Access to land does not necessarily mean the right of land ownership, and this limitation reduced their effectiveness as producers and deprived them of the right to sell the land during times of crisis. Access to the land is only one variable in the production function: access to inputs was largely untouched by the reform.

However, Peasant Associations, and service and producer co-operatives, rarely met their potential for stimulating rural growth. First these newly-established organizations were strongly perceived as tools for central government control of the rural environment. In Sidama, they were widely perceived as giving one-sided treatment to party members. Secondly, the co-operatives suffered from a lack of resources (improved inputs and credit). Thirdly, the price incentives necessary to raise productivity was lacking, thereby hindering any potential gains that land reform and the newly-established organizations, such as Peasant Associations and service and producer co-operatives, might have produced.

For the Sidama, therefore, land reform meant no more than a repetition of the evictions and appropriation of economic resources that they had suffered since the time of conquest and occupation by the Amharan ruling class, except that it was achieved by an organized and consolidated system of state interventions. In the past, the Sidama had been dehumanized by the northern occupying forces. During the Dergue regime the state was run by sons and daughters of the previous oppressors, who were employed and appointed on the criterion of education. Educational access and opportunities for Sidama children were deliberately denied, and therefore there was no one at any of the various levels of government that could represent the interests of Sidama.

Even if the policymakers had good intentions, practical implementation was hindered by those sons and daughters of the former oppressors as a means of retaliation. The support and enthusiasm that the Sidama gave to the nationalization and confiscation of the property of their fathers during the early

stage of the revolution prevented any possible positive outcomes of the policy for the Sidama rural community.

In effect, the political spaces of Amharization process remained the same, and the practice of politics became the negation of what politics should be. Again, the vast majority of the South, West and Eastern Ethiopia had been made vulnerable to livelihood insecurity because wars consume their economic resources, and no favourable economic and social policies have been formulated to avert the conditions in which famine took root.

Another factor that damaged the Sidama's livelihoods under the military government of the Dergue was forced villagization and resettlement. While the villagization policy was imported from Russia, the then ally of the military regime, the resettlement programme was the continuation of an Amharic policy of settling land that belonged to non-Amharas. Scott explains this policy as part of 'a century-old project of the imperial dynasty to subjugate non-Amharic-speaking peoples and, more generally, to bring fractious provinces under central control' (Scott 1998: 248). The military government justified its forces villagization as a method of modernizing a backward way of life. Mengistu declared:

The scattered and haphazard habitation and livelihood of Ethiopian peasants cannot build socialism... in so far as efforts are dispersed and livelihood is individual, the results are only a hand-to-mouth existence amounting to fruitless struggle and drudgery, which cannot build a prosperous society (Mengistu, quoted in Kebede 1992: 23).

Finally, he condemned pastoralism itself and praised villagization as a way of rehabilitating nomadic society. Forced villagization for the Sidama region was planned directly by central government in Addis Ababa with little or no local participation. Then local appointees forced farmers to move to the villages, abandoning their organized farms. They also had to move each large well-constructed *tukul* (traditional thatched house) some twenty feet so that it would be 'in a row with other *tukuls*'.

The impact of forced villagization and resettlement according to key informants interview

17/10/2000 was even more destructive of peasant livelihoods and the environment. The new settlements and villages nearly always failed as human communities and as a basis for food production. Both programmes nullified a legacy of local agricultural and pastoral knowledge of matters such as when to plant, how deeply to sow seeds, how to prepare the soil, and how to tend and harvest it. This knowledge was place-specific, in the sense that the successful growing of any varieties of crops required local knowledge about rainfall and soils, down to and including the peculiarities of each plot the farmer cultivated.

It was also place-specific in the sense that this knowledge and skill were stored in the collective memory of society. Once peasants were moved—usually to a different ecological setting—their local knowledge was all but useless. Resettlement was far more than a change in scenery. It took people from a setting in which they had the skills and resources to produce many of their own basic needs and hence the means of a reasonably self-sufficient independence. It then transferred them to a place where these skills were of little importance or not available. The destruction of social ties was almost as productive of a famine as were crop failures induced by poor planning and ignorance of the new agricultural environment. Communal ties, contacts with kin, social networks of reciprocity and co-operations, local charity and dependency had been the principal means by which villagers managed to survive periods of food shortage in the past. The disruption of such social resources by indiscriminate ‘deportation’, which often separated people from their immediate family, and to settlements that they were forbidden to leave, made the settlers far more vulnerable to starvation than they had been in their original localities.

## **5.8 Reactions from ‘below’**

Reactions, from ‘below’ refer to the responding activities devised by ethnic groups in south in

general and Sidama in particular. Responding activities geared against the consequences of conquest, consolidation of the northern ruling elite and apparent political marginalization, economic exploitation, and disruption of indigenous way of life in south and in Sidama.

The imperial project of building a unitary state faced diverse challenges ranging from peasant rebellion in every corner of the country to militant opposition from university Students. (Zewudie 1991:220). This section presents the type of political reaction and engagement in the Sidama.

Though, defeated the majority of the Sidama never accepted the political identity of Abyssinians. In fact they started the non-violent struggle that made the Sidama land no peace-nonwar zone since the occupation until 1970s. The onset of conflictive political identity had taken its shape in non-violent form after the failure of resistance. 85 years old interviewee in Dale 17/10/2000 relates this non-violent reaction to indigenous Sidama religious movement:

The Sidama religious movements grew stronger among the Sidama after 1941, when the Ethiopian Orthodox Church started to baptize the followers of the Sidama monotheistic religion against their will. At that time, there was no distinction between the said church and expanding Abyssinian empire, as the clergy were facilitating the assimilation processes. *Akaako Ayaana* played a vital role as the active medium through which the Sidama accepted the struggle as inspired by supernatural forces. i.e. their Almighty God mediating through ancestors' spirit

This suggests that for the Sidama people, the period was one of severe stress. In the face of dissatisfaction with the existing world, they looked forward to a better one whose imminent arrival was articulated by local prophets. This also shows that the circumstances under which anti-occupation movements had developed in Sidama were one of acute social change, where old ways of life had been disrupted, but full assimilation into the new political identity had not been achieved.

Indigenous culture in the conquered areas placed a great deal of emphasis on the exchange of gifts as a basis for building friendship and resolved disputes through the system of exchanges of economic materials with each other (Gellner 1983:84-87). The occupiers who arrived in Sidama did not share the

same view of relationships. The anti-occupation movement reorganised after a strategic retreat of 42 years. This movement took non-violent form. After 1941, Sidaman monotheistic religion took the stage of resistance, longing for the restoration of the Sidama way of life.

This also indicates that religious approaches offers credence to the view that religion does not always perform purely conservative functions with respect to conflictive political relationships of dominance. In other words, religions do not necessarily constitute an obstacle to the autonomy of subordinate groups or their alliance against domination. In societies like that of the Sidama, whose world outlook is predominantly religious, Amharization combined with Trinitarian teachings have caused cultural and religious disorientation and political disempowerment. When they found themselves reduced to subordinate positions, they were directed towards developing a strategy of autonomy and striking an alliance against it.

The spirit of ancestors known as *Akaako Ayaana* has provided the Sidaman people with a basis for reorganization, by creating a conducive ground for group consciousness, organization and mobilization. Group consciousness means that the Sidamas perceived themselves as a dominated group distinct from the dominating Amhara. This perception was an awareness of not only the implicit consciousness of their difference from the dominant Amhara, but also attained an explicit perception of collective opposition and rejection.

.In terms of group organization, *Akaako ayana* ,gave the Sidama the unity for their continuous existence and periodically repeated the collective utilization of space, time and resources to prepare themselves, to plan activities and to achieve an agreed upon plan. In terms of group mobilisation, the *Akaako Ayaana* served to bring together the scattered resources of the Sidama not simply in spontaneous actions of protest expressing the demands of isolated groups, but also in the systematic and continuous actions of accelerating offense against political and economic domination.

These actions paved the way to broaden and deepen the transformative capacity of Sidaman power.

Through the experience of the failure and success of *Akaako ayaana*, the sidama learned and began to develop secular political organizations. Thus the religious movement laid the foundation for secular political organization, For example, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) in 1970s, the Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) in 1999. The Sidama National Liberation Organization in 2002, United Sidama Parties in 2012, based on ethnicity that has been fighting openly against political identity-based domination of Amharas and Tigreans.

The survival of Sidaman political institutions is due to the political discourse re-enforcing nascent ethno-nationalism despite untold torture and sustained pressure to destroy traditional values, their religious beliefs passing the audacious performance of the past generation by oral literature, poems and songs such as *weeddo*, *faaro*, *geeraarsha*, *hano*, and *Haarookise*. The latter, in turn, served as the sources of inspiration for for sense of pride in being sidama and the survival of its nationalism

Suffocating political space and the mistreatment of the Sidama in their own land led to the resistance of conquest, strategic submission, and sporadic disorganised armed struggles in the two governments of Menelik and Haileselassie. This disorganised, struggle led by Lanqamo Naare and Teklu Yota laid the for inspiration of the new generation who were suffering from conflictive political identity.

The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) is one of a number of movements in Ethiopia. The political, economic and socio-cultural domination of the Amhara led to a number of violent uprisings in the centre and on the periphery of the country.

In the centre, during 1960s and 1970s, historians witnessed the Ethiopian Student Movements shaping their struggle dominantly on class as a political identity but there was exceptional ethno-centric struggle driven by Waleign Mekonnen. (Balsvik 2005:71-78, Kiflue 1993:35-40; Mulatu and Abate 1988:36). On the periphery however, the peasants organized their struggle against the regime along ethnic lines. For example, the Michile rebellion in the Gedeo, the Ejole Bale rebellion of the

Oromo, the Woyane rebellion in Tigray, and the Sidama Liberation Movements overtly or covertly.

In support of those struggles Walleign Mekonnen published in the student magazine, *The struggle*, an article entitled 'On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia'. In this article, he challenged the very idea of Ethiopian unity by saying 'Ethiopia was not yet a nation but an Amhara-ruled collection of a dozen nationalities with their own language ways dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity' (quoted in Balsvik 2005:276-75). This paved the way for widening ethnocentric struggle action in the periphery and its legitimization by students at the centre who raised the key slogan 'equality of nationalities' in Ethiopia.

Thus, the contemporary organized political struggle of the Sidama started in the late 1970s, 85 years old interviewee in Dale traces the emergence of the Sidama Liberation Movement to religious intolerance policy of the military regime:

The Sidama Liberation Movement was evolved from people's resentment against successive Ethiopian governments. It reached its climax when the Marxist military regime declared open intolerance against religious freedom. For conservative and monotheistic Sidama. It is an abuse against their religious performance such as *anga* literally means pure hand, symbolising purity of mentality and performance staying free from sin and far from harming humanity. This led to the war of liberation. Particularly the Sidama monotheists living in South Eastern and North West and North East start to sell their cattle and their oxen to buy machine guns and bullets, building their military capacity against the military regime. The wealth of cattle if converted to other economic activities could have contributed to individual and social development, but was now diverted to war preparation.

This was coupled with other political developments in the Horn of Africa, which was the ambition of forming Great Somalia in the Africa, which encouraged and supported the irredentism and ethno-nationalism that had already taken roots.

The Sidaman public, at large started to face yet another shock, before they had recovered from the shock of eviction from their land they had to face yet another event that strongly contributed to their livelihood deterioration and vulnerability. This was the war between the military regime in power in Ethiopia and the fighters of the Sidama Liberation Movement. This war in Sidama was one of the best-



kept secrets of the military regime of Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 (Human Rights Watch 1991: 87). Despite the intensity and scope of the fighting, the huge destruction in human lives and the economic and physical impacts of the war for the Sidama, the Ethiopian political discourse barely mentions it.

The start of war had some continuity with the struggles of the Ejole Bale (Oromo Liberation Front in Eastern part of Ethiopia) and the Somali Abo Liberation forces in the 1960s and 1970s. But the launch of the actual guerrilla war started when 700 trained and well-armed soldiers returned from Somalia and attacked the army camp in the Bansa and Arooresa districts in Sidama. According to both the government and informants of the Sidama Liberation Movement, the first victory for the Sidama Liberation Movement at the battle of Hache (just five kilometres south of Daye town) inspired and motivated ordinary people to join the SLM.

Encouraged by popular support, the movement controlled four districts, namely, Arooressa, Bansa, Harbagoona and Hula, and the highland parts of three districts, namely, Dale, Shabadino and Hwassa, for four successive years from 1980 to 1984. The battles of Borricha in Shabadino, and of Woterassa in Malga, respectively 25 kilometres south and 30 kilometres south-east from Hawassa, the capital of Sidama province, were fought between highly-equipped Dergue soldiers and ill-equipped but heroic Sidaman peasantry, and are examples of the popular support the Sidama Liberation Movement enjoyed.

The counter-guerrilla operations of the regime were massive in scale. However, there was no official recognition or statements about the existence of the war. The army that was mobilized for the counter attack was not very knowledgeable about the society, geography and culture in which it was operating. The regime never tried to understand the problem of the Sidama that gave rise to the guerrilla movement and its counterattack was both repressive and mass-targeted. Describing the civilian suffering that resulted from the counter guerrilla operation, a 79 years old interviewee in Hawaassa 26/10/2000 narrates the following:

... the terrible event that affected our lives happened during the war between the Tora [the Sidama Liberation Movement Army] and the Dergue [ the military government of Mengistu] soldiers. At that time a lot of soldiers came to Weele Magaado via kibremengist crossing the Ganale River. They took all of our farming land and dug ditches and pitched tents. We were pushed out of our houses by soldiers wearing helmets and equipped with guns. Our children were afraid and terrified. They shouted ‘Go away from here to Sayid Bare’. They killed our animals and skinned them. They abused us in our own houses. We left our village for the mountainous Odiboko. We stayed in the mountains for one week with nothing to eat and drink. After three weeks in the mountains we travelled to Bansa through Girja. We were stopped by a group of soldiers in a civilian car. Our people dispersed and ran away. They caught me and asked where the Tora people were. When I said I didn’t know them, they started to demand my money. When I said no they stripped me naked and found 500 *birr*, which they took. After that they beat me, shooting near my ear, and then released me after taking all of my cattle. Finally I reached Harbegona where I got food and shelter from our *ayiide*. After two days some of our friends who were dispersed joined me. In the following two months the *ayiide* started to collect money to buy cows for us. Finally we settled in Garamba. We used to come to Aleta during coffee harvest to collect coffee for rich farmers saving our wages to buy additional cows. After three years we left Garamba for Lokka because it was too cold for our children. Lokka is another corner of the country in the lowlands of Dale and Shabbadino with good pastoral land.

According to Human Rights Watch:

In January 1981, 2,000 people were reported killed by an army patrol at Odiboko, Chire, villages in Sidama. Between 19 and 21 March helicopters and aircraft attacked at Gaata, Worancha in Sidama and caused at least 20,000 people in one valley to flee, and over 1,000 and possibly more than 2,000 were reported killed when a ‘wall of flames’ was ignited by bombing using either phosphorous or ethylene’ (Human Rights Watch 1991: 87).

The main problem of the Dergue in this period was that it considered all local people living where the guerrillas operated as their supporters. Therefore, people like these informants were civilian targets for the Dergue military.

The third event is also associated with eviction of the Sidama so that their grazing land could be used for military training purposes. The Bilaate Military Training camp has an area equivalent to fifteen Peasant Associations in the highlands. The author was taken there for military training while he was a fourth-year university student in 1991.

The informants explained how militarization and the Bilaate Military Training Camp establishment in Lokka Abbaaya district adjacent to the Bilaate river contributed to the deterioration of their economic and social resources and their vulnerability to the 1999 famine:

After a few years we were forced to leave our grazing land in Lokka as the government established a military training camp in Bilaate. More than two thousand people left a huge area of grazing land. We had to go to Bakke Lalima near a state farm. In Bakke Lalima drought took our cattle and many of our grandchildren. After the death of my brother and wife I was forced to leave the area as I had no money to buy food. Now we are here with our *ayiide*.

Thus the military camp was established by evicting the present famine victims, including this informant, in 1988-9. Many of the 1999/2003 famine victims confirmed that they have suffered similar terrible conditions and traumatic events, which have destroyed their capacity for sustainable self-sufficiency, and reduced them finally to destitution and famine. For instance, before they were rehabilitated from the trauma of losing their land, cattle, and houses in Adaare, they were also hit by war in Arooressa, Bansa, Harbegoona, and Hula, the highland part of Shabadino, Dale and Hawassa for four years from 1979 to 1983.

This was followed by eviction from the lowland of Lokka Abbaaya which from 1988 onwards was established as the Bilaate Military Training Camp. Thus the backbone of the pastoral cattle herders' economy was continually eroded by a reduction in the quantity and quality of their herds. Most of the highland Peasant Associations began to be overcrowded with people and cattle evicted from their original lowlands first by commercialization, then by war. This led to over-cultivation, a reduction of soil fertility, and poor production per hectare.

This outline of the conflicts between pan-Ethiopianist and ethno-nationalists in Sidama explains some of the reasons for the deterioration in the livelihoods of the majority of the Sidama and contributing factors for destitution and asset loss that has its own role for the 1999/2003 famine.

## **Summary**

This chapter has analysed historical and political trends that paved the way for conflictive political identities. It also depicted the root causes of the political space of conflictive identities; the processes of conflictive identities; and the impact of both on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama.

It presented, how the Abyssinian conquest, consolidation and administrative control of the present Ethiopian territory in the south, (including Sidama) east, and west created two conflictive political identities. While the political space from the above constitute, the institutions, the discourse of Amharization and forced Christianization and actions successive governments of Ethiopia, it also depicted the type of political engagements between the two conflictive political identities in three successive Ethiopian governments.

It also showed that the impact of political engagements that ranged from non-violent religious to violent armed struggle on the lives and livelihood of the Sidama. It explained food insecurity and famine as the last stage of institutional disruption and deterioration under three successive governments that undermined the coping strategies from below culminated in 1999-2003 famine in Sidama.

The deterioration of livelihoods food security that paved the way for 1999/2003 famine is the result of cumulative effects from the suffocating of political space by institutions, discourses and actions from, 'above', and the consequences of distrust, disinterest and that created non violent and violent engagements from 'below' and their consequences such as loss of life and livelihoods, internal displacement, disruption, resource diversion and destabilization with its cumulative effects on marginalised Sidama.

## **CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL SPACE OF CONDITIONED IDENTITIES AND ITS LINK TO FAMINE**

### **6 Introduction**

This chapter aims firstly, to present the genesis of conditioned identities and its impact on livelihoods and land use pattern in sample districts. Secondly, to assess the political space in Sidama from 1991 to 1994 and the trend of engagement. Thirdly, to show, how the Sidama's 1999-2003 Famine was the product of narrowing the political space.

This chapter is organised as follows. The first section explores the genesis and the trend of conditioned political identity in the Sidama. The second section evaluate the political space among the Sidama from 1991 to 1994 and shows how the width of political space allows effective engagement and better livelihood access. The third section deals how narrow political space leads to disengagement and livelihoods and food insecurity finally to famine of 1991 to 2003.

#### **6.1 Genesis and the trend of conditioned political identities in the Sidama**

Using qualitative methodology is helpful to grasp how historical processes that have shaped the political spaces of conditioned identities. Life stories, key informant interviews, ethnographic studies and triangulating them with available literature helps understanding how political identities are inherited from earlier generations. This section discusses the genesis of conditioned political identities in the Sidama. Its origin can be traced back to the introduction of unusual land tenure systems, right after the conquest.

Available evidence suggests that how the introduction of land tenure change was linked to remuneration in lieu of payment from central government to those who were integrated into the political settings of the period. For instance, while the civil servants in neighbouring Kenya were paid by the central government of British Colonial Administration those who were in the military and administrative sections in Ethiopia were not paid by central government of Menelike II but by land and labour, As Kittermaster (1919:2) recorded :

For this purpose, [payment], [the natives] are allocated to officials and soldiers according to rank. This means that not only do the natives have to pay tribute to the Ethiopian government but also they have to pay tribute to official[s] to whom they have been allotted.

Kittermaster was writing about the differential obligation of two Oromo community divided by British Colonial Administration in northern Kenya and Borana of Southern Ethiopia respectively. In fact his report represented the fate of all conquered people in Ethiopia.

Thus, all conquered people in current southern Ethiopia were denied the right to own land. For the Abyssinian conquerors , gaining new fertile territory made it possible to remunerate loyal servants and troops with grants of land, to provide much necessary agrarian surplus, and significantly to increase the taxable revenue of the imperial state. The new relationships of domination and submission that characterized the south, west and east were distinctively different from those applying in northern Abyssinia, where *rist* (the inheriting of land on a hereditary basis) was the prevailing condition in the landholding system. The new political space of dispensation laid the foundation for the formation of new conditioned political identities and social groups, of which there were four main kinds:-

1. The Amhara landlord settlers; integrated into the political settings;
2. Local allies of the settlers loyalists those who were equally, remunerated for their trust and services their provision of northern settlers with guiding services and local information;
3. Sceptics those who were politically active but refused to co-operate with Northern settlers and

4. Those that were neither politically active nor trusted or interested by/in the political settings of the time consequently “marginalised”.

***Integrated:-*** The term integrated derived from the processes of integration. This refers to higher level of engagement in the processes of empire building mission and vision initiated by Menelik II and followed by successive governments of Ethiopia to date. Evidences suggest that the participants in empire building and have been two Abyssinian Ethnic groups the Amhara from late 1880s to 1991 and the Tigre 1991 to date.

***Loyalists:-*** - were the local allies of the northerners with empire building. Although there might be the possibility of integrating the loyalists into general political settings, there seemed a restriction dependent on the political activities and commitment of the locals in the processes of accomplishing, political, economic, social and cultural interest of the northerners. Furthermore, the degree to which the loyalists showed that they avoided backsliding to serving local interest the worst threat the northerners feared. This does not mean however they were not rewarded for their alliance and loyalty.

In feudal regime, for example, their trust and interest in the political system and ideology meant they were given military titles, Girazmach, QegnAzmach, Administrative positions, Balambaras, and special land right called balabats, and Qoro.

In military government, High officials of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) were given some administrative positions in Sidamo Province, sub-provincial Sidama Awuraja administrative positions, district administrative positions and formal and informal exemptions from economic restrictions of the command economy.

In the EPRDF government:- Access to administrative positions like Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, Sidama Zone and districts; Pooling available ethnic Sidamas civil servants who were scattered all over Ethiopia to the Sidama Zone and various districts in

the Zone, and offering access to urban land for house construction in Hawassa and other towns, restricted to non-Sidama settlers in earlier regimes; allowing loyalists to have access to coffee business formerly, dominated by Silte and Gurage ethnic group in present regime of the TPLF dominated EPRDF.

***Sceptic Sidama:-*** Forms the political identities of the Sidamans who are highly interested in politics, but report low trust on politicians and political institutions of successive governments of Ethiopia in Sidama. At the beginning they were indigenous cultivators; they remained as occupiers, if not owners. Those groups identified as having “disbelief in the possibility of good” in dealing with political institutions and politicians of successive Ethiopian governments. It is possible to make a distinction between zealous scepticism and milder forms. Zealous scepticism is usually, connected to ideological beliefs that are highly critical of government, for example, “government is always out to get the ordinary citizen” The examples of those group consists of Sidama indigenous religious leaders, prophets, defenders during the period of conquests, of the Sidama during 1890s, individuals that initiated disorganised individual fighting and the leaders Liberation Movement , their access to livelihood assets was dependent on the zeal of scepticism.

***Marginalized Sidama:*** - Forms political identities of the Sidama who reports low interest in any politics, low trust in politicians and political institutions and strive for alternatives or internalise the way they are marginalised. They are marginalised in the processes of accessing livelihood assets. At the beginning of the new land tenure, these were cultivators who resisted the conquest and were driven from the land, they represent victims who were caught in war of 1970s and 1980s, between the guerrillas of the Sidama Liberation Movement and the communist regime commonly known as the Dergue and were the famine victims of the 1999/2003 famines in Sidama. Most of them are peasants and some of them agro-pastoralists.

***Conditioned political Identities and livelihood assets access in Sidama:*** This sub-section discusses



the impact of conditioned political identities of the Sidama and on their access to livelihood assets. Right after the conquest, most of the marginalised and sceptic Sidamans were deprived of their right to access land a critical asset of the agro-pastoralist's livelihood. Following Italy's occupation of Ethiopia, (1936-1941), the Italian government exempted the Sidama people from paying taxes and other labour obligations. Italian government restored land ownership rights for Sidamans. However, after Italy left Ethiopia in 1941, the restored HaileSellasie government increased the magnitude of the marginalized Sidaman's suffering.

Subsequently, in Sidama, from 1941 to 1960 land without *gabbar* (tenants) was considered by the Northern occupiers to be *tef meret* (waste land) and, irrespective of whether it was arable or not, such land was considered to be lacking in value. As a result, when the imperial government made land grants, what was dispensed was not just any portions of land, but *lem meret* (fertile land), that is, land with *gabbar* or peasant cultivators.

In rural areas, the grant of land was measured not in square metres or hectares, but according to the number of the *gabbar* or peasants cultivating it. Since the Abyssinian occupiers did not farm by themselves, the grantees were often the absentee landlords to whom the *gabbar* were required to hand over the bulk of their crops, as well as render personal services. In this way, the Northern settlers established the *gult* system, which gave them the right to collect tribute in the form of agricultural produce. This could be anything from one-third to three-quarters of peasants' crops.

The Dergue's reform can be regarded as agrarian socialism that created breathing space for agrarian livelihoods aimed at collectivization of small-scale farms and converting former commercial farms into state farms. The overall impact of the Dergues' land reforms did not alter the living standard of peasants, although it restored the human dignity for landless, former daily labourers, the tenant cultivators and generally the marginalised majority.

***The smallholders:*** - This identity entails individual households, which are responsible for approximately 95 per cent of total production in Sidama. On paper, individuals were given access rights to a maximum of ten hectares for private production, yet in practice, average holdings per household did not exceed two hectares, in 1970s (Brune 1990: 15-29), and had been reduced to an average of 0.337 hectares in 2000, owing to overpopulation.

**The Peasant Associations:-** These were the result of the Ethiopian Student Campaign known as *Edget Behebret yewuqtina yesira zemecha*. This campaign was mobilized by the military government commonly known as the Dergue, which came to power after the downfall of Emperor Haile Sellassie. The Peasant Associations were the lowest structure through which the top-down hierarchy of the administrative powers of the newly-established military government aimed to reach the peasants. Approximately one million households were organized into 528 Peasant Associations in the Sidama along geographic lines. These associations controlled the allocation and the use of land, each being responsible for about twenty-five *gasshas* (1,367 hectares). Almost 40 per cent of the Peasant Associations were ‘villagized’ by the end of the 1980s.

***The leaders of the Peasant Associations:*** The leaders of Peasant Associations and other government administrative structures did not take into consideration the traditional clan structure and the form of governance they operated, but simply the loyalty of the office –holders to the government and to the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). This contained potentials of conflicts between the Sidama and the military government as the former expected the restoration of the lost social structure formerly organized by each clan chief’s *mote*.

The military government considered the traditional Sidaman social structures to be as reactionary as the previous regime had done, and therefore the Peasant Associations were encouraged to ‘modernize’, that is, to work towards the formation of service and producer co-operatives. The service co-operatives were interim organizations designed to sell farm inputs, provide storage and processing facilities, offer

low-interest loans, and facilitate the sale of local produce.

The next firm, but eventually unsuccessful, intention of the Dergue regime was the formation of producer co-operatives. These co-operatives pooled land, labour and other resources in an attempt to capture economies of scale. According to experience of one informant a member of in the Galma producer co-operative Association, each day of labour provided by members to communal fields was awarded one 'point'. The communal harvest was then divided according to the number of points held per household.

In order to attract members, the producer co-operatives offered lower taxes, interest free loans, and priority access to inputs and consumer goods. The Galma Producer Co-operative Association in Aleta Wondo and the Beera Co-operative Association in Dale are the best-known of their kinds in Sidama, and were visited by President Mengistu Hailemariam. After the establishment of these Peasant Associations, service co-operatives and producer co-operatives, government intervention in all kinds of economic activities hindered market freedom

***The managers of state farms:-*** These farms were the successors of the pre-1974 commercial farming, and the smallest component of the farming system introduced by the Dergue government. All of them were owned by the Amhara ruling classes and their foreign allies in the northern and western Sidaman lowlands, particularly in Awassa Zurias, western Shabadino and the Dale lowlands. They were converted to state farms and run by the Ministry of State Farms from 1979 onwards. Because the state farms had grown to occupy larger areas, adjoining Peasant Associations suffered further evictions particularly of the Sidama cattle herders living in the western lowlands, currently, Lokka Abaya district. They were forced to leave their traditional pastures, which were later converted to a military training centre around Bilaate, and join state farms. This transfer paved the way for the deterioration of their economic circumstances and made them more vulnerable to famine.

This restructuring, followed by recentralised economic policies. Thus, the Ethiopian administrative

structure during military regime consisted of Central government in Addis Abeba, provincial administration *teklay gizat* renamed as *kiflehager*, sub-provincial remained *awraja*, district remained *woreda*, service co-operatives and Peasant Associations. There were grain-purchasing task forces at each of these levels. Once the quota allocation had been determined nationally, each region received its allotment. This in turn was passed to *awraja* task forces, then to the *woreda*. After that, instructions were given to service co-operatives, the Peasant Associations, and lastly to peasants.

The impact of the land reform on the Sidama has been small. Because the quality of land and the degree of land fragmentation were rarely considered, production has remained small. Redistribution was not supported by increased security of tenure, and the incentives given to the members of producer co-operatives were discriminatory in that non-members were regarded as the opponents of this policy. These policies were formulated by central government and aimed to provide a single solution for diverse problems without taking into consideration the socio-economic context of an area like that of the Sidama. Access to land does not necessarily mean the right of land ownership, and this limitation reduced their effectiveness as producers and deprived them of the right to sell the land during times of crisis. Access to the land is only one variable in the production function: access to inputs was largely untouched by the reform.

However, Peasant Associations, and service and producer co-operatives, rarely met their potential for stimulating rural growth. First these newly-established organizations were strongly perceived as tools for central government control of the rural environment. In Sidama, they were widely perceived as giving one-sided treatment to party members. Secondly, the co-operatives suffered from a lack of resources (improved inputs and credit). Thirdly, the price incentives necessary to raise productivity was lacking, thereby hindering any potential gains that land reform and the newly-established organizations, such as Peasant Associations and service and producer co-operatives, might have produced.

For the Sidama, therefore, land reform meant no more than a repetition of the evictions and appropriation of economic resources that they had suffered since the time of conquest and occupation by the Amharan ruling class, except that it was achieved by an organized and consolidated system of state interventions. In the past, the Sidama had been dehumanized by the northern occupying forces. During the Dergue regime the state was run by sons and daughters of the previous oppressors, who were employed and appointed on the criterion of education. Educational access and opportunities for Sidama children were deliberately denied, and therefore there was no one at any of the various levels of government that could represent the interests of Sidama.

Even if the policymakers had good intentions, practical implementation was hindered by those sons and daughters of the former oppressors as a means of retaliation. The support and enthusiasm that the Sidama gave to the nationalization and confiscation of the property of their fathers during the early stage of the revolution prevented any possible positive outcomes of the policy for the Sidama rural community.

In effect, the political spaces of Amharization process is a zero-sum game, and the practice of politics became the negation of what politics should be. Again, the vast majority of the South, West and Eastern Ethiopia had been made vulnerable to livelihood insecurity because wars consume their economic resources, and no favourable economic and social policies have been formulated to avert the conditions in which famine took root.

Villagisation and resettlement policies that was the continuation of an Amharic policy of settling on the land that belonged to non-Amharas, had negative effects on Sidama. Scott explains this policy as part of ‘a century-old project of the imperial dynasty to subjugate non-Amharic-speaking peoples and, more generally, to bring fractious provinces under central control’ (Scott 1998: 248). The military government justified its forces villagization as a method of modernizing a backward way of life. Mengistu declared: ‘The scattered and haphazard habitation and livelihood of Ethiopian peasants

cannot build socialism... in so far as efforts are dispersed and livelihood is individual, the results are only a hand-to-mouth existence amounting to fruitless struggle and drudgery, which cannot build a prosperous society' (Mengistu, quoted in Kebede 1992: 23).

Finally, he condemned pastoralism itself and praised villagization as a way of rehabilitating nomadic society. Forced villagization for the Sidama region was planned directly by central government in Addis Ababa with little or no local participation. Then local appointees forced farmers to move to the villages, abandoning their organized farms. They also had to move each large well-constructed *tukul* (traditional thatched house) some twenty feet so that it would be 'in a row with other *tukuls*'.

The field study suggests that the impact of forced villagization and resettlement was even more destructive of peasant livelihoods and the environment. The new settlements and villages nearly always failed as human communities and as a basis for food production. Both programmes nullified a legacy of local agricultural and pastoral knowledge of matters like when to plant, how deeply to sow seeds, how to prepare the soil, and how to tend and harvest it. This knowledge was place-specific, in the sense that the successful growing of any varieties of crops required local knowledge about rainfall and soils, down to and including the peculiarities of each plot the farmer cultivated. It was also place-specific in the sense that this knowledge and skill were stored in the collective memory of society.

Once peasants were moved-usually to a different ecological setting – their local knowledge was all but useless. Resettlement was far more than a change in scenery. It took people from a setting in which they had the skills and resources to produce many of their own basic needs and hence the means of a reasonably self-sufficient independence. It then transferred them to a place where these skills were of little importance or not available. The destruction of social ties was almost as productive of a famine as were crop failures induced by poor planning and ignorance of the new agricultural environment.

Communal ties, contacts with kin, social networks of reciprocity and co-operations, local charity

and dependency had been the principal means by which villagers managed to survive periods of food shortage in the past. The disruption of such social resources by indiscriminate ‘deportation’, which often separated people from their immediate family, and to settlements that they were forbidden to leave, made the settlers far more vulnerable to starvation than they had been in their original localities.

When we explore present land tenure in Ethiopia since 1991 and its impact on accessing land, Land and all natural capital in Ethiopia is characterised by state ownership, and devoid of any privatization. The Ethiopian governments’ discourse and justification for its land ownership is to avoid the “re-emergence of wealthy land owners”, “class differentiation” and “exploitative labour relation” that may arise from privatization of land tenure, and with the notion of “egalitarian” access to natural capital in general and land in particular (Devereux & Gunter 2007, Devareux *et al.* 2005).

The political discourse of the Ethiopian government asserts that egalitarian access can be assured by periodical redistribution of the land which equally, seems less practical. Even if it is practical, it never enhances egalitarian access, but in fact it destabilises tenure security and livelihood disruptions that may lead to livelihood and food insecurity.

While EPRDF government officially, justifies its public ownership of the land on egalitarian perspectives, its tolerance of informal land market deprived the household heads and traditional elders and leaders from allocating land to new couples, as key informants interviews suggest due to the land is being transferred to those who have financial power and political backing for legalisation of forbidden land market. Furthermore, (due to uncontrolled urbanisation creating rocketing land price in the informal market that deprived them of tenure security) are among the policy tragedies behind livelihood and food insecurity, that culminated in the 1999-2003 famine in Sidama.


## Livelihoods and Land use pattern among the sample of study

***Livelihood activities land use in Dale:*** The Sidama Zone Finance and Economic Department 2010 report states three livelihood zones have been identified in Dale district. These include (1) ***highland/midland*** cash crop, which includes four *kebeles* producing *enset*, maize, coffee, potato/sweet potato, and fruits; (2) ***midland/lowland*** cereal food crop and cash crop livelihood system which consisted of 15 *kebeles* producing food and cash crops including maize, *enset*, vegetables, fruits, haricot bean, and coffee; and (3) ***midland/lowland*** cereal crop and livestock mixed livelihood system, which consisted 17 *kebeles* producing cereals, haricot bean, and *enset* (Amharic) *weese* (Sidaamu *affoo*) for the staple crop commonly known as false banana.

Off-farm income generating activities (IGAs) also contribute to the livelihood of the community apart from farming activities in Dale district. Half of the population, of both men and women are engaged in different types of income generating activities (IGAs). The bimodal rainfall has an advantage in terms of producing both short season (annual) crops and long –season (perennial) crops in intercropping and relay cropping systems.


The sample households for the Sidama Zone Finance and Planning report in Dale district showed that an average farm size is 0.5 ha. 81.3% of the households have less than 0.5 ha land holding. For this reason, 93% of the farmers in the woreda do not possess oxen and hence 80% of them prepare their land using hand tools. The figure below shows land use pattern in Dale. Figure 6.3 below shows the livelihood pattern among the study communities.





**Figure 6-3 Agro-ecology as natural capital and the bases of livelihoods**


**Source: Adopted from livelihood classification studies in SNNPRS 2005.**



**Figure 6-4 land use pattern in Dale by per cent.**

**Source:** adapted from Sidama Zone Finance and Planning Department 2010 report

***Livelihood activities land use in Lokka Abbaya:*** As opposed to Dale district, where crops occupy the major share of the total land, the size of potential productive land covers the higher share (44 per cent) of Loka Abaya's land area. This was followed by crops (32 per cent), grazing land (12 Pere cent ), forest- land (8 per cent ), non-arable land (3per cent ) and land under institutes 2per cent ) see Figure 6-4. It is presumed that potential productive land might apply for both livestock and crop production. Hence, Lokka Abbaya seems potentially more productive than Dale district



**Figure 6-5 Land use in Lokka Abbaya in per cent**

**Source:** adapted from Sidama Zone Finance and Planning Department 2010 report

## **6.2 The political space in Sidama and the trend of engagement (1991 to 1994) .**

The period 1991-1996, witnessed relative width of the political space in the Sidama. In the immediate aftermath of the ousting of military rule, the interim legislative assembly, known as the Council of Representatives (COR) was established at the July 1991 conference. The COR in turn approved the formation of a transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The change was perceived by the opponents and the sceptic of the earlier regimes and marginalised as the way to federalism, the liberal political economy, and the right of the country's ethnic groups to self-determination as major political principles.

All those political movements that had shaped their struggles along ethnic lines, fighting the Dergue regime succeeded in overthrowing the communist military junta, while the representatives of the victorious ethnically based political movements gathered to run the transitional government and draw up a charter to handle the problems behind recurrent wars. One Key informant narrates the way in which the Sidama ethno-nationalist organization participated in the (TGE) as follows:

..... The Sidamas were represented Sidama Liberation Movement, (SLM) and were provided with only two seats. One for those SLM based in Somalia, and other for its underground cell working in Sidama Land in the name of Sidama Peoples Salvation Council, (SPSC). For the Sidama group it is under-representation that never take into consideration the population size it represents, the sacrifice the Sidama has been paying in its commitment fighting against the military regime. For sidama the marginalization processes started in July 1991. Furthermore, EPRDF started setting obstacles on freedom of movement to SLM among the Sidama. This was aggravated when EPRDF carried out unsuccessful assassination attempt to SLM's leaders. This occurred on 8 December 1991 about 19:00 local time, in Hawassa while they were on their way back home after their conference. Three sidamas were killed and four wounded. This was followed by mass arrests the members, supporters, sympathisers of SLM. When TPLF became aware of the Sidama were sceptic of TPLF and start to support SLM, TPLF started violence against the leadership of SLM. Then, TPLF started creating parallel political organisations in its own image against its peers Ethno-nationalist organisations. This was to make the leaders of these TPLF- made political organizations loyal instrument of the hidden agenda. The Organizations created and controlled by the TPLF

include the Oromo peoples' Democratic Organisation (OPDO), Sidama Peoples Democratic Organization (SPDO) followed by mushrooming (Peoples Democratic organizations) PDOs for every ethnic groups of Ethiopia. The strategy of TPLF has been that PDOs are led by corrupt individuals who abuse and oppress their own people for position of power that rarely last for a year. the TPLF was not ready to allow those political organizations freedom of action fearing that they will be obstacles for its political programmes and policies. They were judged by TPLF as narrow nationalists that will destroy the Unity of Ethiopia if given a political chance, which is paradoxical attitude, TPLF i. e being ethno-nationalist itself condemning other ethno nationalists as the danger of the Ethiopian unity. In fact TPLF fabricating ethnic organization with democratic label parallel to its peers such as SLM, OLF, ONLF. This showed that TPLF was not ready to allow the Sidama Liberation Movement, (SLM) like the rest of Ethno-nationalist political organizations that were participating in the transitional government to run their programmes smoothly. Finally, the prominent political organizations that had fought against the Dergue regime left the transitional government arena, and to fight EPRDF for another round. ( Sic. Key informant in December 17, 2000).

This narration suggests the “political game” of the TPLF was how it defeated hard line pan-Ethiopianists in May 1991. Within less than a year the TPLF pushed away and humiliated independent Ethno-nationalists in 1992. Thus the TPLF, as an ethno-nationalist organization that fought for autonomy of Tigray province and Tigrayans, settled in monopolising of the political decisions of Ethiopia since May 1991. It played a middle ground role between ethno-nationalists and Pan-Ethiopianists.

Consequently, the representatives and leaders of the Sidama Liberation Movement, the Oromo Liberation Front and many other groups were forced to withdraw from the transitional government for their safety, giving an opportunity for the TLPF and its loyalists to monopolize all the decisions in the country. The promise of a genuine multi-party system vanished. It gave way to a single party under the strict discipline of the TLPF, strengthened by donors in the west with double standard kept silent and strengthened the muscle of authoritarian institutionalization by the manipulation of the TPLF, whose main intention at the time was to replace Amahra by Tigrean domination.

According to this proposal the Sidama attained its regional administrative autonomy, status that it lost in the following year, as the result of the forced merger of five regional states. After the SLM left

the TGE, the TPLF filled this political void by the SPDO after 1992. The dependent ethno-nationalist organization for Sidama, created by the TPLF was Sidama Peoples Democratic Organization (SPDO). Thus, the Sidama were forced to engage In Ethiopian Politics through SPDO until 2001.

The proposed change was actually restructuring unitary Ethiopian State into federal state based ethnicity and as depicted in the Figure 6.1.

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**Figure 6-1 Map of Proposed Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia after London Conference**

(Source: Caldwell, 1992)

**Effective engagement (1992-1995) :Partnership of the Sidama Development Programme (SDP) and Ireland Aid :** This period of relative freedom in Sidama, is related with the advent of Ireland Aid to the Sidama- zone, was an unconventional aid model. Unconventional, because the development assistance approach was based on an equal partnership with beneficiaries funding support was provided to projects or programmes directly identified and planned by the people at the grassroots without any interference from central government, which in turn created the political space of

empowerment for local communities to engage themselves on the issues that affected their lives and livelihoods.

The level of freedom can be measured by the extent of relaxation of tightened rules. In this context Ireland Aid is Bilateral aid. i.e. conventionally, the aid from one Nation state to other nation state, that starts from negotiation of the central governments of donor and recipient countries.

The Livelihoods of Engaging Political space analysis (LEPSA), examines the level of the relaxation conventional approach for the sake of livelihood resilience, security and sustainability. This involves to observe how free the individual citizens and their organizations to have their own conviction, and organization, discourse and performances. It is in this context of observing the relaxation level, the partnership of the Ireland AID and the Sidama Development Programme (SDP) and its effect on livelihoods resilience, security and sustainability of the rural Sidama can be examined.<sup>13</sup> How this relaxation extends from organizations to individual citizens to engage in the processes of need identification, setting priorities, planning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating of the projects/ programmes designed to address those needs can contribute or hinder the improvement of the lives and livelihoods of the study sample.

In this unconventional aid model, funding was characterised by direct transfer to the development programme account from Ireland Aid and managed jointly by staff of the Embassy of Ireland and Officials of the Sidama Development Programme (SDP) who were accountable both to the donor and the local Sidaman government structures. Funds were then transferred directly to the line departments responsible for the implementation of a given projects. This avoided bureaucratic delays in obtaining the required project implementation inputs.

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<sup>13</sup> The point of focus on Ireland Aid is not assessing the impact of the Ireland Aid, *per se*. But to depict how the width of the political space during these periods allowed unconventional Aid Model, that in turn facilitated effective engagement that laid foundation for sustainable livelihoods.

Financial utilization reports were prepared per months by the staffs of the (SDP) at the local level and monitored by the staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. This partnership directly with beneficiaries Organisation encouraged the engagement and the political change significantly. This manifest itself with the ownership of the project, and more importantly cultivated the sense of empowerment.

The rural Sidama started to see those projects and programmes as theirs because either they effectively engaged in the project formulation or heard the reports of the successes and failures. It was different from the earlier aid models described by corruption; consequently failed to achieve the purpose intended, in famous phrase of Moyo (2009) “Dead Aid”. The closer look at the principles of the Ireland aid and the way of its implementation helps our understanding how the wider political space of the time helped unconventional Ireland Aid model into practice. Accordingly its principles described by key informant who had been the leader of SDP, over skype on 17/10/2009 from South Africa were:

1. Focused on poverty and needs of the local communities: strictly assisting development projects in poorer areas of the region first.
2. Gender sensitivity: Strictly ensuring the women have been involved from need identification; setting priority; planning; implementation; monitoring; and evaluation processes.
3. Community participation: strictly ensuring that the community members have been involved from initial stage of development to evaluation of the successes and failure of the project. Rapid Rural Appraisals and participatory Rural Appraisals were part of all major project performance processes; At the same time; community members had to voluntarily contribute at least 20% of the project cost either through voluntary labour or material supplies to ensure sense of ownership.
4. Sustainability:- to ensure sustainability of the development initiatives supported by Ireland Aid; the programme encouraged establishment of the rural village development committee known as KDC as well as a coordinating development institution at regional level.

The key informant further added that “it enhanced the freedom of the rural Sidama to engage themselves into the issues affecting their lives without the fear of the consequences.” This suggests dramatic change in political settings that was built in centralized decision making processes.

Describing the evolution of the SDP's projects he said:

The pilot programme initially started in marginalised remote districts of Bansa and Harbagona of the Sidama zone for one year and was expanded to the rest of the Sidama-land after the successful completion of the pilot phase. Using already existing government's line departments ensured the efficient use of the available human capital and saved massive overhead costs for Ireland Aid and SDP. This not only created strong foundation for the suitability of future development efforts in the region, but also enhanced local empowerment. Furthermore; Ireland Aid was a 100 per cent development grant with no future debt implications for the Sidama region or the country at large and no other strings were attached. Awareness creation trainings and workshops for local government officials and politicians on the vitality of participatory approaches in rural development were held. Hundreds of local government officials and politicians travelled to other developing countries such as Bangladesh; Philippines and South Africa to share their experience and gain from others' on rural development activities. Sharing experience and exposure to the external world had built implementation capacity and had increased local staff commitment, the quality of service delivery, and speeded up engagement in livelihood asset creation and access to it.

This presentation suggests that during this period, Ireland Aid followed an innovative approach to tackling the development problem in Sidama. First and foremost, Ireland Aid was accountable to local people for delivery of the services promised and any future collaboration with the community members was dependent up on the fulfilment of the previous commitments. Secondly, the aid programme improved the local government capacity through continuous training and exposure programmes. Thirdly, the direct funding of project made sure that aid fungibility and corruption at the central government level were eliminated. Corruption at the local level was checked by active engagement of the community members, continued training and awareness creation that created a full sense of ownership of the programme. Project implementation by the government departments in charge was regularly monitored by the local development programme office and representatives of the donor based in Addis Ababa.

***The effect of engagement of the marginalised rural Sidama:-***In its initial period the EPRDF government allowed the Ireland Aid to go and create partnerships directly, with the local community. Using this relative freedom, Ireland Aid's model enhanced the political engagement of the marginalised rural Sidama communities through its local non-governmental organization. This



combination was an icon of effective engagement that helped to achieve the following aid success stories: presented by key informant in January 20, 2009 in Hawassa and triangulated by progress report and field observation in Sidama.

***Access to Human capital:*** Increased primary school participation rate:-after about eight years of the Ireland Aid intensive educational sector development in Sidama, the primary school participation rate increased from about 47per cent in the early 1990s to about 67per cent in 2002.

The programme built over 250 low cost primary schools, built and upgraded eight high schools and provided teacher training for over 2000 primary school teachers. It created rural jobs for over 500,000 unskilled labourers through labour intensive rural road construction. It increased access to the health services through which the rural Sidamans were able to improve their use of modern medication and medical facilities, and access to clean water for over 800,000 rural Sidama. Rural small business expanded through access to loan and the electrification of rural towns. An institute of development studies and education was built one of the first of its kind in rural capacity building in participatory development studies in the country. The centre has been upgraded to a college level and continues to operate with its own sources after Ireland Aid left Sidama.

***Access to financial capital:-*** such as rural savings and credit schemes to 30,000 rural households, primarily women and established a sustainable Sidaman Microfinance Institution which continues to operate this day.

***Access to physical capital:-*** Rural road construction connecting several Sidama districts the total length of new all-weather rural roads built by Ireland Aid was over 700 kilometres. About 200 low cost rural health posts and 4 large health centres were built and supported by the programme over 4000 highland springs were protected. Rural electrification including a micro hydroelectric power for one of the rural district capital Yaye town and generator electrification for over five rural towns was implanted.

***Improved Social Capital:*** established a network of village Kebele Development Committees (KDCs) which acted as the voice of the rural communities for issues related to their lives and livelihood.

***Released pressure on Natural Capital:-*** improved the educational, financial and physical capital capacity of the rural Sidama paved the way for livelihood diversification which in turn not only diversified the source of income but also released pressure on land cultivation which in turn helped the land lay fallow to restore its natural elements depleted by over cultivation. Effective engagement between the Sidama rural poor and Ireland Aid is unique in Ethiopian aid history in that it provided some key lessons to be learnt:

Essentially, the Ireland bilateral aid fund flowed directly to the project areas without interruption by the central government of Ethiopia. Secondly, the empowerment of the local community was crucial:- the locals were not only treated as equal partners in the processes of every phases of the project but were trusted to take the lead. Thirdly, the aid funds were development grants with no strings attached to them. Very importantly, the aid projects were not reciprocating political trust and the interest of integrated and loyalist. It integrated all beneficiaries without marginalization, unlike, the conventional aid model where the recipient countries' elite use the fund received in the name of poor for reciprocating and cultivating loyalty to the party machinery and by doing so create integrated, loyalist, and sceptic and marginalised as is the main contention of this thesis.

***Narrowing political space for the Sidama: the trend of disengagement:*** Dependency on aid is not desirable. Walking away unnoticed is also disaster. Due to narrowing political space for the Sidama, Ireland Aid did not repeat what it started at the entry point to Sidama:- that is not engaging people in its intension to withdraw itself from the Sidama in a manner it entered. The reasons for its sudden withdrawal were forwarded by ethno nationalists and by Southern Peoples Democratic Moment (SPDM) one of affiliates of EPRDF is contradictory.

An interview with one of the elites running Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), suggests that they were not happy on the positive development in the Sidama. He asserted “if the Sidama allowed to grow in this pace, it will be potential danger for unity of 56 nationalities.” Arguing from the “equitability of development” perspective, ‘Sidama is developing alone, going a head of nations nationalities and peoples in SNNPRS.’ He also clearly uttered that “the Sidama people are viewing those who are running the programme as their heroes and the Sidama lost trust on formal political leaders and their representatives in government structure; this is disaster for the Southern Peoples Democratic Movement (SPDM) and the EPRDF.” (October 17, 2008 London). A key informant in the SDP leadership, who fled Ethiopia, for South Africa escaping death, suggests how the threat to the SDP came also from central government leaders who “did not like the idea of direct funding to the programme area and openly asked the Ireland government to channel the bilateral funds to the central government treasury as other donors do.”

The same key informant mentions pressure on Ireland Aid from peer donors in Europe. He says “they [Ireland Aid Staff] were seen as anti-status quo and anti-conventional aid model among their EU member state which threatened to alienate them diplomatically from their EU partners”

This suggests that the political space for both donor (Ireland Aid) and the rural Sidama (as direct recipients) was so suffocating that Ireland Aid was forced to withdraw its direct support and engagement with the Sidama suddenly; furthermore the officials of the Sidama Development Programme (SDP) were forced to flee the Sidama for their lives.

***Tightening the political space: fought for regional autonomy forced to merge:-***After the end of transitional government the ruling party was dominated by TPLF opted to use both ethnicity (for those ethnic groups politically influential) and geographical proximity and administrative suitability for those ethnic groups it regarded not to pose a serious threat to the power of the TPLF/EPRDF.

For more than 56 ethnic groups in the South, ethnic based federalism was denied and they are still forced to remain in unitary state form within Federal Ethiopia. Even after the conquest, though they lost their independence but retained nominal regional autonomy and their names, but as a result of the present arrangement they lost even their names (for example Sidamo Province) and are now accountable to SNNPRS, losing their direct contact with the Ethiopian central government. Despite a population estimated at more than 4 million, the Sidama has now been denied regional statehood, as depicted in the following Figure 6.2.

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**Figure 6-2 Federal Administration map that adopt a mixture of ethnicity and administrative suitability after 1994**

**Source : United Nation**

For administrative purposes the EPRDF Ethiopian government is divided into ‘Federal’, Regional and zonal levels, districts (*woreda*), and Kebeles. The Sidama is one of nine Zones and five special *woredas* in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. Regional autonomy, proposed at the London conference for the Sidama in 1991, was denied by the EPRDF Government, which opted instead for establishing the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State by a forceful merger of more than 56, nations, nationalities and peoples in 1995. (see figure 6.2) That became another administrative layer between the Sidama and the Federal Government of Ethiopia and ended century old direct link with the Sidama. The loss of Sidama’s constitutional right to regional autonomy, in this regime restarted yet another struggle for regional autonomy with EPRDF

government of Ethiopia.

Even the leaders of the Sidama Peoples Democratic Organization (SPDO), which had been created and integrated by the TPLF, refused to sign the constitution that deprived the Sidama of regional statehood, and were subjected to harassment of various kinds. The vice-chairman of the SPDO and president of the Sidama Zone Administrative Council, and the Secretary of the Council, were removed from their positions and sentenced to imprisonment in January 1995 for their refusal to sign the constitution that violated the Sidama people's right to self-determination. It was decided that the official language of the newly-established regional state of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples would be Amharic.

Contrary to the spirit of the constitution, this would hinder the development of other vernacular languages and cultures. This paved the way for the Amharan' and Amharic-speaking people's domination in government posts. Thus the old unitary structure was being perpetuated, and there was a lack of genuineness in solving the problem of ethnic diversity at its root.

Sidama was forced not only to stop its demand for regional autonomy, but also suffered retaliation from grand sons and daughters of former settlers and Amharic speaking bureaucrats hiding in the government offices.

Employment reduction proposal prescribed by International Funding institutions has become part of the problems posed on ethnically conscious citizens of Ethiopia. This was witnessed by most of the government employee who were asked to fill the membership forms and pay membership fee every month if they want to retain their jobs. This demand for party membership extended to undergraduates in Universities, high schools to reciprocate job and business opportunities in exchange for support and membership to EPRDF as key informants and focus group discussions in October 2008 revealed.

This suggests that the EPRDF exploited the conditions of structural adjustment to perpetuate its

political power through reciprocating allocation of employment or retaining job opportunities for its loyalists. In every ethnic group, the TPLF has created puppets who have been appointed simply on the grounds of their loyalty to the regime or who have been elected by denying – at the point of a gun – people’s freedom to elect whoever they believe best to serve them. These inefficient and corrupt cadres, have not only created obstacles for investment, but also robbed people of their resources.

In summary this section taught us that how the width of political space is linked to effective engagement better negotiation of interests and sustainable livelihoods and how the narrower political space led to disengagement and livelihood disruption.

### **6.3 Sidama’s 1999-2003 Famine as the product of narrowing the political space**

This section deals with how the political space of conflicting and conditioned identities has prepared the ground for famine creation or response failure. Conflicting identities destabilising the political space that led to war which in turn created livelihood disruption. Conditioned identities created differential and preferential permit to access to livelihood assets

Government attempts to prevent and respond to famine depend on a degree of trust between those who are in charge of different government offices and the people they serve. In this regard, evidence suggests that the SPDO’s leaders, who had been installed by the TPLF, in their attempt to be loyal to their masters, implemented whatever their masters ordered, and consequently failed to gain the confidence and trust of the people whom they claimed to represent.

The root cause of recurrent famine in Ethiopia, as elsewhere in the world, is poverty. One of the contributing factors to poverty in Ethiopia is the recurrent wars, which for the past century have been caused by conflicting political identity commonly known as the “nationality question” by others. The quest to dominate and not to be dominated, or to oppress and not to be oppressed, the absence of the rule of law, and the violation of basic human and democratic rights.

A respect for the rule of law, democracy, accountability and respect for human rights could have paved the way, for peace, stability and an end to poverty. Framed in this way, writing a good constitution by itself does not go beyond an attempt of decorating the ugly image that appears in implementation failure in the face of International community.

If there were political will and commitment to the constitution; with wider political space of effective engagement by all concerned stake holders living in and outside the country, there could have been a ground for resolving the conflicts arising from different interests. The way conflicts are managed can facilitate or hinder peaceful coexistence and diversity. If the way of handling conflicts is based on justice, it is possible to achieve a state of peace in which people can focus on poverty reduction and the securing and sustaining their livelihoods.

The importance of a federal structure based on ethnicity for preventing and responding to food and livelihood insecurity is in the emphasis it gives to local empowerment and allowing people to solve their problems through their own indigenous knowledge, skills and practices, rather than having unsustainable solutions imposed upon them. It is highly centralised and unitary political systems of successive governments of Ethiopia that had led to conflicts and consequent wars, which have been an obstacle to development and justice, as well as to security, and the sustainability of livelihoods. Had a true federal structure been created, it would have removed some of the underlying causes.

The EPRDF government established a sound constitution and federal structure – an aim which has, however, been hindered by lack of effective practical implementation. The nationality question in Ethiopia is very important, for it was one ethnic group's quest for dominance and the resistance to that dominance by others that led to war and hence to poverty and famine as governments and opposition groups diverted all their resources to the conflict.

Key informants from the opposition and neutrals suggest that, the new constitution and federal administrative structure did succeed in temporarily stopping on-going recurrent civil war, but the

constitution was not implemented justly, and opposition in areas like Sidama was silenced by the punishments of demotion, removal from government jobs, detention and torture for their political identities.

For example, Article 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution states that ‘every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’. The intention of this article was to give constitutional guarantees to entire ethnic groups if they felt oppressed or mistreated within Ethiopia. However, in order to avert the disintegration that might result from over-ambitious leaders of ethnic groups, the constitution specified the conditions under which the right to secession could be exercised (Young 1996: 531). A key informant from the EPRDF narrates the challenge of implementation in line with the notion of constitution and retaining skilled implementers but with old attitudes as follows:

For the EPRDF an important challenge was how to reconcile the contradiction that arises from choosing to work with old bureaucrats and yet wishing to provide local empowerment. A deep-rooted bureaucratic mentality prevailed among those holding different posts in the former institutions that give services and rural development. It is, the dilemma of choosing, those who are ‘experienced’ in the field of specialisation but, who have neither the language nor any cultural or psychological understanding of the community whom they serve or those who are ‘inexperienced’ and never meet the criteria set by Civil Service Commission, even though they do have the language and an understanding of the communities in question. Key informant one of top officials. (December 17, 2000)

This suggests that, for the government removing those who have been working in the institution since its inception is difficult, but building up the capacity of local personnel takes time. However, the government will be left with the problem of implementing its aim of ‘local empowerment’ explicitly stated in its constitution if it retains the old bureaucrats.

This problem became even more complicated when profound differences in language are considered. In the context of southern Ethiopia, which contains more than 56 ethnic groups at the regional state level, decision-making was liable to be manipulated and influenced by the Amharic-speaking people, owing to the establishment of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples



Regional State, whose official language had been decided to be Amharic. The opposition figures contend the formation of this regional state against the notion of constitution as follows:

This regional state, formed without creating a southern identity, is very controversial in the context of the Ethiopian constitution and federal structure, which are based on ethnicity rather than geographical features. The official languages at sub-regional (zonal) level could be the language of natives but only in Southern Ethiopia is the official language at the regional level required to be Amharic. This gave further employment opportunities for Amharas and Amharic speaking people rather than indigenous ethnic groups. (Key informant from opposition. January 11, 2001)

The elites who belong to the 56 ethnic groups are in tough competition for the posts created at this regional level, and consequently there was an atmosphere of suspicion amongst them. This, situation was exploited by the Amharas and other non-southerners in the regional government offices, who were suffering from the trauma of losing their traditional bureaucratic power, in order to aggravate simple misunderstandings that could arise from daily interaction.

As a result, the elites who were working in southern government institutions were in constant intrigue, and spent time plotting to gain advancement rather than doing work for the prevention of famine. The constant struggle for power, along with gossip and character assassination, led to the removal and shuffling of staff from their posts every six months before they had achieved their objectives.

This happened in the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Offices in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. Had the symptoms of famine that were seen at the end of 1995 been acted upon at the time, the 1999 famine would have not taken human and animal lives on the scale it did. Ethno nationalist informants accused the bureaucrats in the following ways:

Non-Sidama bureaucrats in government institutions concentrate on paper work rather than on fieldwork. Unless those who were affected by hunger and starvation come to the office to beg them for daily food hand-outs, they did not take the initiative to go to the field and understand what is going on at the grass-roots level. (70 years old key informant January 2001 Hawassa)

On the other hand even the famine victims perceived “applying for food as begging” and were

ashamed to do it and unwilling to be seen queuing for food in front of government offices. This conservative nature of the Sidama made them more dependent on kinship ties than on their entitlement to food aid from government and non-government organisations, It was this value contradiction that became part of the problem and undermined the seriousness of the situation, despite the imminence of famine.

While the conservative attitude of the Sidama is understandable as a rejection of dependency, it provided an excuse for biased bureaucrats who expected to be begged for their services. This communication gap stems from identity conflict between the representatives of government institutions and the marginalised Sidama who were vulnerable to famine and played a role in prevention and response failure. This suggests, the marginalised vulnerable are served best by someone who understands and can be understood by them.

Second, the Sidama people were not confident that the government elite could solve their problems and would rather depend on kinship ties than on applying to the government. When one of the famine victims' household heads was asked why he did not apply to the government office for help before his household's circumstance deteriorated, he replied: 'I do not think that they would be able to understand and believe my situation. I would rather go to relatives who would pay attention, listen and do whatever he can.'

This suggests that mutual trust, confidence, positive understanding between people under the threat of famine and the host government also have an important contribution to make in the process of preventing and responding to famine. To conclude the political space ought to be wider than it was to enhance engagement between conflictive political identities, to increase famine prevention and response efficiency and effectiveness of response.

***Symptoms of famine:-***From the end of 1995 onwards, symptoms of hunger that were unusual in the

history of the Sidama began to be seen. The key informant narrates the following observation:

In the middle of March 1996, homeless families from neighbouring Peasant Associations who had recently left their homes in the Hawassa Zuria districts adjacent to Hawassa City such as Gamato Gaale, Chaffasine, Finchewa and Jarra Galalcha. These families were begging in the Sidama language in front of churches. This was a hitherto unknown phenomenon, for the rural Sidama who perceive Hawassa as an enemy camp built on the land from which they had been evicted. Moreover, in Hawassa they were victimized as Sidama whenever they came to the market and were often robbed as they travelled there and back. In Hawassa they were often imprisoned for no good reason. Finally, it was very strange to see Sidama, who often have to be begged to eat what is in front of them, begging in a public square. Starvation forced them to ignore the historical animosity between the rural Sidama and the urban northern settlers. The key informant counted 67 homeless families sleeping at night under plastic sheets in the dirty park just at the gate of the unfinished building of St Gabriel's Church, which is the biggest cathedral of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Hawassa. This was an unusual symptom for observer but it was the vulnerability and destitution were the result of crop and livestock damage, homelessness, out-migration, malnutrition, family breakup, community tensions, as well as other possible causes. ( Key informant January 7, 2001).

The narration of the key informant was also confirmed by observation as well as interviewing homeless who were begging in the same date at the same place mentioned by key informant. Drawing on his experience working in disaster prevention and preparedness and on the field research, the researcher will show that this famine was allowed to happen due to political space of conflicting political identity.

***An overview of the 1999-2003 famine:*** According to the then Ethiopian official figures, about 19.5 per cent of Sidamans were affected by famine. Once their vulnerability had been aggravated by drought, the support of destitute exceeded the safety net capacity of the traditional kinship tie. At the time, the relatives of migrants were forced to appeal to concerned government bodies in their respective districts (*Woredas*).

According to the information collected from the archives of the Sidama Zone Government Administration Council, the chairperson of each district government councils reported to the zone government council. Instead of responding, the Sidama zone government council established a team that would assess the magnitude of the famine and suggest possible action.

The team of experts was drawn from the Departments of Planning and Economic Development, Agricultural Development, Health and Water Mining and Energy in the In March 2000, the team visited a few of the Peasant Associations that were severely affected by the famine in the Shabadino and Dale Districts. The Sidama zone government council was waiting for the assessment report of the team, so as to attach it with their application to the regional government. As there were no food reserves and no institution that might have dealt with disasters such as famine at the zonal level (the then Deputy Prime Minister had disbanded all Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Departments in zonal government). Responding quickly was not possible. At the time, the Sidama Zone has nine *woredas* and 528 Peasants Associations (PAs) .Table 6.2 ) contains the details of affected people in seven *woredas* and the amount of food in quintals (one quintal is 100kg) and water in cubic meters needed for four months and one month respectively. The figures in this table are extracted from the team report. Although the report says there was a significant amount of out-migration, death and livestock damage, it provides no detailed figures.

**Table 6-1** Numbers of vulnerable and destitute Sidama in the 1999-2000 famine

s/no	Woredas	Number of Peasant Associations affected	Number who require immediate relief in:		The amount of food needed for four months in quintals	The amount of water needed for one month in cubic meters
			Water	Food		
1	Awassa	10	39,063	12,755	7,653	17,578
2	Shabadino	47	237,144	39,086	23,452	106,715
3	Dale	21	70,541	33,606	20,164	31,743
4	Aleta Wondo	4	17,630	6,000	3,600	7,933
5	Banssa and Arooreesa	6	22,800	8,125	4,875	10,260
	Total	88	387,178	99,602	59,744	174,230

Source: Sidama Zone Government Administration Council Archive

However, a close look at this research suggests that even within one district there were local

differences in vulnerability to the effects of drought. However, the report says nothing about differences in vulnerability to the effects drought that resulted from political marginalisation and subsequent income variation the evidence from Table 6.2 in the following page suggests that the local variation of the effect of drought.

Table 6-2 Vulnerable and destitute people by agro-ecology in the Shabadino district

Agro-climatic zone	No of Peasant Association	No of total population	No affected by famine		No of who became destitute and migrated to relatives in better localities
			Peasant Association	People	
Highland	15	46,373	-	-	-
Midlands	45	234,834	13	72,273	4,549
Lowlands	34	139,709	34	139,709	17,472
Total	94	420,916	47	212,982	22,021

Source: compiled from the report of Yitayehu *et al.*, 2000 :6.

There are no Peasant Associations affected in the highlands of Shabadino. The figures in this table also confirm that the lower the altitude, the higher the vulnerability to drought. In order to substantiate this argument, let us examine the situation in Dale. Dale is Shabadino's southern neighbour. It is located 45 kilometres south of the capital Hawassa. It has a total area of 144,000 hectares, 77 Peasant Associations, and 363,908 people. The average family size is six persons per household. The average landholding size is 1.2 hectares. The distribution of Peasant Association in Dale district is 9 in the highlands, 40 in the midlands and 28 in the lowlands. Table 6.4 again shows the numbers of those in Dale district who became vulnerable and destitute in different agro-climatic zone in the 1999-2003 famine. In the Dale district no Peasant Association in the highlands was affected by drought. The figures in the table show that the lower the altitude, the higher the vulnerability to drought.

**Table 6-3 Vulnerable and destitute people by agro-ecology in Dale district**

Agro-climatic zone	No of Peasant Association	No of total population	No of affected by famine		No of who became destitute and migrated to relatives in better localities
			Peasant Association	People	
Highland	9	32,771	-	-	-
Midlands	40	254,482	22	151,000	15,000
Lowlands	28	76,653	21	64,463	21,006
Total	77	363,908	43	215,463	36,006

Source: Compiled from the report of Yitayehu et al. ( 2000 :12).

That report was prepared quickly after the eruption of the famine consequences for the benefit of unsympathetic regional government officials, who were not willing to respond to the famine in Sidama. Consequently, it blames only nature, and failed to address the root causes, and the sequence of consequences.

While the report drew attention to the existence of the famine, it lacks detailed information about the famine's extent, depth, causes and consequences.

Accordingly, to most informants, during drought politically marginalised families in the midlands and highlands were also vulnerable to food shortages, while in the lowlands those who were integrated into the political system and loyalist households were not as vulnerable as those marginalised and sceptics ones. It is easy to assume that crop failure in rain-fed agriculture is due to severe drought during the same year, but the impact of drought can be felt in the next year or the following one, depending on the continuity of the drought. Thus the report was very superficial, and was not helpful for a better understanding of the causes of the 1999-2003 famine in Sidama.

From the author's experience working in disaster prevention and preparedness; it was clear that the role of drought in famine for individual households depended on each household's income and the extent of sharing of that income among the members of the household. Secondly, although the severity and continuity of the drought did not exceed five months, after which the rain came and every particle of dust was covered in green, the poorest households faced chronic food shortage and other consequences of famine despite the greenness of the land. Thus, while drought and climatic change can contribute to the failure of livelihood activities that are dependent on rain, that failure alone cannot automatically push people into famine, unless the famine prevention capacity of the population has deteriorated already.

***The role of political space of conditioned political identity:-*** the following section attempts to show the political space of conflicting identity in Sidama just at the eve of the 1999-2003 famine. There is a focus on how political instability contributed to the Sidama's descent from livelihood self-sufficiency to vulnerability and destitution, which led to famine. One informant commented the following:

Generally, in Sidama in the period that followed 1991, there was neither war nor peace. While there was no conventional war, one could not perform his or her ordinary activities peacefully. Every village was politicized, and there were mass arrests of people who continued to support the Sidama Liberation Movement rather than the Sidama Peoples Democratic Organisation. The EPRDF's politics divided clans and families, eroding the social cohesion that sprang from a common Sidama national identity, and from psychological, religious and kinship ties. People started to count the members in their families who could support or oppose political leaders, regardless of their ability to serve them. Those integrated into and loyalist to the government political settings assist every destitute person for honour and respect earlier now restricted their charity to members of their family. The destitute, without integrated and loyalists in their lineage or clan, were left without anyone to care for them. In the face of encroaching famine, people concentrated on futile politics that destroyed their unity and their sympathy for the destitute. At the same time, a reduction in the number of richer people contributed to the vulnerability of the destitute. Most of those who were better off were involved in clan politics, and the endless meetings and intrigues consumed farmers' time that could have been used for more productive livelihood purposes. (Informant January, 2000.)

The political identity conflicts arose within ethnic Sidama's following the 1991 political change reduced social cohesion and moral values, including the generosity of those who have food and other

economic resources towards those who have not.

Furthermore, the majority of peasants had failed to compete in the ‘free market’, said to have been promoted by the EPRDF government, because they had been unable to afford modern agricultural input such as fertilisers and improved seeds. While the indigenous biodiversity of crops in Sidama had been discouraged by the introduction of genetically modified crops by USAID in 1992 in the name of relief, the necessary know-how about the management of such crops, as well as the willingness to allocate financial and material resources to research, had been lacking. For instance, after the introduction of Sasakawa Global (SG) 2000-type maize, the Sidama peasants were reluctant to plant *weese* (‘false banana’), a crop which is drought-resistant but which takes a long time to mature, but they lacked the purchasing power to buy the chemical fertiliser for the type of maize, with the result that they could not repeat the crop after two or three years.

In addition to this, the traditional maize that is appropriate to the soil and agro-climatic conditions of the Sidama was abandoned because it was not encouraged by the Agricultural Development Department which was trying to implement the government’s agricultural policy without considering the consequences of its action. A report of the United Nations Emergency Unit quoted in the IRINNEWS 13 June 2002 stated:

Generally, the poor productivity of crops ... in the Sidama zone can be attributed on the one hand to the application of no or inadequate fertiliser quantities, and [on the other hand] to the use of inappropriate, poor and degenerated seeds of maize ... This year the use of improved seeds and fertilisers has significantly dropped in the Sidama Zone. The largest drop is in the use of fertilizer, which fell from 2,740, 000kg in 2000 to 311, 900 kg in 2002. The seed usage has also dropped dramatically, from 519, 000 kg in 2000 to 13,600 in 2002 (IRINNEWS.org, 13/06/2002).

The same report revealed that farmers who were unable to meet the repayments on money borrowed for improved seeds and fertilisers were jailed. Although, the report was too late in revealing the truth – more than a decade after the EPRDF’s cruel policy had made hundreds of thousands of Sidama destitute and reduced tens of thousands to diseases associated with famine – it condemned the EPRDF’s policy by saying, ‘It is immoral and impossible to expect full repayment from farm



households that are already experiencing a food shortage for the supplied agricultural extension packages' (IRINNEWS.org, 13/06/2002).

Even those who were in a position to pay back this hidden debt were not interested in the use of artificial fertilizers and genetically modified seeds any more, and were disappointed by the lack of transparency in the EPRDF's cadre. Consequently, they had been forced to return to the use of traditional seeds which they had abandoned. However, they found it difficult to return to traditional crops, because, even if they could get the seed from people who were determined not to use artificial fertilizers or genetically modified seed in previous years, they discovered that the yield of traditional seed sowed in the "spoiled" soil was far less than once was expected.

The rush to implement the EPRDF's policy without further research into its effects on the ecology, climate, soil and livelihood context of the Sidama displaced the traditional seed varieties, which had been produced in village nurseries. In the Sidama, the latter were supplying more than 95 per cent of the peasantry through a system of farmer-to-farmer exchange.

On the basis of the self-assessment of the statistically valid sample, during the 2000 research period, the number of people living in destitution had increased from 2 per cent some 30 years ago to 19.5 per cent in 2000. Perhaps even more worrying is the rise in vulnerable people from 10 per cent 30 years ago to 55 per cent in 2000. In addition to this, there had been a decline in people with sustainable self-sufficient livelihoods from 80 per cent 30 years ago to 25 per cent in 2000. This has a high correlation with conditioned political identities such as integrated and loyalists on one hand sceptics and marginalised to successive Ethiopian political systems.

Not only does this mean that many more people would need assistance when they face a seasonal shock (*lami-ledo*), but the decline in the number of households with self-sufficient sustainable livelihoods had also had a big impact on the poor. One of the first coping mechanisms for the poor is to seek assistance from the better-off households. With entire communities becoming impoverished, the poor have nowhere to turn locally for help.

The disruption of indigenous socio-political institutions, which were not replaced with feasible and sustainable institutions that could increase the famine prevention capacities of the Sidama, along with continuous alteration of institutions with each change of government, strongly disrupted indigenous famine prevention capacities, with the result that, at a certain stage of deterioration of these capacities, famine finally occurred.

***The dismantling of famine institutions:-*** The newly transformed institution entrusted with the duty of dealing with famine like disaster by the EPRDF government was the ‘Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), however, with diluted responsibility and limited resources. For example, in the centre, the National Committee for an Early Warning System comprised the following agency representatives: Commissioner and Chair Person of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), and Nodal Officers of the Minister of Agriculture, Health, and State Farms, the Central Statistical Authority, the Ethiopian Mapping Authority, the National Meteorological Services, and the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute.

The head of the National Committee for an Early Warning System was a member and secretary of the DPPC (DPPC, 1995: 7).

According to the *General Guidelines* DPPC, (1995: 9), there is no explicit structure mentioning the members of regional and zonal committees. But the *Guidelines* explicitly states that ‘Regional and Zonal committees will be established at their respective levels ... [and] will have similar structures and functions as that of the centre.’

This dilution of responsibilities, and limited resources, resulted in not responding as early as possible by awaiting the decision of the committee. Formerly, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) had a mandate to respond as quickly as possible, but the DPPC, had to await the decision of the committees as to whether it should intervene or not in a famine that was taking life every day.

Secondly, a bottom-up and horizontal process in analysing and synthesising information on the

encroachment of famine is likely to produce the best prioritisation in preventing and responding to famine at the local level. This suggests that regional and district level food security analysis and planning are required in order to diagnose problems and prioritise solutions. The EPRDF government's commitment to famine relief was often compromised by its other priorities and also by the fact that its own survival is to some extent dependent on the continuation of famine recounted by key informant from Sidama Liberation Movement. He further says:

Famine is sometimes turned to the government's political advantage. Thus famine can be allowed to happen in order to punish 'rebel' people who are demanding something that are not acceptable to the EPRDF. The EPRDF regime forces such people to renounce their demands in exchange for food, and to accept the decisions of the EPRDF. Moreover, while the proximity of affected people to urban areas that access the press and media may cause any unacceptable actions and decisions by the EPRDF to be exposed, famine victims in rural areas do not constitute a challenge to the established order unless the elite and opposition groups take up their case. That is why most of those who were affected by 1999 famine located in remote villages of Dale and Shabadino and present Lokka Abbaya and Borricha districts.

The key informant further elaborated that the successive governments of Ethiopia common features in ignoring rural famines by giving priority to urban areas in times of food insecurity. Although, there may be a willingness to respond to both at the same time, the threat of famine in urban areas will be acted upon quicker than in rural areas. For instance the author observed that the Sidama zone DPPC top priority was given to displaced people from Assab and Eritrea residing in Hawassa city, rather than to the rural Sidama people. This was because the situation of the rural Sidama was not understood by concerned and influential elites.

This, depicts that the cumulative effect of the disruption of social capital, the lack of freedom, democracy, good governance and accountability, and the absence of institutions to deal with famine (since they had been dismantled in the summer of 1998 by order of the vice prime minister), led to the Sidama famine.

While the regional government was intending to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Sidama Zone Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department, the Department was disbanded by order of the

then vice prime minister of Ethiopia, in the summer of 1998 in the face of encroaching famine in Sidama. Although the Department was institutionally weak owing to lack of food reserves and was dependent on the Regional State's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau, it was attempting to work among the Sidama people and collecting some early indicators of famine and informing the Regional Bureau of its encroachment.

A key informant from SLM asserted that "There are no convincing explanations from the government side for its dismantling of the institutions that dealt with famine." The Ethiopian government says that "we are under external pressure from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank, for servicing its debts." The key informant representing opposition replies with this explanation:

If it is so, the government committed a serious mistake in destroying governmental institutions that in the process of responding to famine could at least contribute something to make their Atlanta-based partners happy. For the Ethiopian government, whose agricultural 'success' had been announced by the Atlanta-based Carter Centre, responding to famine was not a first priority. Therefore the then vice prime Minister ordered his cadres to disband all Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, while the same institutions continued to function in Tigre, Amhara and other regions as well.

Furthermore, instead of replenishing the emergency food stocks of the country in general and Sidama in particular, the country exported grain to meet Ethiopia's debt-servicing obligations. The Sidama Zone Agriculture and Rural Development Department expert substantiates the argument of opposition when he revealed the amount of exported maize:

About one million tonnes of the 1996 harvest were exported", an amount that would have been amply sufficient according to FAO figures to meet the 1999-2003 emergencies. From this the expert explains the reason that the Ethiopian government considered "its debt-servicing obligation a greater priority than preventing and responding to the encroaching famine in Sidama.

This suggests that narrower political space, led to a failure in famine prevention and response.

## **Summary**

This chapter taught us the genesis and evolution of conditioned identities and its impact on livelihoods and land use pattern in sample districts. It also assessed the political space in Sidama from 1991 to 1994 and the trend of engagement. Furthermore it presented how the Sidama's 1999-2003 Famine was linked with narrowing the political space and disengagement. This suggests that how the width of political space allows effective engagement that in turn allows citizens to decide on their destiny and livelihood security. Conversely, the narrowness of the political space leads to disengagement finally to livelihood and food insecurity that may culminate to famine.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS ON CONDITIONED IDENTITIES' LIVELIHOOD ASSET ACCESS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME**

### **7 Introduction**

This chapter presents the results of the field assessment of how trust and interest in political setting conditions political identity formation among the citizens. It also presents the results on how a conditioned political identity affects livelihood assets access including the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). In fact the results show that the PSNP resources were used as reward for those who were integrated into the party system and loyalists for their trust and interest in political settings. It also shows how the institutions from 'above' used access to donor funded programs such as PSNP to deter the sceptics from having voice and choice. It argues that the marginalization resulted from mistrust of the political settings creating fear and suspicions for the marginalised political identity. It suggests that the donors should focus on the programmes that can enhance trust building and effective engagement of the citizens from below.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the results of the survey on the formation of conditioned political identities. The second section shows how conditioning affects resilience from food insecurity. It also shows the local perception of the degree of asset accesses by political identities using the LEPSA Framework and the third section summarises.

#### **7.1 Trust and interest in political setting conditions political identities**

The term 'conditioned' is used to show how trust and interest in the political settings and authority is used as a condition of access to livelihood assets. This 'political capture' enables the ruling elites to legitimise the will of citizens by conditioning livelihood asset access on being a member of the ruling

party.

This implies to control and oppress ordinary citizens; violating the citizen's right to retain their political identity, freedom of expression, association and assembly; and ends up in discriminating against citizens based on political affiliation. This section presents the findings about how access not only to donor-funded services, resources and training opportunities, but also to all livelihood assets was used as threats or reward for citizens to join the ruling party, stop sympathizing and supporting other parties of the citizen's choice. This concern shall be challenged or substantiated by the survey results presented in the following sub-sections.

### ***Survey results***

The survey results may indicate the circumstances and political identities of sample households, during the field research. However, by itself, they do not do enough to trace back the origin of those political identities and the historical processes and events that shaped them. These historical processes can be traced back to life histories, events that happened to some of the individuals in the sample group in time and spaces, and this will be triangulated with available literature on the issue. In addition, an ethnographic approach shall be used to substantiate what the survey figures represent.

Accordingly, out of the 120 sample of this study, 27 people of the total sample trusted the current political system. When those who trusted the political system were asked whether they were interested in the political system, only 10 reported "yes", while 17 answered, "no".

The remaining 93 people reported that they did not trust the political system of the then Ethiopian regime. When this group were asked if they were interested in politics only 42 of this group responded "yes", while 51 answered they are not interested in politics at all.

Taking that figure into the Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA) i.e. improved Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF), trust versus interest, the result of this study is

summarised in Table 7.1

**Table 7-1 Political identity formation by trust and interest of the sample of study**

	<b>High political interest</b>	<b>Low political interest</b>	<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Organisers of political identity.</b>
High political trust	10 Integrated	17 Loyal	27	22.5	Institutions from above
Low political trust	42 sceptic	51 Marginali sed	93	77.5	Institutions from below.
Subtotal	52	68	120	100	
%	43.3	56.7	100	100	

Source: Author's, field work (2008-2009).

***Integrated:-*** includes those who reported high trust and interest in the political system. This table contains ten integrated sample households which reported high political interest and trust. They are characterised by better access to livelihood assets and every available opportunity. This suggests that trusting and being interested in the political setting may enhance better access to livelihood assets and available opportunities with best favours reciprocating to confidence and interest in political contexts. This will be substantiated further by evidence in coming sections.

***Loyalist:-*** signifies those who reported high trust and low interest in the political system. This table comprises 17 of the sample who report high political trust, but take a low or no interest in the politics of the government. Due to their low interest in politics, they just accept and obey what the politicians and political institutions offer them. By doing so they have a tendency to be on the safest side and, in



some cases, they may achieve political favour, particularly in the processes of accessing livelihood assets such as having better access to safety net programmes, urban land, job opportunities in civil service, or business opportunities as a favour to trusting the politics of the government. Evidence for this will be supplied in sections to come.

***Sceptic Sidama:-*** this group is interested in political involvement but reported low or no interest in the political authorities. The table also contains 42 sceptics of the sample in the Sidama who are highly interested in politics but report low trust in politicians and political institutions of government of Ethiopia in Sidama. They are characterised by high social and economic disfavour and diminished public spirit that is attached to the spirit of the government. Due to their high political interest and their low trust in politicians, they are feared as challengers and seen as competitors and consequently in some instances they may gain political favour as a bribe to retreat from confronting politicians and political systems. The case study suggests that they face disfavour in the processes of accessing livelihood assets. They are also sometimes punished to neutralise their leadership role mobilising those who are marginalised.

***Marginalised:-*** those who reported low trust and interest in political authority and the political system. The table contains 51 marginalised sample households. These forms the political identities of the Sidama, who report low interest in any politics and low trust in politicians and political institutions, and strive for alternatives or internalise the way they are marginalised. Further evidence will suggest that this group are marginalised in the processes of accessing livelihood assets, this exclusion will situate them in precarious conditions of vulnerability unacceptable events such as recurrent war, livelihood and food insecurity, hunger and in the worst cases, starvation and famine.

## **7.2 Conditioned political identities' access to livelihood assets**

While conditioned political identities signifies the integrated, the loyalist the sceptic and the

marginalised, the access to livelihood assets shows the level of use five livelihood resources such as natural, human, social, financial and physical assets.

### **7.2.1 Results of field study on accessing natural capital**

Land is one of the major components that constitute natural capital. It is not only, the existence of different types of natural assets that is important, but also access equality and how various natural assets combine and vary over time. (For instance seasonal variations in value) For example, degraded land with depleted nutrients is of less importance to livelihoods than fertile land and the value of both will be much reduced if users do not have access to water and physical capital or infrastructure, that enables them to use irrigation (DFID, 1999).

Access to land can be measured by farm size used by individual household heads among in the study area. Therefore it is imperative to have data on farm size from both official documents and the findings of this study.

**Farm size:-**The sample households for the Sidama zone Finance and Economic Development Department Report in Dale district show average farm size is 0.5 ha. 81 percent of the households have less than 0.5 percent ha land holding.

The land size was so small, that 93 percent of the farmers in the district did not possess oxen hence 80 percent of them prepare their land using hand tools. The average land holding size of Lokka Abbaya is between 0.26 and 0.5 ha. About 66 percent of the sample households have less than 0.5 ha. This is contrary to the land size per head that can be extrapolated from the total land available in the district distributed to the farming community.

As opposed to Dale district, where crops occupy a significant share of the total land, the size of potential land covers the higher share (44 percent) in Lokka Abbaya. This is followed by crop-land 32 percent; grazing land 12 percent, forest land 8 percent non-arable land 3 percent land under Institute 2

percent. It is presumed that potentially productive land might apply for both livestock and crop production. Hence, Lokka Abbaya seems potentially more productive than Dale district. The gap could be due to the existence of unused land, which is regarded as potential expansion land or could be used for pastoralist activities. (Sidama Zone Finance and Economic Development Department 2010). Table 7.2 shows access to this vital natural asset by the political identities among the study sample.

Table 7-2 Land size by the political identities in percentage

Operational Land size	Marginalised Poor (N=51)	Sceptical less-poor (N=42)	Integrated and loyal better offs (N=27)	Total (120)
0.01-0.25 hectare	26.7	10.7	0	37.4
0.26-0.5 hectare	13	14.6	1.3	28.9
0.51-1 hectare	2.8	9.7	12.9	25.4
>1	0	0	8.3	8.3

Source: Author's field research (October 2008-June 2009).

The Sidama field study suggested not only land access problems for emerging couples and families, but also, the problem of deteriorating land fertility, as the following table 7.3.shows

Table 7-3 Soil Fertility Status as perceived by sample households by percentage

Soil Fertility status	Marginalized N= 51	sceptic N= 42	Integrated and the loyalist N= 27	Total. N=120
Fertile	10	5	10	25.0
Less- fertile	14.2	14. 2	8.3	36.7
Infertile	18.3	15.3	4.2	38.3

Source: Authors' field research in (October 2008-June 2009).

In addition to the data in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, it is imperative to examine local perceptions of the level of access to natural capital by political identities. This can be best explained by using the Livelihood Asset Status Tracking Matrix to capture local perception of differential access status of differentiated political identities, and clearly shows how facts on the ground contradict the political discourse of egalitarian access to the land.

Table 7.4 shows local perception of differential access to land collected by Livelihood Asset Status Tracking Matrix

**Table 7-4 Local perception on differential access to land as natural capital by political identities.**

Elements of Natural Capital	Marginalised				Sceptics				Integrated and loyalist			
	The size, and quantity derived from Observation	quality	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	The size, and quantity derived from Observation	The range of local perception	The Average where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	The size, and quantity derived from Observation	The range of local perception	The Average of local perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best		
Land size	0-0.25 can produce less than 2 months food a year from own land	only	0-4.5	3	0.25-0.50 hectare; can produce 3-5 months food a year	4.6- 7	5	0.50-2 hectare may give enough food for a year, depending the type of crops be enough en	7.1-10	9.8		
Land quality	Infertile marginal land		0-4.5	3	Moderate but depends on location	4.6- 7	5.13	Fertile and suitable for irrigation	7.1-10	9.82		
Livestock*	Have no bigger livestock can have chicken		0-4.5	3.12	Can have 1-3 middle and bigger livestock	4.6- 7	5.12	Can have diverse livestock		9.9		
The average									7.1-10	9.84		

Source: Author's field research 2009

\*Livestock can also be seen as physical capital, here they are included to indicate that their natural state of their existence and multiplication.

This table shows the quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and local

perceptions of accessing some of the elements of the natural capital, by using the Livelihood Asset Status Tracking Matrix. Access is understood as holding and using the elements of the natural capital such as land and livestock. The number that ranges from 0 to 10 is given to examine the local perception on the level of access to the elements of natural capital. Thus the average for the marginalised group is 3.04 out of ten. The average for the sceptic is 5.08 out of 10. The average for integrated and loyalist is 9.84 out of 10.

The figures in the following pentagon is derived from the average of quantification of the local perception on the level of access that ranges from 0 for worst and 10 for the best.




Figure 7-1 Local perception on the level accessing natural capital by political identities

Source: Author's field research in Sidama (January 2009)

N.B. The average of nearly ten out of ten for the integrated and loyalist shows how others (the sceptic and the marginalised) perceived those who are integrated and the loyalist of the political system. However, those who are integrated perceive their level of access to the natural capital as less than presented in the figures as they have their own limitations despite their integration into the political system.

## 7.2.2 Results on human capital

Human capital is vital for the poor who earn their living from their labour, for anyone who is healthy and fit. This sub-section presents the field study data on human capital. For the poor the available human capital at their disposal is their own labour (Grosh et al., 2008). Human capital in this context is seen in terms of utilisation of the labour power of the household members' engagement in the donor-financed PSNP. It also examines the level of the differential impacts of the PSNP and OFSP

programmes for different categories of households, grouped in terms of household labour availability among study samples.

To investigate the role of human capital and its use and distribution, it is imperative to see general population size, density, settlement in the study zone. The total population distribution in the Sidama is available in appendix 3.

Accordingly, Dale has a population of 231,322 spreads over 36 Peasant Associations, with population density of 765.7 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. 17/36 Peasant Associations are (PSNP) beneficiaries. The 2010 report from the Agriculture and Rural Development Department indicated about 36,445 households in Dale district and an average family size of 6.09, which is equivalent to the national average.

Based on the 2007 house and population census, the Sidama population was projected to be 3,218,671 in 2010, and 461 persons per/ km<sup>2</sup>. It is one of the most densely populated zones in the region. Lokka Abbaya on the other hand has a total population size of 108,119, and covers 26 Peasant Associations with population density of 112.2 persons per km<sup>2</sup> 24/26 Peasant Associations are PSNP beneficiaries.

Out of the total of 17,865 households, 16,752 were male-headed, and 1,113 were female-headed households. This shows that Dale is densely populated due to conducive agroecological conditions for settled crop farming, and relatively food secure population compared to Lokka Abaya, while Lokka Abbaya is sparsely populated by a majority of marginalised victims of food insecurity. For instance there are more a female-headed household compared to the rest of districts. Most of the female interviewees reported they lost their husbands during 1999/2003 famine.

In the study area, food insecurity became a year-round phenomenon which reaches its peak from May to September, *Lami-ledo* which means 'In between the two' the old harvest is finished, represents

the new harvest is ahead, the primary hunger season.

In terms of households' self-reported status of food security, survey results show that, out of interviewed households from the two districts, about 42.5 percent of the households experienced permanent food insecurity throughout the year and depend on government transfers and other social support.

About 35 percent of respondents revealed that their situation varied from season to season depending on the frequency and distribution of rainfall whereas 22.5 percent of the respondents reported short-term food insecurity. Interview results also showed that female-headed and households headed by elderly people tend to be more food insecure than male-headed and younger households.

**Table 7-5** The circumstances of PSNP beneficiaries by political identities

Demographic characteristics	Direct support	Public work		
		Marginalised	Sceptic	Integrated
Number of households	6	45	42	27
Proportion of household (%)	12	37.5	35	22.5
Working member of households	0	1-2	2-3	4-6
Household size	1-3	3-7	4-7	3-6
Food gap in months	10-11	6-10	3 -5	1-3
Land holding size in hectare	0-0.5	0.25-0.75	0.05-0.75	1-1.5

Source: Author's field work in 2008/2009.

The survey of this study on participant satisfaction shows that the PSNP is instrumental in covering the critical food gap for 51.6 percent of households. However, respondents also reported that the PSNP

resource transfers are not sufficient to cover their entire food gap.

**Table 7-6 The level of satisfaction to PSNP by its beneficiaries.**

Satisfaction of participant	Number of Household	percentage
To cover critical food gap season	62	51.6
Protection of desperate asset sale	48	40
Achieving food security.	10	8

Source: Author's field study (2008-2009).

More than half of the interviewed beneficiary households argued that, apart from receiving PSNP transfers, they were still forced to sell their productive assets and take on credit to cover their food shortages (see Table 7.7). A limited number of households were able to use PSNP transfers not only to cover their food shortages but also to protect their assets and improve their risk-taking behaviour through investing PSNP cash transfers in other income-earning activities. Whenever the PSNP is not enough to cover food gaps the beneficiaries involve the coping mechanism. The following table 7.7 presents what they do if PSNP do not cover their food and other needs.

**Table 7-7 Coping mechanism when PSNP did not cover food needs**

Coping strategies	No. of participant households	Percentage
Sale of household assets	55	45.8
Off-farm activities	35	29.1
Use of credit	30	25

Source: Author's field study (2008-2009).



***Political identities, Human Capital utilisation in the PSNP:-*** This section examines the implications of labour contribution requirements set by the productive safety net programme to gain cash or payment in kind for marginalised households by looking at ways in which availability of household labour affects the PSNP outcomes. Those households that are labour-poor can be affected severely as such programmes can affect the labour input into their farm activities.

PSNP public works households were classified into three categories based on the availability of able-bodied household members compared with the total household family size:

***Marginalised, Labour-poor:-*** This group is composed of 6 direct support beneficiaries and 45 public works beneficiaries, all together 51 households, whose some members of households are not targeted despite being capable of work.

These are households that typically only have one or two adults involved in PSNP, and earning income generated from the PSNP participation, they claim eligible members of their households were excluded from PSNP. This group of households account for about 42.5 percent of the total number of beneficiary households. Some households are landless; most have a plot of land ranging from 0.25 to .75 hectares. Household size ranges from three to seven and households experiencing a food gap of six to ten months.

The following account of one marginalised household illustrates the labour implication of the PSNP programme clearly, how some households' circumstances can have excesses of labour that could be used for participating in PSNP, were they not deliberately excluded by PSNP officials:

In our family, I am the only one who is allowed to work in the safety net. The rest of my family's members sit idly after finishing land preparation in January. They want to join me, but the boss in the Safety Net programme refused to include them. The money I get from the safety net program is not enough to cover our food and other needs. If he allows them, they could join me after finishing their job in our little land, we could have increased our income

to cover our food and another cost.

For marginalised households, however, lack of full participation in PSNP public works limits households' income generation. Lack of other job opportunities to engage in non-farm activities affects household food security.

Some of the households in this group can sometimes engage in daily labour, mainly weeding and harvesting, on other peoples' farms to supplement their income in a subtle way. Lack of labour absorption capacity designed for the safety net public works activities, therefore, is not enough to cover households' income despite available labour as the interview above suggests.

For this group of households, PSNP transfers are utilised as an essential resource to cover the food gaps. For some households, part of the PSNP transfer is used to cover other household expenditures and pay back loans, especially when the PSNP payment was made in cash. This further reduces the food gap covering role of the PSNP transfer and makes households more vulnerable to falling back into destitution rather than improving their livelihoods. Table 7.8. below shows the way the beneficiaries spread the PSNP transfer according to their needs and priorities

**Table 7-8 Spreading PSNP transfers by marginalised households,**

<b>Utilisation</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
To cover critical food gap time	22	43.1
To cover critical food gap time and debt repayment	19	37.2
To cover critical food gap time and other expenditure	10	19.6
Total	51	100

*Source: Author's field Survey, January 2009*

A number of households in this group also depend on credit from informal lending from friends and

neighbours and formal lending including credit from the Sidama microfinance Institution and the Omo microfinance institutions. Although the credit is provided for productive investment, households divert the credit to cover critical food gaps during periods of shortage. This risks further impoverishment due to their inability to repay their loans from loan-financed business activities. Some of the households used the PSNP cash transfer for debt repayment while at the same time taking another loan for consumption purposes thus entering a vicious cycle of indebtedness.

This became clearer when one informant recounted insecurity over vicious indebtedness. In his words: “Failing to repay my loan would mean that I will not receive a credit again, and that means I will face a serious problem. After repaying my loan I am now planning to take another loan so that I can buy input and enset seedlings fuunta to intercrop with maize in my little land,”

For most households in this group, PSNP has no impact on household asset protection or long-term household food security. In fact, about 78 percent of the interviewed households in this category reported that they had been forced to sell their assets, in particular, their livestock. This happened even in normal years in order to buy food to cover household food shortages. Labour-poor households utilise most of their labour for public works activities; this offers only a limited effect in terms of producing enough to cover the critical food gap, let alone protecting their asset base and ensuring long-term food security.

***Sceptic labour-sufficient:-*** This group includes the people who are not integrated into SPDM/EPRDF program due to their political stand not supporting SEPDM/EPRDF. This group included former settlers from the north, who are not ethnic Sidamas, but espouse the Sidama ways of life. The second group comprise ethnic Sidamas become sympathizers, supporters, and members of the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) but who do not support SPDM/EPRDF.

This group includes 42 households from the study sample that are largely dependent on agriculture, but do not produce enough food due to factors including small land holdings, land degradation and

lack of financial capital. These households account for about 35percent of the total PSNP beneficiary households in the two research districts. Household size ranges from four to seven household members and households typically face a food gap of between five to six months. Sceptic households neither openly support oppositions nor government, but have a tendency to lean towards opposition. They are not well integrated into the PSNP programme because they do not announce their support for the governing party. This group reported a conflict of interest between the labour demands of the PSNP and their agricultural practices. Households disclosed that, though they have a plot of agricultural land, their production falls short of producing enough food to feed their household throughout the year, and they depend on the PSNP transfers to cover their food shortages. Due to insufficient production, about 47 percent of the households in this group also report their dependence on credit for consumption, especially during critical periods. PSNP transfers make a relatively small contribution to their livelihood that is partly due to the lack of full-family targeting, as illustrated by the following example:

We do have sufficient labour in the household, and we are using our labour both to participate in the safety net and work on our land. However, production falls short of what we need, and for this reason we depend on the safety net transfer for half of the year. However, we are not getting safety net transfer for all our household members and, therefore, we sometimes take credit from Omo microfinance and sometimes divert loan for our needs and other sources to cover our food shortages. If all household members received safety net transfers, we could have used the credit for other purposes.

Households in this group also mentioned that they do not have confidence in the PSNP programme and are anxious that they will not get the same transfer for next year. Although the programme promises a multi-annual contribution, the frequent re-targeting exercises and the implementation of graduation in recent years will make them doubtful about the future. This undermines households' ability to utilise credit for productive investment. The following account from a farmer shows this clearly:

We are now getting the safety net, but we are not sure whether we will get the same transfer for next year. If we knew for sure that we would continue to receive the safety net transfers, we could have taken a large amount of credit to buy agricultural inputs to increase our productivity. However, if we do not receive safety net transfers and if we do not get good

production how can we repay the credit? Therefore, instead of putting ourselves in debt which we might not be able to pay, we decided not to take a loan as we are not sure if we will still get the PSNP transfer for next year or not.

About half the number of the households in this group explained that PSNP also helped them to retain their household labour to work on their farmland, instead of migrating to seek wage labour in other areas. This situation also enabled some of the households to use the OFSP credit packages to increase their productive assets to a certain extent.

The survey revealed that, for this group of households, given the limited household labour availability together with small land holdings and meagre amount of safety net transfer, PSNP has a limited impact in terms of achieving long-term household food security. The major impact of PSNP for this group of households is consumption smoothing. It also enabled a significant number of households in this group to reduce distress asset sales though a large number of them still depend on credit to cover part of their food shortages. The sceptic household landholding is reported to be between 0.5 and 0.75 hectares of land. This group of households utilise PSNP transfers primarily to cover the critical food gap periods (Table 7.9 below). However, in addition to covering the food gap, for about 55 percent of the households in the group, resource transfers also contribute to protecting household assets. The majority of the households disclosed that, when paid on time, PSNP transfers were instrumental in reducing the sale of their productive assets to cope with food shortage.

**Table 7-9** Spreading PSNP transfers by sceptic households

Utilisation of PSNP transfer	Number	Percentage
To cover critical food gap	26	61.9
Covering critical food gap and debt repayment	10	23.8
Covering critical food gap and other expenditure	6	14.2
Total	42	100

*Source: Author's field survey, (2009 ).*

However, access to OFSP loans was not easy, and most of the households were not successful in securing credit, despite their interest in doing so. Of the total households in the group, 50 percent reported access to an OFSP loan. It was also reported that, of those households who have taken OFSP loans, not all of the households in the group used the credit entirely for the intended purpose which is to increase household productive assets, mainly livestock.

This is because of the need to cover other household expenses as well as to spread risks. Out of the interviewed households in this group who received an OFSP loan, about 78 percent diverted a certain amount of the loan to meet other household needs including loan repayment and consumption smoothing see Table 7.10 below.

**Table 7-10 . Spreading of OFSP loan by labour power sufficient sceptic households**

Utilisation	Number	Percentage
Livestock purchase	22	52.8
Loan repayment	14	33.3
To cover critical food gap and other expenses	6	14.2
Total	42	100

Source: Author's field survey (2009).

***Integrated and loyalists:-*** Ethnic Sidamas, integrated into the program as they are either loyal supporters or members of SEPDM/ EPRDF labour-rich PSNP public works beneficiary households. This group of households constitute around 22.5 percent of all PSNP beneficiary households sample. They are loyal supporters of the regime and members of the governing party, but face food gaps, even in good years. Households' food gaps ranging from three to six months. These are households with five to eight household members and with land holding size from 1 to 1.5 hectares, including the land they rent. For this group of households, PSNP transfers are a major source of food or cash and are said to be effective in covering the critical food gap and protecting asset depletion (Table 7.11)

**Table 7-11 Spreading of PSNP transfer by integrated households**

Utilisation of PSNP transfer by integrated household	Number	%
Covering critical food gap and asset protection	5	18.5
Covering critical food gap and asset building	17	62.9
Covering critical food gap and other expenditure	5	18.5
Total	27	100

*Source: Author's field survey (2009).*

In the integrated households' cases, the transfers helped households to build assets. Some households reported the use of PSNP cash transfers for purchasing livestock (mainly goats and sheep) as illustrated in the following assertion from the key informant.

The safety net is helping us, as we used some of the money to buy livestock. We do have enough labour, and we use our labour to rent additional farm land to farm more land and, therefore, we used part of the cash transfers to buy livestock. This year, for example, we bought two goats using the money we received from the safety net transfer.

As they have enough labour, most of the households reported that they have rented additional farmland from labour and input-constrained households, in order to maximise their agricultural income. Some of the households in this group also try to increase their income through diversification by engaging in petty trade in local towns established recently.

Some also used the PSNP payment to cover other household necessities by that avoiding the sale of crops for other expenditures. A household interviewed exemplifies this as follows:

Before the safety net, we were sometimes forced to sell part of the crops that we have in order to cover other expenditures like clothing, sugar, coffee and to buy stationary for children to go to school. Now, thanks to the safety net programme, we are not selling crops anymore to cover such expenditures. We are using part of the safety net cash transfers to buy such items and preserve our harvest for our consumption.

Of this group of households, some use PSNP transfers to purchase food in times of need and by that avoiding the sale of productive assets such as livestock for consumption purposes.

This group of households also include those who make the most use of OFSP loans. Households

reported that the predictability of income through the PSNP enabled them to take loans enabling them to engage in other income generating activities.

About 95 percent of the households reported having access to OFSP loans. Of these households, the majority of them (about 75 percent) reported that they have at least bought one productive asset using an OFSP loan. About 35percent of the households also engaged in other income-earning activities to supplement their household income. Those who are constrained in the processes of accessing and benefiting from PSNP facilities will be deprived of any capabilities as the Sidama local perception recorded in table 7.12 shows quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and how this stratified group access the available human capital by using the Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix.

Table 7-12 local perception on accessing human capital by political identities


Elements of Human Capital	Marginalised		Sceptics			Integrated and loyalist				
	Character of the utilisation of human capital	of the PSNP	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Character of the utilisation of the human capital	The range of local perception	The Average where 0 = the worst 10 is the best		The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best
Labour exchange for transfer of cash and kind	Participate in PSNP schemes throughout PSNP period have very little time and labour; to work on their farms, rent their labour farming for others when the transfer from PSNP is Not enough to cover their food and other needs.		0-4.6	3.1	Participate in PSNP to ensure case and kind transfer they have better time and labour to spare on their farm compared to marginalised but they are not as comfortable as those who are integrated.	4.7- 7	5	They are required to do a small amount of participate in actual labour; rather they watch those who are labouring and report to the authorities.	7.1-10	9.7



Integrated capability of diversification	Low capability or to integrate agriculture & wage labour	0-4.6	2.9	Agriculture, wage labour & some livestock based income generating activities	4.7- 7	5.13	Good agriculture, good livestock and vegetable & fruit cultivation	7.1-10	9.8
				Agriculture, wage labour & more livestock based IGAs					
Food security status	Food produce from their own farm cover ranges from less than a month to three months	0-4.6	3.0	Food produce from their own farm covers from three to five months	4.7- 7	5. 12	Food grains from their farm covers from 5-7 months.	7.1-10	9.6
The average			3			5.08			9.74

Source: Author's fieldwork (October 2008 to 2009).

This table shows the quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and local perception on accessing some of the elements of the human capital, by using the Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix. Accessing is understood as having labour exchanged for transfer of cash and kind, integrated capability of diversification and food security status. The number that ranges from 0 to 10 is given to examine the local perception on the level of access to those elements of human capital. Thus the average for the marginalised group is 3. out of ten. The average for the sceptic is 5.08 out of 10. The average for integrated and loyalist is 9.74 out of 10. The following figure derived from the average for each group that helps the conversion of the local perception into quantification in the livelihood asset pentagon per conditioned political identities.



**Figure 7-2 Local perception on accessing human capital by political identities**

**Source:** Author's field study 2008-2009.

N.B. The average of nearly ten out of ten for the integrated and loyalist shows how others (the sceptic and the marginalised) perceived those who are integrated and the loyalist of the political system. However, those who are integrated perceive their level of access to the human capital as less than presented in the figure as they have their own limitations despite their integration into the political system.

### 7.2.3 Result on accessing social capital: Party membership as social capital

Membership refers to the community and wider social claims on which individuals and households can draw by virtue of their belonging to social groups of varying degrees of inclusiveness in society. In the context of Sidama, political space conditions the formation of political identities within original identities such as ethnic identity. This can create suspicions among those who value ethnic identities more than those who embrace the new identity and are regarded as opportunists, having no strong stand to protect the blood ties. This can work conversely as well, particularly, on social capital disruption. The Sidama field study suggests that the social capital of the study community was disrupted.

Although appearing ethnically homogeneous, with the same language and cultural make-up, the communities are not homogeneous in their political identities. They are divided by the level of trust and interest of each to the political system run by the ruling elite or the opposition. This created four

main groups in accessing opportunities and livelihood assets such as the PSNP, marginalised, sceptic, integrated and loyalist. This section presents data on the indigenous social capital in the context of food security. It also shows how it is at the risk of disappearing from the political system which PSNP used to cultivate control, political loyalty and obedience, of the vulnerable while the reality and PSNP promise is entitlement for those who are at risk of chronic food insecurity, as one key informant summarised:

The ruling party of the region created a hidden system of 1:5 to control and legitimise the will of households to its hegemony and consequently, we are not free to speak our minds, to do what we think better. When we talk to each other, it is with great care fearing they way one of us interpret what is said and inform the authorities. One to five means every five households have one person, who is assigned to watch every move of the members of five households and report to the local authorities of SPDM/EPRDF. Those assignees are integrated into the political system of SPDM/EPRDF, and watch every activities of the members of five households, such as their attitudes towards the ruling party, the way they behave, and inform to party authorities in the exchange of favours.

The favours can include access to livelihood assets and opportunities that they are not entitled to according to the PSNP manual. Furthermore this favour for only for those who are members to the ruling party and loyalist suffocates the rest particularly at the critical season of food insecurity.

In addition to this fast disappearing social capital explored through the degree of contentment to the arrival of outsiders while food is being served to examine what is left as resources for those who are in need, if the government prioritise or favour only their members. The following table shows the degree of contentment on the arrival or presence of outsiders while meal is being served, as the following table 7-13 shows.

**Table 7-13 The contentment level in the presence of the outsider while the meal is being served**

Political Identity	No	Happy to share	Happiness to share but worry as I have not enough for my family members	Unhappy to share without making sure having something in exchange.
Marginalised	51	16	30	5
Sceptic	42	4	26	12
Integrated and loyalist	27	2	1	24
Total	120	22	57	41
%	100	18.3	47.5	34.2

*Source: Author's field research in 2008-2009.*

As the table shows, unconditional happiness to share food with non-household members is reduced to only 18.3 percent that is unusual for indigenous Sidama hosts who were happy to share their food and drink. This significant disruption poses a risk for those needy Sidamans who are deprived of their social safety net. The table shows two indicators of contentment. First, worries over the sufficiency of food if it is shared out, was the response of the largest group of the respondents at 47.5percent.

The second is the encroachment of greed whereby the earlier free access to cooked food was replaced by the expectation to offer something for exchange for food at 34.2 percent. When asked further one informant said:

You know what? Even the mighty government do not provide free food for hungry people. Every able body is obliged to provide what is under his or her disposals, so why I would be happy to provide for intruders come just waiting for the time food may be served. It makes me unhappy to share my food and hide it until that intruder leaves my house.

Asked how much the study participants shared their annual income to minimise the burdens of the members of community such as kin and neighbours when they encounter shocks, such as death, sickness, and asset loss, in 2009, their responses are recorded in table 7-14.

**Table 7-14. The percentage of the annual income share given to those who are in need in the community**

Political identity	No	None % of my annual income	10-15% my annual income	15-20% my annual income	20-25% my annual income
Marginalised	51	42	9	0	0
Sceptic	42	3	30	9	0
Integrated and loyalist	27	0	18	6	3
Total	120	45	57	15	3

Source: Author's survey 2008-2009.

The majority of the respondents 57 percent share 10-15% of their annual income to share the burden of their fellow community members.

Study participants were asked whether they would be happy to lend out their available farm tools to the needy for temporary use. The following table shows other aspects such as borrowing and lending farm tools and information on livelihood strategies as well is also deteriorating.

**Table 7-15 the level of happiness in sharing available farm tools among by political identities.**

Political Identity	No	I will be happy	I will not be happy to lend out my farm tool	I will be happy, but check punctuality of returning my farm tool on agreed up on time	I will be happy, if the borrower not damage my farm tool, while being used
<b>Marginalised</b>	51	20	10	12	9
<b>Sceptic</b>	42	5	17	10	10
<b>Integrated and loyalist</b>	27	6	1	10	10
<b>Total</b>	120	31	28	32	29
<b>%</b>	100	25.8	23.3	26.7	24.2

Source Author's field survey in 2008-2009 in Sidama.

Table 7.16 shows responses about willingness to share information on livelihood strategies,

**Table 7-16** the level of willingness to share livelihood strategy information

Political Identity	No	I am willing to share and receive the information on livelihood strategies	I am not willing to share and receive information on livelihood strategies	I am willing to share and receive livelihood strategy information depending on the type of relationship I have with a person	I consider the type of information and the type of relationship I have with a person before sharing
<b>Marginalised</b>	51	16	5	3	27
<b>Sceptic</b>	42	1	3	4	34
<b>Integrated and loyalist</b>	27	2	0	5	20
<b>Total</b>	120	19	8	12	81
<b>%</b>	100	15.8	6.6	10	67.5

Source: Author's field research in 2008-2009.

The obligation to fulfil social expectations put extra pressure on those who are marginalised in accessing other livelihood assets that derail them from the social settings. Failure to fulfil social obligation, opens the marginalised group up to bullying and peer teasing.

**Table 7-17** Local perception on conditioned political identities and the level of their access to in social capital


Elements of Social Capital	Marginalised			Sceptics			Integrated and loyalist		
	Character of the utilisation of the social capital	The range of the local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Character of the utilisation of the social capital	The range of local perception	The Average where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	

Obligation to fulfil social bounded ties	As their access status to other livelihood assets prevents them from reciprocating. They are always vulnerable for bullying and peer teething	0-4	2.9	They always keep aside some sorts of saving to fulfil social obligations and expectations to escape from peer teething.	4.1- 7	4.8	They buy prestige and honour by doing something extra for others, to earn others by doing so they persuade their ethnic peers to socialise into and trust in the new political system	7.1-10	9.9
The impact of Success and failure of reciprocity	Self-excluded because shame of indebtedness of reciprocal relationship, not share whatever they have, have individualistic feeling , do not mix with others even in important event during good and bad moments	0-4.6	3.1	Involve in reciprocity to pay back good deeds done to her him by others at least in the same manner	4.7- 7	5.2	Involve in reciprocity to pay back good deeds done to her him by others at least in the same manner	7.1-10	9.9
The average			3			5			9.9

Source: author's research 2008-2009

This table shows the quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and local perception on accessing some of the elements of the social capital, by using the Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix. Accessing social capital is understood as the ability to fulfil the reciprocal obligation to social bounded ties and observing the impact of success and failure of reciprocity on individual households. The number that ranges from 0 to 10 is given to examine the local perception on the level of access to the elements of social capital. Thus the average for the marginalised group is 3. out of ten. The average for the sceptic is 5.08 out of 10. The average for integrated and loyalist is 9.9 out of 10.

The following figure arises from the average for each group that helps the conversion of the local perception into the livelihood asset pentagon quantification as per conditioned political identities.



**Figure 7-3** Local perception on accessing Social capital per conditioned political identities

Source: Author's field study, 2008-2009.

N.B The average nearly ten out of ten is given the way others (the marginalised and sceptics) perceived those who are integrated into the political system. However those integrated and the loyalist perceive their level of access to the social capital assets as less than presented in the figure as they have their own limitations despite their integration into the political system.

#### 7.2.4 Results on accessing financial capital

This section presents data how households are exploited by the lenders who lend them more than they can afford. Many poor households do not have any choice but to incur multiple debts and are exposed to over-indebtedness.

The PSNP of the Ethiopian government has food security loans with in it. Food security loans are provided by Rural Development Offices in Dale and Lokka Abbaaya Districts,

Adminstrative units, below districts which are involved with distribution of food security loans are Peasants' Cooperatives yegeerewoch agelgilot hibret sira mahiber (Amharic) and the government assignees such as Development Agents (DAs) within each Peasant Association with the task of recollecting distributed food security loans to individual households without seeking collateral for the guarantee of repayment. The following account of a household shows how households use part of the credit for unintended purposes:



We borrowed from the food security programme last year to engage in petty trading. However, we did not use all the money for trading purposes. We used half of the loan to prepare a wedding ceremony for our son. The loan provided us with the money to arrange the wedding and enabled us not to sell our livestock.

How this is reflected on the entire study sample through survey method report is summarised in table 7.18

**Table 7-18 . The extent of utilisation of food security loan for unintended purpose by political identity of household**

	Cases of Loan food security loan access.	Total households	Percentage of loan diversion
Marginalised(N=51)	15	51	80
Sceptical (N=42)	24	42	40
Integrated			
And loyalist (N=27)	27	27	0
Total (N=120)	66	120	60

Source: Author's field research in 2008-2009.

Using food security loans for unintended purposes by interviewees suggests that they have avoided risk taking by investing the amount of money they have accessed for the purpose intended such as diversification of livelihood, this is because their true priority was incompatible with the priority they were forced to adopt as if it were theirs.

Secondly their business plan was overambitious compared to other resources at their disposal that would convert into reality, and made just to impress the holder of the loan to appear profitable. In reality, there are other factors that may affect the realisation of business plans, such as shortage of labour, land and most importantly the skills of management and account keeping.

Thirdly, priority incompatibility:- this refers to discrepancies between the priorities of individual households and the priorities of the PSNP planners. This can be discerned when money released to those targets based on an agreed upon business plan is diverted to “unintended” purposes.

However, for those household who have done this, the real priority was clearly missed in the first phase of need identification of the PSNP planners. The way in which, the study sample spent food

security loans shows in loan diversion for the purpose outside business plan the true priority for the households as grouped in various political identities.

Table 7-19 Priority of spending loans by political identity

Political identity	No household	of those who have accessed loan	Percentage of diverted security loan	Reasons they spent outside business plan
<b>Marginalised</b>	51	15	80	1) Covering critical food gap. 2) Investing on social capital 3) covering health expense 4) Repayment of other debt. 5) Alcohol and <i>chaat</i> consumption.
<b>Sceptics</b>	42	24	40	1) Covering critical food gap 2) Children Schooling 3) Children clothing
<b>Integrated and loyalist</b>	27	27	0	

*Source: Author's field research 2008-2009.*

The table above shows that integrated and labour-rich households are the ones which have access to credit services without bureaucratic bottlenecks. They used credit to improve long-term livelihoods and household food security. Having a small food gap and more labour enabled them to invest most of the credit in long-term livelihood enhancement, thus enabling them to improve food and livelihood security, which may lay the foundation for sustainability of their livelihoods.

Instead of assisting marginalised households to move out of poverty and food insecurity, credit has pushed most of them further into indebtedness. This implies food security loans should be accompanied with other targeted transfer programmes to give marginalised households an opportunity to engage in livelihood enhancing investments which will help them to improve their food and livelihood security. Credit, therefore, should not be considered as a 'one size fits all' kind of

programme suitable for all types of households.

There must be freedom for the households to set their own priority with little monitoring to avoid spending on alcohol and *chaat* consumption. Tailored approaches to credit are crucial so that the credit programmes fit the livelihoods of different categories of households and can have a sustainable positive impact on the livelihoods of marginalised households.

The Sidama field study confirms this hard fact. When examining the heart of the context of conditioned political identities and its impact on access to financial capital as depicted in the Livelihood Asset Status Tracking Matrix in the table 7.20.


**Table 7-20 Local perception on accessing financial capital by political identities**

Elements of Financial Capital	Marginalised			Sceptics			Integrated and loyalist			
	Feature resulted from the level of access to Financial capital	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Feature resulted from the level of access to Financial capital	The range of local perception	The Average where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Feature resulted from the level of access to Financial capital	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	
Loan trustworthiness	Low loan trustworthiness they divert loans for purposes other than mentioned in business plan. They are characterised slow debt payment.	0-4	2.8	Food security loan diversion, they are in better position in debt repayments and commitment on the business plan.	4.1- 7	5	Those group save Some forms of durables such as jeweller, Radio-tape players, watch, animals, goats sheep, cattle	7.1-10	9.8	
Connection to other financial institutions and saving	Little or no linkage with other financial institutions, access loan from informally, from closely related kin or friends have no saving	0-4.6	3.2	Little linkage with other financial intuitions but struggle with debt repayments have the habit of saving	4.7- 7	5	Have good linkage with other financial institutions such as micro-finance in some cases even formal banks and savings	7.1-10	9.6	
Average			3			5			9.7	

Source : Author's field research (2008-2009).

This table shows the quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and local perception on accessing some of the elements of the social capital, by using the Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix. Accessing financial capital is understood as Loan trustworthiness, connection to other financial institutions and saving. The number that ranges from 0 to 10 is given to examine the local perception on the level of access to the elements of social capital. Thus the average for the marginalised group is 3 out of 10. The average for the sceptic is 5 out of 10. The average for integrated and loyalist is 9.7 out of 10.

The following figure arises from the average for each group that helps the conversion of the local perception into the livelihood asset pentagon quantification as per conditioned political identities.



**Figure 7-4 Local perception on accessing financial capital per conditioned political Identities**

**Source: Author's field study 2008-2009**

N.B. The average nearly ten out of ten is given the way others (the marginalised and sceptics) perceived those who are integrated into the political system. However those integrated and the loyalists perceive their level of access to the financial capital assets less than presented in the figure as they have their own limitations despite their integration into the political system.

### **7.2.5 Results on accessing physical capital**

This section presents data as to how physical capital is accessed by study communities. Infrastructure is commonly a public good that is used without direct payment. Exceptions include shelter, which is often privately owned, and some other infrastructure that is accessed for a fee related to usage (e.g. toll roads and energy supplies). Producer goods may be owned on an individual or group basis or accessed through rental or ‘fee for service’ markets, the latter being common with more sophisticated equipment.

The producer goods in the context of agrarian livelihood are farm tools. Principal power sources to operate farm tools in farming activities are humans, animals and machines. Added to producers, there are contexts where some assets which are considered as natural capital also can be categorised as physical capital, land and livestock. Particularly, in the rural agrarian context, characterised by a low level of technological advancements, assets that exist naturally can be used as physical capital for pursuing livelihood strategies and activities. It also presents illustrative data on the Sidaman perception of a physical asset creation chain. The access and creating those physical assets by themselves are the indicators of the wealth status among the Sidama.

Secondly, it presents the data on the extent to which the PSNP and other micro-credit facilities has created additional asset and transition from food insecurity, to food self-sufficiency and contribution to physical assets of the local community. More valued asset and wealth creation among the study community is access to livestock and land for food security and self-sufficiency.

These images have been removed

**Figure 7-5, Sidaman perception of food security and asset- creating chain**

**Source: the pictures are collected from Worancha information centre**

Livestock purchase is a common use of credit in the area. The survey revealed that of the total credit beneficiary households, about 56.6 percent bought at least one animal. Livestock purchase, however, is not the same for all categories of household. About 92.5 percent of integrated households, 50 percent of sceptics bought livestock compared with 43.1 percent of marginalised households.

**Table 7-21, Livestock purchase by household's political identities**

<b>Category of Households</b>	<b>Households who bought livestock</b>	<b>Total number of Households</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Marginalised</b>	22	51	43.1
<b>Sceptics</b>	21	42	50
<b>Integrated</b>	25	27	92.6
<b>Total</b>	68	120	56.7

Source: Author's study, 2008-2009

Focus group discussions revealed that the type of livestock bought is also different. The marginalised acquired small livestock such as, sheep and goats whereas the integrated invest their money in large livestock notably, a cow, ox horse or donkey.

The survey found that the impact of credit on asset creation depends on the source of the credit. About 82 percent of the marginalised and 66.6 percent of sceptics took credit from informal sources compared with 22 percent of integrated households. Informal loans are smaller than formal loans: and therefore have limited impact on asset creation even without loan diversion.

About 100 percent of integrated households took loans from the food security credit system whereas only 29.4 percent of the marginalised and 57.1 percent of sceptic took relatively large loans - mainly because the integrated and sceptic are said to be more credit worthy than the marginalised. See table 7-22 in the following page.

**Table 7-22 Access to different types of loans by political identities.**

Type of loan	Type of household								
	Marginalised households			Sceptics households			Integrated and loyalist households		
	No	total	%tage	No	total	%tage	No	total	%tage
<b>Informal</b>	42	51	82	28	42	66.6	6	27	22.
<b>Micro credit</b>	15	51	29.4	23	42	54.7	22	27	81.4
<b>Food security</b>	15	51	29.4	24	42	57.1	27	27	100

Source: Author's study 2008-2009.

According to some marginalised households, access to micro-credit and food security credit not only has a limited impact on household asset creation, but also has a negative impact on marginalised households' asset holdings, by forcing households to sell their livestock to pay back their loans. This drives most marginalised households further into poverty.

The finding of the survey on the local perception also suggests differentials in asset access, asset creation, and asset protection that help to understand access to physical capital situation by political identities, based on local perceptions see Table 7.23

**Table 7-23 Local perception on the level of their access to physical capital by political identity**

Elements of Physical Capital	Marginalised			Sceptics			Integrated and loyalist		
	Feature resulted from the level of access to physical capital	The range of local perception	The Average of perception where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Feature resulted from the level of access to Financial capital	The range of local perception	The Average where 0 = the worst 10 is the best	Feature resulted from the level of access to Financial capital	The range of local perception	The local when best
Shelter	leaking roof . Without proper windows for light, cooking and living in the same room severe darkness clouded by the smoke from fire place. Use bush for toilet with potential to pollute environment and water	0-4	2.8	Roofed with corrugated iron sheet, laminated with bamboo with different living and bed rooms have some proper windows for the light,havedifferent	4.1- 7	5.2	corrugated iron sheet, bricks, or wooden walls laminated floor, with properplanned , living and bed rooms,	7.1-10	9.9




	resources that may be the sources of water borne diseases, use wood for cooking and night light without proper protection from the smoke, use unprotected ponds and springs, rivers that might be polluted.			small house for cooking most of the time at the backyard, have dry latrine toilet few meters away from the smaller house. Use common wells or springs for water. No electricity use kerosene for light			have separate kitchen cooking have dry latrine at the back yard use own wells for water use kerosene lamp		
Ownership of farm tools and Means of power for labour	Do not own farm tools and equipment, and depend on borrowing from friends and neighbours. Use own labour power for farming, most of the time walk on bare foot shoulder, head and back to move their little ones goods from place to place	0-4.6	3.2	Use direct animals or Oxen pulled hoe, for farming and animal donkey or horse pulled carts for own movement and movement of goods sometimes use pedal bicycle if they are near urban areas.	4.7- 7	4.8	Own most of needed farm tools and equipment. Use motor cycle and car for movement of goods and themselves so faster easier livelihood activities than other group. .	7.1-10	9.8
Ability willingness and speed of using new technology	Inefficient to adopt new technologies as they cannot afford the cost and slower in using new technologies	0-4.6	2.8	Able to afford some of new technology but sceptic to use them because of the fear of failure of new technology means losing livelihoods		4.8	They afford the cost of using new technologies quickly and easily		9.8
Productive animal keeping and wealth transition	Animal keeping ranges from non to chickens. To sale their eggs and extra chickens Some might have ability to pass to keeping goats and sheep. Have very little land	0-4.6	3.2	They keep sheep or goat, they can move for sheep goat to cattle depending on the amount of saving have medium size land , they may have donkeys for moving goods		5.2	keep cattle for milk and butter sheep and goats for cash, good size land to grow food crops. They may have donkey, horse, mules for moving goods and people.		
<b>Average</b>			<b>3</b>			<b>5</b>			<b>9.7</b>

Source: Author's field work 2008-2009

This table shows the quantification of local perception of conditioned political identities and local perception on accessing some of the elements of the physical capital, by using the Livelihood Asset Tracking Matrix. Accessing physical capital is understood as the type of housing, ownership of farm tools, means of power for labour, ability and willingness and speed of using new technology, productive animal keeping and wealth transition. The number that ranges from 0 to 10 is given to examine the local perception on the level of access to the elements of social capital. Thus the average for the marginalised group is 3. out of 10. The average for the sceptic is 5 out of 10. The average for integrated and loyalist is 9.7 out of 10.

The following figure arises from the average for each group that helps the conversion of the local perception into the livelihood asset pentagon quantification as per conditioned political identities.



**Figure 7-6 Local perception on accessing physical capital per conditioned political Identities**

**Source:- Author's field study 2008-2009.**

N.B. The average nearly ten out of ten is given the way others (the marginalised and sceptics) perceived those who are integrated into the political system. However those integrated and the loyalists perceive their level of access to the physical capital assets less than presented in the figure as they have their own limitations despite their integration into the political system.

## Summary

This chapter portrayed how conditioned political identities are created based on the level of trust and interest in the political system and how political identities in turn condition access to livelihood assets differently. It shows how differential access to livelihood assets was perceived locally, and portrays the situation using the livelihood asset pentagon. This chapter suggests that reluctance to pay attention to the political dynamics of any society will enhance the status quo of the political power relations. Perceiving political capital as a gate keeper misses the point that the political spaces create the winners and losers. What is overlooked is that the creation of a conditioned political identity comes first before access to the livelihood assets, as the result of the reciprocal relationship between the power holders and trust and interest of their political system. Table 7.24 shows the conclusion from


the field survey.

**Table 7-24 The summary of conditioned political identities and their livelihood status**

	<b>High political interest</b>	<b>Livelihood Asset access character</b>	<b>Low political interest</b>	<b>Livelihood Asset access character</b>	<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Organizers of political identity.</b>
High political trust	10 Integrated	Best	17 Loyal	Better	27	22.5	Institutions from above
Low political trust	42 sceptic	Depends on the circumstance	51 Marginalised	Worst	93	77.5	Institutions from below.
Subtotal	52		68		120	100	
%	43.3		56.7		100	100	

Source:- author's field research in Sidama

Therefore, LEPSA helped to map out differential access to livelihood assets by political identity the following figure 7.7 illustrates. LEPSA also shows how the intuitions from the 'above' used access donor funded programs such as Productive safety net to deter the sceptic from having voice and choice. It argues that the marginalization resulted from mistrust of the political settings creating fear and suspicions for the marginalised political identity. Fear and suspicions of the marginalised in turn is becoming a limiting label for those groups that steal the destiny of their lives and livelihoods. Therefore the donors should reconsider SLF and focus on the programmes that can enhance trust building and effective engagement of the citizen from below.



Source: authors LEPSA diagram built on SLF and literature review.

Figure 7-7 LEPSA as effective mapping tool differential access to livelihood assets by political identity

Source: Author's field research in 2008- 2009

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSIONS**

### **8 Introduction**

This chapter aims primarily, to discuss donor's dilemma while they are supporting the institutions from the 'above', in suffocating political space. It also highlights how the Productive Safety Net Programme evolved from donor's alternative endeavour to protect public service, when they decided to reduce direct budget support, to exert pressure on Ethiopian government to widen political space. Secondly, it discusses the results of 2008-2009 field research which is presented in the chapter seven. As most of the results for 2000 field research discussed in the Chapter four to six it is needless to repeat them here. This Chapter is structured as follows: the first section discusses donors' dilemma. The second section discusses the access to livelihood assets and the assessment of PSNP. The third section summarises discussion.

#### **8.1 Donors' dilemma and the evolution of the Productive Safety Net**

The narrowing political space in Ethiopia intensified from 1998 to 2000. This manifested itself in the form of non-multiparty elections, famine in the Sidama and Ogaden; internal split within TPLF leadership the core of governing party; Ethio-Eritrean conflict that followed with border delimitation without demarcation. Donors worried about instability and some bilateral partners suspended aid to pressurise the government of Ethiopia to open wider political space that engaged citizens and opposition parties.

Between 2001 and 2004, the economy recovered despite food insecurity. Ethiopia benefited from rising commodity prices and remittances. Further in 2003 Ethiopia produced its first comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). However the political space in the Sidama was so

suffocating that it ended up with 24 May 2002 massacre that took 69 lives in Hawassa.

This event evolved from Sidaman's quest for regional autonomy and rejection of the establishment SNNPRS against the notion of the Constitution of Ethiopia article 39. Secondly, the Sidama wanted to retain the administrative authority over Hawassa City. Thirdly, they wanted the release of the former and first president of SNNPRS who was jailed for his support of the defeated group of TPLF during its spilt. The Sidama organised peaceful demonstration to express their discontent over general political space and their marginalisation. The government responded harshly. Nobody is accountable or brought to justice for the lives lost in the incident. This shows how the political space in Ethiopia was so narrow.

In addition to this, the political space of Ethiopia characterised with the following major trends. In 2005, the election which seemed free and fair at the beginning ended with premature declaration of victory by the ruling party that led to public outcry at the loss of nearly 200 lives, dramatic repression, and the jailing of opposition leaders. The government, waged a sustained and coordinated campaign against students, teachers, journalists, non-governmental organisations and opposition supporters using a variety of legislative and extra-legal measures to increase the general support for and dependence on, the ruling party. This resulted in the ruling party winning 99 percent of the available seats in the district and kebeles at local level, what Aalen and Tronvoll called 'a return of electoral authoritarianism' (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008:111).

Reacting to this political regression, donors suspended direct budget support, and it was replaced by general budget support, that they renamed as Protection of Basic Service (PBS) with a commitment to continue food aid, harmonising and co-ordinating aid effort with renewed and increased bilateral commitments with a focus on emergency aid. Furthermore, the donors called for the release of jailed leaders and investigation of the killings of peaceful demonstrators.

A consortium of all major donors to Ethiopia devised an Interim Country Assistance Strategy

(ICAS). Accordingly, (ICAS 2006:2) reports its reaction:

- i) Move away from direct budget support in favour of alternative instruments that would provide greater oversight over poverty reducing expenditure and promote increased accountability; ii) reduce aid over time if governance does not improve ;and
- iii) focus on new governances.

Furthermore, the World Bank decided to freeze direct budgetary support ‘ in an increasingly divided environment, a new instrument was needed to ensure that resource flows to local authorities could be protected from political capture through enhanced set of checks and balances’ (ICAS 2006:3).

This shows donor’s dilemma in the polarised political context of 2005 and post-election repression the ruling party might manipulate the aid to its advantage, and survival.

Apparently they were eager to continue investing in Ethiopia’s economic growth and supporting improvement in human development indicators. The focus on governance by ICAS meant conditional aid contingent on widening of the political space. This focus on governance for donors can be seen as an institutional capacity building both at national (including parliamentary) and sub-national level. This strategy led to the idea of Protection of Basic Services (PBS), that aimed at supporting primary service delivery that sought to channel finance to regional and district governments instead of the federal government (ICAS 2006:17).

However, the strategy of decentralisation of aid in Ethiopia to avoid the risk of political capture at the centre is enhancing the same risk. Because, the regional and district governments are not autonomous enough and simply the implementers of the policies, programmes, projects designed at the centre. In addition to that the donors had not devised the monitoring mechanism to detect the misuse of aid at sub-national and district level as well as the donors cannot separate the ruling party structure that reappears in the state structures at all levels.

Although it is consolidated as an alternative donors' intervention as the component of protection of basic services, PSNP was a well-known arrangement to deal with economic impacts of shocks such as famine and recession on the lowest social strata in any economy. It is also not new for the northern part of Ethiopia that has been suffering devastating famines for centuries. However the BBC's Jonathan Dimbleby exposure of hidden famine of 1974-75 alerted international communities, that came up with PSNP- like arrangements after responding to that famine during the rehabilitation phase, in the form of the Employment Generation Scheme commonly known as food-for-work (FFW) programmes.

It was the extension of Project 2488 run by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Africa. Similar programmes had been also been carried out in Ethiopia, through the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission that the author witnessed as employee of the branch of the same commission in Sidama zone the late 1990s in the form of Employment Generation Scheme (EGS). The following section deals with the assessment on the degree to which and how the PSNP conditions the resilience from food insecurity.

## **8.2 Access to livelihood assets**

This section discusses the findings of on how the Sidama citizens of Ethiopia were allowed or limited to use available livelihood assets such as natural, human, social financial and physical assets and transform them into benefit of their lives through livelihood strategies activities and outcomes. The 2008-2009 sample study in two districts of the Sidama shows in Chapter seven about 77.5 per cent of the people were either marginalised or sceptics of the current political system. In the light of this finding it is imperative to understand how their marginalisation affected their livelihood asset access through preferential and selective household members targeting; poor governance led to premature and preferential graduation. There is lack of separation between decision makers and the body that hears appeals when unfairness and injustice is felt by those who are marginalised. In fact, in a society that is



characterised by the absence of legal protection from starvation and hunger, access to food and livelihood assets can be enhanced through effective engagement of the victims of hunger, or their trusted and committed representatives in the processes of need identification, setting priorities, planning projects and programmes, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessments to learn from success and failures with desire to transform resilience to suitability. Furthermore fair, just and equitable access of citizens to the benefits and opportunities attained from those programmes and projects should be defined and understood by all stakeholders to check and balance inconsistencies whenever they arise.

The following section will investigate the extent to which the “Productive safety net programme” (PSNP) of the Ethiopian government was fair, just and equitable, to understand the way the citizens of Sidama were treated on the processes of accessing the program. Already, it is clear that graduation rates have fallen far behind expectations, with only 9 per cent of recipients having graduated until 2009 and a large number of them faced food shortages even after graduation. This section in Chapter seven a group of households that were graduated. Among the group of 30 graduated households, 21 had not reached food security despite their graduation. This implies the cut of the entitlement to PSNP without achieving the purpose intended, which likely had a tendency to affect the sceptic and the marginalised. Seriously alarming finding of Chapter seven is that not only the marginalisation of some political identities, but also the reciprocal mistrust of the marginalised on the ruling party and their members created fear and suspicion as limiting label that steals their lives and livelihoods.

### **8.2.1 Access to natural capital (land tenure)**

Land is one of the components that constitute natural capital, while tenure refers to the system of accessing this natural capital. The institutionalization of the land tenure change project giving the northern settlers land rights, paved the way for lordship over Sidama peasants and deprived the latter of land ownership rights. Following this change the Sidama were divided into three political identities

the allies of northern settlers, the sceptics of the settlers' political settings and the marginalised. The most deprived were the marginalised.

The deprivation processes among the Sidama resulted in significant disruption of the indigenous way of livelihoods, decreased production incentives and long-term investment, an exploitative relationships and inequality among the 'citizens', forceful eviction, a resistance movement and recurrent wars and famine (see Chapter five for detailed discussion of this). The land tenure types during the imperial regime can be characterised by *rist*:- communal and private ownership that was mixed with hereditary right to access land. *gult*:- grant land for those who were integrated and loyalist to the political settings.; free hold or sometimes referred to as private *gebbar* tenures, Church land *Siso* meaning one third of the total land in the country. This shows how economic and ideological fusion between the Ethiopian Orthodox and the Ethiopian state, where by, the church endorses the feudal political settings and the then Ethiopian government provides economic benefit to the former. *Maderia mengst* refers to the state land. In the words of Brietzke (1976) the most complex anthology of different land use system in Africa that depicts how 1 percent of the property owners of the entire population who were integrated into and the loyalist to the political settings owned more than 70 percent of the fertile land in the country.

The Dergue regime (1974-1991) that had overthrown and replaced the imperial regime fundamentally changed the agrarian structure and the way of access to the land. The Dergue regime decisively announced the 'Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation'. Accordingly the newly organised Peasant Associations (PAs) redistributed all rural land to its tillers who were the marginalised majority the tenants, thereby abolishing exploitative landlord-tenant relations widespread in the imperial regime.

These reform measures transformed the indigenous livelihood structure and laid the foundations of a new livelihood identity among the Sidama. This can be considered in terms of how it affected the livelihoods of four political identities: the smallholders, the Peasant Associations, the leaders of

Peasant Associations, and the state farm managers. The regime imposed on the peasants command economic policies through the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC)

The impact of the land reform on the Sidama has been small. Because the quality of land and the degree of land fragmentation were rarely considered, production has remained low. Redistribution was not supported by increased security of tenure, and the incentives given to the members of producer co-operatives were discriminatory in that non-members were regarded as the opponents of this policy. These policies were formulated by central government and aimed to provide a single solution for diverse problems without taking into consideration the socio-economic context of an area like that of the Sidama. Access to land does not necessarily mean the right of land ownership, and this limitation reduced their effectiveness as producers and deprived them of the right to sell the land during times of crisis. Access to the land is only one variable in the production function: access to inputs was largely untouched by the reform.

While EPRDF government officially, justifies its public ownership of the land on egalitarian perspectives, its tolerance of the informal land market deprived the household heads and traditional elders and leaders from allocating land to new couples, as key informants interviews suggest due to the land being transferred to those with financial power and political backing for legalisation for the forbidden land market. Those who have financial power are those who are integrated into and loyalists to political settings. They have every support in concerned government offices to register their land as the legal owners of the land. This political backing contradicts official stands of EPRDF government that forbids the land sale.

The diminishing land among the Dale study sample community shows the reduction of the land size was so severe that the land allocated to couples is not enough to construct a house, let alone generate viable income from the land. Thus, land access insecurity, coupled with other policy tragedies such as failed intensification,(due to indebtedness over hidden input utilisation costs which deprived the marginalised of the few existing assets that then led to destitution), diversification strategies (due

to uncontrolled urbanisation creating rocketing land price in the informal market that deprived them of tenure security) are among the policy tragedies behind livelihood and food insecurity, that culminated in the 1999-2003 famine in Sidama.

The Sidama Finance and Planning Department states that the average land holding of about 40 percent of Lokka Abaya is between 0.26 and 0.5 hectares. About 66 percent of the sample households owned less than 0.5 ha in Lokka Abbaaya. This is contrary to the land size per head that can be extrapolated from the total land available in the district distributed to the farming community. The gap could be due to the existence of a vast amount of unused land. ‘Vacant’ land is regarded as a potential expansion sphere for investors who are actively linked to the ruling party. A significant portion of the land was occupied by the department of defence for military training.

Responding to land scarcity, the government of the SNNPS within which the Sidama is situated introduced “voluntary resettlement”. This is a policy of relocating farming families from areas where land is constrained; productivity is low, and agricultural risk is high, to areas where land is more abundant; agricultural productivity is potentially higher and agricultural risk is less and seemed like an effective strategy for reducing vulnerability (a core social protection objective) and raising farm yields (a core agricultural policy objective).

It is reported that the SPDM/EPRDF government planned to resettle the Sidama and other neighbouring people 100,000 of households within three years (2003-2005), out of which 20,000 were resettled by 2003. From mid-December 2003 to the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January alone some 2, 600 households were forced to leave their homes in Sidama for Gura and Decha districts in Bench-Maji and Sheka Zones respectively.

While they were forced to leave their homeland to resettle outside their zone, their land was given to Wolayitas. This happened in Western Lokka Abbaya district. The land adjacent to the Eastern bank of the Bilaate river was traditionally cultivated and used for grazing by Sidama pastoralists, and was

administered by the former Dale district from 1991 and now it is under Lokka Abbaya district since 2007.

According to key informant in Lokka Abbaya, this land was occupied by about 8000-10,000 Sidaman pastoralists, before it was distributed to Wolyita settlers that forced the displacement of 500-1000 Sidama from their own land, in addition to which forced eviction created serious tension between the Wolyitas and the Sidamas when no animosity had occurred for centuries. The SPDM/EPRDF's policy of resettlement is reflected in the GFDRE, policy as follows:

Under the current level of agricultural technology and overall development, areas referred to as drought areas cannot feed and support the people currently residing on them...For this reason, resetting some of these people in areas where sufficient land and rainfall are available is one of the essential means to ensure food security

GFDRE (2001:63)

Under the resettlement initiative, the government planned, to resettle 2.2 million people in all of Ethiopia in three years. This was intended to reduce pressure from highly crowded highlands and provide "access to improved land" (where this is available) to families who agree to move (GFDRE 2003). At this point, concerns were raised that resettlement was a misguided strategy that had invariably been implemented badly in Ethiopia – again, early reports of the implementation suggested serious failures with the relocation programme – and therefore critics doubted the success of the programme to achieve its objective of improving food security for the settled population (Rahmato 2003; Pankhurst 2003).

While those integrated and loyal to successive governments of Ethiopia have better access to land. the situation for sceptics and the marginalised shows deteriorating land access to the lowest point where one cannot sustain livelihoods from cultivating land. While this describes their present situation related to land access the data collected from key informant interviews and life stories traces the origin of the inequality of the land access to many things but with two starting points , that is the

disruption of indigenous Sidama land tenure some four –five generations previously, and population pressure that led to land fragmentation

The disruption of traditional land tenure coupled with population growth forced the marginalised Sidamans to inherit land poverty from their parents. Traditional land tenure was suffocated and disrupted by the introduction of the landlord –tribute payer relationship after the Sidama's encounter with the Abyssinians, which deprived the marginalised Sidamans' from their land rights.

While those ancestors of integrated and loyal to successive Ethiopian governments were able to acquire large portions of land, the sceptics and marginalised had smaller or no land to transfer to their descendants. The extent of poverty and marginalisation of the women and children is double in this context, because, Ethiopian land tenure deprived their right to own transferable land. On the other hand, the patrilineal nature of the Sidama customary law confers rights to men over women and children.

In the events of the husband's death, the brother or husbands nearest kin in the clan retains custody of the children and the widow. This situational poverty has increased the marginalisation of these two groups of the study sample to chronic food insecurity and their dependence on government hand-outs for their survival, instead of securing their livelihood from the land like the rest of the society, as thus they have little or no land at all.

### **8.2.2 Access to human capital**

Human capital in the context of suffocating political space can be seen as the only means of survival for the poor who earn their living from their labour. The political marginalisation of local knowledge and skills may be transmitted from the value of the knowledge and skill holders to their trainees if there have been incentives offered.

Furthermore, loss of self-governance forced the marginalised Sidama to provide free labour for northern settlers. Chapter five shows that how the Sidama had to grind the absentee landlord's share of the grain, which was transported to his residence. That obligation to feed others took away their right to feed themselves (Woldemariam 1984: 11). Sidaman people at that time were left without a surplus to store for times of adversity or to sell at market. Quite apart from the sheer volume of produce being paid as tribute, the amount of time spent working for the landlords resulted in massive production losses.

The provisional military government proclamation of March 4, 1975 introduced not only a shift in primary land tenure, but also dismantled tenancy (article 4, sub-article 5) and liberated the marginalised Sidama peasants from all types of obligations to the landowners article 6, sub-article 3 (Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, 1975). Practically, this was a radical departure from the pre-land reform dominant-subordinate relationship between the land usurpers and the Sidama peasants. However, the Sidama were subjected to the provision of unpaid labour in collective projects during the Dergue regime. Seen in this context, the introduction of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is one step forward.

***The PSNP and labour provision among the study community:*** Chapter seven presented the results on the impact of PSNP. This section discusses and further analyses the effects of the PSNP as resources to be accessed, for four types of households: Marginalised, Sceptic, Loyalist and Integrated. It also examines the impact of the PSNP at the household level labour arrangement. The discussion will illustrate that the effects of the PSNP and OFSP differential methods may have integration and marginalisation effects on the availability of household labour.

Irrespective of land ownership, marginalised households were found to be more vulnerable than integrated households who managed to increase their household productivity even without owning enough land to generate income and food to feed them.

The EPRDF government of Ethiopia started the PSNP in 2005. The PSNP requires that those who are affected by food insecurity contribute their labour power for public works and are paid in cash or kind, for that work. This arrangement was based on avoidance of dependency that can be created by free hand-outs and to link infrastructure development with the aid.

The programme's document suggests that the Ethiopian government learnt from the outcomes of emergency response that show the circumstances of beneficiaries remained less resilient even in "normal" situations. This was introduced alongside with proposals from consortia of donors to create a kind of social policy in the form of the PSNP. This paradigm shift away from sporadic dealing with chronic food insecurity that became the norm of the "hit and run" tactics to on-going support, would have made some progress, had it not been for some implementation inconsistencies.

The Ethiopian Government hoped that the provision of six-months food/cash transfer would resist not only food decline shock but also asset depletion by consistent guarantees and timely transfer (Bishop and Hilhorst, 2010) alongside creating medium infrastructure development that could be used by communities themselves (GFDRE, 2004). However, (Slater *et al*, 2006) argue that the success of the programme depends on the reliability, timeliness and productivity of the transfers.

Two main components of the programme are labour intensive public works and direct support. The former was planned for healthy and fit household members who would exchange cash or transfers in kind for their participation in designed public work projects for at least five days per month per household member in order to be eligible for safety net transfers. The latter is intended for those who are food insecure and unable to provide labour, and eligible for free hand-outs (GFDRE, 2004).

However, the designers of PSNP failed to reflect on competing labour demands for would be participants. In rural Ethiopia, where agriculture is the major source of self-employment, the division of work and time between commitments to the PSNP public works programme, and their land were not considered adequately.



To understand precisely the role of labour in rural livelihoods, households were divided into three groups based on labour availability. These categories are used throughout this section.

***PSNP transfers and household food security:*** - Table 7.5 shows, 91 per cent of the total PSNP beneficiary households, were public works participants while the remaining 9 per cent were direct support beneficiaries. Of the total beneficiary households in the districts, according to survey results, about 60 percent acknowledged that the PSNP has helped them to cover food gap. However, despite the high number of PSNP beneficiary households in the districts, only a few households reported a positive impact in terms of livelihood improvement and long-term household food security.

The small number of households who graduated from the PSNP by the end of the first phase of the programme in 2009 also illustrates the limited impact of the PSNP and Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) in terms of long-term food security. Contrary to government expectations, just 9 percent of the total PSNP public works beneficiary households ‘graduated’- meaning that they become food “self-sufficient” and are no longer eligible for safety net transfers. In the study area, about 5 percent of the public works beneficiary households graduated by the end of the first phase of the PSNP.

The impact of PSNP and OFSP programmes on household food security and long-term livelihoods differs according to the nature and type of households participating in the PSNP. Slater *et al.* (2006) argued in their research that rural households in Ethiopia are not all the same. Households differ in many ways, including in terms of their resources, their objectives, the strategies they adopt, the problems they encounter, and the success they have in making a living. Although most of the households have access to land, the majority reported that they are not able to plough their land and are forced to rent it out due to lack of labour. Under sharecropping arrangements, they receive a quarter to half of the production and for this reason increasingly depend on PSNP transfers. This kind of land rent is not an indication of labour shortages alone.

Households sometimes rent out their land to those who got other farm inputs, due to shortage of those inputs at their command. However, interviews showed that labour was the crucial factor because if they had more labour they could have exchanged labour for money for better-off households to be able to buy input. Households in this group expressed concern that due to their involvement in public works, they face competing labour claims between public works and their agricultural activities and involvement in more money generation activities.

In such conditions of competing labour claims, therefore, poor households' uncertainty about securing sufficient production forced them to divide the members of their household to farm the little land they have, and invest their labour in the PSNP public works to secure their transfers, to cover food cost, which is not enough compared to household size. Such decision of securing short-term survival at the expense of long-term preservation is what Wood (2003) calls the 'Faustian bargain'.

PSNP officials claimed that no PSNP labour is required during the peak agricultural season from January to June. However, it seems that government officials consider seeding, weeding and harvesting as the primary farming activities. For farmers, however, the major labour intensive agricultural activity is land preparation, and that coincides with PSNP public works activities. Brown *et al.* (1994), for example, argued that factors that diminish labour quantity and/or quality will increase the incidence and depth of household vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity.

In this regard, poor families in the study area are characterised by an overwhelming reliance on labour as their single most important factor of production and income generation. Participation in PSNP public works reduces their available labour for both their farming and off-farm activities. This is contradictory to the findings of the World Bank, which argues that in developing countries safety net programmes do not often reduce labour efforts substantially (Grosh *et al.* 2008).

The problems encountered by this group of households were aggravated by operational problems within the PSNP, in particular, the lack of full-family targeting and the timing of transfers. Full-family

targeting refers to the provision of sufficient resources to households to meet all family members' food and other needs in order to help households avoid the sale of their productive assets to compensate for partial transfers. Lack of full-family targeting forced households to sell their productive assets to meet consumption needs at the risk of increasing their vulnerability.

The absence of a tailored approach to PSNP transfer is also another major issue. PSNP transfers are provided for a maximum of six months. For this reason, households facing food gaps of more than six months are forced to sell the productive assets they own to cover their food needs. This makes households more vulnerable to falling back into destitution rather than improving their livelihoods.

This section indicates that the PSNP and other related food security programmes did not result in a significant improvement in food security status for the vast majority of labour- poor households in the study area. Due to their inability to afford the labour requirement for the PSNP and their own agricultural activities, marginalised households are forced to spend their available labour on the public works and to rent out their own land to another farmer. This raises questions about demanding a labour contribution to public works from poor people engaged in development or safety net programmes.

Some of the study sample are characterised by labour shortages in their households. However, requirements to participate in public works tend to overlook the fact that such households engage in public works at the expense of other activities that can have a positive impact on their livelihood. The design of such interventions, for this reason, needs to take into account the living reality of those households who are facing labour shortage to provide them an opportunity to use their labour effectively for sustained growth. This calls for rethink of the modern notion of development interventions based on understanding that the policy and political dynamics have to play, allowing some to access and implicitly or explicitly excluding those who are sceptic and reject the legitimacy of political power holder.

In summary, the impact of the PSNP and OFSP programmes varies from household to household

mainly according to the degree they are included, as shown in Chapter seven data. Secondly, in situations where there are competing labour claims, availability of household labour is crucial in ensuring household food security and in enabling the household to benefit from other related food security interventions.

Labour availability provides an opportunity for income diversification and the generation of additional income to support household food security. Marginalised households are found to be more vulnerable and at risk of becoming trapped in poverty and food insecurity as opposed to loyalist and integrated households who showed a relative improvement in household food security. Labour is an indispensable resource and a major determinant of the impact of the PSNP and other related food security programmes on long-term household food security.

Thus, the PSNP and other similar food security programmes fall short in enabling marginalised households to improve their food security status, despite the government's intention to lift these households out of poverty and food insecurity. One of the additional concerns is the small amount of transfers provided to households and the dilution of resources that forces beneficiary households to sell productive assets or to take loans to cover food shortages. Such activities put households at risk of being trapped in a vicious circle of indebtedness and poverty.

Delays and unpredictability in resource transfers received by households are reported as additional reasons and have a similar effect on marginalised households. In particular, the unpredictability of transfers undermines household risk strategies and their productive investment that could contribute to reducing household vulnerability. In this regard, not only the frequent retargeting of the PSNP programme but also the premature graduation implemented in 2009 tends to undermine households' confidence in the PSNP programme.

The evidence in Chapter seven shows that the majority of the PSNP participants continue to be poor and food insecure even though they received safety net transfers and has had access to OFSP

loans for over five years. Apart from covering the food gap, positive impacts on asset protection and asset building are limited to fully integrated PSNP beneficiary households.

The competing labour claims limited value of resource transfers and absence of the full family targeting reduce the effectiveness of the integrated programmes on marginalised households. Given the fact that many of the households are marginalised, this raises serious questions about the feasibility of the PSNP and its complementary OFSP in achieving their intended purpose.

### **8.2.3 Accessing social capital**

The evidence in Chapter seven suggests that the SPDM/EPRDF created conditioned political identities at the grass roots level that suffocates, the political space for groups and individuals. The SPDM/ EPRDF organised the households at the grassroots in 1:5. Means one person is secretly assigned to spy and report the behaviour and activities of five households to the authority for the exchange of economic favour. The attempt to accomplish their assignments of the political elite however cost their social capital among their communities if they are identified. But backed by the power holder they are better off as far as food security is concerned, they are placed in fear and hate in community imagination, but they are not loved by the community members mainly due to their extraordinary indulgence in private freedom of individuals.

*The symptoms of disappearing social capital:-* In order to understand the level of social capital among the study communities before the introduction of this hidden controlling system, it is imperative to look closer at certain elements of the Sidama's social capital, particularly food and livelihoods. In this context sharing and receiving traditional Sidama, and changes to this were taken as the indicators, particularly, sharing and receiving food and drink, the burdens of the community and useful information about livelihood strategies.

However, this is not free provision but it is a kind of social insurance invested by the community

members during not only the shock and sadness of mourning, but also during celebration such as marriage, circumcision ceremonies. However, there are individuals and groups contained in marginalized political identities whose economic capabilities are deteriorating, and who consequently are unable to practice those traditional values accepted by Sidama society. Those groups, who had not been excluded from the Sidama Society on the account of their failure to meet the criteria of reciprocity, now started the feeling excluded and sometimes excluded themselves due to fear of disrespect from friends for failing expected reciprocity. This arises, from conflicting self when a person fails to give back what he/she has taken, economically or materially owing to the circumstances in which they find themselves.

It had been this exchange of economic, material and social status that maintained the ties of reciprocity between those which render visible economic material assistance during times of crises such as food insecurity and shortages and who take invisible social status (prestige, honour) from those who are vulnerable, which is now deteriorating .

Key informant interviews about Sidama's past and the participant observation of the researcher combined to reflect on sharing and receiving food and drinks among the study communities, helping construct communal entitlement to food as a form of social capital in the Sidama. In order to understand the level of continuation or disruption of these elements of the social capital and its impact on food and livelihood (in) security among the study communities The data was generated by using surveys on the level contentment of sharing food, sharing the community burden and helpful livelihood strategies.

The evidence in Chapter seven taught us that social capital gains are more significance in economic return to the individuals where political or party identity constitutes a capital, in that its investment brings about valuable resources embedded in such connection. However in a society like the sample study where trust and interest in political settings within which they are living brings advantage and

mistrust and disinterest in political settings situate the citizens in a disadvantaged position , the social capital is not preventing the deterioration in accessing livelihood assets and is not preventing food insecurity. In the Sidama, the domination of one party system, and the mistrust of the majority of the study community towards the governing party have long dictated political influence in livelihood asset access attainment processes.

The SPDM/EPRDF party apparatus penetrates beyond the public sector. It is active in both small scale and large scale private and joint venture enterprises as well. Being a member of the SPDM/EPRDF, therefore, offers more opportunities for accessing livelihood assets than indigenous social capital can provide. Despite this offer of opportunities, the loyalty of the majority of the study community to the Sidama Liberation Movement created in the SPDM a fear of disloyalty to SPDM. Therefore, it is only one out of five who is benefiting from the best available opportunities. The rest are marginalised. More of worry for those who are marginalised is the effect of the fast disappearing social network that had been serving as a safety net for centuries.

Evidences in Chapter seven particularly, presented in Table 7.13 to 7.17 revealed that in stratified political identities rewarded through differential access to the resources shows there is no system-wide advantage for those who are in need. Advantages were observed in terms of position within the system with respect to access to livelihood assets. Those with privileged access can benefit from measures that are ruinous to those without.

#### **8.2.4. Accessing Financial Capital**

This section discusses how for the rural poor were borrowing more than they pay back, paved the way for debt spiral or over-indebtedness, and asset loss destitution that led to removal of the marginalised group's access to financial capital. However, households are exploited by lenders who lend them more than they can afford pay back. This implies that many poor households do not have

any choice but to incur multiple debts and are exposed to debt spiral over-indebtedness. Debt spiral or over-indebtedness means using loans to pay off other loans and by allocating more than fifty per cent of their net income to loan repayments that could erode the groups' trustworthiness.

***Loans from informal sources:*** - Informal loans signify two kinds of transactions. Primarily, this can be a debt of cash or kind during hard times that is characterised by a small amount, interest-free, with no fixed time of repayment between closely related individuals or not related individuals. Secondly, it can be a debt transaction of cash and kind during hard times of a larger amount, with interest, usually for a relatively fixed time, following harvest time and between those who have more than sufficient and those who have not enough to survive a hard season. The findings of the field study revealed that inconsistency and debt repayment problems are insignificant because of strong mutual trust and small size of the debt transaction size, which is disappearing now a days, due to the institutionalisation of loans and provision of loans beyond individuals' capacity for repayment.

This can be analysed in the context of the introduction of formal credit institutions that undermine the traditional lending practices which enabled people to have choice and preference to borrow from micro-finance institutions rather than from individual lenders mainly because of the possibilities of taking larger loans with smaller interest rates. Secondly key informant raised the issue of fast disappearing social capital mainly the elements of trust coupled with the poverty trend that is encroaching against the capacity of better off individuals who may offer help for those who were in difficulty.

There are two types of food security loans. Primarily, for the Promotion of intensification: - it is a short-term loan provided for crop production purposes such as improved seeds and fertilizer to enable households to increase their annual production. Secondly, it is for promotion of diversification: - a long-term loan provided to households to increase and diversify their asset bases and income through livestock investment and provision of technological inputs and involvement in petty trade. In cases of



diversification, the government's intention was, to include providing start-up capital for self-employment. Credit may help poor people to move out of poverty and food insecurity. However, in practice, the role of food security loans in poverty reduction and long-term livelihood improvement is not as effective as intended.

The lack of alternative means of income to cover the cost of unanticipated household needs and availability of cash at hand poses irresistible challenges to follow the agreed business plan. This forces them to follow their own logic; subsequently their short term utilisation will sacrifice their long-term livelihood improvement. Food security loans are intended to help poor households to develop their capacities to invest in long-term livelihood improvement to ensure their livelihood and food security, but in reality, it has failed to do this beyond providing buffers in times of shortage.

***Loan diversion and indebtedness:*** -The majority of marginalised households lack the resources needed to cover their food gaps and are forced to divert loans to cover short-term consumption needs. That will make these households to divert diversification loan to buy food and other consumption. In addition to this, they are forced to take another loan with high-interest rates to pay back their existing loans. This puts them at risk of further impoverishment and indebtedness.

Further probing of sceptics and marginalised political identities revealed that 40 percent and 80 percent respectively diverted food security loans for unintended purposes other than food and livelihood security. The findings of this study suggest that access to credit has not resulted in a structural improvement in the livelihoods of most of the beneficiary households in the study area. For a vast majority of marginal households, the long-term impact of credit is very limited.

Although it enabled poor households to cover short-term food gaps and helped them to survive in periods of shortage, most of them are trapped in cycles of indebtedness and poverty. Despite all the assumptions and expectations, credit did not enable marginalised households to break out of this cycle. The major structural problems preventing poor households from investing their credit in livelihood

improvements have not been addressed. Improving households' livelihoods in the long-term involves not only provision of access to credit but also greater access to productive resources and assets such as land, labour, livestock, technology, market information and the opportunity to develop the necessary skills.

In summary, access to relatively soft loans, therefore, helped integrated households to invest larger amounts of money in asset depletion prevention. Nevertheless, the impact generally falls short of expectations. Improvements in asset holding have been recorded for integrated households, but the gains were not sufficient to ensure sustainable household food security. This was one major reason why the rate of safety net graduation was very low in the study area. The worst effect on marginalised households' credit did not help escape food insecurity but pushed them into indebtedness and debt spirals.

#### **8.2.5 Accessing physical capital**

This subsection discusses the process of accessing physical capital among the study community, the role of the PSNP in physical asset creation, and how the latter is affected by the policy of physical assets as a benchmark in inclusion and exclusion from the PSNP.

Some physical capital among the study communities was accessed by traditional land tenure and customary inheritance law. The transfers of physical assets range from inheritance from the former owners, keepers or users to the new owners, for instance, land, livestock, farming tools and equipment.

Framed in this way, the extent of accessing physical capital depends on the size of the physical capital held by the original owners, the number of heirs, and the way physical capital is spread or diluted among the heirs. In this case, population growth, the deteriorating trend of physical capital itself due to land tenure, and natural disasters has aggravated the dilution of physical capital so much that, it is impossible to generate any meaningful livelihood strategies and activities from using such

little physical capital access.

The declared intention of the Ethiopian government and its donors at the creation of the PSNP in 2005 was to enhance asset creation capacities and boost the physical capital access of the beneficiaries. The introduction of the PSNP and the existence of rudimentary micro-credit institutions among these communities with the objective of credit intended to enable households to acquire and develop household assets.

These communities are predominantly characterised by hoe agriculture, access or lack of access to oxen has less implications for the improvement of physical capital. The hoe culture of farm tools and equipment that are available cheaply, by indigenous cottage industries made by the indigenous metal and iron working casts, for smallholder farmers to buy. Those who could not afford to buy such farm equipment can access and use them simply by borrowing from their neighbours. Therefore, basic physical capital with which the small farmers can boost agricultural production is not a problem to be solved for subsistence livelihoods. Even coffee and *chaat* livelihoods are characterised by hoe culture except for coffee processing which needs major investment that is unaffordable for smallholders needing much financial capital, skills and networking. This however is highly integrated into the political system, and out of the scope of this study.

Various studies (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Hulme and Mosley 1998; ) indicate that microcredit has a positive impact on building household assets. However, this study found that micro-credit has a limited impact on household assets, and the impact is not the same for all types of household.

Results show that credit has a relatively greater positive impact on integrated households than on marginalised households in terms of asset creation. Comparing marginalised households, one farmer described how integrated households access credit easily and use it to build household assets while the marginalised are excluded:

Everyone is not taking credit from the Omo Microfinance equally. They created a wall between we the supporters of SLM Sidama Liberation Movement and the supporter of SEPDM Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement. When I went to their office, they say come tomorrow, when I go to their office that tomorrow they say the boss is not around to decide on your application. When I saw the boss on the other day, he said the committee rejected your application. While their supporters and members applied, they are allowed credit even without their physical presence. The supporter of SPDM is now becoming rich. They are taking credit because they want to increase their assets and become richer. However, the sympathisers and supporters of SLM are taking credit to cover their food shortages. It seems like every mountain against us. Sometimes those who hold government office tell us to refrain from supporting SLM. SLM represents the interest of the Sidama, and it is my identity how can I support direction south that has no meaning at all? I would prefer staying unfavoured instead of supporting SPDM. One day the justice prevails when they understand the true sense of the constitution

Further questioning of key informants revealed that, in fact, disproportional access to PSNP loans by four political identities is politically motivated.

Primarily, there is an incentive to keep the integrated to work for the political system by informing their neighbour's attitude and behaviour to local authorities in Peasant Associations. Secondly, there is a political strategy to neutralise the sceptics who are politically active so would not be able to motivate the marginalised against the power of the local authorities not only during nominal, periodic elections but also sporadic self-criticism exercise known as *Gingema*.

From the record of the Ethiopian elections, one may learn that the exercise is not really to bring political power to govern from the ballot box but image building and decorating the ugly political reality at grassroots for the sake of satisfying donors who are pouring aid into Ethiopia. The political space of Ethiopia characterised with following major trends. In 2005, the election which seemed free and fair at the beginning ended with premature declaration of victory by ruling party that led to public outcry loss of nearly 200 lives, dramatic repression, jailing of opposition of opposition leaders. The government, waged a sustained and coordinated campaign against students, teachers, journalists, nongovernmental organizations and opposition supporters using a variety of legislative and extra-legal measures to increase the general support for and dependence on, the ruling party this resulted in the ruling party winning 99 per cent of available seats in district and kebeles at local level, what Aalen and

Tronvoll called 'a return of electoral authoritarianism' (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). Further narrowness of the political space manifested through the proclamation of Charities and Societies Proclamation and Anti- terrorism laws.

This suggests the regime has never held a free and fair election. The closest it came to allowing a degree of political space was in 2005 when the opposition nearly won. Instead, the EPRDF claimed a victory, imprisoned opposition members, and closed down all political space in the 2010 election. At that time they even misused humanitarian aid to control voting at every level; finally claiming an absurd 99.6 percent electoral victory. The Ethiopian Parliament has only one opposition member out of 547.

Accessing physical assets as a benchmark in inclusion and exclusion from the PSNP:- Had the PSNP's theoretical stand and principles as well as the graduation manuals been taken seriously, and implemented accordingly, it would have been easy to understand the extent of physical asset creation among the beneficiaries.

The fundamental principle of PSNP was to enable its food insecure beneficiaries to build productive assets side by side to covering their chronic food gaps, transforming the group from food deficit to food self-sufficiency to the point at which they would graduate. This meant their asset base must increase. PSNP beneficiary households would reach a point where they no longer needed support like the Productive Safety Net. They would still be entitled to access other support such as loan extensions for the self-employment creation, and generate sufficient income to live on and cover food deficit and other asset creation (MoARD, 2009). This means the beneficiaries will graduate when the benefits to which they were entitled made them feel self-sufficient. To avoid the dependency syndrome, the Ethiopian government designed a graduation benchmark for PSNP participants.

Graduation benchmarks use a measure of household assets to determine households' potential for graduation. They describe the level of assets a food sufficient household is likely to have in each

region. This is because assets are considered a better indicator than income in reflecting lasting changes in chronic food insecurity status. The idea of asset-based graduation benchmarks was introduced by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), at the request of the Ethiopian government.

The IFPRI study indicated that incomes tend to fluctuate between seasons while assets are likely to remain stable except during periods of severe shocks (Hoddinott, 2006; MoARD, 2007). Assets owned by households are converted into their monetary value in order to assess whether the household reaches the graduation benchmark or not.

The benchmarks differ across regions. The regional food security bureau of SNNPR Region, where the two districts of the Sidama zone are located, adopted a regional benchmark of 4000 birr per capita. According to the regional graduation guidance note, until a household reaches this point, it remains eligible to participate in the PSNP and cannot be removed from the program unless households decide to leave the program by themselves a term that is described as self-graduation (MoARD 2007). This occurs when a household decides that investing labour in other activities (like wage employment or own production) be more profitable than participating in the PSNP (MoARD, 2007).

Most of the marginalised political identities said that they are trapped in debt spirals and a vicious cycle of debt because their failure to pay back the loans forced them to borrow other loans or to sell their existing assets placing them in asset deterioration instead of realising the promised asset creation as the case of the following informant shows:

We have been advised and encouraged by development agents (DAs) and some local authorities to take loans from Omo micro-finance Institution.. I think it has risk, because it has interests that keep counting interest on us while we are sleeping, regardless of circumstance considerations. Secondly, failure to pay back those loans is merciless either you will find yourself one day in the jail or you have to sell out the asset you have created let alone creating additional asset. That is why I am selling my only heifer I have got to pay the debt. I have borrowed from Omo micro- finance. I have avoided jail, but there is no increase of assets as we were told by authorities, in fact we are losing what we have already.

Lending the marginalised above what they can afford and subsequent loan payment failure, is taking away the assets of some beneficiaries which they have already created. By doing so the promised asset creation is not achieved for the marginalised and those who are not integrated into the political setting. However this does not mean that access to the government PSNP programme has not any positive impact in terms of accessing other forms of assets. The issue is that PSNP has differential impacts which depend on the level of integration and marginalisation.

Had it been implemented fairly, objectively, with some skills and transparency on the consequences and risks, on the ways in which households invest their credit, the PSNP would have achieved the purpose intended, for instances some study sample households revealed that by providing a guaranteed transfer to cover household food gaps, PSNP enables marginalised beneficiary households to use credit effectively for livestock investment better than non-beneficiary households.

In addition to this, the PSNP on paper is perfect and includes transparency elements on the processes of the graduation of beneficiaries. This is detailed, as one of the core principles of the FSP is that the community should play a crucial role in the graduation process. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF) to decide on graduation. This taskforce is formed by elected representatives of elders, a youth, females, males, and a health extension worker together with a development agent and representative from the Peasant Association (kebele) food security task force (MoARD, 2007).

For effective implementation of the benchmarks, the regional graduation guidance note emphasises the establishment of a strong institutional framework from the district down to the village level. Nevertheless, as it will be shown later in Chapter eight, some of these institutions were not effective in executing their intended tasks specially those at Peasant Association and community levels. When one tries to understand asset creation and protection through the lens of PSNP on paper to investigate asset creation and protection level to justify graduation among the study community, the discrepancy

between theory and practice is evident.

This is because, apparent that clear differences existed between graduated and non-graduated households in. 272 households from Dale and 755 households from which Loka Abaya had graduated at the end of 2008 start 2009.

However, among the graduated households females represent a small proportion. Of 30 graduated households in the area, only three were female headed households while the remaining 27 were male headed. In the study sample of the total 120 households, 90 households had received PSNP transfers since 2005. Out of these 120 beneficiary households 30 households have been “graduated” by the end of 2008 while 90 households were still getting PSNP support. Table 8.1 illustrates the regional graduation benchmarks adopted by SNNPRS.

**Table 8.1. Graduation benchmark in the SNNPRS.**

Region	Initial Benchmark*	IFPRI	Average value according to FGGN**	asset according to	Benchmark adopted RGGN***	as by	Asset Benchmark Elements
SNNPRS	4,000 capita	birr per	2,998 capita	birr per	75% or more based On regression		Land holdings, level of schooling, capital based on agricultural tools and livestock availability, family size and sex of the household head

\*Based on the 75 percent benchmark (a potential exclusion error of 25 percent) and a land holding of less than 1 ha.

\*\* Federal Graduation Guidance Note

\*\*\* Regional Graduation Guidance Note

Source: Adapted from the IDL group 2010

Calculating physical assets and other income can be a challenge as some households are not



comfortable in sharing such information openly. Devereux (2010) also considers asset ownership as a better indicator of resilience than income, because it provides better protection against livelihood shocks as they can be liquidated to bridge a food gap. Though applying an asset-based system of graduation benchmark seems feasible and might be thought simple to administer, it is not without critics. Asset based criteria are difficult to implement and do not always reflect the extent of household food self-sufficiency.

This is partly because it does not take savings, remittances and incomes from other off-farm activities into account that might constitute significant contributions to household food self-sufficiency; neither does take postponement into consideration. Postponement is a strategy of keeping money or food for future consumption by using the opportunity created by social capital for savings. Social capital among the Sidama has the potential for food consumption postponement as discussed in Chapter four.

Among the graduates, of the scheme, households which reported food self-sufficiency are those with better asset holdings and household labour. According to these households, having enough labour, and other inputs enabled them to rent additional land to produce enough to cover household food shortage. It also enabled them to better utilise the credit they received. Those integrated and loyalist households mostly used the credit to buy an extra input and rent additional land that helped them to increase their productivity. A few labour wealthy households also reported that they used part of the PSNP cash payments to purchase livestock. On the other hand, graduated households who reported food shortages, gave small land size, shortage of labour power and other input for ploughing, and effects of the frequent droughts as primary reasons for their food insecurity situation.

They reported that the inability to adequately feed their households forced them to sell the livestock they had acquired over the last few years to cover household consumption gaps. Household interviews showed that the livestock holdings of graduated households improved after their participation in the

PSNP and OFSP programmes, although most of their livestock was bought with a loan that had not yet been repaid. However, about three-quarters of the graduated households depended on livestock sales to cover food gaps and to pay back their loan. In the study area, where livestock ownership was very low, the sale of livestock for covering critical food gap purposes is essential for rural coping, as it can endanger the future viability of households. This is likely to make households dependent on emergency relief for survival in the long-term (Devereux and Guenther, 2009). The majority of graduated households in the sample was thus still food insecure, in debt over the purchase of livestock and losing their accumulated assets. This raises the question of why they were graduated from the program (Carter and Barrett, 2007).

## **Summary of discussion**

This thesis aimed at understanding the political space of conflictive and conditioned identities. It also strived to comprehend the nature of policy space that permit and prevent access to livelihood assets for those identities involved in conflicts. It attempted to understand control of livelihood assets laid foundation for formation of conditioned political identity through reciprocating access to livelihood assets for political trust and interest. How mistrust and disinterest in the successive governments of Ethiopia led to livelihood and food insecurity that culminated into 1999-2003 famine in the context of the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia.

Thus, this thesis has critically reviewed the literature on food security, famine and its prevention and examined the conceptualisation of famine and its causes and the emergence of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. It presented a critical review of the latter, arguing that it has ignored political and historical aspects. It proposed the concept of 'political space' as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The struggles are between political institutions (from 'above') and citizens sharing different political identities from 'below' see figure 2-5 in chapter two.

This thesis has also investigated the sources of political identity conflicts and the political space of struggle between successive Ethiopian governments' policies and their consequences from above, and the Sidama from 'below' through the lens of LEPSA, exploring and learning about the political space of conflicting and conditioned political identities and its various consequences. The effect it has had on accessing livelihood assets, livelihood strategies activities, and outcomes has been considered.

Chapter four of this thesis presented the genesis of Sidama ethnonationalism as political identity. It lays the groundwork for an understanding of the sources of political identity conflict by explaining how Sidama ethnonationalism was inherited from pre-conquest socio-political institutions and how indigenous governance was used to mediate access to livelihood assets.

It also examined the survival of indigenous Sidama institutions and values. These Sidama remained informally. It also presented the root causes, the processes and cumulative effects of non-violent and violent engagement on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama. It argued that the disengagement and violent engagements between institutions, discourses, and actions from 'above' and 'below' created direct and indirect cumulative effects that contributed to the 1999/2003 famine.

Continuing the in-depth analysis of the development of conflicting political identities, chapter six presented the evidence of comparative political spaces in two successive regimes. Thus, evidences substantiated the arguments of the wider political spaces, the increase in successful engagements, which in turn create fertile grounds for sustainable livelihood initiatives, and where narrower political space leads to disengagement or negative engagements that lead to war of liberations and famine.

Chapter seven focuses on the political space of conditioned identity and its impact on access to livelihood assets. It examined how the political space of conditioned identity, enhances or retards access to available livelihood assets and aid resources. This relates with the political 'capture' of the livelihood assets by the ruling elite led to reciprocating those controlled assets to the trust and interest of the citizens and to legitimize citizens' will with or without their understandings and beliefs. Thus control of livelihood asset is used as reward for integrated and loyalist to the political setting and as a

threat the sceptics and the marginalised, as evidences in Chapter Seven have demonstrated. The following chapter gives concluding remarks on major findings of the thesis and offers the policy recommendations.

## **CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

### **9 Introduction**

This chapter aims, primarily, to conclude whether the research achieved its aims and objectives. Secondly, to give concluding remarks on the research findings. Thirdly, to offer policy recommendations. As contrast to the contemporary accounts, on the causes of food and livelihood insecurity that leads to famine, this research provides a critical, historically grounded analysis of the causes of livelihood insecurity and famine using political space as an overall framing concept. Political space may be defined as a freedom for individual(s) or a group, of thought, belief, expression and action to win public opinion, emotional and practical support to the causes of diverse identities that range from human made such as policy tragedies to natural disasters. It is also freedom for individual(s) or group(s) from worries of livelihood asset access impediments imposed by power holders as the consequence of thought, belief, expression and action held by those who are disempowered and marginalised. This chapter is organised as follows: the first section states whether the research achieved the aims and objectives; the second chapter gives concluding remarks on the research findings. The third section offers Policy recommendations

#### **9.1 Achieving the aims and objectives of the research**

The aims and objectives of this thesis were to explore the political space of conflicting and conditioned identity and their impact on accessing livelihood assets. It also strives to comprehend the nature of policy space that permits and prevents access to livelihood assets for those identities involved in

conflicts. It attempts to understand what conditions the political identity formation and how it reciprocates with access to livelihood assets, and how livelihoods failure leads to food insecurity and famine in the context of the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia.

Thus, this thesis has critically reviewed the literature on food security, famine and its prevention and examined the conceptualisation of famine and its causes, and the emergence of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. It presents a critical review of the latter, arguing that it has ignored political and historical aspects. It proposes that the concept of ‘political space’ as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The struggles are between political institutions (from ‘above’) and citizens sharing different political identities from ‘below’

This thesis also investigates the sources of political identity conflicts and the political space of struggle between successive Ethiopian government policies and their consequences from above and the Sidama from ‘below’ through the lens of (LEPSA): exploring and learning about the political space of conflicting and conditioned political identities and its various consequences. The effect it has had on accessing livelihood assets, livelihood strategies, activities and outcomes; mapping out who has livelihood security and sustainability and who has insecurity and victimisation of starvation and famine.

This research combined Critical Realism as a research philosophy; ethnography as a research tool for extracting valuable information from the Sidama of Southern Ethiopia in the first stage of the research with survey in the second phase of the research.

While critical realism helped the researcher to reflect on what key informants interview, focus group discussion, and observation findings survey findings suggested to substantiate or challenge what the available literature says on the conceptualisation of famine and its causes and the emergence of the sustainable livelihoods framework. It presents a critical review of the latter, arguing that it has ignored political and historical aspects. It proposes the concept of political space as a way of representing the social space in which struggles to control access to livelihood assets occur. The

struggles are between political institutions (from ‘above’) and citizens sharing different political identities from “below”.

This thesis critically reviewed the literature on food insecurity, famine and the evolution of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF), and showed that how the initial SLF was less efficiently politicised. It also argued that even politicised SLF that emerged as the remedy in the second stage missed critical issues for the insecurity and sustainability of livelihoods. This thesis developed the framework Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis (LEPSA). By doing so it has achieved the first objective.

The political space for conflicting identities is dealt with first by presenting the origin of the Sidama identity from their way of life and livelihood by exploring the pre-conquest Sidama governance, and livelihood assets with particular reference to the natural, social and human capital that gave the Sidama district features of building a unique Sidama identity. (see Chapter four).

Chapter four presented the genesis of Sidama ethnonationalism as political identity. It lays the groundwork for an understanding of the sources of political identity conflict by explaining how Sidaman ethnonationalism was inherited from pre-conquest socio-political institutions and how indigenous governance was used to mediate access to livelihood assets. It also examined the survival of indigenous Sidama institutions and values. These remained informally. It also presented the root causes, the processes and cumulative effects of non-violent and violent engagement on the lives and livelihoods of the Sidama. It argues that the disengagement and violent engagements between institutions, discourses, and actions from ‘above’ and ‘below’ created direct and indirect cumulative effects that contributed to the 1999/2003 famine.

Continuing the in-depth analysis of the development of conflicting political identities, Chapter six presented the evidence of comparative political spaces in two successive regimes. Thus, evidences substantiated the arguments of the wider political spaces, the increase in successful engagements, which in turn create fertile grounds for sustainable livelihood initiatives, and where narrower political

space leads to disengagement or negative engagements that lead to war of liberation and famine.

This had led to conflicting and belligerent political identities: The identity that associated with Abyssinian nationalism disguised as Ethiopian nationalism on one hand and the Sidama ethnonationalism on the other in a very suffocation political space (Chapters five and six). Both of them are ethno-nationalism.

The Abyssinian disguised Ethiopian nationalism entails two politically dominating elites in the modern history of Ethiopia. Amhara of Shewa from 1890-1991 and the Tigreans from 1991 to date. While the former strategically denied its ethnic roots, the latter recognised its ethnic identities. Nevertheless, both are shifting between themselves to dominate more than 82 ethnic groups in a country known as Ethiopia, leaving very narrow political space for the rest of the ethnic identities (Chapters five and six)

Conditioned political identity and its impact on accessing livelihood assets in the Sidama also examined how control of the most important livelihood assets (the land) and the change of the land tenure after the conquest of the Sidama land, together with other Abyssinian policies conditioned the formation of extra- identities beyond ethnonationalism and additional identities of the integrated; the loyalist, the sceptic, and the marginalised within the Sidama ethnic group with differential livelihood asset access.

In effect, this has created livelihood insecurity and famine for marginalised and sustainability of the integrated and the loyalists. How this is exhibited in famine response failure and differential treatment of the Sidama's living in districts prone to food insecurity, (Chapters six and seven). However presenting the political space in the Sidama in their engagement with Abyssinians as only suffocating is not realistic. Because there are periods, that were characterised by relative width of the political space. That is dealt in Chapter six.

The period of relative width in political space from 1974-77 witnessed how a little freedom for the marginalised can help them to come up with their initiatives like that of involving in coffee



commerce of the Peasant Association that is still sustainable. The narrowness of the political space created the situation of political tensions and conflicts of war in the period that followed 1977. In this period Sidama became a war zone between the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Dergue regime that claimed thousands of lives and disruption of livelihoods, that equally contributed to the downfall of the Dergue regime, in 1991. The period of relative freedom in political space from 1991-1994 witnessed how the little freedom that the Sidama enjoyed helped to design the developmental civil society (Sidama Development Programme) to empower marginalised Sidama beneficiaries to participate in the issues that affect their lives and livelihood and acted as equals and showed the success stories.

The narrowness of the political period after 1995, that culminated in sowing the seed of famine in the Sidama land that affected 19 per cent of the population from 1999-2003; dismantling the structures of the Sidama Development programme and Sidama Development Corporation structures and forced the thousands to leave the Sidama land for their lives; that created to the evolution of the Sidama Liberation Front in 1999, Sidama National Liberation Organization (SNLO) in 2002, and United Sidama Parties for Freedom and Justice in 2012, to fight against the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia.

Therefore the wider the political space, the freer political discourse, and action the lesser political tension, the wider the peace and effective engagement in politics, that allows negotiation that efficiently lay foundation for local initiatives to work on the security and sustainability of livelihood.

Furthermore, this thesis has evaluated the extent to which engaging political space conditioned the resilience, food and livelihood security in the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) of the Ethiopian governments, the controversy over donor's policy toward Ethiopia, which is conditioned by at least two important factors. Primarily, the strategic position of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, which makes Ethiopia a key ally in the region. Secondly, relative economic growth of Ethiopia ( though created very significant gap between the integrated and the marginalised), attracted the attention of the donors to continue their support to incumbent regime, regardless the narrow political space within

which the inequitable growth generated. The assessment of the donor financed PSNP is the third objective of the thesis through the LEPSA lens. This is also achieved through the lens of LEPSA. (See the results of field research in Chapter seven and discussion in Chapter eight). This thesis also offers policy recommendation on the third section of this chapter based on the following conclusion.

## **9.2 Concluding remarks on the research findings**

There are three components of this thesis. These are the political space, political identities and their effects on the livelihood and food security. This section offers concluding remarks on each of these components.

### **9.2.1 On political space: historical trend of political space in Ethiopia**

The concept of political space can not explain the Abyssinian conquest, consolidation and control of the Sidama and the rest. As it was forceful invasion and occupation of the independent kingdoms. Modern firearms made in Europe to which the northern elite had access changed the status quo of the political space in the favour of the northern elite. Its historical scar is being used by ethnonationalists to justify their causes and advance their mobilising effort in the political space that was observed after the restoration of the Ethiopian state in 1941 and during ‘mechanised feudalism’ in 1960s.

***Narrow political space freezes the political identities:-*** Narrow trends in the political space in fact created conflictive and conditioned political identities. Whenever the political space is narrower it freezes the political identities and it also diffuses extremism. The frozen political identities and extremism escalates conflicts. In Ethiopian context these types of conflicts were between the northern political elites who held the higher positions in the institutions from ‘above’ and the Sidama Ethno-nationalists from the institutions from ‘below’.

The conditioned identities on the other hand encompasses the same northern elites from the ‘above’ who controlled most important livelihood asset, the land, and use that land to rewarded those who

are integrated and allies for trust and interest from below.

***The reward for trust interest conditions the formation of political identities:*** - the integrated, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalised. While the initial conquest led to the occupation of physical space of the Sidama territory. The rewarding processes of the controlled livelihood asset (the land) resulted in the occupation psychological space of the Sidama and conditioned their identities, thus divided them further into those who are integrated and loyalist as favoured and situated them in advantageous position of access to livelihood assets while those who mistrusted and disinterested in the political settings and authorities are the sceptic and the marginalised located in disadvantaged position of accessing livelihood assets.

***Institutionalisation of Pan-Ethiopians and Ethno-nationalist political identities:***-From 1890s to 1991 the political space in Ethiopia full of conflicts between Pan- Ethiopianst and the Ethno-nationalists. In 1991, it was concluded by the victory of Ethno-nationalist vanguard by the TPLF. The TPLF is an ethno-nationalist political organization that heavily wounded and defeated pan-Ethiopianists, in May 1991.

The TPLF started to integrate the would be representatives of ethnonationalism in Ethiopia on the eve of its victory over Pan-Ethiopianist from the war captives who were the speakers of diverse languages in Ethiopia. Then it crafted the Ethiopian Peoples Liberation Front. (EPRDF). The integration attempt of the TPLF, created resentment among both Pan Ethiopians and the ethnicnationalists and its former peers such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and others, who considered TPLF's encroachment to the constituents whom they claimed to represent as a threat.

The threatened former ethno-nationalists who were invited by the EPRDF to form a transitional government left the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, letting the EPRDF be a sole player in the political space in Ethiopia. Thus the EPRDF enjoyed the occupation of the political space but was sandwiched between the Ethno-nationalists and Pan- Ethiopianst; this suggests the perpetuation of

conflictive identities in Ethiopia.

The EPRDF's political space during the transitional government was wide enough to win the hearts and minds of the constituents claimed by ethno-nationalists and Pan-Ethiopianists. However, the period that followed 1998 were tense and made a regression in the political space. The narrowness of the political space in the context of the Sidama manifested by institutional failure to act and respond when famine broke out in the Sidama in 1999. By crushing the peaceful Sidama demonstrators on May 24 2002, killing 69 ethnic Sidamas Jailing 1000s of the Sidama who intend primarily to express their ill feeling the loss of regional autonomy for Sidama, as they did not accept their forced merger into SNNPRS in federal administrative arrangement in 1995 based on the Ethiopian constitution article 39. Secondly, retaining the authority over the Hawassa City, Thirdly, unconditional release of the former president of SNNPRS, who was jailed for his support of the defeated faction of the TPLF during its split in 2001.

At the national level, the narrowing of the political space in Ethiopia intensified from between 1998-2000. This manifested itself in the form of non-multiparty elections, famine in the Sidama and Ogaden; an internal split within TPLF leadership the core of governing party; Ethio-Eritrean conflict that followed with border delimitation without demarcation. The EPRDF has become an increasingly totalitarian government over most of the years it has been in power; however, the real power behind them is the (TPLF) that dominates every branch of the government.

Human right watch documented this tendencies of the Ethiopian government as ‘ One hundered ways of putting pressure: vioaltion of freedom of expression and expression’ (Huma right watch, 2010) revealing the extent to which the Ethiopian government is becoming increasingly brutal in its crackdown on fundamental freedom, of speech, expression the discourses and actions from below democratic processes, and the rule of law. This violation was reached its highest point when the Ethiopian government issued and endosed charities and societies procalmation and Anti-terrorism law.

***Charities and Societies Proclamation:*** - passed in February 2009 by Ethiopian parliament into law

by proclamation no.621.2009. This law places severe administrative restrictions on the work of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in Ethiopia. This law consequently divided the charities into three: - Ethiopian charities or societies; Ethiopian resident Charities or Societies or Foreign Charities.

Thus, a robust civil sector that could act as watchdogs of society from ‘below’ has been eliminated due to the implementation of the Charities and Societies Proclamation. This is a law that has made it a crime for civic organisations which receive more than 10 percent of the funding from foreign sources to advance human and democratic rights, to promote equality among ethnicities, genders and religions, to promote rights for the disabled and children, to promote conflict resolution or reconciliation, or to promote the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services. Some 2,600 or more civic organizations closed in response. In their place, the EPRDF has established loyal-organisations they control.

**Anti- Terrorism Law :** - on August 28, 2009 declared the anti-terrorism law in the proclamation No. 652/2009 and proclamation no.621.2009. (Federal Negarit Gazeta 15th year No 57: 4827). This Anti-terrorism Law that is used to silence democratic voices, journalists, bloggers, editors, opposition leaders and religious leaders under false pretences. Thus Ethiopia has become one of the highest jailers of political prisoners in Africa.

This suggests that the Ethiopian government suffocated the discourse and action from ‘below’ In present day Ethiopia, every significant public and private institution is under the control of the the regime, whether it is the judiciary, the police and security forces, government offices and ministries all the way to the local level, the military, the media, the telecom system, the Internet, the educational system, the economy, and most importantly right now, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE).

***Donors dilemma and funding the institution from ‘above’***

Despite the suffocating political space, donors are pumping aid from multilateral and bilateral ties. The collective aid from multilateral continental Europe flows through two channels. The first is the

European Commission, in the form of European Development Fund (EDF) since 1975. EDF itself suffers unpredictability in budgetary allocations as it relies on periodic replenishments by member states. The fund had to be supplemented by loans from the European Investment Bank, and it accounts 40 percent of total European Union aid to Ethiopia with four phases. Phase one called EDF7 that covered the period (1991-1996) spent 35 million Euro, Phase two called EDF8 spent 83 million Euro between (1997-2001). Phase three called EDF9 covered the period between 2002-2007 with 172 million Euros. Phase four called EDF10 covered the period from 2008 to 2013 with 394 million Euro.

**Bilateral Aid ties:** - signifies the relationship between donor nation states and Ethiopia. Most important in this category are the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Italy, Netherlands and Japan. The focal point of the bilateral partners is the social sector. (education, health, water, and food security). Their secondary interest seems governance though it is not clear whether the term governance also includes the widening political space for citizens to engage or just building institutional capacity for those who are in power.

What seems explicit from bilateral donor discourse is their interest in civic education and gender equity. The ideological tie plays a vital role in cementing the relationship between the donor states and recipient. In this perspective Ethiopia and capitalist nations has strong ties until it was disrupted by the socialist revolution in 1974-1991.

Ethiopia and the United Kingdom have a long standing relationship. It reached the highest point when Great Britain gave refuge for the Emperor HaileSelasie during five years of Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935, military alliance and technical assistance to free Ethiopia from Italian occupation, and restoration of the the Emperor to the throne.

The selection of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to be a member of African Commission established by the UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair shows the political ties Ethiopia has with the United Kingdom (CAF 2005). The Department for International Development (DfID) became progressively engaged in Ethiopia to make Ethiopia the largest recipient of British aid in Africa

which totalled US\$ one billion during 2005-2011, DfID also promised to rise by US\$ 0.8 billion in 2012-2017 (DfID 2011, 2012) .

DfID is distinguished for its Sustainable Livelihood Framework and eagerness to pool its resources with other donors for promoting sustainable livelihood, for its less concern about the internal political implications of its aid (Barnett *et al* 2009; DfID 2010).

***Donors seem disregarded the lack of democratic processes:*** - Donors seem willing to overlook the lack of democratic progress, believing that claims of economic progress make up for it. However, although there may be some advances made, TPLF/EPRDF statistics claiming double-digit economic growth are being challenged as Ethiopians remain at the bottom of every poverty index. There is little to no private sector, but instead, economic opportunities are limited to those who are integrated, and loyalist to the regime as this thesis argues.

***Western Aid has the effect of expectation rising from below:*** - Aid from free and democratic countries raises the expectation of widening of the political spaces in recipient countries. This expectation comes from of the institutional leaders from ‘below’ and the public at large. Because the leaders from ‘below’ and the public understand that it is not only the transfer of money but the virtue and value that are associated with liberty and democracy which is deep rooted in Western donor countries that diffuse with other aid elements. However this thesis found that donors from Western countries though they cared about poverty reduction and political stability, the regime in Ethiopia cares more about its survival, with less emphasis on poverty alleviation, in this context this thesis found that aid has selectively reduced the poverty of those who are integrated into the political ideology of the regime, and sidelined the sceptic and the marginalised. By doing so, the repressive politics endures or even intensifies.

This repression and narrow political space resulted from legitimacy, and institutional strength for the power holders from ‘above’ built by aid resources contradicts the expectation of the leaders from ‘below’ who are organised in the form of political and civil society and the public at large. The

controversy stemmed from observation of the aid is building the muscle of the authoritarian regime. The leaders of the institutions from 'below' and the public do not expect such liberty or freedom from the 'aid' or business from non-democratic countries. Because they perceive, authoritarian is building the muscle of authoritarian. The conclusion of this thesis is that the self-interested aid has done little more than strengthening technocratic robustness of the authoritarian institutions. Because the aid has helped those who are integrated into the political settings and the loyalists.

Structurally, the decentralisation attempt that was aimed by donors at distribution of power and the incentives for local actors did not achieve the purpose it intended due to the merger of party and government structure. Therefore, it did not widen expected political space. In the absence of domestic political means to restrain power-holders, excessive use of power. Donors can certainly use their tiny advantage to open a progressively competitive political and livelihood security ground.

***Double-digit growth claims masked wide income gap:-*** Double-digit growth claims mask a wide income gap between those who are integrated and the loyalist to the EPRDF political settings on one hand, the sceptic and the marginalised. The gap is so wide that the integrated and the loyalist are enjoying every aspects of the 'political capture' of the livelihood assets including the donor funded opportunities while the sceptic and the marginalised are living in rampant poverty to force them to worry for the next meal

***Mistrust is becoming the limiting label :-*** For the marginalised mistrust and disinterest created fear, worries and suspicion that are in turn are becoming the limiting labels that steal their lives and livelihoods. In order to plan and act on their business activities, they have to worry about who will help them in the government offices in legalising and formalising their plan and implementing their intended aims and objectives for their livelihoods, if they have sceptic attitude or refuse to support the ruling parties. These worries may lead them to self-defeat even before starting their livelihood plan.



### 9.2.2 On political identity: historical trends of conflictive and conditioned identities

*Identity politics is a sensitive issue among successive generations of Ethiopia:* - for a century, diversity-related issues such as the right and equality of ethnic and religious groups have been the historical and prevalent questions of Ethiopia. In relation to the issues of diversity, to date Ethiopia has exercised two main ideologies of its state policy.

The first ideology that shaped Ethiopian state formation and its policy was a unitary state that was implemented until 1991. There were two phases of this system :-from the formation of Ethiopia to the downfall of the Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, the policy that strived to homogenise identities in its bid for unity, failed to recognise diversity. The second was from 1975 to 1991. In this period, the Dergue regime recognised the vitality of identities but was not willing to risk the unity of the country.

The second state policy is a federal system of political space that has been used since 1991. It emphasises and promotes diversity and tries to strike the balance of the unity. This attempt to strike balance has potential and actual tension and conflicts. The regime has attempted to address ethnic and religious identities half-heartedly, but failed to challenge its desire for survival as a powerful one party by conditioning access to the livelihood assets and opportunities, for citizens' trust and interest in EPRDF. By doing so, it created the integrated, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalised identities, whereby integrated and loyalists enjoyed while the sceptics and the marginalised discriminated. It is such discrimination that is creating livelihood and food insecurity.

It also mapped out the reciprocity between the state and the 'citizen's that manifested through allowing access to livelihood asset for winning trust and interest of the citizens created another layer of identities within the individual self: such as the integrated; the loyalist; the sceptic and the marginalised.

This thesis reveals the context of conflictive identities between the Sidama ethno-nationalism and Abyssinian nationalism covered by Pan-Ethiopianism. Particularly, whenever the political spaces are

narrower, it is observed the identities become frozen. Those frozen identities helped the leaders of respective identities to organise, mobilise, plan and act against the rival identity

It also taught us that the belligerent powers divided into two identities did not reflect on fluidity of identity such as multiplicity, simultaneity and complexity contained in the both identities or side-lined this aspect of identity by freezing it to achieve political end through frozen and conflictive identities. While the Abyssinian nationalist attempt to homogenise the diverse ethnicity into one- language one-religion, one –country policy, the fire-back effect forced the Ethiopian people to pay dearest in recurrent wars and famine, loss of life and livelihoods..

In this context, the Sidamas are not a collection of individuals as conservatives argue. Nor are they a homogenous collective as communalists have it to mobilise identity for political mission. Sticking to the communalist end of the spectrum leads to embracing landlords and the Sidama tenants to stand in anti- Italian occupation that is the unity of categorically antagonistic class or ethnicity of blacks against white Italians.

Embracing the individualistic end leads to the dreaded Sidama fragmentation. However, there are diverse selves hidden in the individual self that weave and integrates both individual and collective aspects of the Sidama identity. Between individual Sidama and the collective, there are innumerable forms and levels of interrelationship, kinship, solidarity and identity. However, individual and collective selves are not in a position of exteriority to each other

The individual self is also collective self. For example an individual person can be Sidama, a man, a woman, young , old, a wife, a mother, a Christian, a Muslim, a yemerecho clan from Shabadino, a haadicho clan from Dara. A person is indeed an intersection of multiple collective identities. A person cannot for example be dissected to live his/her Sidamaness at one time and manhood another time, or be the victim of poverty and famine, domestic violence and oppression at still another time. Moreover, a person lives all multiple identities at the same time. Thus,a person's identities are characterised not only by multiplicity, but also by simultaneity.

Nevertheless, this does not mean all the identities compete for expression simultaneously. The specific context determines the most important dimension at one particular period of time.

***The positionality of individual self and the fluidity of identity:-*** Identity is not static. It is fluid. It depends on the reflection of the person's position in space and time. For instance when a person from Harbee clan is in Hawassa a capital of the Sidama and deals with a person with Haweela clan, his Harbee identity might be important. When the same person in Addis Ababa a capital of Ethiopia deals with Amhara man, his Sidama identity might be significant, when the same person deals with Egyptian person in Cairo, his Ethiopian identity might be important, when the same person deals with a British man in London his African belongingness might be important.

The experience is individual and social, subjective and objective, conscious and unconscious. Much as his/her experience creates the Sidama man/woman, he/she creates his/her experience as acting subject owing to his/her agency, therefore, a persons' identity is neither static nor linear. His/her alliances and allegiances shift dynamically. For instance, a woman can embrace a Sidama monotheistic religion through *loogo*, the Sidama version of baptism and integration. She can also educate herself out of poverty and join the rank of the elite, and be able to run one of the line departments established by Ethiopian political institutions in the Sidama zone. The intersection of these new identities with Ethiopian identity spins her into yet another experiential space of political identity. Some dimensions of her identity constrain and conflict with others, and other dimensions of her identity mediate her human possibilities.

It is a lack of focus on the reality and nature of identity or merely a political strategy to mobilise and organise the like-minds in identity politics for collective defence or hegemony boosts the vitality of identity politics. However, at the end of the day, freedom and the width of political space increases engagement, reduces pain and suffering of wars and famine. Therefore, promoting equality and valuing diversity with equality and dignity of a person in the legal framework can help to deal with those challenges.

### **9.2.3 On livelihood and food security**

This research found that trust/distrust and interest /disinterest in the political settings and the power holders conditions livelihood assets accesses and consequently, creates additional conditioned identities on the top of ethnic identities acquired by birth or place.

Those conditioned identities entail the integrated, the loyalist, the sceptic and the marginalised. All livelihood assets controlled by the government including donor funded services, such as PSNP, PBS, and training opportunities were being used as a reward for trust and interest in governing parties political settings and governing elites as well as threats for distrust and disinterest in governing parties.

This means access to livelihood assets is not treated as a citizens' right by being the member of the society or the community but by the members of the governing party. While this rewards and threats for citizens enhance the probability of joining the ruling party without internal conviction and ceasing to be a member or supporter of the opposition without citizens' will. While those integrated into and loyal to the political ideology of the ruling party secure and sustain their livelihoods, those sceptics and the marginalised are trapped by livelihood and food insecurity. Furthermore, food and livelihood insecurity can be converted into famine in the context of response failure due to marginalisation.

Famine in this context should be seen as a form of silent genocide, which is unacceptable in the global society of the twenty-first century. The guilty conscience of the various actors on account of their failure to prevent and respond as quickly as possible to the Ethiopian famine of 1999-2003 should ensure that not a single death occurs before any deterioration from sustainable livelihoods to vulnerability to famine is allowed to continue unchecked. Technically the aid resources should be like the 'springboard' to jump over security and sustainability through self-sufficiency.

The 'political capture' of aid resources leads to the strengthening institutional capacity of one party, while the essence of aid is strengthening the institutional capabilities of the nation where all citizens can have access to such resources through entitlement designed in the legal framework. Backward

practices that prevent some groups from having access to food according to their age and sex should be investigated and efforts should be made to eliminate them., the unrecognised needs of children, the disabled, the aged, and the sick, and pregnant and lactating women should be focused on by experts in this field. All discriminatory practices should be exposed as harmful to the development of a healthy society. From the findings of field research from Chapter four to eight and the concluding remarks, this thesis offers the policy recommendations in the following section.

### **9.3 Policy Recommendations**

#### **9.3.1 On Political Space**

##### **Widening the political space and designing trust-building programmes**

Widening the political space and designing trust-building programmes help to enhance freedom of individuals and group engagement using LEPSA as improved Sustainable Livelihoods Framework as a means of mapping out vulnerability and sustainability. Because widening the political space, is an incentive for effective engagement this can be done through facilitating the ground for the following.

##### ***Freedom of conviction***

In order to act and react there should be encounters that touch the hearts and minds of individual(s) Depending on the types of encounters, positive or negative impressions may shape the types of internal conviction created within individual(s). This is because encounters are first-hand experiences that shape understanding, knowledge and identity formation. It is also deeper than simple belief that may be generated in the processes of one to one, one to many, many to one; many to many ways of communications. Clarity of knowledge can also form identity that can be expressed and shared; can be practised and repeated to muster perfection to utilise it in the way of life or” livelihoods.” Therefore livelihood security and sustainability cannot be attained and sustained without freedom, what this thesis calls the political space of effective engagement.

### ***Freedom of expression***

The vitality of freedom of expression is that it enhances the spread and diffusion of knowledge from its sources. This happens when there are no worries about the consequences of the spread and diffusion of the knowledge. This means worries over the consequences that may come back to the source of knowledge and negatively affect the existence of the source of knowledge; and the manner in which knowledge has been diffused and its duplication and perpetuation, which can be understood as “sustainability”. Therefore, livelihood security and sustainability cannot be attained and sustained without freedom, what this called the political space of complete engagement. In this regard precisely, the EPRDF government of Ethiopia must amend the Charities and Societies Proclamation, the Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, and anti-Terrorism Proclamation, to bring them into line with Ethiopia’s constitution and its obligations under international law regarding freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

### ***Freedom of action***

Critical importance of freedom of action is, its provision of incentives to deal with possible impediment(s). The impediment(s) that obstruct movement and action of individuals as agents of transformation and converting what they understood and know to beneficial use for humanity. Awareness of the impediments of livelihood action may lay the foundation for early warning and preparedness. It also leads to capacity building to deal with known or unknown obstacles what is termed as “livelihood strategies” The fact that individuals are living with other fellow humans, who share available space, time and resources needs regulation and management, to minimise the direct or side effect of the conviction, expression and action of an individual will have on other fellow human beings. That is why political space of effective engagement is required for negotiation over space, time and resources or “livelihood assets”.

The better the governance, the wider the political space and freedom. This creates effective engagement between the power holder from above and ordinary citizens from below and better self-

determination of citizens that creates livelihood security and sustainability.

It is possible to build upon DfID's Sustainable Livelihood Framework by resituating the political space of productive engagement not only as a tool for understanding the power dynamics within a given political setting, but also as a tool for informing policies and its implementation. The way of understanding, policy formulation, and their implementation may set a direction to prevent human tragedies such as conflicts, wars and famine. .

Secondly, it will be a tool for building a comprehensive strategy needed for overcoming existing constraints to effective policy design and implementation. It is proposed that such a strategy should be based on the broad principle of providing not only food but also non-food elements, such as freedom of choice and voice for marginalized groups of people in our planet.

As Sen (1999: 160-1) has pointed out, 'lack of freedom to remedy hunger can itself lead to fatalism and the absence of serious attempts remedy the miseries that we see ... What is crucial to analysing hunger is the substantive freedom of individuals and families.' If people have the freedom to solve their problems by themselves and are empowered to share their agony this will lay the foundation for eliminating the causes of conflict, wars and famine, and allow people to decide their destiny as united entity. This can be done by bringing all rival parties around the table and letting all belligerent groups declare their programmes to the people so that finally the people can choose how they want to be governed. It is possible for a free people to solve their problems by themselves

### **Clear distinction between the parties and government's structures**

Whenever the party becomes the government, it carries not only the burden of its members, but much wider burden of the public and entire citizens' of the nation. Therefore, the political space should be wide enough to accommodate the interest and the trust of the entire citizens' of the nation. In order to overcome the interest collusion, the governing party should distinguish its party structure from that of the government.

***Empowering the marginalised:*** - In the Sidaman context, the marginalised and the sceptics are

more likely to suffer food and livelihood insecurity. While drought and other natural disasters exacerbates vulnerability, the narrow political spaces enhance the socio-economic inequalities. To make sure of enabling political space of complete engagement in Livelihood Framework, applicable for assisting marginalised people requires the following list of priorities, before entering into a partnership with government of famine-prone countries. DfID and other donors should negotiate over the way how intended marginalised targets would be integrated with the political setting in the state within which they are living.

### **9.3.2 On conflictive and conditioned identities**

***Promote Equality and value diversity:*** - This thesis reveals the political challenges of diversity in Ethiopia. Using the LEPSA framework, it mapped out the ethnic, linguistic, identities conflicting with the state identities. Therefore promoting equality and valuing diversity is vital to deal with conflicting identity.

***Constitutional Court:*** The 1995 constitution of Ethiopia is the best constitution that contains good elements that could encourage both individual and group rights. However both the government of Ethiopia and the opposition are observed breaching it, due to narrow political space. In addition to widening political space, it requires a constitutional court that interprets the notion of the constitution, guards and decides when the concern and issues of constitutional breaches occurs by both government and the opposition.

***Enforcement provisions:*** In order for the constitutional court to be effective there must be an enforcement facility that implements the descision of the constitutional court.

***Proportional representation and powersharing:*** In order to manage unproportional access to livelihood assets and to manage conflicts that arise from unfairness and which requires proportional representation of identities and power sharing to address the needs of all identities.



### 9.3.3 On food and livelihood security

*Code of legislation and effective law enforcement:-* In order to deal with livelihood and food insecurity, it requires code of legislation and effective law enforcement. This would define three areas of government responsibility; firstly, to record and investigate distress symptoms and to alert concerned institutions of danger; secondly, to strengthen institutional capacities, from grassroots to national level, and to organise an effective response to warnings; thirdly, to target population groups most at risk. In order to implement such legislation, strong political commitment is required. Moreover, real elements of indigenous structures and practice should be mainstreamed and given financial and technical empowerment to do so.

*Legal protection:* - this can be done by legislation of food and livelihood entitlement for the marginalised. This entails the creation of consciousness that rejects famine as the norm. In the short term, improved famine relief remains a priority for marginalised group. The key demands of improved coordination, targeting and cost-efficiency need to be fought for more openly by the various actors. At present, governmental and non-governmental organisations are being observed investing scarce resources in overhead costs rather than on the programmes themselves. The ruling party should discipline or prosecute in accordance with the law of the land the party officials implicated in a partisan allocation of livelihood assets and other opportunities.

Evidence from the Sidama field research on PSNP programme performance examination in Chapter seven, suggests that covering critical food-gap alone have a limited effect on vulnerability mitigation. Improved famine prevention and responses aimed at minimising human and capital asset loss needs to be based, first, on a mixture of food and non-food resources that reduce income and productivity bottlenecks, and second, on the principle of stake-holding and partnership between various actors. These should be the basis for identifying problems and targets, setting priorities, formulating a strategic plan, implementing, monitoring, evaluating, and assessing the impact of the various projects

and programmes that can be used in responding to the needs.

***Avoid political 'capture' of aid resources:-*** This thesis challenged the Sustainable Livelihood Framework as a tool for identifying socio-economic problems, informing and implementing policies and proposed LEPSA building upon SLF. This is due to the failure of the SLF to emphasise on politically driven poverty trap and food and livelihood insecurity of some of the citizens of the recipient countries. The linkage here is that less efficiently politicised and more technocratic SLF has its root in worries and dilemma of donors whether prioritising the national and strategic interest over tackling food and livelihood insecurity for those who are politically marginalised.

***Means of Diversification of income sources:*** - In the rural context of the Sidama, this means the promotion of a mixture of crop, dairy and poultry farming. Employment generation schemes in rural areas should include labour-intensive public works to upgrade infrastructures and protect water and soil resources, forestation and so on. In the medium and long term, the government of Sidama requires the following:

***Investment in research in agriculture:*** - The findings the field research suggest that reduction of the land size, due to land tenure system, partly population growth meant the proportion of land covered by enset or weese. The research should focus on intensification and extension works on enset or weese, (false Banana) which is drought-resistant and the staple crop of the Sidama. First, its importance for farmers should be increased via the provision of more land for its cultivation. Secondly, appropriate technologies aimed at minimising the labour of food processing need to be developed, to reduce the burden on women it is imperative to create working environments that involve men in food production.

***Improving landholding systems:*** - The Sidama field research findings in Chapter six and eight suggest the land tenure insecurity. Furthermore, the current policy creates tenure insecurity for the majority of smallholders (Sidama case study who farm 0.3 -2.0 ha) and prevents them from long-term planning and investing to improve their holdings. Improvement of the land tenure system can be

achieved by ensuring land belongs to the tillers. Smallholdings could be joined together by owners. Then, to make the land large enough for investment, the dwelling and farming areas should be separated. The owners can set up their farming companies based on a share-holding system. This would lay the foundation for commercialisation and industrialisation.

The role of the government should be to facilitate credit and banking, extension services, promotion and research into indigenous practices and ways of integrating them with modern methods. A conducive environment needs to be prepared before rushing to impose new technology in a traditional socio-economic context, in order to avoid the mistake made by the SPDM/EPRDF's cadre in providing artificial fertilisers and genetically modified seeds with hidden debt as the findings in chapter six and seven suggested. In addition, the government should invest in health, education and other social services, and in maintaining law and order to allow the process of privatisation. Currently, growth in agricultural productivity seems not to keep pace with the growing food demand. Above all, deforestation is spreading, and virgin forests and grasslands are being converted to non-farm uses under the pretext of military training and other investments. These evicted, who once were prime producers, are becoming additional consumers. Overall, the present land tenure and land use policies will continue to have a negative impact on the productivity of resource-poor farmers.

Moreover, the EPRDF's present implementation of development policy does not seem to provide the rural sector with the necessary incentives, such as the provision of cheaper energy, machinery, farm equipment and tools and other services to spin the wheel for accelerated development in the context of conditioned political identities.

Traditional food crops (*weese*, *boyna*, maize, barley, sorghum wheat), which about thirty years ago ensured the self-sufficiency in food of the Sidama, can no longer do so. The conventional methods of increasing the yield of these crops per unit area can no longer cope with the food demand and need. Owing to hastiness, lack of proper research and lack of transparency, the so-called improved seeds, and the chemicals and fertilisers promoted through the extension packages have not benefited all crops or

farmers. They were not supplied in enough varieties to fit the different soil types and agro-climatic conditions, nor were the seeds resistant to drought and diseases.

It has also been observed that the use of high-yielding varieties increases the reliance of farmers on purchased inputs. Moreover, these imported varieties of crops have become a major threat to biodiversity, conservation and sustainable food production in the future. The use of indigenous crops, despite their lower yield (that can be improved by the use of compost), will continue to be better for the livelihoods of resource-poor farmers. The Sidama famine has provided evidence that minimising risks are often more important than maximising returns for local farmers. In order to overcome these problems, the following important measures should be considered:

Technologies for a range of ecological settings that require lower inputs and contribute to sustainable farming systems, targeted to benefit resource-poor marginalised farmers and women, who perform more than 50 per cent of farm work. Continuous improvements of plants by selecting respected community leaders and asking them to share their experience with the next generation to produce improved varieties of seeds. These will contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and will be able to cross-breed with existing indigenous seeds to produce high-yielding varieties that do not require inputs that are not locally available.

Expansion of the development of early-maturing (short-duration) varieties, to contribute to higher food production in drought-prone areas. So far, appropriate technologies for dry-land and risk-prone areas are far from reaching potential users. Thus, major challenges confront researchers in delivering solutions to current dry-land areas.

Appropriate systems of irrigation for large-scale producers in order to develop the areas around rivers such as the Gambelto, Bonora, Logita, Ereerte, Jigessa, Koolla and Gidawo. In the future, intensive farming to maximise output and income per unit of land, water, energy, labour and capital will be a demographic necessity in Sidama in order to meet the expanding needs for food, fibre, fodder, fuel, jobs and income.

Putting a strong emphasis on those plant and animal products traditionally not regarded as food. The transformation of many commonly uncultivated plant and animal products into foodstuffs through the adoption of new technologies would facilitate new possibilities of augmenting food supplies.

***Careful screening of available biotechnological options and their applications:-*** the purpose of this would be to identify their ultimate effects on yield quality and, above all, on the health of consumers and producers. Finally, clearance of vast virgin forests and grasslands for development, without a proper assessment by professional bodies of the possible impact, provides at best a short-term benefit for the expenses of non-renewable natural resources. The Sidaman government should not take this path towards destroying Sidama's non-renewable resources. The Sidama had and still can learn from past experiences. Land policies that guarantee tenure security, and provision of incentives for proper management and use of land, forests and water, need to be enacted in order to ensure sustained development.

Alleviating the significant shortage and misdistribution of food, which leave people without enough to eat, and averting the reliance on food aid should be the highest priorities for the Sidama. Thus, the government is responsible for reversing the current and future situation of malnutrition, hunger and famine. In order to achieve this goal, the production of food must be greatly enhanced through revision of government policies on agriculture, including investment in research, education, health and infrastructure, as well as through income generation and the development and modernisation of appropriate technologies.

#### **9.3.4 On donors and Aid.**

This is reflected in donor policy toward Ethiopia, which is shaped by at least two significant and important factors. Primarily, the strategic position of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, which makes Ethiopia a key ally in the region for Western donor states against radicalised Al Shabab in Somalia, intransigent Eritrea, and unstable Sudan. Secondly, the relative economic growth of Ethiopia ( though

created very significant gap between the integrated and the marginalised), attracted the attention of the donors to continue their support to the incumbent regime, regardless the narrow political space within which the inequitable growth generated.

There are two possible choices for donors' dilemma. Primarily, if donors care solely about geopolitics but the recipient regime is secure enough to care about both democracy and dealing with food and livelihood insecurity, then aid will achieve the purpose of reducing poverty. This is the stand of this thesis against the Moyo's 2009 'Dead Aid' that refutes the importance of aid at least in the context of Africa. Secondly, if the donors care about only trade and investment that is producing overnight tycoons who are integrated into the regime and the regime pay more attention to its own survival. This alignment of mutual interest perpetuate both livelihood and food insecurity on one hand the tyranny on the other. That is what this thesis contends the sustainability of the integrated and the insecurity of the marginalised. Therefore, this thesis recommends for donors

***Act beyond expectation rising:*** Aid from free and democratic countries raises the expectation of widening of the political spaces in recipient countries. This expectation comes from of the institutional leaders from 'below' and the general public. Because the leaders from 'below' moreover, the public understand that it is not only the transfer of money but the virtue and value that are associated with liberty and democracy which is deep rooted in Western donor countries that had to be diffused in a way that fit the local context to avoid imposition with other aid elements. However this thesis found that donors from Western countries though cared about poverty reduction and political stability, while the regime in Ethiopia cares more about its survival, with less emphasis on poverty reduction, by doing so both might reduce the poverty of those who are integrated into the political ideology of the regime. By doing so, the repressive politics endures or even intensifies.

For incompletely institutionalised and democratically, non-competitive recipient states like Ethiopia, availability of systems for basic conflict resolution, agreement over the rules for power succession, availability and access to basic needs and services for all, transparent decision-making and

implementation processes, and government responsiveness to input from ‘below’ and non-state actors. Although, designing effective, efficient, accountable state building and lasting empowerment are the responsibility of citizens; the debate is on how much-enlightened external actors can avoid political harm. If the donors prioritise the diffusion of democracy, liberty, they have resources to do so. However, the marginalised and sceptic are left with the burden of enhancing the struggle to go beyond retaining the status quo

## **Summary and the contribution to the knowledge**

This thesis contributes to the field of knowledge on sources of livelihood and food insecurity, and famine creation processes. Primarily, how the trends of political space facilitate or retard the engagements various identities on the issues that affects their lives and livelihoods. It has explored the literature on food insecurity, famine, and the evolution of the SLF with particular focus on less efficiently politicisation of the framework and politicization of the framework. Even the politicised SLF with the concept of ‘political -capital’ as sixth assets missed critical point.

Primarily, without the width of political space diverse political identities cannot access the decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods. Secondly, “Political Capital” as a sixth capital asset or a gate-keeper) will pose a blind spot that prevents us seeing developing hazards to damage livelihood security and sustainability of the lives and the livelihoods of the marginalised (who neither trust nor interested in political settings and authorities) and the sceptic (who do not trust political authorities but interested in politics). Thirdly, derailing “politics” and the “political” from its rightful position may occur, thus preventing appropriate reflection on inequalities, unfairshare of livelihood asstes, and power relations from the household to global level. Fourthly, it isolates political forces that create livelihoods disruptions and livelihood asset deterioration by the long historical and policy processes that created livelihood and food insecurity or famine; and subsequently lead to a withdrawal from accountability and responsibility, for a policy side effect that is claiming lives and livelihood. Such isolation, if

unchecked properly, will have the potential to take it as a norm.

Thus, LEPSA is developed to fill what is missing and misplaced. It starts from encounters, and impression of the humanity that leads to trust and interest. Trust and interest creates the political identities (see Figure 2.7 on page 61). The width or narrowness of the political space is linked to the degree of engagement and disengagement of the various identities from 'above' and 'below' see figure 2.6: on page 57. Whenever the political space is wider the degree of the engagements of diverse identities increases. Whenever diverse identities' engagement increases, initiatives and the level of mutual understanding between 'above' (usually who controls power and resources) and 'below' will be better. The mutual understanding creates confidence and interest and finally integration and smoothing livelihood asset access difficulties. Therefore LEPSA is not only the contribution to the knowledge but also a better lenses through one can identify who is in need of resources and power to decide on her/his life and livelihoods and why?

The concept of political space in narrow political settings is an arena to exchange trust and interest in authorities for accessing livelihood assets. This political market creates integration and marginalization. Marginalization in this context is the product of mistrust and disinterest. Mistrust and disinterest stem from fear and suspicion. Fear and suspicion in turn originate from conflictive mind-set. It is also attitudes that is becoming a limiting label for the marginalised and steal their lives and the livelihoods.

Therefore the concept of political space is a quest for the integration of the side-lined citizens by power and resource holders, in the words of Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002:10) 'the possibility of moving from a situation of political exclusion to one of political inclusion.' It is the 'inclusion' of the citizens through effective engagement to increases the possibility of having voice and choice on resolving the issues affecting their lives and livelihoods.



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## Appendix 1 Interview for key informants and focus group discussion in 2000/2001 Research.

1. After, successful prevention of seasonal food insecurity conversion into famine for centuries why the Sidama small holders and semi-pastoralists of Southern Ethiopia failed in 1999/2000 onwards?
2. What are local livelihood assets (such as natural, human, social, financial,) in the Sidama smallholders and semi-pastoralists' context?
  - 2.1) what kind of governance in the Sidama have been facilitating or else hindering peoples' access to livelihood assets?
  - 2.2. Is it disrupted or transformed why? Since when?
3. What are socio-economic institutions of the Sidama that can be activated during crises? What are their situations right now? Are they disrupted or transformed?
4. How these assets helped the Sidama small holders and semi-pastoralists to pursue their livelihood strategies.
5. How the political actors impede the sidama small holders' and semi--pastoralists' context?
6. How these assets helped the Sidama small holders and semi-pastoralists to pursue their livelihood strategies? How the political actors intervention impede the sidama small holders' and semi-pastoralists' access to livelihood assets?
7. What are historical events and process that created marginalization of majority, integration of few accessing livelihood assets?
8. What roles played by political actors at various levels in the processes of creation and prevention of the 1999/2000 famine, living on the edge of famine and deteriorating livelihood assets for the whole decade of twenty first century?
9. What are the elements of complete political engagement for addressing the causes of those who are marginalised? political power and space as a get keeper to access to livelihood
10. What political space of engagement looks like? In successive Ethiopian governments. How it affected access to livelihood assets, how this has shaped the livelihood strategies and the livelihood outcomes. in successive Ethiopian governments?

## Appendix 2: Semi structured interview for 2000-2001 research

- What is the trend of livelihood activities in the last five years? 1= I feel secure 2= I feel Insecure
- 2.1. The trend of crop production during the last five years?
    - 1=decreased 2= no change 3= increased.
    - 2.1.2. Was the production of the last year enough for your family? 1= yes 0= no
    - 2.1.3. If no how long could it last \_\_\_\_\_month
    - 2.1.4. During which months food shortages severe \_\_\_\_\_
    - 2.1.5. How does the household cover the food shortage?
      - 1= purchase of grain from the market 2= Food/cash for work safety net programme 3= cash support from relatives and friends to be repaid during the harvest 4= grain credit to be repaid during the harvest. 5 = others specify \_\_\_\_\_
    - 2.1.6. Were you affected by the 1999-2000 food crises? Yes \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_
    - 2.1.7 were your relatives or others in the village affected  
If yes, how? \_\_\_\_\_
    - 2.1.8. was the 1999-2000 food crises different form normal seasonal hunger?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ -  
No \_\_\_\_\_
    - 2.1.9 Describe what you remember of the 1999/2000 food crisis?
    - 2.1.10. If received food aid as a means to fill the food gap, how long you have been getting the food aid  
\_\_\_\_\_ years \_\_\_\_\_ months per year.
    - 2.1.11. Indicate the amount food you receive per month \_\_\_\_\_ per week \_\_\_\_\_

Type of food	Unit	1999-2000	2000-2001

2.1.12 Over twelve month of the 1999-2001 how many meals did your household member eat per day? in which month(s)?

Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep oct Nov

3meals

2meals

1 meal

2.1.13 What do you think the main cause of food deficit in order of importance?

Absence of adequate rain fall

Insect or pest infection

Shortage of the land

Poor quality of the land

Animal diseases

Poor health of household head

Flood

Shortage of input

Shortage of labour power

Shortage of input supply ( seed fertilizer and animal feed)

Transport and marketing challenges

2.2. The Impact of 1999-2000 food crises

2.2.1. on Health

2.2.2. health facilities in the areas

2.2.3. Do you have health facilities in your community 1= yes 0= No

2.2.4. How far do you travel to get health service \_\_\_\_\_ Km

2.2.5. Do you have any sanitation facilities such as toilet 1= yes 0=No

2.2.6.. Has any one in your household has been sick during the last one year 1= yes 0= No

2.2.7. If yes how many of your family members were sick?

2.2.8. What were the diseases that affect your family?

2.2.9 At what time of the year is this sickness are worse?

2.2.10. Who are mostly affected by this sickness? 1= Children 2= Wife and daughter 3 = husband 4= elderly 5 = others specify\_\_\_\_\_

Who are affected most?

2.2.11.The \_\_\_\_\_ Pregnant \_\_\_\_\_ women. \_\_\_\_\_ What \_\_\_\_\_ happened \_\_\_\_\_ to her? \_\_\_\_\_

2.2.12. The \_\_\_\_\_ women who is feeding infant with her breast milk What happened to her? \_\_\_\_\_

2.2.13 The \_\_\_\_\_ children Under \_\_\_\_\_ five . \_\_\_\_\_ What \_\_\_\_\_ happened

2.2.14. The \_\_\_\_\_ elderly, above \_\_\_\_\_ 70 \_\_\_\_\_ yearsold \_\_\_\_\_ Whathappened? \_\_\_\_\_ -

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2.2.15. Is the problem of diseases changed overtime? 1= less sever 2= not changed 3=severe 4= got worse.

2.2.16. Is there any one died from your family members during the last 12 month 1= yes 0= no.

2.2.17. Indicate the age, sex, and the cause of death.

Person died

Age

Sex

Cause for death

2.2.18. How did you mange helping the sick person?

1=Did nothing 2= took to the traditional healer 3= took to health facilities 4= bought drug from the shop 5= others specify.

On coping strategies.

2.3. What capital assets are available among the community of the village that enhances the coping strategies of those households facing various crises including huger and food insecurity?

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2. 4. What strategies do you use to cope with food shortages in general?

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Beyond coping by your own, what type of assistance did you get? From whom?

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2.6. If you had been assisted outside your friend and relatives, by whom\_\_\_\_\_

By government

By None governmental Organization, Their names

By International None governmental Organization and their name

2.7. How did they recognize that you are in need?

2.8 Do you remember what that organization had done?

Yes\_\_\_\_\_

No\_\_\_\_\_

If yes,

what?\_\_\_\_\_

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2.9. if yes, through Provision of 1= free food aid 2= Food for work 3= school feeding 4= credit

2. 10. For how long? 1= 6 months 2= 8 months 3= 12 months

2.11. Was it helpful? 1= yes 0=no 2= it depends

4.12. How?

### **Appendix 3:Survey on Political Identity formation conditioned political identities and access to livelihood assets for 2008- 2009 research**

Research assistants' name \_\_\_\_\_

Date of survey

Serial No \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Civil greeting

Self- introduction

Thank giving for willingness to be interviewed or attending focused group discussion meeting

Explaining the objective : The objective of this interview is all about academic research exercise . it has no any administrative values and or will not be used for decisions that might affect your personal life and livelihoods. Thus it will be confidential and I would like you to be open in your response, in answering the following questions. Please, stop me at any point for more clarity if need arise.

General information

Name of district \_\_\_\_\_

Name of Peasant Association \_\_\_\_\_

Name of Household Head \_\_\_\_\_

Age of household head \_\_\_\_\_

Education level of Household head \_\_\_\_\_

Household size \_\_\_\_\_

Agro-ecology \_\_\_\_\_ a) High-land b) Mid-land c) Low- land

Household characteristics.

Name of the household head	Number of household members	sex of member	Age range	Marital status	Education level	Main occupation	Religion	Health status	Comments
		No of Male	No of Female	>5	>18				

Code for sex 1= male 0= Female

Code for marital status 1= married 2= Divorced 3= Widowed 4= widower 5= single.

Code for relationship to household head 1= wife 2= son 3= daughter 4= Grandfather 5 = Grandmother.

Code for occupation 0= no occupation 1= daily labourer 2= farming (land tiller) 3= herder cattle keeper 4 =schooling 5= trading 6= handcrafts 7= Others.

Code for religion 1= Ethiopian Orthodox Church follower. 2= Roman Catholic 3= Muslim 5 = Sidama monotheistic Religion.

Health status 1 = Ok 2= Sick.

2.3.1) Do you belong to the original settler clan in this village? Yes =1 No= 0

2.3.2) If not when did you arrive at this village? \_\_\_\_\_

2.3.3) If not how do you evaluate the hospitality of host community? 1 = Very good 2= good 3= hostile.

If you belong to original settlers in this village how do you host the guest and new comers?

Very friendly 2) Friendly 3) depends on the identity of the guest 4. Others.

2.3.3.1) Do you remember the first time encounter with non-speakers of your language? When \_\_\_\_\_

2.3.3.2) who were they? Specify \_\_\_\_\_

How long it took to communicate with them? Specify \_\_\_\_\_

2.3.3.3) Did they learn your language? Yes =1 No=0

2.3.3.4) Did you learn their language? Yes= 1 No=0

2.3.3.5.) Do you remember the time you started visiting those who do not belong to your ethnic group in their house? Yes= 1 No= 0

2.3.3.5). What was the purpose of your visit? 1= was invited attend their happy time 2= obliged to share their bad time 3= forced to serve them 4= took their house their portion of grain 5= other specify.

2.3.3.6.) Do you remember first time those who do not belong to your ethnic group came to visit you in your house? Yes = 1 No= 0

2.3.3.7) What was the purpose of their visit? 1= I invited them to attend my happy time 2= they were obliged to share my bad time, 3= To warn me for my failure in giving them expected services 4= To instruct me what to do in the future.

**3. Is there any types of conflicts do you remember arose from the relationship have had with non-speakers of your language in your life? 1= yes 0 =no**

If yes could you describe the parties involved in conflict?

1= religious conflict between Sidama Monotheistic religion and Orthodox Church.

2= class conflict between feudal occupiers and sidama people who lost land right.

3= Ethnic conflict between Sidama people and newcomers.  
4 =other specify.

3.1. 1 Does the effect of the conflict have any impact on the access o livelihood assets and livelihood? 1= Yes 0= no  
3.1.2.) is there continuity or change in your relation with those who do not belong to your ethnic group? 1= yes 0= no  
Specify continuity if there is any in successive regimes \_\_\_\_\_ change if there is any \_\_\_\_\_ in successive regimes.

3.1.2) What do you think the effects of these kinds of relationship on accessing livelihood assets and your livelihood?  
1= negative 2= Positive 3= neither negative nor positive 4= depends on each events.

3.1.3 What shocking events you have witnessed in your life that never goes from your memory?

1) = eviction 2= war 3= displacement 4= killings 5= mass migration. 6 = all of them.

3.1.4) Eviction in which regime? 1) Emperor Hailesellase 2) Mengistu Halilemariam 3) Meles Zenawi.  
Elaborate\_\_\_\_\_

3.1.5) War in which regime? 1) Emperor Hailesellase 2) Mengistu Halilemariam 3) Meles Zenawi.  
Elaborate\_\_\_\_\_

3.1, 6) Displacement in which regime? 1) Emperor Hailesellase 2) Mengistu Halilemariam 3) Meles Zenawi.  
Elaborate\_\_\_\_\_

3.1.7) Killings in which regime? 1) Emperor Hailesellase 2) Mengistu Halilemariam 3) Meles Zenawi.  
Elaborate\_\_\_\_\_

3.1.8) mass migration in which regime? ) Emperor Hailesellase 2) Mengistu Halilemariam 3) Meles Zenawi.  
Elaborate\_\_\_\_\_ ?

3.2) on political interest

. 3.2.1 participation in successive government activities Code for yes = 1 N= 0

3.2.2. Did you participate in any political leadership in your life? month 1=yes 0=no

3.2.3 If yes Specify among the following 1= governmental 2= Religious 3= Non government 4= any other  
specify.\_\_\_\_\_

3.2.4. Which government= Emperor Haile sellase 2= Mengistu Hailemariam 3= Meles Zenawi.

3.2.5. Which religion? 1= Sidama monotheistic religion 2= Ethiopian Orthodox church 3= Roman Catholic 4= Protestant.

3.2.6, Which Non government organization? 1= Oliima, 2=seera 3= Idir 4=iqub.

3.2.7. If you involved one of the above what is the benefit did you gain from your role 1= Salaries 2= Social Prestige and fame 3= Access to livelihood assets 4= specify any\_\_\_\_\_

3.3. Contact with government offices and officials.

3.3.1 Have you ever visited government offices and officials? Yes =1 no=0

3.3.2 Why? Specify \_\_\_\_\_

3.3.3 How many times? \_\_\_\_\_

3.3.4. What was the purpose of those visits? 1= To apply for loan 2= To pay loan 4= To pay tax 5= to appeal for unfair verdict. 6- Other specifies.

3.4) questions on political interest.

3.4.1. Are you happy the way you were treated in the government office? Yes= 1 No= 0

Why/ Specify\_\_\_\_\_

3.4.2. Are you visited by government employees? 1= yes 0=no

If yes how many visits do you have in a year? 1=everyday 2=every week 3=every month 4= some times 6= others.

3.4.3. What were the purposes of those visits? 1= To give advice on soil conservation 2= to give advice on animal production 4= to collect tax 5= to collect debts 6- other specify.

3.4.4 If you feel offended by somebody and want the third party to take your case for justice whom you trust most? Why 1= traditional village council 2 =police 3=government court.

The level of interest and trust

Are you interested in political system of successive Yes No  
governments?

Very interested

To some degree

Not so much

Never at all.

Relevant statement on political Trust.

Yes

No

- 1) Government services meet citizens needs.
- 2) Government officials treat every citizen equally.
- 3) Government officials do not take advantage of citizens
- 4) Government Officials are competent.
- 5) Government officials are fulfilling their promises
- 6) Government officials understand citizen needs
- 7) Government officials can be trusted.

**Access to Livelihood Assets: Social Capital, Social network..**

4.1 Do you have relatives in the village? 1= yes 0=no

4.2. Do you help each other with farm land / or other work? 1=yes 0=no.

4.3. Do you give or receive food to and from those relatives 1=yes 0= no.

4.4. Do you give and receive cash from these relatives? 1= yes 0= no.

4.5. Have those forms of mutual aid in the past ten years 1= increased 2= decreased 3= stayed the same over time.

**4.6. Membership to social institutions**

4.6.1 Do you or any of your family members participated in any informal insurance cooperatives like funeral society or *(Ollima)?*

4.6.2) If yes mention the name of cooperative? \_\_\_\_\_

4.6.3 What benefit did you get being member of cooperatives and *Ollima?*

1= income increased 2= labour sharing 3= credit used 4 unexpected difficult situation tackled, 5. Other specify

4.6.4. If no what is the probable reason 1= No information 2= no interest 3= I could not fulfil obligations.

4.7. Do you share your food and other belongings with non-household members?

1=yes 0= no.

4.7.1. How often you share your food and other belongings with non- household members?

1= daily bases 2=once a week 3 once a month 4 I do not share.

4.7.2. Are you happy to share your food and other belongings with non-household members?

1= yes, happy to share 2= Happiness to share but worry as I have not enough for my family members 3= un happy to share without making sure having something in exchange 4= no I am not happy to share.

4.7.3. In this year, how much of your annual income you think you shared to minimize the burden of others?

1= None % of my annual income 2=10-15% my annual income 3= 15-20% my annual income 4= 20-25% my annual income.

4.7.4. Will you be able to be happy to lend out their available farm tools to the needy for temporary use?

1= yes I will be happy. 2= I will not be happy to lend out my farm tool 3= I will be happy, but check punctuality of returning my farm tool on agreed up on time 4= I will be happy, if the borrower not damage my farm tool, while being used.

4.7.5. Will you be able happily to share information sharing and receiving on livelihood strategies?

1= yes I am willing to share and receive the information on livelihood strategies. 2= I am not willing to share and receive information on livelihood strategies I am not willing to share and receive information on livelihood strategies 3= I am willing to share and receive livelihood strategy information depending on the type of relationship I have with a person 4= I consider the type of information and the type of relationship I have with a person before sharing.

4.7.5.1. Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Confidence built in social interaction by fulfilling social obligation?

4.7.5.2. in **The impact of Success and failure of reciprocity on over all livelihood strategies.**

4.7.5.3. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Confidence built in social interaction by fulfilling social obligation?**

4.7.5.4. **The impact of Success and failure of reciprocity on her/his over all livelihood strategies.**

4.7.5.5. Where do you place someone who is best in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Confidence built in social interaction by fulfilling social obligation?** ?

4.7.5.6. **The impact of Success and failure of reciprocity on her/his over all livelihood strategies?**

4.7.5.7. Where do you place someone who is less powerful than you in your area in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the

best in his/her performance in using his/her labour power to gain means of livelihood?

## 5. Natural capital.

5.1.1 Land use and tenure.

5.1.2. Do you hold land? 1= yes 0= no

5.1.3 If yes, answer the following question?

Plot number	size	Own /holding	How did you get it?	For how many generations	Slope	fertility	Land use
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Code for ownership mode 1=own 2=rented 3= sharecropping

Code for how did the household acquired 1= land distribution 2= inheritance *iqqa* since four generation 3= More than four generation 4= purchased 5 = other specify\_\_\_\_\_

Code for land slope 1= flat 2 gentle slope 3 sharply (steeply slope)

Code for soil fertility status 1= Fertile 2= Moderately fertile 3=Infertile 4= specify

Code for land use 1= crop cultivation 2= grazing 3= forest 4= fallow 5= degraded land and non usable.

5.1.4 Do you feel secure and free in tilling this land? Yes\_\_\_\_\_

No\_\_\_\_\_

5.1.5. What are critical problems you are facing in land use and tenure ?

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## .6. Physical capital.

Do you own domestic animals? 1= yes 0= no

6.1.2) Type of animals

Type of Animal	Number of owned for the use last 12 months	Reason for the sale
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Chicken

goats

sheep

Donkey

cattle

mule

horse

cow

ox

others

Code for use of livestock 1=meat 2= manure 3= milk 4= egg 5= savings 6= animal traction

Code for sale of livestock 1= To pay taxes Social obligation 6= to purchase farm oxen 7 = to construct house 8= other specify.

6.1.3) Did you own more animals in the past? 1= yes 0= no

6.1.4) If yes what the reasons are for decline?

What type of the household owned?

1= mud walls grass roofed

3= mud walls and galvanized iron sheet (korkoro) roofed

2=grass walled and grass roofed

4= Bricks walled and galvanised iron sheet roofed

5) Other specifies.

6.1.5. Farm tools and asset ownership.

No	Type of implement	Quantities	Use	Price
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6.1.6. Did use any agricultural input technologies for example fertilizer high yielding variety chemicals for the last 12 months?

1= yes 0=no

If yes give details

Name of agricultural technologies	Quantities used	Unit price	Total price	source
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Fertilizer Dap Urea

Improved Seed (HYVs

Maize teff Hair coat bean

Chemicals

6.1.7) If yes for how many years on average have you been using these technologies \_\_\_\_\_years.

6.1.8) the trend of households technology use in quantity and type for the past years has been

1= increasing 2=decreasing 3= remain constant 4= specify.

6.1.9. If no, what are the reasons?

6.1.10. Why did you sale at that particular time of lower (unreasonable price)?

1= to settle debt 2= to pay tax. 3 social obligation 4= to meet household needs 5 other specify\_\_\_\_\_

What do you think should be done to solve these problems?

6.1.11 Land and other physical asset access tracking by political identities.

6.1.12. Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst, 10 is the best in your land holding ?

6.1.13. Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Shelter?

6.1.14. Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Ownership of farm tools and Means of power for labour

6.1.15 Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Ability willingness and speed of using new technology

6.1.16, Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Productive animal keeping and wealth transition

6.1.17, Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her Shelter



6,1,18 .Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his/her Ownership of farm tools and Means of power for labour ?

6,1, 19. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in Ability willingness and speed of using new technology?

6.1.20. Where do you place some Productive animal keeping and wealth transition body who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 1 is the worst 10 is the best in Productive animal keeping and wealth transition?

7. Human Capital and labour.

7.1.0 Labour for as source Income generating activities

7.1.1 what is your source of income? 1= sale of livestock 2= sale of livestock by products 3= sale of cash crop 4= sale of staple crops 5= petty trade 6= remittance 7 = hand craft and 8= food for work. 9= cash for work.

7.1.2.. income from off-farm activities.

Description of activities	Annual income in Birr	Remark
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Sale of fire wood

Renting land

Renting pack animals

Wage labour?

Participating in PSNP

7.1.3.. Income from other none-farm activities.

Description of Activities	Annual income	Remark
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Hand craft

Petty trade

Remittance

other

7.1.4. Has the number of income sources for your household been 1= increased 2= decreased 3= stayed the same describe the trend.

7.1.5. Which type of combination of the livelihood activities do appear to you best working to bring more money to your house \_\_\_\_\_

7.1.6. Participation in Wage labour?

7.2. Do you participate in casual in your Peasant Association?

7 2.1 If yes in which activities you are involved in?

Activities	Where the place of the work	Days worked in 2008		Wage per hour	
		Male	Female	Male	Female

Land

Preparation

Planting

Weeding

Harvesting

Domestic work

construction

PSNP

participation

The access of daily labour is better 1= with in Peasant Association 2= outside my Peasant Association. 3= Similar.

7.2.3. The wage rate of daily labour is perceived 1= extremely low. 2=low. 3= medium. 4= high 5= very high.

7.2.4. Who decides the amount of wage? 1= employers 2= wage labourer 3= negotiation 4= specify\_\_\_\_\_.

7.2.5. where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your satisfaction using you labour power to gain means of livelihood in the following aspects?

7.2.6.. in Labour exchange for transfer of cash and kind?

7.2.7 in Integrated capability of diversifying income generation?

7.2.8. In Food security status?

7.2.9. where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her performance in using his/her labour power to gain means of livelihood?

7.2.10. in Labour exchange for transfer of cash and kind?

7.2.11. in Integrated capability of diversifying income generation?

7.2.12. In Food security status?

7.2.13. where do you place someone who is best in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her performance in using his/her labour power to gain means of livelihood?

7.2.14. in Labour exchange for transfer of cash and kind?

7.2.15. in Integrated capability of diversifying income generation?

7.2.16. In Food security status?

7.2.17 .where do you place someone who is poorer than you in your area in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her performance in using his/her labour power to gain means of livelihood?

7.2.18. in Labour exchange for transfer of cash and kind?

7.2.19. in Integrated capability of diversifying income generation?

7.2.20. In Food security status?

## 8. Financial capital.

### 8.0. Credit use

8.1.1 Do you face problem of any working capital? 1= yes 0=no

8.1.2 Have you received any type of credit in 2007 1= Yes. 0 No.

8.1.3. If yes fill the following table

Source from Which borrowed	Purpose borrowed	of Amount borrowed	Interest paid	amount	Amount retained in birr.
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Code for purpose 1= purchase of seed 2=purchase fertilizer 3= purchase of chemical fertilizer 4= purchase of oxen 5= purchase of farm implement 6= consumption smoothing 7= social obligation  
Codes for the sources of credit.

1= Service cooperatives 2= Commercial bank 3= Development Bank 4= friends and relatives 5= Micro finance 6= Local money lender 7 Local Non government organization 8= safety net and other food security programme. 9 other

8.1.4. If no why? 1= fear my ability to repay 2= lack of asset for collateral 3= no one to give credit 4= no need for credit 5= high interest rate. 6= others.

8.1.5. Do you have saving habit? 1=yes 0=no

If yes the amount saved in last three years after participating in safety net programme.

8.1.6. Indicate the number of domestic animals the number you bought and sold in the last three years or after participating in Safety net programme

The name of live stock	Their number	The number of the livestock you sold in the last three years	The number of the livestock you bought in the last three years
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2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007
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1)cattle

Ox  
 Cow  
 Heifer  
 Calf  
 2)Goat  
 Male  
 Female  
 3)sheep  
 Male

Donkey  
 Male  
 Female  
 Horse  
 Male  
 Female  
 chicken

- 8.1.7) if you are participated in safety net programme in the last 12 month, how many months did the following food type last?
- 8.1.8) of the food crops you grew last season, indicate how many months this food lasted?\_\_\_\_\_
- 8.1.9) purchased food (food you bought)\_\_\_\_\_
- 8.1.10) Food remittances (food you receive from relatives)\_\_\_\_\_
- 8.1.11) if you receive food aid from any organization, how many months did it last?\_\_\_\_\_
- 8.1.12.) Over the past 12 month how many meals did your household eat per day? Which months?
- |     |     |     |       |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Dec | Jan | Feb | March | Apr | May | Jun | jul | Aug | sep | Oct | Nov |
|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

3meals Per  
 day

2 meals per  
 day

1 meal per day

#### Participating in PSNP

- 9.1. Has the safety net program helped you in preventing asset depletion? yes = 1 No =0  
 If no explain how  
 If yes explain how
- 9.1.1) Is the safety net program helped you in asset creation? 1 = yes no= 0  
 If yes explain how  
 If no explain how
- 9.1.2. Is the safety net program helped you covering critical food gap? 1= yes no= 0  
 If yes explain how?  
 If no explain how?
- 9.1.3. Have you sold your assets within the last twelve months after you are included in safety net programme yes=1 0=2
- 9.1.4. If yes, Why you sold?\_\_\_\_\_
- 9.1.5. Was the price you sold fair or normal? Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_
- Have you sold other asset(s) you sold in addition to the livestock's? Yes\_\_\_\_\_
- No\_\_\_\_\_
- 9.1.6..) if yes, what types of assets? specify

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9.2. What types of loans are there in your area you have ever used in your life?

1= private such as from relatives and friends. 2= Private from organization 3= government institutions. 4= government such as loan for asset building.

9.2.1 Have you accessed food security loan since you are included in PSNP and food Security program?

1= yes 0=no.

9.2.2. If yes, for what purpose?

1= for farm input 2= for asset building 3= to start business

9.2.3. Have you diverted the loan for unintended purpose

1=yes 0=no.

9.2.4.. if you answer yes for what purpose?

9.2.5 .Are you satisfied by the performance of the PSNP? 0=no 1=yes

If yes how it is helped you?

1= Covering critical food gap. 2= Investing on social capital .3= covering health expense 4= Repayment of other debt. 5= Alcohol and cat consumption. 6= Covering critical food gap 2= Children Schooling 3= Children Closing

9.2.6. Where do you place yourself in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your **Loan trustworthiness** ?

9.2.7.. Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your **Connection to other financial institutions?**

9.2.8. Where do you place yourself in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Saving?

9.2.7. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Loan trustworthiness?**

9.2.8. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his/her connection to other financial institutions?

9.2.9. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in savings?

9.2.10. Where do you place someone who is best in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Loan trustworthiness?**

9.2.11 .where do you place someone who is best in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Connection to other financial institutions** ?

9.2.12. .where do you place someone who is best in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **savings** ?

9.2.13. Where do you place someone who is less powerful than you in your area in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **Loan trustworthiness** ?

9.2.14. Where do you place someone who is less powerful than you in your area in the scale 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **connection to other financial institutions?**

9.2.15. .where do you place someone who is less powerful than in your area in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her **savings** ?

9.2.16. Regarding overall effectiveness of PSNP and Food security programme list the problems you have observed.

1= Discrimination against politically “incorrect” 2= Transparency deficiency about PSNP and OFSP 3= Meagreness of PSNP and OFSP transfer.

10. ) Have you created an asset since you participated in PSNP

1= yes 0=no.

10.1 If answered yes what are they? 1= house 2= land 3= livestock 4= sheep 5=goats 6= chicken

10.1.1. If you owned any of above how did you get them?

1= given 2= bought

10.1.2. Have you bought livestock since you are included in PSNP?

1= yes 0= no.

10.1.3 If you answered yes where did you get the money from?

10.1.4. From my savings 2= loan from informal sources 3=loan from Micro credit 4= loan from Food security.

10.1.5. Have you been excluded from PSNP and food security program since you have been included?

1= yes 0= no.

10.1.6 If you answered yes why?

1= graduated 2= forced to graduate 3= I do not want to be included to PSNP because payment is too low.

10.2. If you graduated any way, for how long last the food you produced or purchased? 1= 12 months 10=months 3=

9months 4= 8months 5= 7 months. 6= 6 months. 7 = less than 5 months.

10.2.1. Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst, 10 is the best in your land holding?

10.2.2. Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Shelter?

10.2.3. Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Ownership of farm tools and Means of power for labour

10.2.4. Where do you place yourself in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Ability willingness and speed of using new technology

10.2.5. Where do you place yourself in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in your Productive animal keeping and wealth transition

10.2.6. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his /her Shelter

10.2.7. Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in his/her Ownership of farm tools and Means of power for labour ?

10.2.8 Where do you place somebody who is better than you, in in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in ability, willingness and speed of using new technology?

10.2.9. Where do you place in the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst 10 is the best in Productive animal keeping and wealth transition ?

some Productive animal keeping and wealth transition body who is better than you, \_\_\_\_\_-Thank you for your time\_\_\_\_\_.

## Appendix 4 : Larger tables

Table 1-0-1 Total Sidama population, Density per/ km2 by 21 districts in 2010.

No	Zone/Woreda/Town Adm.	Capital- city			Density per km <sup>2</sup>	Number of Kebeles		
			Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Total pop.		Rural	Urban	Total
.	Sidama zone	Hawassa	6981.8	3,216,671	460.7	524	39	563
1	Hawassa Zuria	Dore- Bafano	341.14	254,869	747.1	23	1	24
2	Shebedino	Leku	245.15	128,595	524.6	32	3	35
3	Dale	Yirgalem	302.12	231,322	765.7	36		36
4	Aleta Wendo	Wondo	223.04	181,827	815.2	27		27
5	Hula	H/Selam	307.45	140,838	458.1	31	1	32
6	Bensa	Daye	537.85	273,179	507.9	37	3	40
7	Arbegona	Yaye	318.54	135,618	425.7	38	1	39
8	Aroresa	Mejo	732.74	185,485	253.1	32	2	34
9	Dara	Kawado	263.36	169,169	642.3	33	2	35
10	Boricha	Yirba	603.45	272,670	451.9	39	3	42
11	Yirgalem T/Adm.	Yirgalem		33,066			7	7

12	Aleta Wendo T/ Adm.	wondo		24,071			6	6
13	Wondo-genet	Chuko	230.03	169,659	737.6	13	2	15
14	Malga	Manicho	206.88	119,625	578.2	23	1	24
15	Gorche	Gorche	180.98	114,917	635	21	1	22
16	Wonsho	Bokaso	145.28	97,691	672.4	17	1	18
17	Loka -abaya	Hantate	963.26	108,119	112.2	25	1	26
18	Chuko	Chuko	306.02	182,281	595.7	26	1	27
19	Bursa	Bursa	234.88	112,911	430.9	27	1	28
20	Bona-Zuria	Qawalanka	262.04	132,092	504.1	27	1	28
21	Chire	Chire	488.02	131,235	268.9	17	1	18

Source;- Sidama Zone Finance and Economic Development department 2010.

**Table 1-2 The drought risk scale**

<b>Ethiopia one</b>		<b>Ethiopia two</b>		<b>Ethiopia three</b>		<b>Ethiopia four.</b>	
Zone	Drought Risk	Zone	Drought Risk	Zone	Drought Risk	Zone	Drought Risk
N.Wello	577	S. Gondar	514	Mirabawi	533	Debubawi	627
S.Wello	577	N.Shewa	510	Mehakelegawu	616	N. Gonder	506
WagHema	622	E. Gojam	454	Misrakawi	573	E.Wellega	369
Oromiya	565	W.Gojam	447	Shinile	387	Metekel	433
W.Hararge	367	N. Shewa 4	487	Jijiga	386	E.Shewa	406
E.Hararge	372	W.Shewa	372	Fiq	588	Bale	555
Gurage	319	Arssi	364	Jimma	298	Gambela Z1	379
Kembata A	320			Hadiya	318	Gambela Z2	349
Sidama	329			Gedeo	342	Gambela Z3	389
				Agewu Awi	420	Aderf	660

North Omo	322	Gode	726
South.Omo	348	Korahe	761
Asosa	416	Deghabur	614.
Kamashi	387		
Keficho sheka	324		
Ilubabor	296		
Bench Maji	303		
Borana	410		
Liben	571		
Warder	788		

Source: (Adapted from World Bank 2004:12, 18, 26, 29)

**Table 3.1 Research plan and methods**

<b>Phases</b>	<b>General Identities of the data providers</b>	<b>Data required</b>	<b>Collection method</b>	<b>Type of data</b>
<b>Pilot for three months From Mid June-Oct. 2000</b>	Peasants and agro-pastoralists in four districts N=40. Affected by livelihood and food insecurity.	Their response agreement and disagreement on the statements of governance.	Reading the statement and watching the way they respond and recording their response.	Primary.
<b>Main phase 1) Dec. 2000-Sept. 2001.</b>	Key players 1) from government and Non-government organizations N=4	The response on the issues of livelihood insecurity and the dialogue on their role	Interview and dialogue	Primary
	Key players from the Sidama indigenous structures N= 3	The response on the issue and dialogue on their role	Interview and dialogue	Primary
	Decision makers The president of SNNPRS and the Head of SEPDP N=1	The response on the issue of livelihood insecurity and the role of the government and his party on the issue	Interview and dialogue key informant interview.	Primary



<b>Main phase 2 October 2008-June 2009.</b>	The opposition leaders Sideman Liberation Movement (SLM) N=4	The response on the issue of livelihood insecurity in the Sidama and the alternative they might have to the issue they might have to prevent and respond on the issue	Interview and dialogue, Key informant interview	Primary
	Grain trader= 2	The nature of their business during food crises	Interview and dialogue	primary
	the sample households who are living in livelihood and food insecurity even on the edge of famine	The response on their living and livelihood circumstances and critical events they faced before they were pushed to this level. and how this affected the level of their access to different livelihood assets.	Survey to collect some figures on their demographic situation their response on trust and interest on successive Ethiopian governments, and income and expenditure, interview the level of their participation in Productive safety net programme designed by Ethiopian government since 2005. And participant observation, focus group discussion	primary
	the sample households of both former settlers from the north and ethnic Sidamas who were opposition sympathizers, members and leaders	The response on trust and interest in successive Ethiopian governments, their living standards and livelihood circumstances and critical events they faced before they hold this position. and how this affected the level of their access to different livelihood assets.	Survey to collect some figures on their demographic situation and income and expenditure, interview on the level of their participation in productive safety net programme designed by the Ethiopian government since 2005. And participant observation, focus group discussion	Primary
	The sample households who were sympathizers, members and assignees and connected to the governing party,	The response on their living standards and livelihood circumstances and how they came to trust the political system and the politicians. And the impact of this relationship in the processes of accessing livelihood assets.	Survey to collect some figures on their demographic situation and income and expenditure, interview on the level of their participation in productive safety net programme designed by the Ethiopian government since 2005. And Participant observation. Focus group discussion.	Primary

N.B: As the field work for 2000-2001 is more of ethnographic, the selection of subjects for the study based on ‘convenience sampling’ the researcher has also used the ‘snow balling’ technique with care to avoid one sidedness of attitude, character and

behaviours of the sample, and tried to diversify to capture general picture. For field research of 2008-2009 however as the field work contained survey which was quantitative different sampling technique was used, such as accessing the register that contains the list of Productive Safety net programme, that shall be justified in the following sections

**Table 5.3. The political space of conflicting identity, the stages in complete political engagement and how it is incomplete in the Sidama**

stages	How Dominant's react in normal political space	The Sidama Context	Mainstream public opinion	The Sidama Context	How excluded react
Encounters from 1890s	Exert maximum efforts to hide the problems from public eyes and ears.	The dominant Abyssinians declared war of conquest. Abyssinian general public aware of conquest. The Sidama public heard the news with shock and prepare to resist.	Is not felt by mainstream public therefore there seems no or little concern. Massive support the institutional framework within which they live.	The problem was felt by both Abyssinian public and the Sidama public.	Felt and touched by social problems hitherto unknown.  Share the problems by words of mouth with those trusted friends. Common Understanding created
Group formation From 1890-1917	Officially, made aware the ferments of the social problems. Still try to cover up and try to get mechanisms to blame the victims. Or try to provide very tentative solutions.	Groups such as 1) allies and loyal of conquering force take its forms  2) Sceptics and marginalised are taking its root.	Start to observe hitherto unknown tensions between dominants and excluded.	Start to observe tension among multiple identities.	Vision, mission, aims, objectives and strategies identified Informal duties and responsibilities shared tentative leaders nominated and elected leadership emerge. Recording the problems and present the problems to the attention of the dominants.
Evidence consolidation to persuade the dominants and mainstream public opinion.	Cover up and denial to blind the public eye. And continue politics as usual and normal. Set on bureaucratic machineries to suffocate the movement of excluded	The shock was so clear that no need of research to find evidence	Can understand the sources of the problems. Although the public seem silent consumers of propaganda of both sides, there are a tendency the excluded may win hearts and minds of thence public depending on the prevalence of the problem	Fully aware of the problems they are situated in. But concerned to know why some of traditional leaders are allies and royals with conquerors.	Interested group conduct research to substantiate their claim and to challenge the inaction of mainstream and dominants in political system. Use available political space to solve the problems. The failure to solve the problems will lay foundation for widespread opposition formation. Prove institutional failure to win the hearts and minds of the main stream opinion in the context of legal and moral framework .Gain more leadership skills
Trans formation and deterioration informal social movements From 1917-1936	Repression by any means including using legislation and violence Try to bribe the leaders of excluded group	Traditional leaders of the Sidama were bribed by the Offer of Military title, and Administrative titles and the benefits attached with those titles.	The public opinion may be divided depending on the horizon of the spread of the social problems and the level of propaganda from both side and evidences to	The Sidama were divided among allies, loyal sceptic and marginalised the latter two continued	Felt the unbearable pressure from the dominants and authorities of public institutions this can lead to submit ion, of the leaders as they might be co-opted to the value of the dominants and betray the value of excluded. This can present fertile condition to social movement to transform into political movement depending how the leaders are charismatic and

			substantiate or challenge claims from both sides. Public opinion will justify whom it support dominant authorities in the formal intuitions or emergent excluded groups in the processes of transformation	struggle against occupying force that denied their land right and existing opportunities.	how the organization follow centralised/decentralised administrative procedures. The transformation may occur due to the contradiction that emanates with in social movement identity crises will emerge, powerlessness prevails those friends start to suspect each other at the end the movement purify itself laying foundation for another form of movement this time political movement.
Formation of formal political organization 1936-1970s	Announce that the social movement failed, and disappeared, while they negotiate with burnouts who intend to with draw from social movements secretly, and blame those who resist co-option	Delegitimizing the Sidama Indigenous religion and demonising it	Naive public an aware of what is going on in closed doors might believe the authority without knowing the real challenges just started at this juncture.	Secrete Negotiation between Abyssinian Occupiers and the leaders of Sidama Liberation movement	Decline in media coverage but renewed political strategy with renewed vigour. Until everything settled the organization may go underground building its organizational capacities, learn from previous experience build on available strength. Laying foundation for launching resurrection in different form.
Expansion of the ideology with vigour. 1970s -1991	Division among those dominate the political system between reformers and to maintain status quo leading to a sort of change in forms but not in the content of their policy. Try to terrorise public by finding mechanisms that cast doubt on the alternatives proposed by emergent political movement .But the attempt will be counterproductive.	The Sidama language became the means of teaching in Illiteracy campaign. The Sidama Liberation movement controlled 4 districts in south Eastern Sidama.	Public tend to support the ideology of the excluded and demand reforms the sympathy support and become members of to excluded and dominated group.	Mass Joined the Sidama Liberation Movement to fight against Mengistu regime	They grow in depth of their ideology to make persuasive enough to attract the attention and admiration of public that helps broaden the horizon of their influence, through involving citizens, and other civic organization. Real transformation of strategy from sporadic protest to consolidated political struggle.
Triumph in changing the political landscape 1991- to date	Making policy change in similar to that is proposed by opposition, But will not be necessarily acceptable by public they will be forced to leave office for alternative power .	The Dergue Regime was defeated, the Sidama Liberation Movement joined to form Transitional Government of Ethiopia. But systematically pushed away by TPLF and continued its struggle to date.	The political movement of excluded will win the majority of public instead of fearing, support the alternative supplied by opposition.	Massive Support for victorious Ethnic Based Political Organizations.	The fundamental political, economic and cultural change. The political goal finally achieved. Celebrate successes formulate new structures of governance positional shift from offensive to defending the fruits of achievement from falling back.

Appendix 5.  
Research Ethics Approval.



## Low Risk Research Ethics Approval

Where NO human participants are involved and/or when using secondary data - Undergraduate or Postgraduate or Member of staff evaluating service level quality

i. Project Title

POLITICAL SPACE, IDENTITIES LIVELIHOODS, FOOD (IN)SECURITY, AND FAMINE : THE CASE FROM THE SIDAMA OF SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA
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b. Principal Investigator Certification

I believe that this project <b>does not require research ethics approval.</b>	X
I confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in the checklist honestly.	X
I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described in the checklist. I will immediately suspend research and request a new ethical approval if the project subsequently changes the information I have given in the checklist.	X

i.

ii. Principal Investigator

Name: Mulugeta Daye .....

Date: 26/02/2013 .....

iii. Student's Supervisor (if applicable)

I have read the checklist and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this project fully and frankly. I confirm that I have discussed this project with the student and agree that it does not require

research ethics approval. I will continue to review ethical issues in the course of supervision.

Name: Marion MacLellan.....

Date: 27/02/2013 .....

#### Low Risk Research Ethics Approval Checklist

##### **iv. Applicant Details**

Project Ref:	P11731
Full name:	Mulugeta Daye
Faculty:	[BES] Business, Environment and Society
Department:	[GA] Geography, Environment & Disaster Manager
Module Code:	PHD
Supervisor:	Marion MacLellan
Project title:	POLITICAL SPACE, IDENTITIES LIVELIHOODS, FOOD (IN)SECURITY, AND FAMINE : THE CASE FROM THE SIDAMA OF SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA
Date(s):	21/01/2013
Created:	26/02/2013 22:02

##### **v.**

##### **vi. Project Details**

Aims of this research are: The aims of this research are:

- 1) To explore the political spaces of conflicting political identities between successive Ethiopian governments and Sidama and its effect on livelihood and food insecurities.
- 2) To examine the role of political space in the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework with particular reference to political spaces of successive Ethiopian governments and conditioned political identities in Sidama and its impact on accessing livelihood assets.

The objectives to achieve those aims are:

1)To critically review the literature on the evolution of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework , to show that non- politicised and politicised frameworks missed critical issues for the (in)security and sustainability of livelihoods in the context of the Sidama.

2)To investigate the sources of political identity conflicts and the political space of struggle between successive Ethiopian governments policies and their consequences from above and the Sidama to defend their way of lives and livelihood asset access from below through the lens of an improved Sustainable Livelihood Framework what I called Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space of Analysis (LEPSA).

3) To evaluate the extent to which engaging political space conditioned the resilience, food and livelihood security in productive safety nets programme of the Ethiopian government.

4) To offer policy recommendations to future stakeholders in development initiatives within the parameters of the Livelihoods of Engaging Political Space Analysis.

**vii.**

#### **viii. Participants in your research**

Questions	Yes	No
1. Will the project involve human participants?	x	

#### **ix. Risk to Participants**

Questions	Yes	No
2. Will the project involve human patients/clients, health professionals, and/or patient (client) data and/or health professional data?		X
3. Will any invasive physical procedure, including collecting tissue or other samples, be used in the research?		X
4. Is there a risk of physical discomfort to those taking part?		X
5. Is there a risk of psychological or emotional distress to those taking part?		X
6. Is there a risk of challenging the deeply held beliefs of those taking part?		X
7. Is there a risk that previous, current or proposed criminal or illegal acts will be		X

revealed by those taking part?		
8. Will the project involve giving any form of professional, medical or legal advice, either directly or indirectly to those taking part?		X

#### **x. Risk to Researcher**

<b>Questions</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
9. Will this project put you or others at risk of physical harm, injury or death?		X
10. Will project put you or others at risk of abduction, physical, mental or sexual abuse?		X
11. Will this project involve participating in acts that may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?		X
12. Will this project involve observing acts which may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?		X
13. Will this project involve reading about, listening to or viewing materials that may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?		X
14. Will this project involve you disclosing personal data to the participants other than your name and the University as your contact and e-mail address?		X
15. Will this project involve you in unsupervised private discussion with people who are not already known to you?		X
16. Will this project potentially place you in the situation where you may receive unwelcome media attention?		X
17. Could the topic or results of this project be seen as illegal or attract the attention of the security services or other agencies?		X
18. Could the topic or results of this project be viewed as controversial by anyone?		X

#### **xi. Informed Consent of the Participant**

<b>Questions</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
19. Are any of the participants under the age of 18?		X
20. Are any of the participants unable mentally or physically to give consent?		X
21. Do you intend to observe the activities of individuals or groups without their knowledge and/or informed consent from each participant (or from his or her parent or guardian)?		X

#### **xii. Participant Confidentiality and Data Protection**

<b>Questions</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
22. Will the project involve collecting data and information from human participants who will be identifiable in the final report?		X
23. Will information not already in the public domain about specific individuals or institutions be identifiable through data published or otherwise made available?		X
24. Do you intend to record, photograph or film individuals or groups without their knowledge or informed consent?		X
25. Do you intend to use the confidential information, knowledge or trade secrets gathered for any purpose other than this research project?		X

**xiii.**

**xiv. Gatekeeper Risk**

Questions	Yes	No
26. Will this project involve collecting data outside University buildings?		X
27. Do you intend to collect data in shopping centres or other public places?		X
28. Do you intend to gather data within nurseries, schools or colleges?		X
29. Do you intend to gather data within National Health Service premises?		X

**xv. Other Ethical Issues**

Questions	Yes	No
30. Is there any other risk or issue not covered above that may pose a risk to you or any of the participants?		X
31. Will any activity associated with this project put you or the participants at an ethical, moral or legal risk?		X

**Other Documents submitted**

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