

## DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

### Influenced transplantation

### a study into emerging Mafia groups in the United States pre-1920

May, Simon

*Award date:*  
2017

*Awarding institution:*  
Coventry University

[Link to publication](#)

#### General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of this thesis for personal non-commercial research or study
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission from the copyright holder(s)
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

#### Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Influenced Transplantation: A Study into  
Emerging Mafia Groups in the United  
States pre-1920

By  
Simon May

May 2017



*A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University's  
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

# Abstract

---

The current literature on mafia transplantation into the US does not address the relationship between Italian mafia groups and United States mafia groups in the pre-prohibition era; any connection between the two is assumed rather than proven. This thesis argues that mafia transplantation theory, showing that the operation of an overseas outpost by an Italian mafia is insufficient in explaining the movement of mafiosi from Italy to the United States and the formation of groups in the United States. Instead, it suggests that members of groups in the United States used knowledge obtained in Italy, but in the form of imitation rather than control. This imitation was based on elements of cultural heritage with which the mafioso would be familiar, helping define the structure, relationships, rituals and *modus operandi* of the US groups. The research involved examining records from various archives; newspaper, police, immigration records, personal records, etc., in order to find proof of transplantation outposts operations, influence or of home-grown mafia.

The thesis tackles transplantation in three areas; migration, markets and operations. It shows that generalised migration was not a factor in determining the transplantation of a mafia group and shows that individual Mafiosi travelled often as the result of increased law enforcement efforts against them rather than as part of a strategy. The thesis demonstrates that the markets in which these migrated Mafiosi operated in the United States were not comparable in a way that suggests the running of an outpost from Italy, but instead that these mafiosi's groups adapted to changing conditions in the United States. At an operational level, the groups in the US fed off the reputation of their Italian counterparts but were imitating their practices rather than being subservient to their control. Overall the thesis shows that the Mafia groups in the US were not operating as an outpost under control of an Italian organisation and instead were made up of close affiliations of individuals with the relevant skills to take advantage of and adapt to the local American conditions in a form influenced by their Italian counterparts.

## Acknowledgements

Firstly I would like to express special gratitude for Dr. Rino Coluccello as Director of Studies for his continuous support of my work on the PhD, professional and personal development. His knowledge and guidance helped me immensely with the research and writing of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Dr. Alex Thomson and Dr. Simon Massey, again for their support and guidance with the PhD and with my professional and personal development. They provided encouragement when needed and helped me develop perspective regarding my work. I also want to thank other colleagues at the university who have both supported me with the PhD in both professional and personal capacity. In addition I would like to thank the external for their help in refining the final elements of the PhD in the corrections.

Outside the university I would like to thank the many researchers and academics who I had a chance to discuss my (and their) research with. Those who helped me locate or obtain sources on mafia in the US; David Critchley, Thomas Hunt, Mike Dash and others who responded to my queries. Vittorio Coco I am grateful to for guiding me around the Palermo State archives and for being very patient with my language troubles.

Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends who have supported me through good times and bad across the last five years, for putting up with me when at my most stressed, for making sacrifices on my behalf along the way, and for making sure I kept going.

Abstract .....	5
Introduction .....	8
Literature Review .....	33
Migration.....	67
Markets .....	124
Operations.....	180
Conclusions .....	219
Bibliography .....	234
Appendices.....	246

# Introduction

---

In October 1888, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* newspaper asked the question 'Has Chicago a Mafia' in one of the paper's front page headlines. The answer they provided exclaimed that the Italians have brought 'their national customs, their secret societies, their traditions of murder' with them to the US (1888). These were incriminatory words imposed upon the millions of migrants that headed to the US from Italy, yet this headline and its accompanying article were not alone in their blame. From the late nineteenth century, the debate raged, mostly within the confines of the local newspapers, as to what the nature of the mafia was in the US. Where had the mafia come from, who ran it, and who was to blame? The answers to these questions normally consisted of Italy/ Sicily, a foreigner, and Italians/Sicilians/lax-immigration laws respectively [see (White, 1909), (New York Times, 1890), (New York Times, 1902)]. Even those newspapers which levied some of the reasoning for the emergence of these crime groups on the conditions of American society ultimately sought to blame a foreign machination. For example the *Salt Lake Herald* in August 1895 ran the following headline; 'Society of the Sicilly [sic] Mafia, Curious Workings or the Murderous Gangs, Originally All Right, But That Was Five Hundred Years Ago, Growth in Louisiana Shows How Easily a Weed of Foreign Origin Can Take Root in This Fertile Soil and How Noxious a Plant it May Become' (Salt Lake Herald, 1895).

The origins of organised crime in America, particularly of Italian American mafias, have long been debated across academic disciplines as well as through government research, the media, popular culture and art. After the aforementioned newspaper reports of the late nineteenth century came early literary studies such as Herbert Asbury's 'Gangs' series in the 1920s and 30s (1927, 1933, 1936 and 1940). These were followed by US government hearings in the 1950s and 1960s such as the Kefauver Committee from 1950-51 or Senator McClellan's Committee on organised crime in 1963. In the 1970s several academics from different disciplines tackled various aspects of the US organised crime (see (Cressey, 1969) (Ianni, 1974) (Nelli, 1976) ). While the study of this topic has, at least in academia, moved on from the sensationalist and short articles such as the ones above, the debate around the origins of these groups persists.

In response to the issue of 'mafia transplantation', the idea that a mafia group creates an outpost in a foreign territory, this thesis focuses on the emergence of the Italian American mafias in the pre-prohibition era (1880-1920) and the nature of their relationship with mafia groups in Italy. This work firstly examines transplantation theories and how they relate to the early mafiosi of the pre-prohibition United States. This thesis concludes that a simple definition of transplantation is insufficient in isolation to define the emergence of mafia groups as foreign entities in the US or to explain US mafia groups origins as the result of local conditions facilitating the emergence of such groups. A look at both theory and supporting data would suggest that 'outpost transplantation' did not occur; there was no concerted effort on the part of any Italian mafia to set up or run an outpost overseas in the United States. This conclusion also supports suggestions that Cosa Nostra, the Sicilian mafia, prohibits families settling outside of Sicily (Paoli, 2004, p. 23).

Instead, there is sufficient evidence of collaboration and influence that would suggest a form of 'influenced transplantation'; an emergence of groups indirectly influenced by but not under the control of, or beholden to, an Italian organisation. These groups may be considered home-grown, but shaped by factors of individual mobility, cultural transplantation, and the immigrant experience. The thesis explores this 'influenced transplantation' process of the Italian-American mafiosi from their decision, willing or unwilling, to leave their homeland, to their exploits in the United States.

To help contextualise the relationship this thesis presents original data, from previously unexplored or overlooked sources, alongside reinterpretations of data that may have been misunderstood and misanalysed, and information that previous studies have not sought to include. It must also be considered that due to the nature of the area, there may be information that has been presented in past work that has continued to be cited and referred to where in fact it is a product of the sensationalism associated with the reporting of Mafia activity. To avoid presenting misinformed data, the reliance on primary sourced data and new interpretations of historical data will provide the basis for analysis.

This research, therefore, reconsiders the approach towards the relationship between Italian and Italian-American mafia groups and shows the nature of that relationship as more than just a simple mobility of a group from one country to another. Overall, this thesis argues that there was not systematic outpost transplantation of mafia groups from Italy to the United States in this period. Groups associated with mafia activity that did migrate at this time did so as

individuals, or ad hoc groups, with few, if any, ongoing contacts with organised crime back in Italy, instead operating in a form of influenced imitation of their Italian counterparts in what this research terms 'influenced transplantation'.



## Aims and objectives

This research aims to explain the nature of Italian mafia transplantation between 1880 and 1920 into the United States. It sets out what is known about the emerging groups and their relationship with Italy. It seeks firstly to identify and review the current state of prior literature. Using this literature as a base, the thesis defines what is currently understood by mafia transplantation, how it can be examined, and how it can be split into different interpretations of mafia mobility. Around this, a robust study was designed to analyse mafia transplantation into the US. To analyse and answer the research questions the data needed was collected using the developed study design. This collected data is used to derive and present the results of the study, and these results are analysed alongside prior knowledge. From these, the study's conclusions are drawn regarding the nature of mafia transplantation, including highlighting the original contribution of the research in the use of new terminology that differentiates forms of mafia transplantation. Accurate references and records for the material and data used in the study are provided throughout.

The study provides a new perspective into the role of transplantation in the emergence of US mafia groups, through the analysis of various data and how it relates to the various existing transplantation theories, instead suggesting new, distinct, types of transplantation. Whilst there has been extensive research done into the US mafia groups, for the most part they are histories and biographies pieced together with collections of anecdotal data and not tied in with the theoretical works produced on mafia emergence; whether those regarded these US groups as transplanted or home-grown. This study combines the two, adding original data, and using it to determine the nature of transplantation. This study fills gaps in the current understanding of transplantation during this period showing the unlikelihood that groups transplanted in the form of outpost creation, which this study refers to as 'outpost transplantation'. Rather, this study shows that these groups emerged because of both conditions in the US and the utilisation of certain skills and traits from Italy in the form of 'influenced transplantation'. This 'influenced transplantation' is the result of a combination of skilled criminals and cultural traits combining with the market opportunities in the US to create independent but structurally and culturally similar (but not identical) mafia groups in the US. It also presents a new set of quantitative data on the mafiosi who made the journey to the US showing their place of origin, destination, and age at migration along with other information.

## Scope of Study

### Timeframe

The study is confined to the years 1880- 1920. The prohibition years and post-prohibition years see a different makeup of organised crime groups as they transformed and adapted to the illegal liquor market and law enforcement responses. Whilst, as Lupo states, the mafias 'power and influence grew exponentially after 1920' (Lupo, 2015, p. 4), this study is concerned with the formative years of early mafia groups. Including the prohibition years would not only significantly increase the size of the project but also produce sets of results based on a different set of circumstances (prohibition as a market, and fascism as a driving factor from Italy). During prohibition, there are some fundamental changes to organised crime groups as their structure and dynamics change to accommodate the burgeoning market opportunities in the illegal alcohol industry. These groups sophisticated and networked, moving from a localised areas of operations to the formation of a nationwide 'commission' in the early 1930s. The formation of a commission sought to enhance the positions and cooperation between the individual mafia groups (for further reading on the prohibition era see Critchley (2009), Fentress (2010), Raab (2005), among others). Prohibition catalyses the evolution of mafia activities in the US, providing the means for these groups to extend beyond their local area, but is not the origin of many mafia groups. As there are mafia-esque groups in the US before prohibition, then it must be considered that any transplantation of mafia groups also occurred before 1920.

As such 1880, during the great wave of immigration, has been chosen as a start point, though there are a few isolated individuals before this date that shall be mentioned where appropriate. This thesis does not seek to establish the nature of the mafia transplantation in the years of prohibition or the great depression, though it will occasionally draw upon sources that reference these periods where the information can be used (for example some of Gentile's recollections in his testimonies occur after 1920 (c.1947), or the research and findings of Lupo (2015) and Critchley (2009) who covered much longer timeframes in their studies). Therefore 1920 is chosen as a cut-off as the start of the prohibition era.

### Defining Organised Crime

Because this thesis will make numerous references to organised crime and deals with the formation of organised crime groups, it is fundamental to define what is meant by organised

crime and what is considered organised crime within the remit of this thesis. Not all crimes and groups covered by this study may be defined as 'mafia', and therefore it is imperative that 'organised crime' be given as a baseline for where a group may exhibit the conditions for being an organised crime group, but not those of a 'mafia' group.

The United Nations definition, formed as part of the Palermo Protocols (2000), allows for a sufficiently broad interpretation that sets some base parameters for what constitutes organised crime. When referring to organised crime groups, it can be inferred that this thesis is considering groups which fit within the conventions' simple definition of organised crime.

The definition in Article 2(a) of the convention:

- *a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed;*
- *existing for a period of time;*
- *acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years' incarceration;*
- *to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.*

The convention provides context for what is 'transnational organised crime' (the convention itself only covers those with a transnational element). While pertinent to the study it is not required beyond a brief mention; the study does not seek to define transnational organised crime, but there will be inevitable overlap between what might be considered 'transplanted' and what might be considered 'transnational'. In the UN convention, transnational considers:

- *Offences committed in more than one state*
- *Offences planned or controlled in one state but committed in another*
- *Offences committed by groups that operate in more than one state.*
- *Offences committed in one state but have substantial effects on another*

These defining factors help differentiate between standard criminals and those that constitute part of an organised crime group. The actions of individual criminals cannot be used to explain transplantation of groups. This is also worth considering when examining sources, for example, the *New York Times* in 1893 in making a case for the existence of 'mafia and camorra' groups presented a list of violent crimes committed by Italians across 9 months (1893), yet there is no connection between this list of unrelated crimes and the actions of an organised crime group.

‘Outpost transplantation’, the running of a mafia outpost in the US by an Italy based mafia group, would fit into the definition of a transnational organised crime group. However ‘influenced transplantation’ that this thesis proposes suggests that the planning, control or operation in other nation-states, in this study Italian mafia groups in the US, does not occur and therefore may not be considered ‘transnational’ in scope’.

The defining of organised crime and its history is explored further in the literature review as it provides essential context to not only this thesis but also to the sources consulted.

### What is ‘mafia’

Mafia, mafias or ‘The Mafia’ are all terms that have been used to explain a wide variety of criminal phenomena.

A broad definition of ‘mafia’ is needed that accepts a certain number of commonalities amongst mafia groups which differentiate them from other organised crime groups, and one that does not betray the etymology of the word.

Regarding US based Mafia groups, Reppetto suggests that the word ‘Mafia’ has become misleading because it has come to represent ‘foreign organisations and alien conspiracies’ and recommends the use of ‘American Mafia’ instead as it ‘conveys the reality that Italian-dominated gangs arose out of socio-economic conditions in this country [US] and often worked in partnership with mobsters from other ethnic backgrounds’ (2004, p. x). Conversely, De Stefano states that Sicilians in the US used the term ‘Mafia’ to refer to local criminal groups in their homeland and continued to use the word in the US (2006, p. 53), therefore using the term ‘Mafia’ on its own should be sufficient so long as it is clear that this refers to the US unless otherwise stated. Smith states that a conflict over the definition of ‘Mafia’, which has been used to refer to either ‘a specific organisation or a general state of mind’, with the former becoming the commonly emphasized explanation, leading to ‘problems of concept and imagery’ (Smith, 1975, p. 40). This research has chosen to continue to use the word ‘mafia’ in reference to an organisation rather than a state of mind, due to the fact it seeks to explore the links between organisations and not between states of mind. This alternative definition is worth remembering however and how this imagery and conceptualisation affects the interpretation of the various factors has been considered.

According to Albanese's analysis of Albini, Hess and Blok's research on the Mafia in Italy, they have all argued that the terms 'Mafia' and 'Mafiosi' have been applied to individuals involved in private protection or extortion with no clear evidence that they formed part of a larger organisation (Albanese, 1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition), p. 23). Similar definitions focused on private protection are also used by Varese (Varese, 2011) and Gambetta (1993). This overemphasis of 'private protection' creates a definition which does not other elements and features of mafias which are similar, for example structures, rituals and other cultural similarities.

Early definitions of mafia focussed on attitudes and behaviour rather than any structural organisation;

‘For the social scientists carrying out the first field studies in Sicily between the 1960s and the early 1980s, for example, the mafia was simply a form of behaviour and power. That is, they asserted, there were mafiosi, single individuals, who embodied determined sub-cultural values and exercised specific functions within their communities, but no mafia organisation existed as such.’ (Paoli, 2004, p. 20)

Varese's definition of mafia; 'a Mafia group is a type of OCG [Organised Crime Group] that attempts to control the supply of protection' (Varese, 2010, p. 17), is market-centric, focussed solely on a specific collection of market activities. It helps differentiate mafias from other OC groups who are not involved in the provision of protection and often control only a single market; drug networks, motorcycle gangs, or white collar organised crime for example.

Although Critchley has criticised the 'protection market' approach (Critchley, 2009, p. 34), as used by Varese, Dickie (2007, p. 203) and Gambetta (1993, p. 251), his criticisms are based on the separating Black Hand groups from mafia groups, as according to him they work separately and in opposition to each other. His criticisms do not highlight the use of protection as a tool by both sets of groups.

Paoli also highlights the difficulty in synthesising a definition, though also indicates Gambetta's enterprise paradigm as one potential definition;

In the past hundred years, members of Sicilian and Calabrian mafia families have used the cohesion created by status and fraternization contracts to extremely different ends and carry out greatly varying functions. It is thus extremely difficult to single out a

single function or goal that can fully characterize the mafia phenomenon, though this has been attempted by supporters of the enterprise paradigm and, more recently, by Diego Gambetta, who describes the mafia as “an industry of private protection” (1993) (2003, pp. 18-19).

Paoli has gone on to suggest that many of these organisations are multifunctional and that ‘in the past hundred years, their members have exploited the strength of mafia bonds to pursue various endeavours and to accomplish the most disparate tasks.’ (2004, p. 20)

Albini, before the testimonies of informant (*pentito*) Tommaso Buscetta, provided a similar definition that, instead of highlighting protection specifically, highlighted a patron-client relationship and the use of violence (though in a Sicilian context);

Mafia then is not an organization. It is a system of patron-client relationships that interweaves legitimate and illegitimate segments of Sicilian society. Mafioso is not a rank or position within a secret organization. Rather it represents a type of position within the patron-client relationships of Sicilian society itself. It refers specifically to one who can and does use violence to enforce his will (Albini, 1971, pp. 135-136).

While the term mafia has come to describe groups of other origins; Russian, Japanese, Albanian to name a few, as this thesis focusses on transplantation from Italy it is not necessary to include this in the definition.

Using a definition that signifies that it is a Sicilian phenomenon with Sicilian origins is not suitable for this study as it creates inferences as to the conclusions of the study (notably that the US is a branch of Sicilian origin and Sicilian alone). This thesis does not take the position of analysing this with the perception that the mafia is a singular Sicilian entity; there existed a number of families across Sicily and the South of Italy, unconnected from each other and operating independently. It does not refer to a single monolithic entity as some sources do, because, as will be demonstrated in the literature review, this is not a realistic assessment of ‘mafia’ or the nature of organised crime, and therefore this thesis shall not refer to ‘the Mafia’. The capitalisation shall remain on the word ‘Mafia’ when used by other authors to indicate or suggest a singular organisational entity called ‘the Mafia’, so as to not misrepresent the original statements by those authors.

Instead, this thesis views the concept of mafia as universal to a number of different groups and sects across Southern Italy with a wide range of *modus operandi*. There are the urban mafias of poorer communities, perhaps what we would associate the term *Camorra* with, a name commonly used for the Neapolitan mafia; as well as the urban bourgeois mafia, made up of the likes of politicians, influential businessmen, merchants and even academics, and a more rural mafia of landowners and protectors. These subgroups are interlinked in many cases – the landowners reside in the city alongside the politicians and merchants.

Moreover, it is imperative to consider that mafia is not solely a Sicilian construct, nor should it be considered so in the American context. In the past the phenomena in America has been attributed to Sicily, often stating that it was headquartered or ran from there. A note made in Critchley's work stated that 'During the 1950's, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics apparently believed that the American organization was run from Palermo, Sicily', exemplified in a US Congress Committee report at the time [ (U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 from note 13, 1958)in (Critchley, 2009, p. 242)]. US authorities would eventually move beyond this Sicily-centric view; an FBI document detailing the relationship between members of the US mafia families in the 1960s stated that although the overruling Commission is supposedly made up of Sicilians and Neapolitans, it featured two 'Calabrians' (FBI, 1963).

Both of Gentile's testimonies, also highlight the wider geographical origins of criminals in the US ; he tells of an episode between his family and a *Camorra* organisation from Naples (Gentile, 1963, pp. D-5).

Umberto Santino provides a broader and all-encompassing definition that moves beyond a focus on the business of private protection. Crucially his definition highlights the elements of the cultural code upon which this thesis builds a hypothesis of an influenced organisation.

'Mafia is a system of violence and illegality that aims to accumulate wealth and to obtain positions of power; which also uses a cultural code and which enjoys a certain popular support. In this way the Mafia phenomenon is seen to be a complete unit with multifarious aspects; criminal, economic, political, cultural and social'. (Santino, 2017)

It is from here that Santino sets out the criminal association as a network of relationships transcending societal classes, but that the principal functions are carried out by what he terms

the 'mafia bourgeoisie'. Santino's definitions, compared with that of Gambetta or Varese, deemphasise the element of the protection racketeering business;

'A cluster of criminal organisations, the most important of which, though not the only one, is Cosa Nostra. Such organisations operate within a wide and articulate relational context, shaping a system of violence and illegality aimed at accumulating capital and gaining power, through the use of a cultural code and the enjoyment of social consent.' (Santino, 1993)

Instead Santino refers to social norms and cultural elements that define why the mafia exists; 'because many people consider violence and illegality as a form of survival and as a way of acquiring a social role; violence and illegality are usually unpunished' (Santino, 2017);

The concept of a 'culture of honour' (regarding traditional values and "men of honor") is also addressed by Santino, which, he suggests has always been a mask which hides a 'culture of wealth' unconnected 'to an abstract concept of virtue' but rather the ability to acquire wealth which is indispensable for gaining a higher position on the social ladder'.

Coluccello also provides a wide, encompassing definition, based on those of Santino and Paoli before;

'Mafias are a kind of organised crime group that are best explained as political organisations that exert control over a territory where they are forms of governance. Members of these organisations typically share the same norms, rituals and code of conduct. Scholars and policy makers use the expression mafia to refer to organised criminal groups such as Sicilian and American Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, the Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triads.' (Coluccello, 2017, p. 193)

Therefore, for this thesis, the term 'mafia' utilises a combination of Paoli, Santino and Coluccello, and will refer to;

*Organised crime groups that exert control over a territory through a system of violence and illegality aimed at accumulating capital and gaining power. Members of these organisations typically share the same norms, rituals and code of conduct.*



It should be noted that sources consulted and referenced will have used alternate definitions, even definitions which may refer to a single organisation or definitions which preclude groups from outside of Sicily.

### What is 'transplantation'

The idea behind transplantation is the movement of a mafia group from its territory of origin to a new territory. Federico Varese describes 'mafia transplantation' as 'the ability of a mafia group to operate an outpost over a sustained period outside its region of origin and routine operation' (Varese, 2011). Varese's definition provides a good reference point from which to analyse. It sets out several pre-requisites for what can be expected during mafia transplantation:

- It must be a mafia group
- It must be an outpost outside its region of origin and routine operation
- It must exist for a sustained period

Should transplantation have occurred, and the nature of said transplantation, in the US then these prerequisites will have been met:

- Mafia groups (as already defined) existed in the pre-prohibition US
- The outpost, the United States, is outside of the region of origin/operation for traditional mafia groups, Italy
- These groups exist from the late nineteenth century through to the prohibition era

However, the second point must be examined closely; are these groups of Italian origin, or are they American creations, perhaps with a facade of an Italian mafia. The idea that any kind of transplantation of an Italian mafia group to the US occurred, consciously, subconsciously or by chance, must be challenged. Too often it is assumed that transplantation happened, and the assumption exists because of the direction of the early research into organised crime in the US, notably Alien conspiracy theory (discussed in detail in the literature review). Thus this thesis introduces the original terms 'outpost transplantation' to define the planning, control or running of an overseas mafia outpost by an Italian mafia, and 'influenced transplantation' to signify

It is the study of this issue that has offered a number of differing but related theories and keywords associated with 'transplantation'. 'Transplantation theory' and 'importation theory' (Ubah, 2007), all refer to the importation of an outside mafia in some form. They suggest, to varying degrees, that the mafia originates or is controlled from outside the State. It is important to remember that these theories are not interchangeable and each is defined by different extremities of parameters. For example 'alien conspiracy theories' (a negative connotation applied to these types of theory and not the title of these theories themselves), are those that suggest that not only are mafia groups in the US foreign entities but that they were put there purposefully by a foreign state in order to undermine the American state.

Within these theories are discussions regarding the emergent and strategic decision making of mafia groups, in that sometimes the mafiosi are forced to transplant rather than deciding to transplant:

This emergent process is quite distinct from the more strategic features that often underlie claims that criminal organisations are taking control of a given market or expanding into new territories. Indeed, popular and mainstream depictions of organised crime generally perceive participants to be strategic (or intentional) in their actions. More often, such claims are preceded by the premise that mobility is an effortless task for any group or organisation. Organisations and groups are often believed to move, with little or no constraint, from one geographic location to the next into another group's territory or into legitimate industries. The criminogenic or contextual factors are generally overlooked, while the rational strategies of criminal groups are often exaggerated. (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 166)

The opposing theories on the spectrum include functionalist theories (Light, 2010, p. 284), deprivation theories (Ubah, 2007), social ladder theories (Bell, 1953), ethnic succession theories (Ianni, 1974) and others (Woodiwiss, 2001) (Albini, 1971) that suggest the emergence of mafia/organised crime groups is due to local conditions. These theories are again not directly interchangeable; with regard to the US, some promoted the idea that it is American cultural values (such as an individualistic society) that encourage organised crime, while others suggest blocked opportunities for those of ethnic backgrounds. Lavorgna, Lombardo and Sergi suggest that it should be expected for 'organized crime to differ in different settings because of the nature of the character of its members and the effects of the physical and social environment' (Lavorgna, et al., 2013, p. 266).

The intertwining of American and Italian (Southern-Italian) cultural values within the migrant community is also an essential part of the 'influenced transplantation' that this thesis introduces. The assimilation of the Italian community into the American capitalist and individualist value system created an opportunity for organised criminals who created crime groups in the image of those found in their heritage including elements of religiosity, group structures, rituals, language and a perceived history.

In this thesis, these theories reappear where they can help explain phenomena and be used to provide an overall picture of mafia transplantation. This thesis concludes that no one of these theories are sufficient in explaining the multitude of applicable factors that contribute to mafia transplantation, but they can be used to explain specific subsets of the factors that led to the emergence of Italian-American mafia groups.

## Overview of thesis

### Chapter 2: Literature Review

Following this introduction, an overview of the current literature provides a critical summary of works concerned with the history of the mafia in New York, and a perspective regarding the unclear nature of mafia transplantation and what it entails. The critical analysis of these works contributes to the approach of this study. The literature review follows a chronological order, starting with early press reports of mafia activity in the United States, before discussing the US government investigations of the 1950s and 1960s, and the divergence of academic fields of study in the 1970s.

The literature review also looks at the history of 'transplantation' theory and associated theories, such as the 'alien conspiracy theory' and Jay Albanese's 'ethnicity trap'. The history of the evolution of these theories and the understanding/acknowledgement of them in subsequent literature has shaped the approach to transplantation, and therefore examining that history provides vital contextualisation.

There is also critical analysis of the works on the development of mafia groups in the US, looking at what each of the reviewed works contributes to the field of knowledge and the usefulness of their findings. As part of this there is a discussion on research into the 'Black Hand', a term whose meaning is debated; was it a criminal organisation or technique. This also involves looking at how the 'Black Hand' overlaps with mafia groups within the literature.

### Chapter 3: Methodology

The methodology provides a brief overview of the methods utilised during the research of this thesis, explaining how sources were found and used, the limitations of the data available (or unavailable in some cases), and the ethics of the study. It covers how the study plans to address the wide variety of factors set out in the theoretical framework.

The methodology chapter explains the mixed-method approach to tackling the source material. It justifies the approaches taken due to the clandestine and secretive nature of the source material; there are not accurate readily accessible records of criminal activities from those present, nor for the most part from the law enforcement agencies pursuing said criminals. Additionally, the interdisciplinary nature of the study also means that there is no easy way to replicate methodology in the existing literature. The different factors identified in the theoretical framework fall under a variety of disciplines with different approaches to measuring them. The methodology, therefore, sets out how each factor can be measured within the reasonable scope of the study.

The methodology sets out how primary data was tracked and obtained from a variety of sources. This includes online and physical sources (or both where online availability of sources increased during the study). It also addresses the nature of what is considered primary and secondary within the scope of the research. It addresses the limitations of the sources available; for example the underlying narrative and accuracy of contemporary newspaper reports, the dry and uninformative nature of police records, the remembering and rewriting of events in memoirs or the political narrative of government and police report.

A theoretical framework for analysis is presented. This is based upon various transplantation theories from existing literature, breaking down the theories into individual factors divided into three sets; those associated with migration, those with the market and those with the operations. Each of these sets is further broken down into three types of factor; push factors that would cause mafiosi to leave Italy, pull factors that would draw them into the United States, and factors for successful transplantation that impact on the difficulty of a group transplanting. These factors form the basis from which subsequent chapters are structured so that analysis follows a logical path and the conclusions are made with each of these areas.

Finally, the chapter addresses the ethical concerns of the study.

## Chapter 4: Migration

The migration chapter is the first chapter that explores the findings of the research and engages in discussion and analysis of these findings. It focuses on migration-related factors and explores the role migration plays in mafia transplantation. This covers both generalised migration and the migration of mafia groups specifically. It looks at the factors introduced in the theoretical framework and evaluates them supported by the research data to determine the importance and validity of claims regarding the role of migration in the emergence of these groups.

The chapter is split into looking at generalised migration and its impact on the transplantation of mafia groups, its impact on organised crime growth and then more specifically the migration of known mafiosi. Within generalised migration, the push and pull factors are examined. This section draws on general migration statistics to look at patterns of migration to establish if there is a relationship between them and mafia migration.

The chapter will highlight that, for the most part, the bourgeoisie mafioso was not subject to the same socio-economic conditions that forced many Southern Italians to emigrate, and therefore that generalised migration alone is not sufficient for explaining the transplantation of groups into the US. The chapter also shows that other generalised migration reasons do to apply to mafia groups; they are not seeking unskilled labour, nor do they require an opportunity at upward social mobility. This chapter also considers the role generalised migration plays in the growth of organised crime in the US highlighting that for the arriving migrant the chance of upward social mobility, while often greater than in their homeland, also presented challenges.

The chapter also focusses on mafiosi at an individual level using data collected for this study to examine where in Italy the mafiosi came from, where they went, the age at which they arrived and correlations between them. It sets out that Western Sicily may be the source for the majority of individuals, but it is not the sole region of origin. Some individuals arrived from the Naples region joining US 'Camorra' organisations or other mafia groups. This information is used to address some of the generalisations made in the wider literature to date.

The chapter also explores the history of individuals travelling to the US looking at which were involved in mafia activities before their departure. Several cases are looked at, and it shows that a small number of the individuals were known to be involved in criminal activities before

their departure. These past criminal associations are linked in with their future counterparts; however, in the examples available, if they did re-associate with the same criminals in the US the closest associates were often relatives (for examples the Galuccis). Alongside this is a look at the reason why certain mafiosi emigrated; if they were active before it was often through fear of police arrest.

## Chapter 5: Markets

The second analysis chapter focuses on the role of markets in transplantation, looking at emerging markets, opportunities, and factors that impacted on the permeability of those markets, and relates these back into the transplantation data. The chapter is split into three sections looking at; market opportunities, market and local conditions, and trade opportunities and conditions. As set out in the theoretical framework these are further broken down into the push factors, pull factors and factors for successful transplantation.

The market opportunities section explores the push factors that would encourage an organised crime group to operate overseas, strategic and unintentional. Within this section is a study of the lemon industry; its relationship with the mafia and its importance to Italian trade with the US. It shows that while the lemon industry was the most important market attached to the rural mafia groups (particularly in Sicily) around which their criminal enterprises were built, the relationship between the mafia and the industry in the US did not exhibit an extension of their current activities (land protection). Instead, the industry often formulated as the legal front for the mafiosi's activities (a significant number of mafiosi were owners or workers at grocers or food importers) though there were some attempts to monopolise the lemon market (as in New Orleans).

The section also looks at new/booming markets as pull factors. It explores the concept of the demand for private protection based on the works of Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993) and Varese (Varese, 2011), and looks at how the lack of protection of markets in the US benefitted emerging organised crime groups regardless of origin.

The second section addresses the market and local conditions. The push section looks at how law enforcement may force mafiosi to leave an area. It focuses on the presence of appropriate market conditions in the US for organised crime groups; lax law enforcement which was present in the Italian migrant communities ('Little Italies'), high political corruption in the political machines (such as Tammany Hall), and other factors. The implementation of these factors is demonstrated through the experiences of migrated mafiosi, for example, Colosimo and Torrio's corruption of public officials in Chicago. These factors combined to create the ideal breeding ground for organised crime in the US.

Finally the chapter looks at trade opportunities and conditions, considering the possibility of the trafficking of goods; this era of organised crime was more localised, and there was yet to



be a global market for the trade of illicit goods (the importation of alcohol during prohibition represented the first time many mafias developed international trafficking skills).

## Chapter 6: Operations

The final analysis chapter looks at the operational side of American mafias and is focussed on pull factors and factors for a successful transplantation were they outpost groups. These include the presence of local ties and kinship network, intelligence gathering, logistics, the ability to monitor and control agents, and communication.

It considers that local ties and kinship were utilised by mafiosi, especially when most groups were small and based on personal relationships. It also shows that immigration laws and protections aimed at keeping criminals out of the US/from leaving Italy were ineffective barriers to the fleeing criminal.

It explores the role that reputation had in the operations of US Mafia groups; their reputation was enhanced by being linked by the media and the police to a national and international organisation controlled from Italy. This link need not be real for the US mafiosi to benefit from it. It shows how the notion of this link was even circulated internally and how that may benefit the structural integrity of a group. The thesis also considers how a perceived history links the American mafia to the Italian groups it is influenced by.

The chapter also looks at the challenges in information collection that faced a transplanting Mafia. It shows that this challenge would have utilised the local kinship networks available to the migrating mafiosi.

The communication between groups in the United States and Italy is also explored and shows that there is no evidence that extensive communication which would have proved an element of control from Sicily. It tackles the concept of the 'letters of reference' that instead of demonstrating control from Sicily, showing a system that subverts the 'villains' paradox' of trust.

The chapter similarly considers that the ability to monitor and control agents is not based on direct control from Italy, but instead, methods of control in the US groups are imitations of their Italian counterparts suggesting influenced similarities in *modus operandi* but not adherence to the formalised structures of Italian Mafias rules and rituals.

## Chapter 7: Conclusions

The conclusions of the study are then outlined in a final chapter, drawing back together the various factors to make an overarching analysis of transplantations and the nature of the relationship between Italian groups and the US groups.

It considers that the study showed some factors of the various transplantation theories also apply to the emergence of homegrown groups. It concludes that a wholesale transplantation in the form of an outpost of an Italian mafia group did not happen; the obstacle factors to a successful transplantation of this degree would present too much of a challenge and the examples that the study draws upon suggests that a relationship of this kind did not exist.

Instead, the study shows that the most likely form of transplantation was one where organised crime groups flourished in the environment and conditions in the United States while skilled criminals were able to utilise their skills to create small networks and relationships of crime. These individuals operated independent from Italy but utilised traditions, connections and reputations to further their career, 'influenced' groups that borrowed transplanted elements of culture to create crime groups designed to exploit the American system.

## Citations

- U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 from note 13 (1958).
- Albini, J. (1971). *American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend*.
- Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.
- Asbury, H. (1940). *Gangs of Chicago* (1986 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1988 (First published 1927)). *Gangs of New York*. London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (2004 (First published 1933)). *Gangs of San Francisco*. London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (2004 (First published 1936)). *Gangs of New Orleans*. London: Random House.
- Bell, D. (1953). Crime as an American Way of Life. *The Antioch Review*, 13(2), 131-154.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Cavaoli, F. (2008). Patterns of Italian Immigration to the United States. *Catholic Social Science Review*.
- Chicago Tribune. (1888, October 28). Has Chicago a Mafia. *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, p. Front page.
- Coluccello, S. (2017). Mafia. In S. Morley, J. Turner, & K. Corteen, *A Companion to State Power, Liberties and Rights* (p. 193). Bristol: Policy Press.
- Cressey, D. (1969). *Theft of the Nation*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers .
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*, . Oxon: Routledge.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.

- Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (Eds.). (2010). *Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Volume 8 : Migration and Culture*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- FBI. (1963). *FBI File on LCN Pittsburgh - NARA record 124-10206-10415 (JFK Assassination files)*. FBI.
- Fentress, J. (2010). *Eminent Gangsters*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America .
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, D. (2009). *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Gentile, N. (1963, September). PaesaSera/ L'Ora interviews.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vita Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.
- Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Krist, G. (2014). *Empire of Sin: Sex, Jazz and Murder in New Orleans 2014*, . Stroud, Gloucester: Amberley publishing.
- Lavorgna, A., Lombardo, R., & Sergi, A. (2013). Organized crime in three regions: comparing the Veneto, Liverpool and Chicago. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16, 265-285.
- Light, I. (2010). The Ethnic Vice Industry, 1880-1944. In F. Varese (Ed.), *Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology* (pp. 282-304). Abingdon, Ox: Routledge.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History, 1888 - 2008*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merlino, R. (2014). Sicilian Mafia, Patron Saints, and Religious Processions: The Consistent Face of an Ever-Changing Criminal Organization. *California Italian Studies*, 5(1).
- Messick, H., & Goldblatt, B. (1972). *The Mobs and the Mafia*. New York: Gallahad Books.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- New York Times. (1890, October 24). The Mafia in the United States. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1893, May 16). Ready with knife or pistol. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1902, August 1902). The Mafia in New York. *New York Times*.

- Nickles, D. P. (2003). *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Paoli, L. (2004). Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 19-31.
- Park, R. E., & Miller, H. A. (1921). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. London: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/oldworldtraitstr00parkuoft>
- Raab, S. (2005). *Five Families*. New York: Griffin.
- Reimers, D. M. (1998). *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Salt Lake Herald. (1895, August 18). Society of the Sicilly Mafia. *Salt Lake Herald*, p. 16.
- Santino, U. (2017). *Centro Impastato*. Retrieved November 2017, from <http://www.centroimpastato.com/mafia-and-mafia-type-organizations-in-italy/>
- Ubah, C. (2007). Immigrants' Experiences In America: Toward Understanding Organized Crime. *African Journal of Criminology & Justice Studies*, 3(1), 95-118.
- Varese, F. (2010). What is Organized Crime? In *Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology* (Vol. 1, pp. 1-35). Routledge.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- White, F. M. (1908, April 5). The Black Hand. *New York Times*.
- White, F. M. (1909, March 21). The Increasing Menace of the "Black Hand". *New York Times*, p. Magazine section.
- White, F. M. (1913). The Black Hand in Control in Italian New York. *The Outlook*, 857-865.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2001). *Organized crime and American power: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

# Literature Review

---

## Introduction

This chapter gives a brief outline of both current and historical literature on the emergence of mafia groups in the US and transplantation, providing an overview of leading theories, paradigms, information and sources used, and areas for further exploration. It follows a chronological path through the studies of organised crime and mafias in the US and transplantation theory to identify gaps in the literature to outline where this thesis's arguments fit. This review of the literature points to a gap in the literature in studying the nature of mafia transplantation from Italy to the US pre-prohibition, which this thesis seeks to address. This thesis argues that mafia transplantation in the form of an outpost controlled from Italy did not occur; instead, individuals migrated to the US were indirectly influenced by the Italian mafia groups, which the subsequent chapters will show.

A review of the literature, as this chapter will demonstrate, shows that there is a need for more research evaluating the nature of the transplantation phenomenon and synthesis of any conclusive findings from the different approaches. There is a gap in the literature for work that considers the approaches of various transplantation theories with the emergence of Italian-American mafia groups, specifically in the years of its inception. This literature review will show the limitations of the analysis carried out so far regarding the emergence of mafia groups in the pre-prohibition US and how that relates to the various transplantation theories. Subsequent chapters in this study will create a link between these two areas and show the nature of this relationship.

When the popular culture versions of the mafia(s) of the United States appear on TV in *The Sopranos* or *Boardwalk Empire*, or in films such as *The Godfather*, *Goodfellas*, and *Casino*, there is often a notable emphasis on the Italian culture, the origins of the criminals and their organisations. De Stefano uses the example where, in Richard Thorpe's film *The Black Hand* (1950) starring Gene Kelly, it is strongly suggested that there existed a link between a 'Mafia' in Italy and a 'Mafia' in the US put there by the 'Old World' to 'place their stake in the American Dream' (De Stefano, 2006, p. 80). Scholars and authors on the subject (as will be shown throughout this chapter), alongside popular culture, have also linked the two, as it is easy to do so; similar structures, a basis in common cultures (such as the Catholic religiosity of both),

ideals and values, nationality and the similarity in types of crimes all make a compelling argument that they are in some-way linked. This link, however, has also been challenged by several academics who oppose the notion the organisation was wholly 'transplanted' by a Sicilian/Italian organisation.

The paradigm of thinking on organised crime group movement has shifted dramatically since its first conception. For many years the mobility of organised crime groups was linked to regular migration; where migration of communities occurred so would the movement of organised crime groups from within those communities. In the US, they had seen the rise of Italian, Irish and Jewish gangs, which led to the conception of the aforementioned foreign organised crime invasion theories, 'alien conspiracy' theories, an over-simplistic approach which was further fuelled by xenophobia <sup>1</sup>.

There are also other reasons that these claims of links have emerged. In particular, the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the United States saw an increase in reports of extortion related crime, predominately in migrant communities such as the Italian communities (New York Times, 1909a; White, 1910d). Simultaneously, Italy, mostly in the South and Sicily, was experiencing an increase in reports of similar activities and investigations had been made into criminal organisations that had supposedly infiltrated the political and legal systems (the Notarbartolo affair highlighted the connections between politics and the mafia, whilst the Sangiorgi report identified a significant number of mafiosi, though few eventually faced trial due to changes in the political climate) (Dickie, 2007). Consequently, suggestions arose that these individuals in America had come from Italy specifically to exploiting the American criminal markets (see (New York Times, 1902a) and, (New York Times, 1902b) for examples).

The transplantation of mafia groups from Italy into the US has been addressed from several perspectives. Works of history have focused on the emergence of the groups in the US and the stories of individuals, generally across a long time frame, such as Selwyn Raab's *Five Families* (2005) or William Balsamo's *The Mafia: The First 100 Years* (1997). There are a few historical

---

<sup>1</sup> This is prominent in newspaper articles at the turn of the century such as 'Charity may forgive to the Italians that they are poor and ignorant to a degree difficult to express to one who has not visited "Mulberry Bend". In a lessening degree we still extend a welcome to these refugees, but there is no reason whatever why we should permit them to import with themselves their racial crime' (New York Times, 1890), or William Roscoe Thayers's quote in the Harvard Graduates Magazine that referred to 'Irish bog-trotter m[who] was as illiterate and bigoted as the Calabrian peasant or the Russian serf... and the pitiable offscourings from the capitals of Europe who in the late nineteenth century were seeking American shores' (Lupsha, 1981)



works that narrow the time frame down to just the earlier years; Mike Dash's *The First Family* (2009), David Critchley's *The Origin of Organised Crime in America: The New York City Mafia 1891-1931* (2009), and James Fentress' *Eminent Gangsters: Immigrants and the Birth of Organized Crime in America* (2010), among older books such as the works on gangs written by Herbert Asbury in the 1920s and 1930s (1940; 1936; 1927; 1933). The current literature often shies away from solely focussing on transplantation theory during the formative years of American mafia groups, although it often features as a fraction of larger studies including those on the origins of organised crime in the US such in Critchley (2009) or Fentress (2010), or in studies on transplantation such as Varese's *Mafias on the Move* (Varese, 2011).

There are also a number of works on the Italian mafia groups, both in English and Italian, including, but by no means limited to, Lewis's *The honoured society* (1973), Hess's *Mafia and Mafiosi* (1973), Arlacchi's *Mafia Business* (1988), Falcone's *Men of Honour* (1993), Paoli's *Mafia Brotherhoods* (2003), John Dickie's *Costa Nostra* (2007), *Mafia Brotherhoods* (2012) and *Mafia Republic* (2014), Salvatore Lupo's *History of the Mafia* (2009), and a number of works by Umberto Santino including *Mafia and Antimafia* (2015). The focus of these books is primarily on the growth and changes within the mafia organisations in Italy, though they do occasionally refer to activities in the US; John Dickie's *Cosa Nostra*, for example, has a chapter on Nicola Gentile's exploits in America (Dickie, 2007). Similar to the aforementioned books on the mafia in the US, while displaying sound research, some of these works provide a narrative approach to the history (both Dickie and Lupo for example).

Mafia 'transplantation' theory has been championed recently by Federico Varese (2011) though others have looked at the concept of mobility. Varese's work has a small section devoted to transplantation of Sicilian groups into New York but as part of a wider study into a number of locations and mafia transplantation situations. Other studies of transplantation have focussed on the theoretical side of the issue, or have chosen other locales in which to study. Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (2011) have focussed more broadly on the various mobility theories in organised crime, though they do not look at the Italian American mafias as an example.

Varese's work on mafia transplantation gave as one of its examples the case of Sicilian criminals who have relocated to New York and became involved in organised crime groups (2011, pp. 103-104). The conclusion Varese comes to is that Mafia transplantation occurred in the case of Sicilian Mafia in New York, as a result of a demand for protection services (2011,

pp. 143-144). However, the examples provided by Varese for proving that transplantation occurred are mostly anecdotal and vague and give little insight into the nature of the transplantation. Varese merely states that the activities of these criminal organisations were not on the same scale as those in Sicily (2011, p. 114). This last admission by Varese raises some significant questions; if they had links back to Sicily, why were the organisations in America unable to develop to the same scale; were they really being controlled or influenced by their Italian counterparts? Again, the notion of transplantation is assumed, rather than proven. Overall Varese's provides a good framework to build upon theoretically as a start point of analysis, but the vagueness of his approach to what constitutes transplantation means that the work instead highlights his property right theory of mafia emergence (that mafias emerge during transitions to market economy) rather than whether transplantation really occurred and in what form. His theory could be applied to home-grown and transplanted groups equally; it sets out the conditions for a mafia group to control a market but makes no case for why transplantation, particularly outpost transplantation, should have taken place.

The two articles of Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (2011; 2010) seek only to outline the factors behind mafia mobility, but they make no reference to the early mafia groups in the US (case studies are not the focus of their work which is more theoretical and summarising of the various factors). It is useful for identifying the different factors and approaches to mafia mobility (or transplantation) but does not identify whether a mobility of mafia has taken place (this is perhaps assumed).

One recent work that deals more specifically with the relations between the organisations is Salvatore Lupo's *The Two Mafias: a transatlantic history* (Lupo, 2015), which analyses the mafia groups in the US and Italy, considering them a network of varied relationships and institutions. It is the only work to date primarily concerned with the relationship on both sides of the Atlantic, covering a 120-year span, though for the most part, Lupo avoids a theoretical approach in favour of a narrative one. It presents some compelling points, but by covering a 120-year history, it does not focus in detail on the relationships in any single period. This thesis builds on Lupo's work, providing greater depth of analysis for the pre-prohibition period and by outlining the type of transplantation that took place.

Of more theoretical approaches is the works of Michael Woodiwiss (Woodiwiss, 2001), who promotes the notion that these are home-grown organisations in the US created as a result of a system of US conditions. While Woodiwiss's approach has its merits in highlighting the local

environment and US system as the main factors in the emergence of organised crime in the US; it fails to account for the similarities in cultural elements that the US mafia groups had with their Italian counterparts. This thesis again builds upon Woodiwiss's work by highlighting some of the cultural elements that merged with the American conditions conducive to organised crime.

A lot of the information on mafia groups in both the US and Sicily is based on the testimonies of Mafioso who turned State witness in the courts (known as *pentiti* in Italy). The information provided by several former mafiosi, in particular, have shaped both government policy and academic study into the mafia: Nicola Gentile, Joseph Valachi, Joseph Bonnano and Tommaso Buscetta. These testimonies are useful for obtaining primary data but come with limitations as to their trustworthiness (see the methodology chapter for further discussion).

Noteworthy to those examining organised crime in the US is that both scholars and state bodies have given 'organised crime' (and 'mafia') different meanings based on personal, situational and political agendas, bias and personal prejudices. Klaus Von Lampe has collected over 180 'official' definitions of organised crime from law enforcement agencies, legal definitions, scholars, and other noteworthy sources. Common themes among these definitions include that an organised crime group has multiple members, exists for an extended period, and coordinates activities which undermine the legal system and the State<sup>2</sup>. As stated in the introduction, within this research 'organised crime group' defers to the United Nations definition referring in summary to a group that has 3 or more members acting in coercion to commit serious crimes over an extended period for financial or material gain.

Much like definitions of 'organised crime' and 'mafia' existing literature also provides divisive with viewpoints on what the 'Black Hand' actually is. The two main views are that either; the 'Black Hand' is a unified Italian criminal organisation, existing across state borders, that controls protection rackets, predominately in Italian migrant communities; or 'Black Hand' was merely an extortion tactic used, and copied, by smaller scale protection rackets. The first viewpoint, the unified Italian criminal organisation, was the predominant contemporary explanation used by the press at the start of the twentieth century and has been repeated by numerous sources since, for example, Messick and Goldblatt states 'the "signature" of the mafia was a black handprint, and for some years the secret society was known as the Black

---

<sup>2</sup> Von Lampe's collection of definitions is available at <http://www.organized-crime.de/organizedcrimedefinitions.htm>

Hand' (Messick & Goldblatt, 1972, p. 11). This thesis considers 'Black Hand' a tactic utilised by mafia groups and individuals alike (examples of this are given in the Markets chapter). Groups referred to as 'Black Hand' groups represent those that utilised the tactic rather than some national or international connected organisation.

## Early contemporary studies and reports

It is appropriate to study the literature covering the origins of the 'Mafia' in the US to determine whether authors attribute it to group transplantation from Sicily/Italy or whether they refer to the socio-economic conditions in the US cities that may lead to the development of organised crime.

One of the most publicised cases, both then and now, concerning organised crime in US in the 19th century and perhaps one of the earliest examples of a 'Mafia' organisation is the murder of New Orleans Police Chief David Hennessey in 1890, allegedly as the result of a feud between rival Italian 'Mafias'. The subsequent investigations saw eleven Italians arrested, face trial and acquitted, but many were subsequently lynched by a mob of citizens of New Orleans as soon as their acquittal was announced – with the press and the mayor claiming that they were part of a mafia society that threatened New Orleans. Press reports were full of accounts of the Sicilian mafia, inferring a relationship between Sicilian groups and the US (for example (New York Times, 1891) and, (New York Times, 1890)), one asking the question 'whether 300,000 or 400,000 Italian immigrants have imported with themselves their characteristic methods of banding themselves together into secret, oath-bound societies' (New York Times, 1890), and this inference continued in newspapers throughout the early twentieth century (New York Times, 1902b) (New York Times, 1902a). Repetto also gives an example of the [contemporary](#) press sensationalism; the New York World declared that the American Mafia was 'now almost as strongly entrenched in New York, New Orleans and Chicago as in its Sicilian home' (2004, p. 33).

There were outlier articles such as one newspaper article published in 1893 which tried to highlight the lack of a mafia in the US; 'While Mafite [sic] methods are still in vogue among Calabrians here, I do not think that any Mafite tribunal has at any time existed in New York' (Goff, 1893), though this article was full of inaccuracies and embellishments regarding the organisation in Italy such as 'not everybody knows that the mafia was originally a patriotic organization founded by young patricians, whose aim was to liberate Sicily from the yoke of

foreign rule' and 'the name means 'the man with the hat,' the members having adopted distinctive headgear' (Goff, 1893).

Another 1903 article (New York Times, 1903a) rejected the claim that the group(s) arrived from Italy, and presented the argument that no such organisation still exists in Sicily. It followed police reports into the 'Barrel Murder' in 1903 that declared the murder mafia related declaring that the police 'cry 'Mafia' every time an Italian is murdered, and they are unable to discover any traces of the murderer' (New York Times, 1903a). The article stated 'Italians admit that there was once such an organization in Sicily, but they say it is now dead, with its elements remaining only in various associated bands of criminals' (New York Times, 1903a). Interestingly the Barrel murder to which the article is responding turned out to have been committed by the Morello-Lupo gang, one of the early US mafia groups.

The name/phrase 'Black Hand' was also a term used interchangeably with 'mafia' in the early press reports. It referred to a group of extortionists who wrote letters to their victims signed with a lack hand symbol to indicate the letter's origin. However, the relationship between any 'Black Hand' group and mafia groups has been subject to debate, as has the concept of the 'Black Hand' originating in Italy.

Newspaper articles, occasionally based on police reports, portrayed the group as operating nationwide in the US and also operating in Italy (New York Times, 1909a). Early opposition to this transplanted Italian Black Hand concept comes from a 1908 article by Gaetano D'Amato in the North American Review which refers to a 'Black Hand' myth (D'Amato, April 1908).

D'Amato's work is contemporary, written in 1908, and as such he holds certain advantages, such as knowledge of the contemporary situation, and disadvantages such as the lack of reflection and hindsight that later authors on the Black Hand have. It should also be noted that D'Amato himself is of Italian origin and was President of the United Italian Societies, an organisation interested in the 'assisting and protecting Italians' under one 'brotherhood' (United Italian Societies, 1906), therefore it might be considered that D'Amato had a vested interest in de-linking the associations between Italians and organised crime.

D'Amato remarked that both newspapers and law enforcement officials were consigned to the existence of a 'Black Hand society' sending its members from Italy to the US with the purpose of establishing branches (D'Amato, April 1908). He suggests that combination of the actions of the police with the sensationalism of the press created a link where there was none (D'Amato, April 1908). He states that Mediterranean skinned Criminals were labelled by the police as

either Turks (if they wore a Fez) or Italians regardless of actual origin (D'Amato, April 1908). The examples D'Amato provides by two law enforcement officials, while anecdotal, show the early workings of the 'alien conspiracy' that dominated both perceptions of and reactions to organised crime in the US. The word 'transplanted' is even used, a word that was later adopted by Cressey, Woodiwiss and has recently been used by Federico Varese in his work on mafia mobility.

D'Amato stated that 'Lieutenant Petrosino' estimates between 3 and 4% of the Italian immigrants may be criminals in an Italian crime brotherhood (D'Amato, April 1908, p. 545), but that they are 'no more organised, however, than are the thousands of lawbreakers of other nationalities'. He points to the living conditions in the US and the lack of law enforcement assistance and factors that encourage the emergence of criminal brotherhoods, pointing out that only 40 Italian police officers exist in New York, while the Italian population in New York numbers 500,000 (D'Amato, April 1908).

D'Amato promoted the idea that the press was partially responsible for sensationalism, even providing an anecdotal account of an article published in Petrosino's name, of which Petrosino had never written, nor held the views expressed in it (D'Amato, April 1908). He furthers this idea by suggesting that the use of 'Black Hand' by the press only gives the title more meaning and more reason to be used by aspiring criminals (D'Amato, April 1908).

D'Amato's well thought out piece was very much the exception as a considered approach to the emergence of organised crime groups in New York; the journalistic alternatives found in the contemporary newspapers favouring sensationalism through tenuous links and misguided statements regarding the nature and history of the groups found in Italy.

### Early discussion on transplantation

*Old World Traits Transplanted* by Park and Miller (1921), attempting to understand concepts of Americanisation, and arguing for greater assimilation, created an unusual view on the study by today's standards. It both argued for the assimilation and acceptance of migrant groups while simultaneously continuing some of the xenophobic or racist tones found in the media (and society) until this point. Concluding, the professors exclaimed;

'While we have on our hands this problem we are importing large numbers of aliens, representing various types, in the main below our cultural level. Some of them bring a

greater and more violent unrest than we know here: psychoses acquired under the conditions where violence was the only means of political participation. Other belong to the nationalistic, opportunistic, or in fewer numbers to the radical elements, who not only do not regard this country as their country, but do not regard it as a country at all – do not recognize that we have a characteristic body of values and the right to preserve these values'. (Park & Miller, 1921, pp. 262-263)

Park and Millar continued from this with a suggestion the United States cannot continue to incorporate those who are 'culturally underdeveloped' (they highlighted some of the minority racial groups that they considered 'culturally underdeveloped'), or it will face a crisis in democracy. Park and Millar do, however, move on from this suggesting that assimilation with American culture for these communities allows them to bring valuable additions to US culture if they are willing to adopt an 'American way of thinking' (1921, p. 265). They also suggest that the suppression of the immigrant's values is part of prejudice against either colour or language, and that language, in particular, should instead be regarded as a tool for encouraging assimilation (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 283). Similarly, they highlight the willingness for the migrant to identify and cherish memories of their former home as a natural sentiment and 'should remain unmolested in the region of personal life' (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 286). This contrast with other language in the same work highlights a difference in societal attitudes towards race and migrants at the time; despite supporting the differences of the migrants, Park and Millar are also perpetuating some stereotypes and narratives now considered racist or xenophobic. Despite the now archaic narrative of Park and Millar's work the data they collected is useful for building a contemporary understanding, including the letters they obtained from the migrant community.

## Prohibition and a focus on the culture of the gangster

In January 1920 the prohibition era began in the United States and the focus of both the media (news and entertainment) and academia changed. No longer were they concerned with an alien migrant criminal or foreign conspiracy. Instead, discussions focussed on the culture of the gangster in the new prohibition era; a middle-class man operating in American society through racketeering and bootlegging. Studies also focused on the criminality and focused on it as part of psychological issues of the individual, as an element of human behaviour, or as criminal businessmen rather than as a consequence of society or environment. Ruth's *Inventing the*

*Public Enemy* covers the changes and differences in the portrayal of the organised crime groups during this era and attributes them to attempts to categorise urban life in an increasingly commercialised society (1996). In entertainment this gangster concept was popularised through movies, particularly in the glamorisation of individuals such as Al Capone; it was not until 1934 that censorship would stifle the content core to many gangster stories, the 'uncritical screenplays and graphic violence' (Ruth, 1996, p. 144). The perceptions in both the media and academia were focused on an entirely contemporary problem and were not concerned with considering the gangs and groups of the pre-prohibition era.

In the mid to late-1930s, there was also a shift in public attention away from the localised issues of organised crime and onto international concerns as the Second World War started. Gangster movies were replaced with patriotic films as part of the war propaganda machine, and post-war the genre had adapted into film noir. De Stefano, borrowing from Clarens (Clarens, 1980, p. 89), highlighted that 'no real-life criminals were portrayed in American films from Dillinger in 1945 until Baby Face Nelson in 1957, roughly the heyday of film noir' (De Stefano, 2006, p. 79).

In 1950 Richard Thorpe's film *The Black Hand* portrayed Italian American organised crime as the result of a propensity Italians have for crime and their non-assimilation with American society. It is loosely based on the life of police lieutenant Joe Petrosino and how he had been investigating links between Italy and the US. De Stefano highlights that the film 'strongly suggests such a link' (De Stefano, 2006, p. 80).

### The Kefauver committee (the 1950s)

It was not until the 1950s that significant research and investigation was done into these mafia groups and their origins in an attempt to understand the continuation of mafia activities in the years since prohibition. It is in the post-war years that alien conspiracy resurfaced, as Smith points out;

The alien conspiracy theory, a particularly American invention, appeared after World War II as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) tried to explain its perceived equation of an Italian-run Mafia with the recently-labelled organized crime in America. The FBN's forced marriage of three unique concepts was eventually adopted as public policy in the United States (Smith, 2016, p. 52).



In reference to the growth of organised crime in the US, the terms 'organised crime' and 'Mafia' have additionally been used by both State sources and academics to describe a national criminal conspiracy in the US- that a singular pan-national, or even international, organisation exists, and in some sources was a wholly foreign organisation planted to undermine the US. This line of thought is publicly visible in the conclusions made in 1951 by the Senate Special Committee on Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, the 'Kefauver Committee', which, among other conclusions, promoted the idea that a nationwide crime syndicate does exist in the United States, behind which is a 'shadowy international criminal organization known as the Mafia, so fantastic that Americans find it hard to believe it really exists', despite the protestations of its existence by 'criminals, self-serving politicians, plain blind fools and other who may be honestly misguided' (Kefauver, 1951).

Woodiwiss points out that around the same time as the Kefauver hearing, book *Chicago Confidential* (1950) by journalists Jack Lait and Lee Mortimer, and its sequels, presented a racist and xenophobic solution to the problems that plagued the US, including all organised crime which it attributes to being controlled by Italians from headquarters in Italy and New York (Woodiwiss, 2001, pp. 101-102). Woodiwiss's research gives examples of the positive press reviews that the books received despite their xenophobic tone (Woodiwiss, 2001, p. 102), highlighting the press appraisal of this theory. It is important to remember the context in which these books were written; it is the formative years of the Cold War and the time of McCarthyism in the US, a time when the press and the State portrayed to US citizens that US institutions and livelihoods were infiltrated by and an external foreign menace (with McCarthyism the threat was from communism). For US citizens this could translate into a fear of all foreigners, particularly when given compelling reasons, such as the concept of nationwide organised crime primarily been controlled by Italian-American individuals.

Woodiwiss states that subsequent books, newspaper articles, films, and television documentaries, even the FBI reports, despite reducing the xenophobic tone, continued the myth of a 'transplanted' mafia, for example in Ed Reid's book *Mafia* (1952) or the more recent Stephens Fox's *Blood and Power* (1995) (Woodiwiss, 2001, p. 104). Critchley notes this also happening within other US investigations during this period; 'During the 1950's, the FBN [Federal Bureau of Narcotics] apparently believed that the American organization was run from Palermo, Sicily' [ (U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 , 1958)from (Critchley, 2009, p. 242)].

Other depictions of the Italian-American experience in New York also began to become popularised, as de Lucia states there was an 'evolution of Italian American cultural identity in the post-war years, where it emerged from an essentialized sphere and entered a broader American cultural context' (de Lucia, 2012). After the success of *Death of a Salesman*, Arthur Miller wrote *A View From the Bridge* (1955) which highlighted a number of themes common in the Italian-American community; the close relationship with the extended family as they arrive in New York, with a willingness for the main character to commit an illegal act on their behalf by harbouring them, the male workers arriving in the US alone and sending money back to their family in Italy, and finally the personal vendetta between two characters after one spoke with the authorities. Miller's approach to the Italian-American experience, particularly that of Southern Italian migrants, had been shaped by both interactions with immigrant communities and on a trip to Southern Europe (de Lucia, 2012), including a meeting he chronicled in his autobiography *Timebends* with Americanised mafiosi 'Lucky' Luciano (exiled from the US) and Albert Anastasia in Sicily (Miller, 1987, pp. 170-175).

Bigsby highlighted how *A View From the Bridge* characterised this culture of *Italian*;

'There is a past in this play but it is not Eddie's. It's a mythical past, a past of elemental feelings and ancient taboos carried forward by the subconscious as much as by traditions, forged in a distant Italy' (2005, pp. 179-180).

Furthermore, de Lucia highlights how Miller's concerns for McCarthyism are on display in the work, portrayed through the actions of Eddie, the main character, who shows a willingness to talk with the authorities to get an advantage over his visitors (de Lucia, 2012).

### The Valachi hearings, Gentile's testimonies and law enforcement (the 1960s)

In the early 1960s, two sets of testimonies emerged from former mafiosi which advanced the understanding of mafia groups in the US including their origins, operations, structures, rules and rituals. Joseph Valachi, a 'soldier' in the Genovese crime family, gave information before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee in 1963 regarding the inner workings of the organisation; information which Critchley states 'formed the empirical basis for subsequent devised models' of the organisation (2009, p. 3). However, Potter points out the works of Albanese (1989), Smith (1975), Albini (1971), and Morris and Hawkins (1970) show that the 1963 testimony of Valachi is 'riddled with contradictions, factual errors and uncorroborated assertions' (Potter, 1994, p. 12). Hank Messick even suggests Valachi's testimonies were used

by US law enforcement as a way to disguisedly reveal the information Gentile's unpublished testimonies (1979, p. 15).

Block cited historical naivety in many of the sources on the US mafias histories as a result of an 'almost total reliance on Valachi' and, conversely, an 'apparent disregard for Valachi's testimony before the Senate Committee Investigating Organized Crime and the Illicit Traffic in Narcotics' (Block, 1994, p. 4). Block highlights Valachi's (and Ralph Salerno's) admission to the Senate that during the infamous 'purge' of the early 1930s only 4 or 5 men were killed. Sources citing Valachi have increased this number, Block highlights this from Cressey (Forty), Chandler (Sixty) and only recently has the infamous 'purge' myth been discounted.

Block suspects that the inflated story instead comes from a magazine article written by Dutch Schultz's attorney J. Richard 'Dixie' Davis which cited an unverified ninety from one of Schultz's stories to him (Block, 1994, p. 5), and from Feder and Turkus's 'Murder Inc' which used Davis's story alongside mafia informer Ernst Rupolo's information (who Block suggests was too young to have first-hand information). Finally Block highlights Messick's 1971 article on Meyer Lansky, which cites the accounts of mafioso Nicola Gentile (which, as Block points out, merely mentions a massacre and no further details).

Similarly, Nicola Gentile's testimonies (c.1947) provided information on the emergence and growth of organised crime groups in the US, including his own experiences. According to Lupo, Gentile is 'the only witness who tells the story in its transcontinental dimension' (Lupo, 2015, p. 45). He talks about the relationship between the US and the Sicilian mafias in the early twentieth century and how personal connections within the groups operated. Gentile's testimonies have never been officially released in English, and only an edited version was released in Italian as *Vito Di Capomafia* (1963) with the help of an Italian journalist, Felice Chilanti.

The testimonies have been used as a predominant example that provides a case for both a national Mafia organisation existing pre-prohibition and that it was controlled from Sicily. The testimonies of 'Cola' Gentile, according to both John Dickie's *Cosa Nostra* (2007) and Messick & Goldblatt's *The Mobs and the Mafia* (1972), show a system of membership referrals and death sentences that are coordinated between groups in the US and authenticated from Sicily (2007, pp. 218-220) and that a *capo di capi* (boss of bosses) existed between families across the US even prior to prohibition and the 'Castellammarese War' (Messick & Goldblatt, 1972, pp. 9-10). The critical examination of this and other testimonials transpires in the analysis chapters, to

determine whether there was any possibility of such a strong link existing before prohibition, or whether this is a fabrication created by Gentile, perhaps to increase his reputation.

In the 1960s the 'Black Hand', the criminal phenomenon in the late 19th century in the US, was again attributed to being an imported Sicilian phenomenon, such as in an 1963 FBI report which indicated that "'Black Hands" and so-called "Mafia" and "Syndicate" are more or less synonymous terms' (FBI Record, part of JFK Assassination Files 12/13/1963, from Samuel A Miller, NARA Record Number: 124-10206-10415, n.d.).

### *Cressey's Theft of the Nation*

The Kefauver committee (1950) and Valachi hearings (1964) laid the foundations for further state investigations, culminating in 1969 with Donald Cressey's *Theft of the Nation* (Cressey, 1969), based on his presidential commission reports (written in 1967). *Theft of the Nation* infers that the nationalistic idea of a foreign organisation existing across the US is somewhat false. Despite this, Cressey's work has come to represent the government stance by providing what Albinì refers to as 'the Cressey model', a model which still portrays the existence of a national crime syndicate (Albinì, 1997, pp. 16-25). Cressey argued that a nationwide crime group exists, and in part attributes the rise in organised crime to the 'clannishness' of the arriving Italians, though he does also point out that the similarities between the US and Sicilian groups do not mean that the Mafia has merely been transplanted and that the criminals and conditions for organised crime were more American than Italian (Cressey, 1969, pp. 9,141). Cressey's work stressed that 'diffusionism', that ideas are invented once and spread, should not be used to explain the US and Sicilian mafia groups, and that independent invention due to common needs and common conditions in these societies, is a more likely explanation for the similarities in these organisations (Cressey, 1969, pp. 24-25).

Albinì, in evaluating Cressey's work, concurs that Cressey mentions the possibility of a lack of connection, but that Cressey ignores the anthropological works of Bouisevain (Boisevain, 1966) and Blok (Blok, 1966) which both contend the idea that the Mafia existed in Sicily as a structured formal secret society during this period (also in the work of Hess in 1973 (Hess, 1973, p. 33)), and that according to Albinì, Cressey's discussions in the seventh chapter of *Theft of the Nation* regarding a value system that was brought to the US by Italians are therefore misguided (Albinì, 1997, p. 22). Further criticisms of Cressey's work by Albinì concluded that Cressey's work was over-focused on the role of Italians and Sicilians in organised crime,

ignoring what came before and after including regard to ethnic-based groups with value systems and operation formats that Italian/Sicilian groups would later adopt (Albini, 1997, p. 22).

Regardless of Albini's interpretation, it is clear that Cressey was keen to stress numerous times that similarities (or lack thereof according to Albini) between the Sicilian and American mafia groups does not equate to transplantation of the organisation.

### The Godfather (1969)

In 1969 Mario Puzo's *The Godfather* was published, and the book, along with its film adaptation directed by Francis Ford Coppola (1972) captured public attention and changed mafia movies and TV (even the mafia itself was changed somewhat as *pentiti* have reported actions inspired by the movies). As Smith highlighted in 1975;

‘Inspired by the success of Mario Puzo's *The Godfather*, virtually everyone out to make money-especially those in the publishing and entertainment industries-jumped on the bandwagon. "Mafia" became a household word; its images remain public property, no longer under the control of the law-enforcement community’ (Smith, 1976, p. 86).

Since then ‘the mafia’ has featured in numerous movies and TV shows, many of them successful or critically acclaimed such as Martin Scorsese's *Goodfellas* (1990) (and a host of other Scorsese films), or *The Sopranos* (1997-2007). De Stefano highlighted the importance of how *The Godfather* established a symbolic relationship between *Italiana* and organised criminality; speaking in Sicilian dialect, singing Sicilian folk songs, eating Sicilian food and ‘engaged in bloody vendettas’ (De Stefano, 2006, p. 85). It created a link between the cultures of Sicily and Italy with the American world of organised crime.

### Diverging field of study (the 1970s)

The 1970s saw challenges to various aspects of Cressey's bureaucratic model of organised crime through Albini's (1971), Ianni's (1974) and Smith's (1975) works, including broadening the studies of organised crime into new academic fields and away from solely focussing on Italian mafias.

Based on Albini's aforementioned suggestion that the works of Hess and Block contend the idea that the Mafia existed in Sicily as a structured formal secret society during this period, then in order to establish the links between the early 'Mafia' groups in the US and the groups in Sicily and Italy, then there must at least be some evidence of an organisation(s) existing in Italy in the first place, and whether there is one that at least has the ability to potentially transplant itself in the US. There are also different viewpoints on the nature of organised crime in these regions.

Dwight Smith suggests that 'desire to believe in a local Mafia society outstripped any objective investigation' (1975, p. 32) into the Hennessey murder. He suggests that the "Mafia connection" charge masked 'other impulses' such as anti-foreign sentiment or economic competition (1975, p. 38). Smith states that sources, such as *The Illustrated American*, attributed the transplantation of a criminal organisation in the United States to a belief that it was 'dwindling' in Italy (1975, p. 45). While this continues the transplantation theory, it introduces a new element- the idea that its appearance in the US was as a result of it disappearing in Italy, and not because of its strength. This is also significant in that it shows this idea which has attributed to the further transplantation of criminals fleeing prosecution in Italy.

Smith also suggests that Petrosino disagreed with the idea of it being a linked organisation with ties back to the Sicilian Mafia or the Camorra; 'he believed that there was no large organization, but that "Black Hand" was a phrase used by casual combinations or Italian criminals as an effective weapon for extortion' (1975, p. 49).

According to Smith, former mayor of New York, G.B. McClellan Jr (no apparent relation to Senator John McClellan of the Valachi hearings), had even 'pushed the view that the Camorra had created New York City's Black Hand', based on the fact Italians were involved and his witnessing of a murder trial against Camorristi in Italy (Smith, 1975, p. 55). This further shows the willingness of, not only the press, but also representatives of the State, to display the 'Black Hand' as an Italian import, regardless of a lack of evidence. Both Smith and, later, Albanese extend this line of thinking, suggesting that the "mafia" associated with the Hennessey murder in New Orleans was the result of a "desire to believe", an acceptance of small amounts of supporting evidence and ignorance of contrary evidence (Smith, 1975, p. 32; Albanese, 1989, p. 19).

In a 1976 article Smith also presented the argument against the 'alien conspiracy' theories, the idea that there is 'a recurring apprehension that somewhere out there is an organized, secret, alien group that is poised to infiltrate our society and to undermine our fundamental democratic beliefs' (Smith, 1976, p. 76). Smith compares it with the fears of Bolsheviks in the 'Red Scare' of 1919-1920 and the Barvarian Illuminati conspiracy of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, sowing two periods of mafia scare; in the aftermath of the Hennessey murder at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and between 1946 and 1963 when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) attempted to 're-establish the "Mafia" in the public eye' (Smith, 1976, p. 84), through the public episodes involving the charges against Frank Costello in 1946, the Kefauver committee in 1951, the McClellan committee and coverage of Apalachin meeting in 1957, and finally the Valachi hearings in 1963, with the FBNs efforts to label a conspiracy finally 'blessed' by the Presidents Crime Commission in 1967 (Smith, 1976, pp. 84-85). Smith refers to the Hennessey murder as an example of where 'Mafia' charges were 'convenient justification for what would follow. Sicilians had to be punished, one way or another' (Smith, 1976, p. 82). Smith also uses Blok (Blok, 1975) and Hess (Hess, 1973) to show that Sicilian 'Mafias' were 'localised patron-client relationships held together by an attitude (or "state of mind") rather than formal oaths of allegiance', that they existed to mediate in the governments absence (Smith, 1976, pp. 82-83). Smith stated 'the phenomenon of Mafia had emerged in response to cultural conditions, not as an organization independent of its surroundings that could decide to export itself' (1976, p. 83). This argument of Smith's has some relevance in this thesis; it rejects the 'outpost transplantation' theories and rather suggests that American culture created an environment in which a mafia could thrive. This thesis builds upon Smith by considering both American influences and imported culture that created an 'influenced transplantation'.

Smith states that the FBN and Presidents Crime Commission had created a national conspiracy that was widely commercialised in subsequent years (partially due to the success of *The Godfather* novel in 1969). Smith presents the result as a 'misinterpretation of a much wider range of activities that are inherently American, not alien, and fundamentally linked to a free-market economy' (1976, p. 87). In this respect, Smith has identified that American society and its individualist value system cannot be ignored when considering the emergence of mafia groups.

Humbert Nelli wrote three books (1970; 1976; 1983) that influenced the field, each dealing with a different area relevant to organised crime or immigration. *Italians in Chicago* (Nelli, 1970) presented the social, economic and political situation for Italian migrants in Chicago. In

it, Nelli presents a chapter on the formative years of Italians in crime (1970, pp. 125-156). Nelli highlighted that the Black Hand in Chicago existed not as a criminal organisation but as a *modus operandi* (1970, p. 154) and suggested instead that syndicate crime, of American origin, involving the political machines, vice operations, gambling houses and corruption, would come to be controlled by the Italians (led by Colosimo and Torrio) (1970, pp. 147-149).

This was followed by *The Business of Crime* (Nelli, 1976), which dealt more specifically with organised crime and this syndicate crime across the United States. He argues that these crime groups came about as part of the migrants struggle to achieve success rather than as a transplanted Sicilian or Italian phenomenon, again drawing examples from Hennessey's murder and the Black Hand gangs. He suggested that most men who joined mafia gangs in the US were not from mafia groups in Italy and were instead turned by the materialistic society in the US (Nelli, 1976, p. 255). Here there are similarities to the arguments of Smith in the American society's values created the environment for a mafia emergence.

Nelli's final relevant work, *From Immigrants to Ethnics* (1983) did not explicitly cover criminal activities of the migrants, but in it, Nelli chronicled some significant cultural factors such as the use of *padroni* (labour agents) by the migrant community.

In 1974 Francis Ianni introduced the concept of Ethnic Succession theory in *Black Mafia* which looks at organised crime as part of the American social system and his 'ethnic succession theory' which saw the Italians replace the Jewish and Irish gangs and subsequently saw the 'Black' groups replace the Italian (Ianni, 1974). This followed his 1972 work *A Family Business* (Ianni, 1972) which outlined the structure and *modus operandi* of a mafia family in the US. His ethnic succession theory built upon the works of Daniel Bell (1953) and Milton Gordon (1964) to suggest that ethnic crime groups followed a succession as they integrated into American society; Italian groups replaced Jewish and Irish groups as they achieved assimilation and progression within society, and subsequently 'Black' groups followed Italian groups as Italians found themselves less marginalised in US society.

*A Family Business* explored the history of the "Lupollo" (pseudonym) family, and specifically an analysis of 'Giuseppe Lupollo' who immigrated to the US. Looking at the 'Lupollo' family, Ianni rejected the idea that the mafia was one organisation that could have made a decision 'to export the Mafia to the United States for criminal or any other purpose' or that 'any one of the *Mafie* [sic] made any such decision to export itself or any other' (Ianni, 1972, p. 43).



In 1975, Chandler labelled the synonymous identification of the 'Black Hand' with the 'Mafia' as 'erroneous' due to lack of a formalised structure and the false identification of the 'Black Hand' criminals as an Italian (Chandler, 1975, pp. 67-68). Rather he uses Gaetano D'Amato's 1908 article as his basis (Lombardo (2010) also uses this article), which promotes the 'Black Hand' as a name used by 'freelance criminals' because it is considered to be 'high sounding and terror inspiring' (Chandler, 1975, pp. 67-68). The symbolisms' origins and the inspiration for the 'Black Hand' in the US have Andalusian origins where Spanish agricultural workers looked to 'punish their oppressors' after land reforms took away the workers' livelihoods (Chandler, 1975, pp. 68-69). Similarly, Smith noted that the 'Black Hand' had appeared in various locations before; during the Spanish Inquisition according to Lindsay Denison writing in 1908, an agrarian socialist organisation in Spain in the mid-1800s according to Arthur Griffith writing in 1899, the Serbian nationalist group that assassinated Archduke Ferdinand and a Puerto Rican liberation group that existed in the late 19th century, but that it had not appeared in Sicily (Smith, 1975, pp. 46-47).

Chandler suggested that 'Black Hand' criminals worked contrary to any mafia, that Mafiosi would report them to the police, and that they had a damaging effect upon the mafia by using the mafia's name openly (Chandler, 1975).

Giuseppe Selvaggi's 1978 book *The Rise of the Mafia in New York* covers the early years of the mafia in New York (1896 until the Second World War), using an anonymous informant as his source. Selvaggi's book mainly covers anecdotal mafia stories and provides little in the way of evidence. What can be determined from Selvaggi's book is that he bases the rise of organised crime in the US on three factors: the poor conditions that the Italian immigrant arrived in, the 'trait in the Italian character [of a need] to live, work and find diversion for themselves in groups', and corruption of the law enforcement hierarchy (Selvaggi, 1978, pp. 13-14).

## 1980s

One of the issues surrounding the study of organised crime that has been highlighted is that organised crime groups are often defined by their ethnicity rather than their activities. In 1981, Lupsha opposed the ethnic succession theories, such as Ianni's (1974), stating that the emergence of organized crime in twentieth-century America 'is not based on either (a) a narrow or limited status or mobility ladder for early twentieth-century immigrants; or (b) frustration or anger at thwarting mobility desires of immigrants by the dominant culture'

(Lupsha, 1981, p. 4). Rather Lupsha suggested that 'entrance to organized crime life styles was a self-choice based on individual skills and a personal rationalization which perverts traditional American values and culture' (1981, p. 4). Whilst Lupsha's point has some merits in that it emphasises the individual, it fails to account for this personal rationalization can be the result of opportunities (or lack thereof) provided by the environment in which many migrants found themselves.

In 1983 Joseph Bonanno's autobiography was published (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983)) giving an overview of his life, starting with his arrival in the US at a very young age. What is interesting about Bonanno's autobiography is that it gives a few details of his father's, a Sicilian mafia boss, transition to the US and the influence he had upon his arrival (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983), pp. 19-34). However, as with all autobiographies, and the culture of the mafia itself, it likely contains embellishments and justifications through the linking to 'old world' culture and traditions that give the mafia groups a sense of legitimacy.

In 1985 Bodnar published *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America*, which looked at various migrant communities as they adapted to the United States' capitalist system, considering the migrants approach to adjustments of ideology and whether they abandoned or retained their own cultural values. In it, Bodnar stated that;

'Not all newcomers behaved in a similar fashion, that varying degrees of commitment to an assortment of cultures and ideologies were evident, and that not everyone faced identical experiences' (Bodnar, 1985, p. xvi)

Bodnar had chronicled the adjustment process for the incoming migrant, and in doing so provides a useful reference point for the struggles and adaptations Italian migrants made in the US cities.

In the late 1980s, Tomasso Buscetta's testimonies helped lead to the conviction of 360 mafiosi in Sicily in the 1980's and 1990's. While Varese used Buscetta's testimonies to corroborate other evidence regarding the links between organisations; his testimonies refer to a period later than the focus of this work. However, it is important to consider the role they had in helping form the contemporary contextualisation of the mafia by debunking the notion that 'Mafia' was a state of mind (Critchley, 2009, p. 3).

Albanese's *Organized Crime in America* was published in 1989, and in it Albanese argues that mafia organisations transplanting themselves from Italy to America is unlikely; literature on the mafia in Sicily overwhelmingly suggests that no centralised or systematised mafia organisation existed in the 1880s and that only small groupings of 'Mafiosi' type individuals, the 'Gabelotti' existed. Albanese supports Hess's suggestion that the 'Mafiosi' 'in the same historical situation had the same economic and political interests leading to the same actions and to cooperation, but without subordination to central criminal government' (Albanese, 1989, p. 21) (Hess, 1973, p. 124).

Albanese also suggests that ethnicity is not 'a proper unit of analysis for organised crime' (Albanese, 1989, p. 26). He refers to Daniel Bell's article *Crime as an American Way of Life* which details a social ladder for immigrant communities that they go through before they become fully assimilated into American society (Albanese, 1989, pp. 26-27). Whilst ethnicity may not be the cause of organised crime, to discount it entirely would ignore both that organised crime emerged in migrant communities afflicted with the negative consequences of belonging to a disadvantaged minority, and that ethnicity is intrinsically tied to culture, and that culture is, in part, tied to the form in which an organised crime group, in this study mafia, takes.

Similar to D'Amato's numbers in 1908 regarding the number of immigrants in criminal groups are numbers provided by Albanese, who states that in the post-Hennessey murder grand jury investigation only 300 Italians in New Orleans were found to have past criminal records in Italy, the majority of which were petty offenders, and that these 300 accounted for less than 1% of the Italian population in New Orleans (Albanese, 1989, p. 19).

## 1990s

In 1993 O'Kane's *The Crooked Ladder* revisited 'Black Hand' crimes and their relationship with mafia groups, suggesting that the 'Black Hand' actually served to attenuate more organised criminal groupings as it created extra police attention and scrutiny (O'Kane, 1993, p. 68). The likelihood is that there is a pluralism of organised crime and that the way in which groups manifest is ever-changed; as the markets chapter will show mafia and non-mafia utilised 'Black Hand' techniques alike.

In 1996 Potter tackled the 'alien conspiracy theory' which claims 'ethnic or racial identity is the key to determining group membership in organized crime' (Potter, 1994, p. 6). Potter claims

the theory overstates the role ethnicity plays in determining organised crime, and there are numerous examples of cooperation and collaboration between individuals involved in organised crime, for example, Meyer Lansky's collaboration with 'mafia' individuals (Potter, 1994, pp. 14-15). Potter points out that whilst this does not disprove the claim that a single ethnic group can dominate a gang, it also does not lead to the conclusion that 'a secret brotherhood of ethnics consciously recruits only from its own group and excludes all others' and instead that this is a result of these enterprises remaining geographically limited and from the 'demographics of urban areas where such enterprises are undertaken' (Potter, 1994, p. 16). Potter's analysis of the role of ethnicity in organised crime groups raises an important question about the nature of a link between the US and Italian mafia groups beyond shared ethnicity, i.e. what is the reason for and purpose of the relationship? Potter concludes by saying that the 'ethnicity of a group has no appreciable impact on the way it performs its illicit activities' (Potter, 1994, p. 16). Again this will need to be analysed further to determine whether the activities of mafia groups in the US were influenced by their Italian or Sicilian ethnicity. Much like with Albanese's approach to ethnicity, Potter does not consider how ethnicity and culture may be linked to this impact upon how a group emerges with cultural features influenced by their ethnic background.

Potter revisited the ideas of Smith in 1975/1976 and the 'Alien Conspiracy' giving an overview of the common features of these 'alien conspiracy theories';

- *organized crime groups exhibit many structural features of legitimate corporate sector enterprises* (Potter, 1994, p. 4)
- *they seek to monopolize criminal enterprises by expanding in size and forming large cartels of national and international scope* (Potter, 1994, p. 5)
- *ethnic or racial identity is the key to determining group membership in organized crime* (Potter, 1994, p. 6)
- *organized crime groups undermine the very foundations of democracy by corrupting public officials and professionals to serve the criminal enterprise* (Potter, 1994, p. 6)

These four assertions of the alien conspiracy model highlight the idea that a foreign organisation, of which membership is determined by ethnicity, is corrupting political and economic institutions in a democratic system.

With reference to the Sicilian mafia, Potter (Potter, 1994) attempts to discredit the 'alien conspiracy' theory, stating; 'First, none of the other nations which were recipients of the waves of Sicilian immigration at the turn of the century (Australia and Britain, for example) developed organized crime groups anything like the mafia' (Potter, 1994, p. 11).

Secondly, Potter argues 'organized crime already had a well-developed foothold in the major cities of the United States before the Sicilians arrived, indicating that it could not have been imported with the immigrants' (Potter, 1994, p. 11). Again, Potter's argument on its own is not sufficient to reject the idea of alien conspiracy, just because organised crime existed before the arrival of Italian immigrants does not mean that the Italian immigrants did not transplant their own group or form of organised crime after their arrival. Potter also points out that the Sicilian mafia was a far different group to those explained by 'alien conspiracy theorists', that it was a group 'rooted in the peasant traditions and feudal economy in Sicily [that would be] virtually impossible to export to a democratic, industrial nation' (Potter, 1994, p. 11). Potter points to Blok's analysis of the Sicilian mafia, consisting of many highly fragmented groups, acted as intermediaries between peasants and the aristocracy [ (Potter, 1994, p. 11), (Blok, 1975)]. Potter's points here contributed to the hypothesis used in building the framework for this study; generalised Italian (or Sicilian) migration is related to the emergence of mafia groups, well-developed organised crime in the US precluded transplantation, and the Italian mafia groups were more suited to the 'peasant traditions and feudal economy of Sicily/Southern Italy. Potter's analysis shows the unlikelihood of an 'outpost transplantation', but ignores some pertinent cultural similarities between groups in the US and Italy. This thesis reintroduces some of the elements of cultural influence that can work alongside the Potters arguments that these Italian mafia groups did not export themselves to the US.

Potter goes on to further discredit 'alien conspiracy theory' generally, stating 'there is ample evidence that the structure and practices of crime groups bear little relationship to the tenets of the alien conspiracy theory', continuing that organized crime is 'not composed of clearly defined, tightly structured families, but rather organised crime occurs in an 'informal, loosely structured, open system' (Potter, 1994, p. 12). Potter links this to Albini's 'patron-client relationship' (Albini, 1971), whereby a patron exchanges information, connections and a network for economic and political support from the client, and Potter highlights that the intense loyalty to one organisation exists, but not on the scale of legitimate corporations, in the long-term socialisation process 'intergroup discipline is not the norm; competition,

treachery, communication breakdowns and other forms of disorganisation are far more characteristic' (Potter, 1994, p. 13). This form of relationship between members of the organisation is considered when examining the relationship between the mafia groups.

Potter, giving Reuter's (Reuter, 1983) and Block's (Block, 1978) works as examples, also argues that, unlike what the alien conspiracy theory purports, 'small, fragmented and ephemeral enterprises tend to populate illegal markets- not large corporate syndicates' (Potter, 1994, p. 13). This point is to be explored further; an international continuing relationship between the US and Italian mafia groups would be contradictory to this point if it existed as current sources suggest. Potter adds that another problem with the alien conspiracy theory is that it '...overstates and misinterprets the role of ethnicity in determining the structure of organised crime' (Potter, 1994, p. 15). The role of ethnicity in the literature is examined later on in this chapter. Potter's final point on 'alien conspiracy theory is that it overplays the role of organized criminals as the corrupters of public officials and professionals' (Potter, 1994, p. 15), highlights that the legitimate institutions are as much a part of organised crime as the underworld figures.

Alan Block's *Space, Time and Organized Crime* (1994) highlighted how the Southern Italian migrants differed from the US environment in which they were entering; 'Southern Italians who migrated to the U.S. in the latter decades of the nineteenth and the early ones of the twentieth centuries unquestionably lack entrepreneurial skills honed form a commercial environment. They were a world apart from any phase of international commerce' (Block, 1994, p. 41). While true of many of the agricultural workers who may have been migrating it presents a partially backwards view of Southern Italian society; international trade had been a feature of the ports of Palermo and Naples, among others, for some time.

Block also highlighted how some previous sources have had their material overstated, such as Feder and Turkus's use of Abe Reles' testimonies;

For instance, When Reles talked about cooperation in the Brooklyn underworld, Turkus and Feder called it an organization. When Reles talked about favors being done by one racketeer for another, Turkus and Feder wrote about orders and a smooth chain of command. When Reles talked about the geographical mobility of various criminals, Turkus and Feder held it was proof of the national scope of the cartel. When Reles talked about the innumerable mobs that populated the New York underworld,

Turkus and Feder interpreted it as proof of the confederation of organized crime. When Reles talked about Murder using the underworld argot of contract, Turkus and Feder concluded that murder was a regal business conducted in the interests of the National Crime Syndicate and carried out by a special group of enforcers. And finally, when Reles talked about the shifting, changing, bickering, competitive, murderous social world of organized crime, Turkus and Feder surmised that this untidiness was only the inevitable and necessary fallout of the consolidation of organized crime. (Block, 1994, p. 13)

In 1999 Liddick examined a variety of organised crime theories and classifications. His section on organised crime in America and its origins states that;

Organized crime in America is, first and foremost, an American social phenomenon, created and perpetuated primarily by the economic, political and cultural variables indigenous to the United States. While it is certainly true that immigration has played a significant role in the development of criminal networks in America, organized crime is not the embodiment of an evil alien conspiracy, nor is it a singular bureaucratic super-organization (Cosa Nostra or Mafia) controlling illegal throughout the nation. Although Italians, the Irish, and Jews have at one time or another exhibited predominance in certain illicit spheres, illegal entrepreneurship transcends the participation of any one ethnic group (Liddick, 1999, pp. 97-98).

Liddick's statement again reemphasises the role of the US environment on the emerging crime groups, and provides an important, if vague, side note that immigration played a significant role. This thesis seeks to establish what the role of immigration was, and show that significant cultural elements travelled with migrants to the US which became valuable in the way in which mafia groups formed.

## Recent historical studies

There had been a number of more recent studies both concerning the history of mafia groups in the US, the study of organised crime and transplantation studies.

In 2001 Woodiwiss's book (Woodiwiss, 2001) championed the idea that organised crime in the US was a wholly American product dominated by US-born citizens. He gave several examples of the xenophobia and racism portrayed by the press at the time of the Hennessey murder, for

example in *Harper's Weekly* where it is described as having been 'transplanted to this country by Sicilian immigrants' (Woodiwiss, 2001, p. 99). Woodiwiss himself portrays a different reality; that the crime groups in New Orleans were 'a small minority of parasitic individuals', and that their activities pale in comparison to those of white supremacists in a city with a reputation for being corrupt (Woodiwiss, 2001, p. 99). Woodiwiss goes on to challenge the aforementioned David Chandler's work, disputing Chandler's suggestion that the Italians in New Orleans involved in Hennessey murder would go on to establish a criminal dynasty, and showing his support to Nelli's work suggesting that those Italians would lead more 'mundane' lives (Woodiwiss, 2001, pp. 99-100).

Morselli reiterated the approach of Woodiwiss and Potter and presented an entrepreneurial model of organised crime in his examination of Sammy Gravano's mafia relationships; 'the bureaucratic and rigid hierarchical image that emerged from traditional conceptualizations of organized crime does not emerge from Gravano's experience. Post-Cressey studies of the Cosa Nostra (North American and Sicilian) have dismissed past claims of formal organization' (2003, p. 406). He continues that the family is perceived as a "patriarchal organization" in which members are criminal entrepreneurs seeking opportunities in both upper and underworld (2003, p. 406). Morselli points out though that these sources 'have continued to stress the unchallenged authoritarianism practiced by the head or boss of a Cosa Nostra family unit' (2003, p. 406) despite evidence in both Gravano's testimonies and Italian case-studies that decisions of elimination of members by murder were made democratically and unanimously amongst members (2003, pp. 406-407).

Bovenkerk on the other hand attempts to readdress elements of this entrepreneurial model particularly Potters claims that 'organized crime is simply entrepreneurial activity that happens to be illegal' (1994, p. 124), instead suggesting that the attraction is that the products are illegal (and therefore command large profits) (2000, p. 229). Bovenkerk states 'the people who deal in drugs and prohibited arms or bring illegal aliens into the country have not made a decision on the grounds of their enthusiasm about the quality of the product or on humanitarian concerns, they did so because operating outside the law can be very profitable' highlighting that a drug deal 'deliberately focuses on controlled substances' (2000, p. 229).

On the study of organised crime, Albanese noted that organised crime groups continue to be defined by their ethnicity, rather than their criminal activities, which he describes as the 'Ethnicity trap', and argues that it 'leads to unwarranted stereotypes of ethnic groups, ignores



the fact that organised crime is committed by groups of many different ethnicities, and that the public demand for illicit goods and services drives most organised crime activity regardless of time and place' (Albanese, 2004, p. 11).

Like Albanese, Reppetto in 2004 argued that the 'ethnic succession' theory can be overstated; 'the idea that it happened everywhere comes from the common mistake of assuming that whatever took place in New York or Chicago also occurred in the rest of the country', arguing that in some cities Jewish groups remained dominant and others Italian criminal attempts were repelled (Reppetto, 2004, p. xi).

In his historical study, Reppetto suggests that residents had believed of a 'Mafia' even prior to the Hennessey murder, the French and Spanish inhabitants since 1718 and the Americans since 1812 had displayed similar attributes of lawlessness and violence, and that by the late 19th century the Italian immigrants had become the latest subgroup to be known for such activity (Reppetto, 2004, p. 8). He points out that very few Italians became involved in crime, and of those, very few of those had ever belonged to a Mafia-like group, 'though many more found it advantageous to claim such associations, the better to instil fear in their victims' (Reppetto, 2004, p. 8). Raab, in 2005, presented a similar idea on the groups in New Orleans, claiming 'They were petty criminals who imitated the tactics of the original mafia, even employing the name of the secret society' (Raab, 2005, p. 18). This idea of using the name of the secret society as a form of tactic for inducing fear into victims features in the works of Allerfeldt (Allerfelt, 2011) and Varese (Varese, 2011), and forms part of the framework of analysis in this thesis.

Reppetto considered that the Mafiosi in Sicily were akin to 'brigands of other depressed areas – Spain, Ireland, the Balkans, the Ukraine' (Reppetto, 2004, p. 3), which suggests that it is the social conditions which lead to the formation of these organisations. This might suggest that organised crime groups are more a product of their locale and its conditions than transplantation or diffusionism. The nature of organised crime groups in Sicily is therefore considered a factor to examining transplantation in this thesis. Reppetto declared the 'Black Hand' to be a method employed by individuals and small groups (Reppetto, 2004). Reppetto also provided the example that many Italians were often described as 'Mafiosi' by the police and local 'chiefs' proclaimed "Boss of the American Mafia" (Reppetto, 2004, p. 26). This brings the accuracy of police and government records into disrepute and must be considered if these are to be examined further.

With reference to the discovery of a list of 'society' rules in Italian, at the home of a suspected American Mafiosi in 1903, Reppetto warns that, although it is clear that these individuals had dealings with Italian suppliers and distributors and imitated the procedures of the Italian Mafia, it does not prove they are part of an American branch of an Italian Mafia (Reppetto, 2004, p. 26). Again, it is essential to examine the similarities between groups in the US and those in Sicily, but not to draw conclusions based on assumptions that similar traits mean they are linked.

Raab, in 2005, gave a different perspective to Albanese and Hess on the comparison between the individuals in Sicily and the US, involved in mafia groups;

‘At the time of this immigration wave, none of the Sicilian *cosche* tried to establish beachheads or branches in the United States. [...] In Sicily, the mafia families were among the favored 'haves', not the downtrodden 'have-nots'. They had no reason to relinquish their enviable, comfortable station in life for risky ventures in foreign lands’ (Raab, 2005, p. 18).

His statement suggests that, in Sicily, the Mafia existed in the higher parts of society and not in the slums as it existed in the US, and while coming to the same conclusion, contrasts with Albanese and Hess that the 'mafiosi' had the same economic and political interests.

Raab, echoing the concerns of D’Amato in 1908, quotes a similar statement by Police Lieutenant Petrosino; ‘Here there is practically no police surveillance. Here it is easy to buy arms and dynamite. Here there is no penalty for using a fake name. Here it is easy to hide, thanks to our enormous territory and overcrowded cities’ (Reppetto, 2004, p. 20). These statements of Petrosino's suggest that it is, in fact, a combination of policing, living conditions and illegal markets that foster organised crime groups.

Raab also pointed out that ‘In the early stages of Italian immigration, the police in New York and other large eastern cities often confused the Mafia with individuals and gangs operating under the name of “La Mano Nero”, or the Black hand’ (Raab, 2005, p. 19). This highlights not only the confusion between the organisations and their links but also the need to be wary of official documents relating to the origins of 'mafia' and 'black hand' during this period. Raab continues; ‘the Black Hand, which had no direct relationship with the Mafia, referred to a crude technique of random extortion used by individuals and small gangs’ (Raab, 2005, p. 19). This echoes Reppetto and D’amato's statements regarding it as a method rather than an organisation.

Ubah favours what he called 'the deprivation approach' over 'the importation approach' (or 'alien conspiracy theory') but his early dismissal of the likely hood of 'importation' based on Albini's statement that mafia was a system of patron-client relationships rather than an organisation (Ubah, 2007) means his work neglects a number of important factors and evidence that links US and Sicilian organised crime – his rejection is based on the lack of a single unified mafia but ignores the evidence in favour of small decentralised mafia groups. Ubah's deprivation model, the core concept of which is that the emergence of Organised crime in the US is the result of adaptation to the integration process into the American social system fits with the paradigms of a number of academics; Albanese (Albanese, 2004) (Albanese, 1989), Block (Block, 1978), Blok (Blok, 1975), and Bynum (Bynum, 1987) are academics Ubah places in this field but the approaches of Bell (Bell, 1953), Woodiwiss (Woodiwiss, 2001), and Lombardo (Lombardo, 2010) amongst others could equally fit under this term. What Ubah does suggest is that some of the theoretical ramifications of deprivation theory were left unexplored (Ubah, 2007, p. 101).

Mike Dash's 2009 *The First Family* (Dash, 2009) gives a historical account of the Morello-Lupo crime family, while also touching upon ancillary events such as the earlier Hennessey murder in New Orleans. It provided details from some new unused records, but as a narrative piece, it does not significantly address the various theories of mafia mobility.

David Critchley's 2009 research on *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia 1891-1931* (Critchley, 2009) presents a lot of new data and introduces new analysis on the topic. Critchley states in his own literature review 'material collected for this book suggests that the New York City's mafias were localized and diffuse in their process and structure, and that ties to other U.S. Mafia groups were loosely defined and operationally devolved' continuing that the only evidence of cooperation between groups was at the enterprise level (Critchley, 2009, p. 2).

Critchley approaches the subject of 'the impact of Sicily' on the mafias in New York in his book, asking whether they were subdivisions of a centralised command system based in Sicily (Critchley, 2009, p. 60). Critchley states 'though current theory gives greater weight to 'American' factors in determining U.S Mafia structure and activities, Sicilian features were predominant in shaping forms of governance and internal practices in New York City's families' (Critchley, 2009, p. 61).

Critchley's work, in contrast to the more journalistic works in this field, provides a source for nearly every piece of evidence or anecdote, including numerous archival materials consisting of court case records, birth, death and immigration records, newspaper archives, police/authorities reports and other miscellaneous pieces of evidence (for example an imitation, leather memorandum book that contained a list of names including known organised crime figures that was erroneously believed to be mafia boss Maranzano's and had its contents published in the New York Times (Critchley, 2009, p. 309)). While Critchley's focus is wider than this and the time span ten years longer (Critchley's analysis covers a further ten years during which prohibition facilitated substantial changes in organised crime), some records he used were again analysed for this research.

Critchley argues that the cultural model of connection between the organisation in Sicily and the US fits the Black Hand organisations more than the mafia groups (Critchley, 2009, p. 71). However, he argues that 'cultural and socio-economic factors could not clarify those organizational similarities identified between mafia organizations in Sicily and America' (Critchley, 2009, p. 71), but also that "transatlantic links were on a particularized basis; there was no evidence that the contacts between Sicily and America went further", with the exception of the Petrosino murder (Critchley, 2009, p. 71).

David Critchley devotes an entire chapter to the 'Black Hand' within which he examines the relationship between 'Black Hand' criminals and the Mafia groups. He criticises earlier works, such as Pitkin's as having devoted themselves to the rise and decline of the 'Black Hand' evidenced from various articles influenced by crime scares rather than focusing on the 'key question of whether or how the Black Hand related to the Mafi (Critchley, 2009, p. 20) a'. Critchley suggests that there was no centralised/ co-ordinated 'Black Hand Society' and that many 'Black Handers' were either working alone or in small-scale partnership with only 'the loosest of links to similar groups' (Critchley, 2009, p. 23). Critchley's research into the relationship between 'Black Hand' groups and Mafia groups led him to make several conclusions; firstly that 'Black Hand' groups acted on an individual basis separate from mafia groups, and that no mafiosi would have concurrently been Black Handers as 'the activity was considered disrespectful of the ideals of *Onorata Societa'*, they would have only have been involved in black hand activities prior to joining a mafia organisation (Critchley, 2009, pp. 26-27). He states that the mafias rules reflected its Sicilian background (he suggests the ideals were 'transmitted') where 'racketeering was undertaken with a degree of wariness', that the Sicilian *Cosca* never thought of "wholesale extortion" or of demanding "a cut" from

shopkeepers' (Critchley, 2009, p. 27). Secondly, he suggests that early Mafia bosses 'were frequently pillars of the Italian community, involving themselves in politics and earning a living from self-employment' (Critchley, 2009, p. 27). He does however, give a number of examples of later Mafiosi who had been involved in 'Black Hand' activities prior to their mafia membership, (Critchley, 2009, p. 27) but later goes on to state that during prohibition the 'beer and liquor trafficking seem to have been performed by others' (Critchley, 2009, p. 34) but is only able to offer anecdotal evidence to support his hypothesis.

Both Varese (Varese, 2011) and Critchley (Critchley, 2009, pp. 62-63) talk of 'letters of reference' from Sicilian bosses for American mafiosi wishing to join or change 'family'. Varese, in particular, uses this as a form of evidence that transplantation occurred, but gives little insight into details of these letters; for example, their frequency or their impact. Exploring the nature of these letters of reference forms part of the analysis of this study as they help provide information into the nature of the relationship between Italian groups and the US.

The most in-depth analysis of the Black Hand comes from Robert Lombardo's *The Black Hand: Terror by letter in Chicago* (Lombardo, 2010), which argues against Italian origins of the Black Hand crime. Lombardo argues that the development of Black Hand extortion 'was not related to the emergence of the Sicilian mafia or the Neapolitan Camorra but rather was rooted in the social structure of American society' (Lombardo, 2010, p. 5). Lombardo also points out that both victims and offenders were not solely Italian, his study showed that 60 of his 267 identified victims were non-Italians and that 20 of 117 offenders were non-Italian (Lombardo, 2010, p. 7). Lombardo attributes the association of Black Hand crime with the Mafia to a 'crime myth' created by the media and criminology studies at the time, stating the myths assign isolated incidents into 'themes' that allow the reader to make sense, where there are gaps, by placing it in a larger framework (Lombardo, 2010, p. 162). Lombardo gives an example that if it is reported that an Italian murdered someone it gives very little info but saying that it is part of a Mafia or Black Hand conspiracy 'implies a myriad of other details about the crime that may or may not be true', whilst also placing crime in a rational context, making 'inherently complicated and obscure' crimes 'comprehensible' (Lombardo, 2010, p. 162). Lombardo's analysis beyond previous newspaper reports and government inquiries makes his conclusions valuable in assessing the nature of Black hand crime and its role in the US – Sicilian mafia relationship. In particular, Lombardo highlights the coverage of the murders of Hennessey and Petrosino as having contributed to the alien conspiracy theory and 'crystallized into an

explanation that has been recycled from one popular book to the next' (Lombardo, 2010, p. 193).

In 2006, De Stefano also gave an insight into Petrosino's work suggesting that despite the press reports, Petrosino had travelled to Sicily to check on the activities of criminals who had returned to Italy and to examine police records of Italian-born criminals in the US (De Stefano, 2006, p. 54). He adds that the claims of a 'prominent Sicilian Mafiosi' that they had killed Petrosino only added to the idea that a connection existed between the US and Italian groups, despite the lack of validity of the claim (De Stefano, 2006, p. 55).

Kristopher Allertfeldt in 2011 suggested that the growth of the mafia in America saw it increase in scale and sophistication, while the 'Italian clannishness and overt violence', which had limited their criminal activity, disappeared (Allertfeldt, 2011, p. 213). Allertfeldt's argument appears to suggest that as the crime groups moved further away from their Italian roots and cultures (including those associated with the Mafia in Sicily) and towards 'syndicated crime' (Allertfeldt, 2011, p. 213).

Allertfeldt points out that the newspaper accounts are 'almost certainly' exaggerated the extent of the 'Black Hand', and that subsequent reports on the history of the mafia need to show the Black Hand as an interconnected network sharing information if it is to be presented as an evolutionary stage of the mafia (Allertfeldt, 2011, pp. 199-200). Allertfeldt also points out that the criminals used the name and symbol to their advantage, they were recognizable to victims and the media invention of 'such a "society"' gave a certain gravitas and authenticity to their demands' (Allertfeldt, 2011, p. 200). This is similar to the claim above of Reppetto's (Reppetto, 2004, p. 8) that it is advantageous for individuals to link themselves to crime groups to instil fear into their victims. It is also worth comparing this with Varese's suggestion that a mafia organisation seeking to transplant itself need to create a reputation, that is an asset that makes victims more readily comply and that without a reputation the mafia will find it difficult to transplant itself (Varese, 2011, p. 14). After looking at Allertfeldt, Reppetto and Varese's different conclusions, it is important to consider the role that reputation and association with a reputation has on both organised crime groups and criminals as individuals. It is also imperative to consider its impact, not only on the development of organised crime but also on literature and paradigms covering the development of organised crime groups.

In 2016 James Cockayne's *Hidden Power* (Cockayne, 2016), looked at the strategic organisation of organised crime groups, examining the political-criminal relations, highlighting the criminal

strategy 'involves the development of clandestine advantage in political relations with and in the upperworld, even if the rents and power accrued lie primarily in the underworld' (Cockayne, 2016, p. 21). According to Cockayne, the criminal group does not seek to replace the state as to do so would remove the criminal tariff the organised crime group benefits from by providing illegal services. Cockayne's work looks at coercion and corruption, examining this relationship in the manipulative tactics used in Tammany Hall in the late nineteenth century, the origins of mafia groups in the US, and the cooperation between state and mafia during the twentieth century (the invasion of Sicily in World War Two, control of Sicily under the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories, and relations (collaborations and competition) between the mafia, the US law enforcement agencies (specifically the CIA), President Batista in Cuba and casinos in the Bahamas.

## Mafia mobility and mafia transplantation

Since 2011 there has been a resurgence of studies into the international movement of Organised Crime groups. The theories used to underpin the factors are set out in subsequent chapters, as they pertain to answering the question of whether the Italian Mafia(s) transplanted in the US.

This new academia has further dispelled the myth of an 'alien invasion' and has moved to further examine the realities behind the movement of organised crime groups. More in-depth analyses of the issue (for example in Varese (Varese, 2011) or Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, et al., 2011)) have brought up issues of push and pull factors; factors in both the home territory and the selected host territory that are key to a successful transplantation. Another aspect which has been more closely examined within these studies is the level of choice the organised crime group has in its movement; this includes considering if they forced to leave their home territory and if they are they limited in their choice of potential destinations.

Federico Varese's 'mafia transplantation' definition as 'the ability of a mafia group to operate an outpost over a sustained period outside its region of origin and routine operation' (Varese, 2011). This discounts short tenures in foreign locations, and tenures which do not result in the creation of an outpost. His paradigm incorporates a number of demand and supply factors; factors which cause individuals to leave a territory and factors which draw them to, or allow them to be successful in, the new territory (Varese, 2011). This definition is used as part of the hypothesis for this thesis, and an exploration of outpost operation is analysed in the subsequent chapters.

Varese's study into Rosario, Argentina presented a similar conclusion to the hypotheses of Smith (Smith, 1975) and Potter (Potter, 1994) while conducting his study in *Mafia's on the Move* (Varese, 2011), comparing why mafias transplanted into one region and not another. This does not rule out 'alien conspiracy' on its own, the nature of alien conspiracy would suggest an element of strategic planning and choice in destination. This is explored in this thesis through factors regarding willing and unwilling mobility.

Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, et al., 2011) take a different line; while still defining push and pull factors, they also talk about opportunities available to groups and separates them into two types; strategic, in which offenders organise themselves around opportunities; and emergent in which opportunities create offenders. These two types of opportunity are prominent in this



study; a link between groups in the US and groups in Italy would suggest the former, while the lack of a link would suggest that the latter occurred. Morselli *et al.* argue that opportunities matter more than the group itself (Morselli, et al., 2011).

The theories of transplantation and how it relates to the relationship between mafia groups in the US and groups in Italy will be explored further in this study. Looking at the theory will allow factors to be examined such as migration, social conditions, or market opportunities. Both Varese's work and Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's will be used in the formation of the study framework.

Morselli *et al.* add that law enforcement has been focussed on the groups and not the setting, looking at their size, structure, reputation and nature, stating that the setting should be examined instead as it is often a constant while the group is transient (Morselli, et al., 2011). This thesis has included issues pertaining to the settings as factors for examination (such as emerging markets in a setting).

Morselli *et al.* claim that even more recent works, such as those by Mischa Glenny (Glenny, 2008), and Nicaso and Lamothe (1995), still give journalistic accounts with hints of the alien conspiracy theory, and that Castells(1998,2000) has also continued to use this 'alien conspiracy' theory (Morselli, et al., 2011).

Salvatore Lupo's *The Two Mafias* (Lupo, 2015) is the closest to a transplantation study into the Italian and US mafias, the work focused on (re)debunking the myths of an international 'octopus' organisation, while also highlighting links between the two organisations. The book covers 120 years of history, so it does not focus on studying a singular aspect of the mafias' transcontinental connections but rather moves from period to period highlighting the concept of a number of overlapping and interconnected networks of criminal and legal business. His observations on pre-prohibition collaborations between 'the two mafias' focus on trade and import/export businesses. These trade businesses are central to the arguments on transplantation but, depending on definition; do not represent transplantation on their own. In Lupo's conclusions he also challenges Albini's approach, including 'contrary to Albini's argument, the idea of an American Mafia is correctly based on historical, ongoing links with its Sicilian counterpart' (Lupo, 2015, p. 164).

## Conclusion

The literature that examines the links between the early Mafia groups in the US and the Mafia groups in Sicily creates as many questions as it answers. The 'alien conspiracy theories' that dominated the literature on the subject for an extensive period has influenced popular culture to the extent they became the commonly accepted theories regarding the origins of organised crime in the US. Some scholars, however, have shown these theories to be based on both xenophobia and assumptions regarding the similarities between organised groups. They do not, however, explain some of the smaller signs of evidence of a link, such as those from Mafia testimonies, for example, the information that 'Cola' Gentile's testimonies give us on letter writing (explored in the Operations chapter). This presents an opportunity to examine documents from this period for evidence to attempt to piece together a fuller picture of what led to the development of organised crime Mafia groups in the Italian American communities. The methodology chapter sets out the process by which this thesis approaches each of the relevant factors relating to transplantation.

This raises some important points that are addressed in this study; why have other authors attributed the rise in organised crime and 'Mafia' groups in the US to transplantation from Sicily and Italy. Both Albanese and Hess provide viewpoints regarding the writings of American authors on the subject, suggesting that the idea of the organised crime group being controlled from a headquarters in a foreign country, and the idea that the group's emergence is not the fault of American society, appeases the readers (Albanese, 1989, pp. 25-26). It is important to consider this 'reader appeasement' that Albanese refers to (Albanese, 1989, pp. 25-26) and the impact it has had on the development of research into organised crime in the US. Much of the more recent study is compatible with the hypothesis that this thesis proposes, that 'outpost transplantation' did not happen, but that 'influenced transplantation' in which homegrown groups emerge as a result of the American environment and society but with operational and cultural features heavily borrowed from their Italian counterparts.

## Citations

- U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 (1958).
- Albanese, J. (1989). *Organized Crime in America* (Second Edition ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.
- Albanese, J. (2004). North American Organized Crime. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 8-18.
- Albini, J. (1971). *American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend*.
- Albini, J. (1997). Donald Cressey's Contributions to the study of Organised Crime: An Evaluation. In *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader*. London: Sage.
- Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.
- Arlacchi, P. (1988). *Mafia business: The Mafia ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Asbury, H. (1927). *Gangs of New York* (1988 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1933). *Gangs of San Francisco* (2004 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1936). *Gangs of New Orleans* (2004 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1940). *Gangs of Chicago* (1986 ed.). London: Random House.
- Balsamo, W. (1997). *The Mafia: The First 100 Years*. London: Virgin Books.
- Bell, D. (1953). Crime as an American Way of Life. *The Antioch Review*, 13(2), 131-154.
- Bigsby, C. (2005). *Arthur Miller: A Critical Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Block, A. (1978). History and the Study of Organized Crime. *Urban Life*, 6(4), 455-472.
- Block, A. A. (1994). *Space, Time & Organized Crime*. New Brunswick, US: Transaction Publishers.
- Blok, A. (1966). Land reform in a west Sicilian latifondo village: The persistence of a feudal structure. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 39(1), 1-16.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bodnar, J. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban American* (First Midland Book Edition ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Boissevain, J. (1966). Patronage in Sicily. *Man*, 1(1), 18-33.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Bovenkerk, F. (2000). "Wanted: Mafia boss" - Essay on the personology of organized crime. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33(3), 225.
- Bynum, T. (1987). *Organized crime in America: Concepts and controversies*. Monsey, NY: Willow Tree Press.
- Chandler, D. (1975). *Brothers in Blood*. New York: Dutton & Co.
- Clarens, C. (1980). *Crime Movies: An Illustrated History*. New York: Norton.
- Cockayne, J. (2016). *Hidden Power*. London: Hurst Publishers.
- Cressey, D. (1969). *Theft of the Nation*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers .
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- D'Amato, G. (April 1908). The "Black Hand" Myth. *The North American Review*, 187(629), 543-549.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- de Lucia, F. (2012). "An Abrupt Impression of Familiarity": *Ethnic Projection in Arthur Miller's Work*.
- De Stefano, G. (2006). *An Offer We Can't Refuse: the Mafia in the Mind of America*. New York: Faber & Faber.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.
- Dickie, J. (2014). *Mafia Republic*. London: Sceptre.
- Falcone, G. (1993). *Men of honour : the truth about the Mafia*. London: Warner.
- FBI Record, part of JFK Assassination Files 12/13/1963, from Samuel A Miller, NARA Record Number: 124-10206-10415.
- Fentress, J. (2010). *Eminent Gangsters*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America .
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vito Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.

- Glenny, M. (2008). *McMafia*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Goff, J. W. (1893, May 22). Mafia's Lawless Practices. *New York Times*.
- Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hess, H. (1973). *Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin Power and Myth* (1998 ed.). London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Ianni, F. A. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kefauver, E. (1951). *Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Committee)*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Lewis, N. (1973). *The honoured society : the Mafia conspiracy observed*. Bath: Chivers.
- Liddick, D. (1999). *An empirical, theoretical, and historical overview of organized crime*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Lombardo, R. (2010). *The Black Hand: Terror by Letter in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.
- Lupsha, P. (1981). Individual Choice, Material Culture and Organized Crime. *Criminology*, 19(1), 3-24.
- Messick, H. (1979). *Of Grass and Snow: The Secret Criminal Elite*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Trade.
- Messick, H., & Goldblatt, B. (1972). *The Mobs and the Mafia*. New York: Gallahad Books.
- Miller, A. (1955). *A View From the Bridge* (2015 ed.). London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Miller, A. (1987). *Timebends: A Life* (2012 ed.). London: Bloomsbury.
- Morris, N., & Hawkins, G. (1970). *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Morselli, C. (2003). Career opportunities and network-based privileges in the Cosa Nostra. *Crime, Law and Social Change*; , 39(4), 383-418.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2010). *The Mobility of Criminal Groups*. Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada.

- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970). *The Italians in Chicago 1880-1930: A Study in Ethnic Mobility*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1983). *From Immigrants to Ethnics: The Italian Americans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- New York Times. (1890, October 24). The Mafia in the United States. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1891, April 27). The Mafia on its Own Soil. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1902a, July 27). Italian Secret Societies. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1902b, August 3). The Mafia. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1903a, April 26). Declares Mafia Cry is a Police Fiction. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1909a, June 10). Black Hand Band a National Order. *New York Times*.
- O'Kane, J. (1993). *The Crooked Ladder*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, R. E., & Miller, H. A. (1921). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. London: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/oldworldtraitstr00parkuoft>
- Potter, G. (1994). *Criminal Organizations; Vice, Racketeering and Politics in an American City*. Illinois: Waveland Press.
- Raab, S. (2005). *Five Families*. New York: Griffin.
- Repetto, T. (2004). *American Mafia*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.
- Reuter, P. (1983). *Disorganized Crime*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Ruth, D. (1996). *Inventing the Public Enemy: The Gangster in American Culture, 1918-1934*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Santino, U. (2015). *Mafia and antimafia : a brief history*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Selvaggi, G. (1978). *The Rise of the Mafia in New York*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Smith, D. (1975). *The Mafia Mystique*, Hutchinson & Co. London: Hutchinson & Co.
- Smith, D. (1976). Mafia: the prototypical alien conspiracy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 423(1), 75-88.

- Smith, D. (2016). The Alien Conspiracy Theory: aka The Elephant in the Front Parlor. *The European Review of Organised Crime*, 3(1), 50-77.
- Ubah, C. (2007). Immigrants' Experiences In America: Toward Understanding Organized Crime. *African Journal of Criminology & Justice Studies*, 3(1), 95-118.
- United Italian Societies. (1906). United Italian Societies Document.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- White, F. M. (1910d, Sept 4). Italians Seek Protection Against Black Hand. *New York Times*, p. Magazine 5.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2001). *Organized crime and American power: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

# Methodology

---

## Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology undertaken throughout the course of this thesis. The research uses a variety of primary sources to gather evidence that either challenge or support various elements of transplantation theories and have been used to form a conclusion regarding 'influenced transplantation'. The research results help reassess not only the history and origins of organised crime in the US, but also the theory regarding transplantation and mobility of mafia/organised crime groups.

An abductive reasoning approach (or inference to the best explanation) was taken based on the observation of available data and information on mafia transplantation during the thesis' time frame. Abductive reasoning allows for the likeliest possible explanation to be formed from an incomplete set of observations. Because of the nature of studies into organised crime where there is a lack of historical/personal data on the criminals along with the multitude of factors in mafia transplantation, through abductive reasoning the premise of the nature of transplantation can be hypothesised. The limitations associated with data acquisition are discussed in depth in this chapter.

This research in this thesis focuses on the links between the early pre-prohibition mafia groups in the United States and the mafia groups in Italy. As explored in the literature review it is apparent many assumptions or claims were made about the origins of mafia groups in the US. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century many sources; including official state sources, journalistic sources and academic sources, made the claim (or inference) that the mafia in the US was planted there by an organisation from Italy (for example; (White, 1909), (Anon., 1890) (Anon., 1902), (Anon., 1902), (Anon., 1891), (U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 from note 13, 1958)) . Other research into the subject (e.g. (Albanese, 1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition)) (D'Amato, April 1908)) actually suggests that such a link never existed and that it was likely a creation of both xenophobia and an unwillingness to accept the problem as an American one.

What is lacking, however, is research which attempts to advance transplantation theory with a greater degree of distinction between types of transplantation. With this in mind this research



aims to look at the possibility of links between the mafia groups in the US and mafia groups in Italy prior to prohibition in the US. The aim of this research is explain the nature of Italian mafia transplantation between 1880 and 1920 into the United States. It seeks to:

- To identify and review the current state of prior literature
- To define mafia transplantation(s) within the context of this study and how it can be examined
- To design a robust study to analyse mafia transplantation in the US
- To collect relevant primary and secondary data needed to answer the research question using the developed study design
- To derive and present the results of the study from the data collected
- To analyse the results of the study in the light of prior knowledge and considering its worth and reliability
- To draw conclusions about the contribution to knowledge made by the study
- To provide accurate references and records for the material and data used in the study

Part of this work's original contribution to knowledge lies within its examination of historical documents, archival data and journalistic information and working through an abductive process to consider what the nature of transplantation is in this case study and whether that is sufficiently the same or relevantly similar to the conclusions made within existing theories espoused by academics such as Varese, Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, and others. In this way a breadth of possibilities has been explored, looking at what is possible, rather than ruling out ideas based on lack of information. Likewise, this study provides an opportunity to re-evaluate secondary data provided by other scholars, applying this evidence to the transplantation debate.

The interdisciplinary nature of studying organised crime requires looking at complementary theories and methods from a variety of disciplines including, but not limited to history, sociology, criminology, politics, international relations, anthropology, American and Italian studies and languages studies. This necessitated the creation of a bespoke methodology that drew upon a variety of methods and methodologies to form an approach that allows the analysis of the sources, as well as allowing the researcher to determine the evidence, and to build the hypothesis. Existing models for analysing archive newspapers and journals are not wholly appropriate for the types of analysis that were required for this research, due to the specific aims and objectives previously outlined. It was important to establish ways in which

information can be found in a clandestine environment; one where criminal activities took place in secret and were not publicly noted and recorded by the criminals themselves, and therefore the study must also look at other potential sources for this information.

## **Studies in organised crime**

The data collection was iterative, whereby new information was sought based on previous information collected, and the plan for data collection adjusted as the study progressed. This data and information have then been compared with the theories on mafia transplantation to synthesise a complete picture on the nature of mafia transplantation into the US.

There is no shortage of non-fiction literature on organised crime available in the public domain, in various forms: books, documentaries, journal articles, etc. But one of the issues facing the organised crime researcher is both the lack of a single unifying academic discipline and the spectrum of literature that transcends from journalistic or general interest through to more rigorous academic work. These fit into a variety of approaches; the most common and easily accessible is the journalistic approach. In addition to a number of journalists writing in the field (for example Glenny (2008), Saviano (2006), Newark (2011)), some academics have been encouraged by publishers to write more journalistic/narrative accounts of organised crime or to adjust their writing style to be more accommodating to the non-academic reader (Dickie (2007) and Lupo (2009) are two such examples). Beyond the journalistic works, studies in organised crime come from a multitude of disciplines; History, Security Studies, Criminology, Sociology, Anthropology, Law, Business and Economics for example. Studies into organised crime and contemporary organisations started in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and have taken a number of directions since.

When determining which sources are worthwhile for inclusion in a study on organised crime each source must be judged on its own merits and failings. As Potter points out, many journalistic sources 'tend to be snapshots of particular sensational incidents or notorious criminals. Organized crime, however, is a social process – constantly changing and adapting' (Potter, 1994, p. 35). What Potter refers to is the over-reliance on the more journalistic style works to give anecdotal stories about an individual or event and ignore the analytical framework by which organised crime is examined (as is not their purpose to do so). Potter goes into this in more detail by looking at the topics covered by authors examining organised crime; 'the vast preponderance of organised crime literature, particularly that emanating from

non-academic sources, deals with notorious characters and their atrocities, both real and imagined' (Potter, 1994, p. 38), and argues that this way of looking at organised crime overemphasised the role of individuals. Conversely, when writing up an academic study that is not biographical in nature, it is important to try to avoid focussing too much on the individuals and their lives and remain focused on a larger picture of organised crime as a series of networks and relationships. Potter also highlights that journalistic works often repeat errors and 'there are many examples of the press reproducing or inventing serious errors of fact within organised crime' (Potter, 1994, p. 35).

Whilst this research has collected data from contemporary news sources; it has tried to avoid relying solely on these journalistic sources for important information, especially when an element of opinion or conjecture is included in the piece (the consideration of the use of newspaper articles is discussed further in the methodology).

## Design

The research used a mixed-method approach to document analysis within an interdisciplinary methodology framework. The mixed method approach allowed for a variety of data to be used from various sources that could be adapted to answer the multitude of factors which form mafia transplantation. The research primarily consists of an analysis of qualitative data, although some parts are supported by the quantitative data. Evans and King state that the use of both quantitative and qualitative helps 'explain and understand social life' (Evans & King, 2006, p. 125). The research uses a flexible approach in determining which primary and secondary sources are to be used and whether that is to provide quantitative data, qualitative data or both. McDowell suggested that the use of a broad list of research questions 'which are capable of being modified and progressively focussed as ...[the] research develops' (McDowell, 2002, p. 74). This list developed as the research progressed, taking an abductive approach which formulated the questions, preventing the research from being forced to fit a hypothesis but rather evolving and developing in a way to best answer the hypothesis.

One of the issues in collecting data of this type is that it is often only recorded or reported both when it is discovered (which, for illegal and mostly secret crimes will not be exhaustive) and when it is deemed worthwhile reporting/recording. Umberto Santino proposes the concept of the 'emergency stereotype'; whereby the mafia only exists, or appears to exist, in the eyes of the state and the media when it is committing high profile murders (Santino, 2015, p. 2). Although Santino's concept generally applied to Sicily, it is equally valuable here when it is applied to the collection of data. It is important to remember when looking at some of the data, such as newspapers, that they only represent the point at which the media (or the state) considered it an issue. The analysis within this work must also consider this concept – a gap in the data does not represent a gap in, or lack of, criminal and mafia activity; mafia and criminal activities continue to occur even when the news is not reporting them.

The research started with a wider examination of existing literature to study both historical and contemporary literature surrounding pre-prohibition organised crime in the US. This extended review of the literature provided a basis for outlining a progression to current lines of thinking on the subject. It allowed existing evidence to be considered, examined further and included when making the final analysis and conclusions. The existing literature was also a

good source for primary data – highlighting appropriate and available governmental records, court records, FBI records, etc.

This primary data obtained from the variety of records is used to explore the nature of transplantation; in what way did it occur? The primary data includes personal records (birth, immigration, WW1 registration), newspaper articles, government reports, law enforcement records and reports, memoirs and testimonies of Mafiosi, and contemporary journal articles, though additional types of record and media have been used where appropriate. As suggested by McDowell (McDowell, 2002, p. 75), this broad selection of sources allows exploration of the subject fully and examination of all possibilities regarding the hypothesis, instead of selecting a small, unrepresentative selection of sources which only support the aims of the hypothesis, and with this in mind this thesis has not discounted any article or report on the basis that it does not conform to the hypothesis; if they contradict other data they have been noted as anomalies.

It is important to consider the advantages and disadvantages of each of these source types and how that impacts upon both further research and the analysis of their data. Whilst some of these records are considered secondary in some scenarios, such as newspaper articles, within the context of this research the media perception towards organised crime, portrayed through the newspapers, is as important as the information they provide. This approach towards the sources is in accordance with McDowell's distinction between primary and secondary sources; primary sources tend to be written around the time of the event, and can be classified as such even if they don't contain original thought or literary skill, and regardless of the format of the source (McDowell, 2002, p. 55). Secondary sources are written sometime after the event and are based upon the primary sources; the individual writing the secondary source was often not present at the original event, and the source contains interpretive and factual material (McDowell, 2002, p. 55). Contemporary newspaper articles can be designated as both of these; the reports of various crimes and activities are based on secondary information, but the approach they take to organised crime groups in what and how they choose to report them can be considered primary material.

Newspapers also help build up knowledge of the time period and society within it; McDowell states 'newspapers can give us an insight into the social and cultural milieu of a given period' (McDowell, 2002, pp. 66-67). Presnell gives a similar opinion on the use of newspapers; they 'tie communities, report events, and provide political commentary', and they are 'excellent

primary sources for discovering public opinion and the issues and activities that surrounded particular events' (Presnell, 2007, p. 105). Within this research it is especially important to consider the social attitude of the newspapers, and of society as a whole, towards immigrant communities and their association with organised crime, for example if newspapers and society link all extortion cases to the Black Hand, and subsequently link all Black Hand cases to Sicily/Italy, then the study must consider why that is and not accept it as fact in the conclusions.

When analysing the newspaper articles for evidence it is also important to consider the limitations of the newspaper articles including; errors made because of the premium placed on speed of delivery, distortion of eyewitness accounts (McDowell, 2002, p. 66), and that they do not always report all of the facts (Presnell, 2007, p. 105).

The approach of Umberto Santino in *Mafia and Antimafia* of splitting existing ideas into two groups, stereotypes and paradigms, fits this topic equally well (2015, p. 2). Santino clarifies that stereotypes are the widespread ideas that lack reflection or documentation, derived from and perpetuating mass consensus. Whilst easy to 'demystify', getting that message across when these stereotypes have been adopted by the media and underpin legislation (Santino, 2015, p. 2). This is particularly pertinent when looking at the efforts to combat organised crime in the United States, often driven by media reporting and the aspirations of politician's careers. A more general definition of 'the media' would also include the numerous books written on organised crime in the US designed for public consumption rather critical examination of a topic. Paradigms, according to Santino, represent ideas that have derived from the 'collection and interpretation of mass data' (Santino, 2015, p. 2).

US and Italian governmental and law enforcement reports have also been examined. This includes, but is not limited to; US police and law enforcement (FBI, FBN, etc.) records, court records, records of immigration, reports on crime and on organised crime, and recommendations set out by state and law enforcement bodies to tackle crime, particularly within migrant communities. Both Presnell (Presnell, 2007) and McDowell (McDowell, 2002) state that official documentation 'should' be more reliable and trustworthy than other primary sources, though D'Amato (April 1908) and Reppetto (Reppetto, 2004) state that police records and actions, and government research, into the emergence of organised crime in the US were sometimes misguided and potentially xenophobic.

Finding and using government documents relating to the development of organised crime and the mafia in the US also posed difficulties. Official government reports are usually freely

available, however more sensitive documents such as police and FBI (including its predecessors) records are harder to obtain, and although many have been released publicly, a lot of the useful information contained within has been censored. This study did identify several sources of official record that provided a starting point for the research, and further research into the secondary literature and the newspaper archives highlighted more sources of official state information.

This research also used contemporary journal articles on the issue to examine the academic response to the growth of organised crime in the US. If early 20<sup>th</sup> century newspapers show what information was available to common people, according to Presnell journals shows the contemporary professional debates around the subject (Presnell, 2007, p. 103).

When analysing sources, the 'witting' and 'unwitting' testimony must be considered; in a 'witting' testimony the writer intended others to see the work, whilst an 'unwitting' testimony delivers information unintentionally (McDowell, 2002, p. 74). The witting testimony refers to the message the source's creator intends the reader (or examiner) to infer; while the unwitting testimony may highlight messages that were not the creators intention (for example a newspaper article written with xenophobic undertones would highlight the xenophobic thoughts of the author, and perhaps the newspaper and within society). The original creator/author may not have been aware of evidence they were conveying to future historians (perhaps because it was taken for granted by contemporaries). Unwitting testimonies are highlighted when they change the perspective of the source.

McDowell gives several reasons why care should be taken when analysing data and these can be applied to the memoirs and testimonies of former mafiosi; memoirs are written from a single perspective, often written long after the event(s), and may be written to impress a wider audience, and they may suppress controversial information (McDowell, 2002, p. 58). When dealing with the memoirs of former Mafiosi, this point is perhaps the most important; it is unlikely that a mafioso would release new incriminating evidence about themselves, or even other mafiosi, not only because it could lead to further police action, but also because it could anger other mafiosi to retaliate (the breaking of *omerta*, the code of silence, itself is enough to warrant a death sentence). With this in mind consideration should be given to another of McDowell's points regarding memoirs; they 'are sometimes more revealing if you consider what topics they omit than what they include' (McDowell, 2002, p. 59). Regarding mafioso's

testimonies, this may include fabrication/ suppression of information that may further incriminate themselves.

The validity, trustworthiness and accuracy of these testimonies should be questioned. For example, Critchley points out that a version of Valachi's testimony provided information that 'a centralized, rigidly hierarchical and monolithic criminal empire run by Italians' existed and which was the interpretation favoured in 'political and media circles', was contrary to data assembled by the FBI which suggested that there was no nationwide conspiracy and that 'indicated a fragmentation of structure with no-overarching control system apparent' (Critchley, 2009, pp. 3-4). This part of Valachi's testimony was later proved to be false (Critchley, 2009, pp. 3-4) (Albini, 1997) (Cressey, 1969)

Whilst the internet featured heavily as a tool of data collection in this research; it was primarily used for searching digitised archives of official records and print publications. The credibility of sites used was considered to ensure the accuracy of data. The usefulness of each of the internet archives was also considered, and Presnell (Presnell, 2007, p. 154) provides a set of criteria to examine with which each site was analysed:

- The quality of the scans of documents and images.
- Searchability
- Bibliography
- Added materials

The first two criteria were the most relevant in this research; there was a requirement to be able to read the scans of newspapers and old documents, so they had to be legible. On the second criteria; the searchability of the text helped to locate key information and articles quickly and easily.

There were other things to consider during the design process; for example, Presnell highlights the needs to consider the mindset of the contemporary people when searching the sources for the information, including considering language terminology and way of life (Presnell, 2007, p. 97). With regards to this research, there are several language issues to note; the difference between British and American English in the spelling of such words as 'organised' (organized), the introduction of Italian and Sicilian words into the American vocabulary, *mafia* and *omerta* are two such relevant examples, and finally of the use of both the Italian and English words



that refer to the same thing, for example '*La Mano Nera*' or 'the Black Hand'. The context of the words can also be an issue, for example, the different definitions of 'organised crime' or 'mafia'. With this in mind alternative spellings had to be tested, in the newspaper search for regular words and switch between anglicised /Americanised and Italian spellings of names in all searches.

When looking for and analysing the evidence, personal knowledge of the subject was used to determine the usefulness and relevance of any information. It is important to analyse and draw this information together; as McDowell expresses that the existence of primary sources alone 'does not improve our knowledge of past events: this will only occur when historians examine the evidence and base their conclusions on an analysis of the evidence' (McDowell, 2002, p. 56). Various pitfalls were also considered before the study; if it occurred that sources yielded no or little information of any use, and in this scenario McDowell highlights the importance in making sure that emphasis is not placed on 'less significant events at the expense of more crucial ones' (McDowell, 2002, p. 75). It is also important to consider how representative sources and evidence are, and also how the value of the information at the time of creation is not the same as the value assigned to it today (McDowell, 2002, p. 75). This is especially relevant when considering what information newspapers and reports chose to include or omit. Additionally, McDowell suggests that 'the discovery of new evidence may also require us to modify existing historical facts and alert us to the possibility that some primary sources could contain inaccurate data' (McDowell, 2002, p. 56), therefore it was important to certain revisit sources should conflicting evidence appear, to determine which of the evidence, if any, was the most reliable.

## Methods

This section outlines the methods by which the research was conducted, describing the process of acquiring evidence. The order of the research was as follows:

1. Further analysis of existing literature
2. Newspaper archive search
3. Government record archive search
4. Police, law enforcement and court record search
5. Census reports
6. Further records search for data on individuals including birth certificates, passenger records, census records, and WW1/WW2 registrations
7. Analysis of collective evidence

### Newspaper search

The first archives to be searched were those of the contemporary US newspapers. Particular attention was given to newspapers based in New York, New Orleans, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago. These 5 cities are the most commonly associated with the mafia and the 'Black Hand', for example in Nelli's *The Business of Crime*, these 5 places had the highest number of reported Black Hand cases involving Italians in 1908 (Nelli, 1976, p. 88). The newspapers databases used are (a full list of Newspapers that eventually were used in the thesis can be found in the bibliography):

Region	Archive	Location Available
All	Library of Congress- Chronicling America	<a href="http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/">http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/</a>
	Google newspaper archive	<a href="http://news.google.com/newspapers/">http://news.google.com/newspapers/</a>
New York	New York Times	<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html">http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html</a>

	Northern New York Historical Newspapers	<a href="http://news.nnyln.net/index.html">http://news.nnyln.net/index.html</a>
	Old Fulton Newspaper Collection	<a href="http://www.fultonhistory.com/Fulton.html">http://www.fultonhistory.com/Fulton.html</a>
	Hudson River Valley Historical Newspapers	<a href="http://news.hrvh.org/">http://news.hrvh.org/</a>
	Brooklyn Daily Eagle	<a href="http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.org">http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.org</a>
	Suffolk Historic Newspapers	<a href="http://www.live-brary.com/historic-newspapers">http://www.live-brary.com/historic-newspapers</a>
Philadelphia	The Philadelphia Press	<a href="http://libwww.library.phila.gov/phila/press/ppsearch.cfm">http://libwww.library.phila.gov/phila/press/ppsearch.cfm</a>
Chicago	Chicago Examiner (via Chicago Public Library)	<a href="http://digital.chipublib.org/cdm4/">http://digital.chipublib.org/cdm4/</a>
	Chicago Tribune	<a href="http://archives.chicagotribune.com/">http://archives.chicagotribune.com/</a>
	Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection	<a href="http://www.library.illinois.edu/dnc/idnc">http://www.library.illinois.edu/dnc/idnc</a>

The US Library of Congress newspaper archive list was used to locate newspaper archives<sup>3</sup>, as well as the University of Pennsylvania's<sup>4</sup>. These archives provided a variety of newspapers including those with distinct agendas (such as those written for immigrant communities) and allowed for a wide view of the contemporary opinion on organised crime and mafia groups to be explored.

Google Scholar<sup>5</sup> and Academic Search Complete<sup>1</sup> are also used to search for journal articles pre-dating 1920 on the Mafia and organised crime in the US. In preliminary test searches, Google Scholar produced a far larger number of relevant results than other journal archives.

---

<sup>3</sup> Available from <http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/oltitles.html>

<sup>4</sup> Available from <http://guides.library.upenn.edu/historicalnewspapersonline>

<sup>5</sup> <http://scholar.google.co.uk>

A variety of sources were also used to access official US government, law enforcement and court records. These include the FBI Vault<sup>6</sup>, the US National Archives<sup>7</sup>, state archives- for example New York State Archives<sup>8</sup>, all listed on the National Archives website<sup>9</sup>, The Mary Ferrell Foundation Archive of JFK Assassination files<sup>10</sup> and the Ellis Island immigration database, for cross-referencing of family names<sup>11</sup>. The Italian State archive in Palermo (*Archivio Dello Stato Palermo*) was also consulted for some files. The files varied between digital and physical. Ancestry<sup>12</sup> was also used to obtain digital records from a number of databases including Italian birth records, US immigration records, WW1 registrations, and other documents that helped pinpoint information on individuals.

For each article or record found relating to a keyword, specific information was noted if available, so that it could be analysed and cross-referenced. Typical data noted included:

- Source details
- Publication title
- Date of publication
- Author
- Type of crime(s)
- Location of crime(s)
- Nationality of criminal
- Name of criminal
- Place of origin of criminal
- Nationality of any victims
- Length of time of crime if over an extended period
- Indicated sources of information

---

<sup>6</sup> <http://vault.fbi.gov/>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.archives.gov>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.archives.nysed.gov/aindex.shtml>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/state-archives.html>

<sup>10</sup> [https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/JFK\\_Documents\\_-\\_FBI.html](https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/JFK_Documents_-_FBI.html)

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.ellisland.org/>

<sup>12</sup> Ancestry.com

- Evidence that relates to the hypothesis
- Notable article bias
- Unique information

This data was stored in various databases depend on how it was to be used. When analysing the information, the first thing to look for was evidence of a link. Other patterns were also looked for, for example, if a significant number of individuals came from one location in Italy and reunited in the United States.

Data collected varied depending on what it was useful for. A database of the details of 380 individuals known or likely to be involved in mafia activities pre-1920 included their place of origin, their year of migration, destination (Felicia Allum used a similar table, albeit with fewer results, in her analysis of post 1970s Camorra mobility, though she used fewer fields and included the year the Camorristi was wanted by police from and year of their arrest (Allum, 2017, pp. 18-19)). The history of some of these individuals was looked at in more depth; exploring their reasons for resettlement, employment, and any criminal past they may have had. These individuals were chosen based on information available – the scarcity of information on many of the individuals meant that the few of which there is information were used as key examples. It is worth noting that these examples may be exceptional cases rather than the norm for mafia transplantation, but with the absence of further data, it would be impossible to test.

### **Identification of relevant Mafiosi**

The list of Mafiosi chosen for this study were those whose careers and migratory patterns make them good cases to examine mafia transplantation. They were identified by using a variety of sources including existing literature for the more famous Mafioso, contemporary newspaper reports, police reports, and latter law enforcement files that allude to pre-1920 activities and mobility (such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics case files). Where possible, these have been verified with available records such as census records, New York passenger lists and WW1 and WW2 Draft registrations cards.

The list leaves out a number of names such as those who arrived very shortly before prohibition (1919) and have no information on them during that period, or those who may have been identified by one source (such as on the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1950 list) but there is little information on them otherwise (this is occasionally due to the use of aliases by

some criminals making matching them to earlier criminals difficult). Some have been omitted as there doesn't appear to be a continuous pattern of crime in their history (for example there were a large number of different associates at various points of Morello and Lupo's counterfeiting and bankruptcy enterprises, but whether those individuals were fledgling criminals or temporary, perhaps even unwilling, partners is impossible to tell). Others have been omitted on the basis that the data provided on them in other sources could not be verified through, or conflicted with, relevant original records.

The best effort has been made to fill in gaps for birth and emigration dates but this is not always possible, especially where the individual has a common name or changed name (Charles Carlisi, for example, resulted in no records for individuals born in Palermo but three in Agrigento province- one born in 1879, one in 1896 and a Carlo Carlisi in 1827). It is also worth noting that even the official information cannot be guaranteed to be accurate. For example, John Roselli's place of birth is listed as Chicago on a number of official documents and early FBI reports, yet latter investigation by the FBI discovered these were forged documents that Roselli held, and he was actually born in Lazio, emigrating 6 years later (John Roselli FBI files, n.d.).

## **Basis paradigms**

The research seeks to test the existing literature, and add to it, and in order to do so, this section outlines the paradigms used in the analysis of transplantation theory to explain the emergence of US mafias pre-1920s. The predominant paradigms that advocate mafia transplantation are examined and converted into a structure that can be used to analyse the likelihood of transplantation from Italy to the United States of America. This structure is based on the existing literature and previous studies outlined below.

There are two sets of established paradigms on transplantation, both of which are used to identify central factors to be examined in the research. Federico Varese's 'property right theory of mafia emergence' model from his book *Mafias on the Move* (Varese, 2011), and his journal article 'How Mafias Migrate ' (Varese, 2006). The second set is that of Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti from their articles both entitled "The Mobility of Criminal Groups" (Morselli, et al., 2011) (Morselli, et al., 2010) are used to form the central structure for analysis. Both Varese and Morselli *et al.* have incorporated the work of previous authors into their own models, between them covering the key points from past research into the subject, with only

one notable exception. Michael Woodiwiss's theory of organised crime emergence in the US does not present us with a model but rather argues that there is no proof that an international transplanted mafia organisation existed and that it is rather the exaggerated conclusions made by government agencies and the media since the 1950s (Woodiwiss, 2001, pp. 243-269).

Whilst Woodiwiss's argument is relevant to the analysis, it does not focus on transplantation theory(-ies) and instead represents the absolute, i.e. that transplantation did not happen at all in this case (Sicilian groups in the US) and instead organised crime in the US is a product of US society. Therefore, whilst his evidence (or rejection of evidence) for transplantation can be used in the analysis, it is not useful in building a framework from which to analyse whether transplantation occurred. There are other works on mafia mobility/transplantation that are journalistic accounts such as Misha Glenny's *McMafia* (Glenny, 2008), but these works do not add directly to the academic debate on transplantation theory, instead often providing stories that entertain the reader.

Both sets of paradigms feature push and pull factors as reasons for transplantation occurring. Morselli *et al.* define push factors as those 'which drives criminal groups away from a setting' and pull factors as those 'which draw criminal groups to a setting' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 6). Varese defines these terms as supply and demand (Varese, 2011, pp. 16-20) but states that the Supply may also be referred to as push (Varese, 2011, p. 27).

This initially demonstrates similarities in paradigm threading through both sets of differing discourse underlying the theory. Though the two sets of paradigm have differing elements, it can be argued that there has not been a paradigm shift in academia relating to transplantation theory in recent years (no new book/article on organised crime has attempted to tackle transplantation). To examine the extent to which transplantation of the Italian Mafia(s) took place, a framework of analysis is required, and this is based on the existing discourse synthesising the two main approaches as established by Varese and by Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti. This section first outlines both sets of models of transplantation before offering a framework that combines the important elements of the two into one framework that splits the factors into thematic sections. It is from this that the analyses can take place. Following the framework, there is a discussion into each theme and how it impacts upon the analysis of transplantation theory.

## Varese's approach to transplantation

Federico Varese's model is based on what he calls the 'Property-right theory of mafia emergence', the idea that 'mafias emerge in societies that are undergoing a sudden and late transition to the market economy, lack a legal structure that reliably protects property rights or settles business disputes, and have a supply of people trained in violence who became unemployed at the specific juncture' (Varese, 2011, p. 12). His model implies that markets play the most important role in the emergence of criminal groups and that this; coupled with the resettlement of criminals, often forced, leads to successful transplantation. He argues that the other objectives of a criminal group, such as resource acquisition or overseas investment, did not lead to the successful transplantation of a criminal group (Varese, 2011).

In his analysis of seven case studies of transplantation (one of which is transplantation to New York), he examined a number of factors to determine which ones coincided with successful transplantation (which he argues was successful in New York). He uses the following table to display these key factors in transplantation to determine which ones lead to the successful transplantation:

### *Varese's Potential Factors Facilitating Mafia Transplantation [Based on (Varese, 2011, p. 28)]*

Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright.  
The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancaster Library -  
Coventry University.



Whilst Varese's analysis is not overly concerned with whether the emergence of organised crime was homegrown in each scenario or whether it was a complete transplantation, his factors can still be used, in conjunction with others, to conduct the analysis of what sort of transplantation took place. Even the factors which Varese concluded to be non-conducive (investments, migration, resource acquisition) are included in the analysis as they represent factors which were promoted by authors prior to Varese (migration, for example, was oft claimed to be the cause of transplantation through the alien conspiracy theory).

Separate from the key factors provided in the table, Varese outlines a number of other factors conducive to transplantation. Varese draws from Reuter (Reuter, 1983) and Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993) to establish theories of why mafias might find it difficult to transplant, represented in the table below:

*Varese's difficulties for transplanting [Based on (Varese, 2011, p. 14)]*

Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancaster Library - Coventry University.

These difficulties in transplantation are important in the analysis as they represent factors which prove that transplantation to the US was not possible or unlikely. They are examined using the evidence available to show the way in which Italian groups allegedly communicated with US Mafiosi, and analysed to determine whether they monitored agents and collected information. The reputation difficulty is also an important point of analysis in that criminals in the US needed to associate themselves with a fearsome organisation, in this case, the Sicilian mafia, in order to carry out their activities. This association barely exists and is mostly the

creation of both these criminals and the contemporary media, both with a vested interest in showing that a powerful international organisation exists.

Putting these together with Varese's push/pull factors it is possible to see which factors Varese considers important in the analysis of Transplantation:

*Varese's factors considered for transplantation [Based on (Varese, 2011, pp. 16-31)]*

<i>Supply/Push</i>	Migration		Willing or unwilling. Forced Resettlement, Fear of punishment.
	Resources		Desire to obtain resources
	Investments		Desire for investment
	Markets		Desire and incentives to open overseas outpost
<i>Demand/Pull and Local Conditions</i>	Generalized Trust		Does the level of local trust impact on likelihood of transplantation
	Demand for criminal protection	Presence of local protectors	Such as existing mafia or corrupt officials and police
		Size Of Locale	
		New/ and or Booming markets	<a href="#">Localised Market.</a> Economies undergoing sudden change
<i>Reputation, Information and Monitoring</i>			

## Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's paradigms

Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti present a set of three transplantation models based on different areas of research which are; criminal markets, ethnic-based groups and criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings. Each of these, whilst focussing on a different research discipline and approach, features push and pull factors, with overlaps and similarities between each model.

Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti analysed each approach by looking at how other researchers in each area have presented the mobility of organised crime groups. They then look at the common themes from the research to provide advice for law enforcement methods. Whilst the conclusions on how law enforcement should effectively tackle the mobility of organised crime groups have little impact on this research, the factors which the trio of academics use in each model can be adapted to fit the research framework.

Below is a summary that outlines each model and how they feed into the analysis<sup>13</sup>:

### Criminal market research

The criminal market research model is the one that is closest to the conclusions from Varese's model. It **takes** the approach that the main push and pull factors are those related to the criminal market with weak law enforcement/state protection and demand for criminal services being the primary factors.

Push factors:

- Increased law-enforcement
- Increased competition from criminal groups (selection effect)

Pull factors:

- Mass demand
- Access to supply
- Lax law-enforcement
- High impunity / corruption
- Proximity to trafficking routes
- Porous borders

---

<sup>13</sup> Bullet points adapted from (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 3)

- Presence of brokers and facilitators

These factors are used in the analysis, alongside Varese's to explore the role of both market opportunities and market conditions. This includes looking for evidence that a market opportunity both existed and was taken advantage of by Italian groups.

### Research on ethnic-based criminal groups

Based on research such as Francis Ianni's ethnic succession theory (Ianni, 1974), the ethnic-based criminal model focusses on the impact of socio-economic changes on the criminal groups and their ethnic backgrounds. Both Ianni and Adler report that as one ethnic group gains a certain social status, it is likely to increasingly turn to illicit activities, leaving space for socio-economically lower ethnic groups to fill the demand for the criminal services (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 172).

Push factors:

- Legitimation of group
- Increased socio-economic status
- Decreasing cultural marginalization
- Increased enforcement in country of origin or against a specific group

Pull factors:

- Individualist value system
- Legitimation of previous groups (ethnic succession theory)
- New opportunities for cross-border crime (e.g., immigrant diasporas in consuming countries; open borders)
- Ethnic group's criminal reputation
- Local ties and kinship networks

Factors from this second model are used to look at ethnic succession theory and how it relates to transplantation. It includes looking for evidence that the criminal groups existed as ethnic groups, or whether this model falls into what Albanese called the 'Ethnicity Trap' whereby groups are defined by their ethnicity rather than their activities (Albanese, 2004, p. 11). The role of the group's reputation in the US is examined; do the groups in the US link themselves to the Italian groups to build a reputation of fear? The extent to which local ties and kinship networks created a bond between Italian and US groups also needs to be analysed within this research.

### Research on criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings

The third of Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's models focuses on the criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings. Criminogenic conditions are identified as conditions likely to cause criminal behaviour. In this model 'offenders organise around available opportunities' and 'opportunities create organised offenders', the latter of which fits with Morselli *et al.*'s emergent context in which groups do not move with a 'strategic' objective (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 176). The following are Morselli *et al.*'s push and pull factors relating to criminogenic conditions:

Push factors:

- Displacement by credible authority

Pull factors:

- Lax security / enforcement / high impunity
- Poorly regulated economic sectors
- Overlaps between upper and underworld actors
- Low skill trade
- Low technology and professionalization
- High number of unemployed, disenfranchised workers
- Lack of conventional products and services (emergence of black markets and private protection needs)

This model focuses heavily on the conditions that allow organised crime groups to develop in a location and these factors regarding the conditions are used in the analysis to look at the conditions in the US locations, and how they compare to the conditions for groups in Italy. This also involves looking at whether these conditions in the US are suited to the criminal skills and expertise of existing Italian groups.

All three of the models feature a push factor that proposes some kind of forced/unwilling resettlement, be it increase in law enforcement or competition from other groups, rather than suggesting that generalised migration is a factor. Therefore, to determine the plausibility of transplantation in the Italy-US case the push factors from Italy are examined – was there a reason that caused forced the mobility of mafia groups from Italy during this time period?

One important point to note is in all of their approaches Morselli *et al.* state that the setting matters more than the groups themselves – that settings that are vulnerable have problems

that are persistent, whilst groups are 'transient' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 7). They suggest that the vulnerabilities in such settings allow criminal groups to evolve as well as 'offering opportunities that may attract established groups in other geographical locations' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 7). Both Varese's and Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's approaches focus heavily on the settings rather than the groups in determining mobility and transplantation of organised crime groups.

## Further additions

In addition to the work of Varese and Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, other factors can be added on or suggested ones expanded upon. In order to consider the hypothesis of this thesis, the two sets of paradigms need to be considered in a way that they show 'influenced transplantation' occurred, and 'outpost transplantation' did not. Elements that are key to this analysis, such as cultural transplantation, are not addressed in either set of factors. However, both sets of factors are sufficiently broad in that these elements can be considered within the context of the other factors in that they are influencing elements that transcend the study. The adoption of cultural traits from the homeland, for example, is central to the building of reputation that the mafia group must undertake in its local environment.

## Structure for analysis

Based on the two sets of paradigms, and contributions from other sources, a structure is formed that covers the major factors leading to the various types of transplantation of a criminal group. These factors are used to determine what type of transplantation occurred of Mafiosi from Italy to the United States pre-1920, and to show that 'outpost transplantation' did not occur but rather an 'influenced transplantation' took place. Whether these factors had an impact should not be considered in absolute terms, for example, communication between US and Italian groups could sit on a range from complete control and orders from Italy, through advice and assistance from Italy, to complete autonomy of the US groups. Varese even points out that the American Mafiosi were not agents of the Italian Mafia, that they were merely subject to influence (Varese, 2011, p. 120). This thesis uses these factors to explore this relationship between the US mafia groups and the Italian groups.

Below is a table that groups the push, pull and successful transplantation factors together into thematic sections to be looked at individually. This table features the factors from both sets of paradigms, which in some cases have been merged or simplified to remove duplicate or similar concepts. The thematic sections have been chosen as they encompass all of the factors into three distinct sections that allow the analysis to be broken down and to focus on closely related factors together. The topics chosen for the thematic sections represent three of the key areas around which the research is centred: Migration, Markets and Operation. The sections and their subsections form the chapter topics for analysis.

The first section focussing on migration looks at both general migration and migration of criminals. It looks at the evidence (or lack of) that mafia groups moved, as a group, with general migration to the US, and rejects the idea that Mafiosi willingly moved to set up an overseas outpost. Instead, the forced resettlement of Mafiosi/criminals from Italy during this time period helped the formation of these new influenced groups in the US.

The second section focuses on the role of the market in the alleged transplantation of Mafiosi from Italy to New York. It is split into a number of subsections which each centre on a different aspect of the market. The first subsection covers market opportunities for criminals in the US during this period and whether these markets were attractive to Italian criminals and whether Italian criminals entered these markets. The second subsection looks at the market and local conditions within these markets to determine whether they encouraged the growth of



organised crime groups or attracted existing groups, and to see if they were particularly susceptible to Italian groups. The third subsection looks at international criminal activities in the trade industry, to see whether there was any evidence of international market trade between Italy and the US by criminals.

The third section focuses on the operations of the groups in Italy and US, to determine whether it was possible for the Italian mafia groups to operate outposts overseas. This includes looking at the communication between criminals in Italy and the US, and the existence of kinship networks and local ties in the US and the influence and control Italian groups had on these networks.

There is some crossover between the sections; some factors will have an influence on others, which cannot be represented within this table.

## Framework for analysing transplantation

Sections		Push Factors	Pull Factors	Factors for successful transplantation
<b>Migration</b>		General Migration	General Migration	
		Legitimation of group	Porous borders	Migration of established mafiosi
		Increased socioeconomic status and decreasing cultural marginalization	Legitimation of previous groups (ethnic succession theory)	Migration of skilled criminals
<b>Market</b>	<b>Market opportunities</b>	Desire to operate overseas outpost in foreign market	New/ and or Booming markets	Financial or other benefits
		Seeking Investments	Mass demand/Demand for criminal protection - (Lack of ) Presence of local protectors	
		Increased competition from criminal groups in existing markets	Market penetrability (size of locale, low technology and low professionalization)	
	<b>Market and Local Conditions</b>	Seeking Resources	Poorly regulated economic sectors	Knowledge to penetrate new markets
		Displacement by increased law-	Lax law-enforcement /high corruption	

		enforcement	Presence of brokers and facilitators	
			Overlaps between upper and underworld actors	
			Generalized Trust	
			Individualist value system	
			New opportunities for cross-border crime (e.g., immigrant diasporas in consuming countries; open borders)	
			High unemployment of workers	
			Availability of local resources	
	Trade opportunities and conditions	Goods to be trafficked	Access to trafficking routes	
			Proximity to trafficking routes	
Operation			Local ties and kinship networks	Ability to Monitor Agents

		Distance and travel	Information Collection
			Communication
			Ethnic group's criminal reputation
			Ability to control agents

## Migration

The relationship between migration and organised crime is looked at both at a general level, and at the level of individuals. It is examined to determine whether there is any link between Italian migrant destinations in the US and the emergence of organised crime groups in these destinations. Beyond that the destinations of known Italian Mafiosi are examined to see whether there is a correlation between these and Italian migration, and if so whether this is coincidence, and if not, why not.

Regarding the push factors relating to migration, Varese separates migration into two categories willing and unwilling (Varese, 2011, p. 27). He describes 'willing' Mafiosi migration as 'due to intentionally seeking resources, investments or markets' and 'unwilling' as forced resettlement due to '*soggiorno obbligato*, mafia wars and the attempt to escape prosecution' (Varese, 2011, p. 27). In his analysis he also points out that willing mafia migration rarely happens, often they are forced to resettle elsewhere (Varese, 2011, p. 191). In the analysis of this research, it is important to look at the reasons for migration of Mafiosi during this period- whether they willingly or unwillingly migrated. The research examines whether unwilling resettlement of Mafiosi did occur during this period (Varese highlights Fascism as a cause for unwilling' migration – but this doesn't occur until the 1920's).

Morselli *et al* point out that 'popular images of organized crime generally perceive participants to be strategic (or intentional) in their actions', under 'the premise that mobility is an effortless task for any group or organization', that they can move 'with little or no constraint, from one geographic location to the next into another group's territory or into legitimate industries' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 7). As Morselli *et al.* reject this approach as 'simple' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 8) and this lends credence to Varese's argument that transplantations are almost always as a result of unwilling migration.

Based on both sets of paradigms it is important to see what may have caused an unwilling migration, for example if law-enforcement increased (or became more stringent) in Italy before 1920, encouraging an exodus of Mafiosi to the US or whether organised crime groups in Italy faced increased competition from other criminal groups (or perhaps from other state/legal protection services).

Other factors that have been suggested to push ethnic-based criminal groups out of a setting include the legitimization of groups based on increased socio-economic status and decreasing

cultural marginalization. In this area Morselli *et al.* refer to Francis Ianni's ethnic succession theory (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 172) that suggests as one ethnic group integrates itself further into society/increases its social standing, it moves away from criminal activities, and other criminal groups take their place.

With the pull factors Morselli *et al.* state that 'new opportunities for cross-border crime (e.g. immigrant diasporas in consuming countries; open borders)' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 3) are a pull factor for organised crime groups to a territory. During the time period to be analysed the US underwent changes in its immigration policy; the previously open-border policy was subjected to stricter immigration checks and limitations. This aspect is considered when looking at the migration of individuals during this period.

As part of the analyses on migration it was necessary to look at the role of cultural identities in the organised crime groups; whether criminals consider themselves part of a historical organisation with its roots in Italy and whether US-based criminals follow the same rules and rituals which govern their Italian counterparts

By looking at the similarities and differences in the cultural customs and rituals between organised crime groups in the US and Italy during this period, an analysis can be made on how similar the two organisations are. However, similarities and common themes should not be misinterpreted as evidence of 'outpost transplantation'. However, similar cultural factors, such as certain mindsets or practices, may be indicative of an 'influenced transplantation'.

Part of this analysis involves looking at the criminal reputation of the ethnic group (Italian/Sicilian) and whether this was linked to a reputation of the Italian mafia. For example were criminals able to utilise the reputation of their Italian counterparts to instil fear on potential victims and to portray a perceived strength to competitors?

## Markets

The role of criminal markets in the emergence of Organised Crime groups in the US is analysed; its importance highlighted by both Varese and by Morselli *et al.*'s models (as well as those who reject outright transplantation such as Critchley (Critchley, 2009) or Woodiwiss (Woodiwiss, 2001)). In order to thoroughly examine the role of the markets in the transplantation process, this section has been broken down into three sub-sections. The first focusses on the market opportunities themselves, looking at emerging markets that have a demand for criminal protection/skills. The second sub-section aims to focus more on the conditions that allow organised crime groups to exist and operate within that market and locale. The third subsection is concerned with the role of trade in transplantation of organised crime groups, particularly between the home and host countries.

### Market Opportunities

This subsection involves looking at various different markets (including extortion, gambling, prostitution, etc.) and determining whether there was a demand for criminal protection of these markets. By looking at the demand for criminal services in the US it is possible to identify opportunities open to foreign criminals. These markets are analysed to determine whether they favour criminal involvement from home-grown organisations (or opportunistic individuals) or from foreign (or Italian) groups. To help this analysis the criminal markets which were utilised by organised crime groups in Italy are compared to the criminal markets that emerged in the US and where Sicilian/Italian groups operated; it was important to look at whether these activities are synonymous with activities carried out by the organised crime groups in Italy in the same period. Existing organised crime activities needed to be looked at [to see if there is](#) the infiltration of Italian groups into criminal markets. This includes looking at activities that were controlled by non-Italian groups and examining why Italians were unable/ unwilling to become involved in these activities.

This section also looks at the push factors that might encourage the Italian groups to take advantage of market opportunities. This could range from a desire to expand into overseas markets; a strategic decision, to being forced to consider an overseas market due to increased competition in home markets. The criminal group may also be strategically seeking to invest resources in an overseas market (licit or illicit).

### Market and local conditions

The second subsections focus is on the conditions that allow the criminal group to exist and thrive in the market. Varese states that 'Mafias emerge and transplant when certain key structural conditions are present in the economy' (Varese, 2011, p. 12). From both sets of paradigms, there are a number of factors that state the ideal conditions for criminal markets to flourish. These include poor market regulation, lax law enforcement, low skill trade, low technology, high unemployment, high corruption and overlaps between underworld and underworld actors. The role of generalized trust is of lesser concern; Varese explores this in his book and determines that trust levels don't impact upon transplantation considered (Varese, 2011, pp. 23-27).

The role of law enforcement and state regulations in the market is key to this subsection with it forming an important part of both sets of paradigms. As Varese states 'the critical factor is proximity to a sudden market expansion that is not properly regulated by the state and the presence of people who can step in to regulate such markets' (Varese, 2011, p. 12). Morselli *et al.*'s research on criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings suggests that poorly regulated economic sectors are a draw for criminal groups (Morselli, et al., 2010). These economic sectors often have overlaps between upper and underworld actors, low skill trades, low technology and professionalization and a high number of disenfranchised, unemployed workers (Morselli, et al., 2010). These factors allow for easy penetration for criminal groups that are able to take advantage of corruption and create opportunities to work in the illicit economy.

These conditions are examined to see whether they benefit new US grown criminal groups or transplantation by established foreign groups. On this Morselli *et al.*, drawing from Peter Reuter's work, stated that 'in geographical locations where law enforcement controls are consistent and effective, the criminal market is more likely to be competitive, thus creating important barriers to growth for criminal groups who are kept in constant check not only by law-enforcement monitoring, but also by their competitors within the criminal market. Such barriers to organisational growth affect a group's ability to expand geographically' (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 168). This not only suggests that law enforcement laxity is key to the growth of organised crime groups within the said market, but also to their ability to grow organisationally into other markets.



Law enforcement is also examined to see whether the strength of the police is lower or comparable to that of Italy, especially in regards to dealing with organised crime groups. Levels of corruption are compared with Italy and viewed to see firstly whether early Italian Organised crime groups took advantage of corruption and secondly if the corruption took advantage of connections with Italy, or whether they were US based.

The demand for resources as a push factor for a group and the access to supplies of those resources as a pull factor is also considered. From this, it is possible to determine the suitability of the US as a host destination for accessing supplies required by the Italian organisations, as well as looking into the type of resources required and for evidence of resource acquisition taking place. In addition, it is possible to look at the advantages gained by retaining supply links from Italy, for example, were they able to obtain firearms, personnel, etc. Beyond this, the proximity to trafficking routes in the locations that Italian migrants and criminals settled in the US may give a clue to the intentions of criminals migrating to the US – especially if they locate themselves to areas in which other legitimate trade routes/ work opportunities are limited.

## Trade

Trade between Italy and the US is examined to determine whether organised crime groups were involved in international trade, of both known Mafiosi who immigrated to the US, and newer criminals who appear to have no criminal history in Italy. It is important to see if there were any links between the international trade and underworld activities.

As a push factor, an Italian organisation may have goods to be trafficked to overseas markets that serve as an encouragement to establish an overseas outpost. As a pull factor, one of the key attributes of said outpost would have to be its proximity to key trafficking routes, which might also provide access to supplies of key resources used in other markets.

## Operations

The final area that is analysed is the potential for operating and communicating with an outpost overseas. If the organisation(s) in the US was an overseas outpost of the Italian organisation(s), then communication would be a key element to maintaining control over that outpost. As Varese highlights there are several challenges relating to [communicating](#) with and operating an overseas outpost, not least because of the illicit nature of the activities (Varese, 2011, p. 14).

It is therefore important to examine these challenges and, if the US organisations were overseas outposts of Italian groups, how they circumvented the problems arising from the challenges. This includes looking how it might have been possible for Italian groups to maintain order and discipline, enforce rules and rituals, and prevent criminals acting of their own accord/undermining the organisation.

Morselli *et al.* also address this issue, again drawing upon Peter Reuter; 'groups were limited in their geographical expansion because they would not be able to control participants who were working for them in extended territories and also because size and distance generally attracted unwanted attention from law-enforcement and competing criminal groups' (Morselli, et al., 2010, p. 11).

The research, therefore, examines the role of local ties and kinship networks in the US which, perhaps inadvertently, support and provide for organised crime groups (acting as a pull factor). Morselli *et al.* provide us with an example of how Chinese triads are supported by their kinship network;

'Criminal actors engaged in such transnational criminal activities are based on flexible and international networks that operate as service providers in both countries. In order to remain highly adaptable to market constraints, participants work in small groups, with informal-referrals and minimal bureaucratic structures. What emerges is a lack of connections between these small entrepreneurs and the traditional Chinese organised crime organisations. Instead, non-Triad Chinese offenders emerge as key players in the global crime scene' (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 170).

Another pull factor that might impact on the likelihood of transplantation is distance. If the new locale is a long distance from the original locale is it easy to communicate with, travel to, etc. Within this research, this involves looking at the contemporary methods of international

transportation and communication between the US and Italy and determining whether they were sufficient to allow not only for transplantation to occur but also whether they were sufficient to support the cultural systems in place as a result of the transplantation.

Part of this analysis involves looking at the criminal reputation of the ethnic group (Italian) and whether this was linked to a reputation of the Italian mafia. For example were criminals able to utilise the reputation of their Italian counterparts to instil fear on potential victims and to portray a perceived strength to competitors.

Finally, it is important to look at what the benefit to operating an overseas outpost of a transplanted organisation was on both the groups in Italy and the emerging groups in the US. Was there any financial or strategic benefit to operating outposts in the US which would run counter to Morselli *et al.*'s claim that rational strategies of criminal groups are often exaggerated (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 166).

## **Determining the nature of transplantation**

The aforementioned sections and subsections form the structure for the analysis chapters, within which the framework is used to show evidence that transplantation occurred (or the extent to which it occurred). From the analyses of these various factors, it should become apparent the extent to which the emergence of mafia groups in the US pre-1920 was linked to a transplantation of Italian Mafiosi. This includes determining whether the Mafiosi were transplanted as individuals or as part of an Italian groups outpost; whether the decision to migrate and operate in the US was a willing/ strategic action or whether it was the result of circumstance; and whether the US groups were operating independently of or controlled by their Italian counterparts.

## Ethics

As this research is not using human participants or gathering empirical research, discussions about ethical principles in research are limited. The research into individuals does not concern anyone living, and the data is already in the public realm. Therefore I do not need to worry about Data Protection of information relating to these individuals. Potential ramifications for living relatives of individuals examined has also been considered, and the conclusion is that there is no risk associated to this; the period of time since these individuals were alive is significant and the information found will not impact upon the overall perception of said individuals. Care has been taken to make sure not to misrepresent individuals, living or dead, through the research.

The main ethical consideration is of ethical integrity and issues of quality. The research is held to UK institutional standards through the ethics review board and the university's annual progress review process and will be held to the standards of the University's research unit. This research is designated as low-risk for a number of reasons, namely because this research does not **involve** living human participants, and therefore does not put them at risk, nor it does not put the researcher at risk. The research will also not put the university at risk, or bring it into disrepute.

In addition, there are no financial, political or personal aspects, for example, external sponsorship or affiliations, which would have produced a conflict of interest. Consideration has been made for any 'gatekeepers' used to acquire access to information, might have any bias that would lead to the withholding or provision of misleading information, or any concerns relating to their presentation and portrayal.

The research has been conducted by an independent academic with no relevant organisational affiliation/sponsor, with a background in historical research and international relations, in particular, both the study of the history of and contemporary issues in international organised crime. The results of the research do not impact upon the researcher, nor his friends, family and colleagues, and the outcome of the research has no financial, political and personal gain for the researcher or their affiliates. Considering the above points it is important to keep the research as neutral as possible in terms of outlook, and keep an open mind rather than promoting a single agenda.

## Conclusions

The study of historical organised crime groups presents a number of challenges. Highlighting a link, or lack thereof, between two (or more) sets of groups internationally, may be impossible to prove without concrete evidence. The framework sets out the key conditions in which a mafia group could transplant and the indicators that it has transplanted (and in what form). Utilising archival data to re-examine the relationship between US and Italian groups allows for the reconsidering of the nature of mafia transplantation and to disprove the outpost based theories, instead suggesting a form of 'influenced transplantation'.

## Citations

### Citations

The Mafia in the United States. (1890, October 24). *New York Times*.

The Mafia on its Own Soil. (1891, April 27). *New York Times*.

The Mafia. (1902, August 3). *New York Times*.

The Mafia in New York. (1902, August 1902). *New York Times*.

U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 from note 13 (1958).

Albanese, J. (1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition)). *Organized Crime in America*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.

Albanese, J. (2004). North American Organized Crime. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 8-18.

Albini, J. (1997). Donald Cressey's Contributions to the study of Organised Crime: An Evaluation. In *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader*. London: Sage.

Allum, F. (2017). *Invisible Camorra*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Bryman, A. (2008 (3rd Ed)). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cressey, D. (1969). *Theft of the Nation*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers .

Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.

D'Amato, G. (April 1908). The "Black Hand" Myth. *The North American Review*, 187(629), 543-549.

Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Evans, K., & King, D. (2006). *Studying Society - The Essentials*. London: Routledge.

Fines, J. (1988). *Reading Historical Documents*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Limited.

Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.

Glenny, M. (2008). *McMafia*. New York: Vintage Books.

Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

John Roselli FBI files. (n.d)

Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.

Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.

McDowell, W. (2002). *Historical Research: A Guide*. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2010). *The Mobility of Criminal Groups*. Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada.

Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.

Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Newark, T. (2011). *Lucky Luciano: Mafia Murderer and Secret Agent*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

Potter, G. (1994). *Criminal Organizations; Vice, Racketeering and Politics in an American City*. Illinois: Waveland Press.

Presnell, J. (2007). *The Information Literate Historian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Repetto, T. (2004). *American Mafia*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.

Reuter, P. (1983). *Disorganized Crime*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Santino, U. (2015). *Mafia and antimafia : a brief history*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sapsford, R. [., & Jupp, V. [.] (2006: 2nd Ed). *Data Collection and Analysis*. London: Sage.

Saviano, R. (2006). *Gomorra*. Basingstoke: Pan Macmillan.

Tosh, J. (1999 (3rd Ed)). *The Pursuit of History*. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

Varese, F. (2006). How Mafias Migrate: The case of the 'Ndrangheta in Northern Italy. *Transnational Organised Crime*, 40(2), 411–444.

Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, . Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.

White, F. M. (1909, March 21). The Increasing Menace of the "Black Hand". *New York Times*, p. Magazine section.

Woodiwiss, M. (2001). *Organized crime and American power: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

# Migration

---

## Introduction

This chapter evaluates the relationship between migration to the US of Italians in the late nineteenth/ early twentieth century, and the emergence of Sicilian and Southern Italian American mafia groups during the selected time frame. It looks at the factors introduced in the theoretical framework and evaluates them supported by the research data to determine the importance and validity of claims regarding the role of migration in the emergence of these groups.

The evaluation includes looking at reasons for migration from Italy (push factors) and to the US (pull factors), and any of the side-effects and consequences of the migration process and how these impact upon the likelihood of transplantation. Also, the reasons will be explored to see how they facilitate/hinder the growth of US mafia groups. Some aspects related to criminal markets and opportunities will be hinted at in this chapter but covered more fully in the chapter on markets.

This chapter will start by evaluating generalised migration and the impact this had on the growth of organised crime, including the effects indirectly caused by generalised migration. The evaluation includes looking at the impact of migration on the cultural elements that existed in the Italian groups and the US groups. An overview of the economic situation of the mafiosi is explained, and from this, the differences between the mafiosi and the average Southern Italian can be seen, and the impact this has on the likelihood of migrating is shown. There is discussion here of the mafia 'social ladder' theories in that they pertain to the socio-economic status of the mafioso. The thesis argues that Italian mafiosi were not subject to the same socio-economic conditions that forced many Southern Italians to emigrate, and therefore that generalised migration alone is not sufficient for explaining the transplantation of groups into the US. In a less globalised world, there were fewer reasons forcing or encouraging a mafia group to move its operations and to run an outpost elsewhere; their business was flourishing in the homeland despite the economic downturns affecting the rest of society.



Similarly, the pull factors are explored to demonstrate their role in relation to generalised migration before exploring how this relates to a transplanting mafia or mafioso. Of the reasons for generalised migration, the main highlights here are the opportunities for work that the US presented to the Italian migrant and the supposed opportunities for upward social mobility that US society afforded the migrant. The chapter explores why, for the mafia groups, these reasons do not equally apply – for example, mafiosi are not seeking unskilled labour, nor do they require an opportunity at upward social mobility.

The mafiosi migration experience is also examined. The collected data is used to look at the places of origin and destinations of mafiosi, their age at migration, their familial ties, and their reasons for migration. It shows that while Western Sicily is the origin for the majority of individuals but it is not the sole location and individuals also came from regions un-associated with mafia activity including some individuals that arrived from the Campania and Calabria joining US 'Camorra' organisations or other mafia groups. It also shows that the majority of mafia individuals active during this period arrived as adults in the US, after their formative years and that many were on the run from law enforcement.

## General Migration and Organised Crime Transplantation

The role generalised migration plays in the transplantation of mafia groups into the US forms an essential part of the understanding of transplantation as evidenced in the literature review. Generalised migration and its role in transplantation are therefore be examined here within the timeframe and location used within this study.

Generalised migration occurred en-masse from Southern Italy to the United States between 1880 and 1914. In 1880 fewer than 40,000 Italians lived in the US, but between 1880 and 1914 nearly 4 million Italians arrived, eighty percent of whom came from Sicily and the provinces south of Rome (Nelli, 1983, pp. 19,42). The study will assess to what extent the factors which attribute themselves to increased generalised migration could also apply to the transplantation of mafia groups. Following the model set out in previous chapters, the push factors away from Italy and pull factors to the US will be analysed in turn. Establishing the role of generalised migration within the study is important contextualisation for the analysis of the data collected on migrated mafiosi, it sets the norms and parameters from which the mafioso's experiences can be examined.

## Push Factors for Generalised Migration

There are a number of reasons why generalised mass emigration from Italy occurred during this time frame. First and foremost was overpopulation; in the Kingdom of Italy, there were 310 inhabitants per square mile in 1909 (Nelli, 1983, p. 19), the largest in a non-highly industrialised European state. Despite the large numbers of emigrants leaving Italy (approximately four million from Southern Italy between 1900 and 1915 (Duggan, 1995, p. 175)), the population continued to grow due to a high birth to death ratio. In Southern Italy, and Sicily specifically, the population doubled between 1861 and 1901 (Diner, 2001, p. 23).

According to Nelli other European states had managed to control their high population density through industrialisation but the Kingdom of Italy was a poor country deficient of the natural resources necessary for industrialisation (Nelli, 1983, p. 20). In the 1870s around 60 percent of Italy's population was directly dependant on agriculture, and by 1911 this was still around 55 percent (Duggan, 1995, p. 146).

In the rural South, the abolition of feudalism in the early nineteenth century compounded issues as new landowners turned the forest into agricultural land which in turn became unusable marshland due to soil erosion. Blok's study of a Sicilian village highlights how the

social erosion was exacerbated by the turning of public domains into private estates, after which the private owners would commence deforestation of woodland, turning them into grain fields, causing soil exhaustion and 'turning quiet streams into irregular torrents', and reducing protection from the wind (Blok, 1975, p. 119). A lack of advancement in farming methods and technology in the South also meant Italy struggled to compete internationally with its produce (Nelli, 1983, p. 22). The low peasant income, according to Nelli 'ruled out purchases of manufactures of quality agricultural goods' (Nelli, 1983, p. 22).

There were also changes in labour arrangements and the wage payment system between the landowners and workers. Landowners eliminated multi-leases (making the access to land by workers more difficult), reduction in workforce sizes, the monetisation of wages (removing cash advances and introducing prorated pay) and removal of remuneration in kind (Petrusewitz, 1997, pp. 35-36).

Natural disasters created further problems for workers in Southern Italy creating displacement of workers, such as after the phylloxera plant parasite which destroyed most of Southern Italy's vineyards, or the change in climate patterns which had facilitated soil erosion rather than providing moisture for produce growing (Nelli, 1983, pp. 24-25).

The economic problems of Italy further aggravated these issues due to a weakness in domestic demand for goods; for example, more than half of all the grain produced in Italy ended up consumed by those who produced it (Duggan, 1995, p. 149). There was little work for day labourers, with work often lasting less than half the year and many turned to theft or migration (Duggan, 1995, p. 149).

International competition had also intensified the problems facing the agricultural industry. Wheat imported cheaply from the Midwest US into Europe caused wheat prices to drop by half between 1873 and 1885. Farmers that survived the widespread bankruptcies converted their produce to grapes, citrus, olives and livestock, in turn damaging those markets (Petrusewitz, 1997, p. 22). In 1888 a trade war with France led to a drop in exports of wine, oil and liquorice (Duggan, 1995, p. 159) (Petrusewitz, 1997, p. 26) and a 300 percent tariff imposed by Russia on citrus fruits had similar consequences (Petrusewitz, 1997, p. 22).

In Sicily, large estates (*latifondi*) were increasingly important in the economy the late nineteenth century and 'a long history of exporting grain had been nurtured with the economy of the industrial world' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 27). The Sicilian landed-elite resisted modern

agriculture such as fertilizers, machinery, and transportation advances, and other modern institutions, such as a strong central government and thus Sicilian wheat consequently became less competitive as an exporting good, with cheaper imports taking over the markets (Bodnar, 1985, p. 27). In manufactured crafts, similarly, the transitions from feudalism to capitalism meant that labours faced competition from factory produced cheaper products (Bodnar, 1985, p. 30).

Worsening agricultural work conditions from the 1870s onwards encouraged the emergence of socialist and workers movements, putting pressure on landowners and the state through strikes and occasionally violence. The state's response to this was to side with the landowners by providing police and military interventions against the workers (Duggan, 1995, p. 163) (Santino, 2015).

The GDP boom between 1896 and 1914, averaging a yearly increase of 2.8% (2.1% per capita) exceeding the growth of Germany, the UK and France , was largely due to industrial advancements in the North, remittances of emigrants to their families and reorganisation of the banking sector (Duggan, 1995, pp. 172-174). This growth was not matched in agriculture, the staple industry of the South, and the rural labourers continued to live in poor conditions.

The urban South wasn't much better. Overpopulation was as much an issue in the cities; Palermo and Naples, the South's largest cities, were experiencing fast growths in population. Between 1870 and 1910 Palermo grew from 219,000 inhabitants to 342,000, and Naples, as Italy's largest city, grew from 449,000 to 723,000 inhabitants (Mitchell, 1992 in (Duggan, 1995, p. 148)).

According to Duggan, seventy –five percent or more of peasant expenditure went on food, the rest on clothing and shelter (Duggan, 1995, p. 146). This was coupled with high taxation and a lack of opportunity for upward socio-economic mobility, with only a few notable exceptions according to Nelli; through the Catholic Church and organised crime groups (Nelli, 1983, pp. 23,26-27).

The state introduced new taxes to finance modernisation efforts, but these taxes on common goods such as food, animals and fireplaces affected the poor more than the rich who were able to evade taxes by trading on political friendships (Diner, 2001, p. 21).

These factors combined led to large numbers of disenfranchised and unemployed workers, particularly those in the lower classes who would look at the alternatives for employment and lifestyle.

From 1900 to 1915 approximately four million people left the South, primarily rural labourers, to work abroad (Duggan, 1995, p. 175). However, this move of workers was not equal across all of society;

‘Lower strata day labourers were among the least likely to leave. In fact, an analysis of Sicilian passports between 1901 and 1914 by Historian John Briggs found 54 percent of the adult males leaving non-agricultural operations such as fishermen or skilled tradesmen’ (Bodnar, 1985, p. 21)

Emigration was not equal across all parts of Southern Italy, for example, Bodnar identified that emigration from Italian coastal areas involved with trade came before inland regions (Bodnar, 1985, p. 13). It was also rather more prominent where the feudal system had not been replaced by working class organisations such as trade unions and co-operatives, and that those who were dissatisfied with the economic conditions, and who also had a fear of losing status in society had the greatest desire to emigrate, rather than those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder who would have been too poor to afford the move (Nelli, 1983, p. 32).

Bodnar also highlighted that social class impacted upon an Italian’s ability to move:

‘Abundant evidence exists, moreover, to suggest that those departing were not coming from the depths of their respective society but occupied positions somewhere in the middle and lower-middle levels of their social structures. Those too poor could seldom afford to go, and the very wealthiest had too much of a stake in the homelands to depart.’ (Bodnar, 1985, p. 13)

It is in the areas where the feudal system had not been replaced by workers unions and cooperatives that the emergence of a different power system that governed worker-landowner relations is visible, a mafia system.

#### Impact of generalised push factors on Sicilian mafia groups

Despite the early newspaper reports in the US linking mafia groups to the immigration waves, the Mafia groups were mostly protected and even benefited, from the adverse conditions

affecting society reducing the likelihood that they migrated as part of a generalised migration wave. As Raab highlights;

*At the time of this immigration wave, none of the Sicilian cosche tried to establish beachheads or branches in the United States. [...] In Sicily, the mafia families were among the favored "haves", not the downtrodden "have-nots". They had no reason to relinquish their enviable, comfortable station in life for risky ventures in foreign lands*  
(Raab, 2005, p. 18)

Raab has exemplified here the position of Italian mafia groups and the likelihood that these factors impacted upon them as a group. Accordingly, this section briefly explains how, and if, these factors had any impact on mafia groups as a whole, and whether the mafia groups would have made the decision to emigrate. The cases of individual mafiosi and the role of these factors, along with other push factors, are explored later in the chapter.

Whilst there was a lack of upward socio-economic mobility post-feudalism for regular Italians, this was not the case for proto-mafia organisations (as Nelli suggested- the mafia was one of the few avenues through which an individual could achieve upwards mobility). Catanzaro separates the mafia relationship with class into two possible theorems (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 12,16-17). In one a 'high' and 'low' mafia exists, whereby the higher class mafiosi protect the lower in return for commitments of loyalty. Catanzaro's second approach suggests that mafia transcends all classes but undertakes social mobility (Catanzaro, 1992, p. 12).

Here there are similarities in Santino's paradigm of complexity. In which he defines the high mafia as a 'mafia bourgeoisie', the dominant element of the mafia system, and the low mafia as those seeking to move up the social ladder;

For the poorer and more marginalized levels, the criminal activity represents the only, or one of the few, means of earning a living; as well, a criminal career offers the real possibility of social mobility (Santino, 2017).

Catanzaro's two approaches can be used to explain the relationship between the push factors causing generalised migration and the impact on the mafia groups' likelihood of whole transplantation. Of the societal classes present, two are most important in understanding the operations of the mafia, the *gabelloti*, managers of the land for the ruling class, and the ruling classes themselves, often away in the cities.

The *gabelloti*, who represented the backbone of the mafia replaced the ruling class as managers and protectors of rural estates (Hobsbawm, 1965, pp. 37-38). They were able to take advantage of absentee landowners post-feudalism by making themselves overseers of the land; dealing with protection of the land, exploitation of peasants and intimidating of absentee owners into giving favourable rent terms (Nelli, 1983, pp. 26-27) (Santino, 2015). In addition to state support, landowners often turned to the *gabelloti* to deal with workers movements, such as *fasci* groups (Blok, 1975, pp. 121-127). In contrast to the plight of the non-mafioso worker, the *gabelloto's* position was enhanced by the abolition of feudalism, and the conditions that fostered the creation of *fasci* groups; their control and protection of the land made them indispensable to the system in the absence of state control. As Farrell highlighted;

‘The changed social conditions gave *gabelloto* the possibility of upward mobility which had been denied his predecessors in the more rigid feudal regime, and his capacity for extracting unearned income from the peasant and the landlord afforded him every opportunity for exploiting that new potential. His status was not sanctioned by tradition, as was that of the feudal overlord, but he found in brute force, and later in economic power, an effective substitute.’ (Farrell, 1997, pp. 12-13)

The *gabelloti*, in turn, used their upper-class links back to Palermo where lawyers settled property transfers, officials and courts could be ‘fixed’, and merchants dealt with the sale and export of goods (Hobsbawm, 1965, p. 38). These two groups, the *gabelloti* and the city upper classes, represent those that Catanzaro referred to in his “high” and “low” mafia approach, and they form the mainstay of the mafia organisation.

In relation to the likelihood of migration, both “high” and “low” mafia are not only unaffected by the issues faced by the common worker, but they are also somewhat enhanced by the situation. Unemployment (or unsecure employment) and poverty did not affect those in these mafia positions; they were in secure employment, well paid, and, with regards to the *gabelloti* protection services, in demand.

Catanzaro’s second model gives the traditional career of the mafiosi up the social ladder in stages (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 34-37). The first four stages of Catanzaro’s ladder represent the first phase of a mafioso’s career whereby he is violent and individualistic, competing with others for the dominant position and public esteem. The second phase, represented by the final five stages, is a process of institutionalisation and the transformation of the mafioso’s

power to recognised legitimate power (See Figure 1 – Model representation of Catanzaro's stages of a mafioso's career towards legitimisation based on for details on each stage). Despite this, Catanzaro argues that the mafia never reaches full consolidation as a legitimate enterprise (Catanzaro, 1992, p. 38).

Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancaster Library - Coventry University.

Figure 1 – Model representation of Catanzaro's stages of a mafioso's career towards legitimisation based on (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 34-37)

Catanzaro's second model can be used to show a split in the fortunes of a mafioso; those in the earlier stages are affected by the some of the conditions also afflicting the common migrant and would therefore potentially migrate, while those in the later stages are not only protected from these afflictions but in some cases benefit from them. Even those in the early stages would have benefitted from the conditions facing the south of Italy; these individuals would have made up the *gabello*, referred to in Catanzaro's first model.

The mafia system emerged in part out of a desire to protect family honour and patrimonies against external attacks and pressures, such as the Catholic Church, who prevented the consolidation of property by outlawing the marriage of cousins, and the state who divided patrimony amongst the heirs (Catanzaro, 1992, p. 51). In the South the barons, preoccupied with social advancement in the cities, gave a free hand to rural entrepreneurs, the *gabello*, to defend the goods and patrimony of the baron through use of violence (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 51-52).



The state's agricultural protection measures in 1887 and 1888, designed to protect the country's economy from foreign imports, assisted the controllers of land in the South (Duggan, 1995, p. 159), in turn strengthening the position of the *gabelloti*. The changing economic and social situations will have solidified the *gabelloti*'s position as managers of the land, and thus controllers of the work available.

The barons and *gabelloti* also utilised instrumental friendships, the relationship between individuals based on exchanges of goods and symbolic rituals, with other mafia members to help solidify their position (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 52-53). The *gabelloti* as part of these mafia groups held advantages over smaller landowners who would have found it difficult to sell their goods competitively and protect their land whilst remaining outside the mafia influence.

The mafia groups were not reliant on the farm-land in the same way that most rural workers were, the economic downturn encouraged their existence, and any fall in employment rates that resulted in an uptake in basic criminality, such as theft and banditry, only meant an increase in work for these mafia groups in their role as private security protectors and intermediaries between victim and criminal.

It is clear that in the rural environment the mafia system benefited from the unstable agricultural and economic situation. Contrasted with the plight of the ordinary worker, the mafiosi was unlikely to have moved for the same reasons; the factors that contributed to generalised migration do not align with the migration of mafia groups. This 'low' mafiosi found in Catanzaro's model would have been protected from, and potentially strengthened by, the conditions that afflicted the island. This does not preclude the movement of individuals who were outside the mafia system prior to their arrival in the US (examples of this are examined later in the thesis). With regards to the rural environment, it is imperative to explore factors more specific to the mafia situation outside of following generalised migration.

From the perspective of the urban environment, the mafia was also at the heart of the city, in particular in Palermo, where produce was gathered for consumption and export and the political instruments of control existed; public order, justice and administration (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 78-79). Farrell states that 'even in its earliest days, the mafia was *also* an urban force. Any doubts on this score should have been removed by the publicity surrounding by the murder in 1893 of Emmanuele Notarbartolo' (1997, p. 14). This would have been the home of the 'high' mafia from Catanzaro's model. It is here that the mafia city-broker utilises

instrumental friendship to try to 'monopolize market licenses, concessions for tolls and taxes, and permits for the export and import of goods' (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 78-79), in addition to the corruption of law officials. A high unemployment rate in Palermo also helped solidify criminal activities, turning individuals either to fencing stolen goods or to banditry (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 81-82), further justifying the position of the *gabelloti* as protectors of the land outside of the city from bandits and thieves.

Both the *gabelloti* and city mafia used their position to accrue wealth and make themselves 'respected' amongst the lower classes by suffering no insults and becoming 'objects of admiration and envy' (Nelli, 1983, p. 27). Over time they continued to exert their influence, becoming problem-solvers, for example by sorting difficulties with the law or helping with job and money needs, in exchange for favours, support and respect (Nelli, 1983, pp. 27-28).

During this time mafia groups were only becoming more engrained in the socio-economic climate and markets in Sicily and the South, not marginalised. They made use of this dominant position to forge political alliances offering control and votes of citizens in return for political influence (Nelli, 1983, p. 28). The urban *mafiosi* coexisted with the Northern capitalists; they did not compete economically with the North but utilised their positions to guarantee votes in exchange for power (Hobsbawm, 1965, p. 43).

Hobsbawm argues that all the heads of the local mafia were men of wealth (Hobsbawm, 1965, p. 37), as does Ianni, who similarly states suggests 'all the heads of local *Mafie* in Sicily were men of some wealth, considerable power and prestige, and hard-earned middle-class status. There was no reason for them to leave the island until Mussolini' arrived (Ianni, 1972, pp. 47-48). This fits those in the 'high' mafia of Catanzaro's first model, and with those who reach the second phase of Catanzaro's (Catanzaro, 1992) mafia career path model. For those who lose out in the first phase, the competitive phase, the result was often subjugation under the new mafia or death, but it is worth remembering that there is a third option here. Those that find themselves on the losing side of the mafia ascension, perhaps in a mafia war, or an internal struggle, especially a violent one, could flee the location and migrate to the US.

Theories of ethnic succession in transplantation (Morselli, et al., 2011) (Ianni, 1974) link the legitimisation or upward social mobility of the group to the 'push' factors. However, as shown with Catanzaro's career process (1992, pp. 34-38), the group never reaches full legitimisation. In addition, the mafia groups' backbone in the upper and middle classes suggest that whilst

upward social mobility occurred it was into an upper and middle criminal class. The mafia groups in Italy did not become replaced by other groups as they moved towards legitimization. Instead, they monopolised control of the various systems, influencing politics, the economy and society.

Most of the literature available deals with groups of Sicilian origin, but the Neapolitan Camorra groups might be equally unlikely to transplant an outpost based on certain factors. According to Hobsbawm, they lived outside the legitimate world, representing the professional interests of criminals with no background of class(es) interest(s). Their normal activity was extortion rather than the system of societal control that was witnessed in Sicilian mafias (Hobsbawm, 1965, pp. 54-55). Macry provides a similar perspective, highlighting their relationship with the city's markets, and linking them again solely with the lower classes (Macry, 1997, pp. 72-73). Their separation from the social ladder and lack of a legitimization process detaches them from ethnic succession theories that suggest social mobility encourages transplantation mobility. If these Camorra groups operate outside of any social hierarchy, then their ascension up or down the ladder does not exist and cannot be a reason for their migration.

The combination of this evidence suggests that generalised migration push factors are unlikely to have caused the 'transplantation' of any mafia groups, as a whole, from Southern Italy to the US. If any 'transplantation' occurred as a result of generalised migration, then a strong set of pull factors conducive to transplantation must exist. This does rule out the possibility that generalised migration is the reason for the emergence of organised crime groups in the US with either a Sicilian or a more general Southern Italian ethnic makeup. There are societal strains associated with migration and integration/accommodation of those migrant communities in host countries, some of which contribute to the fostering of organised crime groups, including the emergence of mafia groups in the US.

## Pull Factors for Generalised Migration

These 'push' factors that account for generalised migration from Southern Italy, even if they don't appear to contribute directly to the transplantation process, need counter 'pull' factors to determine a potential destination. This section examines the pull factors that the US presents to the Italian migrant and how this relates to potential mafia transplantation.

In contrast to Latin America, where 90% of Italian immigrants were Northern Italian, in the United States around 80-90% were from Southern Italy (Nelli, 1983, pp. 32,42). According to Nelli there are two main reasons many Southern Italians travelled to the US instead of elsewhere; the large-scale industrial expansion in the United States required unskilled labourers, and the travel to the US cost less than Latin America but immigrants could earn more (Nelli, 1983, p. 31), (Duggan, 1995, p. 175).

Between 1880 and 1910 'an overwhelming majority of the immigrants from Italy were male, approximating 80 percent for most years', for example 'of the 64,000 Italian immigrants who entered the United States in the year 1882-1883 [...] males accounted for 56,000, or 88 percent' (Kessner, 1977, p. 30). Between 1899 and 1910 more than  $\frac{3}{4}$  of immigrants from Italy were males and nearly 85 % of those males were between 14-45 years old (Nelli, 1983, p. 42). This male-dominated influx suggests that it was primarily work opportunities that drew migrants to the US, and that the migrations were either temporary in nature, or that the intention was to settle the family at a later stage.

The heavily urbanised states were the primary destination for Italians travelling to the US; between 1889 and 1910 approximately three quarters of the total 2,284,601 Italians went to these heavily urbanized states, with New York receiving 993,113, Pennsylvania - 429,200, Massachusetts - 154,882, New Jersey - 118,680, Illinois - 111,249 and 58,699 to Ohio (Nelli, 1983, p. 47).

This exodus towards more urbanised regions in the North and East and not the agricultural Mid-West would present an issue for any transplanting mafia organisations from Southern Italy whose strength had existed in part by providing protection in the agricultural industry, and then translating that strength into the upper echelons of the urban environment; in politics, trade markets and industry monopolisation. For the mafias in Sicily, their operations in Palermo grew because of its position as the agricultural hub for trade in the region.

In addition to the work opportunities these North Eastern states presented, Italians migrated there almost customarily, following their compatriots. Not only would they follow their compatriots to these cities, but they would also settle in the same neighbourhoods. According to Kessner, in New York 'the ethnic grooves carved by the early settlers continued to direct the currents of Italian life in the city. Like most foreigners, they preferred to live among their own' (Kessner, 1977, p. 16). Italian-Americans in the New York were drawn to the compatriots not just because of a shared nationality, but also shared religious practices. As Gabaccia states 'In an overwhelmingly Protestant land, Italians (like other immigrant Catholics) nevertheless quickly organized into "national," linguistically segregated, "Italian" parishes' (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 126).

Not only did they tend to group in the same neighbourhoods, early on they were often further subdivided by their preference to stay close to people from the same village or town. Kessner stated; 'in setting up their "Little Italy" they carefully retained their Old World subdivisions. The local traditions and hatreds of numerous [other] *paesi*' included (Kessner, 1977, p. 16). Epstein and Gang summarise that 'the prevailing explanation for immigrant clusters is the existence of beneficial network externalities when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, assistance in obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the stress of relocating to a foreign culture' (Epstein & Gang, 2010, p. 2). In addition, several other factors help migrants decide where to move alongside the clustering of compatriots and similar folk; 'ties of kinship, friendship, and village link migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in the home and host country' (Epstein & Gang, 2010, p. 3). For the potential migrant the knowledge obtained by those in their home village impacted upon their decision, including information on the labour and housing market, and on specific employers in a region, along with the ability for the migrant to 'count on contacts in a specific location established by former migrants from the same village' (Epstein & Gang, 2010, p. 3). The key feature in the migrant's decision to travel to the US and to these urbanised centres is the labour opportunities they presented.

Should mafia groups have followed the pull factors for generalised migration in finding a destination then New Orleans might have become Palermo-esque in terms of mafia infiltration in particular into the market. Immigration from Sicily to New Orleans 'followed the long-established citrus-fruit trade' with several ships bound for New Orleans from Palermo in the 1880's travelling with cargos of citrus fruits and immigrants (Nelli, 1983, pp. 68-69), and the colony in New Orleans was focussed on the trade, including the importation, distribution,

unloading and selling of the fruit. Although suggestions of a mafia existed in New Orleans (as often evidenced by the death of Police Chief Hennessey in a supposed mafia war), it **would** not have replicated the structure and functions that mafia groups were undertaking in Sicily. The colony was largely detached from the political and administrative bodies of the city. At worst it was two competing families resorting to underhand tactics in an effort to control the trade (the attempted monopolisation of the market and murder of Police Chief Hennessey are explored further in the markets chapter).

### Opportunities for work

The US pulled in migrants with its opportunities for work for unskilled labourers. The Italians travelling to the US often were not seeking rural labour positions similar to what they had largely occupied in Italy, nor did many of them intend to stay. There were relatively high wages to be made on the construction sites and in the factories of the US and to the migrant these presented opportunities to make quick savings before returning to Italy.

Although the majority of the migrants had agricultural backgrounds that qualified them only as unskilled labourers, these immigrants never made it into farming roles in the US.

Contemporaries offered several reasons for this; from the fact that sharecropping and renting were not suitable for the poorer Italians, to more racist suggestions such as inferiority to the earlier settlers (Nelli, 1970, pp. 15-18). According to Nelli, the reality was that Italians travelled to America seeking economic opportunities in the north and east of America, and not in the agricultural regions; despite the apparent grim outlook in the slums there was ready employment and higher wages than could be found as farm labourers (Nelli, 1970, p. 18). In addition, the agricultural work was very different from in Italy due to the use of modern American tools; the Italians agricultural skills were more suited to excavation work (Kessner, 1977, p. 39). The Italian migrants were also subject to taking on riskier work with a higher chance of death or injury, because of the cheap labour they provided and the racism that accompanied a lack of concern in their wellbeing by the industry managers (for example, Woodiwiss highlights an episode in which a construction company report no casualties on the railroad work, except 'wops' because 'Dagos, niggers, and Hungarians' did not count (2005, p. 41)

A number of those travelling to the US did so with the intention of accruing enough wealth that they could return to Italy and purchase land. The repatriation figure was at 31% between 1897-1901, 38% between 1902-1906, and 72.6% between 1907-1911 (Nelli, 1983, p. 46). These

were males who crossed the Atlantic for temporary employment only, taking menial jobs, with little interest in the community or industry and saving money to send home (Kessner, 1977, p. 27). According to Italian figures between 1892 and 1896 for 'every 100 Italians emigrating to the United States [...] 43 were going in the opposite direction back home to Italy' (Kessner, 1977, p. 28). In addition, only 1 in 250 Italian born professionals returned, whilst 80 percent of the returners consisted of farm and common labourers (Kessner, 1977, p. 29). Despite Italian professionals choosing to stay in the US, often they were unable to immediately find suitable work; as Kessner states 'Their high-status positions were place-specific and did not travel well. Italian Lawyers, ignorant of American Law and custom, after landing in cities were often not better off than common laborers' (Kessner, 1977, p. 34) but 'Musicians, sculptors, and artists, representing close to half of all Italian professionals coming to the United States, were conspicuous exceptions to this rule' (Kessner, 1977, p. 35), they found growing markets for their skills, and their differences to the local professionals were valuable rather than hindrances as with other professions.

Social mobility (or lack of) was not an issue in the US as it was in Southern Italy, workers could move from unskilled to skilled professions and move to better working-class neighbourhoods (Diner, 2001, p. 50). The *padroni*, the labour bosses, exemplify this social mobility by moving 'into the strata of the communal elite', as did self-employed entrepreneurs and immigrant bankers (Diner, 2001, p. 50). In an 1880 study, 24.9% of Italians in New York were in 'low white collar jobs' mostly consisting of entrepreneurs, peddlers (albeit very low-income white collar), shopkeepers and other business roles with musicians the only significant non-business role. By 1905 the number of 'low white collars' amongst Italians dropped to 17.8% (Kessner, 1977, pp. 51-52), however Kessner equates this to the declining role of peddlers (according to Kessner low white collar would have risen from 12.7% to 13.8% if peddlers were excluded (Kessner, 1977, pp. 54-55)). Despite the fall in low white-collar workers, the number of Italians in skilled (from 13.1% to 21.8%) and semi-skilled (from 6.9% to 16.3%) jobs increased and the number of workers in unskilled jobs decreases from 53.1% to 41.9% (Kessner, 1977, p. 52)<sup>14</sup>. These changes show that upward social mobility was occurring in the Italian-American community and this chance for upward social mobility would attract the Southern Italian migrant whose chance to progress up to that strata of society was limited back in Italy.

---

<sup>14</sup> The sample size for Kessner's data was 450 in 1880 and 1,015 in 1905.

In the 1890's there was an increase in Italians in three particular skilled and semi-skilled industries in New York; with increasing numbers in the previously Jewish dominated garment industry, the previously Irish dominated waterfront and longshoremen, and the logistics industry of hackmen, draymen and teamsters (Kessner, 1977, pp. 56-57). These three industries in particular later become central to the activities of developing organised crime groups, in particular, the mafia groups, who sought to manipulate labour unions. During this period, however, the skilled Italians who were often 'excluded from American trade unions founded by earlier German and Irish immigrants, formed Italian unions instead' (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 113).

In addition, construction and public works, considered unskilled work, was being increasingly dominated by Italians; in 1890, according to New York's inspector of public works, 90% of those involved in public works were Italian (Kessner, 1977, p. 58). Though it was considered unskilled work, the pay and work was regular and was not subject to the same seasonal issues that agricultural workers faced in the South of Italy.

Kessner also explored the roles held by second-generation migrants. The occupational distribution figures for Italian offspring are not largely different to those of Italian migrants. The data, however, favours early career individuals; its participants still lived in the family household. They held less white collar jobs (perhaps due to their early career status) but held more blue-collar skilled and semi-skilled jobs in comparison to their parents (Kessner, 1977). This progression into more skilled and semi-skilled jobs shows that there was upward social mobility on behalf of the second generation migrants.

The ideological leanings of those in labour movements also had an impact on the pull factors towards destinations that affected migrants' decisions. European destinations offered labour movements of socialist leanings, and in the 1890's 80% of socialists fleeing Italy after the *fasci siciliani* and *fatti di maggio* repressions went to Europe (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 113). On the other hand, the US labour movements were less receptive, in particular, to anarchism; Gabaccia states in the English speaking world labour reform movements were 'comfortable working within capitalism and within political systems where workers already voted' (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 113).

The absence of workers' labours movements outside trade unions would not make much difference as 'pull' factor for a transplanting mafia. Although the *fasci* and similar groups had



posed a threat to the mafias in Southern Italy, they were eventually subverted. Not only that, most labour in the US was largely controlled by corporations, labour agents, or, for the Italian workers, the *padrone* (labour boss) on the corporation's behalf. As will be explored further in the market chapter, the labour union in the US was eventually conducive to the mafia groups rather than a threat to them; they afforded a type of control and power that had eluded the mafia groups in the US political sphere.

The combination of these factors attracted a certain kind of Southern Italian immigrant, though in large numbers. They were mostly male temporary workers seeking employment. But the 'pull' factors that encouraged the regular migrant do not have the same appeal to a transplanting mafia.

The majority of the mafiosi were not seeking unskilled labour like the regular migrant; their jobs in Italian society and their lifelong unwritten contract as a member of the Mafia gave them a lifestyle sufficiently greater than starting life anew in the United States could afford them. Equally, their opportunities for social mobility put them at a unique advantage over other Italians; unlike the migrants to the US who saw emigration as an opportunity for social advancement, the established mafioso had already achieved this feat in their homeland. More likely to transplant is the aspiring mafioso-to-be, not yet integrated into the social power structures found in Sicily, but seeing an opportunity in the US.

Additionally, were mafia groups looking to transplant themselves into an overseas territory permanently as an outpost then some deciding factors for the regular migrant might not apply. For example, initial travel cost to the destination is unlikely to have featured highly in the list of priorities in choosing a destination.

Mafia groups looking to emulate their structure and activities in the US would also face issues. The political machines of the US, though linked with organised crime, largely fulfilled the political role that the mafia groups were controlling in Sicily. Beyond his feudal roots, the mafioso sought to position himself as a political middleman controlling the link from the 'local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of larger society' (Blok, 1975, p. 7). At most the organised crime groups in the US cooperated with the political machines to merely help control the vote of a particular neighbourhood; they could not implement themselves into political office.

The evidence suggests therefore that the factors that attracted Southern Italian migrants to the US in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century would not have an impact on the decision to transplant for a mafia organisation. The decision to work in non-crime sectors for many eventual (and previously) mafiosi highlights that these individuals were not moving with the explicit purpose of setting up an outpost of a mafia crime group but rather to fulfil their own individual needs and goals.

## Generalised Migration and Organised Crime Growth

The absence of reasons that link the push and pull factors of generalised migration to transplantation does not mean that generalised migration does not impact on the growth of organised crime in the US. The combination of migration with local social, economic and political conditions in US cities created the perfect breeding ground for organised crime groups. There also exists the possibility that generalised migration brought with it social and cultural elements of these mafias rather than outposts of existing mafias. The role ethnicity and social class both play is important; they are influenced by migration but also have an impact on society and the potential emergence of organised crime groups.

## Ethnicity and Social Class

Ethnicity is a key concept to studies on migration; it allows individuals to be grouped together for classification and study. It is important to explore the role ethnicity, and shared ethnicity in communities, played on the emergence of organised crime groups. Part of this is to look at the social conditions and classes ethnic groups found themselves in, and whether those conditions are conducive to organised crime. Whilst ethnicity has been considered in organised crime theories such as Albanese's 'ethnicity trap' (Albanese, 1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition)) or Ianni's 'ethnic succession' theories (Ianni, 1974), its relationship to the transplantation process has yet to be explored.

A definition of ethnicity is useful here to show what it before it is evaluated. O'Kane defines ethnic groups as 'Groups that share similar cultural characteristics, values, physical characteristics, and styles of life' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 9) and this includes racial (Black people for example) and religious groups (Jewish people for example). O'Kane's definition allows for the grouping together of Italians as one ethnic group, as well as Southern Italians, and Sicilians. It is possible for an individual to be classified a member of several different ethnic groups as group classifications differ in specificity of origin, for example, a man from Palermo, will share characteristics with his fellow Palermitans that differentiate him a Catanian, but together with the Catanian he will share similar characteristics that differentiate them even more so from Northern Italians. As such the Palermitan may find himself labelled a member of numerous ethnic groupings of various sizes from Palermitan to Southern European (see Figure 2). This is important to this study because it is possible to see Italian-American organised crime groups emerge around ethnic groupings; some would be made up of those only from one particular

village, others would preclude non-Sicilians or non-Italians, and some would have no preference over ethnicity grouping together Sicilians, Neapolitans, Jewish and criminals.




Figure 2 – Eccentric circles representing differing levels of ethnic classification, in this example a Palermitan

The local origins of an individual is relevant here, as Bodnar highlighted; ‘if the social and economic context of emigrant origins is to be fully understood, close attention must be paid to specific geographical locations, for emigrants came not so much from a particular country as they did from a specific region’ (Bodnar, 1985, p. 4). Thus the location from which an individual came cannot be simply attributed to their state of origin; it must also consider the region, and even their village/city.

This ethnic identity could and would change based on the social surroundings. The first newcomers settled in areas where those from the same town or province settled the close proximity to both other Italians and non-Italians living and working in the area caused individuals to think of themselves as Italians rather than associate themselves with a particular family (Nelli, 1983, pp. 59-60). Nelli states that contrary to popular belief, Chicago and other cities had few neighbourhoods and blocks exclusively inhabited by Italians- the majority of so-called Italian districts held a population density of a less than 50% concentration of Italians

(Nelli, 1983, p. 61). This would have an impact on the assimilation process and create an amalgamation of various Italian cultures within US society.

### Social ladder

A connection between migrant ethnicity and social class can be seen in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century United States. The social class system can be interpreted through the idea of a 'social ladder', especially for the newer migrant groups who start at the bottom of the so-called social ladder.

O'Kane identified the dominant groups on the ladder; starting with the white protestant groups of Northern and Western Europe, and later the groups associated with middle and upper-income socio-economic status; and newcomers of a 'foreign lower-class lifestyle' aspiring dominant class. O'Kane's interpretation showed that the ethnic groups had 'made it' when they had 'conformed to the expectations and norms of the established society' allowing them to move up the social class ladder (O'Kane, 1993, p. 9). It is important to note that not all migrant groups to the US found themselves lower class (for example Germans in the 1840s and political refugees such as Jewish people during World War II, or Cubans in the 1960s (O'Kane, 1993, p. 11)).

However, certain social and economic conditions would largely determine a migrant's place at the bottom of the social ladder upon arrival. For example 'prejudice and discrimination prevented equal access to decent jobs, education and eventually social responsibility' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 11). This includes the Southern Italian who upon arrival without little money, little local knowledge, and little English, would often refer to a *padrone*, a labour boss, to assist him.

Ethnic networks might also be associated with negative externalities such as if immigration is subject to adverse selection, or increases competition for jobs amongst migrants and lowers immigrants' wages, and may lower incentives to learn the language of the host country (Bauer, et al., 2009). According to Epstein and Gang, 'these negative network externalities limit the benefits immigrants can obtain from clustering' (Epstein & Gang, 2010, p. 2).

O'Kane uses Robert Merton's functionalist model to explain how ethnic groups respond to the so-called 'social ladder' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 26) ; innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. Of the four, the 'innovation' method most easily explains the transition into organised crime. The model suggests that American society ostracises ethnic groups socially, politically, economically and religiously, making it difficult for them to move beyond lower-class poverty.

To 'innovate' involved 'circumventing the established routes of upward mobility denied [to] them' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 27).

O'Kane extends his argument using the works of Cloward and Ohlin (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960); 'delinquency and crime result from the discrepancy between what lower-income youths desire and what is realistically available to them' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 27), and that they are blocked from achieving their desires by legitimate means by a combination of poverty and discrimination. They, therefore, turn to illegitimate access methods to obtain their goals; criminal subculture, conflict subculture and retreatist subculture.

For organised crime groups this means utilising a way to advance socially outside of the socially accepted defined norms such as entrepreneurialism. In O'Kane's model there are seven routes of mobility that ethnic groups used in the US to move from lower class to middle class; unskilled and semiskilled labour, small retail business, the professions (doctor, lawyer, etc), the clergy, entertainment, urban politics, and organised crime (O'Kane, 1993, p. 28). Of these seven routes only organised crime is clearly illegitimate and 'outside the pale of normal conventional behaviour' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 28) of larger society. O'Kane suggests that certain ethnic groups prioritise certain routes; the Irish into politics, Jewish into professions, Italians and other Southern Europeans into small businesses (O'Kane, 1993, p. 29). Ethnic politics is only semi-legitimate, in that its path often crossed with organised crime in order to garner support and votes in elections, or to damage rival's reputations (O'Kane, 1993, p. 44). Central to this was the political machine that sought to monopolize political power and favour those who supported it. The political machine became self-perpetuating assisting those in need, particularly newly enfranchised voters, even with matters involving illegal activity, in exchange for promised votes. Whilst the political machine relationship with organised crime draws parallels with the mafia model found in Italy the political machine was above any ethnic ties, and was largely dominated by Irish politicians. As such it was also above inclusion into the criminal fraternities based on kinship. Instead, individuals such as mafia boss Jim Colosimo in Chicago (Nelli, 1970, pp. 121-122) would not take office and instead created a voting block through favours and patronage that favoured the Irish politicians in exchange for freedom from officials and the police for criminal activities.

Lupsha adds to the perspective of the 'queer social ladder of mobility' and ethnic succession, in this instance presented by Daniel Bell (Bell, 1953), suggesting that the prohibition-era mafiosi in the US did not turn to organised crime because of 'frustration or because few legitimate

routes to wealth were open to them' but rather they saw 'in American values and culture an alternative easy, exciting, and romantic route to wealth' alongside skills in crime and violence and a coinciding with the advent of prohibition and its opportunities (Lupsha, 1982, pp. 12-14). Whilst this approach takes into account the considerable wealth in the Italian communities (Lupsha points out that the Black Hand gangs ability to extort large sums of money is evidence of this), it also partially neglects, or understates, that a number of these individuals, despite their young age, who had already had their introduction to crime in the pre-prohibition years. Lucky Luciano, for example, may have been 20 at the advent of prohibition but by this point he had already been an errand boy for prostitutes and politicians (being used to hound opponent's rallies) and a narcotics dealer.

What should be taken out of Lupsha's argument is that the pattern of choices made by these career criminals, for example dropping out of school and rejecting common crime, does not represent frustration or exclusion on the social ladder, but only when considering Lupsha's view of the ladder as a narrow ethnic-centred one characterised by a complete lack of opportunity. The concept of the 'queer social ladder of mobility' need not be tied to an ethnicity, in the same way that organised crime groups should not be tied to their ethnicity alone; it must also take into account contextual information such as local and personal conditions. The opportunities to those at the bottom of the social ladder need not be understated; the existence of legal routes of social mobility does not mean that the illegal routes will not occur; again local and personal conditions need to be factored in.

It is important to note that the ability to move up the social ladder was not as much of an issue for Italians in the US as it had been in Southern Italy, so any desire to circumvent the routes up the social ladder would have been based on a desire for faster results without having to undertake the Americanisation process.

### Americanisation and Assimilation

In order to adapt to the language, culture and customs of the United States, the Italian migrant would undergo 'Americanisation', a process of acculturation and assimilation (not to be confused with the homonym use of the term used to describe the spread of American culture).

The assimilation process is visible in the Italian fruit trade in the US. Many Italian immigrants first sold fruit and vegetables to other Italian customers before branching out to a more general market with mixed clientele (Diner, 2001, pp. 63-64). The abundance of food available

in the US comparative to Italy allowed for numerous stores in the same towns and cities selling the same products successfully (Diner, 2001, p. 64).

David Salvaterra refers to the 'melting pot' metaphor often applied to the transformation of the immigrant through Americanisation and that change to the United States itself, as a result, was of secondary importance (Salvaterra, 1994, pp. 31-32). Although Italians and Italy, in general, might not fit into Salvaterra's depiction of the progression of pre-modern and pre-industrial immigrants to a modern state; those from the Southern Italian provinces, particularly those from rural areas, might be considered pre-modern in cultural and societal attitudes.

Salvaterra analyses the stages of Milton Gordon's seven-stage model of assimilation; beginning with cultural or behavioural assimilation 'in which only acculturation occurs' (Salvaterra, 1994, p. 33), then 'structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identification assimilation, attitude reception assimilation, and finally civic assimilation' (Salvaterra, 1994, p. 33). Salvaterra also introduces 'pluralism ideology' as a counter to Gordon's 'assimilation ideology' but this contrast of ideologies refers to an ideal rather than reality (Salvaterra, 1994, p. 35) and therefore Gordon's assimilation theory and model can aptly be used to explain the time period.

Kivisto considered that 'transnational migrants forge their sense of identity and their community, not out of loss or mere replication, but as something that is at once new and familiar – a bricolage constructed of cultural elements from both the homeland and the receiving nation' (Kivisto, 2001, p. 568). In this context the migrant groups, and the mafia groups, contained within American society forge an identity that is both based on the heritage and culture of the homeland, combined with that of the US, and for a mafia this meant the combination of an individualistic value environment in which the adoption of structures, rituals and *modus operandi* familiar to the mafiosi could be used to exploit the American capitalist system.

Milton Gordon's assimilation model can be applied and compared to the transplantation process of Southern Italian mafias into the US to determine whether mafia groups followed the same assimilation process as regular migrants. This should help in identifying which features of the mafia groups can be considered transplanted, and which home-grown.



Gordon's model of social structure highlights the need for 'primary' social groups and 'secondary social groups' (Gordon, 1964, pp. 31-32). The primary groups are where contact between its members is personal, informal, intimate and usually face-to-face, and typical examples include the family or a social clique. The secondary group has contact which is impersonal, formal or casual, non-intimate and segmentalised. Examples of secondary groups include a civic committee or wider society (Gordon, 1964, pp. 31-32). It is the primary group which is most important in shaping an individual, shaping their personality, values and culture. For the Italian migrant in America, therefore, it is his family that will most readily shape his personality, values and culture. In the absence of family, a prevalent situation in the US where many males travelled alone for work, other forms of the primary group were important in shaping the values. These replacement primary social groups may take the form of social cliques.

Gordon introduces culture as the other side of human life, and defines it as 'the ways of acting and the ways of doing things which are passed down from one generation to the next', not genetically but through 'formal and informal methods teaching of teaching and demonstration' (Gordon, 1964, p. 32). This encompasses knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and other capabilities and habits of society, and these can be split in 'non-material culture' which covers the skills, values, behavioural patterns and beliefs, and the 'material culture' artefacts that they produce. Gordon suggests that it is these cultural norms and values of society which determine social groups and relationships, and it is through these groups that these cultures undergo change (Gordon, 1964, p. 33).

Gordon suggests that the ethnic group, in particular, has a distinguishing element that separates it from other social groupings; that throughout life the groups and relationship an individual forms may and often will 'follow a path that which never takes him across the boundaries of his ethnic subsocietal network' (Gordon, 1964, p. 34). Some of these relationships are naturally found within the ethnic boundaries, such as family and many religious groups. The relationships which often form within the ethnic boundaries are the aforementioned primary groups, rather than the secondary groups such as the (usually) non-ethnically orientated Governmental relationship.

Gordon's model allows sight of the functional characteristics of an ethnic group or subculture; the group or subculture serves as a source of group self-identification, it provides a network for the individual so that his primary relationships may remain with his own ethnic group and it

'refracts the national cultural patterns of behaviour and heritage through the prism of its own cultural heritage' (Gordon, 1964, p. 38). The result of this refraction is a culture based on a combination of cultural norms and behaviours from the country of emigration, religious values and the domestic experiences of the ethnic group in the US. This blend creates a subculture of norms and cultural values, within which an emerging mafia must act and draw from in creating its own social identity. Due to a lack of the family support, needs, and goals that were common in Southern Italy, these commonalities were replaced by a community identity and ethnic consciousness in the United States (Nelli, 1983, pp. 59-60).

Gordon's model for society and culture draw parallels with Catanzaro's models of the mafia. According to Catanzaro, 'mafia' is made up of two elements 'structure' and 'spirit' (Catanzaro, 1992, pp. 11-12). Structure pertains to the real relationship between members and how they organise themselves, and this can be related to Gordon's social groups and the relationships they outline. The mafia spirit, on the other hand, is an ideology which can spread separately of its physical manifestations. If mafia and culture are thought of in these terms it helps explain the emergence of culturally similar organisations in the US; the concept of 'mafia' transcends physical relationships and is spread through formal and informal teaching and demonstration, even indirectly through third parties such as media reports. The assimilation process, however, alters these cultural concepts of mafia into something that is more 'American' (for example rules regarding country/place of origin as a condition for entry into a mafia would have been largely unnecessary in Italy). Here 'influenced transplantation' can be argued, the formal and informal spread of mafia concepts and ideas, such as associated traditions, adopted histories (whether real or myth), and the structural and operational practicalities, all influence the emerging US mafioso and his associates as they adapt to the US conditions and markets borrowing from both their existing knowledge and skills, and the shared knowledge that is perpetuated in the community, society and by media. These ideas need not link to a real concept in the homeland, only a belief that they do, such as the black hand extortion techniques utilised by some early groups in order to frighten a local populace.

One of the cultural attitudes that would be adjusted is the Sicilian attitude for resolving disputes through violence in Sicilian culture in response to the state's failure to monopolise the use of physical violence; 'this development influences human interdependencies, most notably the overt level of socially permitted physical force between individuals as well as their prevalent attitudes and sentiments regarding violence and death' (Blok, 1975, pp. 175-177).

This penchant for violence had manifested itself in the *gabbelloti* and the protection system in Italy, where they could leverage themselves as power brokers against and between both landowners and the workers. In the US also the protection system was important where there was a lack of order, and protection rackets emerged. However, as Gabaccia states 'there was no criminal conspiracy or Black Hand behind [these] protection rackets – just a desire for order and security and a handful of isolated toughs willing to sell their services promising order in a multi-ethnic city' (Gabaccia, 2000, pp. 125-126). As evidence of the migrants turning to their 'primary' relationship groups for support, the protection service was centred on friendships; 'For most young men on New York's streets, friends were more important forms of protection than professional toughs' (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 126). The isolated nature of these individuals shows the group emerging around local opportunities and protection demands instead of to a connected or transplanted outpost.

Reich's study of juvenile delinquency and immigration in Germany gives some clues into how and why migrants group and solve problems together;

*Young immigrants build as a reaction to these migration-related problems homogeneous groups along ethnical lines which further impede the process of integration. Additionally, they rely on traditional strategies they are familiar with in order to solve conflicts, build their own identity and regain self-worth. The incentive these groups offer is what the young immigrants are deprived of and miss most in their new environment – a sense of belonging, acknowledgement, respect and status (Reich, 2006, p. 100).*

Reich's findings can be aptly applied to the situation in the US, where these primary relationships were key in creating social groups for the purpose of problem-solving and conflict resolution. The 'sense of belonging, acknowledgement, respect and status' also draws parallels with Catanzaro's mafia model, where recognition as a man of respect featured heavily in several of the stages towards societal legitimisation. These parallels highlight the similarities between migrants' situation and the competition for power in Italy for the aspiring mafiosi.

There is further evidence in the work of O'Kane, who suggests that the most notorious criminals 'accrue to themselves a degree of social honor, in addition to income and power' and become 'models for the thousands of youths in ethnic neighbourhoods who sought the gangster's success and easy, if somewhat dangerous, road to wealth and status in a society

which demands success of its members' (O'Kane, 1993, p. 49). Supporting O'Kane's argument are individuals examined in this study, such as Giosue Gallucci, that built up business empires that presented success in their relative industries, with an outward appearance of legitimacy and honour, whilst using underhand tactics and illegal actions to solidify and improve their position.

Lupsha provides another example of assimilation in the numerous (relative) Anglicisation of names undertaken by organised criminals, for example, Salvatore Luciana to Charles Luciano or Francesco Castiglia to Frank Costello; whilst these name changes had practical and personal purposes, they 'suggest assimilation, openness to adaptation and change' (Lupsha, 1982, pp. 9-10).

But the teaching and cultural knowledge of a mafia concept, alongside the assimilation process, is not enough alone to allow for the emergence of a mafia group. There must be the appropriate social conditions that allow the mafia group to exist and flourish.

### Social Conditions

The emergence of mafia and organised crime groups is dependent on favourable social conditions. For the transplanting mafia organisation a set of conditions similar to those in the home territory is preferable, whilst other sets of conditions allow for the manifestation of different forms of organised crime (high-class white-collar capitalist environments are more susceptible to so-called 'white collar crimes' for example).

The migrant slum living conditions in many US cities in the North and Eastern US cities were unpleasant, crowded, disease-ridden and congested during this time period [Mentioned in (Nelli, 1983, p. 58) and (Critchley, 2009, pp. 14-15)]. According to Diner, the only provision in ample and plentiful supply, even in the poorer communities, was food, with Italians able to indulge in relative luxuries such as imported goods (Diner, 2001). These poorer social conditions would not be suitable for replication by the mafia groups suited to utilising and transcending the class divides, even if the markets conducive to organised crime exist.

Organised crime in the US may not only be the result of specific market conditions allowing illegal markets to flourish, but also the result of social conditions and pressures created by the convergence of new migrants with American values systems. The 'American Dream' and the capitalist model created a United States where individual successes were portrayed as national successes. For the migrants, this meant adapting their way of life to conform to the American

system in order to obtain the perceived indicators of success. Part of this ideal was to move from the lower-classes, which many migrants were in upon arrival, and up the social ladder.

It is important to note that a rural to urban change, which many Italian migrants undertook, does not result in higher crime levels. As Monkkonen explains, urbanisation has often been blamed for causing crime in cities, but the reality is crime rates are comparable to rural rates but in a higher concentration across a smaller locale (Monkkonen, 1988, pp. 95-98).

The relationship between the specific migrant environment and a mafioso is also relevant. Buonanno and Pazzona, in examining mafia groups settling in the North of Italy in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, highlighted how Southern migrants in the north did not feel welcome or integrated, often rejected by the Northern communities. There existed 'social, cultural and even linguistic barriers' which prevented the migrant's integration (Buonanno & Pazzona, 2014, p. 77).

Likewise, in the US these barriers to integration existed and manifested in the migrant slum communities isolated from elements of US society. In the case of North Italy, Buonanno and Pazzona argue that 'these migrants' communities might have provided a not hostile environment for mafia groups to settle. This is not to say that southern migrants provided favorable grounds for mafia to develop, but that it is more likely that mafia-type groups settled where people were accustomed to the presence of such organizations' (2014, p. 77). Whilst this cannot confirm a form of 'outpost' transplantation in the US's case, these social conditions in the migrant communities created an environment hospitable to mafia groups with, perhaps perceived, characteristics relatable to the culture of the 'homeland' and the groups it contains.

Nelli states that 'during this intermediate stage in the migration process individual male workers assisted male relatives of working age to emigrate', going to relatives or friends on their arrival who helped them find lodgings and employment (Nelli, 1983, p. 46). Where friends and relatives were not available, Italians sought the help of the *padrone*, a labour boss.

### *The Role of the Padrone in migration*

As part of the aforementioned assimilation process, the Italian would have to familiarise himself with American culture, customs and the English language. Without this knowledge upon arrival the Italian migrant would turn to a *padrone*, a labour boss.

The purpose of the *padrone* was clear. With little English and lacking contacts with potential employers in America, and no knowledge of local labour practices the Italian migrant needed

an intermediary – ‘someone who spoke both languages, understood Old World traditions, and had contacts with American employers needing unskilled workers’ (Nelli, 1983, p. 77). This boss system did not solely exist within the Italian-American population but was typical of non-English speaking immigrant populations (Nelli, 1983, p. 78). The *padrone*’s existence has direct consequences on the social ladder; ‘The *padrone* (immigrant contractor) was another example of the role literacy could play in immigrant success. Because he could read and write while others could not, he managed the fortunes of fellow countrymen to his great profit’ (Kessner, 1977, p. 40). Bodnar mentioned ‘it was not unheard of for “middlemen” or labor agents to direct large flows of immigrant workers to particular industries or cities in return for modest fees’ (1985, p. 58) , however, ‘immigrants did not need middlemen in the long run because they received a steady stream of information on labor market conditions and wages from relatives, which allowed them to make reasonably well-informed decisions about where to go and what types of work they could expect to find’ (1985, pp. 58-59).

These *padroni* came to control the labour in the urbanised centres, acting as middlemen between the employers and the workers, a position reminiscent of the *gabelloti* in Southern Italy. In New York the *padroni* would also come to control the peddling business - they would pay individuals to take out peddling licenses in their name, but then the *padrone* would control and supply these licences to the peddlers he hires to sell goods for him (Kessner, 1977, p. 55).

Nelli notes that the *padrone* system had declined in use by 1914 due to both new legislation and improvements to the nature of the immigration process (Nelli, 1983, p. 81). Familiarity with American labour practices, improved English language skills and the rise in economic status of Italians all contributed to the decline of the *padrone* system (Nelli, 1983, pp. 81-82). New legislation introduced by states 1904 and 1909 with stiff penalties, as well as increasing pressure on the railroad and construction companies, contributed to a decline in the *padrone* system, replacing them with certified labour agents, and the utilisation of undercover workers to detect wrongdoings at the hands of bosses (Nelli, 1970, pp. 64-65). Yancey *et al.* suggested that ‘the *padrone* system, which imported contract laborers for industrial agents, was less important than networks of friends and relatives as the mechanism by which migration was structured’ (Yancey, et al., 1976).

Either way, the *padrone* system was the closest thing experienced by Italians in the US to the control of labour that occurred in the South of Italy under the *gabelloti*. The infiltration of labour unions, the nature of the *padroni* system and how it interacted with markets, along

with its parallels with organised crime shall be explored further in the chapter on markets.

## Migration of Mafiosi

The migration of known mafiosi from Italy to the US. For the most part, it is not possible to collect data concerning criminal activities of known mafiosi both sides of the Atlantic. This section evaluates the willing and unwilling resettlement of mafiosi, and skilled criminals, during the selected time frame. This section involves looking at the history of mafia individuals, their reasons for resettlement and employment, and any criminal past they may have had. Whilst these examples will help build the theoretical framework on transplantation it is important to remember that these examples may be exceptional cases rather than the norm for mafia transplantation.

The data collected on the migration patterns of mafiosi is used to test the hypothesis that they were not moving as a concerted group from one location to another for the purpose of setting up an outpost. It suggests that whilst common connections between blood relatives or those in the same village were relevant to the migration process there is no evidence of whole outposts being set up by Italian organisations in the US. It also suggests that many of those who made the journey as adults were still relatively young; not many mafiosi of older age, who might have been expected to have achieved seniority in their home-town organisations, migrated.

## Identification of relevant mafiosi

The list of mafiosi (appendix A) includes those whose careers and migratory patterns make them good cases to examine mafia transplantation. They have been identified by using a variety of sources including existing literature for the more famous mafiosi, contemporary newspaper reports, police reports, and latter law enforcement files that allude to pre-1920 activities and mobility (such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics case files). Where possible these have been verified with available records such as census records, New York passenger lists and WW1 and WW2 Draft registrations cards. The list leaves out a number of names such as those who arrived very shortly before prohibition (1919) and have no information on them during that period, and those who may have been indemnified by one source (such as on the United States Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1950 list) but there is little information on them otherwise. Many of the mafiosi are therefore recognised in this study on the basis of their US criminal histories.

Some of the migrating individuals can be linked to previous criminal histories and mafia associations in the home country. Using the data their reasons for migrating, their criminal associations, and their geographic origins and destinations can be examined.



### Data on age

The data collected on age at migration is useful in examining a number of factors. If the migrating (potential) mafioso is too young, then it is unlikely that he is an existing mafia member (established through the initiation process) or has a choice in his destination. It would suggest that if there was a connection to an Italian mafia for that individual, then it was obtained later in life- possibly through family connections, or through other criminals' connections.

This data can be used to build upon, or challenge, the argument put forward by Lupsha that major organized crime figures were overwhelmingly American born or raised, with the exception of Joe Masseria and Salvatore Maranzano (who, Lupsha argues, both had brief leaderships). Lupsha's own table featured 25 'leaders', the majority of these are the prohibition era and post-1930s mafia bosses (Lupsha, 1982, pp. 8-9). The data collected here shows pre-prohibition individuals (some of whom would remain on through the prohibition era, and in some cases excel further such as Lucky Luciano. If Lupsha's argument intended to show that the prohibition era bosses were US raised, then this data can be used to supplement that, highlighting a change from the pre-prohibition era. However, if Lupsha intended to argue that more generally organised crime figures were American born and raised, then this data shows otherwise.

If only major figures of the pre-prohibition era are considered then there is a predominance towards non-American raised individuals; of the pre-prohibition era bosses in New York, Lupo, Morello, Gallucci, and D'Aquila all serve as examples of leading mafiosi who didn't grow up in the US (the youngest on arrival of the pre-prohibition era bosses would appear to be Gaetano Reina, who arrived aged 16 with his family). In Chicago, Jim Colosimo arrived aged 20, and of those whose data was obtainable in New Orleans, all also arrived in adulthood. As the data focusses on those involved in criminal activity prior to prohibition, it can perhaps be surmised that there is a shift during the prohibition era to the American-raised mafiosi.

Overall, beyond the major figures, the data shows a more varied range of ages, from those who arrived very young, to those who arrived in their 50's. Only 30% of the criminals arrived prior before the age of 17.

*Figure 3* shows the breakdown of age groups. Around 30% (88 of 294) of the individuals arrived aged 16 or younger. The largest percentage (35%) arrived in their late teens or early twenties.

The number arriving dwindles after the age of 30, with just fifteen over the age of 40, and only three aged 50 or over.

The closest points of comparison on age come nearly a century later and often focus either on bosses or on incarcerated members. Graebner Anderson plotted the ages of one US family in 1969 (75 members); there were no members under 35 and the median age was 60 years old (a second group she analysed had a median age of 55) (Graebner Anderson, 1979). Gambetta looked at the median average age of 105 bosses in Sicily and 53 in Campania in 1987 finding that the median age was 57 in Sicily and 35 in Campania (Gambetta, 1993, pp. 104-105). He also pointed to 1979 statistics for Calabria, an average age of 42, and the United States with an average age of 60. Gambetta does point out that differences in age may be accounted for by cultural differences (loyalty to elders), or the level of organisation (more organisation discourages challenging of group's establishment).

There appears to be no strict age limit on becoming a 'made member', Gambetta (using Calderone's testimony) highlights a case where a boy of sixteen was inducted in Sicily (Gambetta, 1993, p. 67). However, it is reasonable to accept that those still in childhood were unlikely to be mafiosi on migration.

Gambetta also provides the average age of the group as a whole. The De Stefano mafia group in Agrigento had an average age of 37 while another more established group had an estimated median average of over 50 (Gambetta, 1993, p. 106). Despite both the Italian and American mafias being less organised during the scope of this study than at the time of Gambetta's study (suggesting that there is less likelihood of long leading bosses), the average (mean) age of the migrating mafioso is 21. The average (mean) age of adult individuals (over sixteen), those who might have been inducted into the mafia, is 26. These averages are significantly lower than the ages ranges provided by Gambetta, even of the less mature groups.

Any mafia setting up an outpost overseas willingly would likely have the stability of that group as a main concern. It is hard to envisage a scenario in which a willing transplantation takes place with the migration of predominantly younger, less experienced, mafiosi.




Figure 3 – Age of mafia migrants upon arrival in the US

With around 70% of the individuals arriving in the US as adults, despite their varied mafia histories, this shows that the influence of ‘home-grown’ when examining the mafia in the US should not be overstated, based on age alone. When accounting for an individual’s history within a mafia organisation, ‘home-grown’ may be used to infer the personal mafia developments and status of an individual or it may be used to refer to groups emerging in an environment which fosters mafia growth. Many of these early US mafiosi had spent their developmental years in Italy, and their cultural development will have been shaped to Italian (and local) systems.

Compared with Italian migrants age ranges, the distribution of the migrating mafiosi gives an interesting insight, though the data available is split into much larger ranges. For all Italian migrants between 1880 and 1910, 83 percent were in the age bracket 14-44 (Kessner, 1977, p. 31). Only around 6-7% arrived before the age of 14 (compared with the ~30% of mafiosi arriving before 17, or the 10.7% of who arrived before the age of 10). A larger proportion of mafiosi appear to have arrived in the US as children than the proportion of children in the general migrant populace. This would suggest that American (and the migrant) society and

culture shaped a not-insignificant number of these individuals in the adolescent years, and was central to their development.

Despite this, these ages suggest that most the mafiosi arriving were mostly young adults, not shaped by US society in the same way as those who arrived as children would be, but also too young to have achieved any position of prominence within mafia groups in Italy. At most they could be considered early-career mafiosi, and are unlikely to have been considered to run an overseas outpost without more senior and experienced direction. It may be instead that these individuals had not yet achieved the protection and status that more senior mafiosi had achieved in Italy which would shield them from the state and law enforcement.

#### Data on place of origin

To understand the nature of mafia transplantation there needs to be an assessment of where the mafiosi came from. Nelli stated that 'the mafia did not exist in the eastern provinces of Sicily', using Leopoldo Franchetti's assessment that eastern Sicily was 'the tranquil provinces' around Messina, Catania and Syracuse (Nelli, 1976, p. 9). But the data collected for this study suggests that these Eastern provinces were also places of origin for the US mafiosi. This would mean either these regions had active mafia groups at this time, or the US mafiosi from these areas were not transplanted. Matching Nelli and Franchetti's assessments of Eastern Italy to the studies of Antonino Cutrera in 1900, Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993, p. 82) and Paoli (Paoli, 2003, p. 27) suggests that the former is less likely, and that it is the latter, these individuals were not mafiosi prior to their US arrival and thus not transplanted, is likely.

In 1900 (Cutrera, 1900) Cutrera published a map of Sicily showing towns and regions with lots of mafia activity (Cutrera, 1900). Cutrera's map showed a predominance of strong mafia activity in Western Sicily, but that only the South East and North East of the island, either side of the Catania province, is mafia activity notably absent. This map provides a useful point of comparison for the locations of origin in this study.

Based on the data collected the place of origin for the 'transplanting' mafiosi is not confined to Palermo and Western Sicily. There a number of individuals from the mainland, in particular, Calabria, and Campania (Naples), but there are also individuals from Foggia (Apulia), Abruzzo, Molise, Tuscany and Basilicata (unfortunately Cutrera's map only covers Sicily).

There is also a number from towns in cities in Eastern Sicily that aren't traditionally associated with mafia activities. The *Innocenti* of New Orleans from the 1860s originated in Messina, the

Easternmost city in Sicily, whilst other mafiosi hailed also from Catania and Barcellona Pozzo di Goti in the West, as well as Licata and Vittoria in the South. Messina is identified in Cutrera's map as having no mafia activity in 1900, only in the west of the province is there any activity, which Cutrera labels as small (it is worth noting Gambetta identifies that an 1874 source listed Messina as having a strong mafia presence (Gambetta, 1993, p. 82)). Paoli indicated that there was no established mafia branch in 'Messina, Siracusa, or Ragusa until at least the mid-1970s' (Paoli, 2003, p. 27). Catania and Barcellona are both recognised by Cutrera as having only a small mafia presence. Vittoria and Licata are noted for having medium mafia presence by Cutrera.

Overall, it is clear there is a predominance of individuals coming from the South of Italy (no individuals were from North of Rome), and that Western Sicily and Naples are the main source points for mafia individuals. It mostly matches Cutrera's data which shows the majority of mafia activity around Palermo. The majority of these mafia individuals originated in areas where there was already a dominant mafia system. But the origin of those from outside these mafia locations suggests that coming from one a mafia village/town is not essential to becoming a mafioso in the US. Instead, the predominance of these regions would suggest that they heavily influenced the migrating individuals who may then have been able to utilise the systems, traditions and operating methods they had witnessed in their place of origin (this concept of influence rather than outpost is explored further in the operations chapter).

*Figure 4* maps this data, highlighting that whilst there are mafiosi from these other regions the West of Sicily, in particular, Palermo province, and the towns of Corleone and Castellammare

Del Golfo, along with the city of Naples in the Calabria region, are the main places of origin. Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancaster Library - Coventry University.

Figure 4 - Heat map showing place of origin of the mafia migrants

#### Data on destination

It is also possible to plot the destination of the migrating mafiosi. Of the 321 mafiosi with identified destinations the vast majority of them travel to New York, with around 42% of them settling in Manhattan and 33% of them settling in Brooklyn<sup>15</sup>. No other cities contained more than 6% of the migrating mafiosi. The cities with more than 2% (around 7 mafiosi) are featured in

---

<sup>15</sup> There is some crossover here as some individuals settled in multiple locations prior to 1920.

Table 1.

Table 1 - Destination of mafiosi (multiple destinations allowed)

	Number of mafiosi	Percentage of total (321)
<b>Manhattan, NYC</b>	135	42.06
<b>Brooklyn, NYC</b>	104	32.40
<b>New Orleans</b>	20	6.23
<b>Chicago</b>	13	4.05
<b>Kansas City</b>	12	3.74
<b>Milwaukee</b>	12	3.74
<b>Buffalo</b>	11	3.43
<b>Pittsburgh</b>	8	2.49
<b>New Jersey</b>	7	2.18
<b>St. Louis</b>	7	2.18

All of these destinations are either central or Eastern USA. Only 6 individuals were identified as being located beyond the Midwest (4 in Colorado, 1 in Los Angeles and 1 in San Francisco).

Looking back at Nelli's statistics (Nelli, 1983, p. 47) for migration, there is a correlation with urbanised areas, but not necessarily migrant destinations. New York State (Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens and Buffalo are represented here) received by far the most Italian migrants (993,113 between 1889 and 1910) and far exceeds the other states in terms of a destination for mafiosi. However, Pennsylvania, despite receiving just under half of the migrants (429,200) it received few mafia migrants relative to New York (8 in Pittsburgh, 6 in Pennsylvania). Cities in Massachusetts, New Jersey and Illinois all feature, but again in relatively few numbers in comparison to New York, and of the 321, only one is recognised as having settled in Ohio. Comparatively, New Orleans (Louisiana) and Kansas City (Missouri/Kansas) both feature a number of mafiosi despite having fewer overall migrants (noteworthy is that New Orleans had a high proportion of Sicilians relative to its overall population).

This lack of strong correlation suggests that any mafia transplantation was not linked to the general migration patterns in terms of final destination; perhaps New York provided far more opportunities for the budding criminal, and created an ideal environment for them, causing them to disproportionately congregate there.



### Relationship between origin and destination

Removing New York and Palermo as locations (they are too large to ascertain any meaningful information without obtaining mostly unavailable information on neighbourhood destinations), in order to look at the lesser frequented destinations there is a small correlation between destination and place of origin. A good example of this is a number of individuals travelled from Santa Flavia to Milwaukee were 8 individuals, split between 3 different families arrived. Only 11 individuals (of the 321 with destinations) ended up in Milwaukee, and no-one from Santa Flavia appeared to go elsewhere.

In another example of this, Gregorio Conti, his nephew Giuseppe Cusumano and Nicola Gentile all hail from Agrigento, specifically from Comitini. They all found themselves based in Pittsburgh together in the mid-1910s, after Gentile travelled there as the 'guest of my friend Gregorio Conti' who he had previously been in touch with by mail (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 7-8).

From the data only five other individuals were based in Pittsburgh, three from the Termini Imerese district of Palermo (Salvatore and Vincenzo Catanzaro, and Salvatore Calderone), and the two others from Campania; Ferdinando Mauro from Avellino and Michele Miranda from Naples. Gentile identified that the Catanzaro's (specifically Salvatore) were part of the same mafia 'family' as Conti made up of Sicilians and Calabrians (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 12-13), whilst Mauro was head of a Camorra clan (Gentile, c.1947, p. 13j). This pre-existing relationship between Gentile and Conti would have contributed to their re-acquaintance in Pittsburgh, but the combination of those from Sicily with Calabrians would suggest that these mafia groups were not tied to their respective home 'families'.

Varese argued that non-Sicilians weren't allowed into the organisation at first, and the sign that the US organisations had become autonomous is the admission of non-Sicilians post-1931 (Varese, 2011, p. 123). Contrary to this, however, Gentile's testimony shows Sicilians and Calabrians working together, and he mentioned the absorption of the rival Camorra family into his family in 1915 (Gentile, c.1947, p. 17). Despite Gentile's obvious bias against the Camorristi (when comparing them with the Sicilian groups), and his removal of the Camorra boss, Gentile appears to have been willing to allow the Camorristi to operate under him. In another example, Al Capone was hired by Torrio and Colosimo in Chicago and was then appointed as a *capo decina* (boss of 10) (under Joe Masseria in New York) (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 71-72). Gentile states he was invited into mafia by the Commission (formed 1931); previously he had been paying contributions to Masseria (possibly to be allowed to run his bootlegging businesses)

(Gentile, c.1947, p. 71), suggesting that despite his non-Sicilian background, he was involved in the criminal business but was not formally inducted until far later. Colosimo himself was a non-Sicilian, hailing from Cosenza in Calabria. What this suggests is that a two-tier system existed for mafia membership. There were the criminal mafia groups based on relationships of criminal activity, and within this there were sub-sects of 'brotherhoods' based on ritualistic kinship.

Ferdinando Mauro and Michele Miranda were also both located in Boston at some point, along with Vincent Vallone from Gioia Tauro in Calabria (again from outside of Sicily, but had moved to Houston by 1908), and both Gaspare Messina and Frank Cucchiara from Salemi, Sicily.<sup>16</sup>

These examples suggest that individuals sought out common relations in America, but not that they were wholesale transplanting. Outside of these connections individuals found themselves in the heavily urbanised centres. The twelve individuals located in Chicago (with both origin and destination known) came from 11 different locations spread around the South of Italy, and don't appear to be connected (with the two individuals from Ciminna as exceptions; Mariano Zagone and Rosario Dispenza, who appear to have been related via in-laws).

Here Luconi's discussion on diasporas become relevant; he suggests that the notion of a 'diaspora' with ties to the old country is less prevalent amongst the fairly recently unified Italian and that rather 'newcomers allegiance rested on their respective native regions, provinces or even villages' (Diaspora", 2011). These village diasporas 'if anything, therefore, the worldwide community that people of Italian origins established across borders was less a single nation-oriented network than a series of different regional, provincial, and localistic communities that usually remained divided along subnational lines in social activities, residential areas, and even religious life' [Malpezzi and Clements in (Diaspora", 2011, p. 11)]. This local or village orientation appears to replicate itself in some mafia groups, but not all of them. Camorra groups such as the one in Brooklyn or Mauro's group in Pittsburgh appear to have congregated based in communities of Neapolitans. Otherwise, the diversity of individuals in Chicago, or in Conti/Gentile's Pittsburgh group suggests that these criminals were willing to diversify membership of their groups.

---

<sup>16</sup> The data includes individuals repeated where they had more than one location. For example Vincent Vallone was based in Boston, Houston and Pennsylvania. His data therefore appears on the list three times, each as a connection between Gioia Tauro and the respective city.

Although there are examples of individuals heading to the same cities and regions, there are also a number of individuals where their place of origin does not appear to have determined their destination. Were transplantation in the form of an outpost to be occurring it would be reasonable to expect mafiosi from smaller villages to all head to the same location, but this is not evident from the data except where they have joined their family.

The data supports this thesis' argument that there was not an organised effort to form transplanted outposts in the US by mafia groups in Italy, and that instead any connections that re-emerged in the US were often based on pre-existing local (or blood) connections.

### Family connections

From the data, it is evident that family connections played a part in determining the destination of a mafioso. In the examples we have, close relations appear to travel to same locations as previous members of the same biological family (by blood or marriage). This is consistent with contemporary migration practices at the time (the utilisation of primary relationships), and therefore cannot be used to explain a concerted operation to transplant a unified mafia group, whether those individuals also belonged to that group or not. Whilst the blood relations had relevance in the membership of mafia groups (Dickie, 2007) (Gambetta, 1993) (Paoli, 2003) as shown in Gentile's case the relationship to his Pittsburgh group was based on friendship.

The data shows that family members often travel to the same location. This may be due to known connections to use as a support network, or being moved together by parents at a young age. These familial movements can be used to explain the movement of some of the large groups of individuals into one territory and how they used their blood bond to form a criminal bond.

In Nicola Gentile's testimonies he went to work on the railroad in Kansas and appeared to have no mafia contact in the US. Instead, his point of contact in Kansas was his brother (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 3-4). Despite Gentile's aforementioned reverence for Sicilian connections in his testimonies, he stated he was never a mafioso prior to arriving in the US; 'No, I was very young at the time. But we, Sicilians, have the Mafia in our blood' (Gentile, 1963, p. B2) (Gentile's reference to 'mafia in our blood' is in the context of a shared cultural mindset rather than in a familial context). Instead, he utilised his brother to find work before moving onto to meet his

friend Conti in Pittsburgh (at which point he is introduced to the mafia).

A good example utilising the family as a support network is the Ferrantelli family from Burgio in the Agrigento province. The three brothers migrated separately (1900, 1903 and 1913) and as adults (aged 22, 27 and 46). Despite migrating separately, they all relocated to Kansas City (Paul Ferrantelli claimed in 1950 that he was involved in the grocery business (Paul Ferrantelli testimony. Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 202, 1951)). It is possible that the Ferrantellis in Kansas were related to Domenico De Michele Ferrantelli – mayor of Burgio who appointed mafiosi Vito Cascio Ferro as his *capo elettore* (a political ward boss) and provided Cascio Ferro with an alibi in the investigations of Lieutenant Joe Petrosino's murder (Tessitore, 1997, p. 160) (Lupo, 2009, p. 157).

Mafiosi blood families appear to have travelled to the same location on a number of occasions (the data shows this happening with 13 families excluding those that travel to New York). Referring back to Milton Gordon's concept of 'primary' and 'secondary' connections (Gordon, 1964, pp. 31-32), in all these cases we see the mafiosi using the primary connections; friends and family, when arriving in the US for support. It supports Gabaccia and Reich's concepts that individuals would turn to those primary connections (friends) in order to support and protect each other.

## History of mafia involvement in Italy

An examination of criminal and mafia histories in Italy shows that mafia members in Italy did move to the US but not for the purpose of setting up an outpost. Unfortunately, the data on mafia involvement in Italy is far more difficult to obtain, because of the secretive nature of mafia activities, because of the activities, if undiscovered by law enforcement, would be mostly undocumented, and because even those activities that were documented many will have been lost to time (the documents destroyed, moved, lost). Along with time constraints that limit the potential to research the personal histories of 381 or more individuals, it means that the data on mafia histories prior to migration is limited to a few examples gleaned from various testimonies, newspaper reports and police reports.

There is no clear line on whether Nicola Gentile was a mafioso in Sicily prior to his arrival in the US. Varese claimed Gentile had in the Porto Empedocle *cosca* (family) before his 1905 admission to Philadelphia mafia. Contrary to Varese's claim that Gentile had been in the Porto Empedocle *cosca*, on page 2 of Gentile's interview with Paese Sera, upon on being asked if he was already a mafia member upon his arrival in the US he responded 'No, I was very young at the time. But we, Sicilians, have the Mafia in our blood' (Gentile, 1963, p. A2).

There are, however, examples of other Italian mafiosi making the switch for the US. The Gallucci family serves as an example of the mobility of a group of individuals from Italy to the US and continuing their criminal activities. Their specific activities will be looked at in the markets chapter, but here they provide good examples of migrating criminals and their reasons.

Of the unplanned push factors that might account for a form of mafia transplantation Varese suggests that increased law enforcement maybe be responsible for the push of mafia groups out of Sicily (Varese, 2011, p. 27), and this is also the only push factor highlighted in all three of Morselli *et al.*'s paradigms of mobility ("criminal market", "ethnic-based" and "criminogenic conditions") (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 172). Regarding the migrating mafiosi, Nelli suggested that 'probably the number was not large and those who came were lower-ranking, since the leaders generally were not vulnerable to police action – their arrangements with the police and the government protected them' (Nelli, 1976, p. 20). In this chapter, several examples of transplanting mafiosi have been presented in which the reason for their migration was increased law enforcement.

Giosue Gallucci and his two of his brothers emigrated to the US, separately, around 1891-1892, from Naples (The Sun (New York), 1898). A murder investigation in 1898, into the death of Josephine Anselmo (sometimes Inselma), led police enquiries to request information on three of the brothers (Giosue, Vincenzo and Francisco), and two accomplices, Pasquale Adamo and Raffaello di Nicola Rossomano, from the Neapolitan Prefect of Police. The Prefect provided a brief, but indicting, list of their criminal histories; criminal association, attempted murder, assault, blackmail, theft, rape and other violent activities all featured heavily, and some had already served jail time. Adamo had only recently been released from a 5-year sentence before emigrating in roughly 1897 to escape a new warrant for his arrest (New York Times, 1898). In 1962 Neapolitan police also identified two individuals named Giosue and Giuseppe Gallucci as being Camorristi posing as wine-merchants, extorting local shopkeepers – these may have been relatives (before the US-bound Giosue's birth) (Monnier, n.d.).

A fourth brother, Genario (occasionally written Genero), arrived much later, also on the run from law enforcement. According to the New York Times and Herald, he had been on the run after escaping prison in Palermo for two murders, arriving in New York in 1908. He had already attracted police attention with accusations of extortion and robbery against him (New York Times, 1909b) but was arrested and released on suspended sentence before the courts became aware of his criminal history. The New York Times article, or the police spoken to, seem to have 'forgotten' Giosue and Francisco's past transgressions; they are 'fairly well-to-do Italians for whom the police have only good words. Genario was a sort of handsome Black Sheep' (New York Times, 1909c).

Similarly, Anton Blok suggests that Vito Cascio Ferro might have been a member of the mafia before moving to the United States in 1900; but Blok's research only points to Ferro being involved post-migration. Ferro, in his position as leader of a *Fasci*, a socialist peasant movement in Sicily, had actually led strikes against and held negotiations with landowners and their *gabelloti* (mafia protectors) (Blok, 1975, pp. 123-126). However, Critchley that Cascio Ferro was arrested in 1898 for the kidnapping of the Baroness of Valpetrosa (Critchley, 2009, p. 40) and he allegedly travelled to the US due to increased police attention in his activities following the event. He was arrested within one year of his arrival in the US as part of a counterfeiting group (Critchley, 2009, p. 40). During his time in the US, he also became involved in Black Hand crime, and he became involved with the Morello-Lupo group and was suspected by Secret Service agent William Flynn and Police Lieutenant Petrosino of being

involved in the 'barrel murder' in 1903 (Flynn, 1919). He was deported back to Sicily in 1904 to allegedly become one of the most distinguished chiefs of the mafia (Blok, 1975, p. 143)(he was one of the suspects in the murder of New York Police Detective Joe Petrosino in Palermo in 1909).

There are other examples of other individuals travelling after encountering law enforcement in Italy Ignazio Saietta (Lupo) went to America in 1899 after murdering a man in Sicily (Feder & Joesten, 1994, p. 48). In Corleone, Giuseppe Morello was a murder suspect, and his counterfeiting ring was exposed, so he emigrated in 1892 (Dash, 2009). Francesco Matesi was a municipal politician in Palermo 'before being charged for his Mafia activities and indicted for a killing in Trapani' (Critchley, 2009, p. 58), fleeing to New Orleans whilst convicted *in absentia*. These would all indicate that the migration of these mafiosi was unwilling, fleeing law enforcement, rather than seeking to deliberately operate outposts overseas. Enrico Alfano, who was eventually jailed in Manhattan and extradited for the double murder in Naples that he was on the run from (Romano, 1910). Petrosino sought to establish the extent of these criminal records on his ill-fated trip to Palermo in 1909. The efforts of Police Lieutenant Joe Petrosino, continued by Lieutenant Vachris and Detective John Crowley, in obtaining the past criminal records of Individuals located in the US identified some 700 ex-convicts for deportation (not all necessarily mafiosi) (White, 1913).

These examples highlight the role law enforcement played in the forcing the transplantation process, making it an unplanned/unwilling decision on the mafioso's part. However the mafias' symbiotic relationship with both politics and the police should have protected them somewhat from law enforcement; as summarised by Blok 'Bandits must hide from the law, since they do not have their *carte in regola* (papers in good order); *Mafiosi*, in their role of accomplices (*manutengoli*), do: no evidence can or will be produced against them' (Blok, 1975, p. 130). The mafioso was an important broker of votes from the peasantry for the urban political patron, 'who protected him against the demands of the law, covering up his illegal dealings with a cloak of immunity' (Blok, 1975, pp. 177-178).

Varese attributes some of this movement of the Sicilian mafiosi to the rise of Fascism (Varese, 2011, p. 27), but within the context of this study, the Fascist purges of mafiosi do not occur until after examined timeframe (the Fascist party do not take power until 1922). Cesare Mori's infamous campaigns against Sicilian brigandage do not occur until, at the very end of this studies scope, 1919, and under Fascism, his actions directed at mafia groups specifically do not

occur until 1925. This confirms Critchley's example of mistaken information that 'the FBI was thus given [...] from a member source that many first-generation Mafia leaders came to America to escape "the purges directed at them" by fascists, then I power in Sicily' (Critchley, 2009, p. 6); as evidenced by the data collected of individual mafiosi for this study, and the criminal mafia activity in the US, a number these individuals were in the US, and many had been for some time, prior to the fascist repression.

At a group level, there are few examples of increased law-enforcement against mafia groups, the two major mafia affairs during this time resulted in little long-lasting impact on mafia activities. The investigation into the murder of Emmanuele Notarbartolo resulted in MP and bank director Raffaele Palizzolo being 'uncovered' as a local mafia boss (Notarbartolo had been investigating Palizzolo and others for financial fraud), but his political and mafia connections eventually left him a free man after witnesses changed their testimonies and influential connections publicised his innocence (Pitrè, an influential scholar into folklore defended Palizzolo and glorified the concept of mafia as an honourable Sicilian attitude rather than a criminal organisation) (Coluccello, 2016). In similar circumstances, Chief of Police Ermanno Sangiorgi's efforts against a mafia group were also in vain; he investigated a mafia feud between two families, resulting in arrests and around 200 mafiosi put on trial (Dickie, 2007) (Dickie, 2012). Again at trial, the witnesses changed their testimonies, and the majority of the accused were acquitted or received minor sentences.


Dickie suggests that there was a period of 'silence and inactivity' for mafia groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as a result of the two episodes of investigations (Dickie, 2012). The data collected for this study shows that there was an increase in the number of mafia migrations to the US during this time period; between 1898 to 1910 the number of mafiosi emigrating peaks, with the years 1903, 1905 and 1906 showing much higher numbers of potential mafiosi emigrating.<sup>17</sup> Although because of the study's specific timeframe it should be expected to see more during that period than any other, it might also be expected to see a number of mafiosi arriving earlier. When compared with migration data (Nelli, 1976, p. 22), whilst in 1903, 1905 and 1906 the number of Italian migrants arriving in the US increased on previous years it is not to the same extent as shown above. Equally when similar levels of Italian migration occurred 1901, 1913 and 1914 there is not an equivalent increase in the number of mafiosi migrating.

---

<sup>17</sup> Where there are two possible dates the earliest has been used here.




**Number of mafiosi emigrating to the US**



It is worth looking at the data again when adjusted for age – accounting only those over 16 whose decision to emigrate would likely have been their own; those too young to make this decision would not have been undertaken emigration to escape law enforcement. The results are almost the same, with peaks in 1903, 1905 and 1906.

**Number of mafiosi emigrating to the US (Ages 16+)**



This would seem to correlate with Dickie's suggestion that during these years there was a mafia repression; the number of mafiosi emigrating peaks in the years immediately after these investigations. It is possible that, despite the large-scale acquittals or short sentences, Mafiosi feared further incriminating themselves by continuing activities, or the advent of new evidence against them. The displacement by increased law-enforcement applies more at an individual

level and appears to be based on that individual's criminal activities and their ability to protect themselves from law enforcement.

The methods of entry into a US mafia family can also be used to examine individuals with mafia history. Varese's analysis of Gentile's transcripts claimed that between 1910 and 1920 there were three routes into the US family, the first of which is previous membership in a Sicilian *Cosca* (family). Varese also points out that in Joseph Bonnano's testimonies it is stated that Maranzano was able to enter the Schiro family in 1925 because of his previous position (See Bonnano (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983)). More quotes claiming this from Buscetta in Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993, p. 118). In Joseph Bonanno's autobiography he also gives information on his father's transition to the United States. His father Salvatore Bonanno was previously head of a family in Castellamarese (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983), pp. 19-29).

The introduction into US mafia families based on previous criminal careers does not, however, prove that these individuals were transplanting. Instead, these individuals may have been recognised for their skills and experience, their contacts, and for their relative esteem or 'respect' and 'honour'.

## Conclusions

Overall, the 'push' factors that caused generalised migration would have had little effect on the fortunes of the upper and middle-class mafia predominant in the South of Italy. Equally many of the 'pull' factors that presented opportunities to Italian migrants would not have been attractive to the upper and middle-class Italian mafias; they simply did not present a viable opportunity for expansion of an overseas territory. Despite this, the 'pull' factors that attracted migrants caused a host of social and cultural conditions that are favourable to certain forms of organised crime. These conditions, however, differed from those found in the South of Italy creating a situation whereby organised crime develops in a new environment, separate from the old one but adapting the cultural knowledge acquired from it. Features which may appear to indicate a transplanting fraternity are simply products of the migration process at the time, such as the utilisation of 'primary' support networks, the forming together in localised communities, and the grouping up of youths into protection groups.

The data collected on transplanting Mafiosi would suggest that the 'home-grown' concept of mafia emergence only works if it refers to the US providing the ideal conditions for the emergence of criminal groups rather than the idea that the mafia individuals were nurtured by the US system – the data shows a significant number of Mafiosi arrived post-adolescence. It also shows that the transplanting mafiosi were on average younger than the age in established mafia groups (suggesting transplantation of experienced groups was unlikely).

In terms of place of origin, the data showed that while Palermo and Western Sicily featured prominently, mafia individuals originated from a variety of places across Southern Italy. They transplanted pre-dominantly in New York state (Manhattan and Brooklyn) and other urbanised centres in the US. There was a tendency, where available, to join family (and other primary) connections in order to develop a support network.

The Italian criminal histories of Mafiosi would suggest that their primary reason for migrating, if they were already part of a mafia group, would be to escape law enforcement, rather than to willingly plan to set up an outpost overseas as part of a migrant network. The study, therefore, now turns to the markets and operations to further understand the nature of this transplantation and further explore the hypothesis that these were independent but influenced groups.

## Citations

- Paul Ferrantelli testimony. Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 202 (1951).
- Albanese, J. (1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition)). *Organized Crime in America*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.
- Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.
- Bauer, T., Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (2009). Measuring ethnic linkages among migrants. *International Journal of Manpower*, 30(1), 56-69.
- Bell, D. (1953). Crime as an American Way of Life. *The Antioch Review*, 13(2), 131-154.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bodnar, J. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban American* (First Midland Book Edition ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Brettfield, K., & Wetzels, P. (2007). Religiosity and Crime: Attitudes Towards Violence and Delinquent Behaviour among Young Christians and Muslims in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 73-87). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Buonanno, P., & Pazzona, M. (2014). Migrating Mafias. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 44, 75-81.
- Catanzaro, R. (1992). *Men of Respect*. Oxford: Free Press, Macmillan.
- Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. (1960). *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Study of Delinquent Gangs*. New York: The Free Press.
- Coluccello, R. (2016). *Challenging the Mafia Mystique*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Cutrer, A. (1900). *Le Mafia e I Mafiosi*. Palermo: Alberto Reber.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- Diaspora", T. P. (2011). The Pitfalls of the "Italian Diaspora". *Italian American Review*, 1(2), 147-176.

- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.
- Diner, H. R. (2001). *Hungering for America : Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Duggan, C. (1995). *A Concise History of Italy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckert, R. (2007). Culture or Conflict? Migration, Culture, Conflict and Terrorism. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 21-26). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (Eds.). (2010). *Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Volume 8 : Migration and Culture*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Farrell, J. (. (1997). *Understanding the mafia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Feder, S., & Joesten, J. (1994). *The Luciano Story*. Boston: Da Capo Press.
- Flynn, W. (1919). *The Barrel Mystery*. New York: The James A. McCann Company.
- Freilich, J. D., & Guerette, R. T. (Eds.). (2006). *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Gabaccia, D. R. (2000). *Italy's Many Diasporas*. London: UCL Press.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gentile, N. (1963). Paese Sera Interview.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vito Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.
- Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Graebner Anderson, A. (1979). *The Business of Organized Crime: A Cosa Nostra Family*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.
- Hess, H. (1998). *Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin Power and Myth*. London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1965). *Primitive Rebels*. London: WW Norton and Company.
- Ianni, F. .. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

- Ianni, F. A. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kantowicz, E. R. (1994). The Changing Face of Ethnic Politics: From Political Machine to Community Organization. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States* (pp. 179-195). London: Garland Publishing.
- Kessner, T. (1977). *The Golden Door*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kivisto, P. (2001). Theorizing transnational immigration: a critical review of current efforts. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4), 549-577.
- Lombardo, R. M. (2013). *Organized Crime in Chicago: Beyond The Mafia*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Lumley, R., & Morris, J. (Eds.). (1997). *The New History of the Italian South*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Lupsha, P. (1982). Individual choice, Material Culture and Organized Crime. *Criminology*, 3(19), 3-24.
- Lyle, J. H. (1960, Nov 13). Big Jim Colosimo: Early Overlord of Chicago Crime. *Chicago Tribune*, pp. Part 1- Page 49.
- Mack Smith, D. (1959). *Italy: A Modern History*. Michigan, US: University of Michigan.
- Mack Smith, D. (1968). *A History of Sicily: Modern Sicily after 1713*. Oxford: Alden & Mowbray Ltd.
- Macry, P. (1997). The Southern Metropolis. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 59-82). Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Mignolo, W. D. (2000). *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press.
- Mitchell, B. (1995). International History Statistics, Europe 1750-1988 (New York, 1992). In C. Duggan, *A Concise History of Italy* (p. 148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Monkkonen, E. H. (1988). *America Becomes Urban: The Development of US Cities & Towns 1780-1980*. London: University of California Press.
- Monnier, M. (n.d.). *La camorra: notizie storiche raccolte e documentate*. Retrieved January 23, 2017, from [http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/\\_PP.HTM](http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/_PP.HTM)
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.

- Nelli, H. S. (1970). *The Italians in Chicago 1880-1930: A Study in Ethnic Mobility*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970b, Dec 7). 'Mafia' - A Term Bred of Contempt and Fear. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 13.
- Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1983). *From Immigrants to Ethnics: The Italian Americans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- New York Times. (1898, July 10). Cast-off Criminals. *Kansas City Journal*, p. 18.
- New York Times. (1909b, September 21). Caught After Year's Chase. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1909c, November 15). Italian "Bad Man" Strangely Slain. *New York Times*.
- O'Kane, J. (1993). *The Crooked Ladder*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Petrusewitz, M. (1997). The Demise of the Latifondo. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 20-41). Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press.
- Pfeiffer, C., Kleimann, M., & Windzio, M. (2006). Media, Evil and Society: Media Use and its Impacts on Crime Perception, Sentencing Attitudes and Crime Policy in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 109-132). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Raab, S. (2005). *Five Families*. New York: Griffin.
- Reich, K. (2006). Immigration and juvenile delinquency in Germany. In J. D. Freilich (Ed.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 89-103). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Reimers, D. M. (1998). *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Romano, A. (1910). *Italian Americans in Law Enforcement – Romano – 45*. Bloomington, IN, US: Xlibris, Corp.
- Salvaterra, D. (1994). Becoming American: Assimilation, Pluralism and Ethnic Identity. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Santino, U. (2015). *Mafia and antimafia : a brief history*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Santino, U. (2017). *Centro Impastato*. Retrieved November 2017, from <http://www.centroimpastato.com/mafia-and-mafia-type-organizations-in-italy/>

- Tessitore, G. (1997). *Il nome e la cosa: quando la mafia non si chiamava mafia*. Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli.
- The Sun (New York). (1898, June 21). Nest of Italian Thugs. *The Sun (New York)*, p. 5.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, . Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Walsh, T. (Ed.). (1994). *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Wendt, L. (1941, Aug 17). How Labor is Hijacked. *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, p. 2 (Graphic Section).
- White, F. M. (1913). The Black Hand in Control in Italian New York. *The Outlook*, 857-865.
- Wood, P. (1953, October 17). Potson Tells Profit in Levee Area at Trial. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 3.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2005). *Gangster Capitalism*. London: Constable.
- Yancey, W. L., Ericksen, E. P., & Juliani, R. N. (1976). Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation. *American Sociological Review*, 41(3), 391-403.



# Markets

---

## Introduction

As shown in the migration chapter, generalised migration can be ruled out as a primary factor in causing transplantation to occur, that a mafia did not simply travel with the migrants to the US to set up an outpost. What the chapter did highlight is that some potential subfactors could be responsible for any transplantation; the availability and types of work in the US, the *padrone* labour boss system as an alternative to the *gabelloto* system and the displacement of mafia individuals in Italy occasionally caused by law-enforcement forcing them to relocate. These subfactors all sit within the markets category set out in the methodology. The presence of markets and market opportunities form a key part of several existing transplantation theories including Varese's and the criminal market research presented by Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti.

This chapter tackles market factors that have been argued to facilitate transplantation. The chapter shows that the desire for a mafia to operate on outpost overseas based on market factors is unlikely; the opportunities for crime were not appropriate for international investment. Instead, this chapter shows that the conditions in the US were ideal for the individual independent migrating criminal with the appropriate skills and connections. It, therefore, shows that an outpost run with direct control from Sicily is unlikely, and instead home-grown US mafia groups emerged but with Italian mafia experience and (indirect) influences such as cultural elements suitable for replication in the US. Instead of the direct running of an overseas outpost, this can be considered 'influenced transplantation', there was not full transplantation of mafia groups into the US but a hybrid of home-grown US and foreign elements that reacted to market conditions. It was not under orders from Italy, but instead made use of elements familiar to individuals who had been previously involved in (or aware of) techniques in Italy.

The chapter is split into three sections. The section on market opportunities shows the push and pull factors that relate to the availability of criminal markets. Some of the criminal markets explored here exist because of the emergence of others, for example, the markets for private

protection and for money laundering exist because of an illegal market that needs protection in the absence of state protection (police, laws, etc.) and to hide its proceeds from the state.

Examining the market and local conditions involves considering the market environment into which the mafia group is transplanting; it shows the suitability and penetrability of the US markets to emerging mafia groups. It also considers changes in the home market environment that formed push factors, such as showing how increased law enforcement efforts would have forced a mafia group out of a market.

The section on trade and opportunities considers the availability and exploitability of local trafficking routes close to the destination. The research considers that pre-prohibition there was little use of trafficking routes by mafia groups (there was not the market for an illegal product).

The data collected shows that there was no market reason for the mafia groups to migrate with the aim of operating an outpost during this time period based on their activities. Market conditions in Italy were suitable for the continuing of activities at a group level, and law enforcement efforts were targeted at an individual level. The United States did not present a market opportunity suitable to these Italian mafia groups that with conditions to which they were familiar. Instead, opportunities developed in the US for groups with the relevant skill sets (including the ability to spread fear, to be explored in the following chapter) including independent or small groups of Italian mafia migrants. These mafia migrants had often left Italy because of law enforcement efforts against them at an individual level (they had often committed a serious crime and were on the run). With these individuals came skills, knowledge, and cultural heritage that could be combined together to create a mafia group adapted to the American market conditions.

## Market Opportunities

Market opportunities underpin the paradigms of Gambetta, Varese, and the criminal market theory of Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, et al., 2011, pp. 168-171). For Varese, the existence of a market opportunity available for exploitation by mafia groups is one of two main factors in determining successful mafia transplantation (the other being the absence of local protectors) (Varese, 2011). Morselli *et al.* consider that supply and demand opportunities in a criminal market need to exist for the transplanting group (alongside systematic impunity regarding participation). They also considered that increased competition from other criminal groups in a criminal market would push a group out of a territory (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 171).

## Push

The push factors for market opportunities represent factors which encourage the group to find opportunities outside their own area. With reference to the business operations within markets of organised crime, there are several factors which may push a group out of a region, a number of which have already been identified. These can be forced/ unintentional factors such as increased competition or displacement by law enforcement in a market, or unforced strategic factors such as seeking resources or an ambitious desire to operate an outpost overseas through expansionism. The nature of transplantation that occurs is distinguished by which kind of factors influence the organised crime group, and these factors are explored below.

## Desire to operate outpost in foreign market

The desire to operate in a foreign market represents perhaps the most obvious strategic reason an organised crime group would be convinced to transplant overseas. For this to be the case in this study, the Italian mafias would need a reason to operate in a foreign market. This could come from financial desires to increase their personal wealth and to secure a future income. Territorial expansion could be used as a motivation for operating an outpost, but Ianni has highlighted why that seems unlikely; although 'there are examples of feuds and conflicts between various *Mafie* in Sicily, no *cosca* ever attempted to annex or even invade the territory of another. Why should they then attempt to cross the ocean' (Ianni, 1972, pp. 47-48). Whilst more recently Ianni's statement may not hold true, 'Ndrangheta and Camorra clans have been found around the world, and often fight between themselves in their locales over territory (see (Allum, 2017), (Buonanno & Pazzona, 2014) or (Sciarrone & Storti, 2014)).

For illicit markets, the Italian mafia groups during this period did not control the market for a physical product. Instead, the illicit activities of mafia groups in Italy were often focused on service-based opportunities, whether that is protection services, gambling, or fostering patron-client relationships, or crimes against the person such as kidnapping, violence and murder. This section, therefore, examines the potential desire to operate within a related licit market with which the mafia groups are familiar.

As explored in the migration section; the power-base of the mafia in Sicily was based with the landowners of the country, in the rural environment, and the politicians and merchants of the city, the urban environment. Trade with foreign markets would be a credible objective for the city Mafiosi, and as can be seen in the data collected on migrating Mafiosi<sup>18</sup> a number of those who arrived in the US worked as import merchants of Italian products, typically olive oil or lemons. Creating an outpost in a trade destination would allow the group to control the entire route of a product, allowing for a greater share of the product (along with the potential to monopolise industries and control prices).

The lemon industry is an important element in a study of mafia groups, in particular in Sicily, and data available on the lemon trade with the US allow for an analysis of the market role. The lemon industry has previously been linked to mafia activity in Sicily, its importance to the emergence of mafia groups has been studied and highlighted by a number of authors (Dimico, et al., 2012) (Dickie, 2007) (Lupo, 2009) (Buonanno, et al., 2011). The *gabelloti*, the middle managers of the land, along with the landlords had cornered control of the agriculture markets in Sicily, overseeing a disproportionately large area of land (in 1887, only 2.05% of Sicilian citizens owned land, though sharecropping was common) and managing the labour market (short, low pay or land share contracts usually left peasants in high interest debt to the *gabelloti* (Dimico, et al., 2012)). Dainotto suggests that by 1870 mafia groups controlled the citrus industry around Palermo, controlling 'growth, wholesale and price of lemons, as well as the industry's labour and hiring practices' (Dainotto, 2015, p. 25). Lupo added that a gang led by Giammona in Uditore, Palermo monopolised 'the management of citrus firms, private "security" services, and the first phase of the trade that allowed the fruit to reach the stores around the city's port' (Lupo, 2015, p. 15).

---

<sup>18</sup> See appendix B

The study of Dimico, Olsson, and Isopi into the lemon and citrus markets and the Sicilian mafia showed that ‘the high export revenues from citrus, combined with the sizeable initial investments needed for the development of citrus cultivation, made producers very vulnerable to predation’, and the relative absence of state protection allowed the mafia to exploit this situation (Dimico, et al., 2012). They suggest that the relative ease with which lemons could be stolen by thieves and the higher price they command differentiate them from less easy to collect, cheaper produce such as grapes and wheat (Dimico, et al., 2012, p. 12). They concluded that mafia groups followed the ‘boom in international demand for citrus fruits, combined with the presence of fixed costs in lemon production, as a source of market imperfection and very high profits in certain localities’ (Dimico, et al., 2012, p. 24). With the importance of the lemon industry to the mafia in Sicily highlighted in these previous studies, it is possible to consider its importance in the transplantation of Mafiosi into the US. With regards to the desire to operate an outpost in a foreign market, if the lemon industry is considered key to mafia activities then the significance of that industry in foreign markets is a logical extension to market desires.

The South of Italy, particularly the regions we see mafia presence in (as highlighted in the migration chapter), accounted for the majority of lemon production. In 1898 Sicily accounted for roughly 68.7% of Lemon trees, with Reggio Calabria accounting for another 14.9%.<sup>19</sup> Of the 8,287,758 lemon trees in Italy, the Palermo province alone held 30% (2,488,475) of the trees.

Between 1898 and 1908 the US was the largest market for lemon exports from Italy, accounting for varying rates between 29% and 41.3% of total lemon exports (Powell, 1909, p. 11) (Dimico, et al., 2012). The importance of Italian-United States trade in the lemon market is highlighted by the percentage of lemons going to the US at a much higher percentage than the total Italian exports to the US. In 1900 approximately 29% of the Lemon exports were to the US, whilst, of the total value of all exported products, only 8.9% was sent to the US<sup>20</sup> (by 1913, this had only increased to 10.7%).

The second largest markets were the UK and Austria-Hungary. The UK received between 18.7% and 25%, and Austria-Hungary between 14.4% and 22.8% of the trade. The majority of the US’s Italian lemons came from Palermo (between 80.2 and 90.6% in the years 1903-1908), with the

---

<sup>19</sup> Based on total numbers provided by Powell (Powell, 1909, p. 10)

<sup>20</sup> Figure based on export value from a UN draft report  
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/Historical%20data%201900-1960.pdf>

remainder from Messina and Naples. Powell notes that Messina's shipments largely went to Germany, Russia, Austria, Canada, Norway and Sweden instead (Powell, 1909, p. 11). There is no evidence of mafia transplantation into any of these other regions during this time period. These regions would later become transplanted by outposts of 'Ndrangheta groups, but Paoli indicated the 1960s as the starting point for 'Ndrangheta expansion overseas (Paoli, 2003, p. 32). Looking at this in isolation potentially suggests that were mafia transplantation to follow trade opportunities it would be a strategic decision rather than an unplanned occurrence. Had it been unplanned it might be expected that mafia sects, albeit smaller, would have emerged in these other regions, or that it would at least be a contributing factor. With strategic planning, it might be expected that a mafia organisation chose the US due to it being the largest market. When combined with other factors such as generalised migration it could be considered a contributing factor to either a strategic decision or an unplanned transplantation, and the mafia presences in both Messina and Palermo should also be considered. As seen in the migration chapter the Palermo region was heavy with mafia activity, whereas in the Messina province it was seldom identified. That the primary destination, the United States, of Palermo's lemon trade saw the advent of mafia activity, yet Messina's did not see any (that is known of), aligns with mafia presence in those regions.

Powell provided figures on the lemon exports from Italy and imports into the US, and although not directly comparable (Italian exports were in calendar years while US Imports were in fiscal years) the numbers would suggest that nearly all of the imported lemons into the US came from Italy; approximately 1.714 million pounds of lemons were exported to the US across the 10 calendar years, and the US figures show total imports of lemons from all countries to be 1.739 million pounds across the 10 financial years<sup>21</sup>. It is not an unreasonable conclusion then that nearly all of the imported lemons into the United States<sup>22</sup> came from Italy, and a large proportion of those would have come from Sicily, in particular, the Palermo region.

Powell's data also shows which cities ports were prominent for the arrival of these lemons; New York accounts for between 82.29% and 89.85% of the total imports (fiscal years 1889 to 1908), between 3.02% and 8.07% through Boston, between 1.67% and 9.44% in New Orleans, between 0.29% and 1.67% in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) and 0.26% and 3.34% in Baltimore (Powell, 1909, p. 12). All of these cities were areas known for mafia activity and, with the

---

<sup>21</sup> Based on the tables collated by Powell (Powell, 1909, pp. 11,12)

<sup>22</sup> It is worth noting that lemons were also grown in California but not on the same scale.

exception of Baltimore (only 1 of the 321 Mafiosi appeared to travel here), appeared as destinations in this studies migration chapter. Western US cities, which seldom featured as destinations for would be Mafiosi (as mentioned previously only 6 of the 321 were located beyond the Mid-West), were almost exclusively supplied with lemons from California rather than Italy (Powell, 1909, p. 13). There is a correlation here between US mafia locales and lemon export destinations, but there is not sufficient evidence of causation. The destinations all feature heavily as destinations of generalised migration, which could instead be the causing factor for the two; mafia emerging in areas with significant Italian population, and a fondness for homeland foodstuffs amongst the migrant population driving demand for lemons . Alternatively, the presence of port cities or trade hubs could attract migrants, mafiosi and lemon merchants alike.

The information on the legitimate jobs of Mafiosi in this study (explored later in this chapter) also shows that a number of mafia individuals were involved in some way with the lemon industry stateside. There are numerous food importers, grocers, market sellers, and those working in various trade industries such as the docks where the lemons would be unloaded from the ships. There are even Mafiosi noted for their role in the fruit industry, and there is some evidence that they may have managed to monopolise the industry in certain areas. The Provenzanos of New Orleans were involved in the fruit import industry, holding a monopoly on the unloading of fruit in the docks, although the ships for these came primarily from Central and South America (Asbury, 1936, p. 409). Giuseppe Fontana, notorious for his role in the Notarbartolo murder in Palermo, was a lemon trader (and estate manager) prior to emigration (Dickie, 2012), and continued as a lemon trader in the US (Dickie, 2012, p. 263) whilst associated with the Morello-Lupo gang. Similarly, Don Vito Cascio-Ferro, again associated with the Morello-Lupo group and the 'Barrel murder' was at least fronted as a lemon importer in the US (Dainotto, 2015, p. 65). The murderer of Antonio Flaccomio in 1888, Carlo Quarteraro, was indicated as 'an Italian fruit dealer' and both were involved in a secret sect of Mafia according to the New York Times (New York Times, 1988).

Gentile's testimonies provide a similar picture regarding the fruit industry and mafia connections;

'Before 1900, at Pittsburgh, a small city of Pennsylvania, there were established a lot of immigrants and some of them who entered the fruit peddling business, were able with the growth of the industry to form wholesale businesses which were then run by

their children and nephews. Since they dominated the fruit business they became the absolute bosses of the general market. Their wealth didn't come from robbery or other evil things but from the work of more than a generation.' (Gentile, c.1947, p. 13e)

Gentile goes on to highlight that different factions were, involved in this business, first demonstrating that the rival Camorra squeezed the General Fruit Market of thousands of dollars by opening a small store near the market, which would not earn enough to cover operating expenses, then threaten the wholesalers to lower their prices. Gentile explains that his boss, Conti, would act as an intermediary, despite belonging to the rival mafia, but then would follow the same tactics as the Camorra groups to extort the market.

In these examples the fruit market is used in various ways; monopolisation, extortion and as a legitimate business run by those in secret sects. But the transnational element is not needed for this; the fruit markets were not exploitable because of the mafia groups pre-existing control on the markets in Italy.

Moving onto other markets, outside of opportunities for trade there are few markets in the US that would explicitly attract mafia groups there rather than to markets closer to their home locale (the north of Italy, for example, would be more suitable for replication of results in the south, if organised crime was not reliant on the local environment). Two groups attempted to enter the construction market in the in the early 1900s; Morello and Lupo ran the "Corleone Ignazio Florio Construction" business alongside the "Roma Construction Company" ran by Carlo Constantino and Antonino Passananti (Critchley, 2009, pp. 45-46, 68-69) (Lupo, 2015, p. 24) but both companies failed during the 1907 economic downturn and began using counterfeit notes before becoming involved in a bankruptcy scam. The individuals involved in those construction companies (Morello, Lupo, Constantino, Passananti and more) did not immediately enter the construction industry. Alongside their criminal activities, Passananti had worked as a carpenter and then a wholesale wine dealer upon arrival, Constantino had run a grocery store, Morello had worked as a plasterer, owned a coal basement , a saloon (2 between 1900 and 1901), and a date factory, and Lupo had also run a grocery businesses in New York (it went bankrupt 1908). It would appear that they also had no history in the construction industry; in Palermo Lupo had been a bookseller and then ran a grocery business and a textiles shop, and Passananti's family was involved in the agricultural products trade in Partinico (Lupo, 2015, p. 24).



There does not seem to be a direct desire to operate in a foreign criminal market, and attempts to enter legitimate markets do not appear to be strategic from a mafia perspective. On its own, the desire to operate in a foreign market does not sufficiently explain full transplantation of a mafia group to the US.

Other reasons that create a desire to operate in a foreign market could come from the seeking of investments, increased competition in existing markets, the seeking of resources, and a supply of goods to be exported/trafficked. Each of these is looked at in more depth subsequently.

#### Increased Competition from Criminal groups in Existing Markets

Whilst competition would occur between rival local criminal factions in Italy; there is no nexus to indicate an increase in this competition within the markets across this island. Cutrera in 1900 indicated a level of 'solidarity' between mafia associations in Palermo and Agrigento (Cutrera, 1900) (Paoli, 2003, p. 38) and the Sangiorgi report indicated that 'powerful and widespread associations have long existed in almost all the communities of the Palermo province. They are connected to one another through relationships of dependency and affiliation, so much so that they almost form a single, large association' (Paoli, 2003). These criminal groups mostly worked in concert rather than in competition with one another.

The murder of Emmanuele Notarbartolo in 1893 and subsequent trials and acquittal of Raffaele Palizzolo in 1904, despite vast evidence, highlights the strength of the mafia during this period; Palizzolo's ability to get key witnesses and evidence removed and garner the support of the prominent individuals under the 'Pro Sicilia Committee' serve as testament to the collective influence he had (along with other forms of 'influence'). The contact between the aforementioned Giuseppe Fontana and Palizzolo 'exemplified the links across social classes which were integral to mafia activity, and Palizzolo's connections seemed sufficient to guarantee the two that prospect of impunity which mafia figures routinely enjoyed until recent times' (Farrell, 1997, p. 15).

At a collective level, there is no evidence of increased competition brought about by other criminal groups in the existing markets of Southern Italy. The localised nature of each group's activities, set around their village (rural) or district (urban), and based on systems of land protection, labour control and resource monopolisation, meant that it was unlikely for a significant number of these mafia groups were challenged.

## Pull

Converse to push factors affecting market opportunities; the pull factors represent those opportunities which would draw in criminal groups to the US environment. In the market opportunities environment, these manifest in new or booming markets, coupled with market penetrability and, for mafia groups, demand for criminal protection of the market.

### New and/or booming markets

Both Gambetta and Varese highlight the emergence of new/booming markets as key to the emergence of mafia groups (Gambetta, 1993) (Varese, 2011). The emergence of mafia groups in post Feudal societies in Sicily and Japan, and post-communism in the former Soviet Union have all been used as examples to highlight this (Varese, 2011). Prohibition, and the market for illegal alcohol, has often been credited for the rise of organised crime in the US, but mafia groups emerged before this in other criminal markets. Gambling, drugs and prostitution were all significant illegal markets and required actors to not only run them but also protect them (Varese, 2011).

The paradigms of Gambetta, and subsequently Varese, follow a 'property right theory of mafia emergence' (Gambetta, 1993) (Varese, 2011), when a society in which few individuals are property owners (such as in socialist and feudal societies) and those individuals also monopolise the use of force. Gambetta highlights that it is 'when these societies come to an end [...] there is a dramatic increase in the number of property owners and of transactions involving individuals with property rights' whilst the 'monopoly on the use of force is not transferred to the new class of property owners' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 252). This results in fear of loss of property and demand for trust, a trust which can be placed in the enforcement of perceived property rights. The data suggests that these conditions exist in the US, but also show that they do not align themselves with transplanting groups but instead favour localised groups entwined with the political systems.

The 1890 census report gives an indication of the types of criminal markets available based on incarceration numbers, and how this relates to the national status of the criminal (US born or foreign-born). Of particular note are those crimes often associated in some way with the activity of organised crime groups; gambling, violation of liquor laws, carrying concealed weapons, homicide, abduction, assault, arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, double crimes, and crimes against revenue. The census data suggests that

there is no control of these industries by foreign groups or individuals; instead, they appear to be more prevalent in the reasons for incarceration for home-grown criminals.

The data for these crimes (along with the total for all crime), is set out in Table 2. There are some limitations to this type of data that should first be indicated, as Moehling and Piehl show;

Crime measured by any of these types of data will necessarily understate criminal activity, and there are reasons to believe that all of these types of data may over- or understate relative immigrant involvement in crime: immigrants may have been less likely to report victimization, or racial prejudice on the part of the police or courts may have made them more likely to be arrested and convicted of crimes (Moehling & Piehl, 2009).

Taking this into account the data can only show us the relative share of criminal behaviour amongst each group, rather than the overall criminality of each group within society. Moehling and Piehl suggest that this kind of data may also be affected by disadvantages in court from lack of understanding of the system, translation issues, and scams, as well as unresponsiveness from dealing with issues early enough in the community before they escalated to violent crimes (Moehling & Piehl, 2009). It should also be noted that the data will not be a true representation of the proportion of crimes committed – some crimes carry longer sentences and therefore it should be expected that those crimes would result in higher numbers incarcerated per crime committed if looking on any particular date. The information is still useful for comparisons, however, and in the absence of reliable information from contemporary police reports (which were considered lacking in data, accuracy and consistency even at the time) can be used to analyse the types of crimes committed.

The 1890 census report includes information regarding the skin colour and national status of those convicted, which can be used to further identify the role of migrants in certain types of organised crime. 60.81% of prisoners were considered 'white', and 19.36% were 'foreign-born whites' with a further 3.5% having one foreign parent, and 15.31% having both parents foreign (1.09% had origins unknown, and a further 4.8% had parents origin unknown) (United States Census Bureau, 1896, p. 8). The statistics for juvenile offenders show a slightly different scenario, 80.91% of whom were considered 'white' and of which only 9.46% were foreign, but 6.48% had one foreign parent and 26.71% with both parents' foreign (with a much higher rate,

19.57%, of parents origin unknown). The increased ratio of native-born juvenile offenders, including those with foreign parentage, compared to foreign-born is most likely the result of foreign-born criminals arriving after, or later in, their juvenile years<sup>23</sup>.

As a proportion of their relevant population foreign-born 'white' individuals were nearly twice as likely to be prisoners compared to native-born 'whites' (1,768 per million of foreign-born, to 898 of native-born). Juvenile offenders show a lower proportionality for being foreign-born, but this again is likely due to the aforementioned post-juvenile migration (as stated in the report 'the case of juvenile offenders is different, since there are comparatively few children among migrants' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 11)). There is no dramatic difference in percentage between male and female prisoners among the nationality divisions (Gambetta, 1993, p. 15). In summary, accounting for all crimes foreign-born individuals were more likely to be incarcerated than US-born individuals.

Of note are the regional differences in the data. The percentage of foreign-born inmates (in all institutions) is much higher in the Northern (Atlantic and Central) and Western states – around 65%, whilst in the South Atlantic and South Central states they only represent 13.83% and 16.83% respectively (Gambetta, 1993, p. 17). The cities of interest in this study, identified as the top mafia destinations in the migration chapter, primarily fall under the Northern Atlantic region (New York, Boston, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, New Jersey), and the Northern Central region (Chicago, Kansas, Milwaukee, St. Louis). Of the top 10 destinations for Mafiosi identified in the migration chapter, only New Orleans is in a different region (South Central). The heavily urbanised states in which Italian migrants predominantly went to (Nelli, 1983, p. 47), New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois and Ohio, also all feature in the Northern Atlantic and Northern Central regions.

With this information for context, it is possible to examine the breakdown of prisoners by crimes, looking specifically at those crimes associated with organised crime. Table 2 below highlights the figures for 'white' individuals associated with crimes associated with, but not exclusive to, organised crime.

---

<sup>23</sup> The greater proportional increase in the % of 'white' juvenile offenders to prisoners compared with 'colored' offenders can likely explained by both societal differences at the time and the way in the data on 'colored' offenders is collated (it includes those of Chinese, Japanese and Native Indian origin but it predominately considered those with 'black' skin colour).

Table 2 - Incarceration numbers by crime and national birth identity

Crime		Total White	Native Born(White) <sup>24</sup>					Foreign born	Origin unknown
			Parents Native	One parent native, one	Parents foreign	Parents' origin unknown			
All offences (including those not listed)		57,310	21037	2881	12601	3952	15932	907	
Gambling		66	36	7	8	5	9	1	
Violation of Liquor Laws		654	249	16	92	40	244	13	
Burglary		6,878	2577	427	2030	374	1410	60	
Robbery		1,793	664	115	579	92	330	13	
Larceny		13,862	5677	855	3123	925	3133	149	
Embezzlement		410	229	27	46	19	85	4	
Fraud		322	154	24	50	18	74	2	
Forgery		1508	840	97	198	73	278	16	
Double crimes		2222	940	146	527	160	438	11	
Crimes against Revenue Laws		230	135	11	7	18	58	1	
Crimes against Currency		362	182	14	35	31	99	1	
Other crimes against Government	Against Election Laws	53	21	5	14	1	12	0	
	Against Pension Laws	21	11	3	2	2	3	0	
Abduction		108	51	3	24	4	25	1	
Violence-related Crimes	Assault	4887	1677	206	1027	289	1639	40	
	Homicide	4425	2182	176	494	305	1213	55	
	Arson	465	238	17	40	30	133	7	
	Carrying concealed weapons	165	94	11	13	12	31	4	

<sup>24</sup> The 1890 Census separates individuals into 'White' and 'Coloured'. For 'White' it considers whether they are native born or foreign born with further break-downs for parentage. For 'Coloured' it is broken down into 'Negroes', 'Chinese', 'Japanese' and 'Indians'. The figures are represented as ratios per 1,000,000 of the population. Italians would generally be defined as white therefore the other figures here have been omitted.

When comparing the rates (in Table 3) of these types of offences to all offences, with the sole exception of assault, all of the organised crime related offences have an equal or higher percentage of native whites with both parents native incarcerated for them compared to the norm (all origins of white offenders) for all types of offences. This would suggest that native whites are more likely to commit (or get caught) doing these crimes than other crimes.

For foreign-born nationals only Violation of Liquor laws and two of the violence based crimes, Assault and Arson, appear at a rate higher than their overall average offence rate. The census data showed that Foreign Born nationals are more likely to be arrested and found guilty for crimes not normally associated with organised crime (for example some 'crimes against public morals' such as incest, bigamy, polygamy, adultery, as well as vagrancy, against public health, against military law, disorderly conduct and breach of the peace feature higher in foreign-born than the average). Of particular note is that offences for gambling occur significantly less frequently in those who are foreign-born and those where both parents are foreign.

Table 3 - Incarceration percentages for each crime by national birth identity (Green is higher than average for all offences, red is lower)

Crime	Native Born(White)[1]				Foreign Born	Origin Unknown
	Parents Native	One parent native, one foreign	Parents foreign	Parents' origin unknown		
All offences	37%	5%	22%	7%	28%	2%
Gambling	55%	11%	12%	8%	14%	2%
Violation of Liquor Laws	38%	2%	14%	6%	37%	2%
Burglary	37%	6%	30%	5%	21%	1%
Robbery	37%	6%	32%	5%	18%	1%
Larceny	41%	6%	23%	7%	23%	1%
Embezzlement	56%	7%	11%	5%	21%	1%
Fraud	48%	7%	16%	6%	23%	1%
Forgery	56%	6%	13%	5%	18%	1%
Double crimes	42%	7%	24%	7%	20%	0%
Crimes against Revenue Laws	59%	5%	3%	8%	25%	0%
Crimes against Currency	50%	4%	10%	9%	27%	0%
Other crimes against Government	40%	9%	26%	2%	23%	0%
Against Election Laws						
Against Pension Laws	52%	14%	10%	10%	14%	0%
Abduction	47%	3%	22%	4%	23%	1%
Violence-related Crimes	34%	4%	21%	6%	34%	1%
Assault						
Homicide						
Arson						
Carrying concealed weapons	57%	7%	8%	7%	19%	2%

These statistics also correlate with similar observations Lombardo makes on crime in Chicago; 'in 1892 that of the 22,449 persons arrested in Chicago that year, only 26 were Italian' and similar observations at the prisons found proportionally fewer to no Italians in the local prisons, with their crimes being attributed mainly to ignorance of the law and importation of Old World standards as opposed to vice, drunkenness and mendicancy (Lombardo, 2010, p. 17).

The data, therefore, suggests that, in 1890, the crimes committed by foreign nationals are less likely to be associated with organised crime and that these industries were instead dominated by natively born individuals. This 1890 picture of crime in America would suggest that organised crime activities and markets, in particular gambling, fraud and forgery, were primarily controlled by native individuals, and predominantly those with native parents.

From 1890 onwards the situation changes somewhat; according to Varese a number of reforms aimed at curbing political and police corruption, starting with the Lexow Committee in 1894 and continuing with the reforms of mayor William Gaynor in 1910, created markets for criminal activity in illicit markets where police protection was no longer available (Varese, 2011, pp. 108-112). Prior to the reforms businesses such as brothels and gambling houses paid politicians and policemen 'taxes' to prevent being raided. The reforms ended the police protection rackets by preventing unauthorised raids without warrants of gambling premises, brothels and taverns. Instead, officers had to file violations with their district attorney, undermining their ability to threaten establishment owners with raids. Varese highlighted that prior to Gaynor's reforms, Italians had not entered the traditional protection markets that they had been involved in back home, instead Italian criminality was in other markets; counterfeiting, horse raiding and 'Black Hand' extortions (Varese, 2011, pp. 111-113).

From the data collected in this study, it is possible to outline the types of crimes mafia individuals were involved in after their arrival in the US. A variety of sources were used to provide this information (see methodology for a summary of sources used), it is not merely limited by police investigations and court proceedings, though there is a natural preponderance towards information from these investigative sources due to the secretive nature of the mafia groups activities. These reported crimes by transplanted Mafiosi are set out in Figure 3 and Figure 4.



The majority of crimes recorded involved violent acts, most notably murder, or attempt to commit murder. The increased seriousness, with extra police and media attention into these crimes means that they are much more likely to be investigated, reported on and tried. But they also underpin the mafia system; as Farrell puts it 'killing is indispensable to the ascent of the individual Mafioso' (Farrell, 1997, p. 10) and that 'mafia rule is based on primitive factors, on the rule of force and the dominance of mere strength; violence and the threat of violence are intrinsic to the mafia' (Farrell, 1997, p. 10). It is these violent crimes that underpin the main economic criminal activities that the mafia group undertakes; extortion and protection are both reliant on the perceived strength and threat a mafia group presents, and in other crimes their strength helps protect undertaking the criminal act whether through witness intimidation or political corruption (through a patron-client relationship based on the mafias perceived strength and influence).




Figure 3 - Number of crimes by transplanted Mafiosi recorded

## Percentage of crimes committed by Mafiosi in study (280 recorded crimes total)




Figure 4 - Percentage of recorded crimes by transplanted Mafiosi

Outside of the violent crimes (murder, assault, etc.), thefts, extortion and counterfeiting are the main activities of the transplanted Mafiosi prior to 1920. This would back up Varese's suggestion of the types of activity that the Italian mafia groups were involved in during this time period. Extortion, counterfeiting, gambling, kidnapping, labour racketeering and scams can all be examined considering further evidence of the activities of Mafiosi during this time period.

### *Extortion and Racketeering*

Extortion and racketeering underpin the protection market in which mafia groups operate according to Varese (Varese, 2011) and Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993). The market may need genuine protection, but when this is the case it is also open to those with the ability to exploit it using threats, fear and violence. In Italy extortion underpinned the control of the Sicilian Mafia, the 'Ndrangheta and the Camorra. Henner Hess showed that Western Sicilian provinces had particularly high rates of murder, robbery and extortion between 1902 and 1906 (Hess, 1973, p. 23). In Palermo the average annual murder rate was 29.06 per 100,000 inhabitants, in Caltanissetta 44.52 per 100,000, in Girgenti 38.75 per 100,000 and Trapani 26.12 per 100,000, whereas the Eastern provinces of Catania, Messina and Syracuse only had average murder rates of 13.87, 8.13, and 8.20 respectively (Hess, 1973, p. 23). Reported robbery and extortion rates showed a similar situation, in Palermo there were 33.65 per 100,000, in Caltanissetta 41.41 per 100,000, in Girgenti there were 38.75 per 100,000 and Trapani 26.12 per 100,000, whilst in the eastern provinces, Catania, Messina and Syracuse, there were again lower rates of 24.76, 7.19 and 10.30 respectively (Hess, 1973, p. 23). Train, writing on the Camorra (on trial in Viterbo), explained that they 'levied blackmail upon all gambling enterprises, brothels, drivers of public vehicles, boatmen, beggars, prostitutes, thieves, waiters, porters, marketmen, fruit sellers, small tradesmen, lottery winners, and pawnbrokers, controlled all the smuggling and coined bogus money' (in Nelli, 1976, p. 18), using religion as a front for their extortion, and mixed religious superstition into their modus operandi.

According to Varese, extortion in the form of protection racketeering did not occur in the US as it had done in Italy (Varese, 2011, pp. 111-112) before the aforementioned reforms of the Lexow committee and Mayor William Gaynor but those reforms introduced a market opportunity for the mafia groups. In Frank Marshall White's contemporary report of 1913, he highlighted the level of extortion in the Italian community; 'Ninety-five percent of the rest, Pecorini declares, the tradesmen, shopkeepers, and unskilled workers, are paying daily tribute

to ex-convicts of the Mafia and the Camorra' (White, 1913). This protection racketeering was not just of those businesses deemed to be working in the underworld; the brothels, gambling houses, and out of hours taverns, but also the tradesmen and shopkeepers of 'upperworld' businesses.

The 'Baff Murder' in November 1914, also highlighted in Critchley (Critchley, 2009), Dash (Dash, 2009) and Varese (Varese, 2011, p. 115), illustrates the emergence of Italian-American mafia groups becoming involved in protection racketeering even outside the Little Italys. The murder was a product of the monopolisation of the kosher poultry industry when Barnett Baff informed on competitors on several occasions, first that they were adding extra weight to birds' gullets using grit, sand and gravel, and then on the physical condition of the slaughterhouses in a price-fixing attempt by the slaughterhouse workers in a letter to the New York City Commissioner of Health (Anon., 1914).

This led to 87 men being indicted for anti-trust violations, with more arrests following including 18 members of the Live Poultry Dealer's Protective Association on corruption charges in 1914. The poultry union boss 'Big' Joe Cohen offered and threatened Baff to join the poultry racket, including planting bombs intending to scare Baff. Eventually, in 1914, Cohen utilised local Italian Mafiosi to kill Baff (7 attempts were made on Baff before they were successful including a bomb in his home and an effort to drown him in the North River (Cornell Daily Sun, 1917)). The trial implicated a number of Mafiosi; Gaetano Reina, Tommaso Gagliano, Jack Dragna, Giuseppe Arichiello and Frank Ferrera. One Mafioso, Carmine DiPaolo, when facing his own charges for assault, informed police that Joe Cohen had paid \$4,800 to Ippolito Greco a saloonkeeper who organised the Mafiosi with Antonio Cardinale (Cornell Daily Sun, 1917). Baff had been murdered by a mafia group that had been brought in by his poultry industry competitors.

Varese suggested that the mafia groups in the US were also able to gain control of other industries following Gaynor's reforms; the barbershops, the garment industry, the docks (see the example of labour racketeering below), lathing and the plastering industry (Varese, 2011, p. 115).

One form of extortion that manifested during the early twentieth century is the Black Hand technique. As shown in the literature review, the existence of a nationwide 'Black Hand' has been disputed, for example, according to Lombardo;

There is even less support for the existence of the Black Hand. The alien conspiracy view argues that the Black Hand was a transitional step between the Mafia in Sicily and the Cosa Nostra in American society. [...] There was no international association. There was no central organization. There was no connection to the Camorra or Mafia. There was, however, the press, which through its Mafia interpretation turned Black Hand Crime into an international criminal conspiracy (Lombardo, 2013, p. 17).

Raab presented a similar scenario; 'In the early stages of Italian immigration, the police in New York and in other large eastern cities often confused the mafia with individuals and gangs operating under the name of "La Mano Nero", or the Black hand. [...] The Black Hand, which had no direct relationship with the Mafia, referred to a crude technique of random extortion used by individuals and small gangs' (Raab, 2005, p. 19).

Messick and Goldblatt, however, presented the Black Hand as part of the mafia activities; 'The "signature" of the mafia was a black handprint, and for some years the secret society was known as the Black Hand' (Messick & Goldblatt, 1972, p. 11).

Instead, it is now presented as a crime technique as much as smaller criminal groups, the crimes themselves show an extortion of the Italian community often by organised groups of individuals. Despite the distancing of a Black Hand from the Mafia, there were a number of Mafiosi in the study who had engaged in Black Hand crime. This study, therefore, suggests that treating the Black Hand as a criminal tactic is a more viable assessment, and that it cannot be wholly separated from mafia groups; mafia groups, such as the Morello-Lupo family, used the tactic to their advantage and were often reported as a Black Hand gang in the media. Equally mafia groups had to deal with Black Hand extortionists themselves, Giosue Gallucci found himself threatened by Aniello Prisco in New York as did mafia boss Jim Colosimo who received Black Hand threats in Chicago.

The Morello-Lupo family themselves adopted Black Hand tactics in their extortion methods (Nelli, 1976). Morello's group included future notable Mafiosi such as Joe Masseria and Salvatore D'Aquila. Despite this Lupo revealed that he had also received numerous 'Black Hand' threats, handing over \$10,000 to extortionists (Nelli, 1976, pp. 78-79).

James 'Big Jim' Colosimo brought Johnny Torrio to Chicago in 1909 to deal with Black Hand extortion threats, after Torrio had arranged for their elimination in New York (Nelli, 1970b) (Nelli, 1976, p. 78). Torrio had been previously been the leader of the prominent Five Points

gang in New York (Lyle, 1960). Giosue Gallucci, one of the more prominent mafia bosses in New York, was also the victim of Black Hand extortionists; often a rival Neapolitan Camorra gang (mainly based in Brooklyn) run by Aniello Prisco. After Prisco had attempted to kill Gallucci and fled, Gallucci had him killed when he returned (New York Herald, 1913) (The Day Book, 1913) (New York Times, 1912).

In Chicago, Landesco's study of more than 300 Black Hand crimes found that they were almost exclusively limited to the Sicilian communities (Nelli, 1970b), but there is also evidence that Black Hand crimes were not exclusive to Sicilian criminals. A Black Hand Extortion attempt in 1908 on interior decorator Francesco Spinella was brought to the attention of Police Lieutenant Joe Petrosino, and one of the extortionists caught in the act of planting a bomb was a newly arrived Calabrian (White, 1913).

Park & Miller touch upon Mafia and Camorra, suggesting they developed into Black Hand activities, adding 'before 1905, in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, Pennsylvania, Ohio, wherever Italians were congregated, systematic blackmail and murder produced a feeling of insecurity and terror unfavourable to all constructive activity' (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 241).

Park and Miller presented two extracts in their work, both from the Italian White Hand Society (a society set up to counter Black Hand crimes) regarding the Black Hands letters. The letter 'in its classic form is short, written in an unassuming and sometimes friendly tone. It contains the request for money, with an indication of the place where it is to be delivered, and a threat. Sometimes veiled by mysterious allusions, and sometimes expressed with a brutal lack of reserve' (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 243). The description explains that the victim will receive subsequent letters containing more violent threats and symbols such as 'pierced hearts, of pistols, daggers, crosses, skulls and crossbones, bombs etc.' (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 244). The letters suggest that the individual seek out 'friends' to assist and intervene; this is most likely an intermediary who is on the crime but who presents themselves as someone who can help and distances themselves from incrimination (Park & Miller, 1921, pp. 244-245).

Extortion can also be carried out by the imitators, as Gambetta highlighted, more recently Palermo in the late 1980s was victim to a large number of these faux- protection claims, as freelancers attempted to cash-in on the mafias' business model (and were often caught out by demanding too much) (Gambetta, 1993, pp. 254-255). In early 1900s US cities, these imitators also existed, utilising the fear and reputation of a 'black hand society'. One example, though

not for the purpose of extorting money, is a letter addressed from “The Mafia” that warned of a bomb aboard the SS Umbria:

“Dear Sir: The Mafia greets you and wishes you well.

At the Cunard Dock is a box containing 100 pounds of dynamite. Inside also is a machine that properly set, can explode the staff any time within thirty-six hours.

The society has declared war against England”[...]“The reasons for this movement the society does not want to disclose; suffice to say that the society in order to protect itself must carry the war into the enemy’s country”

Signed by Pietro Demartini (New York Times, 1903b).

A disassembled bomb was found aboard the Umbria, though the Police were quick to dismiss mafia involvement, and the motives behind the bomb remain unclear with Police Inspector George McClusky stating it was ‘not the work of the Mafia or any other secret society’ and that it was likely the work of an individual (New York Times, 1903b), whilst other sources attributed it to the Fenian organisation (The West Australian, 1903). In another example two children (aged 9 and 13) imitated the Black Handers in 1910, attempting to extort \$2,500, using the same letter writing technique (New York Times, 1910b).

Nelli suggested that the primary consequence of ignoring a Black Hand note included ‘the kidnapping of a loved one (especially a child)’ (Nelli, 1976, p. 77). By contrast, the practice of kidnapping for extortion was not used as much by Sicilian groups in Italy (unlike the Camorra). As Catanzaro put it the Sicilian mafia was instead an ‘expression of the regional ruling classes’ and deeply penetrated into society (Catanzaro, 1992, p. 102). However, known examples of kidnapping exist within the Sicilian group, for example, Vito Cascio Ferro’s involvement in the kidnapping of the Baroness of Valpetrosa (Critchley, 2009, p. 40). In the US Nelli highlighted Giuseppe Esposito’s kidnapping ring after 1880 of ‘seventy-five cut-throats’, extorting, but that it was not a mafia group and was more akin to the banditry groups that Esposito had been a part of in Sicily (Nelli, 1976, pp. 28-29). One case of children being kidnapped occurred in 1910 in which ‘Black Hand’ gang members Maria Rappa (interestingly a woman seemingly in the organisation) and Stanislao Pattenza (the leader of the group) kidnapped two boys after their father failed to pay the \$15,000 requested by the extortion letters (New York Tribune, 1910) (The Evening World, 1910).



The line between 'Black Hand' and Mafia is blurred both in the literature and in operation. Whilst 'Black Hand' crime may have been opportunistically seized upon by a variety of criminals, its relationship with the mafia was both as a tactic for extortion, whilst also a nuisance to more successful Mafiosi running legitimate upperworld enterprises.

Also of note is the increased mafia activity in labour racketeering. Paul Kelly (Paolo Vaccarelli) entered the labour racketeering business in Harlem roughly from 1910 becoming vice-president of the International Longshoremen's Union. This reflected a change in the identity of workers on the docks; in 1880 around ninety-five percent of New York City's longshoremen were Irish and the remainder Northern European, but by 1912 Italians occupied up to a third of the positions, and by 1919 Italians comprised 75% (Nelli, 1976, p. 109). The racketeer could partake in a vast number of lucrative crimes on the docks, particularly through control of the sought after labour positions; bribery, kickbacks, loan-sharking came alongside the labour allocation, and pilfering, loan-sharking, gambling and smuggling of illegal products (including drugs) were all profitable dockside activities (Nelli, 1976, p. 109). Kelly also infiltrated the rag-pickers union in East Harlem in association with Cera Terranova, 'where the gangsters extorted money from businessmen and rag-pickers alike' (Liddick, 1999, p. 105). Similarly, Critchley refers to a 'Black Hand' gang that had infiltrated garment industry unions, and that organised in labour strikes until 1913, when the gang was dismantled by police (Critchley, 2009, p. 23).

With regards to transplantation of mafia groups, extortion and racketeering were not key activities upon arrival for many of the Mafiosi. However, societal changes in the United States, firstly the hysteria surrounding the 'Black Hand' crimes that helped the strategy's successfulness, and then the reforms put in place by William Gaynor, allowed mafia groups to begin a transition into extortion racketeering groups that controlled various industries and territories. This was not the creation of an outpost echoing the tactics of the *gabelloti* in Sicily and Southern Italy, but rather an adaptation to the specific circumstances and opportunities that allowed the mafia groups to flourish. It highlights that these groups were not any kind of Italian mafia outpost under foreign orders but rather 'imitation outposts', new groups involved in crimes in an environment hugely different to what was found in Italy. These individuals had adapted to the new market conditions rather than the transplanting of specific types of crime utilise in Italy into incompatible markets.

Buonanno and Pazzona examined a similar adaptation in Italian mafia groups that 'infiltrated' the north of Italy since the 1970s;

‘The clans soon realized that the North was different from the South, where they had operated with impunity, open arrogance and defiance of the State institutions. It was necessary to maintain a low profile, to blend in and not make their moves apparent to the authorities. Therefore, the methods used and the types of crime perpetrated were significantly different from the ones used in their regions of origin. The most common crimes were extortion, kidnapping, robbery, intimidation through bomb attack and drug dealing, while murder was rather infrequent and rare.’ (2014, p. 76)

Buonanno and Pazzona argued that mafia potential was strongly related to extortion, kidnapping, robbery and bomb attacks rather than murder.

### *Counterfeiting*

The main exploits of the Morello-Lupo group focussed on counterfeiting rather than the traditional mafia activity of extortion (that is not to say that mafia did not engage in counterfeiting or other activities, only in that it was secondary to their extortion activities). In 1889 Morello set up a counterfeiting ring whilst still in Corleone, Sicily, distributing the notes through a gambling scheme in a local café running the operation until a police crackdown in 1892 (Dash, 2009, p. 59). Once in the US, Morello was arrested in 1900 for the selling of counterfeit bills, though he was released due to lack of evidence (Dash, 2009, pp. 106-110). By 1902 Morello had redeveloped his counterfeiting gang; it was now exclusively Sicilian, and it no longer made the notes in Manhattan under the surveillance of the secret service (Dash, 2009, pp. 120-121). Instead, the notes arrived from Sicily in sealed cans of olive oil along with a variety of other goods to avoid inspection (Dash, 2009, p. 120).

Morello does not appear to have been the first to have used this tactic. In 1896 it was found that a number of counterfeit notes were being printed in Italy and shipped to the US (Barton, 1896). The misspelling of words on the notes in an Italian manner, ‘Treasurero’ instead of ‘Treasurer’ for example, was a clue that the counterfeiters were Italian (Barton, 1896) (similarly Dash mentions that Morello’s notes had numerous spelling mistakes (Dash, 2009, p. 121)). It was then discovered that boxes of macaroni and canned vegetables were being used to hide the imported counterfeit notes (Barton, 1896).

An investigation into the ‘Barrel murder’ in 1903 appears to have turned the Morello-Lupo group away from counterfeiting. But in 1908 the financial downturn had damaged the cooperative the family was now running, and Morello's group returned to counterfeiting as a

way to cover their expenses (Dash, 2009, p. 184). In 1909 Morello was arrested again for counterfeiting, this time the operation had been run in a village 50 miles North of New York City (Dash, 2009, p. 190).

For Morello, counterfeiting is a criminal trade he had applied in Sicily and therefore had the prerequisite skills to set up and run a counterfeit money printing and distribution operation. But upon his arrival in the US, he does not make use of his Sicilian connection immediately. Upon arrival, Morello spent some time working legitimate jobs (planting sugar cane, cotton picker, coal basement and a saloon) before re-entering the counterfeiting business. It is only after his first arrest that Morello makes exclusive his group to Sicilians and uses connections in Sicily to produce and traffic the notes to the US, and upon his return to counterfeiting in 1908, he opts instead to again produce the notes locally to New York. Here the Sicilian operations are only relevant in that they serve a purpose for the Lupo's American mafia group; Lupo is not reliant on the Sicily-based operations to conduct his criminal activity. The Sicilian operation of producing the counterfeit notes is only relevant in that it sits outside US law enforcement and presents a convenient way to transport and distribute counterfeit notes secretly into the US Italian migrant community; there is no reciprocal arrangement that benefits those in Sicily beyond the financial gain.

### *Gambling*

The gambling industry was synonymous with the US mafia(s) by the time of the Kefauver hearings in the 1950s. Prior to prohibition, however, Italian groups were barely actors in the gambling industry. They were localised to their own communities where they existed, running street games similar to how the Camorra operated in Naples (in one theory of the etymology of their name 'Capo Morra' refers to the game boss who protects the game from law enforcement and other threats) or lottery schemes.

A look at newspapers between 1880 and 1920 reveals very few reports on major Sicilian or Italian gambling den operations; the majority of gambling operations reported on are run by German, Chinese or those of British/Irish descent<sup>25</sup>. Those reported will of course only make up a fraction of the total gambling dens, and the absence of reporting on Italian gambling houses or lotteries certainly does not mean they do not exist (Johnny Torrio's operations in both New York and Chicago are evidence of otherwise); it could be suggested that they were

---

<sup>25</sup> See Appendix C

less likely to be raided on account of the isolated community in which they operated. This, however, would not explain why the equally, if not more, isolated Chinese communities gambling operations were reported on with greater frequency<sup>26</sup>.

Far from having a grip on the gambling industry, it would appear that the Italians were small-time players in running these operations before 1920. In the newspaper articles examined there is also nothing to suggest that Italian mafia groups were providing protection to these non-Italian outfits also – the non-Italian gambling dens seemed to prefer in-house protection<sup>27</sup>.

The police and law-making bodies also played a role in the protection of gambling houses in some cases – one newly opened gambling house was so bold as to advertise it's fixing of the local sheriff so as to avoid interference (Chicago Tribune, 1900) (though the article highlights such a public admission may instead stir official action against it) . A 1870 article points out that in Chicago any building may be entered by the police with reason, unless that reason is that it is used for gambling, in which case it must be reported as such by at least two of the city's householders (and not an outsider) who can prove a "common reputation" and require the Superintendent's permission (Chicago Tribune, 1870). The "common reputation" cannot be proved by 'specific instance of gambling, but only by evidence as to what the neighbours say about the place' and neighbours speaking favourably about the place the "common reputation" claim is contradicted.

Testimonies given in Pellegrino Morano's trial for murder highlighted a system of corruption in avoiding 'police molestation' of gambling games. The testimony is of an Italian man who works for the Bureau of Licences, stating that he asked a 'fixer' in the (US) Camorra to arrange this with the police (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1918).

This does not mean that the gambling houses were exempt from interference by law enforcement, for example, public sentiment forced the mayor of Galesburg to act in closing the gambling dens in 1894 (Chicago Tribune, 1894) and there a number of articles detailing raids of gambling dens in all parts of the US. But what it does highlight, along with the aforementioned self-protection, is that the Italians did not have protection services for gambling monopolised during this time period, and if they were even involved they would have had to share the market with a number of other actors.

---

<sup>26</sup> As above

<sup>27</sup> The following articles detail the venue protection: (Chicago Tribune, 1896) (Chicago Tribune, 1901)

The complexity of the numbers market would also make it unsuitable for newcomers. The intricate hierarchy system from collectors, through controllers and the “bank” and up to the so called banker, as set out in Liddick’s *The Mob’s Daily Number*, features a number of relationships at all levels that require a deep knowledge of the local systems of society (Liddick, 1999, pp. 6-8). The banker, for example, must utilise professional associates including accountants, lawyers and bail bondsmen, alongside a system of bribes to public officials.

There is one example of an Italian Mafioso who becomes eventually involved in the gambling market. In the 1910s, the previously mentioned Giosue Gallucci was engaged in running a lottery game alongside his business empire, posing as a representative of the Royal Italian Lottery (New York Herald, 1917), and usury based around the numbers racket. The ‘Royal Italian Lottery’ was actually run out of his basement, according to the New York Herald, using ‘agents in all cities with Italian colonies and sold many thousands of tickets monthly’ (New York Herald, 1917). The winner of the \$1000 prize was frequently robbed shortly after collecting their winnings (New York Herald, 1917). Alongside Giuseppe DeMarco (sometimes DiMarco) Gallucci appears to have had a monopoly on the numbers racket from the 1910s, and by that point, he had already been in the United States for approximately fifteen years. The long period of time Gallucci was in the US before he had a hold on the lottery industry in New York would point out that transplantation of an outpost for this purpose is unlikely. His transition into the gambling industry, alongside his legitimate enterprises, suggests that it is the changes in the local environment (such as Gaynor’s reforms) that allowed Gallucci and others to gain a more dominant market presence in the early 1910s.

#### Demand for criminal protection

Diego Gambetta’s study of the Sicilian mafia explored the business of private protection and the factors that create a market for protection as a commodity. Gambetta highlights that there exists both extortion and a genuine market for protection in Sicily (Gambetta, 1993). These provide the necessary demand for mafia groups to take advantage of the situation.

One of the key motivators of demand for criminal protection is the artificial demand created by mafia groups themselves, especially outside of the aforementioned illegitimate markets. The aforementioned use of extortion is one of the primary methods of achieving this utilising the mafia groups’ violent acts and intimidation methods. When looking at the demand in US cities for private protection, the role that the criminal groups had in creating this demand factors into the analysis of transplantation. It may be that demand for criminal protection is

small or negligible for a transplanting individual, but the potential to create and exploit that demand, in the absence of alternatives for protection such as the legal system and the police, is sufficient to pull the criminal into that locale.

Gambetta highlights it is more advantageous protect groups rather than individual firms (Gambetta, 1993, pp. 23, 194- 225); protecting only a single business and not its competitors runs the risk of creating opportunities for rival protection rackets or involvement of law enforcement. Gambetta also highlights a chain reaction of protection purchasing that occurs within a locale (Gambetta, 1993, p. 30). If even a small number of businesses purchase protection within a locale, as Gambetta proposes perhaps those more at risk to non-mafia criminal activities such as Jewellers or those who yield to the threats of the mafia, then it increases the risk to the non-protected businesses; 'predators will concentrate their efforts on the unprotected' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 30). This will cause a chain reaction whereby all the businesses buy up protection to avoid the increased risk of being unprotected. It also validates the requirement for the protection as those unprotected are then at far greater risk.

Unlike state protection, it is pertinent to remember that service of protection extends to both victim and the criminal, in that the criminal also buys protection from the mafia. It protects the criminal in an otherwise unprotected market (a criminal cannot rely on the law to protect their business arrangements). According to Gambetta, it is in this scenario that the highest bidder receives the prerogative – though that bid may be, not only cash, but the also the value of favours and services that the protected can provide (Gambetta, 1993, p. 32).

In the US, as Varese suggested, the reforms of William Gaynor opened various markets up to criminal protection services; brothels, gambling houses and out-of-hours taverns along with other businesses operating in some way outside the law. The crackdown on corruption within law enforcement removed the protection services these businesses were being afforded by corrupt officials. This created a vacuum of protection services which mafia groups were willing to provide. But these reforms did not have the impact on creating protection rackets outside of the Little Italys until the 1910s, by which point most Mafiosi examined in this study had already migrated to the US and were involved in other criminal activities. It is wrong to suggest that the vacuum left by law enforcement drew in mafia groups from Italy, whether to run as full outposts, or as a consequence; instead the individuals to control these early rackets had already been in the US for a number of years and were merely taking the opportunity to expand their control and influence.

As part of Varese's analysis, he highlighted that a lack of local competitors was also required (Varese, 2011). As shown already some industries were already well protected such as gambling, which either used the police or their own in-house protection. Similarly, Irish competition in many legitimate markets had made labour racketeering in many markets impossible for Italians until they had a significant number of workers employed by that industry. As noted above, Paul Kelly and Cera Terranova were only able to control labour through the unions once Italians made up a significant number of the workers (Liddick, 1999, p. 105). This would rule out the US as an ideal destination for transplantation of an outpost prior to the 1910s, and even in the 1910s, the Italians face competition from Irish and Jewish groups until and through prohibition.

### *Market penetrability*

One of the main factors identified by both Varese (Varese, 2011) and by Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (Morselli, et al., 2011) is the market penetrability of the destination. This also encompasses several subfactors; the size of the locale, a low level of technology and low professionalisation within those marketplaces.

### *Size of Locale*

As previously highlighted from Gambetta's (Gambetta, 1993) analysis operating in a small locale can be advantageous for organised crime groups; it provides benefits to operations (easier to cover all transactions in a smaller area), reputation, and information collection.

In the US the early mafia groups are centred on smaller locales; Black Handers preying exclusively on Italian communities in the 'Little Italy's for example; as previously mentioned Landesco's study showed black hand crimes were limited to the Sicilian communities (Nelli, 1970b) and Frank Marshall White highlighted that around ninety-five percent of businesses in the communities were paying extortion (White, 1913). The focus on the smaller localised Italian communities allowed them to concentrate their efforts, operate in an environment in which law enforcement was not prominent (see lax law enforcement) and an environment in which they could prey upon the cultures and traditions that perpetuated the fears of the mafia (see the operations chapter for discussion on linking the reputation to these homeland mafias).

### *Low level of professionalisation*

Amongst these communities we also see a low level of professionalization and a high level of unskilled/low-skilled work- many workers have menial labour jobs, typically on the docks or railroads, or work as merchants. Steinberg's study of the early twentieth century points out that only around 15 percent of the Southern Italian immigrant adult labour force were skilled workers (Steinberg, 2001). Whilst this shows low professionalisation compared with other immigrant workforces, low professionalisation cannot be a deciding factor alone – Jewish Immigrants had 67 percent of its adult workforce skilled (Steinberg, 2001) yet was equally plagued by organised crime groups.

The study of Mafiosi reinforces this idea of immigrants taking on labour jobs (see appendix B). Excluding the food industry, just less than 20% (29 out of 151) of the work identified as being carried out by the mafiosi was direct labour work (longshoremen, carpenters, plasterers,



railroad workers, etc.). A further eight of the jobs were associated with the control of labour and unions (Union worker, dock control, etc.). A large number of the jobs were associated with the food and drink business in some way (70 of the 151 jobs were in this industry, around 46%), though that broadly includes restaurants and saloons, importers, market sellers and more.

At least 42 of the 151 (around 28%) jobs involved owning their business in some way (though this may be higher as many records only showed profession and employee status), including 8 saloon owners and 5 café owners.

There were no individuals who were recorded as working in a highly-professionalised industry in which formal qualifications were required; there were no physicians or other medical workers (there was one 'druggist' – but the term druggist often applied to untrained pharmacists (New York Daily Times, 1851)), no engineers, architects, accountants, teachers and none working in the legal professions.

An often-cited exemplar of early Mafia activity in the US, Giuseppe Morello's early jobs in the US included working as a plasterer with his half-brothers, the Terranovas, for his father, running a coal basement, owning two saloons that soon went out of business, and a date factory that also struggled<sup>28</sup>.

The low skilled, non-professional upperworld jobs that the Mafiosi (actual and future) undertook reinforces concerns made by Morselli *et al.* regarding the vulnerability of these legitimate industries. Without professionalisation, these industries are subject to ambiguities in regulatory practices (as highlighted before in the scenario of Baff vs the poultry industry) producing individual deviations that according to Morselli *et al.*, 'come together to form an eventual group phenomenon' (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 187). These groups are more easily penetrated and more likely to develop patron-client relationships that foster the growth of mafia groups when these industry groups gain power.

In this way, the Mafiosi in the US were not emulating Italian experiences of industry penetration, but rather responding to opportunities presented by markets in the US that were particularly susceptible to the introduction of mafia 'protectors'.

---

<sup>28</sup> See appendix A

#### Market opportunities pull factor conclusions

The opportunities presented in the US for organised crime and mafia groups mostly emerged due to the local conditions (lack of law enforcement in the Little Italys for example), or changes in those conditions (the reforms that removed corrupt police protection for illegal businesses). They were not conditions familiar to Italian mafia groups, and the resulting criminal activities were different to those found in Italy. The data suggest that transplantation of an outpost is unlikely due to the differing local conditions and criminal activities that suited them. Instead 'imitation' groups, with members who had developed criminal experience in Italy and relevant skills, were able to exploit the US markets as they became available.

## Market and Local Conditions

Gambetta would argue that the market appropriate for certain criminal activities 'is heavily dependent on the local environment' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 251). The local market environment is made up of a number of conditions that may or may not make it suitable for the operations of a criminal group.

## Push factors

The push factors that formulate the conditions of the local market in which the mafia group originally operates, and changes in these conditions that encourage the mafia group to look elsewhere. This could include seeking resources absent from the local market (usually a strategic decision), or increased law-enforcement which makes continuing operations in the locale difficult or impossible (a forced decision).

## Seeking Resources

The seeking resources factor can be dismissed fairly easily. At this time the mafia groups in Italy were not obtaining any resource by developing connections with criminal groups in the United States (or elsewhere). They had no requirements that the local environment did not already provide; the market in which they operated was built on localised services such as protection or gambling for which extra equipment, labour, and other resources were not needed beyond which they were already able to immediately acquire. Other items like firearms and the relevant licences were seemingly easy enough to obtain (even through disreputable means), as evidenced by Ermanno Sangiorgi's efforts to revoke the licences (Dickie, 2007, p. 89) (Dickie, 2012) , and obtained, according to Dickie, with the reference from a leading citizen, such a as a politician' (Dickie, 2007, p. 89) (including those in the mafia).

It is not until post WW2 that the Sicilian mafia and Camorra begin to acquire goods overseas, such as cigarettes and later drugs, for trafficking into and through Italy (Gambetta, 1993, p. 229). Therefore the act of seeking resources is unlikely to have factored in as a strategic decision for a transplanting mafia group or Mafiosi.

## Pull Factors

### Poorly regulated economic sectors, lax law-enforcement and high corruption

The permeability of various economic sectors by organised crime groups can be prevented by having strong regulations, law enforcement and systems that prevent corruption. When the market is poorly regulated it allows individuals to avoid or subvert the rules for financial or power gain, including monopolisation. With lax law enforcement criminal groups do not face the threat of arrest or interrupted activities. With highly corrupt sectors, or local administrations, the direction of investigations and law enforcement is deliberately subverted, and changes to effective regulations are prevented.

The job history of those involved with the Morello family helps highlight the poor regulation in some market sectors, after having filled a number of labourer jobs, followed by a few business ownerships, Giuseppe Morello and his half-brothers ran a real estate racket, the *Corleone Ignazio Florio Association of Corleonesi* [sometimes written as the *Ignatz-Florio Association of Corleonesi*], which eventually folded (Critchley, 2009). They had also cornered certain markets setting up monopolies such as on the Artichoke trade;

One trio of brothers grew wealthy through the exclusive "right" to sell artichokes in the Italian colonies. Those were the Morello brothers, one of whom, Nicholas, was murdered, and the two, Vincent and Chiro, now under arrest. (New York Herald, 1917)

Similarly, the aforementioned situation between Baff and the poultry industry highlighted how the industry was able to get away with breaking or subverting regulations, utilising a monopoly on the trade to avoid interest and investigation from concerned parties (Baff excluded).

Police Lieutenant Petrosino noted on policing in New York; 'here there is practically no police surveillance. Here it is easy to buy arms and dynamite. Here there is no penalty for using a fake name. Here it is easy to hide, thanks to our enormous territory and overcrowded cities' (Raab, 2005, p. 20) . He referred to an ineffective police force, noted for avoiding the 'Little Italy's and having few police officers who could speak Italian (Raab, 2005, p. 20). The lack of a viable police presence in the Italian migrant community to deal with everyday crime meant that individuals had to turn to mafia groups to secure protection from criminal activity (robberies for example – even if it is the mafia who would have committed them).

Political corruption, according to Nelli, was based on service; 'bargains, compromises, connections, patronage, and favors were and are essential ingredients of practical politics' (Nelli, 1970, p. 92). Nelli continues; 'Ward politicians found jobs and did favors for constituents, obtained franchises for companies, and reimbursed themselves at public expense', as well as involvement in the issue and sale of fraudulent naturalization certificates (Nelli, 1970, p. 92).

Liddick described it as a world of patronage 'where political bosses granted favours such as jobs, exemption from city ordinances, and, for their less savory clients, an unofficial licence to practice breaking the law' (Liddick, 1999, p. 101).

According to Liddick (Liddick, 1999, p. 103) and Nelli (Nelli, 1976) Italians dominated vice in the Bowery, controlling gambling and prostitution in exchange for this political support; in the early 1890's Timothy D. Sullivan, as Bowery Assembly district leader gave foremost criminals positions in the political machine; 'gambling entrepreneurs and organizers of prostitution were election district captains, responsible for bringing out the vote, or perhaps more appropriately, engineering election frauds' (Liddick, 1999, p. 103).

Saloonkeepers assisted political campaigns with contributions and personal work for ward politicians in exchange for the ability to operate undisturbed by the authorities, staying open after hours, serving minors, functioning as places of prostitution and other criminal activities (Nelli, 1970, p. 120). From the data on work (Appendix B) it is clear that a number of Mafiosi during this time had been saloon owners.

Mike 'Hinky Dink' Kenna saloonkeeper and Chicago first ward Alderman helped mayors such as Carter Harrison get elected or removed from office (he did both with Harrison) and had many associates who owned brothels in the area (Doherty, 1952) .

In Chicago, James Colosimo emerged as a political criminal power after 1900. His base of operations centred on Chicago's saloons, gambling halls and prostitution houses. He created a voting bloc in Chicago's first ward that's power extended beyond voting numbers (Nelli, 1970, pp. 121-122). A combination of favours, patronage, threats and force helped Colosimo control the 'Italian' vote. Colosimo, however, would not take office in the first ward, instead favouring the Irish politicians in exchange for freedom from officials and the police for his criminal activities. Colosimo would buy up businesses in Chicago in order to solidify his control (Wood, 1953). He acted as a spokesman to the underworld for local 1<sup>st</sup> ward aldermen Mike Kenna and

John Coughlin with whom he ran a protective association for 'brothel keepers, gamblers, opium peddlers, fences, crooked pawnbrokers and any and all others operating gyp stands' (Lyle, 1960). Colosimo also controlled the street sweepers union, athletic club and more than 200 assignment houses.

When Torrio arrived in Chicago in 1910, with Colosimo, he noted the rise in automobile use and set up large barracks as brothels in towns and villages on the outskirts of the city (Lyle, 1960). Here it was much cheaper to corrupt the small town officials, and much easier to create a lookout system utilising gas stations, diners and other roadside establishments en-route to the brothels (Lyle, 1960). An electrical system linked the lookouts to the brothel- delivering an early warning to criminals and customers (Lyle, 1960).

An article published in the *New York Times* in August 1913 suggested that there had been a corruption of politicians by organised crime groups when 700 certified criminals were not deported after Police Lieutenant Petrosino died, whilst 'Commissioner Bingham had been dismissed, and Vachris and Crowley, who completed Petrosino's work, preparing certificates, photographs, and a card index of the desperadoes, were sent by Commissioner Baker to patrol duty on obscure beats' all while the three year deportation limit expired because 'Politicians who take tribute from the Black Handers 'ordered the Mayor to prevent their deportation'' (New York Times, 1913b). When one ex-convict was found guilty of perjury in the Supreme Court, one Supreme Court Justice and a Tammany Hall district leader intervened to make the sentence small (White, 1913).

In 1912 a poster advertised an 'outing 'of an organisation controlled by a mixture of ex-convicts and Tammany district leaders, and it was supported by 100 or more 'vice presidents'; local businessmen who had been forced to purchase a minimum of one hundred tickets each (or more for wealthier businessmen) under threat of extortion (White, 1913) (New York Herald, 1913).

In New Orleans, the fighting and alliances between the factions from 1860 onwards (and the introduction of Giuseppe Esposito & Giuseppe Provenzano's '[Giaradinieri](#)' in 1879) eventually led to the murder of Police Chief David Hennessey in 1890. The police chief had shown his support to Provenzano's group and was willing, along with his officers, to defend them in court against the Matranga clan (Nelli, 1976, p. 43). Corruption within the police force had led to several murders [among](#) policemen including Hennessey, who had murdered Chief of Aides

Thomas Deveraux in 1881 (who had himself murdered a rival detective in 1876) (Gauthreaux, 2014).

At the trial of 9 of the 19 defendants for Hennessey's murder the Judge acquitted 6 and declared a mistrial for the 3 others (Newton, 2012, p. 7) and a number of witnesses refused to testify. Upon the announcement of the trials result a lynch mob killed 11 of the 19 defendants waiting in jail including Macheha.

Pfeiffer, Kleimann, & Windzio suggested that;

If, over a prolonged period, the media reports upward trends in the number of crimes committed and if the public debate on crime focuses on spectacular, serious crimes, [...]the courts feel in turn duty bound to hand out tougher sentences- passed in the name of the people- and their sentences are meant to reflect public opinion (Pfeiffer, et al., 2006, p. 109)

However, here in New Orleans, the opposite of this happens. Despite increased media attention on mafias, and the murder of Chief Hennessey, the court found the individuals innocent. The corruption of the police and the legal system was strong enough that it was even able to withstand public pressure during the trial.

With regards to transplantation it is this political-criminal nexus that is most reminiscent of *la borghesia mafiosa* (the bourgeois mafia) in Italy; as Farrell puts it 'a network of collusion, cohabitation and connivance' (Farrell, 1997, p. 8). These individuals in the US, in a similar fashion to Raffaele Palizzolo in Palermo, had managed to utilise changing witness testimonies, corrupt law enforcement and influence judicial proceedings at a high level; a feat not possible for the common criminal with little in the way of resources or influence.

There was also corruption in labour unions that Italian Mafiosi exploited, such as with Joseph D'Andrea who took leadership of a hod carriers union in 1903 in Chicago, but whose bid for political office was stifled by revelations that he had killed a man in 1902 and had strong links to corruption (Nelli, 1970, p. 79). He was also eventually killed, whilst vice president of the parent organisation, over a Chicago labour dispute (Nelli, 1970, p. 79).

The lax law enforcement, high corruption in politics and unions, and the poor regulation of economic sectors made it easy for Mafiosi to carry out activities undisturbed, avoid or subvert law enforcement action and infiltrate the political and labour machines, in turn giving them

more control and power in industries that they could exploit. These conditions were not reliant on the group being transplanted, however; in this case, the continued presence of a link to the homeland of the Mafiosi brings nothing to enhance the Mafioso's ability to perform actions that allowed them to easily enter the markets. The permeability of these markets benefitted home-grown organisations as much as transplanted groups and therefore do cannot be used to champion transplantation over the concept of home-grown organisations.

#### Presence of brokers and facilitators

The presence of brokers and facilitators is highlighted by Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, *et al.*, 2011) as another condition conducive to the transplanting mafia groups. These are individuals that help facilitate the market transactions of the Mafiosi. In the US the closest there is to a facilitator in the market is the *padrone*, but a clear link between the actions of the *padrone* and mafia groups is not there.

The migration chapter introduced the role of the *padrone*, the labour boss, who would welcome and assist incoming migrants in finding work and accommodation. The *padroni* controlled the flow of labour, in an unofficial capacity, and were able to exploit the workers. As pointed out in that chapter this was reflective of the control the *gabelloti* had acquired in the rural areas of Sicily, managing the labour in the agriculture sector. The *padroni* had an official presence prior to 1885 as Nelli points out 'a formal contract labor system did exist on a limited scale before the Foran Act in 1885 forbade it [...]. After 1885 the *padrone* acted merely as a private labor agent, owning neither license nor office' (Nelli, 1970, p. 57).

At face value the *padrone* supplied a service, helping immigrants who had no way of communicating with the American employers, and helping employers who were unsure as to go about getting large numbers of Italian labourers (Nelli, 1970, pp. 62-63). The *padrone* also 'collected wages, wrote letters, acted as a banker, supplied room and board and handled dealings between works and employers' (Nelli, 1970, pp. 62-63).

The *padrone* would receive orders from contractors for a number of men, and immigrants would then pay the *padrone* a commission to obtain the employment based on *padrone* facilities and services rendered length of employment and wages. Workers were 'paid secretly and in advance; as an unlicensed labor agent, the *padrone* found it expedient to carry on his activities with a minimum of outside attention' (Nelli, 1970, p. 59).



Nelli suggests that a large number of *padroni* would exploit the labourers in various ways; 'the *padrone* charged first-class rates when the employer had provided free transportation', work with the contractors to share a portion of the labourers wages amongst themselves before handing it to the labourer, collected fares but did not provide promised work, sent labourers home after a few days without reason in order to hire new labourers and get more commissions, and the charging of weekly/monthly 'taxes' during the work period (Nelli, 1970, pp. 59-60). A New York Times article in 1910 indicated that Italian foremen in the Indiana Steel Company had colluded with a society of *padroni* to formulate a system whereby new Italian workers would pay the *padroni* an 'initiatory fee' of \$5, and continue to pay the fee each payday (New York Times, 1910e).

During the off-season, months of employment *padroni* and Italian bankers provided lodgings to labourers in tenement housing, 'where they encouraged the 'guests' to indulge in extravagances in order to place them more completely in debt' (Nelli, 1970, p. 60). At places of work in the country the *padrone* often provided boarding to the labourers (sometimes paying for the privilege to the employer, and sometimes in housing the employer provided for free), collecting rent money (the conditions in this 'accommodation' was often poor- one example had workers sleeping in vermin and bug infested windowless railroad cars on wooden boards and boxes. The *padrone* would send the workers to the camp earlier than necessary in order to maximise rent. Provisions were bought from the *padrone*, fines/dismissal was the punishment for the labourer if not, and the food was often poor quality, netting the *padrone* a large profit (Nelli, 1970, p. 60). An 1897 New York Times article even highlighted the threat of dismissal if the worker did not buy a specified amount daily (New York Times, 1897).

The United States Bureau of Labor studied the average price increase in food charged by *padroni* in Chicago and found that it was on average 59.55% more expensive than food of comparable quality in other Chicago Markets, with some items such as Bread and Tea getting a larger than 80% price increase (Nelli, 1970, pp. 61-62). A New York Times 1897 article gives similar figures for a *padrone's* shanty store near New York charging 2 to 4 times the price for basic foodstuffs found in New York markets (New York Times, 1897). These methods of extorting the workers were reminiscent of the actions of the 'Robber Barons' in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century (Abadinsky, 2016).

The *padroni* would also come to control the peddling business in New York- they would pay individuals to take out peddling licenses in their name, but then the *padrone* would supply these licences to peddlers he hires to sell goods for him (Kessner, 1977, p. 55).

In the 1870s and 1880s, some *padroni* had even been involved in human trafficking/slavery, particularly of children. In 1873 there existed nearly 7000 Italian Children under the control of the *padroni*, used as street musicians and beggars (New York Times, 1873), though a New York Times article in 1897 reported that this practice was gradually stopped (New York Times, 1897).

But a relationship between *padroni* and mafia is not evident. Only a slight suggestion of a link exists in the murder of *padrone* Antonio Prisco in 1895 when the accused defence tried to claim it was a mafia murder (a witness described a rose shaped carving in front of Prisco's house as a mafia symbol) (New York Times, 1894a) (New York Times, 1895) (New York Times, 1894b), but details are scarce. Marion Crawford's 1907 New York Times article links the *padrone* system with the Black Hand or Camorra, suggesting that the power that organisations of *padroni* control over their labourer migrants present the ideal conditions for a Camorra (New York Times, 1907b). But beyond this, the *padrone's* role as a broker and facilitator appears to have been seldom used by the mafia, instead, conducting his own form of extortion and labour racketeering. Instead, the mafia groups come to replace the *padroni* by infiltrating the labour unions in the 1910s.

#### Overlaps between underworld and upperworld actors

An overlap between the underworld and upperworld actors highlighted by Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, et al., 2011), helps foster a relationship between the criminal group and legitimate society. Of the mafiosi examined in this study many of them already operated in the upperworld; the tables of Mafiosi and their jobs (see Appendix A and B) highlight the extent to which the criminals had penetrated legitimate society.

For example Giosue Gallucci built up a business profile owning a number of tenements and a bakery, and controlling the coal and ice, olive oil, cobbler and hay/feed businesses in Harlem, controlling more than \$350,000 worth of real estate (roughly \$8.5 million today) (New York Herald, 1915). District Attorney notes on Giosue's involvement mention the sources of his income outside his bakery; control of the lotteries, gambling and prostitution houses, extortion of local businesses through forced suppliers and 'tributes' (New York Herald, 1917). He also

positioned himself to help return stolen goods, by presenting himself as an approachable businessman to the victim, but also working in cohesion with the criminal. Whilst developing a monopoly on his legitimate businesses he also controlled 'licences' for running gambling games (New York Herald, 1917). Running a game without a licence often had violent retort; murder, arson, bombing, etc.

Gallucci also developed political involvement as head of several organisations, active during political campaigns, and afforded a 'measure of immunity from police interference' (New York Herald, 1915). In 1910 Nicolo Del Guadio shot Giosue Gallucci (non-fatally) for being refused one of Gallucci's licences. Del Guadio fled New York, but on his return, he was killed by Gallucci's men (New York Herald, 1915). Giosue Gallucci was arrested along with 40 others after raids into a gambling vice ring in 1913. The head of the gambling vice ring is described in one paper report as having to be seen before any 'shady resort was opened', and 'collected tribute from every gambling den and house of evil repute' (The Sun (New York), 1918), that suspected head being identified as Giosue Gallucci in another (New York Times, 1913a).

A 1917 article mentions Giosue Gallucci was fast obtaining a monopoly on Little Italy's trade businesses before being killed in by a Calabrian gang during the 'Murder Stable Feud' (New York Herald, 1917). In an interview shortly before his death Giosue, whilst distancing himself from the crimes, gave insight into the methods used by contemporary gangs.

'My business has been built up honestly. I am not one of those who practises black hand methods. Some there are who have grown rich from crime. The money gained from horse stealing or from blackmail is used to purchase a business, which is carried on wholesale. Small dealers are obliged to purchase from the company under threat of bomb explosions, the kidnapping of children or even death. The small dealer dares not go to the police, for he has seen what has happened to so many Informers. One of the most frequent methods was to blow his business into the street by exploding in his store a small bomb which would not wreck the building. So long as the victims of these men patronise the criminals they are safe. The moment they cease - well, they pay the price. Many of the murders down here are the results of quarrels among the blackmailers themselves. They gamble, which leads to fighting, and they dispute the division of spoils. If a leader thinks another is trying to become boss, that man is marked for death.'

However, Ralph Daniello's testimonies placed Giosue Gallucci at the forefront of the crime network and 'murder stable' despite being an eventual victim of the latter;

At that time (1912) Gallucci controlled different gambling games, and would get a percentage on the sale of stolen horses and peddled artichokes, if anybody would not pay this percentage he would either be assaulted, receive blackmail letters or be killed. He also was interested in a stable known as 'the murder stable'. It gets that name for the reason that many murders were committed there (The Sun (New York), 1917).

Giosue Gallucci's own murder stable was used against him in 1915, possibly as the result of interference by the Morello gang with the Brooklyn based *Camorristi* in alliance, who, with Gallucci removed, would both then be in complete control of their respective territories either side of the Hudson (The Sun (New York), 1917). Pellegrino Morano, a former gambling boss whose operations had been taken by Gallucci and the Morellos, sided with the Brooklyn Camorra and provided the funding to kill Giosue Gallucci, \$300 according to one report (The Sun (New York), 1917) (Critchley, 2009, pp. 109-11) (New York Herald, 1915). Gallucci was shot with his son, Luca, at his sons newly opened coffee shop on May 17<sup>th</sup> 1915 (New York Times, 1915a) (New York Tribune, 1915), later dying in hospital (New York Times, 1915c). Morano and the Camorra would later feud with the Morellos over the artichoke business monopoly (New York Tribune, 1918).

Within the Morello-Lupo counterfeiting ring, there are also examples of an overlap between overworld and underworld actors. Leoluca Vassi admitted to being a custodian and distributor of the counterfeit money, and he 'handed out the allotments while apparently attending to his fruit stand' (New York Times, 1910a), and some of the business-owners involved in Morello and Lupo's bankruptcy scam were also not known Mafiosi, but rather usually legitimate businessmen willing (or forced) to operate outside the law.

These overlaps between actors in the upperworld and the underworld presented opportunities for Mafiosi that allowed them to utilise their positions and upperworld connections to further (and protect) their underworld careers. This overlap only highlights the permeability of the US market to organised crime groups, creating the ideal environment in which they could grow.

With Gallucci and the Morello-Lupo group, despite having migrated from Italy, and with criminal histories in Italy, moved into legitimate industries in the US but were able to use their experience to overlap overworld and underworld. They are not running outposts in the US but

rather imitating the skills they developed in Italy in their new environment. It takes a number of years for them to develop their underworld portfolios that would allow them to monopolise and control certain industries. Gallucci arrived pre-1900, but his position as head of a mafia group is not recognised until the 1910s. Morello and Lupo also arrived pre-1900, and despite several iterations of gangs, they did not develop formidable control until shortly before their arrest and downfall in 1910.

### High unemployment of workers

A high unemployment of workers is suggested by Morselli *et al.* (Morselli, et al., 2011) to contribute to the penetrability of the markets in the US; the lack of available jobs may turn individuals to criminal careers, and the shortage of jobs also benefits those who control the labour (mostly *padroni* in the late nineteenth century but labour racketeers began to emerge in the 1910s).

Regarding unemployment, there is little to suggest that the migrated Mafiosi struggled to find work and therefore chose crime instead. Furthermore, Critchley suggests that a few Sicilian organized criminals chose to 'pursue a double life, on the one hand, engaged in organized crime, on the other achieving acceptance as generous benefactors' (Critchley, 2009, p. 19). The data collected shows the legitimate business ventures of the criminals (See Appendix B). Where information on other jobs is available most appear to have worked as a labourer (most commonly on the docks/ railroad) or as a merchant (fruit or oil). Other common jobs for the Mafiosi included baker, barber, butcher, plasterer, saloon owner, or some involvement in the unions. There are also a significant number of Mafiosi who own their own businesses (at least 42 of the 151 jobs found were as owners of the Mafiosi's own legitimate business). It suggests that not only were these individuals employed, a significant amount of them were also in a position whereby they could run their own business.

## Trade Opportunities and Conditions

In addition to markets located within a locale, the trade conditions for that locale should be examined. Whilst a locale may not have the necessary market and conditions for an organised crime group to act successfully, a locale may be suitable as a way-point in a trade or trafficking route to other market locales. It is important that the factors for successful trade opportunities are examined.

## Goods to be trafficked and access/proximity to trafficking routes

The North-East coast was core to global trade routes, and in a pre-commercial flight era, dockyards were the centre of trade operations. However, trafficked goods do not feature in the criminal activities of Mafia groups in the pre-prohibition era, and therefore the associated international trafficking routes were not yet useful to the groups. It is not until prohibition that the international networks of trafficking develop and are used to traffic alcohol into the US, and developing further after prohibition with the growth of the international drugs trade.

## Reputation in the market

The reputation of a criminal group can also be looked at in terms of its market role. Gambetta highlights that 'Mafia families share a common asset of reputation, equivalent to a trademark: a guarantee of high-quality protection and effective intimidation. This reputation is distinct from that of each individual family or member, but each gains from it, and each has an interest in maintaining its distinctive features' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 245). The role of reputation in the market is similar to legitimate enterprises creating a brand and advertising. It increases the effectiveness of mafia activities, particularly those that rely on fear of violence (even between inter-criminal 'transactions' fear of violence plays a part in the absence of both trust and legal protection).

Gambetta suggests that it is 'difficult to advertise protection services by generalized and impersonal means, which in turn makes it even more difficult for mafia firms to expand beyond limited circles' and that the name of the family is far less important for credibility than the 'customers' (victims) knowledge of who occupies key positions (Gambetta, 1993, p. 64), though he observes that the post-prohibition US 'five-families' have kept their 1930/40's names rather than adopting those of newer leading members, perhaps inadvertently as a result of media publicity attached to those names.

Organised crime conducted by Italian migrants was centred in the lower-class neighbourhoods, including extortion, kidnapping, small-time gambling, protection rackets and vice operations (O'Kane, 1993, p. 67). Italians, Sicilians, in particular, developed a reputation, based in part on fears and racism, as kidnappers, both for ransom and for enslavement (Allerfelt, 2011, p. 206). The advertising method by which Sicilian mafioso initially builds themselves is through acts of generosity (Gambetta, 1993, p. 47); the offering of protection, solving of disputes, recovery of stolen goods, all offered as services for free. It is in this way that the mafia likens itself to its Robin Hood myth, a myth perpetuated through cultural works such as Natoli's *I Beati Paoli* or Cesareo's 1921 play *La Mafia*, and through the legitimisation of their activities in the writings of Pitre who identified it 'with popular traditions and feeling Sicilian' (Coluccello, 2016).

The advertising in the market was therefore related to the general reputation the mafia group was able to identify itself with, whether that be as part of an international criminal enterprise or localised but heavily violent groups. This is explored more in the subsequent chapter on the operations of the organisations.

## Conclusions

The market analysis of mafia transplantation into the US before 1920 suggests that there was little to no strategic decision to relocate to the US. Instead, the emergence in certain criminal markets and the functions the groups played in US society were the result of unintentional and emergent causes. Considering the market perspective, there was certainly no strategic decision to operate a full overseas outpost of mafia, controlled from Italy and with the aim of bolstering the activities of an Italian organisation.

In terms of reasons why the mafia groups left Italy, there was little reason for a desire to operate in a foreign market. There was not increased competition in criminal markets in Italy, and the mafia groups were not seeking resources nor looking to significantly traffic goods. Instead, it was often displacement by law enforcement (alongside increased state attention) that forced a number of adult mafia individuals to migrate to the US, but only at an individual level whereby that individual had come under increased police attention often for a crime they had committed. There was not the wholesale movement of groups of Mafiosi with the intention of setting up a full overseas outpost.

Instead, it is the pull factors, which can also be considered to attract and foster the growth of mafia groups, which allowed for the mafia groups to grow in the US independent of their

Italian history. The introduction of new markets requiring protection after reforms removed police protection helped these US mafia groups grow (backing up Varese's 'Property right theory of mafia emergence'). The markets were easily penetrable by Italian criminals; there was weak law enforcement in tackling crime within the Italian community and high levels of corruption, particularly centred on political control, even after Gaynor's reforms. Successful Mafiosi were often able to overlap as 'upperworld' actors, many holding prominent and respectable jobs as business owners. Within these criminal groups, elements borrowed from the mafia groups of their homeland would have given them distinct advantages in the marketplace, like *omerta*, the code of silence and kinship networks enforced through ritual which would have helped solidify trust and enhanced the criminal relationships in the group.

All this suggests that it was not an Italian transplanted outpost with any sort of control from Sicily or Italy, but rather an opportunistic growth of mafia groups based on the combination of criminal skillsets and the market conditions of the US. As will be shown in the following chapter on operations, it is the combination of these market factors with the reputation and styling of the Italian mafias that allowed for an influenced but independent mafia to emerge in the US.

## Citations

(1914). *Copy of memorandum submitted to Commissioner to Health*. New York: NYMA, John P Mitchel papers, box 218, The Baff Murder.

Paul Ferrantelli testimony. Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 202 (1951).

Abadinsky, H. (2016). *Organized Crime*. Andover, UK: Cengage Learning.

Albanese, J. (1985 (First Edition), 1989 (Second Edition)). *Organized Crime in America*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.

Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.

Allum, F. (2017). *Invisible Camorra*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Asbury, H. (1936). *Gangs of New Orleans* (2004 ed.). London: Random House.

Barton, J. (1896, Feb 12). Counterfeit Money. *The Anderson Intelligencer*.



- Bauer, T., Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (2009). Measuring ethnic linkages among migrants. *International Journal of Manpower*, 30(1), 56-69.
- Bell, D. (1953). Crime as an American Way of Life. *The Antioch Review*, 13(2), 131-154.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bodnar, J. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban American* (First Midland Book Edition ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Brettfield, K., & Wetzels, P. (2007). Religiosity and Crime: Attitudes Towards Violence and Delinquent Behaviour among Young Christians and Muslims in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 73-87). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Brooklyn Daily Eagle. (1918, May 15). Camorra Secrets Revealed at Trial. *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, p. 18.
- Buonanno, P., & Pazzona, M. (2014). Migrating Mafias. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 44, 75-81.
- Buonanno, P., Durante, R., Prarolo, G., & Vanin, P. (2011). *On the historical and geographic origins of the Sicilian mafia*. Munich Personal RePEc Archive.
- Catanzaro, R. (1992). *Men of Respect*. Oxford: Free Press, Macmillan.
- Chicago Tribune. (1870, Jan 16). Protection to gamblers. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 2.
- Chicago Tribune. (1894, Jan 18). Gambling stopped at Galesburg. *Chicago Tribune*.
- Chicago Tribune. (1896, Aug 30). Midnight Raid on Gambling Den. *Chicago Tribune*.
- Chicago Tribune. (1900, Dec 28). New Gambling Den near Wheaton. *Chicago Tribune*.
- Chicago Tribune. (1901, April 28). Big Poolroom is Closed. *Chicago Tribune*.
- Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. (1960). *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Study of Delinquent Gangs*. New York: The Free Press.
- Coluccello, R. (2016). *Challenging the Mafia Mystique*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cornell Daily Sun. (1917, Jan 13). To Indict Eleven Men in Baff Murder Case. *Cornell Daily Sun*.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Cutrer, A. (1900). *Le Mafia e I Mafiosi*. Palermo: Alberto Reber.

- Dainotto, R. (2015). *Mafia*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- Diaspora", T. P. (2011). The Pitfalls of the "Italian Diaspora". *Italian American Review*, 1(2), 147-176.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.
- Dimico, A., Isop, A., & Olsson, O. (2012). *Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons*. Nottingham: Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, Nottingham University.
- Dimico, A., Olsson, O., & Isopi, A. (2012, May 13). *Origins of the Sicilian Mafia*. (VOX, CEPR's Policy Portal) Retrieved January 23, 2017, from <http://voxeu.org/print/7982>
- Diner, H. R. (2001). *Hungering for America : Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Doherty, J. (1952, July 20). How Capone captured hinky dink! *Chicago Tribune*, pp. 5,13 ('Graphic Magazine').
- Duggan, C. (1995). *A Concise History of Italy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckert, R. (2007). Culture or Conflict? Migration, Culture, Conflict and Terrorism. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 21-26). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (Eds.). (2010). *Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Volume 8 : Migration and Culture*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Farrell, J. (. (1997). *Understanding the mafia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Feder, S., & Joesten, J. (1994). *The Luciano Story*. Boston: Da Capo Press.
- Flynn, W. (1919). *The Barrel Mystery*. New York: The James A. McCann Company.
- Freilich, J. D., & Guerette, R. T. (Eds.). (2006). *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Gabaccia, D. R. (2000). *Italy's Many Diasporas*. London: UCL Press.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.

- Gauthreaux, A. G. (2014). *Italian Louisiana: History, Heritage & Tradition*. Louisiana: The History Press.
- Gentile, N. (1963). Paese Sera Interview.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vito Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.
- Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Graebner Anderson, A. (1979). *The Business of Organized Crime: A Cosa Nostra Family*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.
- Hess, H. (1973). *Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin Power and Myth* (1998 ed.). London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Hess, H. (1998). *Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin Power and Myth*. London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1965). *Primitive Rebels*. London: WW Norton and Company.
- Ianni, F. .. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Ianni, F. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Ianni, F. A. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kantowicz, E. R. (1994). The Changing Face of Ethnic Politics: From Political Machine to Community Organization. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States* (pp. 179-195). London: Garland Publishing.
- Kessner, T. (1977). *The Golden Door*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Liddick, D. (1999). *An empirical, theoretical, and historical overview of organized crime*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Liddick, D. (1999). *The Mob's Daily Number*. Oxford: The University of America Press.
- Lombardo, R. (2010). *The Black Hand: Terror by Letter in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Lombardo, R. M. (2013). *Organized Crime in Chicago: Beyond The Mafia*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

- Lumley, R., & Morris, J. (Eds.). (1997). *The New History of the Italian South*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.
- Lupsha, P. (1982). Individual choice, Material Culture and Organized Crime. *Criminology*, 3(19), 3-24.
- Lyle, J. H. (1960, Nov 13). Big Jim Colosimo: Early Overlord of Chicago Crime. *Chicago Tribune*, pp. Part 1- Page 49.
- Mack Smith, D. (1959). *Italy: A Modern History*. Michigan, US: University of Michigan.
- Mack Smith, D. (1968). *A History of Sicily: Modern Sicily after 1713*. Oxford: Alden & Mowbray Ltd.
- Macry, P. (1997). The Southern Metropolis. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 59-82). Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Messick, H., & Goldblatt, B. (1972). *The Mobs and the Mafia*. New York: Gallahad Books.
- Mignolo, W. D. (2000). *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press.
- Mitchell, B. (1995). International History Statistics, Europe 1750-1988 (New York, 1992). In C. Duggan, *A Concise History of Italy* (p. 148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Moehling, C., & Piehl, A. M. (2009). Immigration, Crime, and Incarceration in Early Twentieth-Century America. *Demography*, 46(4), 739-763. Retrieved from Available From: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2831353/>
- Monkkonen, E. H. (1988). *America Becomes Urban: The Development of US Cities & Towns 1780-1980*. London: University of California Press.
- Monnier, M. (n.d.). *La camorra: notizie storiche raccolte e documentate*. Retrieved January 23, 2017, from [http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/\\_PP.HTM](http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/_PP.HTM)
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970). *The Italians in Chicago 1880-1930: A Study in Ethnic Mobility*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970b, Dec 7). 'Mafia' - A Term Bred of Contempt and Fear. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 13.
- Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nelli, H. S. (1983). *From Immigrants to Ethnics: The Italian Americans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

New York Daily Times. (1851, Nov 5). College of Pharmacy. *New York Daily Times*, p. 2.

New York Herald. (1913, April 10). Black hand slays victim who doffs his Chinese armor. *New York Herald*, p. Front page.

New York Herald. (1915, May 18). Million Dollar Leader and Son Shot by Assassins Who Have Slain 10 of His Aids. *New York Herald*, p. 7.

New York Herald. (1915, May 22). Swear Revenge as 'Italy Boss' Dies'. *New York Herald*, p. 6.

New York Herald. (1917, Nov 30). Amazing tale of 23 Italian "Gang" Killings. *New York Herald*, p. 2.

New York Herald. (1917, Jan 7). Harlem's 'Murder Stable Feud' counts 21st Victim. *New York Herald*, p. 2.

New York Times. (1873, Dec 4). The Italian Children and Senatro Sumner. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1894a, May 23). Said the Mafia Killed Prisco. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1894b, Sept 1). Think they have Prisco's assassin. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1895, Jan 19). The Prisco murder trial. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1897, April 18). Padroni and their banks. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1898, July 10). Cast-off Criminals. *Kansas City Journal*, p. 18.

New York Times. (1903b, May 10). Infernal Machine on Pier Near The Umbria. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1907b, May 12). Marion Crawford on the Secret Societies of Italy. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1909b, September 21). Caught After Year's Chase. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1909c, November 15). Italian "Bad Man" Strangely Slain. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1910a, Mar 8). Accused Man Confesses. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1910b, Feb 25). Black Hand Letter to Mrs Havemeyer. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1910e, Aug 9). Padrone Levies on Italians. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1912, Dec 17). Kills a Gangster to Save his Uncle. *New York Times*.

New York Times. (1913a, July 23). Raid Italian Policy Shops. *New York Times*.

- New York Times. (1913b, August 13). The Italian Black Hand. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1915a, May 18). Father and Son Shot. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1915c, May 22). 'King of Little Italy' Dies. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1988, Oct 22). By Order of the Mafia. *New York Times*.
- New York Tribune. (1910, December 28). Bad Day for Black Hand. *New York Tribune*, p. 8.
- New York Tribune. (1915, May 18). Two Shot Down in Harlem Feud. *New York Tribune*.
- New York Tribune. (1918, May 21). Gunman gets 20 years. *New York Tribune*, p. 8.
- Newton, M. (2012). *The Mafia at Apalachin, 1957*. North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc.
- NYT. (1952, 12 08). DRAGNA HELD FOR OUSTER - McGranery Says Californian Will Be Deported as Racketeer. *New York Times*.
- O'Kane, J. (1993). *The Crooked Ladder*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, R. E., & Miller, H. A. (1921). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. London: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/oldworldtraitstr00parkuoft>
- Petrusewitz, M. (1997). The Demise of the Latifondo. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 20-41). Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press.
- Pfeiffer, C., Kleimann, M., & Windzio, M. (2006). Media, Evil and Society: Media Use and its Impacts on Crime Perception, Sentencing Attitudes and Crime Policy in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 109-132). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Powell, G. H. (1909). *Italian lemons and their by-products*. (Vol. 160). Washington: Bulletin (United States. Bureau of Plant Industry).
- Raab, S. (2005). *Five Families*. New York: Griffin.
- Reich, K. (2006). Immigration and juvenile delinquency in Germany. In J. D. Freilich (Ed.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 89-103). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Reimers, D. M. (1998). *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- Romano, A. (1910). *Italian Americans in Law Enforcement – Romano – 45*. Bloomington, IN, US: Xlibris, Corp.

- Salt Lake Herald. (1895, August 18). Society of the Sicilly Mafia. *Salt Lake Herald*, p. 16.
- Salvaterra, D. (1994). Becoming American: Assimilation, Pluralism and Ethnic Identity. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Santino, U. (2015). *Mafia and antimafia : a brief history*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Sciarrone, R., & Storti, L. (2014). The territorial expansion of mafia-type organized crime. The case of the Italian mafia in Germany. *Crime Law and Social Change*, 61, 30-60.
- Steinberg, S. (2001). *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America* (3rd ed.). Boston, US: Beacon Press.
- Tessitore, G. (1997). *Il nome e la cosa: quando la mafia non si chiamava mafia*. Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli.
- The Day Book. (1913, Jan 2). New York Letter. *The Day Book (Chicago)*, p. 24.
- The Evening World. (1910, December 23). Conviction of Kidnappers Loosens Grip on the City of Black Hand Terrorism. *The Evening World*, pp. 1-2.
- The Sun (New York). (1898, June 21). Nest of Italian Thugs. *The Sun (New York)*, p. 5.
- The Sun (New York). (1917, Dec 26). Extract of Daniello report. *The Sun (New York)*, p. 8.
- The Sun (New York). (1918, Aug 1). 'Expect to Break up Italian Vice Trust. *The Sun (New York)*, p. 5.
- The West Australian. (1903, May 12). The Mafia: Designs on a Line. A Plot Frustrated. *The West Australian*.
- United States Census Bureau. (1896). *1890 Census Volume 3: Report on Crime, Pauperism, and Benevolence in the United States*. United States Census Bureau.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, . Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Walsh, T. (Ed.). (1994). *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Wendt, L. (1941, Aug 17). How Labor is Hijacked. *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, p. 2 (Graphic Section).
- White, F. M. (1913). The Black Hand in Control in Italian New York. *The Outlook*, 857-865.

Wood, P. (1953, October 17). Potson Tells Profit in Levee Area at Trial. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 3.

Woodiwiss, M. (2005). *Gangster Capitalism*. London: Constable.



# Operations

---

## Introduction

To analyse the nature of transplantation by organised crime groups into the US, the challenges to running overseas operations as an outpost have been examined in order to show that 'outpost transplantation' did not happen and that an 'influenced transplantation' is most likely. This section primarily focuses on the locale in which the group or individual is transplanting, and its connections with the home territory.

Local ties and kinship networks are important to the mafioso for both personal and logistical reasons. The study of local ties and kinship networks looks at the societal links on which mafiosi drew, and show that most groups were small and based on personal relationships (familial ties were common such as within the Gallucis or the Lupo-Morello-Terranova family). The challenge of information collection is also briefly addressed here. The study considers Gambetta's approach to information collection (Gambetta, 1993) (Gambetta, 2009) suggesting that the smaller territories of the 'Little Italys' were ideal for a transplanting mafia group, but that moving beyond these small locales was not feasible for a transplanting group.

Furthermore, an analysis of the logistics of travel draws upon primary information regarding several individuals who made the journey to the United States. It shows how they were able to subvert strict (in appearance at least) immigration laws and falsify travel documents. The chapter analyses further evidence of this provided in Gentile's testimonies; which explains how he was able to obtain passport by utilising connections and corrupting the system. The examples prove that the distance and logistics of travel, even with a criminal record, did not prove an issue for mafiosi.

The chapter then explores the concept of reputation and how a transplanting organised group needs to link itself to a foreign group's reputation in order to make itself fearful and imposing. The conclusion of this study is that the US mafia groups benefitted, externally and internally, from media and police coverage that linked them to their Italian counterparts irrespective of a lack of evidence linking the two.

The analysis of a mafia's ability to monitor and control agents also highlights that "outpost transplantation" of an Italian mafia is unlikely; the rules and rituals utilised by US mafia groups appear to be imitations influenced by their Italian counterparts rather than full transplanted facsimiles operating as outposts. On this issue the study concludes that the letter system between US mafia and Italian mafias was not used as a form of monitoring and controlling agents in the US. Rather it was a simple reference system, which the study shows existed even outside the mafia community – letters were often used to report goings on back to the hometowns in Italy.

## Pull factors

In terms of the operational and logistical factors which would have impacted upon the mafioso's decision to leave Italy for the US there are only pull factors that concern the action of making the transition. The existence of support networks eases issues the individual faces such as information collection. The distance and travel arrangements of mafiosi highlight some of the difficulties outpost transplantation would have faced.

## Local Ties and Kinship Networks

Morselli *et al* highlighted the use of kinship networks and local ties in their assessment of how organised crime groups transplant (Morselli, et al., 2011, p. 170). The presence of these local ties and kinship networks help support the mafia groups in developing support and provisions for entering an overseas market. According to Blok the role of kinship in the Sicilian mafia cannot be overstressed, with cognatic, affinal and ritual kinships all pervasive in the structures of mafia groups (Blok, 1975, pp. 179-180).

Gambetta highlighted how these kinship networks might help with the difficulties in transplanting into a foreign market; 'Its initial costs [in entering the overseas market] can be met solely under a special combination of conditions since basic resources are expensive to produce in a void: information gathering and advertising, for instance, exploit independent networks of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 251). The challenges to transplantation are all supported by the presence of local ties which, even inadvertently (as may be the case with maintaining a reputation), provide a support network for the mafia group.

Within this study there are several examples of this, a few of which were previously shown in the migration chapter. The re-union of Nicola Gentile with his friend Gregorio Conti in Pittsburgh from Gentile's testimonies (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 7-8) is one example. Gentile had been in the US for a number of years before uniting with Conti, having previously working on the railroad and as a linen seller.

Gentile's memoirs might also indicate a potential connection of the kinship networks between cities; when explaining Conti's predicament regarding the stabbing of a family member (and possible previous boss) Salvatore Catanzaro, Conti had called upon 'those in New York that he knew were affiliated to the family' (Gentile, c.1947, p. 13), in this case to 'eliminate' the

assailant. In this case though the kinship network provided ineffective in solidifying criminal activity;

‘Those that came to Pittsburgh to whom they were paying respect and homage to weren’t Mafiosi at all. These people considering the great danger they were facing, and the possibility of getting more and more money from Pittsburgh used to put the matter off, from one season to the other. In the winter they would say we’ll do it in the summer and in the summer they would say we’ll do it in the winter’. (Gentile, c.1947, p. 13)

Gentile’s statement that they weren’t mafiosi was a slight against the individuals, as if they were without ‘honour’. It highlights that the kinship networks only served a purpose as far as parties involved in the network were able to mutually benefit from each other. Here the New York individuals had no interest or desire to involve themselves in Conti’s affairs, making only false promises (from Gentile’s perspective) to continue the pretence of honour in a kinship network.

As shown in the migration chapter, we see other families transplanting based on familial ties; the Gallucci brothers arrived in New York in the 1890s, and were then able to support a fourth brother on his arrival in 1909 (even if he was suspiciously murdered while under his brothers watch). The prominent Morello-Lupo family members had a number of cognatic and affinal ties to each other that helped solidify their position. The remainder of the closer circles of the group all came from Corleone. This provided Morello was a level of reliability in his criminal associates; he already knew these men in Sicily and trusted them. According to Dash even the lower members of the group would need to be vouched for by a higher ranking Corleoneasi (Dash, 2009, pp. 110-111).

In his testimonies, after Gentile is recruited by Conti, he appears to work directly with Conti. Here Gentile intervenes in the consanguineal kinship and business relationship between Conti and his nephew, to prevent Conti from killing his nephew (and business partner) by recommending that the nephew is introduced as a member of the “Honor Society” (Gentile, c.1947, p. 10). Again the introduction of Conti’s nephew into the organisation shows that the organisation that they were a part of was a small group based on personal relationships and connections rather than an international network; Conti’s nephew was recruited into the organisation to end the ongoing issues in the personal relationship between the nephew and

Conti. Whilst the consanguineal kinship between Conti and his nephew would allow for the induction of the nephew into the mafia family, it was not the purpose for proceeding with the induction. It created a second layer of kinship between the two individuals that sought to build trust and reliability. This relationship between the mafiosi, created through initiation into the mafia, was local in nature, but based on a structure and ritual kinship ties typical of Italian mafias (as can be seen in (Paoli, 2002) and (Falcone, 1993)). The US mafia groups adopted the rituals and structure of the Italian mafias because they served a purpose, solidifying the relationship between members. The cultural influence of the Italian mafia societies influenced the way in which that was realised in the US mafias.

According to Paoli these associations are founded on relations of ritual kinship in 'what Max Weber called 'status contracts'' (Paoli, 2002, p. 72). The mafioso novice 'is required to assume a new identity permanently and to subordinate all his previous allegiances to the mafia membership. It is a life-long pact' (Paoli, 2002).

'The kin-like relation is established through ritual. The entrance into all the associations considered, in fact, takes place with a ceremony of affiliation, which constitutes a true 'rite of passage. The ritual marks the change of position of those who undergo them and their assumption of the new status of member of a brotherhood'. (Paoli, 2002)

The symbolism of these rituals is also relevant, both the Italian and American mafia groups 'make extensive reference to the iconography and terminology of the religion dominant in their context' (Paoli, 2002). These rites of initiation reinforced by symbolism, codes and language all eminent in the Southern Italian culture, and thus in the migrating culture to the US

The kin-like relationship is further reinforced by the migrant experience. Bodnar highlights that 'work, shelter, and order would be secured in industrial America – as they had been in the pre-industrial and proto-industrial homeland – through an intricate web of kin and communal associations' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 57). The reliance on these kin-like relationships in both Italian mafia and migrant communities would have only served to influence emerging mafia groups in the formation of their structure.

The element of trust and reliability is important to the functioning of the criminal group. Gambetta highlighted that trust is a key concern in an industry where you are typically dealing

with untrustworthy individuals (2009, p. 31). The absence of state protection from threats (including state law enforcement itself) means that the criminal group has to find alternative methods of protection, and on an individual level, self-survival. Kinship networks, whereby levels of trust in and understanding of those you are working with are already established, help create a protected network within which the criminal group can operate.

There also exists the use of local ties and kinship networks outside of mafia groups, indicating that their usefulness was not only for the development of organised crime activities.

Numerous communities in the US focussed around place of origin, from the same country to the same town. These communities would often have an unofficial leader of some kind; someone who will organise the community. An extract of a report on the Sicilian colony in Chicago by Marie Leavitt, published in Park & Millar's *Old World Traits Transplanted* (1921), mentioned the 'outstanding characteristic' of 'intense family pride' of both blood relations and those related by ritual (marriage or otherwise), creating a 'clan pride'. Here the close familial relationship was apparent in the US community, a reminiscent characteristic of the 'old world' where 'Families were not only the centre of economic production in most preindustrial lands, they were the focus of life itself[...] As one study of Italian Village concluded, 'La Famiglia' was at the center of Italian life, Families were not only biological arrangements facilitating procreation and socialization but society's basic mode of economic organization in the pre-industrial land' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 38). This connection with the mafia survived both societal change and the emigration process; 'the intrusion of capitalism in the premigration lands may have raised the alternative of emigration, but it had not destroyed the essential relationship between family and work that most emigrants, regardless of ethnic background, had nurtured' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 57). Indeed, the family had remained a key element of the Italian American's cultural heritage, the strongest social institution around which individuals organised (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Jones & Holli, 1981)

The report also highlighted the community leaders' role in organising brotherhoods and societies that perpetuated cultural traditions such as the feast of their patron saint or funerals (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 154). These societies 'meet each month, collect dues, have endless and excited discussions over the petty business that is transacted, with, however, most serious regard for rules of order' (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 154). This community leader is in part the facilitator for a community between its 'old world' traditions and its 'new world' needs. The community leader is also involved in the network of employment- helping new arrivals find

work and arranging to supply workers to companies, particularly labourers for the railroad and construction firms (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 153) (a description similar to that of the *padroni* highlighted in previous chapters).

The existence of the community leaders tying links between Italy and the US would have helped transplanting mafia groups of either kind in cementing their position within society. The festivals and events organised by the community were opportunities for high-ranking mafiosi to make their public presence felt, often via large public donations. Merlino explored the tradition of a religious procession to visit a mafia boss's house in Italy, for example, in Riesi, Caltanissetta, the annual procession for the patron saint, Saint Joseph, developed an unofficial custom of stopping in front of the house of the local mafia boss Di Cristina (Merlino, 2014), and the practice has also been noted to have occurred outside Sicily, in Calabria (Merlino, 2014, p. 118) .

In the US attempts by American Christian denominations to force religious integration caused Italian immigrants to become defensive about their old world religious traditions; the processions and parades for patron Saints (Bodnar, 1985, p. 154). In some cities this created disconnect between the migrants, who wanted to retain their homeland traditions, and the clergy who were attempting to adapt to a more unified forms of Christianity. The migrants instead organised their own religious festivals instead of those put on by the church (Bodnar, 1985, p. 154). This separation of homeland religious traditions from the Americanizing clergy that pervaded the migrant communities, also carried over into the criminal traditions of mafia groups, as can be seen in funeral arrangements.

Funerals for prominent mafia bosses in Sicily were arranged to involve the local community, with a variety of prominent members of the community including policemen, politicians, and clergymen following the funeral processions (Merlino, 2014, pp. 113-114). In the US, Giosue Gallucci's funeral had a similar reception, with newspapers reporting up to 10,000 attendees, a procession of 54 carriages (between 150 and 300 carriages were planned) and a brass band (New York Herald, 1915) (New York Times, 1915), though the police presence also in attendance was more because of the violent relations between Gallucci and his rivals.

The religious traditions and ceremonial events, indicative of 'old world' culture, had been adopted by US mafiosi in much the same way that those in Italian mafias had utilised them. It also functioned as part of the cultural relationship that these localised mafias held with the

community, highlighting how important the local network was to a transplanting mafia. The mafioso could use the societal traditions that had continued in the migrant community in the same way that they had been used in Italy to foster and strengthen relationships, and through these ceremonies, exert a dominance or power over the community.

For an organised crime group to pervade a territory or market it must have sufficient knowledge of that territory or market to avoid interference from law enforcement or other crime groups and to make sure that the market is exploitable. Information collection on that territory or market then becomes key in the organised crime groups activities. A transplanting outpost mafia from Italy therefore would need information on the US city neighbourhood or market in which they planned to operate. Here local ties and kinship networks can also play a role; as Varese suggested, a 'tangible and long term presence in the new territory is fundamental' but that the mafia can count on migration networks for this information, as well as using investments 'as a conduit for data gathering' (Varese, 2011, p. 26). Gambetta suggests that 'simply frequenting the right places – bars, shops, the bank, the church – is sufficient to bring useful information' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 37). This is easier across smaller territories where mafias can focus on all transactions in the locale, and focus their network around families and friends.

The presence of extensive Italian migrant networks in the US and the commonplace reporting (both media and personal) from these networks back to Italy would provide mafia individuals with the information they required to understand the markets and opportunities available in the US. As Varese suggested the information 'need not be about complex transactions or numerous locales' (Varese, 2011, p. 26), and therefore the simple information gleaned from these sources might be sufficient. The practice of sending letters to report on community issues was commonplace and would have been a useful form of information collection. It played an important part in the migration process helping create a network of information for the future migrant;

'Because families and friends were in close contact even when separated by wide oceans, immigrants seldom left their homelands without knowing exactly where they wanted to go and how to get there. Relatives and friends constantly sent information back regarding locations to live and possible places of employment' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 57).



In a contemporary report on the migrant community Cusumano (Park & Miller, 1921, p. 151) notes that news is reported by letter back to Italy, in this case Sicily, and that the actions of family members (blood/affinal) in the US can impact on the families' reputation back in the homeland. It appears that the information, knowledge and reputation of individuals in these localised communities transcends their geographic location and becomes a feature of a community shared between locations. Similarly these networks would have been sufficient to build the basic market knowledge required to exploit them.

Migrants faced similar issues in decision making and information collection on where to settle, and the solution created environments suitable for mafia needs. Bodnar in exploring networks of migration identified a number of practical problems in the decision making of the migrants choice of location "'How would information of specific jobs be found? Where could living accommodations be located? How in general did individuals enter the sprawling factories and expanding cities?' (Bodnar, 1985, p. 57). Epstein and Gang summarised that 'the prevailing explanation for immigrant clusters is the existence of beneficial network externalities when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, assistance in obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the stress of relocating to a foreign culture' (Epstein & Gang, 2010, p. 2). The congregation of migrants in Little Italys in major cities therefore presented the ideal location for the transplanting group/individual.

The information collection process also has challenging elements for the migrating mafioso. Gambetta suggests that, in the protection business, the mafioso must find out about those they are to offer services to – 'their businesses, their children, their wives, whether they are carrying any debt or credit, who they friends are, and so on' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 36). This information can be used to assess reliability, conduct blackmail/extortion, and assess relative threats posed. To collect this information the mafioso requires 'a good memory, an ability to formulate productive questions quickly and pose them tactfully, an unassuming and attentive sociability, and a predisposition towards purposeless, unobtrusive loitering' (Gambetta, 1993, pp. 36-37). Even with detailed market and local information there may still be unanticipated difficulties, for example in Gentile's testimony documents he highlighted the difficulties he faced in Kansas where the locals found the Sicilian dialect difficult to understand (Gentile, c.1947, p. 2).

## Distance and travel

The logistical elements of distance and travel should also be of consideration in determining the type of transplantation that was possible. Varese's paradigm presents them as a challenge but not as a factor for analysis (Varese, 2011). In the more globalised world of today distance and travel may not be issues, but at the turn of the twentieth century travel was by boat, communication was slow and distance made both of these harder. Members of a criminal group have to have had the ability to relocate themselves by fulfilling the necessary requirements. These include the ability to obtain and pay for transportation, and the ability to acquire, or circumvent required documents for transportation and transplantation.

A criminal migrating to the US faces a number of extra challenges not faced by the regular migrant. In 1875 the US federal government attempted to control immigration by barring certain classes of immigrants including paupers and criminals, and continued this for the next 25 years, establishing Ellis Island in 1890's as the main receiving station for migrants (Reimers, 1998, p. 11) (Allerfelt, 2011, p. 215). As shown in the previous chapters, a number of the migrating mafiosi were fleeing law enforcement in Italy, and some already had criminal records. However, there was not the means for US agencies to determine the criminal nature of many of the arrivals; many criminals lived in the US for years before their pasts were uncovered; the Gallucci brothers emigrated between 1891 and 1896 but it was not until 1898 that their past was discovered, and Police Lieutenant Joe Petrosino's ill-fated journey to Palermo in 1909 was to acquire criminal records for some of those now operating in New York (New York Times, 1910) (New York Times, 1909).

Additionally, the obtaining of relevant documents to leave the host country and enter the destination country is a challenge for known criminals, such as those on the run or awaiting trial in Italy. A 1901 royal decree forbade prefects and authorities from issuing passports to 'persons liable to be rejected from the country of their destination in force of the local laws on immigration' (White, 1913). This made direct travel to the US harder for the known criminal. But for the criminals seeking emigration this only had the effect of causing them to travel via other European countries (France, Germany, Austria or Britain), or using borrowed/forged credentials. Frank Marshall White in the *New York Times* wrote; 'many of the most dangerous criminals have come here by way of Canada and Mexico, and many others have shipped as sailors from Italian ports and deserted their ships on reaching this country' (New York Times, 1910) (an almost identical quotation appeared in the *New York Times* in 1908 in an article

supporting Gaetano D'Amato's 'Black Hand Myth', only naming England with Canada instead of Mexico (White, 1908)). One example of a mafioso travelling via other countries is when Francesco Motisi (also known as Genova or Matesi) fled a racketeering case (Lupo, 2015, p. 16) and/or an alleged killing(s) in Trapani (Kendall in (Critchley, 2009, p. 58)) (Krist, 2014), he travelled to New Orleans via London (to New York).

Another article in the *New York Times* suggested it was highly improbable that 'Italians of bad character' came directly;

'The police admit that Italians of bad character do emigrate to America, but that is only by crossing the Italian frontier into France or Germany, whence they sail to the United States or by stowing away. Every Italian man, woman and child must have a passport before they can leave an Italian port, and the examination by the doctors and police is so strict that it is very difficult for anyone to evade it.' (New York Times, 1906)

The process involved obtaining four papers in order to get the passport required for emigration: the birth certificate, penal certificate signed off by the chief police official of the applicant's town, a military service certificate, and a certificate to show if a man is single or proof of consent from, and support for, the wife and family (New York Times, 1906).

The article also suggests, however, that despite the visit of six policemen and an officer hours before sailing to make a thorough search for stowaways a number of stowaways still manage to escape (the article gives an example of a ship from Naples having forty stowaways despite the checks). The article also implies that it is possible that police granted passports to 'troublesome characters' in order to be rid of them, although the interview Police Commissioner from Naples denied this happening in his region (perhaps expectedly) (New York Times, 1906).

Professor Jeremiah Jenks produced a report for the New York Police in 1908 that helped formulate the plan for Lieutenant Petrosino to travel to Italy to collect penal records. In it Jenks suggested that there were three ways that Italian criminals came to America;

(1.) As steerage, immigrants, or second class passenger, with a passport secured through political influence or for money, for as a criminal he otherwise would be unable to procure a passport from the Italian government. (2.) With a passport issued

under a fictitious name. (3.) By being smuggled aboard at Italian ports without a passport by those who make a profession of this (New York Times, 1909).

Jenks also suggested three different classes of Italian criminals travelling to the US;

- (1.) Italians who have committed crimes in Italy and escaped to this country before trial
- (2.) Italians who had committed a crime in Italy and served a term in prison, and have come to America to escape the especial surveillance of the police.
- (3.) Italians notoriously known as bad men, guilty sometimes of many crimes which the State prosecution could not prove. They come to America either obliged by public opinion, which makes life in Italy very difficult or through fear of probable prosecution, or through fear of vengeance from their enemies if they remain in Italy. (New York Times, 1909)

In this study all three classes have been seen in examples. Ignazio Lupo and Giuseppe Morello for the first classification, both fleeing law enforcement after crimes they committed, or were suspected of. The Galluci brothers who left Naples in the late nineteenth century all fit the second classification, having records but no warrant for their arrest (New York Times, 1898). Vito Cascio Ferro also fits the second classification emigrating after his arrest for his role in the kidnapping of the Baroness of Valpetrosa, allegedly to escape the increased surveillance (Critchley, 2009, p. 40). The third situation seemingly occurs with Salvatore Bonanno, a leading mafioso from Castellammare, who left Sicily in 1906 after a feud with a rival mafia clan left him vulnerable (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983), p. 21).

Jenks reiterates that it is very difficult for the Italian criminal to obtain a passport, but that 'it is very easy to come to America unknown', claiming to have seen proof of up to a hundred men at once illegally entering the US without a passport and without going through the formality of US immigration laws (New York Times, 1909).

In Neapolitan mafioso Enrico Alfano, there is another example that, despite the laws, it was not always necessary to travel via another country (the travel data collected for this study would suggest that many mafiosi did travel direct to New York, most travel dates were obtained from Palermo/Naples to New York passenger lists). In the Viterbo camorra trial of 1911, suspected camorra boss Alfano admitted that he travelled to the US without a passport (New York Times, 1911). Due to suspicion of murder when he fled, he stated that it would have

been a danger to apply for one. He also stated that it was 'quite unnecessary. Twenty dollars is wholly sufficient to allow one to be admitted on any steamer without a passport' (New York Times, 1911). Alfano's admission gives an important insight into the logistics of travel for fleeing mafiosi. Alfano, despite already having been arrested and released, and under continued suspicion (new information regarding the murder, from a witness named Abbatemaddio, had caused his sudden urge to flee), was seemingly able to travel to the US with relative ease utilising his wealth and by changing the name he used. Alfano adds; 'in fact, from the moment the steamer sailed, I permitted my true name to be known, and was living under that name when arrested by Petrosino, the American detective' (New York Times, 1911).

In another example Don Raffaele Palizzolo, chief instigator in the murder of Emmanuele Notarbartolo and alleged mafia head, was able to travel to the US in 1908, and Police Commissioner Bingham was informed by the State Department that the Italian Embassy had declared him a 'harmless tourist' (New York Times, 1914).

The workarounds for these criminals in obtaining the relevant documents that allow them to travel to the US removes any suggestion that it was simply not possible for them to make the journey (and thus transplant). The ease with which many of these criminals are able to obtain documents for travel, or subvert the need for them, puts the prospect of travel for a criminal beyond just the well-connected. As a factor it is worth remembering but cannot be used to disprove transplantation nor is it proof of any kind of 'outpost transplantation'.

Distance has become less of a factor in today's globalised world but in this historical context its implications must be considered. The distance may impact upon several of the mafias activities including mobility of agents, communication and trade. Whilst all three areas were well served in the early 1900s there are practical limitations relating to speed, frequency and cost of using the appropriate vessels.

With the availability of much closer locales in Europe, even in Italy, the US does not have a strong pull for the transplanting mafioso with regards to distance. The distance to America only presented difficulties, including the aforementioned travel issues (had an individual migrated to elsewhere in Italy or Europe he would have no need for a passport or to board a liner).

The distance would have made communication a challenge. Letter writing was the main form

of communication of news between the migrant community and the homeland. Letters would have to have travelled on the same steam ships as passengers, a journey that typically took around 7 days in 1880, or 5 days by 1920, and that is not including the collection and delivery of the letter at either end. Cavaoli described communicating with and travelling to the homeland as 'costly and cumbersome' (Cavaoli, 2008). It would be an impractical and unreliable way of communicating anything more than small pieces of simple information once you factor in the secretive nature of the society. There would not have been the possibility for a group in Sicily to run the daily, or even weekly, operations of a US 'outpost' and any form of control would have been limited with an outpost group retaining a large amount of autonomy. At most the mafia communication was probably limited to the infrequent letters of reference that helped insure new relationships between unfamiliar mafiosi.

This section has shown that the challenge of travelling to the US for the mafioso, whilst harder than for the average citizen, is not insurmountable. Mafiosi found ways to circumvent the migration laws in Italy and the US, either by using contacts to obtain documents, using false names, stowing away, or by taking a less direct route via Europe. The distance would mean that the direct running of an outpost by a Sicilian group is unlikely, the transportation and communication were not advanced enough to exercise a strong level of control over any outpost; more autonomous mafia groups in the US with infrequent contact is more probable.

## Factors for successful transplantation

There are also operational factors to consider in the transplantation of a mafia group that would determine if it was to be successful. This section shows how mafias in the US were able to build and utilise their reputation, that the monitoring and controlling of agents beyond simple instructions was unlikely (in addition to the aforementioned distance issues), and how they would have communicated (again in addition to the distance issues). As outlined in the section on reputation below, the reporting of crimes overseas in Italy, and within the US Italian communities, by both the US press and the police helped US mafia groups develop a reputation of being linked to their homeland counterparts despite an absence of evidence that this was the case. This linkage strengthened the US groups' ability to operate, and that foreign reputation was eventually utilised internally to foster loyalty and respect. Communication between US and Italian groups in a transplantation scenario is also shown to be unlikely. A letter writing process existed but it was no different to the regular mail that the US Italian communities used to converse basic information with blood relatives. The closest example of mafia collusion is the existence of the letters of reference, but the role of these should not be overstated; they existed as a necessity of the criminals 'trust paradox' and not as some form of Italian control or monitoring. The monitoring and controlling of agents is shown below by this thesis to have been an almost insurmountable task and that instead kinship group control through initiation rules and rituals show the US groups to be imitations of their Italian counterparts rather than transplanted groups; their rules and rituals were different enough from their almost unchanging counterparts in Italy.

## Reputation

One of the key challenges in transplantation is the ability for a transplanted group to create the reputation required in order to carry out their activities successfully. If a group that relies on protection and extortion is feared then their threats will not be taken seriously. There are ways in which a mafia group can actively and internationally increase their reputation in a locale, for example acts of violence can demonstrate the mafia group's willingness to carry out threats. There are also unintentional or indirect means by which a mafia group can increase their reputation, for example the media reporting of mafia activity (newspapers in this time period), particularly sensationalist reporting, can help escalate public knowledge, and fear, of the group. The reporting need not be accurate in order to increase the mafia group's reputation, the more sensationalist the article is, the stronger the mafia group appears in the public perception.

For the transplanting group part of the challenge is to link the group to its homeland equivalent, especially if the homeland equivalent is an already feared organisation with international recognition. Stories of the Camorra in Naples began to appear in the late 1860s (The Morning Star and Catholic Messenger, 1868) (Vermont Watchman and State Journal, 1868) (Anon., 1869), highlighting the criminality and pervasiveness of the group(s). A *Vermont Watchman* article explained that ‘the Camorra crept into every branch of the civil and military service’ whilst ‘strenuous efforts have been made ever since the Establishment of the Italian kingdom to break up the Camorra, that vilest of all systems of murder and robbery’ (Vermont Watchman and State Journal, 1868). The article states that the Camorra were ‘controlling the actions of men high in office, and of swindling them out of their property and of doing away with all those who would not submit to its influence and secret authority’.

Although later than Camorra groups, the Sicilian Mafia groups received US media attention at least as early as October 1874 when a *Manchester Times* and *Guardian* correspondent was reprinted in the *Burlington Press*. The correspondent highlighted exploitation of the court system bought about by the ‘intimidation exercised by the Sicilian Maffia[sic]’ causing a trial to be relocated to Turin where it was hoped the prisoners would no longer be shielded. The article introduces the mafia as the Sicilian equivalent of the Neapolitan Camorra; a vast organisation of the “dangerous classes” (Burlington Weekly Free Press, 1874). It also mentions the transcending of classes within the Sicilian organisation;

‘The Maffia includes within its ranks members of all classes of society; the old Neapolitan Camorra could point to a Neapolitan Prince, of the blood as one of its members, and if the Sicilian Maffia is not quite so highly honoured it comprehends noblemen, judges, lawyers, merchants, agriculturists, every grade of life in short, down to the street pickpocket [...] or the highwayman.’ (Burlington Weekly Free Press, 1874)

The article shows the mafia to ignore authorities and the actions of the state, and highlights the social system of landowners, peasants and the middlemen who control the labour, explaining that the only way to ascend social classes was to join the mafia.

A month after the *Burlington Press* article a *London Times* correspondent wrote in the *New York Times*, highlighting Italian state efforts against a secret society called ‘the Mafia’ (Burlington Weekly Free Press, 1874) and a number of murders carried out by the society. It established for the public mind the rules and customs by which the society supposedly lived,



with the story of two arrested mafiosi in Messina who, in prison, happened across a former member that had entered the army, and had been sentenced to death. The individual showed penitence and a willingness to re-join the society, so the two mafiosi wrote to their 'honored chief' to ask for the absolution of the 'erring lamb' (Burlington Weekly Free Press, 1874).

These early articles in the US create the image of powerful mafia groups in Southern Italy, ones that had pervaded and eluded the state and the authorities, infiltrating all sectors and classes of society. More articles throughout the 1870s and 1880s detailed the threatening, murderous traits of these organisations and highlight trials against them in Italy (New York Times, 1878). These articles had introduced the American public to the ideas of 'Mafia' and 'Camorra', unintentionally creating an awareness that is later exploitable by the US mafia groups.

In the late 1880s and early 1890s when there were murder investigations and trials in the Italian communities of the US, tales of 'mafia' emerged, though now the organisation was in the US. For example the murder of Antonio Flaccomio by Carlo and Vincenzo Quarteraro in 1888 was portrayed as a mafia vendetta, with the existence of a 'Mafia society' testified by a witness (New York Times, 1888) (New York Times, 1889). The articles refer again to the secret society in Sicily known as "The Mafia", implying it was one and the same organisation, though the tone had changed somewhat, underplaying the transcending of classes, and instead blaming a criminal class as shown in the following example;

'The criminal classes in Sicily are banded together in a secret society known as "The Mafia", all the members of which are pledged to protect each other against the officers of the law. If one of the society commits a crime all the other members of the society are bound to shield and keep the crime secret under pain of death. The members of the society are chiefly forgers, counterfeiters, and assassins. Murder with some of these men is simply a pastime. They have no pity, and think nothing of killing any one who stands in their way or betrays their secrets.' (New York Times, 1888)

This article demonstrates a change in which 'mafia' is presented in the US; whilst still a society that opposes authority, it no longer highlights the role of the groups in the perversion of the state systems through politicians, judges, bankers, merchants, etc. The role of the middlemen (the *gabelloti*) in controlling the labour is not mentioned in the article, despite being the primary source of power for the organisation(s). Instead the article focusses on crimes which were more prevalent in US crime, forgery and counterfeiting, alongside murder (though all of

these occurred in Italy protection racketeering is always highlighted as the main activity; counterfeiting, for example, was mentioned in the Sangiorgi report in 1900 but only as a side activity to protection racketeering). The organisation still appears powerful and exudes fearsomeness, but is now adapted in the media to fit the peculiarities of organised crime in the US.

The article, continuing on from the above quotation, immediately links the Sicilian mafia to society in the US; 'There are many reputable Sicilians in this city [New York] who have been compelled to join the society for their own protection' (New York Times, 1988). It gives the impression that the mafia had penetrated legitimate businesses through fearsomeness, presenting those members deemed 'reputable' as victims of a criminal class. The article also presents New York and New Orleans as transplanted outposts of the Sicilian mafia; 'there are two principal headquarters of this society in this country – one in this city and the other in New Orleans – so that members of this society who commit a serious crime in this city find refuge among friends in the South, and vice versa' (New York Times, 1988).

In terms of reputation the media had done the work in giving these US based groups the fearsomeness they required. As exemplified above they had created the idea of a mafia connected across the US, but also related to the Sicilian mafias and Neapolitan camorras, with the same disdain for respecting authority and the law. Despite an absence of coverage on protection racketeering activity, with the US crimes reported on based on counterfeiting, fraud and vendettas, the US media was still able to link the organisations into a wider conspiracy. For the potential criminal, the budding 'mafioso' in the US, the media had created an exaggerated organisation of which the criminal only had to imply they had membership of in order to reap the benefits of the fear the reputation provided.

In addition, by associating themselves with the rules and traditions of an older, more 'prestigious' organisation, US organisations are able to validate themselves to and exercise greater control over their own members. For example, by associating the initiation process or the 'code of honour' that the American groups undertook with the older Italian organisations and the myths surrounding them, giving a sense of meaning through historical and cultural ties. The continuation of the perception that the American and Italian mafias were unified in some way was even present within the mafia organisations (at least in their outward

communications). This would not only reinforce the reputation, but also, if believed internally, help control mafiosi (this is explored subsequently in the ability to control agents).

In his testimonies the origins of the US organisation are attributed by Gentile to a Sicilian 'honor Society' originating in ancient times which 'gives the right to defend the honor, the weak and to respect the human law. With these principles as its guide it still operates' (Gentile, c.1947, p. 10). This shows that, at least in from the perspective of the American mafiosi, the traditions and history of the Sicilian mafia give a kind of justification to the American organisation, but despite Gentile's statement, this does not prove the links beyond what could be a wishful myth- that the US organisations would want to justify and associate themselves with what they view as an honourable society (or system) in their homeland and its mythoi, history and culture.

For example, Gentile continues; 'it was started by land owners as a disciplinary force in the community. It was started in the least developed part of Sicily, and was brought to America in the sections of the country where Sicilian, Calabrian and Neapolitans lived' (Gentile, c.1947, p. 11). Gentile's description makes no mention of a criminal element to the organisation, but portrays it as a justified protector of the community, despite the absence of this element in the type of organisation found in the US. This builds onto the reputation within the US organisation of their founders as an honourable and integral part of society. Gentile's beliefs regarding the origin of the US mafias, and Italian mafias, is similar to many of the 'Robin Hood-esque' stories perpetuated by mafia societies. In particular it bears resemblance to the tale of the *Beati Paoli* described by Luigi Natoli in his 1909 novel (Natoli, 1909), and subsequent adoption into the ideology of Sicilian Cosa Nostra groups. The *Beati Paoli*, whether real or fictitious, were a secret society that represented and defended the poor against the feudal landowners, the church and the state through the use of secretive kangaroo courts and kidnapping the accused. Mafia societies in Sicily have utilised the *Beati Paoli*, in their own folklore; at Antonio Calderone's initiation he was told to 'follow the example of the Beati Paoli' (Gambetta, 1993, p. 13) and both boss of the Corleonaesi, Totò Riina and *pentito* Gaspare Mutolo referred to each other as characters from Natoli's novel in court (Paoli, 2003, pp. 184-185,242). The mafia groups in the US, were likely influenced by the same tale and folklore that the Italian groups have utilised to justify their existence and history (though whether they do this to justify their actions to themselves or society is less clear).

Gentile elaborates on how the organisations developed in the US; 'with the passing of time in every city of America these associations were formal. In the city of New York and Brooklyn alone there were five', with nearly 2000 associates split between them (Gentile, c.1947, p. 12). The formalisation of the organisations in the US is an important element, it suggests that prior to this there was no formal element in the US and that relationships were on an ad-hoc basis. This lack of formalisation provides a stark contrast to deliberate transplantation of a well-structured group (despite the conclusions of Gentile's quotes made by Messick and Goldblatt (1972, pp. 7-11)).

In Gentile's testimonies a 'parent' and 'daughter' analogy is used frequently regarding the relationship between the two organisations (Sicilian mafia and US mafia) (Gentile, 1963, p. a1). In one example Gentile stated that 'over the years, the Sicilian Mafia has always been looked upon as "the noble mother" of the Mafia in the U.S.A. Its authority has always been recognized' (Gentile, 1963, p. d2). It creates the image of a powerful, connected, international organisation, one that would have been beyond the capabilities of localised police forces to bring under control.

Whilst the American organisation(s) may regard themselves as the 'daughter' of the relationship, it is less clear whether the Sicilian organisation(s) regarded themselves as a 'parent' organisation, or whether this was the American organisation(s) portraying a link/connection with the infamous Sicilian group for its own purposes. This is a good example of the criminal linking with a feared/respected organisation in order to wield influence/fear over victims; an important part of establishing a successful organised crime group in a given locale.

This is particularly visible in one of Gentile's statement's;

The parent mafia, the poor mafia, has always exercised its prestige and guidance with respect to the daughter American Mafia. The parent mafia is the custodian of the rules and by-laws of the community, of that Mafia legal procedure which governs the activities of the Mafia, of that democratic façade which provides for elections and sentences voted on by the whole body of leaders; a body with which rests the power that entitles it to command, adjudicate, punish and reward. (Gentile, 1963, p. d8)

The reverence for the Sicilian parent in Gentile's words is apparent. He has elevated the role and reach of the Sicilian mafia to one which appears to control the overseas American mafia.

Gentile continues, 'according to the teachings of the parent Mafia, membership in the family involves a set of rights and a set of duties....' (Gentile, 1963, p. d8), again implying the Sicilian mafia as having a code of rights and duties and the influence those had over American mafiosi.

Gentile, in his own view, compares the undertaking of these rules in the two organisations; 'The "rules and by-laws" of the Sicilian parent mafia have found far-reaching and faithful application in the United States. In Sicily, a killing is committed over a one-hundred lire matter. In America a killing is committed over a one-thousand dollar "racket." however the "rules" are the same' (Gentile, 1963, p. d8).

Gentile's words serve as an example of the reputation the Sicilian group held internally; it was the rule maker and the organiser of the system, to be respected and followed. Whether genuinely following, replicating or imitating, the Sicilian mafia group(s), the American mafias are able to build a reputation based on the image of the Sicilian group

Discussions regarding the 'Black Hand' also serve as examples of how criminal groups in the US used reputation to spread fear. Italian Consul General Count Massiglia stated that;

The use of the 'Mano Nera' or Black Hand emblem, has been proved to be such an easy way of intimidating people that it is no wonder that individual criminals, with no connection whatever with any secret society, use it time after time in their operations. Why it was proved recently that a number of Black Hand letters had been written by a young girl thirteen years old, for her own amusement! (New York Times, 1907a)

The Consul General's argument is backed up by examples in this study; in the previous chapter two examples were given of the 'Black Hand' methods used by those unassociated with any mafia group, in one the letter accompanying a bomb on the SS Umbria, possibly planted instead by a member of the Fabian Society, and the other two boys attempting to extort a lady on their own using an imitation letter.

The mafia groups in the US, both intentionally through their actions and unintentionally through the media, were able to cement a reputation internally within the organisation and externally with the public. These were crucial to the continued success of their activities, the reputation and association with a fearsome, although false, international connected organisation put pressure on victims to cede to any mafia demands. There was no evidence of actual links in the reporting of these groups, always assumed and alluded to; but these groups

benefitted greatly from the imitation and association of their Italian counterparts; news on their counterparts was reflected as news on them.

## Communication

Communication is crucial to understanding the nature of the transplantation that has taken place. To what extent is there communication between the homeland and the outpost, and how is it possible. There are challenges in the communication process that make it difficult to visualise these outposts as under the control of a homeland mafia. It is important to consider, as Diego Gambetta points out, 'communication refers to more than the transmission of linguistic messages. It includes any act undertaken by an agent, the signaller, with the intention of conveying information to another agent' (2009, p. xiv). With regards to a transplanting mafia group intent on running an outpost the communication, however, would primarily have been in written form via mail due to the geographical distance between locations. This chapter has already show there to be logistical concerns regarding the speed and cost of delivery of mail (the only realistic form of communication available to the Mafiosi during the time period). The alternative form of communication in a telegram, whilst quicker, required the use of an operative and was not suitable for the transmission of more secretive or complex messages, and cost considerably more (messages were charged by the word, 40 cents in 1886, 20 cents in 1904 (Nickles, 2003, p. 180)).

Gentile explained that he sent word to his 'family' in Sicily advising them of his arrival in Boston in roughly 1919/1920 (Gentile, c.1947, p. 29). It possible that this information was passed back to the US as at a meeting of 'interstate reunion of representatives of the various Mafia families of the United States' Gentile's arrival was mentioned (though he suspects this may have been part of a trap).

Lupo highlighted another example of communication; reported news from the US back to Italy. Santo Vassolo, an informant to the police, was murdered in New Orleans, and the police report mentioned that the news spread immediately to the Sicilian countryside (Lupo, 2015, p. 16).

There is also evidence of letters being used to establish territorial dominance in the early twentieth century. One example is in a letter, from Francesco Motisi (Genova), mafia boss and citrus merchant (as well as a politician according to Kendall (Critchley, 2009, p. 58)) in Palermo who had fled to New Orleans in 1900 (Lupo, 2015, p. 24). The letter was sent in 1902 to

prominent US mafioso Giuseppe Morello, but intercepted by investigators. It read: 'Do not take in bad part if I tell you, as I am older than you, that you have to be afraid of false friends who are the ruin of the good ones. Do me the favor to remember me as I remember you' (Lupo, 2015, p. 24). The letter indicates an attempt to assert dominance rather than to cooperate or act as subordinate with Morello.

The building of a criminal relationship through communication is important to the continued structure and well-being of a mafia group. As Gambetta suggests criminals, including mafiosi, likely will not work with someone they do not know, or for whom they cannot get a reliable reference. A criminal faces a number of paradoxes in choosing a partner – for a start they do not wish to reveal themselves to law enforcement so must find a way to communicate their activities to fellow criminals in order to foster beneficial partnerships. Even once a partnership has been formed there are issues of trust and reliability. The criminals do not bind themselves to the rule of law; contracts, written or verbal, are meaningless for they have no legal protection.

Gambetta points out four difficulties criminals face in forming partnerships (2009, p. 31):

- Constraints, such as prison or going on the run, may force them to default on an agreement
- Opportunities to renege on their agreement in part due to the secrecy of the activities and the lack of legal protection
- Motivation to renege on agreements driven by selfish goals with less concern for societal rules
- Dispositions to defect, as they are more likely to take risks and less concerned about punishment and societal norms.

Gambetta phrases this as the “villain’s paradox”; ‘criminal needs partners who are also criminals, but these are typically untrustworthy people to deal with when their self-interest is at stake’ (2009, p. 31). For the transplanting mafioso this presents a difficult situation. Unless he is to only work with those with whom he has worked in Sicily then he will be limited in the manpower and resources needed to carry out criminal activities.

#### Letters of reference

The mafia groups in the US created a system of communication with the homeland to get around these issues of trust and reliability. The letters of reference system gave individuals a

more fluid 'trustworthiness' that travelled somewhat with them; the US mafia groups would ask for a letter of recommendation on an individual from their Sicilian hometown. Critchley, upon examining Gentile's testimonies and Morello's letters concluded that;

A telegram or "letter of consent" preceded or followed the Sicilian member traveling in the United States. The latter was sent after the Sicilian member transmitted to his capo in Sicily a telegram indicating which American family he wished to belong to. The letter of consent, written by the boss of the Sicilian Family, was accepted as "proof" by the Americans that the man was trustworthy enough to be admitted into their Family. This system was reminiscent of the contents of items seized from Morello. (Critchley, 2009, pp. 62-63)

Dash highlighted the ease with which some members newly arrived from Sicily were able to be assimilated into the Morello-Lupo group; Vita Laduca, Giuseppe Fontana, Giuseppe Lalamia and the Loboido brothers all joined up with Morello's group so rapidly upon arrival that Dash suggests there must be been pre-planning involved (Dash, 2009, p. 112). Dash also suggests that letters of recommendation written by Sicilian bosses accompanied the travelling mafiosi on their journey to New York, and that telegrams were used when members moved to other states (Dash, 2009, pp. 112-113).

Varese, similarly stated that it would be customary for would be members to carry a letter 'from Sicily testifying to their position back home'. He outlined the importance of the letters as giving the 'Sicilian homeland [...] a say on admission and moves among families', and that they 'operated as a certification agency on reputations' (Varese, 2011, p. 125). He clarifies this further that 'would-be mafiosi from the old country needed a "letter of reference" from Sicilian bosses in order to be admitted into a cosca, and any challenge of family had to be approved by the boss back home' (Varese, 2011, p. 125). Varese, as with Critchley, points to Morello's capture in 1909 where the secret service also discovered such "letters of reference" and to Gentile's memoirs (Varese, 2011) (Critchley, 2009).

Dickie also discusses the use of these letters, also referencing Gentile's memoirs, stating that Gentile transferred between Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Brooklyn and Kansas City and each time he 'needed a testimonial from a senior boss back home in the province of Agrigento. The letters or telegrams would take the form of a character reference, as if for an ordinary job' (Dickie, 2007).



From the above three examples it is clear that Gentile is frequently cited as the original source of this claim, and his testimonies provide some clues into the use of these letters. But it is possible to interpret Gentile's testimonies differently, and by looking at the source material it is possible to envisage an alternative relationship between the organisations than has been previously suggested.

Gentile mentions the letters of reference several times in his work. It is important to note that on their own, Gentile's testimonies regarding the letters should not be taken as proof of a referring system between the various organisations. This knowledge and these experiences of Gentile's may be unique to him, or his various 'families'. Furthermore it should be taken into account that Gentile's statements regarding the importance of these letters may be overstated (perhaps to create a sensationalist statement for the interview/memoirs).

In the interview with Paese Sera Gentile states that 'the Sicilian mafia member who emigrates to America is either preceded or followed by a "letter of reference" issued by a Sicilian "family." According to Gentile this document is the "credentials" required to be accepted into a mafia family of the United States' (Gentile, p. D2), as well as 'like credentials accompanying the transfer from one family to another' (from his other memoirs) (Gentile, p. 34). The interview continues; 'Even the Mafia bosses who spent short or long periods of time in Sicily had, according to Gentile, to request a 'letter of reference' before departing. This practice Nicola Gentile followed every time he came to Italy'. (Gentile, 1963, p. d2)

However, the interview with Gentile also states that;

*Nobody should think that the 'credentials' were official documents with seals and signatures and marginal notations as to proper filing, etc. They were innocent looking letters mailed from Palermo to New York, or from Raffadali to Cleveland, or from Corleone to Kansas City, whose tenor was approximately as follows: "Mr. Joe Blow is an honest and skilful work who should be taken into consideration for work in your company, or on your farm, or in your store" (Gentile, 1963, p. d2).*

This general letter appears ordinary and is similar to any letter of reference when applying for work. These letters therefore fulfil a fundamental role in addressing the 'villain's paradox' by providing an introduction that infers the criminal has a level of trustworthiness and respect, rather than as part of some effort of control by a Sicilian group through the letters.

According to the Gentile interviews it appears letters were even used to help mafiosi that are threatened with the death sentence in the US;

The credentials issued by the parent mafia were never questioned by the “heads of families” in America. As a matter of fact, cases are known in which the parent Mafia gave a hand to U.S mafia bosses in danger of being sentenced to death by accrediting them families in geographic areas far away from those where suspicions had arisen, thus giving the man in trouble time to prepare his defence. (Gentile, 1963, p. d2)

Here it appears that the Sicilian groups have a greater degree of control over their American counterparts, with the ability to relocate them between US families, though it is not clear if this was merely through the referencing system or in an advisory role, or if they had the ability to coordinate the moving of US mafiosi between US families and territories.

Gentile also referred to a personal episode involving the letters of reference in which a Mafioso from Porto Empedocle came to Gentile with a letter of reference for him, despite Gentile not requesting one;

How is it that a letter arrived, if at the moment of departing for the United States, I begged the Capo (head) of (family) Porto Empedocle not to send any letters until I would advise him by telegram in which I would indicate the selection of the representative of the Borgata to which I wanted to become connected with (in the United States). (Gentile, c.1947, p. 34)

I have not yet given the Capo at Porto Empedocle any inclination as to which family (in the United States) I wished to become connected with. (Gentile, c.1947, pp. 34-35)

After this Gentile goes to Brooklyn family of Nicola Schiro to ask to join, then telegraphed Porto Empedocle to send by cable his “Stabene” (Is well) for my entrance into the family of Nicola Schiro and receives the reply “nulla osta” (clearance) after which he was taken in and only subject to Schiro (Gentile, c.1947, p. 35).

There are unusual inconsistencies in Gentile’s memoirs and interviews however. One is that a number of times throughout Gentile’s testimonies he refers to illiteracy amongst mafiosi, including; his own inability to read and write due to no schooling (Gentile, c.1947, p. 2), describing the Commission as containing a majority of slow-witted and illiterate men (Gentile, c.1947, p. 43), and again mentioning illiteracy of nearly all of General Assembly (Gentile,

c.1947, p. 57). A system of letters of reference seems unusual for a society made up, and run by, a majority of illiterate individuals, especially not letters written in a style as formally as shown above.

In addition, although Gentile mentions every mafioso needed a letter of reference, one of his own examples indirectly contradicts this; the admission of Al Capone, a non-Sicilian, into a mafia organisation was done at the request of the US mafia commission (Gentile, c.1947, p. 71), and, as a non-Sicilian, it would have been impossible for Capone to fulfil the criteria that Varese set out for admission.

Later on in Gentile's testimony he states that a letter of transfer was prepared for him in New York with US bosses and vice bosses present, and there is no mention of Sicily bosses (Gentile, c.1947, p. 131). This can be linked to Critchley's explanation that in order to control the size of the American families a self-imposed agreement was put into place after the Castellamarese war around 1931 that meant 'membership in the Sicilian mafia was no longer a sufficient qualification' (Critchley, 2009, p. 70). Although Gentile was not a member of the Sicilian mafia, cutting ties with Sicilian membership allowed the organisation to control numbers and prevent overly ambitious rivals, and this likely included removing the approval of a Sicilian boss to change families in the US. The process however appears to have occurred after the advent of the prohibition era.

### Ability to monitor and control agents

For the Italian mafia group intending on running an outpost, one of the challenges it would have faced is how it both monitors and controls its agents. If an agent is not monitored it may act against the wishes of the home organisation or draw undue attention on it, and without the ability to control the transplanted mafia it cannot prevent this from occurring. These challenges mean that a full transplantation of a controlled outpost was unlikely; as mentioned the distance and communication. The ability to monitor, and control, agents' activities, is particularly important if 'the mafia' is considered to be a single entity (or several international entities).

The monitoring of individuals would have been a difficult task and would have required a network or informants to report information back to the homeland. Those informants would also have to have the access required to obtain information regarding the monitored

individual's secret activities. The difficulty in this makes unlikely anything beyond self-reporting, or the reporting of locations and major actions. The typical major actions reported on would be examples murders, feuds, or hierarchy changes (all these can be seen in Gentile's testimonies).

The sharing of this information and monitoring appears to also be two way. Gentile mentions Toto D'Aquila having informants in Palermo who picked upon the movement of monitored mafiosi out of Sicily (Gentile, c.1947, p. 29). Similarly Salvatore Bonanno was informed of worsening affairs between his family and a rival family in Castellamare, causing his return (Bonanno & Lalli, 2003 (Originally published 1983), pp. 23-28).

Beyond the aforementioned letters of reference, and letters of information, there is little evidence of direct control being imposed on any of the American mafia groups. The only control that was evidenced in Gentile's testimonies is the ability to relocate individuals between territories (as explored in the previous section), but it is not clear to what extent this was controllable or if it was simply advisory.

In Gentile's testimonies during his travels back to Sicily he does not mention any relationship of crime between the criminal associations in the US and Italy. Although he states that 'many more Sicilian-American Mafia bosses took all the trips they cared to take. There came all those who had relatives they wanted to see and friends they wanted to meet again. The police, both in Italy and the United States never took cognisance of these trips' (Gentile, 1963, p. d2), it is noteworthy that Gentile does not refer to himself, or other individuals from the US organisations, travelling to Sicily for the purpose of planning, engaging in or continuing criminal activities. He even mentions that his 'trips to Sicily were not suspended even when Prefect Mori was conducting his well-known "police operations"' (Gentile, 1963, p. d3) in the 1920s (despite the fact that Gentile was arrested during Mori's campaign (Gentile, 1963, p. d5)).

It is also important to look at the relationship the Italian mafias might have had with the (alleged) highest level of the US structure, the commission (or other titles for decision making bodies which Gentile frequently refers to such as the 'government' and 'assembly'), which according to Gentile existed in some capacity even prior to 1931 (and the Castellamarese war). Specifically within both of Gentile's testimonies there is no mention of the involvement of bosses of Sicilian families (or other Italian groups) in the Commission.

However, the interviews with Gentile do highlight an element of cooperation with organisations overseas when it came to the death sentence;

Very often, mafia members who had been sentenced to death in the United States sought refuge and protection in Sicily. This was the case of former “boss of bosses” Fiddo Morello who had been sentenced to death at the request of the new “king” Totò D'Aquila and who, together with ten of his most faithful followers went to seek refuge in Sicily. The sentence was one of those which leave no way out. The order for its execution had gone out to all American families. The word had been sent to Sicily that “those about to die” were to be killed, as Nicola Gentile put it, on first sight. (Gentile, 1963, p. d3)

This international death sentence perhaps highlights one of the most important aspects of the relationship between the US and Sicilian groups, that there was at least an element of cooperation between the two organisations when it came to those that it regarded as disloyal. This is perhaps in part due to the threat that association with the sentenced individuals would hold, either a direct threat from the accusing family, or from a distrust of the accused individuals (i.e. each criminal wants to protect him or herself from potential dangers including arrest or death). The interview continues;

Let us note in passing, so that the connections between the Sicilian mafia and the American mafia may be fully clear, that the eleven men sentenced in the USA did not find any assistance in Sicily. They were not even able to find shelter in care of their relatives because they know only too well that the order to kill them as decreed in New York was equally enforceable at Palermo, at Sivona or at Raffadallo. (Gentile, 1963, p. d3)

This reinforces the previous point regarding the threat that came from associating oneself with, or assisting a sentenced individual; the risk of action from either the sentencing party, or the risk from the distrusted individual. The interviewee concludes;

Gentile's memoirs do not say anything about it, but it is easy to gather from the way the various stories develop that many sentences were passed in Sicily and executed in America and vice versa. By the same token, many Mafia members had to give up lucrative “lines of business” in the United States because somebody in Sicily started to issue threats. (Gentile, 1963, p. e1)

This sharing of the sentencing system between mafia organisations is a way in which the Sicilian group can control the US counterparts and ensure that trustworthiness and loyalty are instilled into their overseas members.

Gentile referenced the relationship in the interviews; 'that the mafia is a complex and intricate thing is demonstrated by the permanent and unbreakable relationship which binds the American Mafia to the Sicilian Mafia. As we have seen before, this relationship is governed by laws, or rather, rules which are precise and unchanging' (Gentile, 1963, p. d8). But the rules and rituals undertaken in the US appear to have changed from the Sicilian ones, only Camorra groups seem to have kept their initiation routine in full.

Instead of direct control it is possible to consider the use of a form of indirect control utilising the traditions to instil loyalty, respect and commitment into US mafiosi. As previously shown, the reputation of the Sicilians and Italian organisations could be utilised to create loyalty within the organisation. This is made possible through the use of the traditional rules and rituals, even if they were facsimiles of the Italian ones. Critchley commenting on the rules and rituals of Black Hand groups in the US noted; 'Their existence demonstrated the fact of blackmailing societies with a rudimentary hierarchy and a crudely defined division of labor, consisting of several members and performing entry rituals possibly referring to Old World practices' (Critchley, 2009, p. 26). It is to what extent these rituals referred to old world traditions that is of interest

The *Giornale D'Italia* and *The Sun* (New York) published a thirty-nine article set of rules allegedly obtained from a Black Hand gang (though how is unknown) (The Sun (New York), 1910). It shows a code of conduct, a system of operations, and the rules for the organisation. For example a number of the articles refer to the concept of respect for the 'family', the term used for the crime group; the first ten regard how the black handers should act in reference to other members and the society and what will cause punishment (The Sun (New York), 1910). There are structural roles referred to such as a treasurer, a head, senior members (called 'camuffo'), and junior members (called 'sgarritto'). These senior and junior members are required to pay entrances fees, attend all required meetings (regularly held every two weeks) and report all information to the head (The Sun (New York), 1910).

In a similar examples a black book was used by the Morello-Lupo group that outlined their rules and initiation ritual; Critchley highlighted that the book 'included strictures against informing, 'offending a companion', and 'refusal to serve the society' (Critchley, 2009, p. 25).

The *Omerta* (code of silence) also plays a role in the control of both mafia agents and those directly affiliated with it (to an extent it also refers to silence of the Sicilian Population). The very first of the thirty-nine Black Hand articles printed in *The Sun* (New York) stated that 'the person who reveals the secrets of the society will be punished with the bond of death' (The Sun (New York), 1910). These rules, similar to those used by societies in Italy, are used to control the mafioso/black-hander and make sure they are loyal to the organisation.

Similarly the rituals adopted by organisations in the US served to entrench loyalty through membership into new members. An 1895 report in *The Press* (New York) detailed a typical initiation ritual that would occur in Five Points, New York with boys as young as 15;

When a new member is to be initiated he is placed in the center of a group of men and the sergeant at arms orders all the lights to be extinguished. In complete darkness the signal "to arms" is given. The official weapon of the Mafia is the stiletto [...]. An order to "charge" is given, the lights are turned up, and the novitiate is confronted with a terrifying array of glittering blades [...] with their points pressed against him, a low, heavy voice mutter, "Death to all traitors!"

The candidate is then excused for a short time. When he next appears he is compelled to swear to his age, and to be truthful and faithful to his brother members against the whole world.

Sinking upon his knees the candidate places the point of the stiletto upon his bared chest, directly over the heart, and solemnly swears that he would plunge the blade through his heart rather than betray his brethren. (The Press (New York), 1895)

The paper mentioned that the initiate must also marry if he is not already, and if he doesn't do so within a specified period a wife will be chosen for him.

At a trial in 1918 one US camorrista, Notaro (erroneously spelt Nataro and Nottaro in newspapers), told the courts of his initiation ritual, reported here in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*;

Mike Nataro [sic], one of the newer members, told the jury that he was initiated by engaging in a knife duel with one of the trusted members by way of having his courage tested. He drew blood from the arm of his adversary in that weird ceremony. Morano kissed the blood that flowed and Nataro was sworn in with the statement "We are all brothers in blood." (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1918)

*The Daily Standard Union* also reported Notaro's initiation revelations;

By Pellegrino Morano he was then asked whether he was ready to do the bidding of the bosses in everything, whether he would willingly commit murder to accomplish the will of the bosses and whether if caught he would maintain silence and never help the authorities in running down a crime. When he had given his promise he was handed an open knife, the blade of which had been wrapped around with cord up to near the point. He was, then directed to fence with Perretti [sic], who also held a knife. When he had inflicted a slight wound on the arm of Perretti, Pellegrino intervened and declared Nottaro [sic] the winner. Turning to Perretti, Pellegrino kissed the cut on the wounded man's arm and declared the initiation of Nottaro completed. (The Daily Standard Union, 1918)

Critchley provided another initiation example, this time within a Black Hand group; the initiate's forearm was cut and drops of blood were mixed with that of an existing member, 'the initiate then took an oath of silence, and an instruction against divulging the secrets of the society was given to him, while a dagger was pressed against his chest' (Critchley, 2009, p. 26). The initiate was then required to name a wealthy Italian who could 'contribute' money to the gang.

Whilst there are similarities between the initiation rituals in the US and those in Italy, the examples above are not as similar to the Sicilian and 'Ndrangheta rituals as they are with the Camorra rituals. Buscetta's testimonies in the 1980's referred to the initiation rituals taken seriously within Sicily which involved holding a burning picture of a saint or the Virgin Mary, while repeating the oath. A report from the Chief of Police in Palermo to the Minister of the Interior in 1875 highlighted a near identical initiation ritual, virtually unchanged by the time Buscetta revealed it in the 1980s. The initiate would be presented to a group of bosses and underbosses, who according to Dickie, 'would prick the would be Mafioso's arm or hand and tell him to smear blood on to a sacred image. Then the oath of loyalty would be taken as the



image was burned and its ashes scattered, thus symbolizing the annihilation of all traitors' (Dickie, 2007, p. 34). Dickie's work highlights other initiations in Sicily that held the same routine; the revelations of the Favara brotherhood in 1875, Bernardino Verro's initiation in the 1890s (though the picture was of a skull rather than a saint), and Giovanni Brusca's in 1976 (Dickie, 2007, pp. 34-38,81-82,161). The example above from The Press makes no mention of a burning picture (saint or otherwise), or of the use of bloodletting, only the element of making an oath with the presence of a blade in a room of current (senior) members.

In another work Dickie also introduced the rituals used in the Camorra and 'Ndrangheta in Italy. The 'Ndrangheta ritual, whilst more elaborately verbose, had the same features as the Sicilian grous with the pricking of the thumb and the dripping of blood onto the picture of the saint (Dickie, 2012, p. 16). In the Camorra Dickie details a 1850s initiation ritual;

In the 1850s, a recruit usually took an oath over crossed knives, and then had to have a dagger fight, either with a Camorrista or with another aspiring member. Often the blade would be wrapped tightly in rags or string, leaving only the point exposed: too much blood, and the duel might stop being a symbolic exercise in male bonding, and start being a battle. When the first hit was registered, the fight was declared over, and the new affiliate received both the embraces of the other camorristi, and the most junior rank in the Honoured Society's organisational hierarchy. (Dickie, 2012, p. 18)

This ceremony is identical to the aforementioned Camorra ritual in the US of Notaro, with the same duelling and oath process taking place. Dickie mentions that once the Camorra ceremony in Italy was completed the new member became a *picciotto di sgarro* (Dickie, 2012, p. 71). This term is similar to the term identified in the thirty-nine article book of the Black Hand that referred to junior members as *sgrarrito* (little *sgarro*). Critchley had noted that 'Seized "Black Hand" notebooks were likely to have belonged to groups with mainland Italian backgrounds, who were not subject to the absolute prohibition in Sicily of Mafia members recording their activities and practices' (Critchley, 2009, p. 26).

The American mafia initiation rituals do not appear to be facsimiles of their Sicilian or 'Ndrangheta counterparts, but those in US Camorra organisations appear to have followed the original Italian Camorra rituals more closely. This would suggest that the Camorra groups held a closer relationship with their homeland organisation than the Sicilian or other Italian groups. Were the Sicilian (and other Italian mafia groups) able to control their US counterparts it

would be expected to see an initiation ritual and sets of rules identical to those found in Sicily, rather than similar experiences that instead appear to be utilising the same methods of building a loyal criminal fraternity (and linking to a reputation) through imitation rituals and rules. These US mafiosi use rituals they are familiar with back in Italy but they are not being instructed to use these rituals, and instead are reproducing them independently.

As Paoli states;

‘By building a strong collective identity, shared cultural codes and norms enhance group cohesion and create trustful relationships among mafia members. The reliance on status and fraternisation contracts, which are non-specific and long-term, produces a high degree of flexibility and makes the multifunctionality of mafia groups possible. The same shared cultural codes and norms also represent, however, a powerful brake on entrepreneurial initiative’ (Paoli, 2005, p. 23).

A recent Europol assessment on Italian mafia’s states highlighted the importance of the group and the control within in;

‘This sentiment provided the ideal base on which the Mafias built their power: total commitment to (and total control of) a closely knit group; tremendous emotional impact boosted by centuries of local traditions; induced self-victimisation to justify abusive behaviours (‘everybody is against us, but we will defeat them all’); mistrust of the state and of its laws (‘the family only recognises and follows its own rules’); incessant reinforcement of family ‘esprit de corps’; strict systems of reward and punishment; overbearing emphasis on an adapted concept of honour; and ruthless treatment of members considered as traitors’ (Europol, 2013, p. 5)

## Conclusions

This chapter has shown that there were adequate local and kinship networks available for a transplanting group, and that mafiosi made use of them. They offered the transplanting groups information, reliability and trustworthiness by using pre-existing network relationships. The advantages these local and kinship groups presented also benefited the migrant communities as a whole and provided. The local communities also provided an element of familiarity and tradition that could be exploited by transplanting mafia groups in the same way that they had been exploited in Italy (such as religious festivals).

The other pull factor, the distance and travel to the US, introduces a number of challenges to US mafia transplantation that closer locations, such as Northern Italy or elsewhere in Europe, do not face. The process of obtaining the documents for travel to the US, both in leaving Italy and arrival in the US, was an extra obstacle for the transplanting mafiosi, but not insurmountable as they found ways to circumvent or pervert the system. They used methods such as travelling via a third country, obtaining fake documents, using fake names or paying off officials, or simply stowing away on the ship bound for the US. The distance, however, would not have been an attractive pull factor for a transplanting mafiosi; the journey was long and it made communication hard. These factors add to the suggestion that there was not a planned direct running of a mafia outpost in the United States but rather mafiosi found themselves travelling to the United States by forced circumstance.

The reputation of the Italian organisations would have helped an emerging US mafia group, whether they were transplanted outposts or home-grown organisations, as long as the US groups could link themselves in some way to their Italian counterparts. For the most part this link was created by the media, who pieced together similarities between US and Italian organisations in order to create suggestions of a pan-Atlantic organisation. This served the US mafia groups by spreading fear that supplemented their activities (victims were more likely to pay extortion demands for example if they believed there was no way to escape the group). The perception of an Italian-American connection was also perpetuated within the organisation, helping a group to present to its members the concept of a traditional and honourable society by which's rules they were bound. This is useful as a form of control over members, by instilling in the members a sense of strength of the group, making the group attractive to stay within and threatening to those seeking to disobey.

The information collection challenge for a transplanting mafia would have been surmountable by utilising the aforementioned local and kinship networks. The practice of letter writing would have informed all individuals in Italy of what was happening in the migrant community in the US.

Communication between the organisations would have presented a number of challenges. There is evidence of reporting back to Sicily from American mafiosi, but logical and distance limitations would have made this a slow process, not suitable for direct management of an outpost. Instead only important communications were sent, including the use of letters of reference, crucial to the migrating mafioso looking to build a trustworthy relationship with others in the US.

The ability of an Italian mafia to monitor and control an outpost in the US seems limited. The monitoring of mafiosi in the US is subject to the same restrictions as information collection, with distance hampering the ability to do this effectively. There are no examples of direct control of US mafiosi, beyond assisting a mafioso who is relocating between territories. Indirect control is possible through the rules and rituals of the organisations, though only the Camorra initiations in the US showed any significant resemblance their Italian Camorra counterparts.

Overall the operations point to organisations in the US which are influenced by, but not under the control of their Italian counterparts. This fits with Varese's claim that 'although American Mafiosi were not agents of the Sicilian ones, the homeland still exerted some influence on such U.S outposts' (Varese, 2011, p. 120). This fits the thesis argument that an outpost controlled from Italy in the United States is unlikely, and instead supports the argument for a 'transplantation light'; the groups in the US was not under direct control from their Italian counterparts but imitated and drew influences from them through individuals utilising their past experiences.

## Citations

State of Morals in Italy. (1869, Oct 10). *The New York Herald*, p. 6.

- Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bodnar, J. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban American* (First Midland Book Edition ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Brooklyn Daily Eagle. (1918, May 15). Camorra Secrets Revealed at Trial. *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, p. 18.
- Burlington Weekly Free Press. (1874, October 16). The Sicilian Mafia. *Burlington Weekly Free Press*.
- Cavaoli, F. (2008). Patterns of Italian Immigration to the United States. *Catholic Social Science Review*.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.
- Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (Eds.). (2010). *Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Volume 8 : Migration and Culture*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Europol. (2013). *Italian Organised Crime Threat Assessment*. The Hague: Europol.
- Falcone, G. (1993). *Men of honour : the truth about the Mafia*. London: Warner.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, D. (2009). *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Gentile, N. (1963). Paese Sera Interview.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vito Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.
- Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (2nd ed.). London: M.I.T. Press.
- Jones, P., & Holli, M. (1981). *Ethnic Chicago*. Michigan: WM B Eerdmans Publishing Company.

- Krist, G. (2014). *Empire of Sin: Sex, Jazz and Murder in New Orleans 2014*, . Stroud, Gloucester: Amberley publishing.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.
- Merlino, R. (2014). Sicilian Mafia, Patron Saints, and Religious Processions: The Consistent Face of an Ever-Changing Criminal Organization. *California Italian Studies*, 5(1).
- Messick, H., & Goldblatt, B. (1972). *The Mobs and the Mafia*. New York: Gallahad Books.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Natoli, L. (1909). *I Beati Paoli* (2017 ed.). Feltrinelli Editore.
- New York Herald. (1915, May 25). Guard Widow at Gallucci Funeral. *New York Herald*.
- New York Times. (1878, Dec 1878). The Camorra and Mafia. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1889, March 27). The 'Mafia' Murder. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1898, July 10). Cast-off Criminals. *Kansas City Journal*, p. 18.
- New York Times. (1906, May 13). Italian Emigrants not criminals. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1907a, March 3). Is 'the Black Hand a Myth or a Terrible Reality? *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1909, March 16). Jeremiah J Jenks letter for NY Police (Nov 7 1908) printed in 'Mission that took Petrosino to Italy'. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1909, March 26). Mission that took Petrosino to Italy. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1910, Sept 4). Italians Seek Protection against black hand. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1911, April 2). Alfano Came Under His Own Name. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1914, June 30). More Undesirables. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1915, May 25). Gallucci Funeral guarded. *New York Times*.
- New York Times. (1988, Oct 22). By Order of the Mafia. *New York Times*.
- Nickles, D. P. (2003). *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Paoli, L. (2002). The Paradoxes of Organised Crime. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 37, 51-97.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Paoli, L. (2005). Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises. In M. Galeotti (Ed.), *Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime* (pp. 19-31). New York: Routledge.
- Park, R. E., & Miller, H. A. (1921). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. London: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/oldworldtraitstr00parkuoft>
- Reimers, D. M. (1998). *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
- The Daily Standard Union. (1918, May 8). Relates Camorra Degree in Court. *The Daily Standard Union*, p. 2.
- The Morning Star and Catholic Messenger. (1868, April 5). Foreign Catholic Intelligence. *The Morning Star and Catholic Messenger*, p. 3.
- The Press (New York). (1895, Feb 3). The Mafia At Work Again. *The Press (New York)*.
- The Sun (New York). (1910, Dec 26). A Black Hand Constitution. *The Sun (New York)*, p. 6.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, . Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Vermont Watchman and State Journal. (1868, July 8). Correspondence from Italy. *Vermont Watchman and State Journal*.
- White, F. M. (1908, April 5). The Black Hand. *New York Times*.
- White, F. M. (1913). The Black Hand in Control in Italian New York. *The Outlook*, 857-865.

# Conclusions

---

## Introduction

This study set out to explore the emergence of Italian-American mafia groups in the US in the pre-prohibition era (1880-1920) and the nature of their relationship with mafia groups in Italy. It addresses theories of overseas transplantation against those that propose the concept of home-grown organisation. This work takes into account more recent findings alongside recent transplantation/home-grown theories and contrasts them with both primary data and earlier research that, whilst uncovering important data, often had predetermined unsupported conclusions. It has identified that several key components of transplantation that would lead to confirmation of a full direct outpost being run from Italy are either absent or even opposed. The research instead supports the likelihood of these US mafia groups being home-grown organisations with influence from and occasional collaboration with, but not direct control from, their Italian counterparts.



## The role of migration

This research has shown that, despite the assertions of Varese, generalised migration played a role in the evolution of Italian-American organised crime groups in the US, though not in a direct manner.

### General Migration

Looking at general migration, there is no evidence that established mafia groups moved en-masse with the migration waves of the late nineteenth/ early twentieth century. The data provided in this thesis suggests that the motives for the generalised migration of Southern Italians does not apply to or affect the Southern Italian mafia groups, and in some cases enhanced the mafia groups' strength in its own domain. The downturn in economic fortunes in Southern Italy, coupled with societal changes since the abolition of Feudalism, only served to further engrain mafia groups as facilitators and problem solvers. The mafia's core was a middle and upper class, whilst the issues facing Southern Italy affected primarily the lower classes. The general migration 'push' factors have little to no impact on Mafiosi, or, in some cases, encourage them to stay.

The 'pull' factors of the US for general migration present a more varied picture when applied to mafia groups. The opportunities for work do not directly apply to the already employed Mafiosi (though, as explored in the markets chapter, market opportunities do). The heavily urbanised centres that the Sicilians and Italians flocked towards were unlike the rural Sicilian and Southern Italian landscape. Dickie's simplification that 'urban America and Sicily were not widely different' (Dickie, 2007, pp. 196-197) could be applied to all places where markets and politics exist; it is the nature of those markets and politics that would determine permeability for transplanting groups.

Moreover, features which may indicate a transplanting mafia are also features of the contemporary migration process; the utilisations of 'primary' support networks, the forming together in localised communities, and the grouping up of youths into protection groups are all features of the migration process rather than an indication that a mafia group is transplanting.

At this surface level the analysis appears to support Varese's conclusions that generalised migration is not a cause in the emergence of organised crime groups (or the 'transplantation' he is examining). However, to limit the analysis of generalised migration to its mobility of people aspect underplays the impact migration has on the conditions and make-up of the local

environment, socially, politically and economically, as well as underestimating the role culture plays in the process.

The research concludes that the assimilation process helped create the conditions for, and determined the structure and operations of, emerging organised crime groups. As a result these organised crime groups show cultural similarities to the Italian mafias, despite operating in different domains.

### Legitimation of group and increased socio-economic status in Italy

Whilst it is true that mafia groups underwent a socio-economic change in 19<sup>th</sup> century and Southern Italy (Dickie, 2007) (Lupo, 2009), their elevated social standing did not encourage their mobility elsewhere but rather helped protect them from some of the elements, the “push” factors, that **may have forced** them to move. They became further ingrained in the political system and the social systems, becoming landowners and infiltrating/influencing peasant movements alike. With the exception of murder, and even then only in a few cases, these new positions largely sheltered them from law enforcement and potentially damaging political change until the 1920's.

### Legitimation of previous group in the US

Looking at the US, and the case for the ‘ethnic succession’ theory, it is important to note that whilst the Irish and Jewish migrant groups had established themselves in the years preceding the mass immigration of Italians, their organised crime groups never disappeared from their respective communities, merely diversified and specialised. The Irish and Jewish communities had ascended the social ladder somewhat by the time the Italians arrived, staking a place largely in politics for the Irish and the finance, jewellery and garment industries for the Jewish, but they still remained plagued as a community by the conditions that the migratory process had left them in. Like in the mafia organisations in Italy, the Irish and Jewish criminals’ increased social standing heightened their criminal position allowing them to further evade law enforcement efforts through manipulation of systems and corruption. What this did allow for, however, is for the Italian-American organised crime groups to take advantage of some of the now vacated crime markets.

### Porous Borders

It is easy to conclude that the final ‘pull’ factor for organised crime groups to the US exists in principle. The US borders were largely open to immigration, bar occasional attempts to limit

certain races (the Chinese in the late nineteenth century in particular) and the porousness of its borders in terms of trade, licit and illicit was significant for criminal groups that utilised trade markets. As a 'pull' factor on its own it is not enough to explain or conclude that a 'transplantation' occurred, only that the US was a suitable location for organised crime groups who needed to take advantage of markets which utilised the porosity of borders (as seen in the market chapter, the criminal activities conducted were largely localised rather than transnational).

### Migration of Mafiosi and Skilled Criminals

In looking at the cases of specific individuals there is some evidence of individuals having been involved in mafia activities in Italy, but none of these Italian Mafiosi appear to be making the journey to the US willingly. Almost all of these former-Italian mafiosi are forced to leave due to law enforcement efforts and convictions *in absentia*. These Mafiosi are not all originally from Palermo and Western Sicily (and Naples for Camorristi), but cover parts of Sicily and Southern Italy not traditionally associated with mafia activity. The Mafiosi's destination in the US also differs from the regular Italian migrant destination; instead New York seems to disproportionately feature a larger number of Mafiosi, and less frequented Italian migrant destinations also hosted Mafiosi (Kansas City for example). There was a trend among some Mafiosi between their places of origin and destination (with regards to the less usual destinations) which appeared to be based on the utilisation of mutual connections. This was particularly prominent in the re-uniting of blood relatives overseas whereby Mafiosi sought out family members on their arrival.

The data collected did show that a number of these Mafiosi arrived post-adolescence, so suggestion that their criminal careers were nurtured by growing up in the US would appear to be false. They do not appear to have migrated however as part of a concerted effort to produce an overseas outpost.

## The role of markets

This research supports the premise that market opportunities and conditions are primary motivators in the emergence of organised crime groups; in agreement with those who support the paradigms of “criminal market research” such as Varese, to the extent that they facilitate the development of such groups. However, this research also surmises that these market conditions do not create an environment that is suitable for an outpost of a foreign mafia, but rather to the sophistication of local criminal groups who are somewhat assimilated into the local environment whilst also retaining their migrant heritage. This research also suggests that market conditions are not alone in assisting the development of organised crime groups; social and political factors should not be discounted.

## Market Opportunities

The research into market opportunities explored both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors and their impact on transplantation and/or emergence of crime groups. The ‘push’ factors can be used only to explain transplantation, whereas the ‘pull’ factors can be used to explain both transplanted and home-grown organisations. The pull factors alone are not enough to explain transplantation, only opportunity for criminal groups to emerge in the US capitalist and individualist value system.

The ‘push’ factors that would influence market opportunities in Italy have been shown to be near impossible to prove or negligible. The desire to operate an overseas outpost in a foreign market and the seeking of investments somewhat difficult to prove; there is no evidence to suggest that the desire existed. Mafiosi were more receptive to local opportunities for investment. Whilst competition from criminal groups in existing markets was evident (Blok, 1975) (Dickie, 2007), it does not appear to have acted as a push factors causing individuals to migrate and pursue criminal careers.

On the other hand, the research into the ‘pull’ factors produces a case that these factors allow for the emergence of organised crime groups, though again they support the emergence of home-grown groups over transplanted organisations. The important markets available for exploitation in the US are largely occupied by pre-existing sophisticated crime groups, predominantly the Irish and Jewish groups. The markets that the newer Italian migrants exploited upon arrival were suited more to less organised more opportunistic groups, such as simple small-scale protection rackets and extortion rings. These initial small-scale market

opportunities would not be an alluring prospect to the sophisticated Sicilian and Italian groups, and willing planned transplantation is unlikely to have occurred in this case.

The demand for local protection from mafia groups was only relevant in isolated Italian communities in the US; the protection markets for these communities have high penetrability due to their relatively small size, low technology and low professionalization. The research has shown that these factors are not necessary for the existence of organised crime group; locales with higher levels of skilled workers and technology have been vulnerable to mafia groups throughout history.

Instead changes in US society and law enforcement allowed for the sophistication of US mafia groups. The reduction in police protection through reforms aimed at tackling corruption, the gradual penetration of labour unions by Italians and the increased role that influential Italians were able to play after 1910 allowed US mafia groups to expand outside of their localised ethnic-based territories. Until this point the transplanted Mafiosi had not been able to operate on the same scale with which mafia groups in Italy operated.

### Market and Local Conditions

Whilst the presence of exploitable markets is a key factor in the emergence of mafia groups in the US, it is not the only factor. The political system, at a micro-level also helped organised crime groups, as evidenced by the likes of 'Big Jim' Colosimo in Chicago. The *quid pro quo* system between the political machines and local ethnic bosses identified a system not similar to that in Italy, but one that transcended ethnic divides as power not ethnic bonds was the primary interest. For the organised crime groups, the individuals need not hold office or position in order to wield political power.

The groups primarily associated with the term 'mafia' in the US were not associated with these political crime groups prior to 1910. The examples of those associated with Morello's gang highlight that they undertook Black Hand and other simple crimes long before moving onto the more lucrative business ventures. In a common theme these early Italian-American organised crime groups were primarily concerned with undertaking crimes of which violence and threat of violence was a key theme, but they never attempted to legitimise themselves. Kidnapping, extortion, and murder were their primary activities and they had more in common with the camorra organisations of Naples as groups of classless professional criminals rather than the mafia groups found in Sicily that could be found in the upper and middle class. The nature of

these criminal organisations meant that they were often short-lived, though those with particular sets of criminal skills may later find work for more sophisticated organisations during prohibition.

The 'pull' factors such lax law enforcement, high corruption and overlap between underworld and over world actors have been shown to be conducive to organised crime, and they existed in some form in the US during this time period, but their presence alone does not prove transplantation. Rather it is the adaptations of American society that created these factors in the US.

The final 'pull' factor, high unemployment of workers, is not a prominent factor. Compared with Southern Italy unemployment was relatively low; unemployment figures were not unusually high during this period ranging between 1% and 14% in low skilled professions such as in the building, agriculture and transportation industries. When put into the context of the mass population growth in preceding years, especially into the lower classes, this relatively low unemployment figure in unskilled and low-skilled jobs highlights the availability of opportunities for work available to those travelling to the US and consequently the lack of both recruitment pool for criminal groups and opportunities for the exploitation of workers due to low recruitment rates. The data on the work of the arriving Mafiosi suggests that many were able to find work in the US and, in many cases, become business owners.

Overall, the local market conditions produced an environment suitable for incubating emerging organised crime groups, but only insofar as they were adapted structurally and operationally to it. For a transplanting mafia group this would mean a significant number of adaptations in terms of operations and structure that would make it wholly different from the Italian mafias.

### Trade opportunities and conditions

The opportunities for trade during this period are primarily limited to legal goods. The research has shown that these legal routes may be still be open to exploitation, but that it requires a criminal network that pervades the local political and administrative spheres; the ability to manipulate trade opportunities is out of reach for crime groups focussed almost entirely around violent activities.

For legal goods there exists the opportunity for goods from Italy to be trafficked primarily foodstuffs. There is evidence of mafia involvement in some of the international trade markets

in Sicily, such as the sulphur mining industry and citrus trade (Lupo, 2009, pp. 8-9), but the opportunities for those in the US was limited to the multi-ethnic groups who had developed links with the political machines and trade unions.

There was not a large market for goods to be trafficked pre-prohibition; the majority of the criminal markets were centred on local goods and services (gambling and prostitution). The small drugs market was dominated by non-Italian groups (such as the Chinese groups controlling the opium business). The lack of illegal goods to be trafficked makes the access to supply of said goods irrelevant, though it is significant to note that the positioning in the North and East of the US for many criminal groups would prove of strategic importance during the prohibition era. This highlights the need for proximity to trafficking groups for transplanting mafias involved in illegal goods trafficking, but the absence of these markets during this time period means that it has no impact on conduciveness to transplantation.

## The Operations of Mafias in the US

Looking at the operational relationship between the US mafia groups and the Italian mafia groups this research points to an imitation system that stands counterpoint to the idea that there is over-ruling control from a foreign organisation.

### Local Ties and Kinship Networks

Whilst many migrants utilised kinship and local ties upon arrival in the US, and settled in close proximity, they quickly diffused into more general Italian communities. Despite this new migrants continued to utilise these ties upon arrival in the US and they eventually contributed to the downfall of the *padrone* system. For criminals travelling to the US these kinship networks would be utilised to find opportunities for taking part in violent crime (as with the Lupo-Morello criminals), but there is little evidence of this being used by established Italian mafia groups to transplant individuals in to the US. What these local ties and kinship networks did provide is an element of familiarity within the Little Italys that could be exploited by small localised crime groups.

### Distance and Travel

The challenges associated with distance present themselves fully when dealing with the Italy-US transplantation. Preventative measures in the United States and Italy presented an extra obstacle for the transplanting Mafiosi, but that many found ways to circumvent the system. Though logistically Italy has strong links with the US through direct trade and transportation, the suitability of the US as a destination based on distance is low if compared with equally developed European states, travel and communication took several days and was an expensive process. In addition the operational factors outlined below only intensify as the distance between home and host country increases for the transplanting group.

### Operational factors for successful transplantation

These factors apply only when operating an outpost of a transplanted organisation, so they do not impact on the likelihood of an organised crime group emerging, only a transplanted one. The conclusion based on the research shows that all four of the factors would have faced difficulty and suggest transplantation of an outpost did not happen.

Regarding the ethnic groups criminal reputation, an important distinction is made in this study. Groups in the US linked themselves to their Sicilian and Italian counterparts, or at least the US media portrayals of them, in order to carry out their crimes utilising fear. But, for the large part, these links did not exist and had not existed, with few exceptions. Though the



testimonies of mafia individuals in the later parts of the twentieth century may suggest these links, this can be attributed to the continuation of the myth, perhaps unknowingly (it was possibly used as a fear tactic to keep Mafiosi in line), or to later connections that emerged post-prohibition.

The ability to collect advanced information would likely be hampered by the issues that faced all Italian migrants upon their arrival in the US; a foreign language, a foreign market, foreign cultures and customs. It would be a herculean task for an individual to undertake and for the information to be of any use. To do it they would need the help of local experts, as the migrants did when they turned to the *padroni*, but any expert with this kind of knowledge was probably already taking advantage of it.

Communication represents another stumbling block during this time period for 'transplantation' theory; the telegram was unsuitable for secret or criminal purposes due to its reliance on post-office staff, the telephone had not yet crossed the Atlantic, and letter writing and sending was a slow process. In addition communications posed a threat to discovery by law enforcement or could be presented as evidence against an individual. The use of reference letters suggested by Gentile does show that communications occurred between the US and Italy, but the logistics of it make any kind of Italian Mafia control unlikely.

The ability to monitor and control agents would have been very difficult without significant manpower and financial resources, who in turn would need to be monitored. The ability to control agents, for the logistics involved in controlling overseas agents, including the use of the previous three factors, seems impossible in terms of resources and manpower, and the effort required combined with the risks involved far outweigh the advantages to be made from transplantation. Instead control in the US mafia groups seems to be based on an imitation of Italian groups rules and rituals rather than following the exact methods used by their Italian counterparts.

## Theoretical Implication

As a conclusion, this research discounts the idea of the operation of an outpost run by a transplanted Italian organisation, and instead points more towards the emergence of new groups that adopted some of the traditions and methods similar to its Italian counterparts.

This reinterpretation of transplantation that rejects the idea of an 'outpost' and instead favours an 'influenced' form of transplantation is more consistent with recent research in organised crime studies that suggests looser, more fluid criminal networks with less identifiable leadership rather than a historic view of a large hierarchically structured organisation, at least from an international perspective.

The push and pull factors that account for generalised migration, rather than suggest that strategic transplantation of an outpost happened, point to its unlikelihood, the conditions in Italy that were causing many to migrate were the same conditions that the Italian Mafias were thriving off. Equally the conditions in the US that drew migrants in, particularly to the urbanised cities of the North and East were centred on local conditions and markets that would be unfamiliar to the Italian mafia groups— there was no agricultural prerogative for the Sicilian and Italian migrants.

The 'push' factor used in all three of Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's paradigms and in Varese's (Varese, *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, 2011, p. 27) of increased law enforcement in Italy appears in a number of individual cases such as Casio Ferro, Morello and several of the members of Morello's gang; and the law enforcement effort against them was often for murder. For the large part individuals were protected by their social and political position and connections until the arrival of Mori in the 1920's.

Though the US mafia groups feature many of the same characteristics as their Italian counterparts, many of these same characteristics may also be found in other, independently formed criminal groups globally. This stresses Cressey's notion that "diffusionism", that ideas are invented once and spread, should not be used to explain similarities between the US and Italian mafia groups (Cressey, 1969: 24-25).

The idea that groups transplanted during this time period due to market opportunities, is partially contradictory to the evidence of market opportunities that existed. Through the

primary years of Italian migration to the US, the key criminal markets available were specialised and largely occupied by other groups at this stage. To suggest that the transplantation occurred later, during prohibition, goes against the data on the mobility of the prohibition era's key mafia individuals- the majority of them either migrated between 1900 and 1920 (See appendix A) or were too young at migration to have been a part of an Italian mafia.

The local market conditions in the US were more suited to the emergence of local groups whose structure and operations were tailored to take advantage. For Italian mafias looking to transplant the local conditions would appear alien and dissimilar to the conditions found in the south of Italy.

The research into operational factors that are key to the transplantation of groups concludes that it would be logistically difficult for transplantation of an Italian organisation to occur; the distance, technology and lack of control would all produce conditions that were not suitable for the operation of an overseas outpost.

Overall, the research suggests that transplantation, in the form of an overseas outpost, was especially unlikely, and that only elements of the Italian organisation made it to the US. Instead, this thesis proposed a reemphasis on the cultural dimension of mafia phenomenon and how this relates with assimilation theories. The 'influenced transplantation' that this thesis hypothesises considers that mafia ideas and mafia can be two separate constructs, one which is freer to move with the migratory patterns of regular migrants and those with criminal histories alike. The emerging organised crime group can draw upon elements of its heritage, including religion, language, and ethnic identity to create a group suitably adapted to the new environment; these elements help the mafia group build relationships, structures, trust and develop a relationship with the migrant community if necessary.

### Limitations of the study

One limitation this study faces is the issue of trying to disprove something that might not have happened. It only shifts the burden of proof to 'transplantation' theorists to provide conclusive evidence based on fewer assumptions, rather than the creation of complex theories that fail to explain the basics of crime emergence.

A recommendation for further examination is to look at the Mafiosi fleeing Mori's campaign against the Sicilian mafia in the 1920s, and who then arrived in the US during prohibition, to determine the impact they had on the already established Americanised groups.

## Final conclusions

Looking back at the theories put forward by Varese (2011) and Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (2011) (2010), in terms of mafia mobility, as well as those put forward by Woodiwiss (2001) and Critchley (2009), that largely reject such theories of transplanting foreign entities, they only go so far as to explaining the emergence of mafia groups in the US. Whilst this research rejects the notion that an organisation was transplanted into the US to run an overseas outpost it also recognises that migration, alongside local conditions, played an important part in creating the social conditions necessary for an emerging organised crime group. It is important to note that this is not a conclusion that supports the 'alien conspiracy' theories but rather that a failure on the part of the US to improve conditions for migrants, coupled with market opportunities, facilitated the growth of organised crime in these communities.

Unlike 'alien conspiracy' theories, this research rejects the idea that ethnicity dictates the likelihood of organised crime groups, but rather that social elements grouped those of the same ethnic background together and influenced the form those groups took. It is rather the conditions that those groups found themselves in that were conducive to organised crime. This element fits in with Varese's and Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti's approaches, which focus heavily on the settings rather than the groups, but only in so far that it determines the likelihood of organised crime and not the way in which the group manifests itself.

The research recognises that factors of transplantation theories can also be used to explain the emergence of home grown groups, and to attribute them to transplantation without significant evidence of this occurring is misrepresentative. The clear conclusion is that these factors contributed to the emergence of locale specific groups heavily influenced by their local environment that encapsulates both American and Italian features.

In summary this research suggests an 'influenced transplantation' in which there is not the creation of an overseas outpost by transplanting Mafiosi, but rather they utilised skills, cultural heritage and experiences to create new groups in the US's local conditions imitating their Italian counterparts where necessary (in order to build a reputation for example) but uniquely perverting the local markets and political systems.

## Citations

- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Coloumbia University Press.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2010). *The Mobility of Criminal Groups*. Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*, . Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2001). *Organized crime and American power: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

# Bibliography

---

- U.S Congress, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, hearings 85th Congress 2nd Session 1958, 12220 (1958).
- Abadinsky, H. (2016). *Organized Crime*. Andover, UK: Cengage Learning.
- Albanese, J. (1989). *Organized Crime in America* (Second Edition ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.
- Albanese, J. (2004). North American Organized Crime. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 8-18.
- Albini, J. (1971). *American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend*.
- Albini, J. (1997). Donald Cressey's Contributions to the study of Organised Crime: An Evaluation. In *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader*. London: SAGE.
- Allerfelt, K. (2011). *Crime and the Rise of Modern America: A History from 1865-1941*. London: Routledge.
- Allum, F. (2017). *Invisible Camorra*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Arlacchi, P. (1988). *Mafia business : The Mafia ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Asbury, H. (1927). *Gangs of New York* (1988 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1933). *Gangs of San Francisco* (2004 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1936). *Gangs of New Orleans* (2004 ed.). London: Random House.
- Asbury, H. (1940). *Gangs of Chicago* (1986 ed.). London: Random House.
- Balsamo, W. (1997). *The Mafia: The First 100 Years*. London: Virgin Books.
- Barton, J. (1896, Feb 12). Counterfeit Money. *The Anderson Intelligencer*.
- Bauer, T., Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (2009). Measuring ethnic linkages among migrants. *International Journal of Manpower*, 30(1), 56-69.
- Bell, D. (1953). Crime as an American Way of Life. *The Antioch Review*, 13(2), 131-154.
- Block, A. (1978). History and the Study of Organized Crime. *Urban Life*, 6(4), 455-472.

- Blok, A. (1966). Land reform in a west Sicilian latifondo village: The persistence of a feudal structure. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 39(1), 1-16.
- Blok, A. (1975). *The Mafia Of A Sicilian Village: 1860-1960*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Bodnar, J. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban American* (First Midland Book Edition ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Boissevain, J. (1966). Patronage in Sicily. *Man*, 1(1), 18-33.
- Bonanno, J., & Lalli, S. (2003 (Originally published 1983)). *A Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. New York: St. Martins.
- Bovenkerk, F. (2000). Wanted: Mafia boss. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33(3), 225–242.
- Bovenkerk, F. (2000). "Wanted: Mafia boss" - Essay on the personology of organized crime. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33(3), 225.
- Bovenkerk, F., & Yesilgöz, Y. (2004). Crime, Ethnicity and the Multicultural Administration of Justice. In J. Ferrell, K. Hayward, W. Morrison, & M. Presdee (Eds.), *Cultural Criminology Unleashed* (pp. 81-96). London: The GlassHouse Press.
- Brettfield, K., & Wetzels, P. (2007). Religiosity and Crime: Attitudes Towards Violence and Delinquent Behaviour among Young Christians and Muslims in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 73-87). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Bryman, A. (2008 (3rd Ed)). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buonanno, P., & Pazzona, M. (2014). Migrating Mafias. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 44, 75-81.
- Buonanno, P., Durante, R., Prarolo, G., & Vanin, P. (2011). *On the historical and geographic origins of the Sicilian mafia*. Munich Personal RePEc Archive.
- Bynum, T. (1987). *Organized crime in America: Concepts and controversies*. Monsey, NY: Willow Tree Press.
- Campana, P. (2010). *A Response to "The Mobility of Crime Groups"*. Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada.
- Campana, P. (2016). Explaining criminal networks: Strategies and potential pitfalls. *Methodological Innovations*, 9, 1-10.
- Catanzaro, R. (1992). *Men of Respect*. Oxford: Free Press, Macmillan.
- Cavaioli, F. (2008). Patterns of Italian Immigration to the United States. *Catholic Social Science Review*.



- Chandler, D. (1975). *Brothers in Blood*. New York: Dutton & Co.
- Chu, Y. K. (2013). Review of Varese, F., *Mafias on the Move*. *Asian Criminology*, 8, 225-226.
- Clark, W. (2003). *Immigrants and the American Dream*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. (1960). *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Study of Delinquent Gangs*. New York: The Free Press.
- Cockrayne, J. (2016). *Hidden Power*. London: Hurst Publishers.
- Coluccello, R. (2016). *Challenging the Mafia Mystique*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Coluccello, R. (2016). *Challenging the Mafia Mystique*. London: Palgrave.
- Cressey, D. (1969). *Theft of the Nation*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers .
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Critchley, D. (2009). *The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931*, . Oxon: Routledge.
- Cutrer, A. (1900). *Le Mafia e I Mafiosi*. Palermo: Alberto Reber.
- Dainotto, R. (2015). *Mafia*. London: Reaktion Books.
- D'Amato, G. (April 1908). The "Black Hand" Myth. *The North American Review*, 187(629), 543-549.
- Dash, M. (2009). *The First Family*. New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
- De Stefano, G. (2006). *An Offer We Can't Refuse: the Mafia in the Mind of America*. New York: Faber & Faber.
- Diaspora", T. P. (2011). The Pitfalls of the "Italian Diaspora". *Italian American Review*, 1(2), 147-176.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2007). *Cosa Nostra* (2007 Edition ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Dickie, J. (2012). *Mafia Brotherhoods*. London: Sceptre.
- Dickie, J. (2014). *Mafia Republic*. London: Sceptre.
- Dimico, A., Isop, A., & Olsson, O. (2012). *Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons*. Nottingham: Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, Nottingham University.

- Dimico, A., Olsson, O., & Isopi, A. (2012, May 13). *Origins of the Sicilian Mafia*. (VOX, CEPR's Policy Portal) Retrieved January 23, 2017, from <http://voxeu.org/print/7982>
- Diner, H. R. (2001). *Hungering for America : Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Doherty, J. (1952, July 20). How Capone captured hinky dink! *Chicago Tribune*, pp. 5,13 ('Grafic' Magazine).
- Duggan, C. (1995). *A Concise History of Italy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckert, R. (2007). Culture or Conflict? Migration, Culture, Conflict and Terrorism. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 21-26). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (Eds.). (2010). *Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Volume 8 : Migration and Culture*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Europol. (2013). *Italian Organised Crime Threat Assessmnt*. The Hague: Europol.
- Evans, K., & King, D. (2006). *Studying Society - The Essentials*. London: Routledge.
- Falcone, G. (1993). *Men of honour : the truth about the Mafia*. London: Warner.
- Farrell, J. (. (1997). *Understanding the mafia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- FBI. (1999). An Overview of La Cosa Nostra. In *Organized Crime Contemporary Issues Companion*. California: Greenhaven Press.
- Feathers, B. (2017). *Mafia Membership Charts*.
- Feder, S., & Joesten, J. (1994). *The Luciano Sotry*. Boston: Da Capo Press.
- Fentress, J. (2010). *Eminent Gangsters*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America .
- Ferrell, J. (2004). Style Matters. In J. Ferrell, K. Hayward, W. Morrison, & M. Presdee (Eds.), *Cultural Criminology Unleashed* (pp. 61-63). London: The GlassHouse Press.
- Fines, J. (1988). *Reading Historical Documents*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Limited.
- Fiorentini, G. [., & Peltzman, S. (1995). *The Economics of Organised Crime*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flynn, W. (1919). *The Barrel Mystery*. New York: The James A. McCann Company.
- Fox, S. (1990). *Blood and Power*. London: Penguin.
- Freilich, J. D., & Guerette, R. T. (2006). *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.

- Gabaccia, D. R. (2000). *Italy's Many Diasporas*. London: UCL Press.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, D. (2009). *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Gauthreaux, A. G. (2014). *Italian Louisiana: History, Heritage & Tradition*. Louisiana: The History Press.
- Gentile, N. (1963). Paese Sera Interview.
- Gentile, N. (c.1947). *Translated Pre-release Transcript of 'Vito Di Capomafia'*. New York: NYPD.
- Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (2nd ed.). London: M.I.T. Press.
- Glenny, M. (2008). *McMafia*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Goff, J. W. (1893, May 22). Mafia's Lawless Practices. *New York Times*.
- Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Graebner Anderson, A. (1979). *The Business of Organized Crime: A Cosa Nostra Family*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.
- Hess, H. (1973). *Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin Power and Myth* (1998 ed.). London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1965). *Primitive Rebels*. London: WW Norton and Company.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1969). *Bandits*. London: The Trinity Press.
- Hortis, A. (2014). *The Mob and the City: The Hidden History of How the Mafia Captured New York*. New York: Prometheus Books .
- Ianni, F. (1972). *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Ianni, F. (1974). *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kantowicz, E. R. (1994). The Changing Face of Ethnic Politics: From Political Machine to Community Organization. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States* (pp. 179-195). London: Garland Publishing.
- Kefauver, E. (1951). *Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Committee)*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.

- Kessner, T. (1977). *The Golden Door*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Krist, G. (2014). *Empire of Sin: Sex, Jazz and Murder in New Orleans 2014*, . Stroud, Gloucester: Amberley publishing.
- Lavorgna, A., Lombardo, R., & Sergi, A. (2013). Organized crime in three regions: comparing the Veneto, Liverpool and Chicago. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16, 265-285.
- Lawrence, C. N. (2011). Spatial mobility and organised crime. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 161-164.
- Lewis, N. (1973). *The honoured society : the Mafia conspiracy observed*. Bath: Chivers.
- Liddick, D. (1999). *An empirical, theoretical, and historical overview of organized crime*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Liddick, D. (1999). *The Mob's Daily Number*. Oxford: The University of America Press.
- Light, I. (2010). The Ethnic Vice Industry, 1880-1944. In F. Varese (Ed.), *Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology* (pp. 282-304). Abingdon, Ox: Routledge.
- Lombardo, R. (2010). *The Black Hand: Terror by Letter in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Lombardo, R. M. (2013). *Organized Crime in Chicago: Beyond The Mafia*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Lumley, R., & Morris, J. (Eds.). (1997). *The New History of the Italian South*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Lupo, S. (2009). *History of the Mafia*. Chichester, West Sussex: Coloumbia University Press.
- Lupo, S. (2015). *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History 1888-2008*.
- Lupsha, P. (1981). Individual Choice, Material Culture and Organized Crime. *Criminology*, 19(1), 3-24.
- Lupsha, P. (1982). Individual choice, Material Culture and Organized Crime. *Criminology*, 3(19), 3-24.
- Lyle, J. H. (1960, Nov 13). Big Jim Colosimo: Early Overlord of Chicago Crime. *Chicago Tribune*, pp. Part 1- Page 49.
- Maas, P. (1969). *The Valachi Papers*. New York: Bantam.
- Mack Smith, D. (1959). *Italy: A Modern History*. Michigan, US: University of Michigan.
- Mack Smith, D. (1968). *A History of Sicily: Modern Sicily after 1713*. Oxford: Alden & Mowbray Ltd.

- Macry, P. (1997). The Southern Metropolis. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 59-82). Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
- Maran, A. (2008). *Mafia: Inside the Dark Heart*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.
- Marion, N. (2008). *Government Versus Organized Crime*. New Jersey: Pearson.
- McDowell, W. (2002). *Historical Research: A Guide*. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- Merlino, R. (2014). Sicilian Mafia, Patron Saints, and Religious Processions: The Consistent Face of an Ever-Changing Criminal Organization. *California Italian Studies*, 5(1).
- Messick, H. (1979). *Of Grass and Snow: The Secret Criminal Elite*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Trade.
- Messick, H., & Goldblatt, B. (1972). *The Mobs and the Mafia*. New York: Gallahad Books.
- Mignolo, W. D. (2000). *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press.
- Mitchell, B. (1995). International History Statistics, Europe 1750-1988 (New York, 1992). In C. Duggan, *A Consise History of Italy* (p. 148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univeristy Press.
- Moehling, C., & Piehl, A. M. (2009). Immigration, Crime, and Incarceration in Early Twentieth-Century America. *Demography*, 46(4), 739-763. Retrieved from Available From: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2831353/>
- Monkkonen, E. H. (1988). *America Becomes Urban: The Development of US Cities & Towns 1780-1980*. London: University of California Press.
- Monnier, M. (n.d.). *La camorra: notizie storiche raccolte e documentate*. Retrieved January 23, 2017, from [http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/\\_PP.HTM](http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA3395/_PP.HTM)
- Morris, N., & Hawkins, G. (1970). *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Morselli, C. (2003). Career opportunities and network-based privileges in the Cosa Nostra. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 39(4), 383-418.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2010). *The Mobility of Criminal Groups*. Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada.
- Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 165-188.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970). *The Italians in Chicago 1880-1930: A Study in Ethnic Mobility*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1970b, Dec 7). 'Mafia' - A Term Bred of Contempt and Fear. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 13.

- Nelli, H. S. (1976). *Business of Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nelli, H. S. (1983). *From Immigrants to Ethnic: The Italian Americans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newton, M. (2012). *The Mafia at Apalachin, 1957*. North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc.
- Nicaso, L. (1995).
- Nickles, D. P. (2003). *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy*. London: Harvard University Press.
- O'Kane, J. (1993). *The Crooked Ladder*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Paoli, L. (2003). *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Paoli, L. (2005). Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises. In M. Galeotti (Ed.), *Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime* (pp. 19-31). New York: Routledge.
- Park, R. E., & Miller, H. A. (1921). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. London: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/oldworldtraitstr00parkuoft>
- Peterson, V. (1983). *The Mob*. Illinois, US: Green Hill Publishers.
- Petrusewitz, M. (1997). The Demise of the Latifondo. In R. Lumley, & J. Morris (Eds.), *The New History of the Italian South* (pp. 20-41). Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press.
- Pfeiffer, C., Kleimann, M., & Windzio, M. (2006). Media, Evil and Society: Media Use and its Impacts on Crime Perception, Sentencing Attitudes and Crime Policy in Germany. In J. D. Freilich, & R. T. Guerette (Eds.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 109-132). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group.
- Pitkin, J. (1980). *Black Hand*, . US: Littlefield.
- Potter, G. (1994). *Criminal Organizations; Vice, Racketeering and Politics in an American City*. Illinois: Waveland Press.
- Powell, G. H. (1909). *Italian lemons and their by-products*. (Vol. 160). Washington: Bulletin (United States. Bureau of Plant Industry).
- Presnell, J. (2007). *The Information Literate Historian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raab, S. (2005). *Five Families*. New York: Griffin.
- Reich, K. (2006). Immigration and juvenile delinquency in Germany. In J. D. Freilich (Ed.), *Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 89-103). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

- Reimers, D. M. (1998). *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration*. Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia Univeristy Press.
- Reiss, A. J., & Tonry, M. (Eds.). (1986). *Communities and Crime*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Repetto, T. (2004). *American Mafia*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.
- Reuter, P. (1983). *Disorganized Crime*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Romano, A. (1910). *Italian Americans in Law Enforcement – Romano – 45*. Bloomington, IN, US: Xlibris, Corp.
- Ruth, D. (1996). *Inventing the Public Enemy: The Gangster in American Cluture, 1918-1934*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Salvaterra, D. (1994). Becoming American: Assimilation, Pluralism and Ethnic Identity. In T. Walsh (Ed.), *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Santino, U. (2015). *Mafia and antimafia : a brief history*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Santoro, M. (2011). Introduction. The Mafia and the Sociological Imagination. *Sociologica*, 2.
- Sapsford, R. [., & Jupp, V. [.] (2006: 2nd Ed). *Data Collection and Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Searle, C. (2012). *Researching Society and Culture* (3rd ed.). London: Sage.
- Selvaggi, G. (1978). *The Rise of the Mafia in New York*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Short, M. (2003). *Murder, Inc*. London: John Blake Publishing.
- Silverstone, D. (2011). A response to: Morselli, C., Turcotte, M. and Tenti, V. (2010) The Mobility of Criminal Groups. *Global Crime*, 12(3), 189-206.
- Smith, D. (1975). *The Mafia Mystique*, Hutchinson & Co. London: Hutchinson & Co.
- Smith, D. (1976). Mafia: the prototypical alien conspiracy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 423(1), 75-88.
- Smith, D. C. (2016). The Alien Conspiracy Theory:. *The European Review of Organised Crime*, 3(1), 50-77.
- Steinberg, S. (2001). *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America* (3rd ed.). Boston, US: Beacon Press.
- Sterling, C. (1990). *Octopus*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Tessitore, G. (1997). *Il nome e la cosa: quando la mafia non si chiamava mafia*. Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli.

- Tosh, J. (1999 (3rd Ed)). *The Pursuit of History*. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- Ubah, C. (2007). Immigrants' Experiences In America: Toward Understanding Organized Crime. *African Journal of Criminology & Justice Studies*, 3(1), 95-118.
- Varese, F. (2010). What is Organized Crime? In *Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology* (Vol. 1, pp. 1-35). Routledge.
- Varese, F. (2011). *Mafias on the Move; How Organised Crime Conquers New Territories*. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Walsh, T. (Ed.). (1994). *Immigrant America: European Ethnicity in the United States*. London: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Walters, G. (2002). *Criminal Belief Systems: An Intergrated-Interactive Theory of Lifestlyes*. London: Praeger.
- Ward, D. (1989). *Poverty, Ethnicity, and The American City, 1840-1925*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watts, M. J. (2016). The mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860–1960; a study of violent peasant entrepreneurs, by Anton Blok. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 43(1), 67-91.
- Wendt, L. (1941, Aug 17). How Labor is Hijacked. *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, p. 2 (Graphic Section).
- White, F. M. (1908, April 5). The Black Hand. *New York Times*.
- White, F. M. (1910d, Sept 4). Italians Seek Protection Against Black Hand. *New York Times*, p. Magazine 5.
- White, F. M. (1913). The Black Hand in Control in Italian New York. *The Outlook*, 857-865.
- Wood, P. (1953, October 17). Potson Tells Profit in Levee Area at Trial. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 3.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2001). *Organized crime and American power: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Woodiwiss, M. (2005). *Gangster Capitalism*. London: Constable.



## Newspapers

Adirondack News - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn87070345/>

Brooklyn Daily Eagle - <http://fultonhistory.com>

Burlington Weekly Free Press - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86072143/>

Canton Commercial Advertiser - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84031981/>

Chateaugay Journal - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn84035853/>

Chicago Tribune/ Chicago Sunday Tribune - <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/>

Cornell Daily Sun - <http://cdsun.library.cornell.edu/>

The Day Book (Chicago) - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045487/>

The Daily Standard Union - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn93062965/>

Elizabethtown Post - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn87070340/issues/>

Essex County Republican - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn84031741/>

The Evening World - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030193/>

The Free Press, Gouverneur - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn92061434/>

Fort Covington Sun - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org>

Hammond Advertiser - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn84035822/>

Kansas City Journal - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86063615/>

Malone Franklin Gazette - [http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/titles/places/new\\_york/franklin/](http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/titles/places/new_york/franklin/)

Malone Farmer - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn84031968/>

Malone Palladium - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn83031566/>

The Morning Star and Catholic messenger -  
<http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86086284/>

New York Herald - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/>

New York Daily Times - <http://search.ancestry.com/search/db.aspx?dbid=6186>

New York Times - <https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/>

New York Tribune - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030214/>

Northern Tribune - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85026455/>

The Outlook - <http://www.unz.org>

Plattsburgh Daily Press – <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn84031094/>

Plattsburgh Republican – <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/>

Plattsburgh Sentinel – <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn88075736/>

Pittsburgh Daily Post – <http://archives.post-gazette.com>

The Press (New York)

Salt Lake Herald - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85058130/>

The Sun - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/>

Ticonderoga Sentinel - <http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn93063544/>

Western Australian - <https://archive.thewest.com.au/>

Vermont Watchman - <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84023200/>

# Appendices

---

## Appendix A – table of Mafiosi

Surname	First Name (Alternate name)	From	Born	Year of emigration	Approx age at emigration	Based	Legitimate Job (s)	Pre-1920 Criminal activity	Organisation/ Affiliation
Adamo	Pasquale	Naples	1864	Approx 1897	33	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Record in Italy - 9 convictions and 5 year prison sentence (theft, assault, outrages), Murder suspect (1898)	Camorra group (Gallucci)
Agello	Giuseppe	Palermo	Possibly 1862	Possibly 1893	31	Brooklyn			
Agnello	Joseph	Palermo				New Orleans		Killed J. Banano and P. Allucho (1869)[Killed in 1872]	<i>Palermitani</i>
Agnello	Raffaele	Palermo	c.1829	c.1860	31	New Orleans		[Killed in 1869]	<i>Palermitani</i>
Aiello	Isidoro	Bagheria, Palermo	1874	1902	28	Milwaukee			
Aita	Francesco	Palermo	1878	1894	16	NYC			
Alberti	Francesco	Castelbuono, Sicily	1888	1902	14	Manhattan, NYC			D'Aquila group, J. Biondo and S. Armone
Allucho	Pedro	Messina				New Orleans			<i>Innocenti</i>
Altieri	Alberto	Naples	1890	Unknown		Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Amato	Vincenzo	Palermo				NYC			
Amato	Joseph	Possibly Caltanissetta	1883	1908	25				
Amodeo	Diego	Palermo	1893	1905	12	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC	Butcher (WW1)		
Anastasio	Umberto ('Albert Anastasia')	Tropea/Catanzaro, Calabria	1902	1917	15		Longshoreman	Accused of 1921 murder, First arrest in 1922	
Anselmo	Albero	Palermo	1856			Brooklyn			
Arcuri	Domenico	Allesandria Della Rocca, Agrigento, Sicily	1886	1906	20	Tampa			
Armone	Stefano	Palermo	1899	1906	7	Manhattan, NYC		1916 with Petty Larceny, Assault + 1918 Battery	Biondo group
Bacino	Philip	Ribera, Agrigento	1902	1923	21				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Balsamo	Battista	Palermo	1868	1897	29	Brooklyn			
Balsamo	Giuseppe	Terrasini/Palermo	1871	1895/97	25	Brooklyn	Fishmongers,		Mangano

							Union Street market		
Banano	Joseph	Messina							<i>Innocenti</i>
Barba	Litero	Messina				New Orleans			<i>Innocenti</i>
Bettini	Candelara	Messina	1839	1860/1897	21	Brooklyn		Counterfeiting (1896)	
Biondo	Giuseppe	Barcellona, Messina, Sicily	1897	1898	1			Narcotics 1919 (with Umberto Valenti)	D'Acquila Group, U. Valenti, C. Gambino, N. Gentile, S. Armone
Boiardo	Ruggerio	Naples	1890	1901	11	Chicago/ New Jersey		Manslaughter, Assault (1914)	
Bonanno	Salvatore	Castellammare Del Golfo	1879	1908	29	Brooklyn			
Bonasera	Cassandro (Anthony)	Vallelunga, Caltanissetta	1897	1906	9	Brooklyn		Robbery, Extortion, Burglary, Larceny, Assault, Concealed weapon (from 1916)	
Bonassi	Salvatore	Palermo				NYC			
Bono	Salvatore	Palermo	1868	1898	30	NYC	[If same person as John Bono ran Wholesale wine dealer in Lupo network]		
Bonventre	Giuseppe	Castellammare Del Golfo	1881	1906	24	Brooklyn	Baker	Arrested for Murder (1908)	P & V. ( 1891) Bonventre (Brothers)
Bonventre	Pietro	Castellammare Del Golfo	1887	1905	18	Brooklyn	Barbers, Baker		G & V (1891). Bonventre (Brothers)
Bonventre	Vito	Castellammare Del Golfo	1891	1906	15	Brooklyn	Bakery	Arrested for Murder (1908)	P & G. Bonventre (Brothers)
Bonventre	Vito	Castellammare Del Golfo	1875	1906	30	Brooklyn	Bakery		
Boscarino	Giuseppe	Corleone	1850	1890	40	NYC		Guilty of counterfeiting (1910)	Lupo/Morello gang
Bova	Rafael							Murder (1913)	Societa Camorra de Lucre
Brancato	Salvatore	Palermo	1871	1908	37	NYC			
Brodno	Angelo	Caltanissetta	1878	1908	30	Milwaukee			
Buccellato	Vito	Castellammare Del	1876	1903	27	NYC			

		Golfo							
Buccellato	Felice	Castellammare Del Golfo	1880	1904	24				
Buccellato	Salvatore	Castellammare Del Golfo	1889	1906	17				
Bueta	Edwardo								Societa Camorra de Lucre
Bufalino	Calogero (Charles)	Montedoro, Caltanissetta	1878	Possibly 1903/1904	25	Pennsylvania		Black hand extortion of mine workers (1907)	
Buffa	Gaetano	Partinico, Sicily	1887	1909	22	St. Louis			
Calderone	Salvatore	Termini Imerese, Palermo	1858	1885	27	Pittsburgh			
Cammarata	Emanuel	Villabate	1903	Unknown					1928 Cleveland Meeting
Cancemi	Michaele						Bookbinder	Killed patrolman (1857)	
Cannizzaro	Giuseppe	Palermo	1881	1900	19	NYC			
Cantelupo	Emilio	Salerno, campania	1896	1913	17	Detroit/Brooklyn			
Capone	Al					New York, later Chicago (1920)		Petty wharf thief	Torrio and Colosimo
Caradonna	Vito	Castellammare Del Golfo	1888	1908	20	Brooklyn		Murder (1913)	
Carlisi	Charles	Palermo				NYC			
Carlisi	Giuseppe	Palermo				NYC			
Carollo	Antonio	Gela, Caltanissetta	1880	1910	30	Kansas			
Carollo	Giovanni	Castellammare Del Golfo	1880	1906	26	Brooklyn, NYC			
Cascio Ferro	Vito	Bisacquino, Palermo	1862	1901	39	NYC, New Orleans	Paper mill worker (possibly an alibi), Lemon importer	Counterfeiting	Morello-Lupo/ Terranova group
Castellano	Bartolo	Palermo	1897	1910	13	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC			Cousin of F. Castellano
Castellano	Giuseppe	Palermo	1878	1907	29	Harlem	Butcher (1930 census)		Brother of B. Castellano, Cousin of F. Castellano
Castellano	Francesco		1895	1915	20				Related (cousin) of B & G. Castellano
Castelli	Giuseppe	Palermo		1907		NYC			
Castiglia	Francesco	Lauropoli, Calabria	1891	1895	4	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Grand larceny (1908, 1912 and 1919),	

								concealed weapon (1915)	
Catania	Giuseppe (possibly also known as 'George' and 'Morelli')	Bagheria	1862	1887	25	Brooklyn, NYC	Grocer, possibly a labourer (George Catania, 1910)	Counterfeiting [Killed in 1902]	Morello-Lupo group
Catanzaro	Salvatore	Termini Imerese, Palermo	1882	1902	20	Pittsburgh			
Catanzaro	Vincenzo	Termini Imerese, Palermo	1878	1894	16	Pittsburgh			
Cecala	Antonio	Corleone	1875	1889	14	NYC	Grocery business Lupo Network)	Insurance fraud, arson, Counterfeiting (1910)	Morello/Terranova group
Chiapetta	Vincenzo	Poggioreale, Trapani	1886	1905	19	New Orleans/kansas City		Black hand extortion (1908 and 1911)	
Chiaromonte	Michele	Palermo	Possibly 1821	1848 and possibly 1871	27	NYC		Counterfeiting (1869) and Arson (1872)	
Chiri	Salvatore	Palermo, Sicily	1888	1908	20	Manhattan, NYC	Butcher		
Chirico	Salvatore	Palermo	1888	1908	20	New Jersey			
Cina	Salvatore	Santo Stefano Quisquina	1886	1895	9	NYC/Tampa		Counterfeiting (1910)	Morello-Lupo group
Cincotta	Antonio	Palermo	1868	1890	22	Brooklyn			G.Cincotta (Brother)
Cincotta	Giuseppe	Palermo	1870	Possibly 1881	11	Brooklyn			A.Cincotta (Brother)
Cinquemani	Giovanni	Palermo	1885	1907	22	NYC			
Cirincione	John (Giovanni)	Possibly Grotte, Agrigento	1879	Possibly 1909	30	Kansas City			
Clemente	Frank	Carvinara, Calabria	1887	1906	19	Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Clemente	Salvatore	Corleone	1863	1890	27	NYC		Counterfeiting (1902), Also arrested 1895 and 1910	Morello Lupo group
Colosimo	Giacomo (Jim)	Cosenza, Calabria	1875	1895	20	Chicago	Street sweepers union/ Precinct captain/ Café owner(1910)	Brothels	
Coniglio	Michele	Corleone	1870	1892	22	NYC			
Consagra	Calogero	Montedoro, Caltanissetta	1870	1903	33	Pennsylvania			

Constantino	Carlo	Partinco	1874	1903	29	NYC	Grocery store (Lupo network), 'Roma Construction Company'	Bankruptcy fraud, arrested in connection with Petrosino murder in Sicily	Lupo/Morello group, Ran construction company with Antonino Passananti
Conti	Gregorio	Comitini, Agrigento	1874	1907	33	Pittsburgh			
Coppola	Michael	Fricana, Salerno, Campania	1900	1900	0	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Criminal record from 1914	
Corbi	Pasquale	Catanzaro, Calabria	1895	1899	4			Black Hand crimes	
Cordado	Carmello	San Cataldo, Sicily	1878	1909	29	NYC			S.Cordado (Brother)
Cordado	Silvestro	San Cataldo, Sicily	Unknown	Unknown (a Silvestro Cordado, born ~1887, entered the US via Texas from Mexico in 1911, had previously entered in 1905 but may not be same person)		NYC			C.Cordado (Brother)
Costa	Salvatore	Castellammare di Stabia, Naples	1893	Unknown		Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Crisalli	Vincenzo	Gallico, Calabria	1889	1905	16	Brooklyn			Mangano group, Anastasia group
Crocevera	Isodoro	Palermo	1873			Brooklyn/ Buffalo	Foreman (WW1 registration 1918)		
Cucchiara	Frank	Salemi	1895	Before 1915		Boston	[Cheese company owner in 1938]	Assault and Battery arrest - discharged (1915)	
Culmo	Angelo	Caltanissetta, Sicily	1897				Plasterer		
Curatola	Antonio	Castellammare Del Golfo	1878	1903	25	Brooklyn			
Curto	Salvatore	Canicatti, Sicily	1889	1913	24	Manhattan, NYC			
Cusumano	Giuseppe	Comitini, Agrigento	1881	1907	28	Pittsburgh			
Cusumano	Calogero	Castrofilippo, Agrigento	1879	1891	12	NYC			
Cusumano	Salvatore	Castrofilippo,	1870	1905	35	NYC			



		Agrigento							
D'Acquisto	Salvatore	Palermo	1897	1914	17		Sailor, Longshoreman		
D'Andrea	Antonio	Valledolmo, Caltanissetta	1872	1895	25	Buffalo/Chicago	Owned pasta factory, Unions (after 1914), stood for election in 1914,1916 and 1918	Counterfeiting (1902), Carrying gun (1916)	Morello/Cascio Ferro groups, Esposito, Colosimo, Unione Siciliana
D'Andrea	Joseph	Pizzone, Molise	1873	1887	14	Chicago	Hod Carrier union head (1911)	Acquitted of murder (1902)	Colosimo group, Esposito, Antonio D'Andrea (associated but not related)
D'Aquila	Salvatore 'Toto'	Palermo, Sicily	1873 or 1877	1906	29	East Harlem & Brooklyn		Arrested in 1906 and 1910	Morello Group, Ignazio Lupo, own group (1910 onwards)
D'Argenio	Edward	Avellino, Naples						1917- Burglary, Extortion, Grand Larceny, Impersonation and Narcotics Trafficking	
D'Auria	Pasquale	Castellammare Del Golfo	1890	1906	16			Murder, manslaughter, extortion, gun possession, assault (from 1912)	
D'Angelo	Francesco					Manhattan, NYC		Murder of V Gallucci (1899)	
Daniello	Ralph	Pagani, Campania	1886	1907	21	Brooklyn		Extortion, Murder (admitted in testimonies)	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
D'Aquila	Salvatore	Palermo	1873	1906	33	East Harlem, NYC/ Brooklyn			Morello Family, own family (1910 onwards)
DeBenedetto	Antonio	Castellammare Del Golfo	1874	1903	29	Brooklyn			
Deleo	Calogero	Porta Empedolce, Agrigento	1883			Manhattan			D'Aquila group, Gentile, Lo Cicero
DeMarco	Guiseppe (Joseph)		1885			Harlem, NY	Restaurant	Murder, Plans to	Morello- Lupo

							(1915)	murder and kidnap (1912), Attempted to kill N. Terranova (1913), Gambling rooms	group before tryign to kill N. Terranova [1916 - Killed by Brooklyn camorra in alliance with Morello group]
DeMayo	Francesco	Naples	1885	1889	4	Kansas City			
Desidero	Ernesto	Angri, Campania	1885	1915	30	Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
DeSimone	Rosario	Salaparuta, Trapani	1873	1906	33	Los Angeles/Colorado			
DiBella	Salvatore	Palermo	1878	1899	21	Brooklyn	Dock foreman		
DiCarlo	Samuel	Vallelunga, Campania	1904	1906	2	Buffalo			1928 Cleveland Meeting
DiCarlo	Giuseppe (Joesph Peter)	Vallelunga, Campania	1873	1905	32	Manhattan/Brooklyn/Buffalo	Food import/Grocery		Possibly Morello gang
DiCarlo	Giovanni	Corleone	1887	1905	18	Manhattan, NYC	Plasterer		
Diecidue	Alfonso	Cianciana	1873	1901	28	Tampa			
DiFilippi	Giovanni	Castellammare Del Golfo	1889	1906	17				
DiGaetano	Sebastiano	Castellammare Del Golfo	1866	1898	32	Brooklyn	Barbers, Pool hall		
DiGiovanni	Giuseppe (Joseph)	Chiusa Sclafani, Palermo	1888	1903	15	Kansas City		Black hand extortion (1915)	Paolo and Pietro DiGiovanni (brothesr)
DiGiovanni	Paolo	Chiusa Sclafani, Palermo	1875	1906	31	Kansas City			Giuseppe and Pietro DiGiovanni (brothesr))
DiGiovanni	Pietro	Chiusa Sclafani, Palermo	1886	1903	17	Kansas City			Giuseppe and Paolo DiGiovanni (brothesr))
DiGregorio	Bartolomeo	Castellammare Del Golfo	1884	1905	21	Brooklyn/ Philidelphia			
DiLeonardo	Vincenzo	Palermo	1880	Possibly 1896	16	Brooklyn	Possibly a salesman in 1920 census and unemployed on 1942 WW2 registration		
DiMartino	Giocchino	Palermo	1871	Possibly 1903		Brooklyn			

				though not permanently					
Dimino	Accursio	Sciacca, Sicily	1885	1900	15	Harlem			U. Valenti, D'Aquila group
Dio Guardi	Giovanni	Baucina, Sicily	1884	1906	22	NYC			
DiPalermo	Sebastiano	Corleone	1866	1886	20	NYC			
DiPriemo (Possibly DePrimo)	Giuseppe	Lercara Friddi, Palermo	1880	1902	22	NYC	[Possibly a treasurer (1911 city directory)]	If DiPrimo then involved with Morellos counterfeiting and deported in 1909 after prison spell.	
Dispenza	Rosario	Ciminna, Palermo	1869	1899	30	Chicago			Morello group
Ditta	Antonio	Vita, Trapani	1875	1903	28				
Domingo	Antonio	Castellammare Del Golfo	1881	1886	5	NYC			
Dongarra	Rosario	Gangi, Sicily	1896	1906	10	Manhattan			
Donnici	Angelo	Possibly Piane Crati, Calabria	1875	1900	25	Kansas City			
Dragna	Ignazio (Jack Igantius/Charles)	Corleone	1891	1898-1908, 1914	7	Brooklyn (youth), Manhattan/Bronx (1914), California (1915)		Baff Murder 1914, Black Hand Extortion in 1915	Reina group
Enea	Pasquale	Palermo	1868	1901	33	NYC			
Esposito	Guiseppe ('Vincenzo Rebello')		1843	1879	36	New Orleans		Arrested for murder, attempted murder and robbery (1881)	
Esposito	Guiseppe ('Joseph')	Acerra	1872			Chicago			
Esposito	Alberto ('Lefty')	Avellino, Naples	1891	'1905'	14	Brooklyn		Extortion, Perjury (1916)	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Fanara	Giuseppe	Carini	1876	1903	27	NYC			
Fasone	Salvatore	Possibly Termini Imerese, Palermo	1877	1894	17	Kansas City			
Favaro	Giuseppe	Sicily						Barrel murder suspect (1903)	Morello-Lupo group
Ferrantelli	Antony	Burgio, Agrigento	1876	1903	27	Kansas City			M & P. Ferrantelli (Brothers)
Ferrantelli	Michael	Burgio, Agrigento	1867	1913	46	Kansas City			A & P. Ferrantelli (Brothers)
Ferrantelli	Paul	Burgio, Agrigento	1878	1900	22	Kansas City			A & M. Ferrantelli (Brothers)
Fetto	Giovanni	Cusano Mutri,	1886	1910, 1913	14, 17	Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy

		Campania							Street Camorra
Fevrola	Frank	Avellino, Naples	1886	'1901'	15	Brooklyn		Extortion, Murder of J. Nazarro (1917), manslaughter of N. Terranova (1918)	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Finazzo	Giovanni Battista	Palermo	Ca. 1879	1903	24	Brooklyn	Labourer (occupation on arrival)		
Flaccomio	Antonio	Palermo	1864			Brooklyn			
Florada	Joseph	Messina				New Orleans		Gunman (killed R. Agnello in 1869)	<i>Innocenti</i>
Fontana	Giuseppe	Villabate	1860	1905	45	NYC	(Lemon trader and estate manager in Sicily), Lemon trader in 1905	Accused of Notarbartolo murder in Palermo (1895)	Morello-Lupo group
Fresina (Frisina)	Carmello	Castiglione, Catania	1892	1909	17	NYC/ St. Louis	Fruit and veg pushcart vendor, olive Oil dealer		
Frisella	Paolo	Corleone	1846	1883	37	NYC	Labourer (1932 naturalization record)		
Gagliano	Angelo	Corleone	1878	1899	21	Manhattan, NYC	Plasterer, Saloon, Laundry Business	Murder (Baff murder 1914- arrest 1916)	Morello group
Gagliano	Tommaso	Corleone	1875	1905	30	NYC			
Gagliano	Vincenzo	Corleone	1875	1899	24	NYC			
Galante	Gaspere	Castellammare Del Golfo	1882	1904	22	Manhattan, NYC		Arrested for murder (1904)	
Galante	Mariano	Castellammare Del Golfo	1883	1905	22	Manhattan, NYC			
Galante	Vincenzo	Castellammare Del Golfo	1879	1907	28	NYC			
Gallo	Benedetto	Santa Ninfa, Trapani	1888	1905	17	Brooklyn, NYC		Gun possession (1908 and 1915)	
Gallucci	Giosue	Naples	1865	1891/1892 (1896 according to police report)	27	Little Italy, Harlem, Manhattan, NYC	Bakery (restaurant), Coffee house, Saloons, Real	Criminal record in Italy - 9 convictions (blackmail, theft, criminal association)	Camorra group

							estate	and violent crimes), Murder arrest(1898), Lottery, Gambling houses, Prostitution houses, Extortion, Arrested during gambling round up (1913)	
Gallucci	Vincenzo	Naples		1891 (1897 according to police report)		Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Criminal record in Italy 16 convictions, 2 prison terms (blackmail, criminal association, rape, attempted murder and violent crimes). [Killed in 1899]	Gallucci brothers. Camorra group
Gallucci	Francesco	Naples	Approx 1849	Before 1898		Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Criminal record in Italy - 6 convictions (blackmail, criminal association, theft, attempted murder, carrying dangerous weapons, and violent crimes)	Gallucci brothers. Camorra group
Gallucci	Genario (Genero)	Naples	1857 or 1867	1908	41	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Killed two men in Palermo, Escaped prison and fled to US, Blackmail, carrying concealed weapon [Killed in 1909]	Gallucci brothers. Camorra group
Galluccio	Francesco	Naples	1989	1901	2	Brooklyn		Assault (1915 and 1919), Narcotics (1919)	
Gambino	Andrea	Palermo	1878	Possibly 1901/1902	23	Brooklyn	Possibly carpenter upon arrival		
Ganci	Antonio	Palermo	1871	Possibly 1906	35		Possibly labourer upon arrival		
Garofalo	Frank	Castellammare Del Golfo	1891	1910	19	NYC			
Genaro	John	Corelone	1889	1895	6	Dallas, Texas			M. Genaro (Father)

Genaro	Michael Angelo	Corelone	1857	1895	38	Dallas, Texas			J. Genaro (Son)
Genova (Matesi)	Francesco	Sicily	1860s			New Orleans	Italian Paste shop	Lamana kidnapping (1907)	
Genova	Antonio	Sicily				NYC		Barrel murder suspect (1903)	Morello-Lupo group
Genovese	Vito	Naples	1897	1912	15	Queens/ Manhattan, NYC		Gun possession (1917)	
Gentile	Nicola	Siculiana, Agrigento, Sicily	1884	1903	19	Manhattan/ Philadelphia/ Pittsburgh	Railroad Tracks in Kansas	Selling fake linen	Philadelphia 'family' (1905)
Giacona	Corrado	Bocca di Falco, Palermo	1875	1893	18	New Orleans			P. Giacona (Father)
Giacona	Pietro	Bocca di Falco, Palermo	1848	1875	27	New Orleans	Wine merchant		C. Giacona (Son)
Giallo	Vito	Castellammare Del Golfo	1887	1911	24	Brooklyn		Arrest for murder (1919)	
Giallombardo	Giuseppe	Belmonte Mezzagno, Palermo, Sicily	1872	1902	30	NYC			
Giambrone	Domenico	Palazzo Adriano, Palermo	1876	1903	27	New Orleans/ Birmingham, Alabama/ St. Louis	Saloon, Fruit business	Murder suspect (1912), Murder (1916)	
Giannola	Vito	Balestrate, Palermo	1893	1910	17	Detroit/ St. Louis	Railway worker, Butcher shop		
Giglio	Vincenzo	Bivona, Agrigento, Sicily	1880			NYC/Tampa			
Giordano	Angelo	Avellino, Campania	1879	1890	11	Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Giordano	Biagio	Gallico, Calabria	1879	1898	19	Brooklyn		Blackhander (1903)	
Giustra	Giovanni	Catona, Calabria	1898	1913	15	Brooklyn			
Governale	Antonio	Camporeale	1851	1889	38	Brooklyn			
Greco	Ippolito	Corleone	1878	1905	27	Harlem, NYC		Involved in Baff murder	
Grippi	Salvatore	Partinico	1877	1904	27	Brooklyn			Schiro group
Grisafi	Calogero	Caltabelotta, Sicily	1885	1904	19				D'Aquila group
Guardalabene	Angelo	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1890	1902	12	Milwaukee			Guardalabene – V (Father) & G (Brother)
Guardalabene	Giovanni	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1881	1900	19	Milwaukee			Guardalabene – V (Father) & A (Brother)
Guardalabene	Vito	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1845	1903	58	Milwaukee	Barber shop	Murder (1910 and 1913)	A & G Guardalabene (Sons), I . Aillo

									(Brother in law)
Guglielmini	Salvatore	Cefalu, Sicily	1883	1906	23	Brooklyn/Baltimore			
Inzerillo	Pietro	Marineo	1858	1890	32	NYC			
Italiano	Ignazio	Santo Stefano Quisquina, Sicily	1860	1888/1903	28	Tampa	Grocery		Profaci, 1928 Cleveland Meeting
LaBarba	Carlo	Campofelice di Rocella, Palermo	1878	1907	29	Dallas, Texas			
LaDuca (LaDua)	Vito	Carini, Palermo	Possibly 1868	1902	34	NYC	Butcher shop (1903 newspaper articles), Lemon importing business	Arrested in connection with barrel murder (1903), Arrested on suspicion of kidnapping Mannino (1904)	Morello group
Lagattuta	Angelo	Mezzojuso, Palermo	1875	1900	25	NYC			
Lamanna	Angelo	Palermo	1853	1883	30	NYC			
LaRosa	Luigi					Manhattan, NYC		Murder of V. Gallucci - convicted for manslaughter (1899)	
Lasala	Stefano	Corleone	1889	1896	7	NYC		Counterfeiting, Murder, Grand larceny (1909), Number s lottery	Morello-Lupo group
LaTorre	Stefano (Steve)	Montedoro, Caltanissetta	1886	1903	17	Pennsylvania	Worked in coal mine at 14, operated gasoline station, Partner in coal company	Black hand extortion (1907)	
Lauritano	Leopoldo	Agerola/Gragnano, Naples	1872	1899	27	Brooklyn	Owned coffee house with A. Vollerro	Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Leone	Domenico	Prizzi, Palermo	1879	1902	23	Milwaukee			
Licalsi	Giuseppe	Allesandria Della Rocca	1885	1899	14	Tampa, Florida/ NYC			D'Acquila
Liconti	Carmelo	Calabria	1888	1904	16	Brooklyn			
Lima	Gioacchino	Corleone	1870	1892	22	NYC			Morello-Lupo group
Limandri	Marco	Palermo	1891	1913	22	Manhattan/ New Jersey			D'Aquila
Lo Baido	Vito	Sicily						Barrel murder suspect	Morello-Lupo group
LoCicero	Vincenzo	Agrigento, Sicily	1865	1889	24	Manhattan			D'Aquila group,

									Gentile, his sons Felix & Joseph
Loiacano	Salvatore	Marineo, Palermo	1873	1900	27	NYC			
Lolordo (possibly Lombardo originally)	Pasqualino	Ribera, Agrigento, Sicily	1885	Unknown (possibly 1903 if the same person on 1910 census as 'Pascalino Lombardo' in Philadelphia)		Chicago	Olive Oil Merchant (1929 death certificate)		1928 Cleveland Meeting
Lombardi	Giuseppe		1880			NYC			
Lombardino	Salvatore	Gibellina, Sicily	1891	1907	16				1928 Cleveland Meeting
LoMonte	Gaetano	Villafrati, Palermo	1887	Possibly 1903	16	NYC (possibly Pennsylvania)			
LoMonte	Fortunato	Villafrati, Palermo	1883	1894	11				
LoPiccolo	Stefano	Monreale	1882	1910	28	Brooklyn			
Luciana	Salvatore ('Chales/Lucky Luciano')	Lercara Friddi, Palermo Provence, Sicily		1907	9	Chelsea, New York	Errand boy for Hat plant	Probable shoplifting and errands for politicians and prostitutes. Narcotics dealing. Record from 1916	Five Point gang
Luciano	Frank	Salerno, Campania	1900	1904	4	Queens, NYC			
Lupo	Giovanni	Palermo	1882	1901	19	New Jersey	Grocery business (Lupo network)		Brother of I. Lupo
Lupo (Saietta)	Ignazio	Palermo	1877	1898/1899	21	Brooklyn/Harlem, Manhattan	Bookseller, Grocery business in Palermo (87-99), Grocery businesses in New York (bankrupt 1908), Construction company	Shot business rival in Palermo, murder suspect - G. Catania (1902) ran counterfeiting ring (convicted 1910), extortion, Question on kidnapping (1906), arrests for arson, kidnapping and death threats, money laundering,	Morello group
Macaluso	Marco	Corleone	1875	1887	22	NYC			



Madonia	Benedetto	Lecara Friddi, Palermo	1860	1901	41	NYC			DiPriemo group
Magaddino	Stefano	Castellammare Del Golfo	1891	1902	11	Buffalo			
Magliocco	Joseph (Giovanni)	Villabate	1898	1914	16				1928 Cleveland Meeting, Father of Profaci's
Maiorana	Gaetano	Milazzo, Messina	1898	1902	4	Brooklyn		Juvenile (1913), Petty Larceny (1916), Burglary (1917), Narcotic (1918), Assault and Robbery (1919)	
Mangano	Filippo	Palermo	1898	1909	11	Brooklyn			V. mangano (Brother)
Mangano	Vincent (Vincenzo)	Palermo	1887/1888	1905-1906	18	Brooklyn	Fishmonger clerk [WW1 Registration]	Fraud [1912], Assault & Robbery (1919)	Gentile, Biondo, Anastasia, D'Aquila group, F. Mangano (Brother), 1928 Cleveland Meeting
Mangiapane	Salvatore	Palermo	1879	1907	28				
Mannina	Nunzio	Corleone	1874	1903		New Orleans			
Mannino	Ignazio	Palermo	1889	1906	17	Manhattan/Brooklyn			
Manzella	Carmello	Valledolmo, Palermo	1865	1890		Buffalo			P. Manzella (Brother)
Manzella	Peter	Valledolmo, Palermo	1867	1890	23	Buffalo			C. Manzella (Brother)
Marchione	Salvatore	Palermo	Possibly 1886	1906/1907	20				
Marchione	Paul		1892	1913	21			Assault (1914)	
Marciano	Luigi	Sciacca	1892	1903	11	Manhattan			
Maressa	Joseph ('Vincent Orsica')	Messina						Killed J.Agnello in 1872	<i>Innocenti</i>
Marino	Nicola	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1877	1900	23	Milwaukee			S. Marino (Brother)
Marino	Santo	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1890	1904	14	Milwaukee			N. Marino (Brother)
Marsalisi	Mariano	Corleone	1879	1905	26	NYC	Barber		
Masotto	Salvatore	Palermo	1863	1913	40	Manhattan/Brooklyn			D'Aquila group
Masseria	Giuseppe 'Joe'	Menfi Agrigento, Sicily (later in Marsala)	1886 <sup>[i]</sup> /1887 <sup>[ii]</sup>	1902	16	Manhattan		Involved in Black Hand and kidnappings. Gunman(from 1907), Burglary (1907, 1909,	Morello group

								as part of gang 1912-1913)	
Mateo	Alphonse	Palermo				New Orleans			<i>Palermitani</i>
Matranga	Salvatore	Monreale				New Orleans	Saloon Owner, Docks		<i>Stoppaglieri</i>
Matranga	Pasquale	Monreale	1887	1914	27	Manhattan/Brooklyn	Baker (1930 census)		Inlaw of Scalicis
Matranga	Charles						Docks		Matranga clan (formelly <i>Stoppaglieri</i> & <i>Innocenti</i> )
Mauro	Ferdinando	Avellino, Campania	1876	1899/1904	23	NYC/Boston/Pittsburgh	Barber, Fruit market, Liquor company	In prison (1900)	
Mauro	Salvatore	Baucina, Palermo	1853	1890	37	NYC			
Mazzara	Filippo	Castellammare Del Golfo	1889	1907	18	Brooklyn/Buffalo			A. Mazzara (Brother)
Mazzara	Antonio	Castellammare Del Golfo	1887	1910	23	Brooklyn			F. Mazzara (Brother)
Meli	Rosario	Messina				New Orleans/ san Francisco			<i>Innocenti</i>
Meli	Francesco								Camorra group
Merlo	Michele	Sambuca, Agrigento	1880	1890	10	New Orleans/Chicago	Commission Merchant, Business Agent		Unione Siciliana
Messina	Gaspere	Salemi	1879	1907	28	Boston, New England			
Mezzasalma	Rosario	Vittoria, Sicily	1899	1913	14	Manhattan			
Milone	Antonio	Corleone	1879	1889	10	Manhattan			Morello group
Milone	Ignazio	Corleone	1881	1898	17	Manhattan		Arrested for murder (1906)	Morello group
Mineo	Manfredi	Palermo	1880	1911	31	Brooklyn	Lemon Importer	Counterfeiting [1911]	Morello group, Terranova group
Minore	Francesco	Trapani	1879	1906	27				
Minore	Girolamo	Trapani	1876	1905	29				
Miranda	Michele	Naples	1896	1912	16	Boston/ Buffalo/ Pittsburgh		Pickpocket (1915)	
Modica	Onofrio	Palermo	1885	1902	17	Brooklyn			
Morano	Pellegrino	Prata di Principato, Campania	1877	1892, 1912	15, 35	Brooklyn	Santa Lucia restaurant	Arrested for shooting but convicted of concealed weapon(1904), Extortion, Gambling,	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra (and Coney Island Camorra)

								Cocaine Dealing, behind the death of Gallucci (1915), Convicted of murder of Ubriaco and J.Morello (1918)	
Morello	Guiseppe	Corleone, Sicily	1867	1892	25	Harlem, Manhattan	Plasterer, coal basement, saloon owner (2 between 1900 and 1901), Date factory, Shoe store and barber shops, Construction company	(In Sicily - Suspected of cattle rustling and murder, convicted of counterfeiting), arresting for counterfeiting (1900), barrel murder (1903), arrests on suspicion of kidnapping, bomb-throwing, extortion and murder	Morello-Terranova group
Morici	Joseph	Termini Imerese, Palermo	1855	1885	30	Chicago	Commission merchant	Acquitted of murder twice (1901 and 1908), arson (1911)	
Moscato	Francesco	Corleone	1866	1893	27	NYC			
Mule	Vito	Castellammare Del Golfo	1886	1903	17	Brooklyn			
Musso	Antonio	Partinico, Palermo	1893	1912	29	Detroit/ St.Louis/ Rockford		Robbery (1918), Burglary and weapons (1919)	
Navarra	Giuseppe	Castellammare Del Golfo	1887	Possibly 1904	17				
Navarra	Paolo	Possibly Castellammare Del Golfo	1861	1906	45				
Navarra	Alberto	Trapani	1885	1906	21				
Nazzaro	Joe ('Chuck')			1904			Café owner	Arrested for policy games and carrying concealed weapons (1913), arrested in connection with killing of the purchaser of his café (released)	Camorra Group (Gallucci)
Notaro	Antonio ('Mike')	Saviano, Campania	Ca. 1892	Unknown		Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra

Oliveri	Salvatore	Corleone	1895	1912	17				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Oliveri	Andrea	Corleone	Ca. 1852	1889	37	NYC, possibly New Orleans (place of arrival)	Farmer in Sicily (according to Passenger list 1889 in New Orleans)		
Orlando	Paolo	Camporeale	1864	1906	42	Brooklyn			
Ottumvo	Vincenzo								<i>Giaradinieri</i>
Palazzolo	Paolo	Cinisi	1895	1920	25				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Palmeri	Angelo	Castellammare Del Golfo	1878	1906/1909	28	Manhattan/Brooklyn/Bufalo	Saloon, Fruit store, Cigar store	Assaulting policeman (1915)	
Pangallo	Giuseppe	Naples	1889	Possibly 1906	17				
Parlapiano	Giuseppe	Sciacca, Agrigento	1886	1900	14	Manhattan		Gambling	
Parretti	Aniello (Antonio/Tony/Anniellio)	Caserta, Campania	1891/1892	1902	11	Brooklyn		Extortion, Death sentence for killing Nicholas Morello and Charles Ubriaco (1916), escaped prison. Murder of Nazzaro (1917)	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Passananti	Antonio	Partinico	1879	1903	24	NYC	Carpenter (upon arrival), Wholesale wine store/grocery (Lupo Network), 'Roma Construction Company'	Extortion, Bankruptcy conspiracy, Arrested in Sicily in relation to Petrosino murder	Lupo/Morello group, ran construction company with Carlo Cosntantino
Paterno	Antonio	Catania	1893	1911	18	Newark, NJ	Real Estate (1930 census)		
Pecoraro	Domenico	Bagheria, Palermo	1851	1891	40	New York	Grocery (possibly Lupo network)	Murder (1902 of G. Catania)	Morello-Lupo group
Pecoraro	Giovanni	Piana dei Greci, Palermo (now 'Piana degli Albanesi')	1867	1900	31	New York		Arrested and acquitted for murder in 1901, and in 1908 as 'bomb throwing suspect'. Acquitted in 1898 in Sicily for	Morello group

								embezzlement.	
Pellegrino	Rocco	Calabria	1889	1905	16	Brooklyn	Bakery	Black hand extortion, Arrested for murder (1912), Assault (1919)	Societa Camorra de Lucre
Pennachio	Gaetano	Avellino, Campania	1876	1893	17	NYC		Petty Larceny (1909), Burglary (1915)	
Penza	Raffaele	Palermo or Atripalda, Campania				Bronx, New York/ Possibly Birmingham Alabama			
Peranio	Giuseppe	Palermo	1889	1910	11	Brooklyn		Murder (1918 and 1920)	
Perillo	Armando	Carrara, Tuscany	1902	1915	13			Burglary (1918)	
Petrelli	Dominic	Abruzzo	1899	1910	11	NYC		Juvenile (1914)	
Petto	Tommaso 'The Ox' (also known as Luciano Perrino)	Carini	1879			Brooklyn/ Pennsylvania	Presser	Alleged professional killer	Morello-Lupo group
Pininno	Giuseppe	Palermo	1872	1884	12	Brooklyn			
Pinzolo	Bonaventura	Serradifalco	1887	1906	19	NYC	Timber contractor	Bomb (1908)	
Piranio	Carlo	Corleone	1877	1888	11	Dallas, Texas			J. Piranio (Brother)
Piranio	Joseph	Corleone	1879	1904	25	Dallas, Texas			C. Piranio (Brother)
Pollaccia	Saverio	Palermo	1886	1904	18	Brooklyn/Manhattan			
Poretto	Giovanni	Palermo	1856	1895	39	Brooklyn			
Prisco	Aniello ('Zopo the Gimp')							Black Hand, Attempted to extort Gallucci, Arrested for carting concealed weapon (1908 & 1909), Assault (1909), Arrested for robbery (1912), Arrested for attempted murder (1912)	Killed by J Russomano (1912)
Procida	Giuseppe	Palermo	1856	1891	35	Brooklyn			
Profaci	Joseph	Villabate	1897	1921	24				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Provenzano	Giuseppe					New Orleans	Unloading Fruit, Owned Grocery Store	Racketeering	<i>Giaradinieri</i>
Puma	Francesco	Castellammare Del Golfo	1886	1905	19	NYC			

Quartararo	Carlo	Palermo	1855						V. Quartoraro (Brother)
Quartararo	Vincenzo								C. Quartoraro (Brother)
Rao	Vincent	Corleone	1898	1899	1	NYC		Grand Larceny (1919)	C. Rao (Brother)
Rao	Calogero	Corleone	1889	1899	10	NYC			V. Rao (Brother)
Reina	Antonino	Corleone	1893	1909	16	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC	Laundry	Bomb (1913 – in Baff's house)	G. Reina (Brother)
Reina	Gaetano 'Tommy'	Corleone, Sicily	1889	Early 1900s	12	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC	Laundry	Murder of Barnet Baff in 1914	Morello group, own group, Masseria group, A. Reina (Brother)
Reina	Giacomo (Graconio)	Corleone	Ca. 1845	1896	51	Manhattan	Wholesale Oil Dealer (1910 census)		
Ricci	Gaetano (Andrea)	Foggia, Apulia	1893	1899	6	Brooklyn		Assault (1915), [Killed by Morello group]	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Riccobene	Mario	Enna, Caltanissetta	1885	1915	30	Philadelphia			
Riccobono	Giuseppe	Palermo	1894	1905	11	Manhattan	Fishmonger		
Rizzo	Peter	Serradifalco, Caltanissetta, Sicily	1889	1904	15	Buffalo			
Rizzo	Antonino	Palermo/ Corleone	1887	1906	19	Brooklyn		Fraud (1908), involved with Lupo's bankruptcy/mortgage scheme	Morello group
Romano	Lorenzo	Prata di Principato, Campania	1889	1908	18	Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Romeo	Paul	Calabria	1894	1913	19	Ohio			
Romeo	Anthony	Calabria	1894	1910	16	Brooklyn	Dock worker and union		Anastasia group
Rosa	Salvador/Salvatore	Palermo				New Orleans		Killed J. Banano and P. Allucho in 1869	<i>Palermitani</i>
Rossomano (Russomano/Romano)	Raffaello di Nicola	Naples	1858	1894	36	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC		Criminal record in Italy (21 convictions inc theft, rape, criminal association, attempted murder), involved in Genaro Gallucci's murder (1909)	Camorra Group (Gallucci)
Ruffino	Giuseppe	Castellammare Del	1886			Brooklyn			S. Ruffino (Brother)

		Golfo							
Ruffino	Pasquale	Corleone	1886	1906	20	NYC			
Ruffino	Salvatore	Castellammare Del Golfo				Brooklyn			G. Ruffino (Brother)
Russo	Michael	Cerda, Sicily	1893	1906	13	New Jersey		Assault, Burglary, Swindling, Embezzlement (from 1911)	1928 Cleveland Meeting
Russomano	John (Genaro)					New York		Killed Aniello Prisco in (1912). Arrested for carrying concealed weapon in policy game crackdown (1913).	Camorra Group (Gallucci), Nephew of Giosue
Sabatino	Natale	Palermo	1879	1900	21				Quartararo brothers
Sabella	Salvatore	Castellammare Del Golfo	1891	1912	21	Brooklyn/Philadelphia	Apprentice butcher in Sicily, Butcher, Storekeeper	Murder in Sicily (1905-of butcher)	
Salemi	Vincenzo	Corleone	Ca. 1879	Ca. 1903-1905	24	Manhattan	Plasterer (WW1 registration)		Morello group
Salica	Giovanni	Palermo	1883	1902	19	Brooklyn			
Sanfilippo	Calogero	Casteltermini, Sicily	1899	1907	8				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Sanfilippo	Antonino	Lascari, Palermo	1877	1904	27	Chicago	Druggist (WW1 registration), Ticket agent, Alderman		Unione Siciliana
Santagata	Aniello	Caserta, Campania	1888			Manhattan/New Jersey	Barber	Criminal record from 1909 (Pickpocketing, Larceny, Kidnapping, Bastardy, Fornication, Assault, Disorderly Conduct, Gambling, Bootlegging, and Narcotics)	
Santino	Pasquale	Siculiana, Agrigento	1886	1903(Canada)/1905	17	Canada/St.Louis	Fruit wholesaler, Saloon	Extortion (1912), Arson (1915)	
Santuccio	Girolamo	Florida, Syracuse, Sicily	1901	1908	7	Manhattan/ Connecticut		Assault (1916)	

Saraceno	Salvatore	Castellammare Del Golfo	1862			Brooklyn			
Sarcona	Luca	Castellammare Del Golfo	1885	1906	21	Detroit			
Scacco	Joseph	Camporeale, Sicily	1901	1920	19				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Scaglia	Pellegrino (Antonio Viola)	Burgio, Agrigento	1884	1905	21	Brooklyn/Colorado/St Louis	Grocery store	Suspect of 3 murders (1908), murder suspect (1911)black hand extortion, murder suspect (1918)	M.Scaglia (Brother)
Scaglia	Mariano	Burgio, Agrigento	1889	1905	16	Colorado			P.Scaglia (Brother)
Scalici	Salvatore	Palermo	1886	1909	23			Arrested for murder in Sicily in 1915	D'Aquila, his brothers (Frank, Giacomo, Giovanni and Giuseppe)
Scalici	Francesco	Palermo	1893	1912	19	Bronx		Grand Larceny (1919)	Brothers (Giacomo, Giovanni, Giuseppe and Salvatore)
Scalise	George							Sentenced in 1913 for transportation of a woman between New York and New Jersey with forcing her into prostitution	
Scannavino	Constantino	Palermo	1897	1912	15	Brooklyn	Dock worker and union		D'Aquila
Schiro	Nicola	Roccamena, Palermo	1872	1902	30	Brooklyn			
Sgro	Salvatore	Possibly Mirto, Messina	1868	Possibly 1900	32	Springfield, Illinois			
Sgroia	Alfonso ('Butch')	Eboli, Campania	1886	1899/1900	14	Harlem/Brooklyn	Butcher	Extortion, Murder of C. Nazzaro (1917), Manslaughter of Nicholas Terranova (1918). Admitted to three murders in 1921	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Smaldone	Ralph	Calabria	1872	1902	28	Colorado			
Sprizza	Ralph	Naples	1896	1905	9	Brooklyn		Burglary (1915)	
Taranto	Nicola	Palermo	1848	1888	40	Brooklyn	Possibilities -ran	Counterfeiting	[Died 1911]



							second hand clothing shop, purchased tenement block in 1905,	(1896),Palm reading scam (1910)	
Tedeschi	Gaspere	Villafrati	1864	Unknown		Brooklyn			
Teresa	Vincenti	Monreale		1895					
Terranova	Ciro		1888	1893	5	Uptown, NYC	Plasterer		Morello-Terranova group
Terranova	Vincenzo		1886	1893	7		Plasterer		Morello-Terranova group
Terranova (Morello)	Nicola (Nicholas, James)		1890	1893	3			Arrested for counterfeiting (1910), Assaulting policeman (1912), Killed Rooco Tapano (1912), [Killed in 1916 by Morano Navy Street group]	Morello-Terranova group
Testa	Nicola	Bagheria	1887			NYC			G. Catania
Tilocco	Salvatore	Licata, Sicily	Ca. 1892	1909	17				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Torregrossa	Andrea	Licata, Sicily	1892	1909	17	Brooklyn			
Torres	Giovanni	Palermo	1900			Manhattan, NYC		Robbery, Assault, Gun possession (1916), Murder (1918)	
Torrio	Johnny (Giovanni)	Irsini, Basilicata	1882	1884	2	Manhattan/ Brooklyn/Chicago	Saloon/ Boxing promoter	Brothel	Five point gang, Colosimo
Traina	Giuseppe 'Joseph'	Belmonte Mezzagno, Palermo, Sicily	1882/1883	1901	18	Brooklyn			D'Acquila group, 1928 Cleveland Meeting
Tripitaro	Salvatore	Cerda, Palermo	1886	1889	3	Kansas City			
Trovato	Giuseppe	Palermo	1863	1892	29	Brooklyn			
Trupia	Gaetano	Agrigento, Sicily	1884	1907	23	Manhattan/ Brooklyn	Grocer/ Coal Dealer		
Ubiraco (Umbraccio)	Eugene (Charles)		1867	1907	40			[Killed with N. Terranova in 1916 by Morano Navy Street group]	Morello-Lupo family
Vaccaro	Giuseppe	Angri, Campania	1878	Unknown		Brooklyn		Extortion	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra

Vaglica	Joseph	Monreale	1893	1894	1				1928 Cleveland Meeting
Valente	Saverio	Cervinara, Campania	1893	1902	9			Assault, Robbery, Forgery, Narcotics (From 1918)	
Valenti	Umberto	Barcellona, Messina, Sicily	1891	1910	18	Manhattan, NYC	Tailor (WW1 Registration)	Assassin in 1914	Salvatore D'Aquila
Vallone	Vincent	Gioia Tauro, Calabria	1884	1904	20	Boston/ Houston/ Pennsylvania	Grocer		
Vallone	Joseph	Prizzi, Palermo	1885	1907	22	Milwaukee			Guardalabene family
Vasi	Leoluca	Corleone	1883	1893	10	Manhattan, NYC	Unemployed (1942 WW2 registration)		
Verra	Giovanni	Palermo	1845	1901	56	NYC			
Virzi	Saverio (possibly Francesco)	Possibly Sciacca, Agrigento	1858						
Viserti	Giuseppe	Salerno, Campania	1891	1900	9	Harlem, Manhattan, NYC	Truck Driver (WW1 registration)	Murder suspect (1913), Manslaughter (1913)., murder (1919)	
Vollero	Alessandro	Gragnano, Campania	1889	1909	20	Brooklyn	Owned coffee house with Lauritano	Extortion, involved in murder of Ubriacco and N. Terranova (1916)	Brooklyn Navy Street Camorra
Volpe	Santo	Montedoro, Caltanissetta (or Calabria)	1879	1906	27	Pennsylvania			Possibly Calabrian gang
Vultaggio	Santo	Castellammare Del Golfo	1878	1905	27	Brooklyn			
Zabbia	Giuseppe	Corleone	1878	1893	20	New Orleans/ Dallas, Texas			
Zagone	Mariano	Ciminna, Palermo	1862	1899	37	Chicago	Cigar maker	Counterfeiting (1901)	Antonio D'Andrea. Morello, Cascio Ferro, Unione Siciliana
Zarcone	Giovanni	Bagheria	1857	1903	46	Brooklyn/Connecticut	Butcher shop owner	Barrel Murder suspect (1903)	C Zarcone (Brother in law and distant cousin)
Zarcone	Carlo	Santa Flavia				Milwaukee		Counterfeiting (1909)	
Zarcone	Carmelo	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1864	1892	28	Milwaukee			Zarcone (Brother in law and distant cousin)

Zarcone	Stefano	Santa Flavia, Palermo	1878	1902	24	Milwaukee		Counterfeiting (1909)	
Zarcone	Francesco					Brooklyn		Arrested for murder (1909) and acquitted. Deported to Italy	
Zarcone	Nicola					Brooklyn		Manslaughter (1909)	
Zarcone	Domenico							Kidnapping ransom arrest (1914)	
Zarcone	Pietro							Killed Andrea Gambino (1909), accused of kidnapping (1914)	G. Zarcone (Nephew of)

## Appendix B – Jobs of Mafia Migrants

<b>Butcher</b>	<b>Longshore man</b>	<b>Market</b>	<b>Fishmonger</b>	<b>Wine dealer</b>	<b>Baker</b>	<b>Barbers</b>
8	6	3	3	2	7	7
<b>Paper mill</b>	<b>Grocer</b>	<b>Labourer</b>	<b>Union</b>	<b>Café Owner</b>	<b>Construction company owner</b>	<b>Dock control</b>
1	10	5	5	5	4	3
<b>Foreman</b>	<b>Cheese company owner</b>	<b>Plasterer</b>	<b>Sailor</b>	<b>Pasta factory</b>	<b>Restaurant owner</b>	<b>Food importer</b>
1	1	7	1	1	2	7
<b>Pool Hall owner</b>	<b>Salesman</b>	<b>Treasurer</b>	<b>Olive oil dealer</b>	<b>Saloon owner</b>	<b>Laundry owner</b>	<b>Wine store owner</b>
1	1	1	3	8	1	1
<b>Real estate</b>	<b>Carpenter</b>	<b>Railroad</b>	<b>Grocery owner</b>	<b>Coal mine</b>	<b>Partnered coal company</b>	<b>Gas station</b>
3	2	2	7	1	2	1
<b>Errand boy</b>	<b>Bookseller</b>	<b>Liquor company</b>	<b>Commission merchant</b>	<b>Business Agent</b>	<b>Coal basement</b>	<b>Date factory</b>

1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Cigar store	Shoe Store	Presser	Timber contractor	Bookbinder	Laundry	Shop owner
1	1	1	1	1	2	3
Druggist	Ticket agent	Alderman	Clothing store	Boxing Promoter	Tailor	Coal dealer
1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Truck driver		Cigar maker				
1		1				

## Appendix C – Articles on Gambling Dens

### New York Times

‘A Three Card Monte Victim’ Dec 1, 1874

‘Raid on Gambling House’ May 16, 1874

‘Two Faro Games Stopped’ Feb 24, 1887

‘Raid on Gambling Den in Jersey City’ March 15, 1974

‘A Gambling Den at Niagara Falls Broken Up’ July 31, 1874

‘Gamblers Arrested’ August 7, 1873

‘A Chinese Gambling Den’ Sept 16, 1879

### Chicago Tribune

‘Big Poolroom is closed’ Aug 28, 1901

‘Gamblers Growing Alarmed’ Jan 28, 1890

‘Gamblers in their Midst’ Jan 24, 1891

‘Gambling in a houseboat’ Aug 20, 1892

‘Gambling Stopped at Galesburg’ Jan 18, 1894

‘Midnight raid on Gambling den’ Aug 30, 1896

‘New Gambling Den near Weaton’ Dec 28, 1900

‘Protection to Gamblers’ Jan 16, 1970

‘Revokes License of Gambling Den Scene Shooting’ July, 16, 1913