

Hans J. Morgenthau

Felix Roesch

Accepted manuscript PDF deposited in Coventry University's Repository

Original citation:

'Hans J. Morgenthau', in *Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism*, ed. by Robert Schuett and Miles Hollingworth, pub 2018 (ISBN 9781474423298)

Publisher: Edinburgh University Press

Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

The Possibility of Peace: Finding Solace in a Belligerent Worldview?

Felix Rösch, Coventry University

Abstract

Hans J. Morgenthau is one of the most iconic classical realists of the twentieth century. His *Politics Among Nations* remains one of the most used textbooks in the field of International Relations to date. And yet, despite his popularity, many students and scholars of International Relations still consider him to have been a positivistic scientist that in essence perpetuated a belligerent worldview in which people live in an anarchic world riddled by conflict among nation-states. By contrast, this chapter argues that Morgenthau's work was normatively guided by a desire to transcend the Westphalian system of nation-states. Although Morgenthau knew that his aim to create a world state was unattainable in the foreseeable future, his work still can open intellectual spaces to imagine more peaceful political orders. To give evidence to this argument, it is first demonstrated that, for Morgenthau, human nature was tragic because people aspire perfection, but they are never able to achieve it. This is the case because people cannot live in solitariness that Morgenthau sees as a requirement for achieving perfection. However, in aspiring perfection, people have the ability to realise and eventually transcend human nihilism. This enables them to criticise the current political *status quo* and to imagine different political realities.

Introduction

It seems that last decade's efforts of reconsidering classical realist contributions to International Relations (IR) have hardly happened. Attending conferences of major associations in the field and going through some widely accepted textbooks, students and scholars of IR are still presented with a caricature of realism as an

exclusively Eurocentric and belligerent worldview.¹ In these accounts, we read that realism promotes war, operates on the ontological *a priori* of anarchy, and only accepts the nation-state as an actor in international affairs. This shows that many scholars still confound classical realism with neo-realism, not realising that both have nothing to do with each other. Neither epistemologically, nor ontologically have the often Central European classical realists shared any assumption with American neo-realist scholars (cf. Behr and Heath 2009). Equally, recent insights that explore epistemological and normative overlaps between realism and critical theories are not taken up by the wider discipline (cf. Scheuermann 2008, 2009b, 2011; Molloy 2010; Rösch 2014a; Behr and Kirke 2014; Troy 2015; Behr and Williams 2016; critical Levine 2013; Stullerova 2016).²

This chapter is challenging this commonly accepted view of realism as a belligerent worldview and it aims to achieve this by discussing the work of the one realist scholar who – even almost 40 years after his death – is for many critical theorists still today their archetypical nemesis: Hans Morgenthau. To this end, I dig deep into the philosophical fundament of Morgenthau’s work, which he mainly elaborated in unpublished manuscripts during the beginning of his career in Europe (also Rösch 2015; 2016b). Traces of these underpinnings are to be found throughout his career in some of his most well-known works, but paraphrasing Nigel Thrift (2000: 380), it is in ‘the little things’ that we find the most insightful clues. It is argued that, for Morgenthau, human nature was tragic because people aspire perfection, but they are never able to achieve it. This is the case because people cannot live in solitariness that Morgenthau sees as a requirement for achieving perfection. However, in aspiring perfection, people have the ability to realise and eventually transcend human nihilism. This enables them to criticise the current political *status quo* and to imagine more peaceful political orders beyond the still dominant Westphalian system of nation-states.

This argument is unravelled in four steps. First, I discuss the relation between loneliness and tragedy before focusing on the one human drive that can find satisfaction by humans living together: the drive to prove oneself. Then, I explore the

¹ For a general discussion on criticising IR as Eurocentric, see Kuru (2016); also Jørgensen et al. (2017).

² Notable exceptions are the works of Brent Steele (2007) and Daniel Levine (2012).

human ability to give meaning to their social life-worlds (autopoiesis) and, finally, the findings are related to Morgenthau's critique of the nation-state.

Human Tragedy: the Inability of Being Alone

Arguing that tragedy is an important element in Morgenthau's thought is hardly a new discovery. There is a wide body of literature that explores the importance that tragedy played for Morgenthau and indeed other realist scholars (cf. Gismondi 2004; Klusmeyer 2009; Chou 2011; Lebow and Erskine 2012). Particularly Ned Lebow (2003) has demonstrated that realists employed human tragedy as an analytical category by returning to Greek antiquity. This is well evidenced for Morgenthau (2004), as he frequently made references to Aristotle and he gave lectures on *The Politics* throughout his career. Recently, Konstantinos Kostagiannis (2014) even argued that reading tragedy as a metaphor helps to understand Morgenthau's criticism of the nation-state. This chapter builds upon these insights and it shores them up by stressing that, for Morgenthau, the inability of being alone is at the core of the tragedy that characterises the human condition.

In an unpublished manuscript titled *The Significance of Being Alone*, Morgenthau (n.d.) expounded the relation between tragedy and loneliness. Referring to the Old Testament, Morgenthau (n.d.: 2) started by characterising humans as an *imago dei*. Being created as the image of God, however, puts humans into a position from which they cannot escape. They have the ability to envision perfection, but they are never able to achieve it. The opening lines of Morgenthau's (1972: 2) *Science: Servant or Master* helps to understand this point further. In this first part, which is based on an early manuscript from 1934, he argued that 'science ... elates man with the promise to transform *homo faber*, the maker of tools, into *homo deus*, the maker of worlds, [but] it also depresses him.' Believing in the promise of science to furnish perfection, as Morgenthau experienced it with the rise of positivism, and the subsequent attempt to create life-worlds through social planning, however, leads to scenarios in which human creativeness atrophies. Rather than being enabled to turn from a *homo faber* as the ideal typification of self-determined work into a *homo deus*, people are reduced to the constraints of an *animal laborans*. Living in such a world, 'its members [are compelled] to live below their capabilities rather than

exhausting them. It misdirects their energies and wastes the best of their talents' (Morgenthau 1960: 79) and, consequently, people are 'suspended between heaven and earth: [they] are an ambitious beast and frustrated god' (Morgenthau 1963: 420).

For Morgenthau (n.d.: 3), however, tragedy is less caused by the fact that humans cannot achieve perfection because it is part of the human condition. In agreement with Aristotle, Morgenthau (2004) conceived of humans as a *zoo politika*; i.e. people cannot live as solitaires, but it is in their nature to establish, engage in, and commit themselves to various socio-political and cultural communities. In order to achieve perfection, people, however, would have to endure solitariness like God. Morgenthau explains this connection between numinous loneliness and perfection through the effects of monotheism. Sharing their lives with others, by contrast, people only subdue the human strife for perfection by living in an 'illusion of being perfect' (Morgenthau n.d.: 2). As Hans-Jörg Sigwart (2013: 413) puts it:

'The main objection of the realist critiques against the liberal zeitgeist is that it is based on particular forms of "wishful thinking" and on (mostly pseudo-religious) moral and political "illusions" that systematically eclipse the actual realities of social and political, and also of intellectual, life.'

Morgenthau (1960) particularly saw this evidenced in modern societies. He argued that mediocrity is perpetuated in modernity because humans are not encouraged to make use of all their abilities. Rather, a mediocre effort is sufficient to fulfil the tasks that a bureaucratized and technologized everyday demands. Any further effort would make no difference. However, through 'cultural blinders' (Morgenthau 2004: 36), modernity creates an assumption among people to have reached socio-political, economic, or cultural perfection (for more see Rösch 2016a). It was against these cultural blinders that students were protesting during the 1960s:

'What the students revolt against ... is what they are revolting against in the world at large. That world, thoroughly secularized and dedicated to the production of consumer goods and weapons of mass destruction, has lost its

meaning ... That world is also thoroughly mechanized and bureaucratized. Thus it diminishes the individual who must rely on others rather than himself for the satisfaction of his wants, from the necessities of life to his spiritual and philosophical longings' (HJM Archive 43; Morgenthau 1968: 9).

Consequently, Morgenthau (n.d.: 4) argued that human life 'can be understood as one great enterprise to escape from being alone, to make complete the incompleteness of ... existence, to fill the void in ... being.' Following Morgenthau, four strategies are being employed by people to stage this escape successfully. Two of these strategies are spatially vertical. The first vertical strategy is upward in which people aim to transform loneliness into solitude (cf. Rösch 2013), while the second vertical one is a downward strategy. In this latter strategy, people aim to exert influence over others with the intention to dominate them. People might also employ a philanthropic horizontal strategy, such as volunteering, in order to escape from loneliness by putting oneself into the service of others. Finally, Morgenthau envisaged also a temporal strategy, as he argued that people strive for secular and religious forms of immortality. However, Morgenthau left no doubt that all these ambitions are in vain. 'Instead of the linear movement in time and space ... one might think of their combinations in the image of a sphere which combines the different lines of movement and in which man himself moves without escape' (Morgenthau n.d.: 5).

The Drive to Prove Oneself

To understand that human tragedy rests on the inability of being alone, we have to take a closer look into Morgenthau's argument that social life provides an escape from loneliness, as people can maintain an illusionary image of perfection. This illusion is sustained by the possibility to satisfy one of two human drives through the engagement with others.

In an early unpublished manuscript, Morgenthau (1930: 5; author's translation) argued that human action is determined by 'the impulse of life striving to keep alive, to prove oneself, and to interact with others.' Hence, there are two fundamental drives for Morgenthau: the drive for self-preservation (*Selbsterhaltungstrieb*) and

the drive to prove oneself (*Bewährungstrieb*). Robert Schuett (2007: 59; also 2010) rightfully demonstrates that Morgenthau relied heavily on Sigmund Freud's ego and sexual instinct (hunger and love) in his elaboration of these two human drives, even though Morgenthau (1984: 14) tried to negate Freud's influence on him in later years. For Morgenthau, the drive for self-preservation (hunger) was more fundamental because the preservation of one's life is the central concern for humans. This drive focuses on human survival and is manifested in the pursuit of food and shelter. In modern times, it also contains the aspiration of money as a substitute for acquiring food (Morgenthau 1930: 5, 15). Also other vital interests are represented in this drive, such as security, and the means to achieve them, like marriage or a secure work place (Morgenthau 1947: 165). In agreement with Freud, Morgenthau (1929: 119-30) also used both drives to analyse international affairs, initially identifying them as questions of honour (*Ehrfragen*). Shortly thereafter, however, Morgenthau (1933: 33-4, also 2012) referred to them as 'questions politiques de première classe' and 'questions politiques de deuxième classe'. The drive for self-preservation (political questions of the first order) was already present in his doctoral thesis, in which he introduced them as interests of existence (*Lebensinteressen*). For Morgenthau (1929: 98), this interest helped to preserve all of the constitutive elements of nation-states, such as sovereignty and their legal order, and it helped to satisfy the position of a state among other states.

Central for understanding Morgenthau's conceptualisation of human nature, however, is the drive to prove oneself (love) (Solomon 2012) because '[t]he desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual's survival, but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured' (Morgenthau 1947: 165). The drive to prove oneself was important for Morgenthau because it fostered his criticism of the nation-state and affected his views about the potential of establishing peace globally. For Morgenthau, the intention of this drive was to make oneself aware of one's own life and gain awareness of one's strengths and capabilities. The self manifests itself only through the other, which is why this drive finds its expression in games, arts, science, and even relationships. '[E]verywhere where the human being strives to show "what he [and she] can"' is the drive to prove oneself its origin (Morgenthau 1930: 6; author's translation). Its purpose is to

gain and increase pleasure. Particularly challenging situations promise its highest surplus because they require overcoming obstacles by mastering non-routine situations (Morgenthau 1930: 26-7). Such situations assure one's identity because they promise the appraisal of others (Morgenthau 1930: 31-2). However – and this is where the tragedy lies – given that this drive is limitless, such aspirations can never be fully realised (Morgenthau 1929: 71; 1945: 13; 1947: 166).

Autopoiesis

Stressing the tragedy of human existence, it seems only likely that current realism-readings increasingly focus on theological aspects by interpreting realism as a political theology (cf. Mollov 2002; Rengger 2013; Paipais 2013; Troy 2013). Realists' concern of modernity depriving people of the ability to experience themselves in their subjectivity and their attending to questions of international ethics are being interpreted as a contribution to the manifold attempts to re-instil spirituality and transcendental security in people. This reading of realism, however, is not without its problems, as it neglects the human potential for meaning-autopoiesis that is particularly to be found in Morgenthau's work.

Although human nature was tragic for Morgenthau, he did not promote a pessimistic worldview. The initial reason to engage with others might have been to satisfy one's drive to prove oneself and to subdue human imperfections, but in doing so, people can reflect about social life-worlds, realising that they are constructed in intersubjective, discursive processes through which power is established in collectivity. This is the case because the 'propensity for self-deception is mitigated by man's capacity for transcending himself, for looking at himself as he might look to others' (Morgenthau 1963: 422). This implies that, while trying to elude from one's fate, people not only can learn to accept it, but they can also understand that meaning and identity are created in autopoiesis. In other words, Morgenthau promoted a positive worldview (Rösch 2015), in which people can actively embrace the opportunity to give meaning to their life-worlds through their own thoughts, actions, and relations. In this process, people also develop their identities.

Arriving at what Hannah Arendt would have called *amor mundi* (Young-Bruehl 1982: 324), however, was also for Morgenthau a long and arduous personal process, as

meticulously traced by Christoph Frei (2001; also Scheuerman 2009a; Rösch 2015).³ From Frei, we know that Morgenthau started this journey with studying Friedrich Nietzsche. It was through his work that he learned about *amor fati* (Nietzsche 2003: 157); i.e. the acceptance of one's fate. For Nietzsche, this embracement of one's fate is the initial recognition of the eternal recurrence of time and space. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche (1969: 234) explained this nihilism as '[e]verything goes, everything returns; the wheel of existence rolls forever. Everything dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs on forever ... Everything departs, everything meets again; the ring of existence is true to itself forever.' If people realise this initial aimlessness and meaninglessness, they can also understand that modernity had deprived them of their ability to actively contribute to their own life-worlds. For Morgenthau, this insight was the initial step that eventually would encourage people to develop and make use of all their abilities.

However, realising that life in itself does not have a prescribed meaning is an *awesome* experience. It can be disappointing, since it 'offers with each answer new questions, with each victory a new disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In this labyrinth of unconnected causal connections man discovers many little answers but no answer to the great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction' (Morgenthau 1947: 176). Countless combinations of actions and reactions provide a multitude of eternally recurrent moments, which evolve without pre-inscribed purpose. Still, Morgenthau did not intend to surrender to this nihilism, but aimed to overcome it since also Nietzsche (1968: 336) accentuated that '[t]he unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no "law" but a power relationship between two or more forces.' People do not have to agonise about these returning moments, but they can choose to affirm them. This constitutes Nietzsche's *amor fati*. Relating the initially meaningless moments to oneself and transforming them into significant situations enables people to realise that life is eternal becoming.

³ Leigh Jenco (2007: 752-3) has identified a similar understanding of scholarship and intellectuality in general for a Chinese context. She argues that 'the process of attaining ... wisdom takes a lifetime of practice and study. Its borders are made permeable not by means of prior intellectual or ethnic background, but by means of ... very hard work.'

Even more challenging, however, is the dolorous experience that *amor fati* provides because it causes 'transcendental homelessness' (Lukács 1963: 41). People yearn for ontological security (Anthony Giddens) because it provides a clearly structured life through standardised conceptions of reason, virtue, justice, and even pity and happiness for which they accept that their subjectivity is being negated. Only when people approve their fate, they can become an *Übermensch*. Agreeing with Mihaela Neacsu (2010: 99), it was this Nietzschean concept that provided Morgenthau with the ideal for what is required to arrive at a positive connotation of one's life-world. The recognition of the eternal recurrence, and concurrently the renunciation of an ideologised life through the ability to intellectually alienate oneself from one's life-world enable an understanding of dominant knowledge-power relations, how they are temporally and spatially conditioned, and consider their influence on society. The *Übermensch* epitomises the ability to recognise *and* the will to overcome the surrounding nihilistic world. Through self-restraint, self-assurance, and self-reflection, people are enabled to refer the ever-recurrent moments to themselves, creating meaning and identity. It is for this reason that Morgenthau (1972: 48-9) deplored the absence of the qualities of an *Übermensch* in *Science: Servant or Master?*:

'[t]his meaningless and aimless activity may convey the superficial appearance of an abundant dynamism trying to transform the empirical world. In truth, however, it is not the pressure of creative force but flight from his true task that drives man beyond himself through action. In the intoxication of incessant activity, man tries to forget the question posed by the metaphysical shock. Yet, since the noise of the active world can drown out that question but cannot altogether silence it, complete oblivion, which is coincident with the end of consciousness itself, becomes the unacknowledged ultimate aim.'

Achieving the stage of an *Übermensch*, through the ability to give meaning to one's life-world and to create one's own identity, is total liberation since '[w]illing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will and freedom' (Nietzsche 1969: 111). It

liberates people from subduing to the illusions of ideologies that control the constructions of life-worlds and it helps to accept human imperfections. People begin to take ownership over them through embedding their 'biological existence within technological and social artefacts that survive that existence. [Their] imagination creates new worlds of religion, art, and reason that live after their creator' (Morgenthau 1972: 146).

However, Morgenthau did not endorse Nietzsche's view of a pre-existing reality which considered the will to power and its achievement as the highest ethical value in itself. Rather, the will to power has to be implemented for the achievement of the common good, since 'there is nothing more senseless for the human conscience than a morale which is indifferent to the dissolution of human society' (Morgenthau 1937: 88; author's translation). To claim this societal meaning-autopoiesis, Morgenthau agreed with his fellow émigré scholars like Paul Tillich, Eric Voegelin and particularly with Arendt (Rösch 2014b), as for both it was fuelled by a reinvigoration of an 'ethics of responsibility' (Klusmeyer 2011: 86; Sigwart 2013: 408). To reinstall this form of ethics, Morgenthau actively engaged in the public sphere. Much has been written about Morgenthau's political activism particularly in relation to the Vietnam War (cf. Rafshoon 2001; Cozette 2008; Tjalve 2008; Zambenardi 2011). Hence, it suffices here to stress that Morgenthau's engagement rested on an understanding of scholarship as a corrective of the political *status quo*. In this regard, he acted in a Socratic maieutic manner by discerning people's political interests through discussions and by establishing fora in which the political could re-evolve. For Morgenthau, scholars, therefore, had to act as facilitators of the political through which people can transcend the various constraints in modern societies in order to free them in their thought and action and to help them creating their life-worlds. However, as Morgenthau (1955: 446-7; also Sigwart 2013: 412-3) was well aware of, convincing others of their capacities by challenging vested interests, causes discomfort among people because their habitual ways of thinking are questioned. Morgenthau's own life exemplifies the consequences critical scholarship can face even in democratic societies. Most well-known is certainly the 'Operation Morgenthau' (HJM Archive 27) in which the FBI and the White House aimed to collect imputations against him (Cox 2007: 184; Cozette 2008: 17). However, despite

being critical of American (foreign) policy making, Morgenthau remained an ardent supporter of American civic culture. Even at times, when the ideological penetration of socio-political life seemed irrevocable, he did not question its assimilative capacity (Behr and Rösch 2013), but he aimed to reaffirm it. Morgenthau's criticism was, therefore, not a criticism of substance, but a criticism voiced in fear that the United States would lose its liberal culture and threatens its democratic system; a loss that Morgenthau had already experienced in the downfall of the Weimar Republic (for a general discussion, see Greenberg 2015).

Peace and the Possibility of a World State

Embracing one's *amor fati* and realising the human ability to autopoetically construct socio-political life-worlds eventually nurtured Morgenthau's political agenda. For Morgenthau, the nation-state was an outdated model of human sociation and adhering to it only fortifies a belligerent outlook on the world. Contrastingly, he strived for the establishment of a peaceful world state. This brought him into opposition with many of his American colleagues, as Morgenthau aspired a paradigm change in international politics, as he wanted to abolish inter-*national* relations altogether. Certainly Morgenthau's vision of a world state does not live up to the standards of more elaborated cosmopolitan visions, but realist contributions still have the potential to add on to current cosmopolitan discourses, as they help 'defenders of the global state ... to stay sober' (Scheuerman 2011: 150).

While delivering the first Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA) lecture on Morality and Foreign Affairs, Morgenthau (1979: 42) insisted that 'we are living in a dream world'. Humans still hold on to an obsolescent form of sociation – the nation-state – although the world changed dramatically since the end of the Second World War. Contrary to what we find in current scholarship (cf. Mirkowski 2011), nation-states were for Morgenthau (1979: 34), 'no longer viable economic, political, or military units', having lost the ability to administrate their sovereignty effectively. Claiming that the nation-state is economically outdated can be explained by contextualizing Morgenthau's CRIA lecture from 1979, as he gave this lecture under the impression of the second oil crisis. The decreased oil production in the wake of the Iranian Revolution irretrievably destroyed the myth of a consistent economic rise

in which numerous states had lived under the Bretton Woods System since the late 1940s. States were no longer able to yield enough economic power to control all the interrelationships of an increasingly globalized economy. Morgenthau was also critical of the nation-state politically. These 'blind and potent monster[s]' (Morgenthau 1962: 61) have an interest in securing their existence through an increase in the possibility of international conflict in which its citizens can freely follow their drives because, nationally, various ideologies have in their egalitarianism deprived them of their ability to act and establish thereupon an identity. Finally, in military terms nation-states cannot guarantee their territorial integrity and the security of their citizens anymore. Indeed, the development of nuclear weapons has made the existence of borders obsolete because an aggressor does not have to face own considerable losses any longer in order to overcome them. A border is, therefore, in Morgenthau's (1966a: 9; 1970b: 61-2) sense reduced to an artificial line on a map and the traditional concept of sovereignty that yielded exclusive rights to nation-states on the international level is rendered obsolete (for more, see van Munster and Sylvest 2016).

To transcend the shortcomings of the nation-state, Morgenthau argued for the creation of a world state, as expounded in detail by William Scheuerman (2011). However, to be able to create a world state, a world community has to be established first. If citizens are not willing to give their loyalty to a world state and rather leave it with their nation-state, no attempt at establishing institutions for a world state can be successful (Speer 1968: 215; Fromkin 1993: 84). Furthermore, under the impression of the recently ended Second World War, Morgenthau expressed doubt that the principle of national sovereignty can be circumvented in the foreseeable future because people will continue to imagine space as being monopolised by the state. Morgenthau (1948: 344) came across this impenetrability of the state in the writings of Hans Kelsen (see Jütersonke 2010) and used it to stress that under the current system only one organization can claim sovereignty within a given territory. To transcend national sovereignty, a world community has to be established first through traditional forms of diplomacy. By negotiating on equal terms, Morgenthau hoped to establish such a community through which a

compromised can be established based on a common understanding, trust, and loyalty among people.

Although Morgenthau was initially sceptical of international organisations, like the United Nations and the forerunners of the European Union, to be able to provide a forum for such diplomatic encounters, he became more optimistic during the 1960s under the impression of the achievements of the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (Morgenthau 1970a) and in view of a reconsideration of David Mitrany's functionalist approach (Ashworth 2014: 221-5). Morgenthau (1962: 75-6) had concluded that as much as a common agreement to shift loyalties to a world state has to be achieved by creating a world community, also international forums have to be established in which such compromises can be facilitated because through daily contact they allow countries to recognize commonalities, while being sensitive enough to accept those conditions and experiences which separate each culture.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated Morgenthau's understanding of human nature and its relation to the establishment of peace globally. It has been pointed out that sustainable peace was for Morgenthau unattainable as long as the Westphalian system of nation-states dominates international relations. For this reason, normatively, Morgenthau, like other realist scholars (Scheuerman 2011), aspired a world state, as it was only in a global political community that he could imagine lasting peace and security to be established. Although Morgenthau was aware that the establishment of a world state would require dramatic socio-political and cultural changes as well as changes to human mind-sets, he did not consider it altogether unattainable. This positive outlook rested on Morgenthau's understanding of human nature. This connection might come as a surprise, given that human nature was for Morgenthau dominated by tragedy. Still, for Morgenthau, it is because of human tragedy that humans eventually can establish a world state.

To give evidence to this verdict, this chapter discussed one particular aspect of human tragedy that so far has received limited academic interest: solitariness. For

Morgenthau, perfection was out of reach for humans, as it is in their nature to live together in communities. This prevents them from achieving perfection, as they can never be alone, but it also helps them to subdue their quest for perfection, as they can pursue their drive to prove oneself. Pursuing this drive in human interactions, however, puts people in a position to realise that their life-worlds are not given, but socially constructed through their thoughts, actions, and relations. This stresses a neglected element of Morgenthau's thought which, however, is central to understand Morgenthau's optimistic worldview. Drawing upon Nietzsche, autopoiesis implied for Morgenthau that humans have the ability to understand that reality has no pre-given meaning. Rather, meaning is created in a wilful, collective process. This insistence on autopoiesis freed Morgenthau to think beyond the nation-state and encouraging others to go through this potentially cruel thought process was the central concern for his engagement in the public realm.

References

Ashworth, Lucian M. (2014), *A History of International Thought. From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*, London: Routledge.

Behr, Hartmut and Amelia Heath (2009), 'Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz, and Neo-Realism', *Review of International Studies* 35 (2): 327-349.

Behr, Hartmut and Felix Rösch (2013), 'The Ethics of Anti-Hubris in the Political Philosophy of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau', in Jodok Troy (ed.), *Religion and the Realist Tradition. From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back*, London: Routledge, pp. 111-128.

Behr, Hartmut and Xander Kirke (2014), 'The Tale of a "Realism" in International Relations. *E-International Relations*', <http://ow.ly/BO9ej> (last accessed: 22nd February 2015).

Behr, Hartmut and Michael C. Williams (2016), 'Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating 'Divides' in International Relations Theory', *Journal of International Political Theory*, doi: 10.1177/1755088216671735.

Chou, Mark (2011), 'Morgenthau, the Tragic. On Tragedy and the Transition from Scientific Man to Politics Among Nations', *Telos* 157: 109-128.

Cox, Michael (2007), 'Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War', in Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 166-194.

- Cozette, Murielle (2008), 'Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of Scholarship', *Review of International Studies* 34 (1): 5-27.
- Frei, Christoph (2001), *Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Fromkin, David (1993), 'Remembering Hans Morgenthau', *World Policy Journal* 10 (3): 81-88.
- Gismondi, Mark (2004), 'Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity: *Kulturpessimismus* in the theories of Max Weber, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 (3): 435-464.
- Greenberg, Udi (2015), *The Weimar Century: German Emigres and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jenco Leigh K. (2007), "'What does Heaven ever say?" A Methods-Centered Approach to Cross-Cultural Engagement', *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 741-755.
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Audrey Alejandro, Alex Reichwein, Felix Rösch, and Helen Turton (2017), *Trends in European International Relations Theory. Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jütersonke, Oliver (2010), *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klusmeyer, Douglas (2009), 'Beyond Tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Responsibility, Evil and Political Ethics', *International Studies Review* 11 (2): 332-351.
- Klusmeyer, Douglas (2011), 'The American Republic, Executive Power and the National Security State: Hannah Arendt's and Hans Morgenthau's Critiques of the Vietnam War', *Journal of International Political Theory* 7 (1): 63-94.
- Kostagiannis, Konstantinos (2014), 'Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State', *International History Review* 36 (3): 513-529.
- Kuru, Deniz (2016), 'Historicising Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism in IR: A Revisionist Account of Disciplinary Self-Reflexivity', *Review of International Studies* 42 (2): 351-376.
- Lebow, Richard Ned (2003), *The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests, and Orders*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lebow, Richard and Toni Erskine, eds. (2012), *Tragedy and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levine, Daniel J. (2012), *Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levine, Daniel J. (2013), 'Why Hans Morgenthau was not a Critical Theorist (and why Contemporary IR Realists should care)', *International Relations* 27 (1): 95-118.
- Lukács, Georg (1963), *The Theory of the Novel. A Historic-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, London: Merlin Press.

- Mirkowski, Philip (2011), 'Realism and Neoliberalism: from Reactionary Modernism to Postwar Conservatism', in Nicolas Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 210-238.
- Mollov, M. Benjamin (2002), *Power and Transcendence. Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*, Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Molloy, Seán (2010), 'From The Twenty Years' Crisis to Theory of International Politics: A Rhizomatic Reading of Realism', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 13 (4): 378-404.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (n.d.), 'The Significance of Being Alone' (Leo Baeck Institute New York, Hans Morgenthau Collection, Series III, Box 4, Folder 6).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1929), *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen*, Leipzig: Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1930), 'Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen' (Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1933), *La notion du "politique" et la théorie des différends internationaux*, Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1934), 'Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen' (Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1937), 'Kann in unserer Zeit eine objektive Moralordnung aufgestellt werden? Wenn ja, worauf kann sie gegründet werden? Kennwort: Metaphysik' (Container 112, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1945), 'The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil', *Ethics* 56 (1): 1-18.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1947), *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, London: Latimer House.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948), 'The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered', *Columbia Law Review* 48 (3): 341-365.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1955), 'Reflections on the State of Political Science', *Review of Politics* 17 (4): 431-460.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1960), 'The Social Crisis in America: Hedonism of Status Quo', *Chicago Review* 14 (2): 69-88.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1962), *Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume I. The Decline of Democratic Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1963), 'On Trying to be Just', *Commentary* (May): 420-423.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1966a), 'Introduction', in David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle, 7-11.

- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1966b), 'Letter to the editors of the *New York Times*, 16th August' (Container 43, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1968), 'But are they allowed to do that?', *Christian Science Monitor*, 19th July, 9.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1970a), *Truth and Power. Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970*, London: Pall Mall Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1970b), 'Der Friede im nuklearen Zeitalter', in Oskar Schatz (ed.), *Der Friede im nuklearen Zeitalter. Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten und Utopisten. 4. Salzburger Humanismusgespräch*, Munich: Manz Verlag, pp. 34-62.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1972), *Science: Servant or Master?*, New York: New American Library.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1984), 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932', in Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds.), *Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, pp. 1-17.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (2004), *Political Theory and International Affairs. Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's The Politics*, edited by Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Westport: Praeger.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (2012), *The Concept of the Political*, edited by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Munster, Rens van and Caspar Sylvest (2016), *Nuclear Realism: Global Political Thought During the Thermonuclear Revolution*, London: Routledge.
- Neacsu, Mihaela (2010), *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations. Disenchantment and Re-enchantment*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1968), *The Will to Power*, New York: Vintage Books.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1969), *Thus spoke Zarathustra. A Book for Everyone and no One*, London: Penguin.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003), *The Gay Science. With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paipais, Vassilios (2013), 'Necessary Fiction: Realism's Tragic Theology', *International Politics* 50 (6): 846-862.
- Rafshoon, Ellen Glaser (2001), 'A Realist's Moral Opposition to War: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam', *Peace & Change* 26 (1): 55-77.
- Rengger, Nicholas (2013), 'On Theology and International Relations. World Politics beyond the Empty Sky', *International Relations* 27 (2): 141-157.
- Rösch, Felix (2013), 'Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau', *International Politics* 50 (6): 815-829.
- Rösch, Felix (2014a), 'Best Friends Forever? Classical Realism and Critical Theory. E - *International Relations*', <http://ow.ly/BOaxc> (last accessed: 24th February 2015).

- Rösch, Felix, ed. (2014b), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations. A European Discipline in America?*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rösch, Felix (2015), *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rösch, Felix (2016a), 'Unlearning Modernity. A Realist Method for Critical International Relations?', *Journal of International Political Theory*, doi: 10.1177/1755088216671535.
- Rösch, Felix (2016b), 'Crisis, Values, and the Purpose of Science: Hans Morgenthau in Europe', *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 23-31.
- Scheuerman, William E. (2008), 'Realism and the Left: the Case of Hans J. Morgenthau', *Review of International Studies* 34 (1): 29-51.
- Scheuerman, William E. (2009a), *Hans Morgenthau. Realism and beyond*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Scheuerman, William E. (2009b), 'A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as a Critical Realist', in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations. Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-62.
- Scheuerman, William E. (2011), *The Realist Case for a Global Reform*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Schuett, Robert (2007), 'Freudian Roots of Political Realism: the Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Power Politics', *History of the Human Sciences* 20 (4): 53-78.
- Schuett, Robert (2010), *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realist Man*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sigwart, Hans-Jörg (2013), 'The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism', *Review of Politics* 75 (3): 407-432.
- Solomon, Ty (2012), 'Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power', *International Studies Review* 14 (2): 201-224.
- Speer, James P. II (1968), 'Hans Morgenthau and the World State', *World Politics* 20 (2): 207-227.
- Steele, Brent J. (2007), 'Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts': From Classical to Reflexive Realism', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10 (3): 272-300.
- Stullerova, Kamila (2016), 'Embracing Ontological Doubt: The Role of 'Reality' in Political Realism', *Journal of International Political Theory*, doi: 10.1177/1755088216673079.
- Thrift, Nigel (2000), 'It's the little things', in David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions. A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, London: Routledge, pp. 380-387.
- Tjalve, Vibeke Schou (2008), *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace. Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Troy, Jodok, ed. (2013), *Religion and the Realist Tradition. From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back*, London: Routledge.

Troy, Jodok (2015), 'Desire for Power or the Power of Desire? Mimetic Theory and the Heart of Twentieth-Century Realism', *Journal of International Political Theory* 11 (1): 26-41.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth (1982), *Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zambernardi, Lorenzo (2011), 'The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau's Critique of American Intervention in Vietnam', *Review of International Studies* 37 (3): 1335-1356.