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An Examination of IGOs and NGOs Understanding of Children's Involvement in Somali Piracy Networks and their Land-Based Responses

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An Examination of IGOs and NGOs Understanding of Children's Involvement in Somali Piracy Networks and their Land-Based Responses

Elizabeth Ann Norman

PhD

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An Examination of IGOs and NGOs Understanding of Children's Involvement in Somali Piracy Networks and their Land-Based Responses

By

Elizabeth Ann Norman

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University's requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2021

Coventry University

Certificate of Ethical Approval

Applicant: Elizabeth Norman

Project Title: A comparative case study of IGOs and INGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses

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[1] Original ethics certificate

Certificate of Ethical Approval

Applicant: Elizabeth Norman

Project Title: A comparative case study of IGOs and NGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses

This is to certify that the above named applicant has completed the Coventry University Ethical Approval process and their project has been confirmed and approved as Medium Risk

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[2] Ethics certificate with updated title. There was no change to the project at all. The title was likewise changed after the Viva, but no new ethics certificate was required.

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Abstract

Current estimates suggest that one-third of apprehended Somali piracy suspects are children under the age of eighteen, who are pushed into piracy due to fragility and insecurity onshore. Beyond their involvement at sea, children occupy land-based roles in piracy networks. Yet, there is little research into the involvement of children in piracy networks and what does exist focuses on how to treat those who are apprehended for piracy at sea, with little attention paid to the land-based context in which children join pirate groups, nor the shore-based roles they may occupy.

The aim of this thesis is to address this gap, by investigating the involvement of children in piracy networks from the context of human insecurity onshore, and the attempts that have been made to proactively address this issue on land. This is achieved through original qualitative research that examines how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia have understood the involvement of children in piracy and how this influenced their land-based programme and policy response between 2009-2018.

By examining the involvement of children in piracy networks from the context of human insecurity onshore, this thesis identifies the various roles children occupy within piracy networks and considers how such involvement may be proactively addressed on land, thereby providing a more holistic understanding of the issue. The findings show that both boys and girls are engaging with piracy groups, mainly in land-based roles, due to a lack of opportunity and alternatives onshore. As such, not only do the findings contribute towards a better understanding of the interrelationship between child piracy and human insecurity onshore, but they show how future attempts to counter the child piracy problem may be better achieved by addressing these land-based drivers.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family, whose constant love and support has made this possible. To my parents, David and Susan, for always encouraging me to chase my dreams, to my siblings, Lynne (and her partner Subi) and Stephen, for being my biggest cheerleaders, and to my partner Harry (and our dog Andromeda), for loving and believing in me.

I would also like to dedicate this thesis to Harry's family, Josh, Rose, Louis, Wendy, Rob, and Luke, for loving me as one of your own.

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I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge those people whose support, guidance, and belief has made this thesis possible. I am deeply grateful to my supervision team, Dr Ioannis Chapsos, Professor David McIlhatton, and Dr David Curran, for their assistance at every stage of the research project. I would also like to extend a special thank you to Ioannis, not just for his academic insights but for his pastoral support, particularly over the last year.

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I am extremely grateful to my research participants, for not only giving up their time, but for being so passionate and open when speaking to me, for believing in the importance of this research, and for the work they are doing to make the world a better place.

Finally, to all my family and friends. There are too many to name individually, but thank you for keeping me grounded and for being a wonderful support network.

List of Acronyms

Adeso - African Development Solutions

ALEO - Alternative livelihood and employment opportunity

ALP - Alternative livelihoods to piracy

CCAP - Coastal Communities Against Piracy

CGPCS - The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child

CSI - The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative

DDG – Danish Demining Group

DMPP – Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project

EU – European Union

FAO - The Food and Agriculture Organization

IDP – Internally displaced person

IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGO - International governmental organisations

ILO – International Labour Organisation

IMB - International Maritime Bureau

IMO – International Maritime Organisation

IUU – Illegal, unreported, and unregulated

MASE - The Maritime Safety Promotion Programme

MOLYS - Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sport

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA – Norwegian Church Aid

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

OBP – Oceans Beyond Piracy

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PASOS - Peace Action Society Organization for Somalia

SCD – Save the Children Demark

UN – United Nations

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

It has been claimed that an estimated one-third of all apprehended piracy suspects operating off the Somali coast have been younger than eighteen, making them children under international law[3] (Aquilina 2013: 1-2; Bellish 2015: 275; Conradi 2014: 16; Couper, Smith and Ciceri 2015: 197; Drumbl 2013: 249; Gaswaga 2013: 279; Kohm 2015: 334; Salomé 2016: 44; Scharf and Taylor 2017: 82; Sterio 2018: 2; 27), with others likely used by pirate groups on land in shore-based roles. Despite the suspected number of children involved in the crime, there is currently little research into this issue, and what does exist focuses on how to treat children who are apprehended for piracy on the high seas. This is because previous studies into child piracy have used the definition of piracy outlined in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982: 60-62), which legally defines it as a crime that only occurs on the high seas, outside of any state's sovereign territory.

Yet, considering the issue only from a high seas' perspective is problematic. It ignores the involvement of children in Somali pirate groups on land and in maritime zones other than international waters[4] and it fails to recognise that piracy does not exist in a vacuum in the maritime domain. Rather, it is linked to state fragility and human insecurity onshore. As such, the original primary research of this thesis, introduced within this chapter, examines how international governmental organisations[5] (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Somalia have understood and created land-based policy responses to the issue of child piracy between the years 2009-2018. Thereby examining the issue from its land-based context, creating a more holistic understanding of the diverse roles that children have occupied in pirate networks, and how their involvement is interrelated to human insecurity onshore.

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[3] As will be discussed in 2.5.1 of the next chapter, the accuracy of this figure is questionable
[4] Such as in territorial waters
[5] Also known as intergovernmental organisations

To aid with this, section 1.3 of this chapter provides context to the problem, by outlining the impact of modern-day piracy off the Somali coast and the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks, both of which will be examined in more detail in Chapter Two. Section 1.4 then outlines this thesis' original contribution to knowledge, the overarching research question it seeks to answers, the objectives, and sub-research questions, while section 1.5 discusses the overall thesis structure. However, before this, this chapter must define how the terms child, fragile states, piracy, IGO and NGO are understood within the context of this research, given the diverse understandings that can be applied to these terms.

1.2 Definition of terms

The child

In alignment with previous research into child piracy (Aquilina 2013: 1-2; Bellish 2015: 275; Drumbl 2013: 243; Sterio 2018: 3; Whitman et. al 2012: 3), this thesis accepts the definition of the child, outlined in the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989: 2), as being anyone below the age of eighteen. However, it recognises the difficulty of speaking about the child as one homogeneous category, given that theories of age and childhood are socially and culturally constructed, as opposed to naturally produced (Brown 2005: 5). Defining the child as someone below the age of eighteen has been found to create problems in the context of Africa, including Somalia where this research is situated, given that, as Sloth-Nielsen explains, 'it is linked to effective birth registrations, physical capacity, initiation ceremonies and other cultural and traditional concepts of childhood in Africa' (2016: 35). It is further complicated by the fact that there is a crossover between the concept of childhood and other age defining categories such as juvenile, adolescent, young adult, and youth.

As will be expanded on in later chapters[6], recognising and understanding the difficulty of defining the child is important when carrying out research into the issue of child piracy. Despite Somalia having ratified to the CRC in 2015, it appears that for many, including the authorities within the Puntland region where piracy has been most

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[6] See Chapters Six and Seven

prevalent, those aged between fifteen and eighteen are not considered children but young adults, and are treated as such (Human Rights Watch 2018: 61; United States Department of Labor: 3). Moreover, some of the development and academic literature on fragile states[7] often uses the term youth, rather than child, when speaking of those who are aged fifteen plus (Alfy 2016: 100; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 5; Cordaid 2015: 5; Goldstone 2002: 11; Urdal 2006: 615). Yet, while this thesis recognises the difficulty of speaking about the child in terms of age, it adopts the CRC understanding as in most cases, although not all, this same definition is not only used in previous studies into child piracy, but by the organisations and participants involved in this research.

Fragile states

There is no single accepted definition of a fragile state, rather, as Lewis explains 'state fragility is a broad and fluid concept that has been adopted by donors, practitioners and academics working in the area of international development to group together a number of countries' (2012: 35). Previous studies have identified three different categories that definitions of state fragility fall into (Bird 2007: 1; Cammack et. al 2006: 16-17; Hout 2010: 143). The first refers to the state's ability to function, particularly the inability or unwillingness of states to provide basic services to protect or safeguard the well-being of their citizens. The second category is more concerned with outputs, with fragile states considered those 'likely to generate poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, global security threats, refugees, organised crime, epidemic diseases, and/or environmental degradation' (Cammack et al. 2006: 16), which could spill into neighbouring countries leading to regional instability. The final way state fragility is understood is with regards to donor relations, which is less concerned with the nature of the state itself, but instead 'the difficult relationship they have with a particular donor or group of donors' (Hout 2010: 143).

The definition of state fragility used throughout this thesis aligns with the first and second category. This thesis understands state fragility as a consequence of weak state functions and institutions, with the government being unable, or in some cases unwilling, to provide basic services to their citizens (Baird 2010: 3; Ganson and Wennmann 2016: 24; IARAN 2017: 9; Torres and Anderson 2004: 3). This absence,

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[7] Which will be looked at in Chapter Three

inability, or unwillingness to provide social protection to their citizens then renders the state 'vulnerable to internal and external shocks' (Mcloughlin 2012: 9), such as poverty, natural disaster, conflict, or criminal activities including piracy, which can further impact upon those residing in fragile state, have negative implications for neighbouring states, and have more global consequences (Andrews et. al 2012: 4; Ganson and Wennmann 2016: 16; 21; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 5; Zoellick 2008: 68).

Maritime piracy

As Otto states, 'maritime piracy can be a slippery concept' (2014: 314) to define with academics, organisations, countries, and international law defining and understanding it differently (Oceans Beyond Piracy; Otto 2014: 314-315). As discussed in 1.1, previous research into child piracy has understood it in legal terms using the UNCLOS definition, which refers to piracy as 'any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed: on the high seas, against a ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state' (1982: 61). Aside from being utilised in previous studies into child piracy, the UNCLOS definition is also commonly used by the organisations involved in this research, particularly those that are departments of the United Nations (UN), or those who have delivered programmes on behalf of UN departments. However, as will be examined later within this thesis[8], while the wider organisational understanding of piracy may align with the UNCLOS definition, those delivering shore-based counter-piracy programmes have actually operated on broader understandings of piracy that take into account its wider land-based structures and operations.

As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, this thesis finds the UNCLOS definition to be problematic, not least of all because it confines piracy to the high seas, which ignores similar acts committed in territorial waters and the wider shore-based structurers that are essential to the piracy operation. Other definitions have attempted to avoid these limitations, as can be seen in the case of the

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[8] See Chapter Six

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (2021), which brings together the UNCLOS definition of piracy and the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) definition of armed robbery against ships laid out in Resolution A .1025 (26) (IMO 2010). As such, the IMB more broadly defines piracy as 'the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act' (Durand 2019: 74). While this provides a more inclusive definition than that of UNCLOS, as it avoids limiting piracy to the high seas and allows for attacks within territorial waters and on vessels anchored in port, it nevertheless still focuses only on the maritime space in which piracy occurs, failing to account for the land-based structure and operations that are involved. As such, while this thesis' understanding of piracy is more closely aligned with the IMB definition, this still does not go far enough. As will be discussed throughout, this thesis proposes that piracy should not be defined as something that exists in a vacuum within the maritime domain. Rather, it understands piracy to be a land-based activity that is rooted in human insecurity onshore, encompasses several shore-based actors, and which manifests itself at sea.

However, in alignment with both the IMB and UNCLOS definition, this thesis does accept that Somali piracy is a criminal act committed by private actors. This is not to say that some individuals will not have underlying political motives for engaging in piracy, nor that Somali pirate networks might not have secondary political motives, but rather it recognises that the overall aim of these pirate groups is economic gain. As will be expanded on in the next chapter, when the primary motives are political, this thesis considers the activity to be a separate issue, more closely aligned to the definition of terrorism at sea (Bateman 2010: 103; Dillon 2005: 157; Little 2010: 80-81).

International-Governmental Organisation and Non-Governmental Organisation
This thesis uses the standard definition of an IGO being an organisation that is 'composed primarily of sovereign states, or of other intergovernmental organisations' (Union of International Associations 2021), which is developed from an agreement or treaty among the states involved (Harvard Law School 2021; Union of International Associations 2021). This thesis recognises that while IGOs may have several aims,

they are predominately used as a 'mechanism for the world's inhabitants to work more successfully together in the areas of peace and security, and also to deal with economic and social questions' (Harvard Law School 2021).

While NGOs are harder to define, as their diversity 'strains any simple definition or classification' (Malena 1995: 75), this thesis considers the most important features to be that they are 'entirely or largely independent of government and characterised primarily by humanitarian or cooperative, rather than commercial, objectives' (Malena 995: 75). This is because, while IGOs and NGOs usually share similar humanitarian aims, and may work in partnership to deliver humanitarian programmes, they are nevertheless different organisational types. NGOs remain independent from governmental control, whereas IGOs are, by definition, controlled by governments.

1.3 Background on impact of modern-day Somali piracy

Pirate-like attacks are a reoccurring issue in the waters off East and West Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (Joubert 2020: 3; 9; 18; 24; Pigeon et al 2018: 3; 10; 17; 24). Piracy in these different regions is often tied to fragility onshore, with conflict, corruption, and human insecurity in countries such as Somalia, where this research is situated, having spilled out into the maritime domain[9] (Al-Qattan 2016: 35; Baniela 2010: 192; Eichstaedt 2010: 79; Murphy 2010: 25; 42; Nincic 2010: 6; Sterio 2018: 23; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 17-18; 27-28; 41; 49-50).

The impact of piracy, both in terms of the economic and human cost, is significant and has implications at the local, regional, and global level (Whitman and Suarez 2012: 56-86). According to the annual state of piracy reports, there were a total of 625 reported incidents of piracy or armed robbery at sea[10], with 14,617 seafarers, of varying nationalities, exposed to the activity between 2017 and 2019 (Pigeon et al 2018: 4-5; 11-12; 18-19; 25-26). Of these, seventy-five incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea were recorded off the Somali coast (Joubert 2020: iv; 4). While this is a significant decrease in the number of attacks compared to those that occurred during

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[9] This will be discussed in more detail in both the following chapter and Chapter Five
[10] Which refers to attacks within state territorial waters, as opposed to piracy on the high seas

the peak of Somali piracy, when up to 160 incidents were happening in a single year (Reva 2018), it shows that piracy in this region is not yet eradicated[11].

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has not only had implications for the shipping companies and crews involved, but the families of the seafarers affected. Those whose loved ones have been held hostage by pirates have suffered emotionally and financially, and it has been common for pirates to phone the families of hostages and threaten them that if ransoms are not paid their loved ones will be killed (Hurlburt 2011: 19-20; Seyle 2016: 20; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 76). At the same time piracy in the region has negatively impacted upon maritime transport, commerce, and the global economy (Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe 2020: 228; Gries and Redlin 2017: 309; Hahn 2012: 242; Kontorovich 2010: 252; Sterio 2018: 13; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 56; World Bank 2013: 1), with the estimated global cost of addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia totalling $1.4 billion in 2017 (Pigeon el al 2018: 6). Piracy has likewise negatively influenced the regional economy, with piracy in the Horn of Africa being linked to an increase in unemployment among fishermen, a decrease in tourism and leisure travel throughout East Africa, and has led to concerns that piracy resulted in an increase in transborder criminal networks (Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe 2020: 230; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 105; Sterio 2018: 24; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 66-67).

Besides the global and regional impacts, piracy has had negative consequences in Somalia. As will be examined in Chapter Two, those who profit most from piracy are often criminal syndicates, who have an interest in ensuring the state remains weak (Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 98; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 4; 33-36), and piracy operations coexist alongside other criminal enterprises such as trafficking operations and extremism, which increases the fragile situation onshore (Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 106; World Bank 2013: 62-67). Additionally, deliveries of food aid to the country have been intercepted and impacted by piratical activity, adding to the issue of food shortages and famine (Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 99-100), and piracy has led to an increase in prostitution, alcohol, and drug intake (Murphy 2011: 113). Furthermore, a high volume of young men have been arrested or killed during piracy operations,

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[11] This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five

leaving several communities without men of working age (Eichstaedt 2010: 174; Hulbert 2011: 25-26; Murphy 2011: 113; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 77). As will now be discussed, it is believed that in many cases these young men have been under the age of eighteen, raising concerns that Somali children have been involved with pirate groups.

1.3.1 The involvement of children in Somali piracy

This thesis focuses on child piracy in Somalia, as there is limited research into this problem and what does exist has likewise focused on child piracy in the context of Somalia (Aquilina 2013; Bellish 2015; Conradi 2014; Drumbl 2013; Fritz 2012; Gaswaga 2013; Gries and Redlin 2017; Hahn 2012; Holland 2013; Sterio 2018; Sterio 2013; Whitman 2013; Whitman et. al 2012). This is because the concept of child piracy is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged as part of the Somali piracy model. It was first identified as a potential issue in 2009, following the apprehension of Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse for his part in the hijacking of the MV Maersk Alabama (Hahn 2012: 254; Whitman et. al 2012: 4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 78). During his trial Muse's defence argued that he was below the age of eighteen, making him a child under intentional law (Bellish 2015: 294; Hahn 2012: 254; Payne 2010: 140). Although the Judge subsequently ruled that Muse was older than eighteen, the question of his age continued to be disputed throughout the trial (Hahn 2012: 254-255).

The potential involvement of children within Somali piracy networks was further highlighted in 2011, when twenty-five out of sixty-one piracy suspects apprehended by the Indian Navy were estimated to be aged fifteen or younger (Sterio 2018: 104; Whitman et. al 2012: 4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 78). As discussed in 1.1, it has since been estimated that one-third of all apprehended Somali piracy suspects have been younger than eighteen. As will be expanded on in the proceeding chapter[12], while the accuracy of this figure is debatable, given that the common practice of catch and release; the difficulty of accurately determining the exact ages of piracy suspects; the lack of birth certification in Somalia; and restricted data on piracy apprehensions

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[12] See 2.5.1

obscures efforts to gain an accurate picture of the overall child piracy problem, the available data does suggest that Somali children have been used by pirate networks and highlights the need for more focused research into this phenomenon. However, despite this, research into this area has been scarce. Within the academic literature that does exist, the focus has been predominantly on how to treat those who have been apprehended for piracy on the high seas (Conradi 2014: 16; Drumbl 2013: 248; Holland 2013: 186; Salomé 2016: 43; Whitman 2013: 233; Whitman et. al. 2012: 2; 14). This is because, as discussed in 1.2, the previous research operates using the UNCLOS definition of piracy being a crime that legally only occurs on the high seas, outside of any state's territory (UNCLOS 1982: 60-62).

However, as alluded to in 1.2 and as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, viewing piracy, and the involvement of children within this, from a purely high seas perspective is restrictive and problematic (Geiss and Petrig 2011: 59; Kontorovich 2010: 253; Sterio 2018: 17). Not only can pirate-like acts occur within state territorial waters (Chang: 2010: 282; Dillon 2005: 160; Kontorovich 2010: 253; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 94), but piracy is a land-based activity, linked to insecurity and fragility onshore. It is planned on land, the goods and hostages taken during piracy raids are held onshore, and pirate networks have their basis on land (Bueger, Edmunds and Ryan 2019: 974; Chapsos 2016: 68; Daxecker and Prins 2012: 943; Gaswaga 2013: 280; Kurniawan 2010: 72-73; Murphy 2010: 162).

Correspondingly, many of the actors involved, including some children and those who plan and finance acts of piracy, may never go to sea (Gaswaga 2013: 277; Hastings 2009: 318; Holland 2013: 181; Sloggett 2013: 305; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 43). As such, seeing piracy only as a high seas or purely maritime problem and responding to it as such is unlikely to provide a long-term solution, nor is it likely to keep children from engaging. Rather, piracy needs to be understood as a land-based problem that requires efforts to address the root causes of fragility and human insecurity onshore (Baniela 2010: 192; Gathii 2010: 112; Holland 2013: 180; Sloggett 2013: 144; Whitman et. al 2012: 2).

While previous literature pertaining to child piracy has referenced the land-based insecurity factors that could push children into piracy, its adoption of the UNCLOS definition of piracy means it has predominately focused on what this means for how children should be treated when apprehended on the high seas (Drumbl 2012: 267-268; Fritz 2012: 910; Sterio 2018: 64; Whitman et. al 2012: 5-6). As such, there is a lack of understanding regarding how this issue may be understood and treated from its land-based context. This includes an absence of academic knowledge surrounding what activities have been undertaken by IGOs and NGOs to help keep children from engaging in Somali piracy networks, the potential benefits of these activities, and how they could be enhanced and improved. Moreover, by working from any existing definition (such as those proposed by UNCLOS, the IMO, or the IMB) and focusing predominately on the maritime domain, the current literature fails to consider the involvement and needs of those children who are recruited for land-based roles. This not only imposes geographical limitations, but it genders the debate, resulting in claims that only boys are involved in pirate networks (Drumbl 2013: 268; Holland 2013: 182-183). This is because most, if not all, of the children who have been involved in Somali piracy at seas have been male, however this is not to say that girls do not take on land-based roles.

Furthermore, because it focuses on the maritime space, the current academic discussion has failed to examine how the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks relates to the wider understanding of children in fragile states, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. While there are some unsubstantiated claims that children may move between pirate networks and other armed groups onshore in Somalia (Holland 2013: 184; Whitman, Reeves and Johnson 2016: 7), there is an absence of research that examines the extent to which this may be true. Consequently, it is not clear how the use of children within piracy networks might be interconnected to the use of children within militant armed groups and gangs, nor on how measures aimed at keeping children from engaging in piracy in Somalia may help to dissuade them from engaging in other similar activities on land.

1.4 Original contribution to knowledge, research questions and objectives

The original contribution to knowledge of this thesis addresses the academic gap, outlined above, by examining the involvement of children in piracy networks from the context of human insecurity onshore, and the attempts have been made to proactively address this issue on land. By doing so, it makes an original contribution to the academic literature in two distinct areas. The first is maritime piracy, and specifically the involvement of children in Somali piracy, whereas the second is the fragile states' literature. This is because, by examining Somali child piracy in relation to the fragility of nation states and placing the issue alongside the wider literature pertaining to youth in fragile states, it brings the maritime domain into this field.

As will be outlined in more detail in Chapter Four, it does this through an examination of how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia understand the involvement of Somali children within piracy networks and how this influenced their policy and programme responses between 2009-2018. By doing so, this thesis works towards creating a more holistic understanding of the engagement of children in piracy networks in Somalia, which looks beyond the understanding of piracy being a purely maritime activity, to consider both the sea-going and land-based roles that children may be utilised for, along with the shore-based drivers that facilitate their engagement in pirate groups, and how these may be addressed.

Given this, the principal research question of this thesis is:

How have IGO and NGO actors understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia from 2009-2018?

To work towards answering this overarching research question, the following objectives have been identified. Where required, a series of inter-linked sub-research questions are included to ensure these objectives are met.

Objective 1. To understand the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy, and examine how these relate to state fragility

Sub-Research question 1.1: What are the drivers, enablers, motivators, and responses to Somali piracy?

Sub-Research question 1.2: What does the literature reveal about the relationship between state fragility and piracy in Somalia?

Sub-Research question 1.3: How are children and youth understood as a cause, victim, and solution to state fragility and where does this relate to the discussions of the involvement of children and youth in Somali piracy networks?

Objective 2. To explore the role of children within Somali piracy networks and the extent to which these can be compared to children involved in other security challenges in fragile states

Sub-Research Question 2.1: What does the literature tell us about the similar drivers and stressors that lead children to become involved in Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs within the context of fragile states?

Sub-Research Question 2.2: Are there any comparisons that can be made with regards to the roles and responsibilities children take on within Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs?

Sub-Research Question 2.3: What does this reveal regarding how children involved in Somali piracy are currently framed in the academic literature and in policy?

Objective 3. To explore how IGOs and NGOs define, understand, and respond to children who are involved in Somali piracy networks

Sub-Research Question 3.1: What do IGOs and NGOs perceive to be the land-based causes of child piracy in Somalia, and how did this influence their policy responses from 2009-2018?

Sub-Research Question 3.2: What does this tell us about the wider understanding of the perception of child pirates among IGOs and NGOs and what does it reveal about how children associated with Somali piracy groups are viewed when they are seen from a land-based perspective?

Objective 4. To consider whether the findings reveal any wider commonality between the perceptions of children involved in piracy networks in Somalia and children involved in armed groups and or gangs in fragile states

Sub-Research Question 4.1: How do the IGO and NGO perceptions relate to the wider understanding of children in fragile states involved in similar activities within military armed groups and gangs and does this suggest a more holistic way of understanding the involvement of children within Somali piracy networks?

Objective 5. To draw on the limitations of this study and suggest how these may be used to influence further areas of research

To fulfil the overall purpose of this thesis a desk-based review of the academic literature is utilised to answer the sub-research questions connected to Objectives One and Two, while a review of the relevant methodology literature, along with a discussion and justification for the overall research design is used to identify how the proceeding objectives are addressed. An exploration of how IGOs and NGOs understand children's involvement within Somali piracy networks and how this influenced their land-based responses between 2009-2018 answers the sub-research questions connected to Objectives Three and Four. Finally, Objective Five focuses on the impact of the overall research findings and the limitations of the study, providing a foundation from which the Conclusion can suggest potential areas of future research.

While the focus is on children below the age of eighteen, it should be noted that Research Question 1.3 focuses on both children and youth. This is because, as previously mentioned[13], the fragile states' literature, reviewed in Chapter Three, often refers to youth as being aged fifteen plus, particularly when discussing youth bulge theory (Alfy 2016: 100; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 5; Cordaid 2015: 5; Goldstone 2002: 11; Urdal 2006: 615). Therefore, given that many children involved in maritime piracy could fall within this age bracket, literature relating to both children and youth is required to adequately answer this question and meet the overall research objective.

1.5 Thesis structure

This thesis is made up of seven further chapters, all of which are guided by at least one of the research objectives outlined above. Chapter Two works towards meeting

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[13] See 1.2

research Objective One, through a critical review of the academic literature pertaining to maritime piracy in Somalia. In particular, it seeks to answer Sub-Research Questions 1.1 and 1.2, by examining the drivers, enablers, motivators, and responses to Somali piracy, along with what this reveals about the relationship between state fragility and piracy. The concept of child piracy is also discussed within in this chapter, with a critical review of the existent research into this issue. This includes a review and analysis of the child piracy problem, including what is currently known about the issue. By doing so, it will outline the limitations of the current high seas approach to the child piracy problem and highlight the importance of broadening the research focus to consider the land-based context when examining the involvement of children within the crime.

Chapter Three builds on the findings of Chapter Two, by seeking to establish a much greater understanding of how young people are viewed as a cause, victim, and solution to state fragility and how this may be interrelated with the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks, thereby meeting the final associated sub-research question for Objective One. In addition, this chapter works towards meeting the second research objective and its associated sub-research questions. This is achieved by exploring the role of children within Somali piracy networks and the extent to which these can be compared to children involved in similar security challenges on land in fragile states – namely armed groups and gangs. By doing so, this thesis advances the academic discourse on state fragility, along with maritime piracy. Taken together, Chapters Two and Three serve to ground the thesis in theory and identify the academic gap addressed through this research. The theory and findings discussed within both these chapters are then used to inform the methodological approach adopted by this research, which is discussed in Chapter Four.

As such, Chapter Four sets out the overall methodological framework and research design of the study. This includes providing the justification for the use of qualitative data collection methods, by outlining the social constructionist epistemology underpinning the study. It likewise justifies the rationale for focusing on Somalia as the case selection and why the decision was taken to explore how IGO and NGO actors understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia between 2009-2018.

Chapter Five is where the case study of Somalia is introduced. It provides an overview of the fragile situation in Somalia, including the impact this has on children and youth, while presenting additional justification for the geographic focus on Somalia. In addition, by outlining the relevant context and background, Chapter Five acts as a bridge to the following empirical chapters, by providing the foundation from which to address Objective Three.

Both Chapters Six and Seven present the original primary research of this thesis, with Chapter Six examining how IGOs and NGOs understand child piracy in Somalia. Chapter Seven then considers the characteristics and limitations of the responses carried out by the IGOs and NGOs between 2009-2018. Both chapters will work towards meeting Objective's Three and Four and the associated sub-research questions. This will be achieved by exploring how IGO and NGO actors have defined, understood, and responded to children involved in Somali piracy networks, and whether this reveals any wider commonality between the perceptions of the children involved in Somali piracy networks and those involved in armed groups or gangs.

The Conclusion chapter works through the findings of the overall thesis, including what implications the research findings have for the academic discourse on child piracy in Somalia, maritime piracy more broadly, and fragile states. In doing so, it highlights this thesis original contribution to knowledge, by considering what the findings reveal about the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks when seen, not from its limited maritime perspective, but from the land-based perspective of IGOs and NGOs. In addition, it will consider what this reveals about the land-based operations of Somali pirate networks, how the issue of child piracy may be related to the fragility of the Somali state, and what recommendations can be made for addressing the issue of child piracy going forward. The Conclusion likewise draws on the research limitations and uses these to suggest further areas of study.

Chapter Two: Piracy and State Fragility in Somalia

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consult the academic literature and work towards meeting the first research objective of this thesis, which is to understand the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy and examine how these relate to state fragility. In particular, it seeks to address Sub-Research Questions 1.1 and 1.2, by examining the drivers, enablers, motivators, and responses to Somali piracy, along with what the literature reveals about the relationship between state fragility and piracy in Somalia. The final associated sub-research question for Objective One, which considers how children and youth are understood as a cause, victim, and solution to state fragility and how this relates to the discussions regarding the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks is addressed in the following chapter. Together, both this chapter and the next will ground this thesis in theory and identify the contribution made by this research in the fields of maritime piracy and fragile states.

To work towards meeting Objective One and the relevant associated sub-research questions, this chapter begins in 2.2 by outlining the limitations of the UNCLOS definition of piracy, and the arbitrary distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, before moving on to consider the global impact of pirate-like attacks on the high seas and in territorial waters. As part of this discussion, consideration will be given to how the definition outlined by the IMB has attempted to address this problem and the limitations this definition poses. The following section (2.3) examines the problems of understanding piracy as a purely maritime activity, by outlining the broader land-based context of Somali piracy, including the political and social geography in which these pirate networks operate and the involvement of actors onshore. This then leads into a discussion regarding the limitations of the current responses to Somali piracy. Section 2.4 then considers the shore-based factors such as conflict, the impacts of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing on livelihoods and industry, and economic instability, all of which may contribute to how Somali piracy can be viewed as both a product and a driver of state fragility. The concept of child piracy in Somalia is then

introduced in section 2.5, which examines what the existing research and available literature tells us about the issue, along with outlining the importance of understanding the land-based context when considering the involvement of children within the crime. Finally, section 2.6 summaries the main findings from this chapter and outlines how it links to the proceeding one.

Before moving on it should be noted that the geographical focus of this chapter, in keeping with the overall thesis, is on Somalia, although instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea occur in other regions as well (such as in the Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asia). The decision was taken to focus on piracy in Somalia within this chapter for the practical reason that there is limited research into the issue of child piracy and, as outlined in 1.3.1 of the Introduction Chapter, what does exist has only examined the issue from the Somali context (Aquilina 2013; Bellish 2015; Conradi 2014; Drumbl 2013; Fritz 2012; Gaswaga 2013; Gries and Redlin 2017; Hahn 2012; Holland 2013; Sterio 2018; Sterio 2013; Whitman 2013; Whitman et. al 2012). Furthermore, in keeping with this, the overall purpose of this thesis seeks to address how IGO and NGO actors have understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia from 2009-2018. Therefore, the decision was taken to focus on research into Somali piracy and state fragility to reflect this overall geographic focus. A full justification for the case study selection (including the selected timeframe) will be discussed in more detail in the Methodology chapter[14].

2.2 Piracy and armed robbery at sea

As discussed in the Introduction chapter[15], previous research into child piracy in Somalia has primarily adopted a UNCLOS understanding of the crime, which defines piracy under Article 101 (1982: 60-62) as an illegal act of violence or detention committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, for private ends, against another ship or aircraft on the high seas. While it is understandable that previous research has understood child piracy in this way, given that UNCLOS provides the definition of piracy used under international law, it is nevertheless

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[14] Chapter Four section 4.4
[15] See 1.2

problematic[16]. The situation is often more complex than UNCLOS allows for, and this definition can be accused of hampering responses to piracy, as it suffers from being both ambiguous and restrictive (Geiss and Petrig 2011: 59; Kontorovich 2010: 253; Sterio 2018: 17).

One of the main problems with the UNCLOS definition is that many acts that resemble piracy do not occur on the high seas but in the territorial waters of nation states (Chang: 2010: 282; Dillon 2005: 160; Kontorovich 2010: 253; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 94). While this is less of a problem in the Somali context compared to regions where pirate-like attacks occur in archipelagos, straits, or gulfs[17], attacks in the Horn of Africa nevertheless can and do occur close to the shore within the territorial waters of nation states (Kontorovich 2010: 253; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 94). Yet, 'pirate-like attacks against vessels in territorial waters do not amount to piracy in the legal sense' (Geiss and Petrig 2011: 64), meaning many instances of maritime violence, including some committed by Somali pirate groups, are not actually considered acts of piracy under UNCLOS (Murphy 2010: 17; Raymond 2010: 12; Sterio 2010: 1468).

Instead, when pirate-like attacks happen within territorial waters this is known as armed robbery at sea, which has most notably been defined by the IMO under Resolution A .1025 (26) (2010). There is no difference between piracy and armed robbery at sea (Klein 2011: 303; Murphy 2010: 8), rather the distinction is an attempt to protect state sovereignty, as piracy on the high seas occurs outside any state territory and is considered 'a domestic or municipal crime of universal jurisdiction' (Kranska 2011: 106). This means that any country can prosecute someone for the act of piracy using their own domestic laws (Chang 2010: 274). Therefore, as Sterio explains, 'if the scope of piracy extends into a state's territorial waters, the universality of the crime collides with the territorial sovereignty of that state' (2010: 1468). Consequently, UNCLOS limits piracy to the high seas to avoid this and to ensure the responsibility remains with nation states to arrest and prosecute those who carry out such acts in their waters. However, as will be discussed in 2.3, this is problematic as

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[16] As previously alluded to in 1.2
[17] As is often the case in the Gulf of Guinea or Southeast Asia

armed robbery at sea may arise in states that 'might not have the will or the motivation, the financial means or the capabilities to suppress armed robbery against ships in its own territorial waters' (Jesus 2003: 373).

The issue of piracy and sovereignty is further complicated by the fact that UNCLOS extended the territorial waters of nation states up to twelve nautical miles (Kelley 2011: 2302), which, as Kontrovich explains, has had 'the unintended effect of reducing the area where piracy can be internationally policed' (2010: 253). Moreover, the right to hot pursuit[18] ceases to exist as soon as a pirate vessel enters a state's territorial waters (Jesus 2003: 384; Lombardo 2019: 81; Russell 2010: 65; Sterio 2018: 18). As Klein explains 'the termination of the right of hot pursuit as soon as the pursued vessel enters the territorial sea of its own or a third state reinforces the lack of policing powers of other states in the territorial sea, even if pirates…are being pursued' (2011: 304). This has led Kelley to argue that, in cases such as Somalia where law enforcement and security is virtually non-existent, pirates can 'theoretically harass and hijack ships with a manner of double impunity' (Kelley 2011: 2302).

Understanding the geographical confines of both the UNCLOS definition of piracy and the IMO understanding of armed robbery at sea is important, as it highlights the space in which the international community cannot respond to piracy, and, as will be examined in more detail in 2.3.1, it shows the limitations of who can legally be classed as a pirate. There is no difference between the crime on the high seas compared to the crime in territorial waters, yet only those involved in the former are recognised as pirates within these definitions. This is because it is not the action nor the nature of the crime that matters, but the space in which it occurs. Furthermore, as will be considered now, despite the distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, the location of the crime, whether it be within territorial waters or on the high seas, does not significantly change the impact that the crime can have on the wider global community. As such, and as will be discussed in the proceeding section, this has resulted in the

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18 This refers to the 'right of a state to pursue a foreign ship within its territorial waters (or possibly its contiguous zone) and there capture it if the state has good reason to believe that this vessel has violated its laws. The hot pursuit may – but only if it is uninterrupted – continue onto the high seas, but it must terminate the moment the pursued ship enters the territorial waters of another state, as such pursuit would involve an offence to the other state' (Oxford Reference 2021)

IMB developing a more inclusive definition of piracy, which does not stipulate the maritime space in which the crime can occur.

2.2.1 The global impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea

While piracy on the high seas is classed as a crime of universal jurisdiction it is not legally an international crime since it does not fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or any international tribunal (Kranska 2011: 106). Yet, as Drumbl explains, piracy is a global crime in the sense that 'nationals and property of many states have been victimized by pirate attacks, including: Thailand, the Netherlands, Bangladesh, the U.S., the U.K., China, Ukraine, France, Bulgaria, Greece, the Philippines, Malta, Myanmar, Denmark, Iran, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation' (2013: 249). This global nature of the crime is succinctly summed up by Sterio, who explains how 'pirates work at a supranational level: they attack a vessel owned by a company headquartered in country A, which flies the flag of country B, and employs crewmembers coming from countries C, D, E, and F' (2010: 1451).

While the crew, and to some extent the company who own the vessel, are the direct victims of piracy, the impacts go beyond those who encounter pirates at sea. As past research shows[19], the families of seafarers caught up in pirate attacks often struggle emotionally and financially (Hurlburt: 2011: 19-20; Seyle 2016: 20; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 76) and the impact on global commerce can negatively influence both the local and global economy, causing commodities to rise in price (Gries and Redlin 2017: 309; Hahn 2012: 242; Kontorovich 2010: 252; Raymond 2010: 11; Sterio 2018: 13). Furthermore, the existence of piracy in one state can significantly affect neighbouring states (Murphy 2007: 44). This can be seen in the Horn of Africa, where Somali piracy has impacted upon the tourism industry and wider economy in neighbouring countries, resulting in concerns that this could damage the overall regional stability (Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe 2020: 230; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 105; 106; Sterio 2018: 24).

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[19] And as discussed in 1.3 of the Introduction chapter

Such global impacts cannot just be felt in instances of piracy on the high seas but also in cases of armed robbery at sea, as they too have been found to create 'major havoc to maritime trade' (Jesus 2003: 369). As Potgieter and Schofield explain 'the vast majority of attacks on shipping, including many off the Horn of Africa, tend to take place relatively close to shore, and thus within the territorial seas of coastal states' (2010: 94). This suggests that the impact can be the same, whether the crime occurs on the high seas or within territorial waters, as even when it happens in the latter it can still influence global trade and world economies, along with having various international victims (Klein 2011: 303; Murphy 2010: 17).

Therefore, although the distinction between piracy under UNCLOS and armed robbery at sea under the IMO may protect sovereignty, as outlined in the previous section, it does not account for the fact that attacks within territorial waters can still have global impacts (Hastings 2009: 215; Haywood and Spivak 2012: 95). As has been shown in this section, the victims and effects of the activity often remain the same, regardless of the space in which it occurs, or the name used to describe the crime. Further definitions of piracy have attempted to address this problem, most notably that developed by the IMB, which defines piracy as 'the act of boarding any vessel' (Durand 2019: 74), removing the distinction between territorial waters and the high seas.

However, while the IMB definition is more inclusive, it does not provide the same legal recourse to address piracy in the same way that UNCLOS does. This means that even in the most violent and extreme cases, the international community still has no jurisdiction over pirates who have subsequently entered the waters of a nation state from the high seas, nor over those who have committed such acts within a state's territorial waters (Jesus 2003: 379). Instead, as Haywood and Spivak explain, the responsibility falls to 'those governments least able to arrest and prosecute pirates' (2012: 95). This points to a further limitation of both the UNCLOS and IMB definitions of piracy, as seeing it as a purely maritime activity is problematic. As will be discussed in the proceeding section, pirate-like attacks flourish within fragile states such as Somalia that either cannot or will not adequately enforce the rule of law (Murphy 2011: 2; Murphy 2010: 18), and piracy requires the support of numerous actors onshore.

2.3 Piracy as a land-based crime

The fact that current understandings and definitions of piracy consider it a crime that only occurs in the maritime space are flawed, as they fail to recognise that piracy is as much of 'a land-based activity as it is a marine activity' (Murphy 2010: 162). Pirates have their base and their homes on land, along with conducting their business and selling the items they have looted onshore (Bueger, Edmunds and Ryan 2019: 974; Chapsos 2016: 68; Kurniawan 2010: 72-73). As Daxecker and Prins explain 'pirates need sanctuaries on land to plan attacks, protect themselves from capture, and conduct ransom operations' (2012: 943). The dual nature of piracy being a crime that happens at sea, but an activity planned on land is summed up by Gaswaga, who explains 'piracy is a very unique offence. It occurs on the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of any state, while the planning and coordination, facilitation, aiding and abetting by way of financing, and recruitment of pirates is done on dry land' (2013: 280).

The relationship between piracy as a maritime crime and a land-based activity highlights the importance of understanding both the space and wider context in which it occurs. As previously discussed, by limiting piracy to the high seas, the UNCLOS definition fails to examine what happens in coastal states' territorial waters - the maritime space that exists between the high seas and the coastline – while both the UNCLOS and IMB definitions ignore the land-based causal effects. As Pham explains 'while favourable physical geography can be conducive to outbreaks of piracy, often overlooked is the need for a social and political geography that likewise encourages the marauders' (2010: 330). As such, and as previous research has shown, pirate-like attacks are more likely to occur when a favourable maritime geography is present in states that have weak or corrupt governance structures that lack the capacity or will to tackle piracy either at sea or via its base on land (Berlatsky 2010: 9; Chapsos 2016: 68).

The failure to recognise the land-based elements of piracy points to an important gap in existing understandings and definitions of the crime. By treating it as something that happens in the maritime space and separating it from its land-based context, previous

definitions fail to adequately address the drivers, enablers, and motivators of piracy. As will be considered in 2.3.2, this in turn is hampering responses to piracy. Furthermore, failing to recognise the shore-based factors is problematic when considering the legal distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, along with the restrictions placed on hot pursuit from the high seas. As previously outlined, despite being more inclusive, the IMB definition does not provide the legal recourse to address piracy. Rather, this falls to UNCLOS, which means the international community has no power or jurisdiction when pirates are operating in or retreat into territorial waters. This has created a situation in which those who generate the political and social environment that allows piracy to flourish are the actors tasked with suppressing it. In some cases, this becomes more problematic since, as will now be considered, the officials responsible for tackling the crime in territorial waters or on land are often in support of, or complicit in, the activity (Eichstaedt 2010: 86; Hartley 2010: 47; Murphy 2007: 40).

2.3.1 Land-based actors in piracy networks

When the land-based elements of pirate-like attacks are considered, it becomes clear that many of the actors involved in the operation are based onshore, rather than partaking in the activity in the maritime domain. As Lehr explains, not only are pirate bases on land but so too are 'their business contacts, their banks, their connections to crime syndicates, and their spotters in the ports' (2011: xi). The involvement of land-based actors raises further questions surrounding who we refer to when we speak of pirates, as not everyone associated with a piracy network takes part in the activity at sea. As past research has shown, for such operations to flourish in the maritime domain, it requires the support of local actors and communities, along with the backing of corrupt and complicit officials on land (Chapsos 2016: 68; Geiss and Petrig 2011; 10; Murphy 2010: 161).

Understanding these support networks is paramount when considering piracy off the Somali coast, as according to previous studies the sophistication of the operations implies there are 'land-based connections and protections' (Lehr and Lehmann 2011: 17). As Whitman and Suarez explain this includes 'numerous actors invested in the

success of the pirate attacks, from the financiers, sponsors, organized crime elements and corrupt state officials, to the small-scale recruits and communities who now depend on the economic opportunities it provides' (2012: 43). Furthermore, as Geiss and Petrig explain 'pirate groups are engaged in the systematic corruption of local officials' (2011: 10). This is supported by past research, which details how some Somali MPs and officials have defended pirates, referring to them as heroes and arguing that their actions are in defence of their coastal waters (Harper 2012: 150; Pham 2010: 331).

The involvement of local community members in shore-based roles reinforces the difficulty of speaking about piracy as a purely maritime crime, as it becomes apparent that pirate networks are not just comprised of those who are part of the boarding party. Rather there are many other actors involved, most of whom do not go out on the water. As Whitman and Suarez note, in the case of Somalia, 'it is estimated that for every 50 pirates used in the actual attacks, there are another 50 individuals on the coast employed as guards, cooks, producers and traders' (2012: 43). Pham similarly claims that pirates have subcontractors onshore who range from 'the elders of local clans who permit the pirates to operate out of their ports or to bring their captive vessels there, to those guarding a hijacked ship, to caterers who provide food to captors and prisoners alike, to prostitutes who provide diversion while the ransoms are being negotiated' (2010: 334). When looked at from this angle it becomes apparent that pirate networks rely on the involvement of shore-based actors, as much as those who are involved in the sea-based operation.

Additionally, pirates rely on the support of the coastal villages where acts of piracy are orchestrated from. In Somalia pirates receive backing from the local community partly because, as will be looked at in more detail in 2.4.2, they are considered Robin Hood style heroes who fight against illegal fishing and benefit the poor (Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 1300; Murphy 2010: 157; Schneider and Winkler 2013: 186). Although members of this community may not necessarily be considered part of the pirate network, they are still essential to the operation since, as Harper explains, it is from them that pirates 'buy fuel, water, soft drinks, sheep, goats, rice, spaghetti and cigarettes' (2012: 154). Similarly, according to Pham, 'some pirate gangs have even

set up exchanges where individuals may invest in their enterprises by providing cash, weapons, or other useful materials' (2010: 334). According to previous research, the economic benefits associated with this has helped to garner support in some coastal towns where piracy flourishes, as whole communities are able to live off the profits (Sloggett 2013: 144; Sterio 2018: 26; Sterio 2010: 1451; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 27).

Furthermore, in Somalia, piracy is planned on land by kingpins, who then contract out the actual crime to those who are vulnerable onshore (Gaswaga 2013: 277; Holland 2013: 181). As Sloggett explains 'warlords operating in the coastal areas take a large part of the earnings and the people at the sharp end of the activities – those risking their lives to hijack the ships – get quite low levels of income' (2013: 305). Similarly, Hastings claims that 'most of the pirate gangs appear to be making money for warlords situated on the central and northeastern Somalian coast' (2009: 318). There is evidence to suggest that apart from remaining onshore, some organisers and financiers are not based in Somalia but are part of the diaspora (Couper, Smith and Ciceri 2015: 197; Eichstaedt 2010: 97; 146; Gathii 2010: 111; Murphy 2010: 110; Sterio 2018: 25). This means those apprehended for the crime of piracy are very rarely the masterminds of the activity (Eichstaedt 2010: 117-118). In fact, as will be looked at in more detail in 2.5, many of those involved in the actual act of piracy are thought to be children, with claims that an estimated one-third of apprehended Somali piracy suspects have been younger than eighteen (Aquilina 2013: 1-2; Bellish 2015: 275; Conradi 2014: 16; Couper, Smith and Ciceri 2015: 197; Drumbl 2013: 249; Gaswaga 2013: 279; Kohm 2015: 334; Salomé 2016: 44; Scharf and Taylor 2017: 82; Sterio 2018: 2; 27). While the accuracy of this figure is debatable, it is evident that some children are involved in pirate groups[20].

When these factors are considered together it becomes apparent that, while piracy is defined as a crime that occurs in the maritime space, the scope of who could be classed as a pirate becomes much broader when the wider land-based activity is taken into consideration. For piracy to flourish the operation depends on more than just the boarding party; with politicians, officials, businessmen and whole communities playing

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[20] This will be examined in more detail in 2.5.1

key roles. This is summed up by Scharf and Carlton, who describe pirates as being 'sophisticated business men, desperate and impoverished ex-fishermen, vulnerable children and deadly terrorists' (2013: 1). As will now be considered, when looked at from this angle, it reveals possible limitations with attempting to counter the problem purely at sea. Especially when those who arguably bear the greatest responsibility – the organisers and financers of the crime – remain onshore.

2.3.2 Limitations of current anti-piracy responses

When piracy is seen from this land-based perspective it appears that both the definition under UNCLOS and the IMB, along with the vast majority of counter-piracy responses, are treating a symptom rather than the root of the problem, as they predominantly focus on the maritime space in which the crime occurs (Lehr 2013: 116). This has led Potgieter and Schofield to claim that 'naval actions are likely to, at most, result in only ephemeral victories' (2010: 106). This is further echoed by Pham who states that 'the inherent structure of any piracy…frustrates any attempt to stop it merely by focusing on countering suspect pirate vessels at sea. Piracy has always been a land-based crime which happens to manifest itself at sea; pirates will always require a port from which to operate' (2010: 326).

As discussed in 2.3.1, limiting piracy to the maritime space means that only the 'foot soldiers' are held accountable, with previous research outlining how the land-based financer, orchestrators, profiteers, and criminal networks that make the crime possible are effectively immune to prosecution (Bellamy 2010: 80; Fritz 2012: 906; Whitman et. al. 2012: 8-9). This has resulted in concerns that while these masterminds and criminal networks exist onshore it is unlikely that Somali piracy will completely cease, especially as for every pirate apprehended at sea there are plenty of willing recruits on land ready to take their place (Bahadur 2011: 23). As such, Drumbl argues that 'rigorous pursuit of justice would look far beyond the individual pirate, and even the gang leader, so as to address the catalytic role of clan elders, financiers, weapons dealers, and profiteers (many of whom never leave shore)' (2013: 277). Until this

occurs, even if it is suppressed, Somali piracy will continue to be a potential threat[21] (Oladipo 2017; Pigeon et. al 2018: 1; 3; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115).

Additionally, while conditions onshore remain precarious and piracy continues as a lucrative investment, it is probable that pirates will continue to garner at least some support from either the coastal communities from which they operate, or the corrupt officials who assist them (Pham 2010: 336; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 106). This is a concern in Somalia where, as Lehr (2013: 132) explains, piracy can only be addressed in the long-term by addressing the lack of law and order onshore that has allowed pirate groups to operate and grow.

What this shows is that piracy does not exist in a vacuum within the maritime domain. Rather, as Nincic explains, it is tied to human and state insecurity on land 'where humanitarian conditions are dire and economic opportunities are limited' (2010: 6). As such, this has led some academics to claim that naval forces alone are inadequate, since any long-term solution will only be secured through recognising piracy as land-based activity and placing it within the context of human insecurity onshore (Baniela 2010: 192; Holland 2013: 180; Sloggett 2013: 144; Whitman et. al 2012: 2). According to Fergusson, 'even NATO's navies agree that the eventual solution to piracy will be found not at sea but on the land' (2013: 158). In the case of Somalia, where attempts have been made to counter piracy at sea through a coordinated international naval response, this does not mean that this should cease. Rather, as Gathii explains, it just means that this should 'not shift international attention away from the reconstruction of Somalia' (2010: 112). Considering the relationship between human insecurity onshore and Somali piracy is something that this thesis will now consider.

2.4 Shore-based insecurity and Somali piracy

The purpose of this section is to examine the main drivers and mobilisers of maritime piracy in the Somali context, and what this reveals about how the academic literature views piracy and state fragility as being interrelated, thereby working towards meeting

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[21] This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five

Sub-Research Questions 1.1 and 1.2. As such, this section examines the extent to which Somali piracy can be seen as being interrelated to land-based conflict, IUU fishing and its associated impacts, and economic instability, before examining how a nexus of different factors, which are related to the fragile situation onshore, are found to create the right conditions for piracy to flourish.

2.4.1 Somali piracy, conflict and 'private-ends'

According to previous research, the disorder and instability that exists in conflict and post-conflict states are often related to a growth in piracy (Chapsos 2016: 68; Murphy 2010: 28). As can be seen in the literature relating to Somalia, the origins of piracy and armed robbery at sea can be linked to the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, which left the country without an effective Government and caused a cycle of humanitarian crisis and low-level conflict, with the instability onshore spilling over into the maritime domain (Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe 2020: 230; Geiss and Petrig 2011: 14-15; Nincic 2010: 8; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 106). This is because the lack of law and order made it easier for pirates to operate with impunity, with Geiss and Petrig explaining how 'piracy was a symptom of a wider lack of security and rule of law in Somalia' (2011: 15). Along with being a prominent theme in the academic literature, the interconnection between Somali conflict and piracy has been recognised in research by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which found that 'piracy is a consequence of the civil war that has contributed to overall insecurity in Somalia…State collapse, domestic insecurity, extreme poverty and unemployment, and easy access to weapons provide the perfect environment for piracy to thrive and increase' (2012: 40).

While conflict onshore may impact upon the piracy problem it is important to understand that Somali pirates are criminals and not combatants (Gaswaga 2013: 289; Guilfoyle 2010: 2; Schneckener 2009: 12). This is because they are neither acting as part of the state, nor do they fulfil any of the criteria to count as a military non-state armed group - namely they do not control any territory, nor are they waging conflict against a specific group either on land or at sea (Cioto 2013: 208; Guilfoyle 2010: 4; Holland 2013: 202). Furthermore, the motives of pirates are seen to be different to

those of combatants, as piracy is defined under UNCLOS (Article 101) as an act committed for private ends, while the actions of combatants are considered political. Similarly, under the IMB definition, pirates have criminal intentions rather than political ones (Durand 2019: 74).

Yet, in the case of UNCLOS, it is not clear what is meant by 'private ends' (Jesus 2003: 377). As Haywood and Spivak explain, 'one perspective is that "private ends" are financial or personal gains as opposed to political gain…another perspective argues that "private ends" means only that the act is committed by actors who are not affiliated with, or endorsed by, a state' (2012: 76). This second perspective means that acts carried out for political ends could potentially count as piracy if they are conducted by private actors with no affiliation to the state. However, this understanding is inherently flawed. While some pirates may have secondary political motives, such as responding to IUU fishing[22], this is not the overriding aim of pirate groups (Little 2010: 83). Rather, piracy is an economically driven crime[23], while politically motivated attacks against ships fall into the distinct category of maritime terrorism (Bateman 2010: 103; Dillon 2005: 157; Little 2010: 80-83). As such, maritime terrorists and maritime pirates are different, since despite 'the similarity in the violent methods employed to achieve their goals and their attitude of lawlessness towards shipping, as well as their disregard for human lives, they are, nonetheless, the objects of different legal treatment' (Jesus 2003: 399) and have different overriding motivates (Batman 2010: 103; Little 2010: 80-81).

Despite this distinction there are concerns that there may be a relationship between Somali pirates and the continued insecurity and unrest onshore (Cioto 2013: 214-215), including the idea that pirates may support terrorist and insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab (Eichstaedt 2010: 146; Hartley 2010: 46; Sloggett 2013: 143; 305; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 36). Nevertheless, this appears to be a weak claim, as there is no evidence that pirates have any affiliation to any of the armed groups within Somalia (Geiss and Petrig 2011: 9). Rather, it appears that the opposite may be true, as according to Hartley (2010: 49) one of the only groups to have publicly taken a stand

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[22] As will be discussed in 2.4.2
[23] As will be discussed in 2.4.3

against piracy are Al-Shabaab. Overall, it seems that pirates are merely taking advantage of the lack of law and order and, as such, they may occasionally engage with armed groups. However, this is not because Somali pirates have any real affiliation to such groups, it is more that they require their support with their illegal activities (Eichstaedt 2010: 145-146; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 105; Sloggett 2013: 305).

When these factors are considered together it appears that while piracy often flourishes in conflict and post-conflict states such as Somalia, this is due to instability and weak governance, not because the pirates are affiliated to the conflict in anyway. Pirates are not primarily motivated by political ideology but by factors that are tied to economic instability, which may include IUU fishing and its associated maritime environmental degradation, as will now be considered.

2.4.2 Somali piracy and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing

Like piracy, IUU fishing occurs at sea but its origins and enabling factors are linked to insecurity onshore, and its consequences are felt most keenly on land, since it damages livelihoods and destroys industry (Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 103; Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2010: 1385; Sloggett 2013: 221). IUU fishing has been linked to economic instability and piracy off the coast of Somalia, where it has destabilised local marine resources with destructive fishing practices, damaged local ecosystems, and foreign trawlers have attacked local fishermen and destroyed their equipment (Bahadur 2011: 181; Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 1300; Bueger, Edmunds and Ryan 2019: 974; Couper, Smith and Ciceri 2015: 193; 196; 197; Harper 2012: 151; Lehr and Lehmann 2011: 13; Murphy 2011: 21-22; Russell 2010: 69). This in turn has damaged local fisheries production, leading to an erosion of livelihoods that is credited with influencing people's decision to turn to piracy (Daxecker and Prins 2012: 960; Murphy 2011: 24; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 103-104; Sloggett 2013: 221; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 27).

According to past research, IUU fishing in Somalia arose due to the absence of a national coastguard following the state collapse, with foreign trawlers taking advantage

of the situation to plunder Somalia's rich fish stocks (Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 1300; Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2010: 1385). Consequentially, this has created a narrative in which those responsible for the act of piracy off the Horn of Africa state that they are protecting their waters against such illegal fishing (Bahadur 2011: 31; Hansen 2011: 26; Hari 2010: 78-79; Schneider and Winkler 2013: 187-188). Aside from academic studies, the relationship between IUU fishing and Somali piracy has been documented by the international community, with research by UNDP stating the illegal fishing of foreign trawlers and the erosion of the fishing industry 'has led to armed resistance by Somali fishermen, and the escalation of pirate attacks against commercial vessels and innocent seafarers' (2012: 40). Similarly, the UN Security Council (2017: 2) have cited a connection between IUU fishing and piracy within the region.

However, while piracy off the Somali coast may have originated as a defence mechanism against such illegal foreign trawlers, this no longer appears to be the case (Eichstaedt 2010: 59; Lehr 2013: 124-125). Rather, research suggests it has developed into a criminal enterprise focused on economic gain, with pirates regularly leaving fishing vessels alone to go after more profitable targets, including cargo ships, oil tankers, and aid conveys (Bellamy 2011: 80; Fritz 2012: 895; Guilfoyle 2010: 2; Hansen 2011: 27; Hansen: 2009: 9-10; Harper 2012: 150; Lehr 2013: 125-126; Russell 2010: 70). Therefore, as Hansen explains 'while it is highly likely that pirates actually do prevent illegal fishing by scaring foreign trawlers, the pirate's targets clearly indicate that profit considerations are more important than any agenda to protect against illegal fishing' (2009: 8). This is similarly echoed by Potgieter and Schofield, who state that 'removing the illegal fishing problem would not, in all likelihood, lead to a resolution of the piracy problem, as it is the case that piracy is now a well-established and highly lucrative 'business'' (Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 104).

Although it no longer appears to be true, it is important to understand this defensive narrative, as it continues to play a significant role within the Somali piracy framework. As Schneider and Winkler explain 'this is the Robin Hood narrative, which still forms a basis of legitimization of piracy today' (2013: 187). This narrative combines with the anger felt by Somalis at being labelled pirates while the presence of foreign trawlers

goes virtually unchallenged, which in turn is found to garner support for piracy from the local community and politicians (Eichstaedt 2010: 131; Hansen 2011: 30; Harper 2012: 150; Lomardo 2019: 74-75; Pham 2010: 331; Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2010: 1389). Furthermore, the Robin Hood narrative likewise allows pirates to justify their actions to themselves (Hansen 2011: 26; 30; Harper 2012: 142).

When taken together, this suggests that while the overall motive of Somali pirate groups appears to be economic gain, those participating in the crime could still harbour grievances and anger towards the countries they blame for illegal fishing and its associated problems (Couper, Smith and Ciceri 2015: 200; Hansen 2009: 8-13; Harper 2012: 142-143; Schneider and Winkler 2013: 187-188). This is supported by research carried out by Al-Qattan (2016: 66; 69), in which Somali pirates used a stronger narrative of anger when speaking about certain states. Similarly, according to Harper, one Somali pirate she interviewed stated 'we would love to have the support of anyone who takes our side against the aggression of the United States' (2012: 142). Therefore, this seems to suggest that, even when the primary motives are economic, grievance can be a secondary motive for pirate groups and those who join them.

2.4.3 Economic factors of Somali piracy

As highlighted within this chapter, while piracy originated in Somalia in part due to the conflict state and is potentially tied to overfishing, it is likewise thought to be intrinsically influenced by economics. According to previous research, at its core piracy is fundamentally a profit driven business and so long as it remains a viable economic option for those involved it will continue to flourish (Chapsos 2016: 68; Hansen 2011: 27; Pham 2010: 326; Russell 2010: 74-75). This is in part because piracy is rooted in poverty and economic instability, with people engaging in the crime as they lack other options (Hahn 2014: 244; Sterio 2018: 9; Young 2010: 23). Poverty and economic instability have therefore been found to make it easier for pirate kingpins to recruit people to carry out the actual attack since, as Lehr explains, 'stark poverty provides…a convenient recruitment base' (2011: xi). As such, there is an assumption that individuals join pirate groups because 'the gains from piracy outweigh the benefits gained from other forms of economic activity and the risks involved in committing

piracy' (Daxecker and Prins 2012: 945). Or, as Hansen puts it, piracy is 'a product of rational cost-benefit analyses conducted by the potential pirates' (2009: 7).

In the case of Somalia, economic motives have been considered within the academic literature as an overriding incentive driving people to join piracy networks (Bellish 2015: 275; Gries and Redlin 2017: 311; Russell 2010: 74-75; Sterio 2018: 9). As Geiss and Petrig explain, piracy is attractive as 'the socio-economic situation in Somalia is dire, as indicated by its gross domestic product per capita ratio and life expectancy, which are among the lowest in the world' (2011: 13-14). This is further supported by Baniela, who argues that the 'most important cause is surely the extreme economic and social hardships suffered by the general population since the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006…leaving most of them with no sources of income other than crime and creating a need to turn to piracy' (2010: 195). This supports the idea that many people engage in piracy as they have limited alternative options.

Yet, while poverty may be a significant factor in areas where piracy flourishes, this alone does not explain how piracy develops, since not everyone who experiences poverty turns to crime (Murphy 2010: 24). Instead, poverty, alongside conflict and IUU fishing, needs to be understood as one aspect within a nexus of factors that exist within fragile states like Somalia where piracy occurs. This is something this thesis will now consider in more detail.

2.4.4 State fragility and the nexus of factors involved in Somali piracy

Overall, it is likely that a combination of the different factors discussed so far work in tandem to create the conditions that allow piracy to flourish. This is supported by past research, which found that piracy develops in coastal regions such as Somalia as the human insecurity factors onshore, such as poverty, limited economic opportunities, weak institutions, and corruption, are linked to the fragility of the state (Al-Qattan 2016: 35; Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 1300-1301; Chapsos 2016: 68; Hahn 2012: 244; Russell 2010: 74-75; Sterio 2018: 23). This suggests that the human insecurity factors that are prevalent in fragile states create the conditions for piracy to flourish when the environment and geography are right (Murphy 2011: 2; Whitman et. al. 2012: 2). As

Baniela explains, this includes 'large sea spaces that challenge easy implementation of legal restraint, propitious geography, weak, lawless or indulgent states that provide sanctuaries, corrupt officials and political leaders who can benefit from and protect piracy, conflicts and economic disruption that open markets for stolen goods, and the ransoms paid for seafarers' lives' (2010: 192).

When piracy is understood as being a land-based activity and an extension of human insecurity linked to state fragility, it becomes clear the long-term solution cannot be realised by naval forces at sea. Rather, as suggested in 2.3.2, it must be secured on land through the restructuring of the state (Baniela 2010: 192; Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 1300-1301; Gathii 2010: 112; Lehr 2013: 132; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 106; Sloggett 2013: 144). Despite this, when the crime occurs anywhere other than the high seas, it remains an issue for the nation state in which pirates operate to deal with, as 'there has been little willingness to move away from a position that prioritises the legal rights of the coastal states' (Klein 2011: 304).

Yet, as discussed in 2.3.1, corrupt officials are often complicit in piracy and are therefore unlikely to seriously act to tackle the crime. Furthermore, even if states are willing to act to suppress piracy within their borders, this will not be their only pressing concern, and they are unlikely to have the resources to adequately address the situation without international assistance (Murphy 2007: 15; 44). Schneider and Winkler have argued that this is the case in Somalia, as 'the country continues to be affected by civil war and food crises' (2013: 196). This is further highlighted through research conducted by the US-based think tank Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), which states that while 'piracy is a pressing issue for seafarers and the maritime shipping industry, it is only one of the many challenges that Somalis face' (Hurlburt 2011: 24).

Acting to tackle piracy at its root on land would not only help challenge the global impact of the crime, but its influence upon the nation states in which it flourishes. This is because piracy should not be seen purely as product of state fragility but a driver of it too (Murphy 2007: 87). Those who benefit most from piracy have an interest in keeping the state weak, particularly when they have 'links to organised crime groups that are involved in larger drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and

human trafficking' (Whitman and Suarez 2012: 4), who likewise rely on fragile state structures to operate.

The dual relationship of piracy being both a product and driver of state fragility can be seen in Somalia where, according to Potgieter and Schofield, 'some of the warlords are apparently not keen to see a strong central government…as it would curtail their business operations' (2010: 98). Somali piracy has been found to further add to this cycle of instability as whole communities have lost scores of young men, as they have either faced trial outside of Somalia or been killed during piracy operations (Eichstaedt 2010: 174; Hulbert 2011: 25-26; Murphy 2011: 113). It has likewise been linked to an erosion of traditional Somali values, with pirates being blamed for spreading 'drugs, alcohol, street fights and AIDS' (Murphy 2011: 113), along with restricting access to food. Not only has piracy made it harder to import goods, causing prices of staples such as sugar and rice to rise in price (Eichstaedt 2010: 150; Hulbert 2011: 24), but it has hampered the delivery of food aid, as pirates have taken World Food Programme ships hostage, stealing the cargo for themselves, or in some instances leaving it to rot (Nincic 2010: 10-13; Potgieter and Schofield 2010: 99-102; Russell 2010: 70). This, in turn, has resulted in fewer food aid deliveries.

Given all this, it appears that in Somalia state fragility and piracy exist together in a vicious cycle that feed into one another. As has been discussed within this chapter, piracy originated in Somalia due to poverty and the inability or unwillingness of the fragile and corrupt state to effectively police their waters – either against pirates or foreign trawlers. Likewise, fragility onshore has provided pirate groups with the freedom and support to be able to run their land-based operations. This means the weak and ungoverned space that allows piracy to flourish in the maritime domain cannot be disentangle from the need for such a space on land, where pirates are provided with a safe haven from which to launch their operations. What this shows is that there is a need to move beyond seeing piracy as a purely maritime issue, as it is a product and driver of state fragility, and it is likewise a land-based activity as much as it is a maritime one.

2.5 Children's involvement in Somali piracy

Understanding the importance of state fragility and the land-based root causes of piracy is essential in considering how children come to be associated with pirate groups. This is something that will be considered in more detail shortly in 2.5.2. However, before doing so, this thesis will examine what the existing literature and research reveals about the extent of the child piracy problem.

2.5.1 What the existing literature and research reveals about the extent of the child piracy problem

As previously discussed in the Introduction, the involvement of children in piracy is a relatively new concern (Mayank 2017: 414), which gained attention during the trial of Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse for his part in the hijacking of the MV Maersk Alabama, as his defence team argued Muse was younger than eighteen at the time of the attack (Hahn 2012: 254; Whitman et. al 2012: 4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 78). The research that has since been carried out into the issue of child piracy has focused predominately on the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks (Aquilina 2013; Bellish 2015; Drumbl 2013; Fritz 2012; Gaswaga 2013; Gries and Redlin 2017; Hahn 2012; Holland 2013; Sterio 2018; Sterio 2013; Whitman 2013). This is not to say that children are not involved in pirate groups elsewhere, and there are some claims that children are used by pirate groups in areas such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Malacca Strait (Conradi 2014: 20; Salomé 2016: 43; Whitman et. al 2012: 6-7; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 82-83; 85) although there has been little evidence or research presented to support this.

Child piracy in Somalia appears to have gained attention due to the international community's naval operation to suppress piracy in the region, which has resulted in several states arresting and prosecuting those who claim to be below the age of eighteen (Bellish 2015: 289; Drumbl 2013: 253-254; Fritz 2012: 893; Sterio 2018: 91; 103; 111). This in turn has raised specific legal and academic questions regarding how to correctly handle and prosecute potential juvenile pirates[24] (Aquilina 2013: 2; Bellish

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[24] This will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding section

2015: 283; Drumbl 2013: 259-260; Holland 2013: 200; Kohm 2015: 334; Sterio 2018: 45; Sterio 2013: 289; 297; Whitman et. al 2012: 11). As such, it is possible that children may be used by pirate groups in countries besides Somalia, but the absence of an international naval presence elsewhere means such legal conundrums have not been raised and the involvement of children in pirate groups has not been reported on.

As previously mentioned, it is estimated that roughly one-third of apprehended Somali pirates have been younger than eighteen[25], although there are some slight variations on this figure, with the Seychellois Department of Legal Affairs reportedly putting the figure slightly lower at ten to twenty percent (Conradi 2014: 16), while a 2018 report from the The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (CSI) (2018: 19) put it at closer to forty percent. These estimates are based on the available public data from countries that have apprehended or prosecuted Somali piracy suspects where at least one of the defendants has claimed to be a juvenile. Specifically, it is based on data relating to piracy prosecutions in France, Italy, India, Germany, Malaysia, Spain, the Seychelles and the US (Bellish 2015: 276; 289-294; Hahn 2012: 261; Sterio 2018: 4; 103-125; Sterio 2013: 283; Whitman et. al 2012: 4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 79). As will be discussed in more detail later in this section, in the case of Spain this claim was subsequently ruled to be false following forensic tests (Bellish 2015:293-294; Hahn 2012: 257-258; Sterio 2018: 96-97), whereas in the US case juvenile status was rejected based on testimony evidence (Bellish 2015: 294; Drumbl 2013: 254-258; Hahn 2012: 252-257; Sterio 2018: 111-125). However, with regards to the other countries, juvenile status was granted to at least one of the suspects standing trial.

Besides the examples above, which are based on publicly available data, Drumbl (2013: 253-254) and Salomé (2015: 45) also cite cases in which Somali children have stood trial in Japan, Yemen, Kenya and Somalia. As will be spoken about later within this section, while there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that child pirates have been tried in both Kenya and Somalia, there is an absence of hard data to support this (Whitman et. al 2012: 10; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 80). As for the Japanese case, this is based on media reports relating to one case in which an eighteen-year-old was found guilty of engaging in a piracy operation when he was sixteen-years-old (Ito

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[25] See 1.1 and 1.3.1 of the Introduction Chapter and 2.3.1 of this chapter

2013). In the Yemeni case, neither Drumbl nor Salome present any evidence to corroborate this claim.

Much of the knowledge about child piracy and the number of children who are involved is based on the findings of research conducted by the CSI, in partnership with the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project (DMPP). Together, the CSI and DMPP have carried out most of the primary research on this issue. This has included analysing the available data on juvenile prosecutions (Whitman et. al 2012: 4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 79); conducting interviews with Radhika Coomaraswamy, the former UN Special Representative of the Security-General for Children and Armed Conflict, who was informed about the use of children in Somali piracy networks through meeting with apprehended pirates (Whitman et. al 2012: 5; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 7; 35; 79); and by speaking with those who have direct experience of encountering the issue of juvenile piracy, by attending the Counter-Piracy Week in Djibouti in 2013 and carrying out four-week fieldwork missions in Kenya and the Seychelles (Conradi 2014: 18). It was through the latter that the Seychellois Department for Legal Affairs put forward the figure of ten to twenty percent, while Dallaire himself previously suggested the figure of one-third while taking part in a piracy roundtable discussion in 2013 (Scharf 2013: 416).

Aside from children having been apprehended for piracy, the fact that Somalia's population is made up predominately of youth is used to support claims that many Somali pirates are younger than eighteen (Ngachi 2018: 5; Whitman et. al 2012: 7). Indeed, estimates put the median age of the Somali population as being younger eighteen (UNFPA 2014a: 46) and this has been cited as a factor to consider when assessing the prevalence of the child piracy problem (Gries and Redin 2019: 310; Holland 2013:183; Salomé 2016: 44). Furthermore, while not necessarily reflective of the claim that one-third of children are engaging, research presented by the likes of Gaswaga (2013: 279), a Seychellois Judge who has direct experience of dealing with juvenile pirates, along with Gjelsvik and Bjørgo (2012: 12; 13) who have interviewed Somali youth who have formally engaged in piracy, including those below the age of eighteen, lends support to the idea that children are regularly involved in Somali pirate groups. As does the fact that the Human Cost of Somali Piracy Report produced by

OBP (Hurlburt 2011: 4; 26) discusses the use of children in pirate networks, and Resolution 1950 (2010: 1) of the UN Security Council likewise notes concern that Somali children are used by pirate groups.

While it has been proposed that one-third of apprehended Somali piracy suspects have been younger than eighteen, the academics that use this figure accept that it is merely speculative, and there are difficulties with accessing the overall prevalence of the problem (Holland 2013: 183; Whitman et. al: 2; 3; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 8). One reason for this is due to the limited data available on piracy prosecutions. As Bellish explains, due to 'the multiplicity of jurisdictions that have prosecuted Somali pirates since 2005 and the differences between jurisdictions in the availability of information about criminal proceedings, a truly comprehensive review of state practice regarding the treatment of juveniles is effectively impossible' (2015: 289). Similarly, there is a lack of comprehensive information available on the issue of child piracy in general, in part because there is no specific reporting procedure on this issue (Drumbl 2013: 249; Holland 2013: 181; 182; Kohm 2015: 334; Ngachi 2018: 8; Salomé 2016: 34; Sterio 2018: 111; Whiman, Johnson and Reeves 2016: 1). This has led CSI and DMPP to note 'that systematic collection of data on this matter does not currently exist…it has been difficult to conduct a clear, evidenced-based assessment of the situation' (Whitman et. al 2012: 2).

There are further concerns that adults routinely claim to be juveniles to receive more lenient sentence, which can make it difficult to assess the exact number of children who are engaging (Bellish 2015: 285; Hahn 2012: 269; Scharf and Taylor 2017: 82; Sterio 2018: 126). Likewise, in some instances juveniles may refuse to admit their young age because they do not wish to be separated from their adult counterparts (Scharf 2013: 417). This was reported to be a problem by Judge Rosemelle Mutoka, who has preceded over piracy prosecutions in Kenya. Despite no official record of juveniles having stood trial in the country, she claimed that at least two of the case she tried included juvenile suspects, but 'it is not very common for the pirate defendants to claim that they are juveniles. In fact, they avoid saying that' (Scharf 2013: 417). The fact that juveniles may refuse to disclose their young age if they fear they will be separated from their adult counterparts is further supported by a case from the

Seychelles, in which a fourteen-year-old Somali piracy suspect attempted to kill himself on two separate occasions when he was separated from his older comrades (Conradi 2014: 19).

When the question of age arises, it is extremely hard to confirm whether those apprehended for piracy are a juvenile or not. Somalia does not have a proper birth register and citizens are not issued with birth certificates (Drumbl 2013: 250; Fritz: 2012 :907; Hahn 2012: 269; Holland 2013: 186-187; Salomé 2016: 46). In fact, suspects themselves are often confused about their age (Sterio 2018: 93). As Bellish explains, 'in Somalia, where birthdays are not celebrated at all, individuals genuinely do not know their precise age' (2015: 285). Furthermore, given the harsh conditions in which Somalis live, it can be hard to judge age purely on physical appearance, as malnutrition and disease may make people appear older (Whitman et. al 2012: 12). Sterio explains how Gaswaga[26] has raised this with her, with him having stated 'if a bearded Somali piracy suspect claims that he is fourteen years old, what should the judge do? Is a judge under a legal obligation to order medical and forensic tests to ascertain the defendant's actual age? Or can a judge simply reject this type of claim if it appears unreasonable that the suspect is actually of the age that he is claiming?' (2018: 77).

In countries such as Germany, India, Italy, Spain and the Seychelles medical and forensic tests have been used to determine the ages of those involved when it has not been evident by their physical appearance that the defendant is a juvenile (Bellish 2015: 290-291; 293-294; Hahn 2012: 257-259; Gunawardena et. al 2017: 278.e2; Sterio 2018: 92-99; 103-106). However, the Seychelles have not always used this method (Bellish 2015: 293; Sterio 2018: 107-110). In the Spanish case, only one defendant out of those on trial claimed to be a juvenile and, as previously mentioned, the results of forensic tests disputed this and the court ruled that he was in fact an adult (Bellish 2015: 93-94; Hahn 2012: 257-258; Sterio 2018: 96-97). In the other cases, multiple suspects have claimed to be juveniles, and in each case at least one of the suspects has been found to be below the age of eighteen. It should be noted

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[26] As discussed above, Gaswaga is a Seychellois Judge who has direct experience of trying Somali piracy suspects, including some who were deemed to be younger than eighteen

that in France and Malaysia juvenile status has likewise been awarded to those who claimed to be younger than eighteen, although in these cases a lack of available public data means it is not clear if this decision was based on the results of any medical or forensic testing (Sterio 2018: 99-101; 106).

Even when medical and forensic testing is used, it can still be difficult to determine the ages of those involved, as 'no single reliable age-determining method currently exists' (Sterio 2018: 87). There is an absence of studies into the age markers and physical development in the Somali population, and most of the 'standard references available on dental and skeletal maturation are based on populations that are considered to be within affluent or developed regions in the world' (Gunawardena et. al 2017: 278.e5). This has resulted in concern that such tests may lead to inaccuracies when carried out among 'persons who are malnourished or diseased and whose bodies are therefore suffering from accelerated ageing' (Conradi 2014: 19:). As such, medical and forensic examinations on Somali piracy suspects are open to criticism, as differences in ethnicity and lifestyle can make comparisons problematic (Fritz 2012: 907; Salomé 2016: 46). Therefore, even going off the available data of those who have be subject to medical and forensic testing, it can be difficult to estimate the exact number of children that have been apprehended for Somali piracy.

Medical and forensic examinations are still considered to be more accurate than the approach taken in the US, where the juvenile status of two defendants in two separate cases were rejected based on testimony evidence (Drumbl 2013: 256-258; Hahn 2012: 255; Sterio 2018: 111-121). One of these cases was that of Muse, whose father testified that his son was sixteen at the time of the attack, having been born in November 1993. However, he provided conflicting evidence to this, by claiming his fourth oldest child was born in 1990, which suggested Muse was older than sixteen as he was the first-born (Bellish 2015: 294; Hahn 2012: 225; Sterio 2018: 115). Based on this account the court ruled that Muse was over eighteen, although this continued to be disputed throughout the trial. This is partly because the defence provided affidavits from Muse's mother and brother that claimed Muse was younger than eighteen at the time of the attack, and Muse's dental records suggested he was most likely between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one when he was arrested (Hahn 2012: 255-256;

Sterio 2018: 115-116). As Drumbl argues, this shows the difficulty of determining ages based on testimony evidence, as it can 'be imprecise, vague, and vacillating' (2013: 250).

There are further limitations in accessing the extent of the child piracy problem in Somalia, as the issues associated with identifying juvenile defendants, along with legal complexities in trying piracy cases in general, has resulted in a practice known as 'catch and release' (Aquilina 2013: 2; Conradi 2014: 18; Drumbl 2013: 261; Fritz 2012: 906; Holland 2013: 194-195; Salomé 2016: 45; 46; Sterio 2018: 15; 42; 111; White 2016: 89-90 Whitman et. al 2012: 11). This is when piracy suspects are apprehended, have their weapons taken from them, and are then returned to their boats and allowed to return to Somalia. Although there is no exact figure on the number of pirates who have been liberated by the practice of catch and release, Bellish (2015: 285) estimates that it is between fifty-seven to eighty percent. A significant portion of those who are released could have been children, as according to Sterio 'child pirates when caught are more often released, because very few prosecuting nations want to bother with setting up a separate trial for a juvenile offender' (2018: 28). This was the case following an attack on the S/V Quest as, according to Neil MacBride, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, one of the fifteen apprehended suspects was released at sea due to his young age (Bellish 2015: 294; Sterio 2018: 121-122). Not only does the practice of catch and release make it harder to adequately access how prevalent child piracy is, but it raises concerns that pirate kingpins may be more inclined to use children if they are likely to be released upon capture (Conradi 2014: 18; Scharf and Taylor 2017: 82; Sterio 2018: 28; 42).

Accurately assessing the extent of the child piracy problem in Somalia is also difficult due to a lack of data on the legal proceedings in some countries, and the failure of others to try adults and children separately. This can be seen in the cases of Somalia and Kenya, where anecdotal evidence suggests children have stood trial for piracy, but there is a lack of hard data from which to make any firm conclusions on how prevalent this has been (Bellish 2015: 289; Whitman et. al 2012: 10; Whitman and Suarez 2012:80). In the case of Somalia, David Hammond, a UK representative for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and legal advisor to the European Union in

Somalia, has discussed encountering children aged roughly between twelve and fourteen while visiting prisons in Puntland (Counsel Magazine 2012), while in 2010 ten children convicted for piracy 'were released following the overturning of their sentences by the Bossaso Appeals Court' (Whitman and Suarez 2012: 80) Furthermore, journalist James Fergusson (2013: 199) has described meeting a fifteen-year-old boy in a prison in Galmudug, and Drumbl (2013: 247; 274) has highlighted how, while in office, former Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud championed a partial amnesty for boys involved in pirate groups.

In the case of Kenya, beyond the evidence presented by Judge Magistrate Rosemelle Mutoka[27], there is limited information available on the prosecution of juvenile pirates and 'it is unclear how many…piracy suspects prosecuted in Kenyan courts may have been juveniles' (Sterio 2018: 32). One reason for this is that defendants are tried together and have the same legal representation, which means even if there were suspicions that a defendant was a minor, they would not have access to adequate legal representation (Bellish 2015: 292; Fritz 2012: 899-900). Moreover, a lack of interest in supporting suspected child pirates among Kenyan children's rights group might add to the absence of available data (Fritz 2012: 902). As such, it is not possible to state one way or the other how often juveniles may have been prosecuted for piracy in Kenyan courts.

While it is impossible to say with certainty how many have engaged, what the above shows it that it is evident that Somali children have been involved in piracy missions at sea and have stood trial in several countries. However, as will be examined in more detail in the next section, what has been overlooked in previous studies into child piracy is the likelihood of children supporting pirates onshore. Brief reports of children being used in land-based roles can be found in the wider literature related to Somali piracy, although the information provided is scarce. This includes a short claim by Lombardo (2019: 78), in which she states that those as young as ten have been hired by pirates to patrol the streets and watch for police or extremists, while George (2013: 159; 167) has similarly discussed how former hostages have described being guarded, and in some instances tortured, by boys who look to be no older than fifteen. The

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[27] Which has been discussed previously in this section

failure to take into account the ways in which children may be involved within the shore-based structures cast further doubt on the estimated number of children involved in piracy, as a significant number of children may not have been involved in piracy operations at sea, but could still have been an essential part of the operation onshore.

Before considering the limited data available on the land-based context of the child piracy problem in more detail, it is important to recognise that children are less likely to be involved in Somali piracy today, given that piracy in the region has decreased following the international naval intervention. However, although it might not be the pressing issue it was in the early 2010s, this does not mean that academics or international forces should be complacent. As Sterio outlines 'it would be foolish to assume that piracy has been eradicated, or that the international community can back off and no longer invest resources in capturing and prosecuting suspected pirates' (2018: 16). This is because pirate networks have not ceased to exist, they have merely scaled back or diversified into other criminal activities while piracy is no longer a viable option (Oladipo 2017; Pigeon et. al 2018: 1; 3; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115).

Furthermore, while children may not currently be as vulnerable to piracy recruitment, this does not mean they are not still in danger. In 2018 Somalia had the highest number of children involved in armed groups (UN Security Council 2019: 2) and there are concerns among those who have carried out research into child piracy that children may merely have moved from pirate networks into other criminal and armed groups (CSI 2018: 20; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 18-19; Holland 2013: 184; Salomé 2016: 45; Sterio 2018: 64; Whitman et. al 2012: 3; Whitman, Johnson and Reeves 2016: 7). While there is limited research to corroborate this claim, what is clear is that it is not unusual for children to be engaged in different armed activities in Somalia, including piracy. As such, understanding how children come to be involved in pirate networks, considering how this might be interrelated to the involvement of children in other armed groups, and examining what can be and has already been done on land to address this is still an important scholarly pursuit that this thesis intends to undertake.

2.5.2 Child piracy in Somalia and its interconnection to state fragility

As previously mentioned, if piracy is rooted in human insecurity onshore, then this must also be true in the case of children's involvement within the crime. While previous research into child piracy has briefly mentioned why children may engage with such groups, as will be examined in more detail in Chapter Three, the academic debate is nevertheless predominantly concerned with what legal and policy responses should be used when children are apprehended for piracy at seas (Aquilina 2013: 2; Bellish 2015; 283-288; Conradi 2014; 18-20; Drumbl 2013: 244-245; 248-249; Fritz 2012: 893-894; Holland 2013: 186-189; Salomé 2016: 43-47; Sterio 2018: 1-5; Sterio 2013: 283-284; Whitman 2013: 225-226; Whitman et. al. 2012: 9-13).

This overarching focus on the responses to children apprehended for piracy at sea is partly because, as Bellish explains, the 'special legal rights afforded to juveniles present themselves at each stage of an accused pirate's interaction with law enforcement and the judiciary' (2015: 283). Yet, despite this, there is an absence of international legislation or guidance on how children should be treated when they are apprehended for piracy, nor on how they should be prosecuted (Conradi 2014: 16; Drumbl 2013: 248; Holland 2013: 186; Salomé 2016: 43; Whitman 2013: 233; Whitman et. al. 2012: 2; 14). As Holland explains 'the sources of piracy law are virtually silent with respect to the treatment of these youth' (2013: 190). As such, there are concerns that members of the maritime community are often left ill-equipped to deal with such an encounter and may be unaware of their obligation to treat children differently to their adult counterparts (Salomé 2016: 44; Whitman, Johnson, and Reeves 2016: 1; 3).

The concern around the proper treatment of children apprehended for piracy is compounded by the universal jurisdiction of the crime and different states' minimum age of criminal responsibility. As discussed in 2.5.1, those claiming to be children have faced trial in several countries, including France; Germany; India; Italy; Malaysia; The Seychelles; Spain; and the USA, and have experienced varying levels of care depending upon the arresting and prosecuting state (Bellish 2015: 289-294; Hahn 2013: 252; Holland 2013: 186-189; Sterio 2018: 91-127; Sterio 2013: 290-297).

Drumbl claims this is resulting in 'a confusing hodge-podge in which the rights (and fate) of the detainee hinge upon the locus of detention' (2013: 261). A point that is further supported by Holland, who states 'nations terrorized by Somali pirates have dealt with the youth involved in their ranks in different and largely ad hoc ways' (2013: 186).

Consequently, the academic literature is primarily focused on how to treat children who are apprehended for piracy at seas, particularly with regards to the varying obligations states have, under international and human rights law, to treat children in the judiciary process with special consideration and dignity (Aquilina 2013: 2; Bellish 2015: 283; Drumbl 2013: 259-260; Holland 2013: 200; Sterio 2018: 45; Sterio 2013: 289; 297; Whitman et. al 2012: 11). As Sterio explains 'piracy-prosecuting nations that handle cases involving juvenile piracy suspects need to be aware of their legal obligations, under human rights law, regarding the treatment of juveniles, and need to be prepared to tackle difficult legal issues associated with this type of prosecutions, including age determinations, pre-trial and post-trial detention issues, and other specific rights that attach to all juvenile suspects, including those accused of piracy' (2018: 3). Thus, the academic literature has focused on these issues.

When the shore-based context is mentioned within the literature pertaining to child piracy, it is often in connection to the responsibility of states to treat apprehended child pirates distinctly, with Fritz arguing that the 'prosecution of child pirates in foreign courts flies in the face of the findings that…child pirates from Somalia often engage in piracy as a means of survival' (2012: 910). Additionally, the land-based context is frequently used to highlight similarities between the children involved in piracy and those associated with military armed groups (Conradi 2014: 16-17; Drumbl 2012: 267-268; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 12; Holland 2013: 186; Salomé 2016: 45; Sterio 2018: 64; Sterio 2013: 288; Whitman 2013: 227-228; Whitman et. al 2012: 5-6). This comparison, which will be considered in more detail in Chapter Three, is used to question the justice models applied to both child soldiers and child pirates, with the literature focused on whether the current mechanisms used for children involved in armed conflict can provide guidance on the correct handling and prosecution of children apprehended for piracy (Drumbl 2013: 269-277; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 2;

12; Salomé 2016: 34-35; 45-48; Sterio 2018: 64-74; Sterio 2013: 288; Whitman 2013: 228-229; Whitman et. al 2012: 8-9).

As the literature overwhelmingly focuses on addressing the issues that arise once children have been apprehended for piracy at sea, the current academic debate does not recognise how children, much like adults, may be involved with piracy networks onshore. Consequently, as mentioned in the previous section, there is no discussion regarding the roles that children may occupy in piracy networks besides sea-going roles. This has resulted in claims that only male children are involved with pirate networks (Drumbl 2013: 268; Gaswaga 2013: 277; Holland 2013: 182-183; Sterio 2018: 25). Yet, wider research into Somali piracy suggests that this is not necessarily true. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, when looked at from its land-based context it appears that young women are involved in Somali piracy through support roles onshore, including providing pirate networks with resources, acting as caregivers, and being engaged as prostitutes or trafficked into pirate groups (Dini 2014: 5-6; Gilmer 2019: 8-9; Gilmer 2017: 1372; World Bank 2013: World Bank 2013: 32; 45; 66-67; 85-86).

Moreover, while the need for shore-based responses aimed at keeping children out of piracy is mentioned in passing within some of the literature (Fritz 2012: 905-906; Holland 2013: 211-212; Whitman et al 2012: 14) there is no research that examines this in detail. As will be discussed in later chapters, by examining the shore-based responses of IGOs and NGOs from 2009-2018, this thesis will address these gaps in the literature. By doing so, it will provide further clarity on the extent of the Somali child piracy problem, not only considering the involvement of those who go to sea, but those engaged in shore-based roles too. It will likewise examine why children join pirate groups in the first place and what this reveals about what has and what more can be done to tackle the problem of child piracy, not just at sea, but from its core on land.

2.6 Summary

This chapter has brought clarity to the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy and has shown how these relate to state fragility. In doing

so, this chapter has demonstrated the limitations of the existent definitions of piracy, such as those outlined by UNCLOS and the IMB, as they fail to account for the land-based context of the crime. As such they do not reflect the true nature of the activity, and place limits who can be classed as a pirate.

As has been discussed, piracy off the Somali coast is a land-based activity driven by a nexus of human and state insecurity factors including corruption, conflict, IUU fishing and its associated impacts, and poverty. As such, failing to recognise the land-based root causes of pirate-like attacks is deeply problematic. Furthermore, by limiting piracy only to the maritime domain, both UNCLOS and the IMB definition create a situation in which those who help to create the political and social environment that allow the crime to flourish are the same actors tasked with suppressing it at its core on land.

Correspondingly, this chapter has examined how, for piracy to flourish, it requires the support and involvement of land-based actors such as politicians, officials, businessmen, and the local coastal community. Yet, despite the number of shore-based roles needed to make the operation a success, only those taking part in the activity at seas are considered pirates. In Somalia this has created a situation in which those who are arrested for the crime of piracy are the mere footmen, as the organisers and financers remain onshore where they are effectively immune from prosecution. In turn, this has shown that naval forces alone cannot adequately tackle the issue of piracy, as until the shore-based root causes are addressed and pirate bosses are brought to justice, the business infrastructure for piracy will remain, with people being willing to risk being caught if it will provide them with a potential income. As such, a viable long-term solution needs to be secured on land.

Along with considering the importance of placing piracy within its land-based context, this chapter has shown how this matter relates to the involvement of children in maritime piracy. While the current literature has overwhelmingly focused on how to treat those who are apprehended for piracy at seas, it has failed to account for the involvement of children in piracy networks on land. Moreover, despite claims that shore-based policy responses are important in tackling the involvement of children in piracy, there is currently no academic literature that specifically focuses on this issue.

This highlights the academic gap that this thesis intends to fill, through examining how IGOs and NGOs perceive the involvement of children within piracy networks and how this influenced their specific programme and policy responses between 2009-2018.

The relationship between state fragility and the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks is something that will be considered in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis. This will include analysing how children and youth are viewed in the current fragile state literature, and how this relates to the academic discussion surrounding the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks. In addition, the next chapter will advance the discussion regarding the potential comparison between children involved in piracy and those involved in other armed groups[28], by considering how the issue of child piracy in Somalia relates to the wider understanding of those involved in military groups and gangs within the context of fragile states.

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[28] Which was started in 2.5.2 of this chapter

Chapter Three: Children and Youth in Fragile States

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish how young people are viewed within the fragile states literature and how this may be interrelated to the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks. By doing so, it will build on the findings of the previous chapter, which not only brought clarity to the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy and how these relate to state fragility, but likewise outlined the limitation of the current academic discourse on child piracy. As was shown, the existent research has predominantly focused on how to treat children apprehended for piracy at seas, with scant discussion relating to the shore-based roles children may occupy in Somali pirate networks, nor the land-based factors that cause children to engage and how these may be addressed onshore. By examining the issue of Somali child piracy alongside the wider literature pertaining to youth in fragile states, this chapter, like the last, will ground this thesis in theory and identify the original contribution to knowledge it makes. Taken together, both chapters will inform the methodological approach adopted by the research[29] and provide a guide for the discussion and analysis within Chapters Six and Seven.

To deliver on this purpose, section 3.2 discusses some of the issues that are found to impact upon young people within the fragile states' literature, and the ways in which large youth demographics may add to state fragility. As such, it considers the competing narrative of children and youth as victims or causes of state fragility. Section 3.3 then moves on to consider how young people have been found to provide potential solutions to state fragility. In both these sections, questions of how the issues raised may be applied to the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks are considered. Section 3.4 then examines the involvement of children in piracy in relation to those engaged in similar activities within armed groups and gangs onshore. The emphasis is primarily on those who voluntarily engage in such groups, as previous research suggests that most Somali children join pirate networks willingly (Drumbl 268-269; Holland 2013: 184; Sterio 2018 64; Whitman 2013: 224; Whitman et. al 2012:

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[29] Discussed in the proceeding chapter

6). Section 3.5 then brings together the findings of both literature review chapters and discusses the gap in research knowledge this thesis addresses, leading to the original contribution it makes, while section 3.6 summarises the main findings from this chapter.

By examining how young people are understood as a cause, victim, and solution to state fragility within the relevant literature, and how this relates to the discussions of the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks, this chapter contributes towards answering the final sub-research question associated with Objective One. Moreover, by exploring the role of Somali children within piracy networks and the extent to which these can be compared to the involvement of children in armed groups and gangs, this chapter likewise works towards meeting the second research objective and its associated sub-research questions[30].

It should be noted that this chapter focuses on children and youth, as opposed to just children, as the fragile states' literature, particularly in relation to youth bulge theory, often refers to youth as being age fifteen plus (Alfy 2016: 100; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 5; Cordaid 2015: 5; Goldstone 2002: 11; Urdal 2006: 615). Therefore, given that many children involved in maritime piracy could fall within this age bracket, references to both have been considered to ensure a fair reflection. Throughout this chapter, the terms children, youth, and young people are used interchangeably to refer to those below the age of eighteen, who under international law would be classified as children (CRC 1989: Article 1). This is in keeping with the definition of the child used throughout this thesis[31].

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[30] Which are:

Sub-Research Question 2.1: What does the literature tell us about the similar drivers and stressors that lead children to become involved in Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs within the context of fragile states?

Sub-Research Question 2.2: Are there any comparisons that can be made with regards to the roles and responsibilities children take on within Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs?

Sub-Research Question 2.3: Does this reveal anything significant regarding how children involved in Somali piracy are currently framed in the academic literature and in policy?

[31] Outlined in 1.2

3.2 Issues impacting upon young people in fragile states

According to both policy and academic literature young people residing within fragile states are severely impacted by fragility (Bermudez, Williamson and Stark 2018: 2; Lemmon 2014: 4; Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 4; Save the Children 2017: 1; Wessells 2018: 15). As will be discussed in more detail within this section, they face issues such as the absence of child protection; negative impacts upon their health and well-being; demographic pressure and youth bulges; economic pressure and youth unemployment; lack of education; waithood; and an interconnected cycle of these. This is not an exhaustive list, as children in fragile states may likewise experience child labour, early and forced marriage, early pregnancy, FGM, and modern-day slavery (Collins 2017: 15; Lemmon 2014: 3; Save the Children 2017: 1; Wessells 2018: 15), but for the purpose of this research the focus is on those factors that appear to most closely relate to the discussion around child piracy, as will now be considered in more detail.

3.2.1 Absence of child protection

This thesis defines fragile states as those that are unable or unwilling, through ineffective governance or corruption, to provide basic service and to meet the needs of their citizens[32] (Baird 2010: 3; Bird: 2007: 1). Such fragility and lack of services impacts upon the security and well-being of the population, with past research demonstrating how limited funding and resources, poor or non-existent infrastructure, and a faltering of formal governmental and justice system hinders social protection services (Andrews et. al 2012: 2; Ang and Wong 2015: 376-377; Hout 2010: 143; Mayar 2018: 222). Furthermore, the lack of social protection has been found to increase the prospect of conflict and extreme poverty, with over half of the world's poor living in fragile states (Andrew et. al 2012: 4; Hout 2010: 143; Lemmon 2014: 1; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 5; Zoellick 2008: 68). Consequently, because the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection for its citizens, residents in fragile states face greater risk than those residing in stable countries.

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[32] As was previously discussed in 1.2

Children, along with women, appear to be most at risk, with Mcloughlin having highlighted how 'these groups experience the greatest impacts in terms of increased risk of violence, exploitation, abuse, neglect, loss of livelihood, threats to personal safety, poverty and malnutrition' (2012: 7). This claim is not unique, as much of the academic and policy literature argues that in fragile states children are particularly vulnerable to the effect of poverty and are more likely to suffer abuse (Ang and Wong 2015: 369; Bermudez, Williamson and Stark 2018: 2; Collins 2017: 15; Lemmon 2014: 4; Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 6; Wessels 2018: 15). This is supported by research carried out by the NGO Save the Children, which found that young people in fragile states regularly experience 'poor health, conflict, extreme violence, child marriage, early pregnancy, malnutrition, exclusion from education and child labour' (2017: 1). As such, while the overall population may suffer the effects of fragility, children seem to be particularly vulnerable.

Children may be disproportionately impacted by fragility because of an absence of formal child protection at the state level. According to past academic and policy research, the needs of young people are not seen as a priority, with child protection being underfunded and virtually non-existent in fragile states (Canavera et. al 2016: 363; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 11; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 7; 11; Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 6; Sommers 2007: 106). Even when states recognise the importance of providing protection to children, this is not always feasible. Rather, the lack of social infrastructure, rule of law, and resource scarcity can hinder efforts to provide child protection (Ang and Wong 2015: 377; Lemmon 2014: 5; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 11). Therefore, as Ridsdel and McCormick explain, 'in fragile contexts, where children are at greater risk of exploitation, abuse and neglect…capacity to respond to this risk is diminished' (2013: 6).

It likewise appears that the specific needs and vulnerabilities of young people are frequently ignored within international responses to state fragility, with research conducted by humanitarian and development agencies calling for youth programmes to be incorporated into these, to avoid further exacerbating the vulnerable situations facing children and youth (Norris, Dunning and Malknecht 2015: 63; OECD 2011b: 51; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 8; 11; 43). However, according to Rubenstien

and Stark, 'while the importance of addressing violence against children in humanitarian emergencies has become increasingly accepted by programmers and policymakers, most prevention and response work is informed by evidence from outside the humanitarian sphere' (2017: 59). As a result, action over child protection remains vastly underfunded and side-lined by the international community, with donors reluctant to invest in long-term programming, especially when the state itself seems unable or unwilling to provide basic support services to children (Bird 2007: 2; Canavera et. al 2016: 363; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 46; Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 9; Wessels 2018: 15). This means, despite their increased vulnerability, the needs of children in fragile states often go unmet, by the state and the international community.

In the wake of the state's inability to provide basic services and protect children, along with the international community's failure to address their needs, children may become more vulnerable to piracy recruitment. It does not appear to be a coincidence that in Somalia, where children are engaging in piracy, child protection measures are weak, with children regularly being used by other armed and criminal groups[33] (Conradi 2014: 16; Sterio 2018: 27; Whitman et al. 2012: 3). It is therefore important to recognise how the impacts of state fragility and the lack of child protection may be interrelated to the involvement of children in piracy within Somalia, which is something that will be considered in more detail throughout the rest of this section, along with the rest of the chapter.

3.2.2 Impact on children's health and well-being

The lack of child protection and basic services, outlined above, can have serious impacts on the health and well-being of children, with previous research highlighting how fragile states account for more than half of the world's children who do not live past their fifth birthday (Carpenter, Slater and Mallett 2012: 1; Newbrander, Waldman and Shepherd-Banigan 2011: 641; Said 2013: 27; Save the Children 2017: 4; Zoellick 2008: 68). In many cases these children die from preventable issues, such as lack of clean water, malnutrition, or treatable diseases, as access to health care is limited

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[33] This will be discussed in more detail in 3.4

(Baird 2010: 6l; Said 2013: 26; Save the Children 2017: 4; Smith Ellison 2016: 466; Zoellick 2008: 68). Aside from the high infant mortality rate, adolescents face considerable danger, with evidence suggesting that teenagers are at substantial risk of contracting HIV (Chamla, Luo and Idele 2018: 89; Said 2013: 26) and are more likely to be murdered (Save the Children 2017: 22; UNODC 2013: 14). When taken together, this suggests the lack of child protection, effective governance, and basic systems such as health care, increases the mortality rate among young people living in fragile states.

Children appear to be more vulnerable when they reside in fragile states experiencing natural or man-made humanitarian disasters (Ager et. al 2011: 1046). According to past research, children represent at least half of those impacted by disaster and make up half the civilian casualties during times of conflict (Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 3), while both situations increase the probability of children experiencing physical and sexual abuse (Ager et. al 2011: 1046; 1049; Lemmon 2014: 3; Rubenstien and Stark 2017: 59). According to Bermudez, Williamson, and Stark this is because 'armed conflicts and large-scale disasters increase the potential for family separation and the erosion of existing support systems, putting children at risk of abuse, exploitation, violence, and neglect' (2018: 2). Thus, children's vulnerability is exasperated by conflict and disaster, as it not only limits the state's ability to protect them, but it damages children's social support and protection networks, such as the family unit.

The likelihood of children experiencing abuse and exploitation increases when they are forced to flee in an emergency (Olson 2012: 4). Displacement due to conflict and disaster is a significant challenge to children in fragile states, with statistics showing that half of the world's internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee population is under the age of eighteen (Bermudez, Williamson and Stark 2018: 2; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 11; Save the Children 2017: 20; UNICEF 2018a: 2). Such displacement has been found to increase the risk of children becoming separated from their families, along with making it more likely they will be trafficked, engaged in forced labour, or recruited into armed or criminal groups (Lewis 2012: 154; Olson 2012: 4-5; Ridsdel and McCormick 2013: 3-4; Save the Children 2017: 20; UNICEF 2018a: 2-4). As such, while all children in fragile states may be susceptible to abuse and

recruitment for illicit activity, the risk appears to be higher for IDP and refugee children, particularly those separated from their family.

Even with the absence of conflict and humanitarian disaster, young people residing in fragile states are still regularly exposed to and impacted by violence on an everyday level. As Save the Children explain, 'chronic community violence – frequent and continual exposure to the use of weapons, drugs and random violence – is most common where government protections for children are weak' (2017: 22). This has raised concerns that children are growing up in communities where firearms are prevalent and violence is normalised, leading children to re-enact violence through play (Lewis 2012: 22) and making it more likely they will witness, suffer, and engage in violent activities (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 12; 13; 28; OECD 2011a: 37; OECD 2011b: 14; 15). When considered from this angle it appears that, even during times of relative peace, limited social protection and high levels of community violence may still put children at risk of abuse.

Understanding the dangers children face in fragile states such as Somalia is important when considering how they come to be engaged in pirate networks. As Holland explains, 'youth associated with Somali piracy appear to join pirate gangs willingly, but only insofar as one can describe a situation where crushing poverty, conflict, lawlessness and desperation force individuals, young and old, to make unthinkable choices' (2013: 184). Holland's claim is not unique, as although it is not mentioned in detail, when the land-based factors that cause children to engage in Somali piracy are stated within the academic literature, it repeatedly cites poverty, displacement, separation from family, and a lack of alternative options as push factors (Fritz 2012: 895; 904; Gaswaga 2013: 282; Holland 2013: 182; Kohm 2015: 334; Sterio 2018: 64-65; Sterio 2013: 288; Whitman et. al 2012: 3-4; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 78). Thus, it appears that children may engage in piracy networks in Somalia as a form of survival and to mitigate against the impact fragility is having on their lives.

The involvement of children in activities such as piracy shows how, despite being vulnerable due to the impacts of fragility, children in fragile states such as Somalia are often the perpetrators of violent crimes, as well as the victims, a point that has been

raised within policy literature (OECD 2011b: 13; 15; Save the Children 2017: 20; UN DESA 2012: 1; 2). As McLean Hikler and Fraser explain this has resulted in 'a recent gradual shift from discussions about "children" as the "victims" of violence to "youth" as a "threat" to security and stability' (2009: 3). As will be discussed in more detail now, this can most clearly be seen in discussions relating to countries experiencing a youth bulge.

3.2.3 Demographic pressure and youth bulges

As mentioned above, aside from being considered victims of state fragility, children, especially adolescents, are often seen as a cause of instability, with countries that have a high youth demographic considered more likely to experience unrest, a concept commonly known as 'youth bulge theory' (Alfy 2016: 100; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 2-3; Goldstone 2002: 11; Urdal 2007: 90; Urdal 2006: 608). There does appear to be a correlation as youth bulges, which refers to large youthful population aged fifteen plus, are common within fragile states, with previous research estimating that young people aged between ten and twenty-four make up the majority of the population in such contexts (Norris, Dunning and Malknecht 2015: 63; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 7; 11; Whitman et. al 2012: 3). Thus, youth bulges should be understood, not just as a current issue, but as a trend that is set to continue.

Given they are a shared factor across fragile states, youth bulges are often understood, both in policy and academia, as indicators and causes of state fragility (Alfy 2016: 100; Collier 1999: 3; Fund for Peace 2018: 25; Goldstone 2002: 11; UNDP 2012: 39). Much of the fragile states' literature points to a perceived correlation between the prevalence of youth bulges, and an increased likelihood of violence and conflict (Alfy 2016: 100; Collier 1999: 3; Cramer 2012: 1; Goldstone 2002; 11; Munive 2010: 324; Norris, Dunning and Malknecht 2015: 63; UNDP 2012: 39; Urdal 2007: 91-92; Urdal 2006: 609; 623-624). An example of this can be seen in the work of Azeng and Yogo, which states 'for each percentage point increase of youth share of adult population, the risk of conflict increases by more than four percent' (2013: 2-3). This supposed interrelationship between high youth demographics, conflict, and fragility

has resulted in claims that youth bulges create an 'arc of instability' (US National Intelligence Council 2010: 211).

Moreover, large youth cohorts are not just considered a danger to the state in which they originate but to global security, with past research having linked youth bulges to threats that impact beyond national boarders, particularly terrorism (Lia 2005: 141-142; Sommers 2007: 102; Sukarieh and Tannock 2018: 857; Urdal 2007: 96-97). It is not only through potential acts of terrorism that youth bulges in fragile states may impact upon global security, as Gries and Redlin claim that 'all piracy hotspots are affected by this demographic development and exhibit a disproportionately large and growing share of young people' (2017: 311). Consequently, the authors propose that, just as youth bulges may lead to a rise in terrorism, there may likewise be a relationship between high youth populations and piratical activity (Gries and Redlin 2017: 310).

Despite this perceived correlation, it is wrong to assume large youth populations on their own create fragility, and, by extension, issues of global insecurity, such as terrorism or piracy. Rather, as Mclean Hilker and Fraser rightly explain, 'while a correlation between a high relative youth population and high risk of violence supports a causal claim, it does not prove causality and reveals little about the processes at work and why certain young people engage in violence' (2009: 3). This is supported by the fact that several countries with a high youth demographic have not suffered insecurity or unrest (Sommers 2007: 104; Sukarieh and Tannock 2015: 107). Moreover, according to Baker and Ricardo (2006: 181), even in fragile states that have been subject to unrest and conflict, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, only a small proportion of the youth population were actively engaged. Taking this into account, it appears that although there is an interconnection between youth bulges and increased insecurity or unrest in some fragile states, youth violence should be understood as a symptom rather than cause of fragility (Munive 2010: 335).

As such, it is important to understand the root causes behind why youth in fragile states engage in destabilising activities. Failing to explore the context in which young people partake in violent or illegal activities, including piracy, runs the risk of developing overly simplistic policy responses (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 12-13; Sommers 2007:

102-103). It also simultaneously dismisses the positive impact youth bulges can have on the economy (Staveteig 2006: 11), a point that will be returned to in 3.3. Therefore, instead of being considered a cause of fragility, the relationships between large youth demographics and the wider issues impacting upon young people in fragile states must be understood. One explanation, which will be considered in more detail now, is that it is within the context of economic inactivity and unemployment that large youth cohorts increase fragility.

3.2.4 Economic pressure and youth unemployment

Rather than argue that large youth cohorts in and of themselves create fragility, some youth bulge theorists such as Goldstone claim 'it is particular kinds of demographic changes, occurring in particular political and economic contexts, that cause instability' (2002: 9). He is not alone in this claim since, as Sukarieh and Tannock explain, it is 'in the context of economic stagnation and decline, most youth bulge theorists now argue, that youth bulges (or youthful age structures) can lead to social unrest and political conflict, not necessarily due to innate characteristics of the young, but to competition over limited resources and opportunities' (2018: 858). From this point of view, it is the fact that large youth cohorts exist in fragile states with weak economies and high levels of unemployment or underemployment that is thought to be a catalyst for youth violence and unrest (Azeng and Yogo 2013: 1; Urdal 2007: 94; Zoellick 2012: 70).

In conjunction with the above, large youth demographics are thought to further add to economic and employment pressure, by increasing the workforce population and making it harder for the labour market to accommodate the rise in job seekers (Goldstone 2002: 5). As such, economic stagnation, large youth cohorts, and high rates of unemployment are referenced within the youth bulge literature as interconnected issues increasing the potential of violence and fragility (Azeng and Yogo 2013: 1; 19; IARAN 2017: 5; Urdal 2007: 94). This correlation is summarised by Urdal, who explains 'if the ability of the market to absorb a sudden surplus of young job seekers is limited, a large pool of young unemployed and frustrated people arises' (2006: 611). From this understanding, youth bulges in and of themselves are not inherently dangerous, but when they exist alongside economic stagnation it can

intensify the unemployment problem making violence and unrest more likely.

Research suggests that the interrelationship between unemployment and insecurity in fragile states is exacerbated by rapid urbanisation on account of 'economic decline in rural areas…"pushing" people out' (Resnick 2020: 404-405). According to Tegenu, this is particularly true for youth, since 'young adults are more mobile by character and resource scarcity in rural areas often leads to out-migration' (2011: 2). Such internal migration further intensifies the pressure on urban labour markets during periods of fragility, as there are often not enough jobs to compete with the level of urban population growth (Arnold 2009: 389; Urdal 2006: 613). This, in turn, has been found to increase social tension among young people, making violence and unrest in urban centres more likely (Alfy 2016: 103; Goldsmith 2002: 10; UN DESA 2012: 1; 2; 3; Urdal 2016: 613). Therefore, although youth may migrate to avoid unemployment and unrest in rural areas, this can worsen the situation in urban centres.

Such widespread unemployment could make it easier for criminal and armed groups to recruit young people since, according to Zoellick, it 'may increase the opportunity for predators to tempt young, disconnected men with the allure of achieving power and criminal gains through brutality' (2008: 70). This claim is supported by research carried out by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which found that 'youth with no access to legitimate employment opportunities are more likely to be drawn into illicit activity' (2010: 86). Although there is limited research into the root causes leading young people in Somalia to engage in piracy, when children or youth are mentioned within the piracy literature, unemployment has likewise been recognised as a potential influencing factor (Biziouras 2013: 119; Neethling 2010: 100; Nincic 2009: 7; Sterio 2018: 64-65; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 20; 35; 78). This can be seen in the work of Gries and Redlin, which claims 'a disproportionately high number of adolescents in combination with high youth unemployment may exacerbate the problem of maritime piracy' (2017: 313). When taken together, this suggests widespread unemployment makes it easier it to recruit young people in fragile states for several destabilising activities, which may include piracy.

One reason unemployed youth may be easier to recruit for violent and destabilising activities is because they lack other options. As Urdal explains 'if young people are left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty, they are more likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of generating an income' (2006: 610). In this sense young people join armed and criminal groups, such as piracy networks, because it provides a potential income, which outweighs the possible associated cost (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 23; Collier 2008: 20; Munive 2014: 336; Urdal 2006: 609). This idea, known as the greed or opportunity perspective, suggests that young people engage in a process of cost-benefit analysis when deciding to become involved in destabilising activities (Azeng and Yogo 2015: 3; Barakat and Urdal 2009: 4; Blattman and Ralston 2012: 23; Collier 2008: 17-37; Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 569; 588; Farzanegan and Witthuhn 2017: 49; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 4; Munive 2014: 336). Although the greed perspective is mostly used to explain youth involvement in political violence and conflict, it mirrors the claim that engagement in Somali piracy is the result of a similar cost-benefit analysis[34].

The perceived link between youth unemployment and the involvement of young people in illicit activities supports the idea that large youth demographics on their own do not cause violence. Rather, it is a combination of youth bulges, mass unemployment, and rapid urbanisation that appears to make it easier to recruit children and youth to armed and criminal activities. As such, Stewart and Brown suggest that the 'expansion of employment opportunities for youth would be likely greatly to reduce political fragility'(2009: 26-27). However, stagnant labour markets and rapid urbanisation are not the only factors that increase youth unemployment, as barriers to education have a significant impact (Kirk 2007: 188; 189). Understanding how limited educational opportunities create further issues for young people in fragile states is something that this thesis will now consider.

3.2.5 Lack of education

As suggested above, aside from addressing economic stagnation and high youth unemployment, the fragile states' literature considers education to be a key

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[34] This was previously discussed in 2.4.3

component in addressing instability and lessening the likelihood of conflict (Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 6; Tendetnika, Clayton and Cathcart 2018: 18). Indeed, Collier claims that 'each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around 20%' (1999: 5). This may be because, according to previous research, education helps with rebuilding the states, strengthens government positions, provides stability, and encourages economic growth (Commins 2017: 1; Kirk 2007: 193-194; Mcloughlin 2009: 81; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 6; Tendetnika, Clayton and Cathcart 2018: 18; World Bank 2018a: 3). Thus, education is frequently considered essential in countering fragility.

In addition, education is believed to lessen the likelihood of young people engaging in destabilising activities in fragile states, in part because it provides a sense of normalcy, hope for the future, a means of escaping poverty, and a shared sense of identity, whilst also improving overall health and wellbeing (Baird 2010: 6; Commins 2017: 1; 21; Kirk 2007: 193; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 1; 6; OECD 2011a: 31; Tendetnika, Clayton and Cathcart 2018: 18; World Bank 2018a: 3). Moreover, educated youths are found to be less likely to engage in activities that create or increase fragility, since they have greater employment and income-earning prospects and more to lose by doing so (Azeng and Yogo 2015: 3-4; Barakat and Urdal 2009: 4; 25; Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 569; 588; Farzanegan and Witthuhn 2017: 49; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 4). Therefore, much like employment, education, and the potential income prospects it creates, is considered to be the subject of a cost-benefit analysis that keeps youth from engaging in illicit activities.

As highlighted in the previous section and as discussed in the last chapter[35], involvement in Somali piracy is believed to be the result of a similar process of a cost-benefit analysis. When considered together, the barriers to education, limited employment opportunities, and greed perspective imply that young people, much like adults, engage in piracy because the economic benefits outweigh the limited alternatives available, along with the risks associated with the crime. This is supported by research on youth involved in Somali piracy carried out by Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, which found 'without the benefit of formal education and employable skills, piracy

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[35] See 2.4.3

presented an attractive alternative access to income' (2012: 8). Thus, because lack of education exacerbates the issues facing large youth cohorts in fragile states like Somalia, by reducing their ability to make money and escape poverty, young people may engage in illicit activities, such as piracy, to fill this gap.

Yet, despite the benefit to young people and the state, education in countries experiencing fragility remains low, with nearly half of the world's out of school children residing in countries considered fragile (Carpenter, Slater and Mallett 2012: 1; Commins 2017: 5; Smith Ellison 2016: 467; Turrent and Oketch 2009: 357). Furthermore, education remains one of the most underfunded sectors in international programming on fragility (Bird 2007: 2; Tendetnika, Clayton and Cathcart 2018: 18; Turrent and Oketch 2009: 357). One reason for the lack of funding is believed to be because, much like child protection, education is primarily viewed as the responsibility of the state, with donors being reluctant to invest in this sector when the state is unable, or unwilling, to do so (Bird 2007: 1; Mosselson, Wheaton and Frisoli 2009: 6-7; Rose and Greeley 2006: 4). However, by failing to address barriers to education, the international community limits the prospects of young people, making it more likely they will turn to criminal or armed groups, thus increasing the level of state fragility.

While providing educational and employment opportunities appears to be important in countering fragility, there are concerns within the literature that youth exclusion at a social and political level likewise makes it easier to engage them in acts of violence (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 4; Murphy 2012: 10). This is commonly known as the grievance perspective and, unlike the greed perspective, it proposes a correlation between high levels of youth frustration and unrest (Urdal 2006: 609-610). In this sense, large youth cohort are perceived to be more likely to be mobilised for violent and illicit activities when they view themselves as being excluded at the social, political, or economic level (Cordaid 2015: 7; Elzarov 2015: 2; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 4; Murphy 2012: 10). As such, rather than keeping young people from engaging in violence, there are cases when education may make it more likely, particularly when a bottleneck in the labour market means the expectations of educated youth are not met (Goldstone 2002: 10; 14; Mercy Corps 2016: 2; Urdal

2006: 609-610; Urdal 2004: 4). The grievance perspective is something that this thesis will now explore in more detail, through the concept of waithood.

3.2.6 Youth and waithood

Fragility can have a direct consequence on the development of young people in fragile states, keeping them from successfully transitioning from childhood to adulthood (Murphy 2012: 10). As outlined already within this chapter, youth in fragile state regularly face barriers to education, have limited employment opportunities, and are more likely to be impacted by conflict and disaster. According to previous research, this multitude of factors often keeps young people from successfully meeting the traditional indicators of adulthood, such as financial independence and marriage (Cordaid 2015: 3; 5; Mercy Corps 2016: 15; Murphy 2012: 10; OECD 2011b: 17; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 7). Thus, many young people in fragile states are experiencing a '*waithood*, a prolonged period of suspension between childhood and adulthood' (Honwana 2013).

Despite the impacts of fragility on their lives, including waithood, young people often face continuous marginalisation at the economic, social, and political level. Such marginalisation can be seen in responses to state fragility since, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the needs of young people are often not seen as a priority. Moreover, young people struggle to influence policy or have their voices heard, with both academic and policy research demonstrating how in some cases this creates a disunion between the generations and increases levels of youth frustration (Cordaid 2015: 6; Munive 2010: 326; Murphy 2012: 10; OECD 2011b: 17). This, in turn, has been linked to a rise in youth engagement in violence and unrest, with young people considering this a legitimate way to achieve change and have their voices heard (Cordaid 2015: 3; 7; IARAN 2017: 9; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 4; Mercy Corps 2016: 15; Munive 2010: 326; OECD 2011b: 17; 18). This suggest the involvement of young people in violent and destabilising activities is not always the result of a cost-benefit analysis but is due to frustration and grievance brought about by exclusion and waithood.

For adolescent males, periods of waithood may keep them from achieving traditional ideas of masculinity, heightening their level of grievance and frustration (Sommers 2007: 108). This is because, not only does youth exclusion and waithood stall young men's transition to adulthood, but it keeps them from owning land or fulfilling their traditional role as breadwinners (Finn and Oldfield 2015: 34; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 7; Sommers 2007: 108; Ungruhe and Esson 2017: 25). For many young adolescent men being able to provide for one's family in this way is an important aspect of achieving manhood. Therefore, according to Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 'to promote livelihoods and protect their self-dignity and masculine reputation, many men become vulnerable to the appeals of criminal and armed groups' (2012: 7). Or, to put it another way, young men in fragile states may turn to illicit activities both due to grievance and to protect their masculine identity in the face of such waithood.

Waithood and the promise of social mobility may be potential motivating factors leading young people, particularly adolescent men, to engage in Somali piracy networks. According to Whitman and Suarez (2012: 94) piracy may be an attractive option to young people, since it offers the potential of upward mobility in regions where youth regularly experience periods of waithood. Similarly, Gjelsvik and Bjørgo (2012: 7) propose that young Somali men, whose traditional masculine roles are limited by the effects of state fragility, may be easy recruits for piratical activities. Moreover, it is possible that the frustration felt by young people experiencing waithood may collide with the anger felt by the general Somali population towards the presence of IUU fishers[36]. Consequently, the narrative that piracy is an opportunity to protect their waters against IUU fishing, which young people may view as being interconnected to this period of waithood, may further encourage frustrated Somali youth to partake in acts of piracy (Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 10; Salomé 2016: 45). Consequently, piracy could offer Somali youth the chance to achieve social mobility and provide an outlet for potential grievances.

Overall, it is likely that a combination of greed and grievance drives youth to engage in activities linked to fragility and instability, including piracy. As can be seen in both policy and academic research, when young people lack the resources required to

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[36] As was previously discussed in 2.4.2

transition from childhood to adulthood, engaging in destabilising activities may appear to be the most rational choice, as it provides profit and a means of gaining power and addressing grievance (Azeng and Yogo 2013: 4; ILO, UNDP and UNHCR 2017: 5; Mercy Corps 2016: 7; Munive 2010: 326; OECD 2011b: 18; Sambanis 2002: 224; UN DESA 2012: 2; UNDP 2012: 39). The potential interrelationship between greed and grievance highlights how, rather than existing independently of each other, the different challenges youth face in fragile states are interconnected to one another, as will now be discussed in more detail.

3.2.7 Children in fragile states and the cycle of fragility

The issues children face in fragile states do not exist in isolation, but rather are impacted by and interrelated to one another (Baird 2010: 21). An example of this, discussed within this chapter, is how large-scale youth unemployment is frequently interrelated to barriers to education and rapid urbanisation. Likewise, as highlighted through previous academic and policy research, barriers to education and rapid migration of youth from rural to urban areas do not exist in isolation, since they too are interconnected to other aspects of fragility, such as a lack of resources, conflict, or disaster (Andrews et. al 2012: 27; Baird 2010: 21; Carpenter, Slater and Mallett 2012: 43; Lewis 2012: 156; OECD 2011b: 17-18; Tegenu 2011: 2-3). As such, it is important to understand, not only the different issues young people face in fragile states, but the complex ways these feed into one another.

The interrelationship between the various issues impacting upon young people in fragile states highlights how the competing narratives of children as victims of violence and youth as threat to stability, mentioned in 3.2.2, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, state fragility impacts upon public services and creates a crisis in child protection, thereby increasing the vulnerabilities and limiting the opportunities available to young people, making it more likely they will engage in illicit activities (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010: 252; Lewis 2012: 160; OECD 2011b: 18). An example of this cycle can be seen in the correlation between food shortage, poor educational performance, and youth violence, with Taylor explaining how 'chronically malnourished children perform less well at school, are more often unemployed, and earn less over their

lifetimes of economic activity. As a result – poorer, economically excluded and cognitively disadvantaged – they become the kinds of young adults on whose relative deprivation crime, social fragmentation and recruitment to militia and insurgent causes thrive' (2014: 3). This illustrates a cycle of fragility, by showing how issues that impact upon children have immediate impacts and potential long-term consequences for the young person and the state.

Furthermore, young people are rarely the organisers or orchestrators of violence or unrest in fragile states, but are recruited by adults, who mobilise them for their own ends by tapping into their vulnerabilities and grievances (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 31-32; Whitman et. al 2012: 3). This point is illustrated by Mitton who explains how, in the context of Sierra Leone, concern that high levels of youth frustration will result in renewed civil conflict are unfounded, as they do not 'grasp the importance of third-party actors to mobilization' (2013: 324). Therefore, as mentioned in 3.2.3, youth violence should be understood as a symptom rather than a cause of fragility, as young people do not cause fragility, but fragility increases the likelihood that adults will be able to recruit them for activities that aggravates the already volatile situation.

Understanding this cycle is important when examining the interconnections between state fragility and the involvement of young people in Somali piracy. Just as young people are not the mobilisers or organisers of violence in fragile states, neither are they responsible for orchestrating piratical activity off the Horn of Africa. Rather, as mentioned in the previous chapter[37], Somali piracy is planned on land by kingpins who then hire vulnerable people, including children, to carry out the actual attack (Gaswaga 2013: 279; Holland 2013: 181; Whitman et al. 2012: 8-9). As discussed throughout this chapter so far, in fragile states, including Somalia where piracy flourish, child protection may be weak. As a result, children may experience a multitude of issues, including extreme poverty; barriers to education and employment; risk of death; displacement; and separation from family, all of which may be used by these kingpins as tools for recruiting them into pirate groups.

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[37] See 2.3.1

Moreover, as discussed in the last chapter[38], piracy itself is both a product and cause of state instability in Somalia. Therefore, by becoming involved in piracy networks, Somali children may, by extension, be adding to the very fragility that made them vulnerable to piracy recruitment in the first place. However, while the vulnerable situation of young people is recognised within the child piracy literature, the academic focus has been predominantly concerned with how to treat children apprehended for piracy at seas[39] (Bellish 2015: 276-278; 289-294; Drumbl 2013: 258-259; Holland 2013: 186-189; Sterio 2018: 45-50; 91-127). As such, there is scant discussion or research into this cycle of instability, nor on what can be achieved by addressing the issues of child piracy from its wider shore-based context.

While youth involvement in activities such as piracy should be considered part of a cycle of instability, it is equally important to recognise the positive contribution that young people can play in countering state fragility. According to previous studies, young people possess the potential to help create positive change in fragile states, yet because large youth cohorts are generally seen as part of the problem, their potential as part of the solution is often overlooked (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 3). Examining how young people could help to secure solutions to state fragility, and how this may be related to discussions around the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks, is something this thesis will now examine.

3.3 Young people as potential solutions to fragility

Young people are not merely victims or potential recruits for unrest, they are also agents of change and rights holders who should be included in decisions that impact upon them (Collins 2017: 23; Ruiz-Casares et. al 2017: 1-2; 3). Under the CRC (1989: Article 12), young people have the right to participate in discussions relating to their welfare and, given the affect fragility has on their lives, it stands to reason youth should be included in efforts to tackle state fragility. This point has been raised by Ruiz-Casares et. al, who state 'it is essential to stop considering these children and young people only as 'victims', as they are rights-holding individuals whose dignity and

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[38] See 2.4.4
[39] This has previously been discussed in 2.5.2

physical and psychological integrity must be respected' (2017: 1). Similarly, further literature cites how children and youth should be seen, not as victims or drivers of fragility, but as individuals who have the right to be included in discussion relating to state building (Collins 2017: 15; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 47). Thus, when considered from this perspective, it appears young people should be actively engaged in addressing fragility.

Besides having the right to participate, the unique insights of young people could be beneficial when considering potential solutions to state fragility (ILO, UNDP, UNHCR 2017: 4). According to previous research, youths have a clear understanding of how fragility impacts upon their lives and wider community, and in some cases are already taking proactive steps to alleviate this (Collins 2017: 20; Law, Sonn and Mackenzie 2014: 120; OECD 2011b: 51; Oosterom, Wignall and Wilson 2018: 7). Moreover, it has been found that when youth are positively engaged their resilience, energy, creativity, and innovation can help create positive change (Cordaid 2015: 3; 6; ILO, UNDP, UNHCR 2017: 4; OECD 2011b: 51; UN DESA 2012: 1-2; Wessells 2018: 14; Williams 2016: 104). As such, engaging youth in efforts to combat fragility is considered important, not just because they have the right to be included, but because their participation can add value and provide new solutions.

Engaging and addressing the needs of youth may likewise improve the economies in fragile states, with Barakat and Urdal claiming 'given the right conditions, large youth cohorts may represent a significant resource that can boost development, a so-called 'demographic dividend'' (Barakat and Urdal 2009: 2). This is because, as alluded to in 3.2.3, large youth cohorts can be a positive economic force, especially if young people are skilled in areas required to tackle fragility (Cordaid 2015: 5-6; Elzarov 2015: 2; ILO 2010: 85; Munive 2010: 327; Murphy 2012: 9; Sommers 2007: 109; Staveteig 2006: 11; Urdal 2004: 16). However, as discussed in the previous section, this is dependent upon young people gaining an education and the labour markets ability to absorb them. This suggests that, by addressing the multitude of issues that create youth unemployment, fragility may decrease, not because large unemployed youth demographics increase insecurity, but because when properly engaged youth bulges are a force for economic and social good.

The importance of engaging young people in areas of peacebuilding and security has become a more prominent theme within the academic and policy literature on state fragility in recent year (Collins 2017: 15; 20; Cordaid 2015: 3; Law, Sonn and Mackenzie 2014: 120; McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009: 47; OECD 2011b: 51; Sommers 2007: 110; Williams 2016: 107-108). Yet, despite this, just as the needs of young people are often not considered a priority in programmes aimed at addressing fragility[40], they are likewise regularly side-lined in state-building efforts. As past research demonstrates, youth continue to be marginalised in policy decisions relating to fragility and, even when their participation is considered important, this is often not properly implemented in practice (Collins 2017: 15; Law, Sonn and Mackenzie 2014: 111; Sommers 2007: 106-109). By excluding youth in efforts to tackle fragility, states are overlooking one of their most valuable resources and adding to youth marginalisation, thereby increasing the probability that this resource will be utilised by those seeking to create unrest and instability (Sommers 2007: 102).

When considered together, this further reinforces how state fragility and the involvement of children in activities that add to this may be part of an interconnected cycle. Failures in child protection make young people vulnerable to recruitment for activities that add to fragility, creating the perception that youth are part of the problem and should not be positively engaged as part of the solution, which further marginalises them. When it comes to the involvement of Somali children in piracy networks, this is an area that has not yet been explored. Despite their heavy involvement in the crime, it appears that young people have not been engaged in efforts within Somalia to combat piracy. Nor is there much emphasis in both the academic and policy literature on how addressing the needs of young people may help with counter-piracy programming.

So far, this chapter has predominantly focused on how children involved in Somali piracy networks may be understood in relation to the academic discussions regarding children and youth in fragile states. It will now consider how such involvement may be

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[40] As discussed previously in this chapter

viewed in comparison to the involvement of children in similar destabilising activities, namely military armed groups and gangs.

3.4 Children involved in piracy compared to children involved in other armed activities

This chapter now moves on to addressing Objective Two and its associated sub-research questions, by exploring the involvement of children within Somalia piracy networks and the extent to which these can be compared to children involved in other security challenges in fragile states. Specifically, it considers the similarities and differences in how the children involved in Somali piracy are seen in relation to those involved in military armed groups and gangs. This is because when the land-based context of child piracy is mentioned within the academic literature, it often highlights similarities between the children involved in piracy and those associated with armed groups[41] (Conradi 2014: 16-17; Drumbl 2013: 267-268; 271-277; Holland 2013: 186; Salomé 2016: 34-35; 45-48; Sterio 2018: 64; Whitman et. al 2012: 5; 8-9; 13-15). Moreover, as alluded to in 3.2.1, in regions where piracy occurs, such as Somalia, children are regularly used by other armed and criminal groups, with Whitman et al. claiming that 'the use of children and youth by pirate groups could be viewed as a natural extension of these groups' (2013: 3).

3.4.1 Children involved in military armed groups

As previously discussed[42], when the child piracy literature refers to the land-based insecurity context that leads young people to partake in Somali piracy, a comparison is often made to the voluntary engagement of children in military armed groups (Aquilina 2013: 2; Drumbl 267-271; Gaswaga 2013: 282; 300; Holland 2013: 184; Salomé 2016: 45; Sterio 2018 64-65; Whitman 2013: 219-220; Whitman et. al 2012: 3-4). While children used by Somali pirate groups are not directly comparable to those used by militant groups, since pirates are criminals and not combatants[43], there are

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[41] This was originally discussed in 2.5.2
[42] And as mentioned in 2.5.2 of the previous chapter
[43] As was discussed in 2.4.1

notable similarities regarding the environment in which children join both groups. Armed conflict and the use of children as soldiers is symptomatic of state fragility (Dallaire 2011: 2; 109; Wessells 2006: 44) in much the same way as piracy is, and, as discussed in Chapter Two[44], Somali piracy originated due to the disorder and instability caused by conflict. This means that, while the children involved in piracy are not child soldiers, they nevertheless 'function in a lawless environment, similar to that of an armed conflict' (Sterio 2013: 288).

Given the comparable environment in which children join these groups, similar factors likely influence their engagement in both contexts. As discussed throughout this chapter, several issues may cause Somali children to engage in piracy, including poverty; lack of education; unemployment; separation from family; and everyday violence. This is reflective of the literature relating to child soldiers, which cites family breakdown and orphanhood, poverty, and lack of alternative options as reasons why children join armed groups (Dallaire 2011: 110-114; Francis 2007: 208-209; Jørgensen 2012: 676; Wessells 2006: 47-48; 50-52; 54-55). Although this is not a definitive list, since 'the causes of soldiering are contextual, vary across individuals, and are embedded in wider systems of exploitation and violence' (Wessells 2006: 55), it signifies that children may enter pirate and military groups for similar reasons. Moreover, given the youth bulge literature frequently focuses on the involvement of youth in conflict (Alfy 2016: 103; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 1; Barakat and Urdal 2009: 2-3; Collier 2008: 20-21; Goldstone 2002: 11; Munive 2010: 324-325; Urdal 2006: 608), it can be assumed that children associated with military groups, much like those involved in Somali piracy, function within and as part of a similar cycle of instability.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, in regions where piracy flourishes, such as Somalia, children are often used by state and non-state armed groups (Gaswaga 2013: 282; Holland 2013: 176-177; Whitman et. al 2012: 3). It appears that the rationale for this recruitment is the same, with the literature pertaining to child piracy (Aquilina 2013: 2; Conradi 2014: 16-17; Holland 2013: 185-186; Sterio 2018: 27; Whitman et al 2012: 5) and that pertaining to child soldiering (Dallaire 2011: 117-118; 186; Nobert 2011: 13-14; Wessells 2006: 33-37) claiming that commanders value

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[44] See 2.4.1

children because they are impressionable; fearless; cheaper to feed; replaceable; and pose a moral dilemma to those who encounter them. This use of children by both groups has raised concerns that in Somalia children may move between armed groups and piracy networks (Holland 2013: 184; Whitman, Reeves and Johnson 2016: 7). If this is true, then removing children from one group is not enough, as young Somalis may exchange one destabilising activity for another if the issues impacting upon them go unaddressed. Despite this, there is limited research into the dual role that children may occupy in pirate and armed groups, nor on what this may signify for land-based responses to both these issues.

Along with similarities in the engagement process, comparisons can be made regarding the roles that children occupy in both groups. Children involved in armed groups are often used in active combat, being expected to fight, kill, rape, and torture, which may cause them physical and emotional trauma (Bond and Krech 2016: 569; de Silva, Hobbs and Hanks 2001: 131; Ursini 2015: 1027). However, not all children partake in active combat, as some take on support roles such as cooks; spies; medics; bush wives; and porters (Jørgensen 2012: 668; Wessells 2006: 71). Similarly, some children may take on frontline roles in Somali pirate groups and be expected to shoot at marines, take hostages, or commit acts of torture, which could likewise cause them harm, while others may occupy support roles (Conradi 2014: 18; Sterio 2018: 64). Many of these support roles are likely to be land-based, such as offering logistical support for sea-based crews, guarding hostages, cooking, cleaning, and providing sexual services for pirates (Bosetti et. al 2013: 44; George 2014: 159; Lombardo 2019: 78). Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter[45], because this involvement occurs on land and not on the high seas, it is overlooked in the child piracy literature.

The failure of the literature to recognise the land-based support roles that children often occupy in Somali pirate networks signifies a major difference within the understanding of child pirates and child soldiers. Unlike those involved in piracy, there is a more holistic understanding of the different roles that children occupy within armed groups. This is because armed conflict is not geographically bound in the same way that piracy legally is, but also because the Paris Principles (2007: 7) provides an

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[45] See 2.5.1 and 2.5.2

inclusive legal description of what constitutes a child associated with an armed group. Moreover, there is significant research into the phenomenon of child soldiers, while 'there appears to be scant awareness of the existence of child pirates, let alone the creation of comprehensive, nuanced legal and policy responses to cope with their distinct experience' (Salomé 2016: 43). Thus, while the majority of children associated with an armed group fall within the classification of child soldier, the same is not true of children involved in piracy.

The holistic understanding of child soldiers, compared to those involved in piracy, can most notably be seen through the way both disciplines understand the role of girls. Although historically overlooked, and despite some existing gender bias, there has been a gradual shift so that child soldiering is now mostly considered an activity that both genders are engaged in (Francis 2007: 208; Haer and Böhmelt 2018: 396; Jørgensen 2012: 680-681). However, this is currently not the case in the child piracy literature. Instead, it has been stated that girls are either not involved, or their involvement is minimal (Drumbl 2013: 268; Holland 2013: 182-183). This is not strictly true, as according to the few pieces of research that have been undertaken in this area, females as young as fourteen are used by pirate groups on land in Somalia as cooks, sex workers, cleaners, and guards for hostages (Bosetti et. al. 2013: 44; Dini 2014: 6; Gilmer 2017: 378-381; World Bank 2013: 66-67; 85-86). Therefore, it appears that by failing to recognise the active roles that Somali children occupy within pirate networks onshore, the current child piracy literature does not accurately reflect the different gender dynamics involved.

Overall, when compared together, it becomes apparent that there are similarities between the children used by pirate networks in Somalia and those used by military groups. While children involved in piracy are not child soldiers, they nevertheless appear to engage in the crime because of the same shore-based insecurity factors that push others into armed groups. In some cases, it may even be that Somali children move from one group to another, depending on the situation onshore. Yet, while the literature and policy relating to child soldiers is mostly inclusive, the same is not true with regards to child piracy. Instead, the literature has largely dealt with those involved in the crime within the maritime domain, while simultaneously ignoring the many land-

based roles that children may occupy. This is a significant gap and weakness in the current academic debate, in which the participation and needs of many of the children operating within pirate groups go unnoticed. Moreover, the failure of the literature to recognise the land-based roles that young female Somalis occupy in piracy networks does not only signify the geographical limits imposed by the high seas' narrative, but also how this may create 'gender-blind or non-gender inclusive solutions to piracy' (Dini 2014: 3).

Just as the involvement of Somali children in piracy networks is seen as comparable to the use of children in military armed groups, so too is the association of children in gangs (Garbarino, Governale and Nesi 2020: 2; Kerig et. al 2013: 776; Quénivet and Shah-Davis 2013: 5-6). This is because, as Quénivet and Shah-Davis explain, 'what happens to child soldiers is an exaggeration of what happens to children in gangs' (2013: 24). Given this, and as will now be considered, it could be that the similarities between children involved in Somali piracy networks and military armed groups may also apply to those children involved in gangs, as is claimed within some of the child piracy literature (Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 2; 12; Whitman el. al 2012: 5; 7-8).

3.4.2 Children involved in gangs

Much like armed and pirate groups, gangs appear to be a prevalent problem in fragile states, with previous research suggesting they are common in areas of weak governance, as the lack of authority creates a power vacuum they can exploit (Rodgers 2005: 5; 8; Rodgers and Muggah 2009: 312; Rotberg 2004: 6; Sullivan 2007: 500). This is cited as being a particular problem in post-conflict countries, where gangs take advantage of the lack of authority, as can be seen throughout South and Central American post-conflict states (Baird 2017: 183-184; Brenneman 2014: 113; Rodgers and Muggah 2009: 304; Savenije and Van Der Borgh 2004: 155; Schuberth 2015: 309). This suggests, just as the fragile conditions in conflict and post-conflict states such as Somalia allows piracy to flourish[46], this is also true of gang violence.

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[46] As was previously discussed in 2.4.1

However, unlike militant and pirate groups, while gangs are more prevalent in fragile states, they are also a global phenomenon that may be found in most urban areas of the world (Hagedorn 2005: 153; Rodgers and Muggah 2009: 301; 304; Sullivan 2007: 500; UN DESA 2012: 3). Yet even when found in relatively stable and affluent societies, the context in which children seek gang membership may still be comparable to those causing young people to enter armed or pirate groups. Particularly as issues such as poverty; barriers to education; unemployment; family breakdown; and marginalisation, which are cited as push factors in the child piracy and child soldiers' literature, have likewise been found to influence gang membership, in fragile and more developed countries (Cramer 2010: 9-10; Densley 2013: 40; Finelli 2019: 246; Garbarino, Governale and Nesi 2020: 4; 7; Kerig et. al 2013: 775-776; Rodgers and Muggah 2009: 304; Savenije and Van Der Borgh 2004; 155; 160; Schuberth 2015: 310; White 2011: 211). Thus, even when youth engage with gangs in non-fragile contexts, it may still be because they experience similar structural barriers as those living in fragile states.

The greed and grievance narrative features within the gang literature, as a lack of options, marginalisation, and the potential for social mobilisation are cited as factors that influence youth engagement (Finelli 2019: 245; 246; Garbarino, Governale and Nesi 2020: 3; Savenije and Van Der Borgh 2004; 155; Schubert 2015: 301). This can be seen in the work of Kerig et. al, which claims youth may see gang membership as a 'strategy for achieving economic success, safety from victimization, or social status' (2013: 775). Furthermore, just as waithood may influence youth engagement in Somali piracy networks, particularly among adolescent men, previous research has found that this may likewise push young men in fragile countries to engage with gangs (Baird 2017: 198-201). This suggests that in Somalia, where gangs and pirate groups coexist, programmes aimed at tackling the root causes of greed and grievance and the resulting issue of waithood could have the dual effect of helping to keep youth from engaging in both groups. Yet, because the academic research has not focused on addressing the land-based root cause that have led Somali children to engage in piracy, the possible impact this could have on gang membership has not been explored.

Along with commonalities in the push factors that cause youth to join gangs and Somali pirate networks, they are also thought to be recruited for similar reasons. According to previous research gang leaders, like pirate kingpins and military commanders, value children because they are easier to manipulate; cheaper; replaceable; and pose a moral dilemma to those who encounter them (Finelli 2019: 245; Quénivet and Shah-Davis 2013: 27-28). At the same time, much like those involved in Somali pirate groups, these children are often tasked by adults to carry violent and criminal activities. In extreme cases this includes murder, rape, drug trafficking, and kidnapping, while more small-scale crimes involve muggings and theft (Brenneman 2014: 113; Densley 2013: 56; Finelli 2019: 245; 246; Garbarino, Governale and Nesi 2020: 3-4; 6; Katz, Hedbergb and Amaya 2016: 660: Rodgers and Baird 2015: 12; Rodgers and Muggah 2009: 307-308). Thus, just as children involved in Somali piracy may be considered as advantageous by adults and used in frontline criminal activities, this is also true of children involved in gangs.

Not all children associated with gangs regularly partake in acts of violence however, as much like pirate and armed groups, some young people are used for logistical and support purposes (Finelli 2019: 246; Quénivet and Shah-Davis 2013: 39). This is true of girls who may be 'used as mules, take on domestic chore and, alas, used as sexual service' (Quénivet and Shah-Davis 2013: 27). Yet, like the case of child piracy, the involvement of girls in gangs is often overlooked. This has lead Rodgers and Baird to claim that 'looking forward, there is a clear need to further understand the gendered range of interactions that girls and women have with gang-life' (2015: 14). Given girls are used by both pirate networks and gangs, it is likely that in regions such as Somalia where both groups operate, girls engage for similar reasons. Therefore, it could be that addressing the structural issues that push young women to engage in one group, may by extension help those associated with the other, although this has not been explored within the existent research.

Much like those engaged in piracy, the children associated with gangs are not viewed in the same holistic way as child soldiers. Yet, unlike child pirates, they are still a focal point of debate and policy. These policies have often been repressive, with many states using law enforcement to tackle this issue and, in more extreme cases, killing

those suspected of gang membership (Brenneman 2014: 113-114; Garbarino, Governale and Nesi 2020: 7; Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe 2012: 25; White 2011: 207). However, there has been a shift, both in academia and policy, towards recognising the importance of tackling the insecurity factors that push children into gangs. This includes focusing on addressing the socio-economic factors, such as inequality; poverty; lack of education; and unemployment, that often cause engagement (Brenneman 2014: 117-118; Hagedorn 2005: 153; Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe 2012: 25; UN DESA 2012: 5). This is a distinct difference to the way in which children involved in Somali piracy are seen in both policy and academia. While the gang debate considers the importance of addressing the root causes, the child piracy literature fails to examine what can be achieved by addressing the involvement of children in piracy from its shore-based context.

When the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks is compared to the participation of children in gangs it becomes apparent that, much like the case of child soldiers, there are similarities between both groups. However, while the use of children in gangs and Somali pirate networks is connected to human insecurity onshore, the child piracy literature focuses instead on how to deal with the issue at sea. Not only does this fail to examine what measures may be taken on land to dissuade young Somalis from engaging in piracy, but also how such efforts may interlink with and enhance measures aimed at keeping children from engaging in similar land-based activities.

3.5 The gap in research knowledge

In the last chapter this thesis examined how Somali piracy is a land-based activity, rooted in human insecurity and fragility onshore, which manifests itself in the maritime domain. As such, examining and attempting to combat piracy purely from the maritime domain is ineffective. Not only does this allow the shore-based orchestrators and financers to act with impunity, but it fails to address the root causes that have allowed Somali piracy to thrive. Piracy is rooted in fragility onshore, and as such it requires a long-term, land-based solution.

Yet, as has been discussed both within this chapter and the last, there is an absence of research into how state fragility and human insecurity onshore relates to the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks. Nor on how this involvement may be best understood and treated from its land-based context. Instead, the academic discussion predominantly focuses on what legal and policy responses should be used when children are apprehended for piracy at seas. As discussed in the previous chapter[47], even when the shore-based context is mentioned, this is often related to why children should be treated distinctly once apprehended. It does not consider how to proactively address the involvement of Somali children in piracy from a land-based perspective.

By focusing on how to respond to the issue of child piracy only within the maritime domain, the literature fails to examine how the involvement of Somali children in piracy networks relates to the wider understanding of children in fragile states. As such, it does not consider how this involvement may be interconnected to a wider cycle of fragility onshore, with inadequate child protection measures marginalising young people and potentially pushing them into piracy. Nor does it examine how organisations working in Somalia have recognised and responded to this issue. Furthermore, it is currently not clear whether children may be positively engaged onshore in efforts to tackle piracy, and what impact this might have.

As discussed in 3.4, children may engage in piracy networks and other armed groups, such as militant organisations and gangs, for similar reasons. Moreover, in Somalia where these different groups coexist, young people may move between them. However, because previous studies have predominately considered child piracy from a high seas' perspective, the potential interconnection between the involvement of children in Somalia piracy networks, gangs, and armed groups is currently not clear. Instead, when comparisons are made within the child piracy literature, particularly to child soldiers, the core purpose has been to examine how similar justice models may be used when children are apprehended for piracy at sea[48]. It does not consider what this reveals about addressing the child piracy problem from its land-based context, nor

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[47] See 2.5.2
[48] As was previously discussed in 2.5.2

how programmes aimed at dissuading children from engaging in one activity may lead to a decrease in the other.

By focusing only on the involvement of children at seas, the current literature has failed to recognise the many land-based roles that children may occupy within pirate networks in Somalia. Such land-based roles include shore-based logistical support to pirate crews at sea, guarding hostages, cooking, cleaning, and providing sexual services. Failing to recognise these roles that children could occupy is a significant weakness in the current academic debate, as it does not consider the full extent to which children may be involved in piracy. Correspondingly, considering only those children involved in piracy at seas has led to misleading claims that the children who are associated are always male. This is not necessarily true, as while boys are more likely to partake in the actual act of piracy at sea, girls may fulfil several roles onshore and engage in pirate networks for similar reasons as their male counterparts. As such, failing to recognise or consider how best to respond to the many land-based roles that children occupy within pirate networks highlights how the current child piracy literature is both geographically limited and gender-blind.

As will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding chapter, by examining how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia understand the involvement of children within piracy networks and considering how this influenced their land-based policy and programme responses between 2009-2018, this thesis will address this gap and provide an original and significant contribution to the academic literature. The original primary research of this thesis will examine whether the perception of IGOs and NGOs provides a more holistic understanding of Somali piracy and the various roles that children may occupy within this – both on land and in the maritime domain. Furthermore, it will analyse what this reveal about the perceived relationships between state fragility and the use of children in piracy networks, including how this may be interconnected to the use of children in other similar groups onshore. Through examining the involvement of children in piracy networks from the context of human insecurity onshore and those actors with experience of delivering land-based programme response, this thesis will add to a more rounded understanding of the involvement of children within the Somali piracy structure. It will do this by not only identifying the various roles that children may

occupy within piracy networks but also how such involvement may be proactively addressed on land.

3.6 Summary

This chapter has established how young people are viewed within the fragile states literature and how this may be interrelated with the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks, thereby addressing Sub-Research Question 1.3[49]. As has been seen, in fragile states, including those where piracy flourishes such as Somalia, child protection measures are weak or non-existent, and those under the age of eighteen are vulnerable to a multitude of interconnected issues, which often work in tandem to push children into destabilising activities. However, while the vulnerable situation of young people is recognised within the child piracy literature, the academic focus is predominantly concerned with how children should be treated when apprehended for piracy at seas. As such, there is scant discussion or research into this cycle of instability, nor on what can be achieved by addressing the issues of child piracy from its wider shore-based context. Similarly, both the academic and policy literature has failed to examine how addressing the needs of young people onshore in Somalia could positively impact upon overall counter-piracy programming efforts.

Objective Two and its associated sub-research questions have also been addressed within this chapter, which has examined the extent to which the involvement of children in Somali pirate networks can be compared to those used by armed groups and gangs within fragile state. As was shown, children seem to join these groups for similar reasons related to insecurity and fragility onshore. Furthermore, pirate kingpins, armed group commanders, and gang leaders appear to share similar rationales for recruiting children, while likewise utilising them for both front-line and support roles. However, in the case of child piracy, there is an absence of research into the use of children within these support roles, as they are predominantly shore-based and the academic literature, in keeping with the UNCLOS definition of piracy, has only focused on those children involved in piracy on the high seas. Not only does this impose geographical

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[49] Which focuses on how children and youth are understood as a cause, victim, or solution to state fragility and how this relates to the discussions of the involvement of children and youth in Somali pirate networks

limitations on who is considered a child pirate, but it genders the debate, resulting in claims that those involved are always male.

Taken together, the findings of both this chapter and the preceding one have outlined the importance of examining the issue of child piracy in Somali from its shore-based context. As will be discussed in more detail in the following Methodology chapter, the original primary research of this thesis does just this, by examining how IGOs and NGOs understand the involvement of children in piracy and how this influenced their land-based programme responses from 2009-2018. By doing so, this thesis works towards creating a greater understanding of how state fragility and human insecurity onshore relates to the involvement of children in maritime piracy, and how the issue may be best treated from its land-based context. As such, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, the theory and findings discussed over the last two chapter are used to inform the methodological approach adopted by this research.

Chapter Four: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline how this thesis goes about addressing the gap in academic literature discussed in the previous two chapters[50]. It will do so by explaining the research methodology and strategy utilised throughout the research process, thereby detailing how the research objectives will be addressed. As such, this chapter describes how qualitative data was identified, collected, and analysed in order to ascertains how IGO and NGO actors understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia from 2009-2018.

To deliver on the purpose of this chapter, section 4.2 reiterates the principal research question, objectives, and associated sub-research questions that were originally discussed within the thesis Introduction[51]. Section 4.3 then outlines the research epistemology, including the rationale for using a qualitative study, while section 4.4 explains why Somalia was chosen as the case selection. Section 4.5 discusses the data collection, including the rationale for why interviews were used as the primary sources of data and how research participants were identified, as well as a justification for why document analysis was utilised as a secondary form. The data analysis process is then discussed in section 4.6, including a description of the steps taken to ensure trustworthiness in the research findings, while section 4.7 considers the methodological limitations of this study. The chapter is then summarised in section 4.8.

4.2 Principal research question, objectives, and sub-research questions

This thesis' original contribution to knowledge addresses the absence of research[52] into how state fragility and human insecurity onshore relates to the involvement of

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[50] See 3.5 for a summary of this
[51] See 1.4
[52] Outlined in the previous two chapters and summarised in 3.5

children in maritime piracy in Somalia and how this issue may be best understood and treated from its land-based context. This is achieved through an examination of how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia have understood the involvement of children within piracy networks, both on land and at sea, and how this has influenced their policy and programme responses.

As discussed within the Introduction chapter[53], the purpose of doing so is to meet the principal research question of this thesis, which is: *How have IGO and NGO actors understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia from 2009-2018?*

To work towards answering this overarching research question, the following objectives have been identified. Where required, a series of inter-linked sub-research questions are included to ensure these objectives are met.

Objective 1. To understand the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy, and examine how these relate to state fragility
Sub-Research question 1.1: What are the drivers, enablers, motivators, and responses to Somali piracy?
Sub-Research question 1.2: What does the literature reveal about the relationship between state fragility and piracy in Somalia?
Sub-Research question 1.3: How are children and youth understood as a cause, victim, and solution to state fragility and where does this relate to the discussions of the involvement of children and youth in Somali piracy networks?

Objective 2. To explore the role of children within Somali piracy networks and the extent to which these can be compared to children involved in other security challenges in fragile states
Sub-Research Question 2.1: What does the literature tell us about the similar drivers and stressors that lead children to become involved in Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs within the context of fragile states?

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[53] See 1.4

Sub-Research Question 2.2: Are there any comparisons that can be made with regards to the roles and responsibilities children take on within Somali piracy networks and armed groups or gangs?

Sub-Research Question 2.3: What does this reveal regarding how children involved in Somali piracy are currently framed in the academic literature and in policy?

Objective 3. To explore how IGOs and NGOs define, understand, and respond to children who are involved in Somali piracy networks

Sub-Research Question 3.1: What do IGOs and NGOs perceive to be the land-based causes of child piracy in Somalia, and how did this influence their policy responses from 2009-2018?

Sub-Research Question 3.2: What does this tell us about the wider understanding of the perception of child pirates among IGOs and NGOs and what does it reveal about how children associated with Somali piracy groups are viewed when they are seen from a land-based perspective?

Objective 4. To consider whether the findings reveal any wider commonality between the perceptions of children involved in piracy networks in Somalia and children involved in armed groups and or gangs in fragile states

Sub-Research Question 4.1: How do the IGO and NGO perceptions relate to the wider understanding of children in fragile states involved in similar activities within military armed groups and gangs and does this suggest a more holistic way of understanding the involvement of children within Somali piracy networks?

Objective 5. To draw on the limitations of this study and suggest how these may be used to influence further areas of research

As alluded to in Chapter One[54], and as will be further explored throughout this chapter, a review of the relevant methodology literature, along with the research design discussed within this chapter, was used to inform how each objective would be addressed. A desk-based review of relevant academic and policy literature has been utilised to answer the sub-research questions connected to Objectives One and Two,

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[54] See 1.4

while an exploration of how IGOs and NGOs understand children's involvement within Somali piracy networks and how this influenced their land-based responses between 2009-2018 answers the sub-research questions connected to Objectives Three and Four. Finally, Objective Five focuses on the impact of the overall research findings and the limitations of this study, providing a basis from which to suggest potential areas of future research, which will be discussed in the thesis Conclusion.

Before outlining the overall research strategy in more detail, it is important to first explain the underlying epistemology in which the research is grounded, as this has influenced the rationale for using qualitative research methods and the overall research design used throughout this study.

4.3 Research epistemology and rationale for using qualitative methods

The original research of this thesis is based on qualitative research methods grounded in a constructionist understanding that 'all human knowledge is cultural knowledge, produced collaboratively by social beings in particular social, economic and political relations at a particular historical moment' (Gomm 2009: 332). As such, it adopts an interpretivist epistemological worldview that knowledge is constructed through our social interaction within the world, meaning we cannot objectively study the social world in the same way as we would the natural world (Esterberg 2002: 15). This is opposed to the positivist belief that meaning exists independently of any consciousness and is waiting to be discovered (Bryman 2001: 11-18; Crotty 1998: 41-42; Gray 2018: 22).

Researchers working from a constructionism framework accept that the meanings of social phenomenon are diverse, leading them to seek a complexity of views rather than trying to narrow the understanding of a particular topic (Creswell 2007: 20). In the case of this study, the research is set within the context that there is no one single understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy, as 'different people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon' (Crotty

1998: 9). As discussed in Chapters One[55] and Two[56], this can be seen in the wider maritime piracy debate, since what constitutes as piracy and who classifies as a pirate varies depending on the legal or geographical perspective taken. As Otto summarises, 'academics have held a number of varied definitions for maritime piracy' (2014: 315) and, as outlined previously[57], there are different legal and operational definitions proposed, such as those laid out by UNCLOS and the IMB. While the former limits piracy to the high seas, the latter considers piracy any act of boarding a vessel regardless of the maritime space in which it occurs. As this thesis has already discussed[58], these definitions can likewise be accused of limiting piracy to the maritime domain and failing to recognise the land-based operations and structures of the activity. These varied understandings of piracy underlie the decision to explore how this extends to the phenomenon of child piracy, particularly regarding the way different constructions and meanings have influenced how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia defined, understood, and responded to the involvement of children in pirate networks, not just from a maritime perspective but from its land-based context, between 2009-2018.

The interpretivist epistemological basis underpinning this research influenced the decision to use qualitative data collection methods, which are discussed in more detail in 4.5. This is because quantitative research is more in keeping with the objectivism of positivism, in that it tests theories and hypothesis, whereas qualitative research focuses on how individuals interpret and make sense of the phenomenon being studied (Denscombe 2003: 236-237; 267-268; Gomm 2009: 248-249; 270-271; Holliday 2008: 5-6; Silverman 2000: 1-2). Therefore, a qualitative study was better placed to explore the various perceptions held by organisations and individuals in relation to the involvement of children in piracy, as it would allow for a more complex picture of the issue to develop (Creswell 2007: 39; 40). The intention is, through having conducted qualitative research with IGOs and NGOs, this study results in a more holistic understanding of the engagement of children in Somali piracy networks, going

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[55] See 1.2
[56] See 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.3 and 2.3.1
[57] See 1.2, 2.2 and 2.2.1
[58] See 1.2 and 2.3 and 2.3.1

beyond the traditional high seas' and broader maritime definitions associated with the activity, to examine the land-based context.

Qualitative research was also the more practical approach to take to this study. As explained in the previous two chapters, there is limited academic research into child piracy, which would make it difficult to conduct a quantitative study as there is an absence of data and information from which to test hypothesis (Bryman 2001: 24). This further highlights the benefit of having used qualitative study to investigate how IGOs and NGOs have perceived and responded to the relationship between Somali piracy networks and children. Not only does it allow for a more in-depth description of a social phenomenon that has received scant academic attention, but it provides the opportunity to consider the different, often overlooked, determinates of the subject (Gibbs 2018: 11; 12). Namely, the role that state fragility is perceived to play in the involvement of children in Somali piracy, along with how this understanding has influenced the policy responses implemented by IGOs and NGOs.

4.4 Rationale for Somali case selection

Somalia was chosen as the geographic focus of this study as it provides a paradigmatic case of the child piracy problem, in that it 'shows or reveals key elements of that phenomenon' (Pavlich 2010: 646). As discussed previously[59], Somalia provides the most well-documented cases of children involved in piracy networks, with the issue having gained attention when the international community began a coordinated naval response to piracy off the Horn of Africa, resulting in the arrest and prosecution of those claiming to be juveniles. Furthermore, there are concrete examples of IGOs and NGOs having developed and delivered land-based programmes aimed at keeping young Somalis out of the crime[60].

However, as previously alluded too[61], and as will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding chapter[62], due to the international naval intervention Somali piracy has

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[59] See 1.3.1 and 2.5.1
[60] This will be discussed in more detail in 4.5.2
[61] See 1.3 and 2.5.1
[62] See 5.4

decreased since 2012. As such the issue of child piracy is not as prevalent as it once was. Yet, this does not mean that examining the understandings and land-based responses of IGOs and NGOs regarding the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks is not still an important endeavour. As was discussed in Chapter Two[63], although piracy has decreased, Somali pirate networks have not ceased to exist. Rather, they have scaled back or diversified into other criminal activities, leading to concerns among those who have carried out previous research into child piracy that Somali children may merely move between pirate networks and other armed and criminal groups if the wider root causes are not addressed. (CSI 2018: 20; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 18-19; Holland 2013: 184; Salomé 2016: 45; Sterio 2018: 64; Whitman et. al 2012: 3; Whitman, Johnson and Reeves 2016: 7). Furthermore, while Somali piracy has been suppressed it is not yet eradicated, and there are valid concerns among academics and policy makers that the predominantly naval response is resulting in only short-term solutions to the problem (EUNAVFOR 2016: Joubert 2020: iv; 4; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115). As such, there is a need to better understand what has and what can be done to address the land-based causes of the Somali piracy problem and the involvement of children within the crime. By providing a paradigmatic case that examines IGO and NGO understandings of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and their land-based responses to this phenomenon between 2009-2018 this is what this thesis aims to do.

Although Somalia has the most well documented cases of children engaging in pirate groups, there are concerns that child may likewise be involved in similar activities in other areas where piracy flourishes, such as the Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asia[64] (Conradi 2014: 20; Salomé 2016: 43; Whitman et. al 2012: 6-7; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 82-83; 85). This presents another reason why Somalia was chosen as the geographic region in which to situate this study, as while the findings may not necessarily be transferable there have been growing calls to examine what lessons can be learnt from counter-piracy efforts within Somalia and whether these 'can be exported to address the emerging piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea and other piracy hotbeds around the world' (Hodgkinson 2013: 147). Or, as Bueger and Edmunds put

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[63] And as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter
[64] As previously discussed in 2.5.1

it, there have not only been efforts to codify and consolidate Somali counter-piracy responses, but to 'expand these practices to other maritime regions' (2021: 188). Therefore, when it comes to programmes that have been designed to try and keep young Somalis out of piracy, it is first important to examine how these have been developed, along with how successful these have been in keeping children from engaging in piracy or similar land-based activities, before considering whether they may provide a useful roadmap from which to develop similar programmes in other geographic regions in the future.

In order to deliver on its core purpose, this thesis is concerned with IGO and NGO response between 2009-2018. This timeframe was chosen as it was within this nine-year period that IGOs and NGOs were most visibly involved in delivering counter-piracy programmes aimed predominately at young Somalis. The majority of programmes considered in this study were implemented from 2012 onwards, however the timeframe considers responses that were in effect from 2009 as some organisations, such as Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), were developing and delivering anti-piracy programmes that targeted youth as early as this. Similarly, 2018 was chosen as the date up to which programmes would be considered, as this was when data collection began. While some organisation had ended their youth focused counter-piracy work by this point, others such as Fair Fishing, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) still had projects on-going. Furthermore, even those that had officially 'ended' their counter-piracy work were still delivering humanitarian programmes to vulnerable young Somalis (as was the case with Save the Children and NCA), and some organisation, such as PASOS, had broader on-going projects aimed at keeping vulnerable children out of armed and criminal groups, including but not limited to piracy. As such, the timeframe of 2009-2018 was chosen to accurately reflect the different IGO and NGO programmes targeted at young Somalis who were vulnerable to piracy recruitment up until the point that data collection began.

4.5 Data collection

To meet the objectives of this study and answer the associated sub-research questions, both of which are outlined in 4.2, it was important to collect data that would allow for this to be achieved. As a result, this research identified the need to collect theoretical, perceptual, and contextual data and information. This data and information included: an on-going examination of the theoretical context within which the study is placed; an in-depth analysis of the research participants' perceptions of child piracy in Somalia, including their understanding of the maritime and land-based geographical context, the motivating factors for engagement, the role of state-fragility, and their organisational responses; and an examination of the contextual information relating to the objectives, operational framework, programmes, and policies of the organisations involved in this study, to see whether these reflected the perceptions of the research participants.

One of the strengths of case study research is it permits for flexibility in the data collection, allowing for multiple sources and multiple methods to be used (Denscombe 2003: 31; Gray 2018: 267; Remenyi 2013: 4). This is beneficial for this study, which has involved using multiple methods of data collection. As will be discussed in more detail now, this included a desk-based review of the academic literature to inform the theoretical context; the use of semi-structured interviews to gather the perception of participants; and the use of document analysis to examine the policy and programme documents of the organisations involved, to gain the required contextual information.

4.5.1 Literature review

A detailed examination of the relevant academic and policy literature relating to the topics of maritime piracy in Somalia, the involvement of children and youth in Somali piracy networks, and children and youth in fragile state preceded data collection and was on-going throughout the research process. The purpose was to ground the thesis in theory, to identify the academic gap addressed by the research, and to act as a guide when drafting the interview questions and analysing the data (Bryman 2001: 496-497; Silverman 2000: 226). The review of the literature was split over two

chapters[65], with both focusing on meeting Objectives One and Two and their associated sub-research questions.

The first literature review focused primarily on examining the causal effects and motivating factors that contribute to Somali piracy, and how these relate to state fragility, thereby working to address the first research objective. Aside from academic journal articles and books relating to maritime piracy, documents from organisations such as OBP and the UN Security Council were utilised during this review process, giving a more thorough reflection of how the relationship between state fragility and Somali piracy is viewed. Through a close analysis of the literature, the importance of recognising the space and wider context in which piracy occurs became apparent, as perceptions of the crime and who constitutes as a pirate change depending upon the geographical lens used. Furthermore, this review process assisted in identifying the academic gap this thesis addresses. It became apparent that the literature on child piracy in Somalia focuses on the issue from a maritime perspective, taking a predominantly high seas' approach, with scant discussion regarding how state fragility and human insecurity onshore relates to the involvement of children in maritime piracy, nor what can be done on land to counter this.

The second literature review primarily worked towards meeting Objective Two, by exploring the role of children within Somali piracy networks and whether these can be compared to children involved in other security challenges in fragile states. In doing so, it built on the findings outlined in the first literature review, by comparing the child piracy literature against academic journal articles and books relating to children and youth in fragile states. This included reviewing specific literature pertaining to child soldiers and gangs, as the existent child piracy literature makes passing comparisons to both (Drumbl 2013: 267-268; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 2012: 2; 12; Sterio 2018: 64; Whitman et. al 2012: 8-9). Like the first literature review, documents produced by organisations such as Save the Children and The World Bank were reviewed, to reflect how children involved in piracy and those involved in similar activities onshore are currently framed in policy, as well as academic literature. The conclusions from this review are returned to within the Chapters Six and Seven to meet Objective Four,

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[65] Chapters Two and Three

which considers whether the research findings reveal any wider commonality between the perceptions of children involved in piracy networks in Somalia and those engaged in similar activities in fragile states.

Literature relating to youth as well as children was consulted to meet these objectives. This is because this thesis uses the CRC definition of a child being anyone below the age of eighteen (1989: Article 1), whereas the fragile states' literature, particularly relating to youth bulge theory, classifies youth as anyone over the age of fifteen (Alfy 2016: 100; Azeng and Yogo 2013: 4-5; Goldstone 2002: 14; Urdal 2007: 98). Therefore, given that children involved in Somali piracy networks, or similar destabilising activities within fragile states, may fall within this age bracket and be classed as 'youth' as opposed to children, references to both were considered to reflect the different understanding of these terms with regards to age.

In addition to the academic and policy literature outlined above, relevant methodological literature was also reviewed. The purpose was to identify the most appropriate methodological framework to answer the research question and deliver on the research objectives, to ascertain the type of data needed, and to identify how participants would be selected for this study. As such, this review of the methodological literature has helped to develop the overall research framework discussed throughout this chapter, providing the rationale for using a qualitative study, grounded in a constructionist epistemology, in order to explore how IGOs and NGOs have understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia between 2009-2018.

4.5.2 Interviews and research participants

In keeping with case study research, primary and secondary data (Remenyi 2013: 33) have been utilised to meet Objectives Three and Four and to answer their associated sub-research questions. Interviews were the primary form of data collection for the reasons outlined below, while document analysis, which will be discussed in 4.5.3, was the secondary form. Eighteen interviews were carried out between December 2018 and June 2019. These were split evenly over the two organisational types, with

nine interviewees[66] representing six different IGOs and nine interviewees[67] representing seven NGOs[68]. This was done to ensure a balanced dataset across the research findings.

The interview sample was purposefully kept relatively small, to focus on the rich description of the participant perceptions of child piracy, while still providing enough variety to allow for a comparison. However, as will be discussed in more detail in 4.6, to ensure enough data was produced to meet the research objectives and answer the sub-research questions, analysis occurred alongside data collection. This meant it was possible to ensure what Saunders et. al have termed 'inductive thematic saturation' (2018: 1896) occurred, with neither the interviews, nor the document analysis, leading to the creation of new codes or themes by the end of the collection process (Given 2016: 135; Gray 2018: 384; Olshansky 2015: 20; 22-23; Saunders et. al 2018: 1895; 1896; 1897; Urquhart 2013: 194).

Interviews were used as the primary method of data collection as they are active, meaning research participants could share their in-depth perceptual understandings, while the interviewer could use follow-up questions to further knowledge production (Esterberg 2002: 83-85; Gillham 2005: 3; Gray 2018: 378; Holstein and Gubrium 2004: 140-141). Research participants were free to explain their organisational and personal contextual understandings of the causes of child piracy, along with who they defined as a child pirate, and how this influenced policy responses. At the same time, the interviewer could follow up on what was said during this exchange, encouraging participants to go into more depth when needed and expand on what was said. As such, interviews offered flexibility, allowing for the exploration of ideas and themes as they emerged. Moreover, multiple interviews have provided informant triangulation (Remenyi 2013: 86) and allowed the intricacy of the case to develop (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 35), with various, and sometimes conflicting, themes emerging. Questioning how these different perceptions and meanings are constructed and examining the

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[66] Referred to as participants one to nine
[67] Referred to as participants ten to eighteen
[68] More information on the organisations and participants involved in this research will be outlined below and in Chapter Six. In addition, further information on the participants and a full list of organisations can be found in Appendix C and D

similarities and conflict among the responses is important for understanding the complexity of the child piracy issue, and how it is perceived by those working in the field.

Given the importance of flexibility, semi-structured interviews were utilised, as opposed to structured or unstructured. This is because semi-structured interviews, unlike unstructured, provided a general focus for inquiry (Bryman 2001: 314), while still allowing for flexibility in the process, unlike structured interviews (Denscombe 2003: 166). As such, a clear list of questions was developed, focusing on the issues and academic gap identified through the literature review process discussed in 4.5.1. These questions[69] were open-ended and were broadly grouped into the following five themes: professional perceptions of children involved in piracy; how and why children are used by pirate groups; the use of children by pirate networks compared to those used by other armed groups; child piracy and gender; and whether current responses could be improved by considering piracy from its land-based context. As questions were open-ended, interviewees were encouraged to expand on these subject themes, allowing for a wider discussion and providing the space for participants to share their perceptual understanding (Denscombe 2003: 167). Additionally, semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewer to ask follow-up questions and, where appropriate, to development new lines of inquiry, while still exercising control over the overall process (Esterberg 2002: 87-88; Gray 2018: 378; 381).

Representatives of IGOs and NGOs were interviewed as there are concrete examples of both types of organisations developing specific programmes and policies aimed at addressing piracy, or seeking to keep children and youth out of piracy or similar activities in Somalia. As will be discussed more in Chapter Six, twelve of the organisations[70] were chosen as they were running, funding, or supporting alternative livelihoods and educational projects that aimed to keep young Somalis from engaging in armed and criminal groups, including some programmes that were developed

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[69] A copy of these questions can be viewed in Appendix E

[70] As will be outlined in more detail in Chapter Six these organisations are: Adeso; Fair Fishing; FAO; IGAD; IOC; NCA; PASOS; Save the Children; UNDP; UNICEF; UNODC; and YOVENCO

specifically to offer alternative livelihoods to piracy[71]. Of these twelve organisations, five[72] were involved in coastal rehabilitation and alternative livelihoods programmes within the fisheries sector. Furthermore, four organisations[73] were involved in running anti-piracy awareness and advocacy campaigns; three[74] were involved in counter-piracy capacity building projects; three[75] were involved in diverting young Somalis from engaging in armed and criminal groups; eight[76] were supporting more broad development and humanitarian programmes targeted at Somali youth and the wider community; and one organisation[77] was involved in both debriefing piracy hostage and repatriating apprehended pirates back to Somalia. While there were similarities regarding the work these organisations were doing, with some delivering programmes in partnership with each other, there were also some differences in their overall operational framework[78]. The differences and similarities provided a useful point of analysis regarding the way children's involvement in piracy is constructed and interpreted among different IGOs and NGOs, while ensuring a further level of informant triangulation (Remenyi 2013: 98).

Both purposeful and snowball sampling were utilised to identify research participants. With regards to purposeful sampling the focus was on individuals who had experience of working for IGOs or NGOs in child protection or piracy prevention within the Somali context[79]. Participants were identified through a mix of the professional networks of the researcher and organisations identified through the literature review process. Snowball sampling was then used to engage further participants in the study, as those working within the field were able to recommend useful contacts with relevant experience in either child protection or piracy prevention, who might not have been identified otherwise. Overall, of the eighteen participants involved in this research,

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[71] As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six this includes programmes delivered by Adeso; Fair Fishing; FAO; IGAD; IOC; NCA; Save the Children; UNDP; UNICEF; UNODC; and YOVENCO
[72] These organisations are Adeso; Fair Fishing; FAO; IGAD; and IOC
[73] IGAD; NCA; Save the Children; and UNODC
[74] IGAD; IOC; and UNODC
[75] DDG; UNDP; and UNICEF
[76] Adeso; FAO; NCA; PASOS; Save the Children; UNDP; UNICEF; YOVENCO
[77] UNODC
[78] This will be examined in more detail in Chapter Six
[79] See Chapter Six and Appendix C for the full list of organisations

fourteen[80] had some experience of delivering or supporting alternative livelihoods or educational projects (including those with experience of funding or running coastal and fisheries programmes[81]); five[82] were involved in delivering or developing counter-piracy awareness and advocacy campaigns; four were involved in counter-piracy capacity building projects, or community resilience projects more broadly[83] (including programmes aimed at diverting youth from armed groups into peacebuilding activities); two participants[84] had direct experience of encountering Somalis imprisoned for piracy; one participant[85] had direct experience of the repatriation of child pirates; and one participant[86] had done work with former piracy hostages. As will be examined in more detail in 3.7, while three of the participants[87] worked for organisations that had run counter-piracy programmes aimed at young Somalis, they themselves had not been directly involved in designing or delivering these programmes. With regards to the make-up of participants, fourteen were male[88] and four were female[89]; ten were Somali or Somaliland nationals[90]; one was from a different African nation[91]; five were European[92]; and one was American[93].

Potential participants and organisations were contacted about being involved in this study using the steps laid out in the research ethics application[94]. An initial email was sent explaining the purpose of the research and the reason why the specific organisation or individual was being invited to partake. This email outlined what was expected of the research participants, including a copy of the ethically approved

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[80] Participant 1; participant 2; participant 3; participant 4; participant 6; participant 7; participant 10; participant 11; participant 12; participant 13; participant 14; participant 15; participant 16; participant 18

[81] Specifically, this applies to participants 4, 6, 7, 12, 16, and 18

[82] Participant 1; participant 2; participant 7; participant 11; and participant 13

[83] Participant 1; participant 3; participant 4; and participant 17

[84] Participants 4 and 7

[85] Participant 7

[86] Participant 3

[87] Participants 5, 8 and 9

[88] Participant 1; participant 2; participant 3 ; participant 4; participant 6 ; participant 8 ; participant 9 ; participant 10; participant 11; participant 12; participant 13; participant 14; participant 15; and participant 18

[89] Participant 5; participant 7; participant 16; and participant 17

[90] Participant 1; participant 2; participant 8; participant 9; participant 10; participant 12; participant 13; participant 14; participant 15; and participant 18

[91] Participant 4

[92] Participant 3; participant 5; participant 6; participant 11; participant 17

[93] Participant 7

[94] See Appendix G

participant information sheet[95] and consent form[96]. Once individuals expressed their interest in being involved, they were sent a follow up email explaining the process going forward. In a couple of cases research participants were volunteered by gatekeepers within their organisations. To ensure these individuals did not feel coerced or pressured to partake in the study, it was made clear that they could withdraw at any time and the reason for this would be kept confidential. Furthermore, all interviewees were sent a copy of the interview transcript once completed and permission was again sought to use the information shared during the interview.

All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity to protect themselves and their organisation. There were two stages to this process. For the first stage, each interviewee was provided with a unique participant number on their individual consent form. Interviewees were then known by these unique numbers throughout the transcription process. Once the transcriptions were completed, these participant numbers were altered for the thesis write-up, with those representing IGOs being redesignated as participants one to nine, while those representing NGOs were similarly redesignated participants ten to eighteen. This was done to ensure that the final participant numbers would not reflect the order in which interviews had taken place, thus providing a further safeguard to protect the anonymity of those involved.

Although the geographic focus of this research is Somalia, data collection did not take place there. Instead interviews predominantly took place online via Skype. This was due to ethical and safety concerns around conducting research in Somalia, along with the diverse international locations of many of the individuals and organisations involved in the study. While face-to-face interviews would have been the preferred method, this posed a logistical problem given the vast geographical scope of where research participants were based, with interviewees working for organisations based in Denmark; Kenya; Norway; The Seychelles; Somalia; the UK; and the USA. As such, only one face-to-face interview was able to take place.

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[95] Attached as Appendix A
[96] Attached as Appendix B

Skype interviews were the best alternative to in person interviews, as this provided financial and logistical benefits (Deakin and Wakefield 2014: 613; Iacono, Symonds and Brown 2016: 3-6; Janghorban, Roudsari and Taghipour 2014: 1; O'Conner and Madge 2017: 423), while allowing for face-to-face contact, which helped build rapport between the interviewer and interviewee. It likewise allowed for observations, and although these were limited to the camera screen, it was enough to pick up on verbal and non-verbal cues (Janghorban, Roudsari and Taghipour 2014: 2). Furthermore, Skype interviews provided flexibility for the research participants (Deakin and Wakefield 2014: 613; Iacono, Symonds and Brown: 2016: 5; Janghorban, Roudsari and Taghipour 2014: 1; O'Connor and Madge 2017: 423), who could choose the most appropriate location and time for the interview to occur. It also meant in some cases interviewees were able to reschedule the interview at the last minute, with no additional cost to themselves or the interviewer.

However, there were instances when technical issues hampered the Skype interviews. In one case the internet went down during an interview and it had to be finished via email. Similarly, in another instance the interviewee could not get online, and the interview had to be conducted over the phone. One interviewee also requested an email rather than a Skype interview, as they felt more comfortable with this format. In these instances, while it is likely that the information produced was not necessarily the same as what would have been collected via a stand-alone Skype interview, the data gathered was still judged to be beneficial, being preferable to having no interview take place. Furthermore, in each case the participant was available to answer additional questions via email, which ensured the interviewer could still actively engage in the process by following up on emerging themes.

Most interviews lasted roughly an hour, although there were exceptions, with some being over an hour and some being less than this. These were conducted on a one-to-one basis, apart from in one instance when two participants from the same organisation were interviewed at the same time. All interviews were audio-recorded, after permission was sought from the research participants. Once the interview had taken place, these recording were utilised to ensure accuracy during transcription[97].

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[97] This will be discussed in more detail in 4.6

Once the transcript was completed it was shared with the relevant participant, giving them the opportunity to amend, edit, clarify, or expand on any of the points they had made during the discussion. This has helped to limit bias in the research process[98], as it provided an opportunity for the interviewee to clarify their own interpretations and statements before the data was fully analysed.

4.5.3 Document analysis

As mentioned in 4.5.2, along with conducting semi-structured interviews, this research has utilised document analysis as a secondary form of data collection. By document analysis, this thesis is referring to 'the systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents…in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge' (Bowen 2009: 27). These documents relate to the organisations involved in this research and were selected on a case-by-case basis depending upon their relevance to the study. Priority was given to documents that evaluated or influenced IGOs and NGOs specific responses, particularly with regards to their programmes and policies and their interpretation of piracy, or the involvement of children in piracy networks. Overall, this includes annual reports, programme reports, evaluation reports, organisational research papers, newsletters, and press releases.

Document analysis was chosen as the secondary form of data collection as it lends itself to case study research through the provision of supplementary data, background, and contextual information, and by verifying or corroborating evidence obtained via other sources (Bowen 2009 29-31; Remenyi 2013: 38; 86; Robson and McCartan 2016: 352). As will be discussed in 4.6.1, by combing interview data and document analysis, the research ensures a triangulation of data that goes beyond the limited views of the research participants, thereby minimising the potential for bias (Bowen 2009: 28; 38; Owen 2014: 8; Robson and McCartan 2016: 352). Furthermore, document analysis is beneficial, as while documents are socially constructed and shaped by their intended purpose and the author (or organisation) who produced it (Atkinson and Coffey 2004: 58; Bowen 2009: 27; Bryman 2001: 376-377; Owen 7; 10-

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[98] This will be discussed in more detail in 4.6.1

11), unlike interviews the information they pertain is not constructed through the interview process. In this sense, document analysis is a beneficial source of secondary data, as the 'investigators presence does not alter what is being studied' (Bowen 2009: 31), which counterbalances concerns regarding the 'interviewer effect'[99] (Denscombe 2003: 169-170; Gray 2018: 384-385).

The use of document analysis was utilised alongside interviews, with both being done simultaneously to address Objectives Three and Four and their associated sub-research questions, thereby ensuring rigour in the research process. This is because it was possible to compare the relevant organisational documents alongside the interview transcripts and to ascertain whether the perception of the interviewees reflected the wider organisational understanding of children's involvement in piracy, and appropriate land-based responses. At the same time, this process ensured any assumptions and interpretations related to the interview findings were being checked against another form of data, to try and limit bias in the data collection and analysis phase. Moreover, by conducting both types of data collection simultaneously, it was easier to search for any unexpected and emerging codes or themes regarding how the perception of child piracy was seen among and across different organisational types, and to measure when inductive thematic saturation was reached.

The documents used during this process were sourced in a variety of ways, with the primary method being to request access to relevant documents as part of the interview process. This included requesting copies of documents when the initial contact was made with the organisation, along with asking during the interview if any organisational or operational documents could be shared. Furthermore, as many of the documents were public and not internal, they were able to be accessed and downloaded online via the organisational websites. In a couple of instances, interviewees shared documents that were still in the initial drafting process and embargoed for public use. However, the most pertinent information relating to this research was available via other open access sources, so the decision was taken not to use these documents. This was for ethical reasons to protect the organisation and individuals involved.

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[99] This will be discussed in more detail in 4.6.1

The analysis of documents during the data collection phase was different to the literature review, as the findings have not been used to place the study within the wider academic debate. Rather they are utilised as part of the thesis' primary research. The documents were analysed alongside the interview transcripts, with themes and codes being identified and presented as part of the overall research findings. As will be discussed in more detail next, thematic analysis was used on these documents to identify and codify emerging themes, using a similar process to that described by Bowen (2009: 28; 32), with the purpose of looking for similarities and difference from across the data set.

4.6 Data analysis

As mentioned in the previous section, data collection and data analysis were conducted simultaneously. This was partly for practical reasons, to help manage the large amount of raw data that is produced through case study research (Remenyi 2013: 100; 117; Robson and McCartan 2016: 464). However, the primary reason data analysis occurred alongside data collection was so that both could feed into the other, with the research findings being used to inform the collection as it progressed and to gauge when no new themes or codes were appearing (Bryman 2001: 392-394; 398; Silverman 2000: 121-122). This in turn was used to measure when inductive thematic saturation occurred.

The data analysis initially took the form of a within-case analysis, in which there was a detailed description of each individual organisation's perception of the child piracy issue and its emerging themes. To assist with this, a reflection form[100] was completed directly after each interview to capture initial ideas on what had been discussed and the emerging themes. As part of this reflection form, there was space to write down any pertinent information collected through the analysis of documents related to the organisation the interviewee had been representing. The within-case analysis was then followed by a cross analysis, in which the findings from individual interviews were compared and analysed alongside one another. This then fed into the final interpretive

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[100] This reflection form is attached as Appendix F

phase, in which the research findings were analysed to ascertain what they reveal about the meanings and perceptions of the nature of child piracy (Creswell 2007: 75).

To identify and compare themes in each interview the data needed to be coded and analysed as it was collected, which required full immersion in the data (Denscombe 2003: 270-271; Gray 2018: 686). To achieve this immersion, all interviews were transcribed verbatim, creating familiarity with what the data was saying at the surface level. During the transcription process, ideas, and reflections on emerging themes within the dataset were marked down in the research logbook, before being uploaded to NVivo as memos (Bazeley and Jackson 2013: 36-37). Consequently, writing up interview transcriptions provided a valuable analysis method within which initial reflections on codes and themes began to emerge. Notes and observations taken during the interview, along with any initial thoughts regarding how the interviewees perspectives matched those in the organisational documents, were also noted down during the transcript stage. These reflections, which were used to aid with analysis, were added into the transcripts in italic casing, thereby separating them from the voice of the research participants.

Once the transcript was completed it was read through in its entirety more than once, without attempting to create codes. Rather, a similar process to the transcription stage was followed, with initial reflections on codes and themes being noted down in the research logbook and then transferred to NVivo as memos. This same process was used when analysing organisational documents, with the whole document being read through multiple times before any attempt was made to actively analyse what the data was saying. Once these initial readings had taken place, preliminary insights and ideas were noted down in the form of memos, before a more thorough reading of the data occurred. This thorough reading involved approaching the data in an active way, searching for meaning and patterns from which thematic codes were developed (Bryamn 2001: 392-394; 398; Esterberg 2001: 157-158; Gray 2018: 692-693).

As discussed in 4.5.1, this study is informed by the findings of two detailed literature reviews, which acted as a guide when drafting the interview questions and analysing the data. As such, certain key areas and themes were identified to look for during the

coding process to help meet the research aim and objectives. These included: how the land-based causes of child piracy were understood within the data; the role of state fragility within this; the roles children were used for within pirate networks; how the gender dynamics of child piracy were understood; the geographical lens through which piracy was understood; and how relevant policy was developed. In this sense, the data analysis processes looked for 'patterns not just between the data, but between the data and what is already known from prior research' (Remenyi 2013: 107), with a priori coding being utilised for this.

However, given the importance of inductive thematic saturation the analysis was not just limited to predetermined a priori codes. Rather, open coding was utilised alongside a priori coding, as neither of these approaches are mutually exclusive and incorporating both enhances, rather than limits, the overall analysis process (Gibbs 2018: 61-62; Robson and McCartan 2016: 471). A priori coding provided an initial focus to the data analysis, while open coding allowed the data to challenge the initial assumptions underpinning the study and provide insight that would not otherwise have been considered. Moreover, through the process of open coding, new themes emerged, particularly in relation to the perceived cross-cutting issues of child piracy and youth migration, and the way different understandings of childhood influence how IGOs and NGOs respond to the issue of child piracy. As the analysis occurred alongside data collection, it was possible to recognise when issues relating to these themes were mentioned within interviews, making it easier to incorporate an appropriate line of enquiry when this occurred.

NVivo was utilised throughout the coding process and initially the IGO and NGO data were placed under the same codes when referring to similar themes. As coding progressed these initial codes were refined as new ones emerge, with hierarchal codes being identified when necessary (Bazeley and Jackson 2014: 95-103; Gray 2018: 686). While new codes were added when appropriate as individual transcripts and documents were analysed, time was set aside to sort through the entire code set, refining, deleting, or merging these as required (Gray 2018: 686). Coding was refined in this manner a total of six times during the data collection and analysis phase before inductive thematic saturation was reached. On the third refining codes were split to be

IGO and NGO specific, making it easier to analyse which themes could be found across both organisational types. Memos were used during coding to aid analysis, to outline the rationale for the recoding, and to ensure there was a clear audit trail showing how the data was interpreted (Grey 2018: 686). When this initial process was complete, the three-stage approach of describe, compare, and relate was used to develop an analytical account of what the data was showing (Bazeley 2009: 10; Bazeley and Jackson 2013).

Once all the data was coded, qualitative tables (Gibbs 2018: 109-111) were utilised to allow for deeper analysis, with one table relating to the IGO research findings, and another relating to the NGO research findings. These tables were formatted so that the first column provided a brief description of the organisation in question and, when it came to interview data, the participants background. The proceeding columns then included a summary of the coded text to give an overview of individual organisations perceptions relating to the identified themes and codes. The summarised information outlined within these tables was then utilised to help with the analysis, as this allowed for a comparison between the information in one cell and that in another, making it easier to identify patterns and differences in the dataset. A similar process was utilised to explore how the IGO and NGO findings related to one another.

As will be seen in later chapters, this process of analysis made it possible for this research to explore how different IGOs and NGOs defined, understood, and responded to children who are involved in piracy, thereby meeting the third research objective[101]. Likewise, it has allowed for Objective Four to be met[102], by considering how this compares to the understanding of children within the fragile states' literature, particularly those involved in military armed groups or gangs. Moreover, a close analysis of the data has helped to highlight the limitations of this study and how this could be used to influence further areas of research, thereby meeting Objective Five[103].

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[101] See Chapters Six and Seven
[102] See Chapters Six and Seven
[103] See Chapter Eight

4.6.1 Trustworthiness of the data

The trustworthiness of the data and the role of the researcher has been considered throughout the research process. This is because, as discussed in 4.3, the research is based on the epistemological belief that the social world cannot be objectively studied. Rather, as Alvesson and Karreman explain 'although fieldwork in social science is typically performed among speaking objects…one must remember that social reality never speaks for itself. It always speaks through a language that is familiar to and favoured by the speaker; a matter further complicated by the fact that in social science it is not only the subject but also the researcher who will act as mediators of the social world' (2011: 15). A similar point is made by Remenyi, who explains how researchers using qualitative case studies are working with their 'interpretations of the informants' interpretations' (2013: 48). It is therefore recognised that 'no data are 'untouched by the researcher's hand' (Silverman 2008: 55) and their personal beliefs, values, and background cannot be entirely removed from the research process (Alvesson and Karreman 2011: 15; Denscombe 2003: 268). As such, the potential for bias during data collection and analysis needed to be considered and acknowledged.

When it came to data collection the interviewer had a considerable amount of influence over the interview process, as they were not a neutral observer but actively involved in the exchange. However, this is not necessarily negative. The use of the interview as a data collection method is, by its very nature, collaborative, with the aim being to generate knowledge (Holstein and Gubrium 2004: 141; 143). As discussed in 4.5.2, this is why it was chosen for this study, since the use of active interviews meant the interviewer and the interviewee were involved in creating meaning together. It also provided both parties with the opportunity to clarify that they understood what was being said, which has helped to limit the possibility of bias, especially as the interviewer could ensure they had correctly interpreted what they were hearing and could ask for more information when needed.

There was likewise the possibility that in some cases the personal identity of the researcher could unintentionally influence the interview process due to what is known

as 'the interviewer effect'. This refers to the fact that 'people respond differently depending on how they perceive the person asking the questions' (Denscombe 2003: 169). Although there was no obvious example of this occurring during the data collection, steps were taken to limit the impact this could have on the research process. This included practical steps such as reassuring the research participants that they did not have to answer any questions they felt uncomfortable with (Denscombe 2003: 169), along with ensuring triangulation of both informants, by which this study is referring to use of multiple interviews, and information, including interview and document data (Remenyi 2013: 86; 97-98). The use of this triangulation strategy has not only ensured rigour in the data collection process but helped to create a richer and deeper understanding of the issue, while providing validation for the research findings across several participants and methods.

The potential for bias was more likely during the analysis, as this involved interpreting the data and deciding what codes and themes were most relevant for meeting the overall research question. This process has involved selecting the data that best supports the research findings, meaning the final product is not necessarily representative of the dataset as a whole (Charmaz: 1995: 60). While it is impossible to be completely impartial in this process, several methods were employed during the analysis to ensure the research findings are trustworthy and academically rigorous. The first was simply to recognise the potential for biases and how it could impact upon this study, so that steps could be taken to limit this (Bryman 2001: 22-23; Denscombe 2003: 273; Robson and McCartan 2016: 171-172). This was important, given that previous research into the rights of child pirates was a motivating factor leading to this study and could potentially influence the interpretation of the data.

As such, a process of critical reflection was utilised to mitigate against any unintended bias, with the research findings being regularly compared against the dataset to ensure that they supported the analysis (Esterberg 2002: 173; Guillemin and Gillam 2004: 275). This involved looking for evidence that seemingly went against the interpretation of the data, the so called 'negative case' (Esterberg 2002: 174-175), in which the data was re-examined with the purpose of looking for anything that discredited the initial findings or raised questions regarding any underlying

assumptions within the analysis. When negative cases did occur, the data was either reanalysed, or the disparity within the research findings was discussed within the relevant chapter. This provides a level of confirmability to the study, as the research findings have been subjected to regular, critically reflective, scrutiny.

Aside from looking for the negative case, when appropriate the interpretations from specific transcripts have likewise been checked with the relevant research participants, to ensure accuracy and credibility when analysing their interview responses. In most cases this was done immediately after the interview was transcribed, as this was the best time to ask for clarification and meaning. This is because the transcript was shared with the participant for approval for use, which meant research interpretation could be checked against the answers they had given. However, there were a couple of cases in which the interpretation of the transcript data was checked with the participant at a later stage, particularly when writing up the research findings, as this involved bringing much of the data together. Along with this, and as mentioned already within this chapter, interview data was often analysed alongside policy and programme documents from the same organisations, which provided a further pillar to check interpretations against.

Documenting was another measure utilised to limit bias and ensure confirmability throughout data collection and analysis (Bazeley and Jackson 2013: 36-38; Esterberg 2002: 164-165). As mentioned in 4.6, this has provided an audit trail, which outlines the rationale behind the decisions taken, including why certain codes and themes have been used, and how these have evolved and been refined throughout the different stages of analysis. A research logbook was kept throughout data collection and analysis, in which potential codes and themes were noted down, alongside wider reflections on the research process, including records and observations made during the interview and transcript stages. Additionally, an interview reflection form was filled out directly after each interview, and NVivo memos have been used to provide direction throughout the coding process. This has ensured transparency, as there is a record of the analytical thought process that occurred throughout the data collection and analysis, providing a clear rationale and defence of the research findings, adding another level of trustworthiness to the overall research process.

4.7 Methodological limitations

One of the limitations of this research is the location in which the fieldwork was able to take place. As has been discussed, due to ethical and logistical constraints it was not possible to conduct the research in Somalia. This presented certain restrictions regarding what data could be collected and the method through which it could be gathered, as it was impossible to conduct first-hand observations in-country, or to carry out face-to-face interviews in most cases. However, while in-person research may have yielded slightly different results, such an omission does not limit or invalidated the research findings. This study is concerned with the insight, perceptions, and policies of IGOs and NGOs and, as has been explained, these were still obtained through a mix of semi-structured interviews conducted predominantly via Skype, and document analysis. Furthermore, despite some technical issues, Skype offered certain benefits to in-person research. As mentioned in 4.5.2, conducting interviews online allowed for a broader geographic scope of research participants, many of whom would have been excluded from this study if Skype had not been utilised. Skype was also more cost-effective and provided greater flexibility to the research process.

The ethical and practical constraints to the research have also been influential in the decision to focus on IGO and NGO perceptions and responses to child piracy in Somalia, as they were judged to be the safest groups to approach to carry out this research. This is because they have the relevant first-hand experience of running programmes targeted at young Somalis at risk of engaging in piracy, but are not directly involved in piratical activity, and are not minors themselves. Yet, this means the findings presented within the data chapters are limited to the perceptions of these actors. It is therefore possible that carrying out a similar study with different members of Somali society, including those who have been involved in piracy, may yield different results. However, rather than invalidating the research findings, this presents an opportunity to build on this study, by examining how the issue of child piracy is understood by different groups, and what further implications this has for future policy response[104].

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[104] This point will be returned to within the thesis Conclusion

As previously discussed in 2.5.2, in some cases participants who came to this research via snowball sampling worked for organisations involved in running programmes in Somalia aimed at tackling piracy and keeping young people out of pirate groups, however they themselves did not have direct experience of these. Rather, their professional experience is more focused on child protection in general within the Somali context. Instead of impeding the research, this has helped widen out the research findings, as by comparing the results from these interviews with those carried out with participants who have direct experience of children's involvement in piracy, it has evidenced how the findings are reflective of wider problems impacting upon children onshore. This has helped to develop new themes that otherwise might not have emerged, such as how the issues of child piracy and youth migration in Somalia are perceived to be cross-cutting. Furthermore, when the research participants have been unable to provide specific insights into the child piracy problem, they have supplied documents that details how their organisation has approached and dealt with the issue.

4.8 Summary

This chapter has detailed how this research went about identifying, collecting, and analysing qualitative data to ascertain the role and involvement of children in Somali piracy networks and the responses developed by IGOs and NGOs to counter and mitigate this phenomenon. To do so, this chapter provided a detailed description of the overall research design and strategy that underpins this thesis and how this relates to the research question and objectives. As discussed, a qualitative case study approach, grounded in a constructionism epistemology, is utilised to examine how different IGOs and NGOs have defined, understood, and responded to the issue of child piracy within the Somali context between 2009-2018. This has been achieved through the collection of theoretical, perceptual, and contextual information, gathered using multiple methods of data collection, including semi-structured interviews and document analysis. This data has been analysed, with the findings of the individual interviews being compared with one another.

Aside from outlining how this research was conducted, this chapter has also discussed how trust in the research process was ensured, given that the researcher is not an impartial observer but was actively involved in creating and interpreting the data. Several processes were utilised during both the data collection and analysis stage to ensure rigour and trust in the research. This included the use of the triangulation strategy; sharing the interview transcripts and checking interpretations with the research participants; looking for negative cases to discredit the research findings; and using a research logbook and memos to document the analytical thought process throughout the research journey, creating an audit trail.

Finally, this chapter has considered the methodological limitations of this study, including how, due to ethical and logistical considerations, fieldwork took place virtually. While this presented certain restrictions regarding the type of data collected, it has likewise allowed for a broader geographic scope of research participants, many of whom would have been excluded from this study had this not been the case. The research is similarly limited to the perceptions of IGOs and NGOs, meaning it is possible that carrying out a similar study with different members of Somali society could yielded different results. However, rather than undermining the research findings, this presents an opportunity for future study. Moreover, not all the research participants had direct experience of working in the field of piracy prevention, nevertheless because they work in the field of child protection within Somalia, this has helped widen out the research findings.

The next chapter provides important background and context to the original primary research of this study, by providing an overview of the fragile situation in Somalia, including the impact it has on children and youth, thereby laying the foundations from which Objective Three will be addressed. By doing so, it builds on the rationale, outlined within this chapter, regarding why Somalia presented the most appropriate geographic focus for this study, given its fragile nature, prevalence for piracy, and the notable use of children by pirate networks.

Chapter Five: The Situation in Somalia

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to act as a bridge to the following two chapters, by providing relevant context and background to the fragile situation in Somalia, including the impacts this has on children and youth. By doing so, not only does it lay the foundations from which Objective Three will be addressed. It likewise builds on the rationale, outlined in the previous chapter[105], regarding why Somalia was viewed to be the most appropriate geographic focus for this study and why it was chosen as the case selection.

To achieve the purpose of this chapter, section 5.2 discusses state fragility within Somalia and how prolonged conflict and underdevelopment impacts upon young people, in some cases causing them to join armed and criminal groups. Section 5.3 then gives an overview of the state of governance across the different regions of Somalia, and the prevalent role the clan plays within Somali society, while section 5.4 provides more detail on the Somali piracy problem[106]. Section 5.5 then concludes with a summary of the main points discussed within this chapter.

5.2 Fragility in Somalia and its impact on children and young people

In 2019 Somalia was ranked second on the Fragile States Index, where it has 'remained stubbornly at the top three…for 13 years' (Fund for Peace 2019: 23). Although often described as a collapsed or completely failed state (Harper 2012: 1; 105; Leonard and Ramsay 2013: 1; Pham 2013; ix; 1; Seaman 2013: 28; UNPD 2012: 3), this is not an adequate reflection of the country overall. While the internationally recognised government[107] does not control all regions, 'every part of Somalia is, in some sense, governed by *someone*, in certain cases rather successfully' (Ramsey and Leonard 2013: 281). This includes independent Somaliland and semi-

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[105] See 4.4
[106] Building on the findings of Chapter Two
[107] By which this thesis is referring to the Somali Government

autonomous Puntland where, as will be discussed in 5.3, there is a degree of stability (Glowion, de Vries and Mehler 2018: 278; Harper 2012: 109; Walls and Kibble 2013: 254; 255). Furthermore, despite the limited governance, 'Somalis have created their own survival mechanisms' (Harper 2012: 8) to fill the void left by the state, which has ensured some aspects of society continue to operate, and in some cases flourish, despite the fragile situation.

While Somalia is not necessarily a failed state, it is appropriate to classify it as a fragile state, using the definition outlined in 1.2 of the Introduction. This is because citizens are regularly denied access to basic services, with conflict and underdevelopment rendering the state unable, or in some cases unwilling, to provide them (Ali, Nicholl and Salzmann 2017: 11; Baraket et. al 2014: 27; EASO 2014: 33-35; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115-2116). The fragile nature is one reason Somalia was chosen as the geographic focus for this research, particularly since the continual conflict and underdevelopment, which will be looked at in more detail in the rest of this section, has a detrimental impact upon the lives of young Somalis, often resulting in their engagement in armed and criminal groups, including piracy.

5.2.1 Violent conflict

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has 'experienced varying levels of instability, and protracted, multi-level armed conflict in one form or another' (Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115). For a twenty-year-period clans, warlords and different factions of society fought for power and, since the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, the extremist group Al-Shabaab has presented a major security threat (Burnett 2007: 38; 45; Cobo 2015: 3; Fergusson 2013: 2-3; 5; Glowion, de Vries and Mehler 2018: 292; Leonard and Ramsey 2013: 6-9; Malet, Priest and Staggs 2013: 98). There is currently an on-going conflict between Al-Shabaab, the Somali Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia, resulting in 'relentless violence' (Fund for Peace 2019: 23) and human rights abuses on all sides (Human Rights Watch 2019: 519-521; UK Home Office 2018: 7). Additionally, inter-clan conflict and regional border disputes are a reoccurring issue often resulting in violent clashes, causing further instability (Ali,

Nicholl and Salzmann 3: 2017; International Crisis Group 2018: 1-4; UK Home Office 2019: 8; 18).

The continual violence has had a significant impact upon children, with multiple generations missing out on a childhood and growing up knowing nothing but conflict (Burnett 2007: 137; Fergusson 2013: 46; Leonard and Ramsay 2013: 1; UNDP 2012: 3). As will be discussed in 5.2.3, it is not unusual for children to be used by Al-Shabaab and other various armed groups, and in 2018 Somalia had the 'highest number of cases of the recruitment and use of children' (UN Security Council 2019: 2). Even when not engaged in conflict, children are routinely 'killed or maimed by targeted and indiscriminate violence' (Human Rights Watch 2018: 15) with Al-Shabaab being accused of turning 'schools into battleground' (Human Rights Watch 2012: 4). Furthermore, Somalia has one of the highest civilian arms rates in the world and gun violence is a prominent issue, with children often being the unintended victims of stray bullets (Burnett 2007: 18-19; 40; Eichstaedt 2010: 133; Fergusson 2013: 46; 49; 200).

For those children who remain physically unharmed they nevertheless suffer the effects of the violence in multiple ways. This includes experiencing psychological trauma (Defence for Children International 2015: 3) and being denied access to basic services such as education and health care, with the required infrastructure having been destroyed in the conflict (Burnett 2007: 15; EASO 2014: 33; Somalia Federal Republic Ministry of Human Development and Public Services 2014: 5). Furthermore, conflict, along with repeated natural disasters[108], has resulted in an estimated 2.6 million people, many of whom are thought to be children, being displaced (UNHCR 2020; United States Department of State 2019: 34; Yarnell 2019: 8), and it is not uncommon for children to suffer the loss of at least one parent (Defence for Children international 2015: 3). This has caused several adolescent men to become the head of the family following the death of their father (Fergusson 2013: 66), along with resulting in an increase in 'abandoned, orphaned, separated, and displaced children living in the streets' (EASO 2014: 111).

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[108] This will be discussed in more detail in 5.2.2

Aside from the above, continued conflict, along with repeated environmental pressures, has impacted upon Somalia's overall development. The economy has been 'in recession since the outbreak of the civil war' (EASO 2014: 34) and, as will be considered in more detail now, this has further impeded the state's ability to provide basic services to its citizens, with children suffering as a result.

5.2.2 Underdevelopment

Somalia is one of the least developed countries in the world, with over half of the population estimated to be living below the poverty line (EASO 2014: 34; Naqvi, Leydier and Majoka 2018: 5; UN DESA 2018: 80-81). As the country is currently experiencing a youth bulge, with seventy-five percent of the country being under the age of thirty, poverty predominantly impacts upon young people (UNICEF 2016: 12). Young Somalis are 'highly disadvantaged by resources scarcity and population growth' (Winn and Lewis 2017: 2118), with the most severe cases being among those between the ages of five and fifteen (Naqvi, Leydier and Majoka 2018: 5). Aside from the high poverty rate, the level of youth unemployment is among the highest in the world, which causes further complications including high levels of youth migration, violence, and exploitation (Isak 2015; Save the Children Somalia 2020).

The lack of education and facilities for schools, mentioned in 5.2.1, further impacts upon the level of poverty, as families headed by someone who is uneducated are more likely to be destitute (Naqvi, Leydier and Majoka 2018: 5). This has created a troubling cycle in Somalia where, following the central government collapse, more than one generation has been denied an education due to 'the deliberate destruction of schools, university lecture halls, libraries and laboratories' (Abdi 1998: 336). Beyond the absence of infrastructure there are further barriers that have kept subsequent generations of children from accessing education, including the inability of families to pay school fees and a lack of teachers (Barakat et. al 2014: 3; 87; Fergusson 2013: 119; UNICEF 2020). Consequently, Somalia has a high level of youth illiteracy and one of the lowest school enrolment rates in the world (EASO 2014: 29; Save the Children 2017: 8; UNFPAb 2014: 3; UNICEF 2018b: 3; 9).

Aside from being interrelated to years of conflict[109], the persistent underdevelopment in Somalia is intricately linked to environmental pressures, with droughts, flooding and famine being regular occurrences (Burnett 2007: 8-9; Fergusson 2013: 3; Fund for Peace 2019: 23; Naqvi, Leydier and Majoka 2018: 11; Leonard and Ramsay 2013: 9-10). Not only have these environmental shocks left millions of Somalis in 'urgent need of humanitarian assistance' (EASO 2014: 34) but, since much of the population is employed in farming and traditional pastoralist practices, it has affected livelihoods and increased food insecurity across the region (Ali, Nicholl and Salzmann 2017: 8-9). Children are particularly vulnerable to such humanitarian disasters, with famine causing high rates of acute malnutrition and death among Somalia's younger population (EASO 2014: 111; Human Rights Watch 2018: 15). This, along with the absence of health care facilities outlined in 5.2.1, has resulted in one the worst child mortality rates in the world (Save the Children 2017 4; UNICEF 2018b: 4).

Natural disasters not only increase the risk of malnutrition and death among the younger population but, as previously mentioned[110], it increases the risk of children becoming displaced or being orphaned (DFCI 2015: 3; Fergusson 2013: 3). Millions of Somali children are internally displaced, while others are living on the streets or in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, often without any form of social protection (EASO 2014: 37; 113; Human Rights Watch 2018: 14-15; Naqvi, Leydier and Majoka 2018: 5; 11; 19; UNDP 2012: 89). Consequently, displacement and separation from one's family not only leads to heightened rates of poverty, but it adds further barriers to education, puts children at risk of experiencing physical and sexual abuse and, as will be looked at in more detail now, it makes it easier for armed and criminal groups to recruit them (EASO 2014: 37; Gaswaga 2013: 282; Human Rights Watch 2018: 15; UNICEF 2018b: 7; 10).

5.2.3 Involvement of children in armed and criminal groups

As mentioned in 5.2.1, in 2018 Somalia had the highest number of children used by armed groups. While Al-Shabaab are the main perpetrators, they are not the only

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[109] As outlined in 5.2.1
[110] See 5.2.1

group to use children, as freelance, local, and clan militias along with various security groups use children within their operations (Baraket et. al 2014: 60-61; Fergusson 2013: 72-73; Human Rights Watch 2018: 15; UNDP 2012: 116; United States Department for Labour 2018: 2; UN Security Council 2020: 19). Furthermore, despite the Somali Government condemning the use of children in conflict, governmental security forces, including the Somali National Army and Police Force, are reportedly using children (United States Department for Labour 2018: 2; UN Security Council 2020: 19), as are regional forces in Puntland, Galmudug, and Jubbaland (UN Security Council 2020: 19).

Children involved in armed groups within Somalia are frequently used on the battlefield, putting them at heightened risk of death or serious injury (Save the Children 2019; UN Security Council 2020: 24). The risks increase for children involved with Al-Shabaab, as they are likewise used as human shields and suicide bombers, while also being subjected to abusive training regimes, which include 'forcing children to execute other children' (United States Department of State 2020: 13). Aside from frontline service, children carry out support tasks such as 'cooking, gathering information, carrying water, ammunition and heavy loads for other soldiers, guarding the camps or pressuring potential recruits among their peers to join the army' (Spoldi 2020: 23). Girls occupy some of these roles, taking on domestic tasks in armed groups, along with being 'battlefield brides' and fulfilling sexual purposes (Burnett 2007: 139; Fergusson 2013: 52; Spoldi 2020: 24; United States Department of Labor 2018: 2; United States Department of State 2020: 34). According to a recent report from the UN Security Council (2020: 19) allegations of sexual abuse and rape have been made against most armed groups operating in Somalia, including pro-government forces, regional forces, international forces, and Al-Shabaab.

Various factors cause Somali children to engage in armed groups, with some being forcibly taken and others choosing to join. For those who are forced to join, this is usually due to abduction, press ganging, or because clan leaders and families are pressed to hand over children (Barakat et. al 2014: 60; Spoldi 2020: 23; United States Department of Labor 2018: 2). Such recruitment is predominantly carried out by Al-Shabaab, however there are instances of clan militias also forcibly recruiting children

(United States Department of State 2020: 12). Those that join armed groups voluntarily do so for a variety of reasons, including to 'escape from extreme poverty, seek food, protection, money and material benefits that could help them and their families survive' (Spoldi 2020: 27) and, in the case of Al-Shabaab, ideology is another influential factor (Baraket et. al 2014: 60; Spoldi 2020: 25). As previously mentioned,[111] IDP children are especially vulnerable to recruitment, particularly those who are orphaned or separated from their family, as armed groups deliberately target IDP camps to enlist desperate children with no form of social protection (Barakat et. al 2014: 60; Fergusson 2013: 119; Spoldi 2020: 29).

Besides extremist and militaristic groups, Somali children are likewise drawn into criminal gangs, with gang-culture being a prominent issue in many regions since the government collapse in the early 1990s (Barakat et. al 2014: 2; 109; Fergusson 2013: 124; Horizon Institute 2018: 1; UNDP 2012: 21; 118; United States Department of State 2020: 31). This includes Somaliland where an estimated ninety-five percent of gang members are school-aged (Somtribune 2019). Children are vulnerable to gang recruitment for the same reasons as they are vulnerable to recruitment into other armed groups, with those living in IDP camps, from fatherless households, or out of education more likely to join (Barakat et. al 2014: 2; UNDP 2012: 21; 118). Those affiliated with gangs are utilised for various aggressive and criminal activities, including violent clashes with rival gangs and gang rape, further increasing the level of instability in the areas where such groups operate (Barakat et. al 2014: 65; Horizon Institute 2018: 1; United States Department of State 2020: 31). Aside from gangs, children are recruited by other criminal groups, including those involved in the charcoal and drugs trade and, as will be discussed in 5.4, pirate networks (UNDP 2012: 117).

Taken together, this section shows that the issues impacting upon children within Somalia today are generational. Following the state collapse in 1991, lack of opportunity, insecurity and inadequate child protection caused large numbers of young Somalis to join armed or criminal groups. Once part of these groups, children have partaken in activities that create further instability, trapping subsequent generations in this same cycle (UNDP 2012: 44; 47; 109)

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[111] See 5.2.2

5.3 Governance and clans

After having 'no properly functioning central government in Mogadishu for over two decades' (Fergusson 2013: 2) a new Federal Government was founded in Somalia in 2012. However, as mentioned in 5.2, it has little control over much of the country. This is in part because, following the government collapse, the country 'splintered into a patchwork of semi-autonomous regions whose boundaries shift constantly' (Harper 2012: 3). Not only has this resulted in wide variations in the stability and types of governance structures across Somalia but, as Winn and Lewis explain, it has frustrated international efforts to assist in building the state since 'Western preoccupation with the central government in Mogadishu is misguided as Somalia is made up of diverse territories, clans and localities' (2017: 2123).

Those who live or work in Somalia typically 'divide the territory into three, referring to it as the separate units of "south-central', Puntland and Somaliland' (Harper 2012: 3). Of these, the self-declared republic of Somaliland is the most stable, operating as a complete separate state, with a functioning government and system of democracy, built from the grassroots following 'years of negotiations between clan, military and political leaders' (Glawion, Vries and Mehler 2018: 284). Similarly, Puntland has operated as a semi-autonomous state since 1998, with its own administration, government, and President, although these are not as established as those within Somaliland (Fergusson 2013: 158; Glawion, Vries and Mehler 2018: 284-285; Harper 2012: 109). Other areas of Somalia have similarly declared to be semi-autonomous 'mini states', although these have been less successful than Puntland, often being governed by Somalis living in the diaspora and remaining vulnerable to attack from Al-Shabaab. (Harper 2012: 110). South-central is the most unstable and 'war-ravaged' of the three regions, with Al-Shabaab controlling the rural areas (Glawion, Vries and Mehler 2018: 281; 284-285).

Unlike south-central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland have managed to avoid Al-Shabaab gaining any significant control within their territories (Glawion, Vries and Mehler 2018: 285; 291; Harper 2012: 71; US States Department of Labor 2018: 2).

However, despite this, the insecurity within south-central Somalia has repercussions for Somaliland and Puntland, as it increases the level of IDPs seeking refuge in both regions, adding additional strain on their resources (Drumtra 2014: 15; Fergusson 2013: 160; UK Home Office 2018: 48). Furthermore, although stable in comparison to the rest of the country, Somaliland and Puntland still experience elements of fragility. As discussed in 5.2.3, gangs are a prominent issue in Somaliland, particularly among out of school children, while piracy, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, originated in Puntland (Eichstaedt 2010: 3; 23). Additionally, Somaliland and Puntland are engaged in a long-standing border dispute, which regularly results in violent clashes and continues to undermine the security of both regions (Harper 2012: 109; International Crisis Group 2018: 2-3; Lunn 2019: 5; 20).

Aside from the regional differences, establishing a strong central government in Somalia faces difficulties due to the importance of the traditional nomadic lifestyle and clan-system. An estimated seventy percent of Somalis are directly involved in or affiliated to the nomadic culture, meaning 'national borders and the very idea of a 'country' do not mean much to many Somalis' (Harper 2012: 12). Furthermore, there are six main clans within Somali society, along with several subclans (Burnett 2007: 45; Seaman 2013: 29; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2116) and following the fall of the Barre regime the country 'became deeply fractured along clan lines with inter-clan violence continuing to this day' (Ali, Nicholl and Salzmann 2017: 3). The clan plays an important role in Somali society and 'whatever political system is introduced is almost immediately transformed by the clan, which is stronger and more durable than any form of government' (Harper 2012: 11). As such, Somali politics is intrinsically tied to clan allegiances and interests, with clannism having played a prominent role in the 2017 election of President Faramaajo (Ali, Nicholl and Salzmann 2017: 7; Lunn 2019: 9; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2116).

Aside from influencing the political framework, clans create a 'a complex tapestry of social hierarchies and relations' (Winn and Lewis 2017: 2116). Youth and women are particularly disenfranchised by this, as the clan system champions the role of male elders (EASO 2014: 108; UNDP 2012: 24-25; 52; 116; World Bank 2018: 16; 34). This has resulted in the social, political, and economic exclusion of both young and female

Somalis, along with their marginalisation within peacebuilding efforts (UNDP 2012: 116; World Bank 2018: 16; 27). Moreover, the hierarchical structure means that young people are required to do as their clan and elders request without question, making it easier for elders and leaders to mobilise youth for violence (UNDP 2012: 22-23; 52; 116; UK Home Office 2019: 26). As such, the clan system can be seen to be adding to the already volatile situation young Somalis face, along with further influencing their engagement in violence (UNDP 2012: 8; 118).

5.4 Somali piracy

As highlighted in the previous chapter, besides its fragile nature, Somalia was chosen as the geographic focus for this research due to its interconnections to piracy and because it has the most well-documented examples of children involved in the crime, providing a paradigmatic case of the child piracy problem. The concept of child piracy is a relatively new phenomenon, emerging as part of the Somali piracy problem and first gaining attention following the apprehension of Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse in 2009[112]. Since then, an estimated one-third of those apprehended for piracy off the Horn of Africa are believed to have been younger than eighteen[113], making them children under international law. Furthermore, there are reports of children being used on land in roles such as lookouts (Lombardo 2019: 78). It therefore appears that, along with being used by different armed and criminal groups, young Somalis are likewise used by pirates. Yet, there remains limited research into how the fragile context within Somalia is interrelated to the involvement of children in piracy[114], although the interrelationship between state fragility and the Somali piracy problem, discussed in Chapter Two, has been well-documented by both academics and policymakers.

As outlined previously[115], Somali piracy is the direct result of the fragile situation onshore, where 'a loss of law and order at land also translates into a loss of law and order at sea' (Lehr 2013: 118). The first instances of piracy occurred following the state

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[112] As previously discussed in 1.3.1 and 2.5.1
[113] As previously discussed in 1.1, 1.3.1, 2.3.1, and 2.5.1, although this figure is debatable, it is evident that children have been used within piratical activity
[114] As previously discussed in 2.5.2 and 3.5
[115] See Chapter Two

collapse in the early 1990s and were largely carried out by local fishermen in response to IUU fishing in Somali waters (Eichstaedt 2010: 30; Lehr 2013: 124-125; Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2011: 1385-1386). It has since evolved into a criminal business enterprise that takes advantage of the 'the superb looting opportunity provided by the 30,000 merchant ships that annually ply the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean' (Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2011: 1386). The continual conflict and underdevelopment, along with political corruption and clan allegiances, discussed within this chapter, have facilitated this evolution, with an entire economy being built around piracy (Eichstaedt 2010: 36; 58; 62; Harper 2012: 152-153; 1154; Russell 2010: 69; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115; 2119).

Despite its interconnections to state fragility, piracy is not a problem across all of Somalia. Rather, as mentioned in 5.3, the operational base for pirates is mainly contained in the Puntland region, particularly around Galkayo and Eyl (Eichstaedt 2010: 3; 23; 72-73; Fergusson 2013: 158; 175-177; 184-186). According to Hansen (2012: 526), this is because the relative stability and peace within the region, coupled with the weak governing institutions, has created the conditions for pirates to operate successfully. Due to its limited operational basis, thousands of Somalis from across the country flocked to the Puntland region during the height of piracy, hoping to earn their fortune (Lehr 2013: 124). The prevalence of pirate groups in Puntland is part of a wider trend, alluded to earlier[116], in which the different Somali territories have separate armed and criminal factions operating within them, with Al-Shabaab being predominately a problem in the south-central region, while criminal gangs continue to be an issue in Somaliland.

As mentioned in earlier chapters[117], the peak of Somali piracy occurred between 2007 and 2012, with one-hundred-and-sixty incidents occurring in 2011 alone (Reva 2018), before decreasing in the wake of a coordinated international naval response (The Economist; Hodgkinson 2014: 150). However, despite this decrease, it is misguided to assume the international counter-piracy response has been a complete success. Seventy-five incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea were recorded off the coast

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[116] See 5.3
[117] See 1.3, 2.5.1 and 4.4

of East Africa between 2017 and 2019, showing that while piracy in the region has been suppressed, it is not yet eradicated (Joubert 2020: iv; 4). This has resulted in warnings against complacency, with the EU Naval Force stating that 'the conditions that enabled piracy to flourish remain in place' (2016). Somali pirate networks, and their ability to carry out sophisticated attacks when the opportunity arises, have not gone away (Oladipo 2017; Pigeon et. al 2018: 1; 3; Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115) and the naval response alone offers 'only a temporary and costly stopgap measure' (Winn and Lewis 2017: 2115).

5.5 Summary

Overall, this chapter has provided an overview of the fragile situation onshore within Somalia, and the impact this has on children and young people. As has been shown, the continued conflict and underdevelopment within the country has resulted in low school enrolment rates, high youth unemployment, mass displacement, family separation, and high mortality rates among the younger generation. Furthermore, these factors are facilitating the recruitment of children into armed and criminal groups, with Somalia having had the highest rate of recruitment of child soldiers in 2018.

Additionally, this chapter highlighted the wide variation in the types of stability across the three regions of Somaliland, Puntland, and south-central Somalia, while outlining the difficultly of creating a strong central government, particularly given the nomadic culture and importance of the clan. As discussed, clan allegiances and interests' impact upon the political sphere, influencing elections and governance, while the hierarchical nature of the clan system facilitates the social, political, and economic exclusion of women and youth. Furthermore, the hierarchical nature of Somali society and the importance placed on respecting one's elders makes it easier for clan leaders to mobilise children for violence. Thus, the clan system is simultaneously excluding young Somalis from positions of power and making it more likely they will engage in destabilising activities.

Finally, this chapter provided an overview of the evolution of Somali piracy from its origins as a defence against illegal fishing to a criminal business enterprise, including

how this is interrelated to issues of fragility such as conflict, underdevelopment, political corruption, and clan allegiances. As was highlighted, Somali piracy has decreased in recent years due to a coordinated naval response from the international community, but it has not been eradicated. The conditions that enable piracy to thrive remain and Somali pirate networks continue to operate, albeit in a limited capacity, with the naval response providing only a temporary solution.

This chapter has acted as a bridge to the following two chapters, by providing context and background on the fragile situation within Somalia, including how this is impacting upon children and youth and the role fragility plays in facilitating Somali piracy. The proceeding two chapters will build upon this by presenting the original primary research of this thesis, which examines how IGO and NGO actors have understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia, including how they view this issue to be interconnected to such fragility and how this influenced their specific shore-based programmes between 2009-2018.

Chapter Six: IGO and NGO Understandings of Child Piracy in Somalia

6.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the original primary research of this thesis, by examining how IGOs and NGOs have defined and understood the issue of Somali child piracy and its interrelationship to the fragile situation onshore[118], thereby working to address Objective Three. The next chapter will build on this, by proving a thorough examination of how such understandings influenced organisational responses to the problem of child piracy from 2009-2018. Aside from working to address Objective Three, this chapter likewise addresses Objective Four, by examining whether the findings reveal any wider commonality between the perceptions of children involved in piracy networks in Somalia and those involved in armed groups or gangs in fragile states[119].

To deliver on the chapter purpose, section 6.2 provides an overview of the specific organisations involved in this study, including their relevant experience in delivering counter-piracy or child protection programmes in Somalia and the ways in which this related to the involvement of children and youth in piracy[120]. Section 6.3 then considers the various ways organisations understood the involvement of children in piracy, including debates around the age, gender, and the different roles they occupied within pirate networks, both in the maritime domain and on land. The perceived motives for children's engagement in piracy are considered in detail in section 6.4, including the various ways this was considered to be interrelated to state fragility. Following on from this, section 6.5 examines what the findings of the previous sections reveal about how child pirates are seen when looked at from the perception of these organisations in comparison to the way the academic literature views those involved in armed groups and gangs[121]. Finally, section 6.6 summaries the main findings from this chapter and outlines how it links to the proceeding one.

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[118] Which was outlined throughout the previous chapter

[119] Which were discussed in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2

[120] Programmes involving youth, as opposed to just children, were considered since, as discussed in 1.2 and as will be examined in in more detail in 6.3.1, those who are aged between fifteen and eighteen are typically considered youth as opposed to children in the Somali context

[121] Originally discussed in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2

6.2 Overview of IGO and NGO programmes

As discussed in Chapter Four[122], the data for this chapter came from semi-structured interviews with representatives of IGOs and NGOs, as well as documentation sourced from these organisations. Before presenting the original research findings and the analysis of what this reveals about child piracy in Somalia, it is first important to provide a more in-depth overview of these organisations and to evidence what authority they had to provide insights on the issues of state fragility and piracy, and how this related to the problem of child piracy. As such, this section maps out what involvement the organisations had in delivering counter-piracy or child protection programmes within the Somali context.

6.2.1 The IGOs involved and their relevant programmes

This section provides an overview of the IGOs involved in this research and their specific counter-piracy or child protection programmes investigated for this study. Where relevant, information is given about how these programmes were funded, and who their delivery partners were.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

FAO is a UN agency focused on providing food security that has experience of running several programmes in Somalia, including those aimed at improving the fisheries sector with the purpose of providing alternative livelihoods to piracy (FAO 2019: 1; FAO 2014: 3). This included a programme delivered between 2012-2014 that focused on providing employment opportunities to youth in Puntland who were at-risk of piracy recruitment. The programme, which was run in partnership with the Puntland Regional Authority, the Puntland Highway Authority, and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, received funding from the European Union (EU) and focused on promoting the fisheries sector as an alternative livelihood for youth (FAO 2019: 1). Moreover, in 2016 FAO began to deliver the Coastal Communities Against Piracy (CCAP) project (FAO 2016). This project, which was on-going at the time of data collection, is run in the coastal regions around Puntland, Galmudug, and Mogadishu and promotes

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[122] See 4.5.2 and 4.5.3

economic opportunities for young people through the provision of long-term job opportunities in the fisheries sector. The project is part of the EU-IGAD[123] regional initiative known as The Maritime Safety Promotion Programme (MASE).

Besides these programmes, FAO has run further programmes within the fisheries sector, most notably working on fishermen and fleet registration and acting to improve safety at sea, which was funded by the Trust Fund to Support the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (DPA 2017: 51-53; 31-38; DPA 2016: 31-37; 64-69; DPA 2015: 43-47; 73-78; FAO 2014: 2). Additionally, FAO has partnered with local NGOs, including the Somaliland youth organisation YOVENCO and the humanitarian organisation PASOS[124], on programmes that address wider livelihoods issues, particularly in relation to environmental concerns and agriculture (PASOS 2019; PASOS 2017: 4; 6; 7; YOVENCO 2021b; YOVENCO 2016: 18).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD is an intergovernmental regional economic community of the Horn of Africa that works for peace, prosperity, and regional integration, made up of eight member countries from across the region, including Somalia (IGAD 2020). Since 2013, IGAD has been a key partner and the main coordinating body in delivering the EU funded MASE programme, which aims to strengthen regional maritime security capacities, at sea and on land (MASE 2016). IGAD work in partnership with the IOC[125], EAC and COMESA to deliver this programme, and they take the lead on providing alternative livelihoods through vocational development initiatives and advocacy against piracy, while ensuring maritime coordination mechanisms are reinforced in Somalia. As part of the vocational training and awareness raising IGAD has worked with Somali regional states, elders, and religious leaders. Additionally, and as outlined above, they have partnered with FAO to deliver the CCAP project to vulnerable young Somalis living in coastal communities (FAO 2016).

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[123] IGAD, like FAO, were a participating organisation in this research.
[124] Both of these local organisations also participated in this research
[125] The IOC were also a participating organisation in this research

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Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

IOC is an intergovernmental organisation that brings together five Island member states situated in the Indian Ocean (IOC 2020b). Since 2013 IOC, like IGAD, has been a key partner in delivering the EU funded MASE programme[126] (MASE 2016), leading on creating an enhanced national and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions, while improving regional coordination and information exchange. Besides their involvement in the MASE programme, IOC is a member of The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), a voluntary and ad-hoc international group established in 2009 to bring together countries, organisations, and industrial groups to work on countering piracy off the Somali coast. Members of CGPCS work together to 'coordinate political, military, industrial and non-governmental efforts to end piracy off the coast of Somalia and to ensure that pirates are brought to justice' (IOC 2020a).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP is the UN's development agency that works to eradicate poverty, minimise inequalities, and create resilient communities. In Somalia, UNDP partner with the Federal Government and Federal Member States to address issues 'including governance, rule of law, environment, livelihoods, disaster reduction, peacebuilding, economic recovery and women's empowerment' (UNDP Somalia 2019), and have been actively involved in running counter-piracy programmes. This has included the youth at risk initiative[127], funded by DFID and implemented jointly with ILO and UNICEF[128] and utilising several local NGO partnerships (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 8). The programme, which was part of the Armed Reduction Project, was delivered in the four regions of Bossaso, Burao, Galkayo, and Mogadishu and was design to reach youth 'at risk' of violence at the community level, with the recognition that youth in different regions were at risk of engaging in different armed groups, with piracy being an issue in Galkayo (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 8-10). The project used DDRR concepts related to the demilitarisation of armed actors and looked at how to prevent violence by providing youth at risk of joining armed and criminal groups with employment and livelihood opportunities.

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[126] The aim of which is outlined above in the information related to IGAD.
[127] Also know as the Youth at Risk Project and later changed to be called Youth for Change
[128] UNICEF were likewise a participating organisation in this research

UNDP also delivered an alternative livelihood to piracy (ALTP) project in partnership with the Federal Level Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Puntland Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sport (MOLYS) (UNDP2016a; UNDP 2016b). The project, which was funded by seven shipping companies under the Joint Industry Contribution to Support Community Projects in Somalia, was targeted at women and youth at risk of engaging in piracy activities in Puntland and Central Somalia. It aimed to improve local community resilience against piracy through activities aimed at stimulating local economic development, supporting entrepreneurship, and creating jobs. Furthermore, as part of the project UNDP provided counselling and reintegration support for young people who had defected from piracy and other criminal activities (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 3; UNDP 2016a; UNDP 2016b).

Besides these counter-piracy programming efforts, UNDP has been involved in delivering programmes that support young people more broadly, working with local NGOs such as YOVENCO[129], who they supported in delivering the Gender Equality and Women Empowerment programme (YOVENCO 2021a; YOVENCO 2021b; YOVENCO 2016: 3; 16-18).

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
UNICEF is a UN agency that works to ensure children worldwide are provided with humanitarian and development aid that has been working in Somalia since 1972, running programmes that aim to save the lives of children, while also working to provide child protection, ensure children's rights are respected, and their overall health and educational needs are met (UNICEF 2021). UNICEF has experience of delivering programmes to young Somalis at risk of engaging in armed and criminal groups, including but not limited to piracy. This includes their work in partnership with UNDP and ILO on the Youth at Risk Initiative[130]. As part of their role in delivering this initiative, UNICEF led on the demobilisation and reintegration of those classed as children under

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[129] As highlighted in a previous footnote, YOVENCO were also a participating organisation in this research
[130] The purpose of this initiative is outlined above in the UNDP column

the CRC, along with capturing data on those below the age of eighteen (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 8; 21; 51).

Additionally, UNICEF has been involved in the delivery of programmes focusing on health; nutrition; water, sanitation, and hygiene; education; child protection; social policy; and emergencies (UNICEF 2021). This includes supporting YOVENCO[131] to deliver their Educate a Child Project (YOVENCO 2016: 3; 10-11; 16).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
UNODC is a UN agency that works on drug, crime, corruption, and terrorism related issues, with the aim to secure peace, security, human rights, and development worldwide. As part of this mission UNODC has been involved in several counter-piracy programmes in Somalia and have been among the main recipients of funding from the Trust Fund to Support the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (DPA 2016: 12; DPA 2016: 10). This counter-piracy work has involved programmes that work directly with young Somalis involved in piracy, such as the Anti-Piracy Advocacy and Livelihood project, in which UNODC worked in consultation with the local community, Puntland Government and local NGOs, including the Youth Organisation Against Piracy[132] (UNODC 2012a: 3; UNODC 2021b: 14-15). The objective of this project was to engage with the local community on anti-piracy advocacy and to create alternative livelihoods.

Furthermore, UNODC has delivered educational and vocational training programmes to piracy prisoners and at-risk youth in Puntland and Somaliland, with the aim of equipping the beneficiaries with employability skills and deterring their involvement in piracy and similar criminal activities (DPA 2017: 20-21; 38-39; DPA 2016: 29-31; 70-72; DPA 2015:37-42). These programmes were delivered by two local organisations, the Bossaso Technical Vocational Training Centre and YOVENCO[133]. The selection of at-risk youth was done in agreement with the Mayor of Bossaso; the Minister of

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[131] As previous footnotes have outlined, YOVENCO were a Somaliland youth organisation that also participated in this research
[132] A group that was founded by several ex-piracy suspects who had been imprisoned in countries outside of Somalia
[133] As discussed in previous footnotes, YOVENCO were also a participating organisation involved in this research

Counter-Piracy in Puntland; the Mayor of Berbera; and local youth organisations (DPA 2016: 30-31; DPA 2015:39-40; YOVENCO 2016: 8).

UNODC has been involved in a number of other counter-piracy programmes in Somalia, which have focused on hostage releases; capacity building projects; assistances in addressing fisheries crimes; the training of prison staff and coastguard recruits; prison transfers and the repatriation of former piracy prisons and children apprehended for piracy; and efforts to apprehend and prosecute piracy kingpins (DPA 2017: 19; 21-22; 40-41; 44-47; 50-51; DPA 2016: 28-29; 38-45; 61-63; 69-70; 72-73; DPA 2015:60-62; 67-69; UNODC 2012a: 4; 6-8; 14; UNODC 2012b 12-13).

6.2.2 The NGOs involved and their relevant programmes

This section, in a similar vein to the last, provides an overview of the NGOs involved in this research and their specific counter-piracy or child protection programmes that were investigated for this study. Where relevant, information is given about how these programmes were funded, and who their delivery partners were.

African Development Solutions (Adeso)

Adeso is an African humanitarian and development organisation delivering programmes to vulnerable communities in Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan. The organisation is based on the belief that development must come from within African communities, and its mission 'is to work at the roots of communities to create environments in which Africans can thrive' (Adeso 2021c). Coastal rehabilitation programmes, funded in part by the by the Leonardo Di Caprio Foundation, are among those delivered by Adeso in Somalia (Adeso 2012b). Their work on coastal rehabilitation includes investing and creating jobs within the fisheries sector for young Somalis and the wider community. Furthermore, in 2015, Adeso, in partnership with the EU, produced a report into IUU fishing in Somali waters and its interconnections to piracy off the Horn of Africa (The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 12). This study was carried out across ten major coastal towns and villages in Jubbaland, Benadir, Galmudug, Puntland, and Somaliland (The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 12-13).

Additionally, Adeso run programmes in pastoralist education and vocational 'skills for life'; natural resource management; livelihoods and economic development; emergency response; and cash and social protection (Adeso 2021d). To deliver their work, Adeso partner with several international IGOs, including but not limited to Care International; Oxfam; Mercy Corps; and Save the Children[134], and they receive funding from international donors such as The European Commission; FAO; OCHA; and USAID (Adeso 2021a).

Danish Demining Group (DDG)

DDG is a Humanitarian Mine Action Unit in the Danish Refugee Council that has been working in Somalia, particularly in the Central and Southern regions of Southwest State, Jubbaland, Hirshabelle, Puntland, and Galmudug, since 1998. Their work in Somalia focuses on stabilisation, peacebuilding, security, and governance, along with humanitarian mine action (DDG 2020b). As part of this work, DDG delivers programmes at the communal level in Somalia, running projects that focus on community safety planning and resilience building. This includes engaging young people as potential agents of change, diverting them from destabilising activities, and including them in peacebuilding efforts. DDG also work broadly with concepts of children involved in organised armed violence within the Somali context, which applies to the involvement of children in armed groups and criminal activities, including but not limited to piracy.

DDG's main donors include the governments of the UK; Denmark; Sweden; Norway; Canada; and the USA, along with IGOs such as UNICEF; EuropeAid; UNDP; and The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs' Crisis and Support Centre. Additionally, DDG receives funding via private donations from organisations such as the MAERSK Foundation (DDG 2020a).

Fair Fishing

Fair Fishing is a Danish-Somali NGO, founded in 2011, which works to improve the lives of those in and around Somalia. It does this through delivering programmes aimed at strengthening the fisheries sector, working to reduce poverty, and helping to

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[134] Who were also a partner organisation in this research

create employment and income opportunities. The organisation's founding purpose was to 'turn Somali pirates into fishermen' (Fair Fishing 2020c). While Fair Fishing initially worked in Somaliland, the organisation has since expanded into the Puntland region.

Through their work, Fair Fishing provides critical infrastructure to enhance local fisheries capability, supports the supply of fish to satisfy a growing demand, creates alterative livelihoods to piracy and criminality through the creation of jobs in the fisheries value chain, and runs training programmes aimed at young men and women in the fisheries sector. Fair Fishing also owns and runs fish restaurants that are supported by the local fisheries (Fair Fishing 2020b; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 8). To deliver their programmes, Fair Fishing works with a range of stakeholders and partners, including industry partners, the Somaliland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, the local government in Berbera, as well as other local and international NGOs, such as Oxfam, Shuraako, and FAO (Fair Fishing 2020a; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 8). They also receive funding from international bodies such as the EU and the Trafigura Foundation.

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

NCA has been working in Somalia since 1993, delivering programmes that focuses on issues related to gender-based violence; climate resilient water, sanitation and hygiene; climate smart economic empowerment; and peacebuilding (Norwegian Church Aid 2019). In 2009, NCA began to develop a project on alternative livelihoods to piracy (ALP). The core aim of this programme was to raise awareness of the negative effects of piracy and provide rehabilitation and re-integration for ex-pirates, by cooperating with the Government of Puntland, village authorities, clan elders, and religious leaders (Acacia 2010; Mohamed 2016; Norwegian Church Aid 2012; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; Yussuf: 2014). The programme also delivered vocational training and alternative livelihoods projects to thousands of young Somalis living along the coastline who were vulnerable to piracy recruitment.

To achieve the project aims, NCA partnered with relevant stakeholders, including the Ministry of Justice; the Secretariat for Puntland Religious Leaders; Garowe Vocational

Training Centre; Somalia Relief and Development Organization; and Somalia Women with Vision. They likewise received funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NORAD, and private sectors including the Norwegian Ship Owners Associations (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; Yussuf 2014: 4).

Peace Action Society Organization for Somalia (PASOS)

PASOS is a Somali NGO, founded in 1997, whose mission is to 'empower the vulnerable and the underprivileged communities in Somalia in order to bring about sustainable development and positive social transformation while focusing on equality, justice and human rights' (PASOS 2017: 1). PASOS deliver programmes on livelihood support; emergency relief; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. They likewise implement different projects on issues of governance; education; food security; economic empowerment; and child protection (PASOS 2019). Through these programmes, PASOS supports vulnerable children, including but not limited to those at risk of being recruited into armed and criminal activities like piracy. Furthermore, PASOS is committed to empowering Somali youth to contribute to their community's social, economic, and political development and they promote awareness of issues surrounding children in difficult circumstances (PASOS 2017: 2-3).

PASOS is a member of the South-Central AIDS Commission, and the Coalition for Peace in Africa, along with being registered with the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Federal Government, Ministry of Agriculture and other regional Administrations (PASOS 2017: 4). To deliver their programmes, PASOS partner with and receive funding from several organisations, including but not limited to The World Health Organisation; the Embassy of Japan; UNDP; OCHA; FAO; and UNICEF. They likewise receive financial support from the diaspora and Somali Business community (PASOS 2017: 4).

Save the Children

Save the Children is an international NGO that has been working in Somalia for over forty years, operating predominately in Somaliland, Puntland, and the independent regions of northwest Somalia (Save the Children 2020). Their work focuses on improving the lives of young Somalis through the provision of humanitarian

programmes. This includes educational programmes that focus on enrolling children in school, along with the delivery of vocational, life skills, and literacy training. In 2010, as part of their remit to deliver these programmes, Save the Children implemented an Alternative Livelihood and Employment Opportunity (ALEO) project, which aimed to keep vulnerable youth living in Somaliland and Puntland from engaging in piracy (Abdullahi 2012: 7-11; Forcier Consulting 2014: 1; 6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7; Thariki 2012: 3-4). This project had four specific objectives, which were to provide vocational training to those susceptible to piracy recruitment; increase the employability of unemployed youth through the provision of apprenticeships and enterprise-based technical vocational education training; increase awareness of piracy's negative effects and discourage young people from engaging through the provision of anti-piracy events and materials; and improve the capacity of local youth organisations so they could continue to deliver effective and sustainable programmes on issues relating to conflict-resolution, peacebuilding, and poverty reduction (Abdullahi 2012: 7-18; Thariki 2012: 3-4)

To run this programme, Save the Children received funding from the Danish Shipowners' Association; DANIDA; the Royal Danish Government; AP Møller-Mærsk; J. Lauritzen; Torm; Clipper; Norden; and the EU (Abdullahi 2012: 7; Forcier Consulting 2014: 6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7; Thariki 2012: 3-4). Moreover, to meet the project objectives, Save the Children worked in partnership with the MOLYS; local youth networks; NGOs and youth organisations such as YOVENCO and GAV; and local vocational and educational training centres (Forcier Consulting 2014: 6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7; Thariki 2012: 3-4). They likewise worked with community elders, politicians, religious leaders, and media outlets to deliver the awareness raising strand of the project.

Youth Volunteers for Development and Environment Conservation (YOVENCO)
YOVENCO is a Somaliland youth NGO founded in 2001 whose mission is 'to improve the lives of the poor and most vulnerable youth, women and children of Somaliland by improving their livelihood and health, protecting their rights, and protecting the environment through policy advocacy, awareness creation, empowerment, and mobilization of resources' (YOVENCO 2014: 3). To do this, YOVENCO run community

programmes related to social livelihood development; education; health; child protection; youth empowerment; and environmental conservation.

YOVENCO regularly acts as a local implementation partner for international humanitarian organisations, from whom they receive funding. These partner organisations include the FAO; Norwegian Refugee Council; Save the Children; UNPD; UNICEF; UNODC; and the United States African Development Foundation (YOVENCO 2016: 14-18). In the case of UNODC, YOVENCO acted as a local implementation partner on their educational and vocational training programmes aimed at piracy prisoners and at-risk youth in Puntland and Somaliland (DPA 2016: 30-31; DPA 2015:39-40; YOVENCO 2016: 8). Similarly, YOVECO partner with Save the Children on several different projects focused on education, training, and child protection and were one of Save the Children's two local implementation partners for the ALEO programme (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7).

6.3 Organisational understanding of children involved in piracy

As discussed previously in this thesis[135], the concept of child piracy is relatively new, having emerged as part of the Somali piracy problem. It has presented a challenge for those tasked with countering and mitigating the impacts of piratical activity, particularly since the geographical lens through which piracy is viewed impacts upon how this term is understood[136]. While piracy is primarily defined as a crime that occurs within the maritime domain, it is also a land-based activity, rooted in human insecurity and fragility onshore.

It was therefore important to examine how the organisations involved in this study interpreted and understood the issue of child piracy and the diverse roles children were perceived to be recruited for. When questioned about this, it became apparent that various definitions of childhood, along with different understandings regarding why children have been utilised by pirate groups and in what roles, shaped how IGOs and

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[135] See 1.3.1, 2.5.1 and 5.4
[136] As previously outlined throughout Chapters Two and Three

NGOs responded to this issue[137]. In alignment with Objective Three this section reflects these findings, examining how child piracy has been understood with regards to age, before exploring why children were perceived to be recruited by pirates and the specific roles they fulfilled within these networks, including a gendered analysis of the different roles males and females were recruited for.

By doing so, this section furthers the academic debate, as the previous child piracy research has only focused on how to treat those children apprehended for piracy on the high seas, while simultaneously ignoring the wider shore-based context of the problem[138]. This has geographically limited and gendered the debate, resulting in narrow and restrictive understandings that are not reflective of the whole problem. By examining the issue from the land-based perspective of the organisations in this study, this thesis counters such narrow understandings, thereby presenting a more holistic and inclusive overview of the child piracy problem.

6.3.1 Age

The question of age and different cultural and organisational understandings of childhood[139] is important, as it influenced how IGOs and NGOs targeted their anti-piracy programmes[140]. While there was no set definition of what constituted a child pirate among those involved, there was a consensus that young Somalis regularly engaged in pirate networks (participant 3: 2019; participant: 4 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As one participant with experience of interviewing imprisoned piracy suspects explained, 'I hear that there are many who are not eighteen who have been caught as pirates, and I presume there would have been many other youngsters like this also on land in the camps' (participant 4: 2019). Similarly, another explained that when he has run debriefs with the victims of piracy attacks, they described some of those involved 'as extremely young men or kids' (participant 3: 2019). Children living in coastal regions around Ely, particularly Galkayo

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[137] This will be examined in more detail in the following chapter
[138] As originally discussed in 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 3.5
[139] Outlined previously in 1.2
[140] As will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding chapter

and Garowe, were viewed as especially vulnerable (participant 14: 2019), and the involvement of young Somalis from poor coastal communities is likewise mentioned within policy documents looked at for this study (Abdullahi 2012: 14; FAO 2019: Forcier Consulting 2014: 89; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 9; Mohamed 2016: 5; Rashid 2009: 4; 8; Simba 2011: 5; 15; 23; UNODC 2012a: 3; UNODC 2012b: 14).

However, determining the exact ages of those involved was difficult, with different organisations having various understandings regarding at what age children would enter pirate groups (participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 9: 2018; participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 18: 2019). One NGO that has run anti-piracy programmes aimed at youth claimed to 'have not experienced…anyone under fifteen' (participant 12: 2019). Yet, other NGOs working in the field of child protection believed those between the ages of eleven and thirteen were involved (participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019) and, according to the findings of a study carried out by Save the Children, young Somalis were likely to enter pirate groups from the age of fourteen (Simba 2011: 23). Assessing the ages of the children involved in piracy was made more difficult as organisations were often forced to estimate such ages due to the lack of birth registration in Somalia[141], with one participant who had been involved in the repatriation of two young people apprehended for piracy explaining how 'we could tell that one of them was a child, but the other…we weren't so convinced' (participant 7: 2019).

While there was no consensus regarding the age at which children joined pirate groups, and despite the difficulty of assessing the ages of those involved, the majority were perceived to be older adolescents. This complicated the situation as, although the Somali Government have ratified to the CRC[142], in reality anyone aged fifteen and above is not considered a child in the Somali context (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13:

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[141] This reflects the findings of 2.5.1
[142] As was discussed previously in 1.2

2019; participant 16: 2019). As one international organisation that operates using the CRC definition explained, this resulted in friction, as 'there is a very distinct difference between how those of us in the West define childhood and those in Somalia do' (participant 7: 2019). This concern was compounded by the fact that in the Somali culture someone enters adulthood upon marriage, which could be as young as thirteen depending on the child's clan or regionality (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019). Moreover, fifteen-year-old males were observed to be more likely to be viewed as adults, and be out of school and working, when they lived in isolated locations and came from a fatherless household. As one organisation with experience of delivering projects in remote coastal communities explained, this is because it is the responsibility of the oldest son to earn an income if his father is not around, and because those in isolated coastal regions have limited access to the information and resources available to those in cities or urban centres (participant 6: 2019).

Due to the predominately older age of those involved and the various understandings of what constitutes a child within Somalia, one NGO described how there was 'a blur of what is okay to say and what is defined as a child or not a child' (participant 16: 2019), which made it harder to deliver targeted age-based programmes. This is because organisations had to balance the international, organisational, and cultural norms, which, 'creates a grey area' regarding who qualifies as a child (participant 7: 2019). While some organisations (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019) accepted the Somali understanding and maintained that 'anybody who is fifteen is considered a young adult' (participant 1: 2018), this was not always the case. Rather, others (participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019) considered those younger than eighteen to be children, since 'in today's world anyone who is over fifteen…can still be vulnerable' (participant 13: 2019).

To address the age issue, one international NGO that works with children using the definition outlined in the CRC explained that they recognised there was an 'overlap between…childhood and youthhood' (participant 11: 2019). As such, given the prevalence of fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds involved in piracy, this NGO developed programmes that targeted youth, as opposed to children, to avoid this grey area. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, this was not the only organisation

to have addressed the tension in this way, as the vast majority of those involved in this research delivered youth programmes as opposed to those targeted at children (Abdullahi 2012: 7-11; Acacia Consultants Ltd. 2010: 25-27; DPA 2017: 20-21; 38-39; DPA 2016: 29-31; 70-72; FAO: 2019; Forcier Consulting 2014: 5-6; 9-10; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012; 8-10; Mohamed 2016: 4-5; 14-15; 18-20; NCA 2012: 3-6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 3; 4; 7; 9; UNDP 2016a: 3-6; UNDP 2016b: 4-5; UNODC 2012: 5; 14-15; UNODC and DPA 2011: 88; YOVENCO 2016: 8-9). However, programmes, such as the Youth at Risk Project run by ILO, UNICEF and UNDP, ensured special access to protection services for those who were younger than eighteen (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 21; 51) and one organisation that focused heavily on delivering child protection programmes worked more broadly on lobbying the Government to implement policies that reflected the CRC definition of the child (participant 9: 2019).

6.3.2 Why have children been used by pirate groups

Pirate commanders were perceived to have several motives for including children within their operations, with many of these reasons indicating a commonality between the children involved in piracy and those involved in armed groups and criminal gangs outlined in Chapter Three[143]. Specifically, the research findings suggest pirate commanders used children because they considered them more daring, energetic, active, and fearless than their adult counterparts (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019). Linked to this, those below the age of eighteen were deemed more naïve and less aware of their actions (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 9: 2019 participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 16: 2019). This led one NGO that worked with children at risk of engaging in armed and criminal groups to claim a parallel existed between the children involved in piracy and those used in the drug trade, as in both cases 'it is easier to twist them, their minds' (participant 13: 2019). Uneducated young Somalis from poor families were perceived as being particularly attractive, as the lack of education made them easier to control (participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019;

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[143] See 3.4.1 and 3.4.2

participant 13: 2019). Indeed, one organisation that delivered youth fisheries projects explained that uneducated young Somalis were advantageous to pirate commanders because they lack knowledge regarding 'what is good and what is bad with piracy' (participant 6: 2019).

There was also a sense that pirate kingpins considered the use of children and youth as a good business investment. One reason for this is because children are plentiful in Somalia, meaning it was 'easy to use them' (participant 13: 2019). Most of Somalia's population is made up of youth[144], which provided 'new flesh' to keep the business moving (participant 9: 2019). This is supported by documentation provided by IGAD, which explains how 'the formative stage is easy to organize, it just takes a dozen like-minded youth to constitute into group' (Hersi 2014: 3). It is likewise backed-up by research carried out by Adeso, which found 'without a large pool of frustrated and disillusioned young men, it is unlikely that piracy would have blossomed to such an extent' (Ali 2014: 5).

Furthermore, the fact that children are more likely to follow orders, regardless of the consequences, was thought to make them valuable assets to pirate commanders (participant 10: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 16: 2019). This is partly because the absence of education, mentioned above, made them ignorant of the dangers of piracy. As was illustrated by one interviewee with experience of delivering youth-focused counter-piracy programmes, 'if someone is not educated, they cannot calculate most of the risks associated' (participant 12: 2019). Coupled with this is the fact that Somalia's hierarchical society[145] means children 'literally listen and do what their cousin or fathers tell them' (participant 16: 2019). As Somali children do not question their elders, it was thought that it may have been easier for both armed and pirate groups to mould them into what they needed them to be (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019).

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[144] As previously discussed in 2.5.1 and 5.2.2
[145] Discussed in 5.3

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Some of those with experience of delivering programmes aimed at keeping young Somalis out of piracy also suggested that children were advantageous because they are fast and agile, which made them suitable candidates to carry out more frontline work, while pirate kingpins ran the operation in the background (participant 11: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 18: 2019). This then provided anonymity to kingpins since, even if children were apprehended, the fact they followed orders without question meant they were usually unaware of who was running the enterprise (participant 15: 2019). Furthermore, an organisation with experience of repatriating child pirates spoke about how there was little reintegration support when children were apprehended for piracy, which incentivised pirate groups to recruit them since 'they know that they will just get them right back and they are already trained' (participant 7: 2019). Children may also have been recruited as the psychological impact upon hostages may be greater when faced with a child with a gun, especially as they are more unpredictable and potentially more violent than adults (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019). As one participant with experience of working with former piracy hostages explained, when children engage in piracy 'it brings out the cruel side' (participant 3: 2019).

The prevalent use of children within violent activity in Somalia[146] was also thought to be significant (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 16: 2019). Children are frequently used by armed groups, including Al-Shabaab and armed militias, and they are routinely called upon by their clan leaders to engage in conflict (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13; 15). It was therefore suggested that not only is the use of children in armed activity normalised, but the hierarchical structure of Somali society has made it advantageous to use them. This is because 'children…can be useful recruits for any groups' (participant 13: 2019) since, as outlined already, they are easier to control, do what their elders tell them, and their vulnerable situation makes them naïve and easy targets. As such, and as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the involvement of children in pirate groups was perceived to be part of a wider trend linked to the regular use of young Somalis in armed and criminal networks.

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[146] Outlined in 5.2.1 and 5.2.3 of the previous chapter

Finally, it is worth noting that although most of the organisations thought pirate commanders had specific reasons for using children, there was some dispute over this. Specifically, one NGO that delivered programmes to Somali children involved in different armed activities explained that, while children have been involved in piracy, they 'don't think pirate groups target children particularly' (participant 17: 2019), especially not in the same way as groups such as Al-Shabaab do. Rather, they believed that children actively sought out pirate groups instead of being recruited[147].

6.3.3 The roles and gender dynamics of the Somali child piracy problem

Although piracy is almost universally defined as something that occurs in the maritime domain[148], including by organisations involved in this study[149], there was a strong understanding across those interviewed that this is restrictive and does not fully reflect the scale of the Somali piracy operation, nor how children have been used by these groups. While the physical act of piracy occurs in the maritime domain, the rest of the Somali operation, including logistical support, mobilising people to join pirate groups, intelligence gathering, guarding hostages and ransom negotiations have taken place onshore (participant 1: 2018; participant 3 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). This was well-summarised by one local NGO, who cited how 'eighty percent is done on the land…and then twenty percent – even less – is done on the high seas' (participant 13: 2019). As such, when discussing the make-up of the Somali piracy operation, it became apparent that most organisations recognised a sea-going and a land-based unit, reflective of those discussed in previous chapters[150] (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 17: 2019).

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[147] The reasons why children were believed to be seeking out pirate groups are discussed in more depth later in section 6.4

[148] As discussed in 1.2 and throughout Chapter Two

[149] For example, UN departments such as UNODC and FAO define piracy using the UNCLOS definition

[150] See Chapter Two 2.3.1 and Chapter Three 3.4.1

It was generally accepted that adolescents were more likely to be involved in the land-based unit (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019), as being in the attack team would require specific skills, including experience at sea and the ability to swim. This meant the sea-going operation was perceived to be the responsibility of professional seamen, particularly ex-fishermen, who were skilled in steering boats and swimming (participant 1: 2018; participant 8: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 16: 2019), and, as these are skills that adolescents generally do not possess, it was more unusual for them to be part of this 'hardcore business' (participant 11: 2019). According to one NGO that has delivered fisheries programmes to young Somalis, when children have been used at sea it is because their agility and speed[151] has made them good candidates for hijacking vessels (participant 18: 2019). This was likewise supported by an IGO experienced in running counter-piracy programmes onshore (participant 2: 2018), who discussed how, because children are more daring and follow orders[152], when they have been used in sea-going operations they have been expected to climb the ladder and enter the ship.

It was also accepted that the children involved in the sea-going unit would not have automatically been placed in these roles upon entering a pirate group. Rather, several organisations described how young male Somalis were promoted to these positions after serving in land-based support roles, during which time they gained both the required skills and the trust of those in charge (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019). The idea that juveniles entered pirate groups via these shore-based roles and were promoted to the attack team is likewise supported by testimonials from ex-pirates gathered by NGOs (Rashid 2009: 23-24; Simba 2011: 33). When looked at from this perspective, it appears that the modus operandi of Somali piracy has been to recruit boys into land-based support roles and then to upskill them to become part of the sea-going unit. This is a significant finding that suggests a career progression exists for young males involved within the

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[151] Which was discussed in the previous section
[152] See 6.3.2

Somali piracy structure, with the children who have been apprehended at-sea being at the peak of this career trajectory. This has not been identified in previous research, which has primarily focused on how to treat those children apprehended for piracy at sea and failed to consider how intervening earlier, when children were part of the land-based unit, could have supported their disengagement from piracy networks before they had the opportunity to go to sea.

According to a local Somali NGO, children have taken on several land-based roles within pirate networks, including 'collecting intelligence, doing some logistical work on the ground, renting a car...buying food' (participant 13: 2019). This was supported by an IGO with experience of delivering youth fisheries programmes, as they explained how children had regularly engaged with pirate groups onshore by carrying out logistical tasks, such as running errands and buying supplies for the sea-going unit (participant 6: 2019). Moreover, a further IGO discussed how nomadic children whose families provided general support to pirates frequently performed domestic chores for these networks (participant 7: 2019).

Besides logistical support roles, children were also thought to have been used as guards. Those who worked closely with former piracy hostages explained how 'young kids were assigned the roles where…they kept guard of the hostages' (participant 7: 2019). This was perceived to be because 'youngsters are better as guards…than necessarily part of the attack team' (participant 3: 2019), partially due to being unpredictable and potentially more violent[153]. Similarly, along with acting as guards, an organisation that carried out significant research into the land-based structures of Somali piracy described how children were 'used as stake outs to look for any new people or any police' (participant 1: 2018). However, there were different understandings regarding the gender of these roles. While one interviewee who worked closely with both males and females involved in piracy thought it was predominately young men employed as guards (participant 7: 2019), another described how female hostages reported being 'looked after by a girl, who helped with girl type issues' (participant 3: 2019). Young women were also said to have acted as

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[153] As previously mentioned in 6.3.2

stakeouts (participant 1: 2018), further suggesting that girls were involved in such roles.

The different perception regarding the gender of these roles is part of a wider issue in which girls have not been as visible in pirate groups as their male counterparts, although most organisations accepted that females were involved in some capacity (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019). The reason girls have not been as visible is because of the maritime focus of piracy operations, and the fact no female has been apprehended for piracy, since culturally Somali girls do not go to sea (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As discussed in Chapter Three[154], this has created a gender-blind narrative within previous research into child piracy, which does not wholly reflect the situation on the ground. Besides being used as stakeouts and guards for female hostages, girls were perceived to be involved in traditional gender roles, providing domestic support to pirate groups (participant 1: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 11: 2019). As was summarised by one organisation that worked directly with children at risk of piracy recruitment, girls were the ones 'doing the cooking…the upkeep on the beaches, or where…people have been held' (participant 11: 2019).

Girls were also perceived to have been used for sexual purposes, being at risk of commercial sex and forced marriage with pirates (participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019). Not only did the growth in piracy off the Puntland coast coincided with a rise in prostitution (Rashid 2009: 14; Schultze-Kraft 2018: 12; Simba 2011: 8), but according to first-hand accounts from local NGOs, girls were 'lured into…sham marriage' (participant 13: 2019) and used 'for some kind of sex abuse' (participant 14: 2019). Consequentially, one IGO expressed a belief that 'the issue piracy is affecting young women…in indirect ways, whereas it is affecting

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[154] See 3.4.1 and 3.5

the young men directly' (participant 8: 2019). Likewise, another suggested that while girls might not be pirates, as they do not go to sea, they should still be considered accessories to piracy (participant 1: 2018).

Though girls were not as prominent in pirate networks, the likelihood of experiencing sexual abuse meant those who were involved were considered vulnerable in ways their male counterparts were not (participant 5: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). Boys were thought to face different risks however, given that they could be promoted to the attack team and 'sometimes they fail and they get arrested' (participant 10: 2019) and in more extreme cases there is the 'risk of lives' (participant 18: 2019). This is likewise highlighted in research conducted by Save the Children (Simba 2011: 8). On the surface, this suggests that children faced different risks depending on their gender. Yet, it might not be this simple. While some girls involved in piracy experienced sexual abuse, this does not mean that all girls have. Nor does it rule out the possibility that some males have experienced sexual abuse while involved in piracy. Similarly, while the physical act of piracy was predominantly seen as a male issue, girls were still involved in the revenue sharing, as one local NGO made clear (participant 13: 2019). In this sense, the research findings merely indicate that both genders have been utilised by pirate groups, while highlighting a lack of detailed understanding regarding the land-based involvement and varied gendered experiences of the children affected.

As already alluded to, it was not just girls who were considered 'accessories to piracy'. Both boys and girls were used by pirate groups onshore in domestic and support roles, and while there are questions around whether these children could be defined as pirates (participant 4: 2019), given their land-based roles, they were considered an essential part of the wider operation. This view was succinctly summarised by one participant who worked for an organisation that operated using the UNCLOS definition of piracy, who stated, 'whether you want to argue that they are pirates, or they are just pirate affiliates, is a different question, but you definitely see kids being involved in piracy' (participant 7: 2019). Overall, given that children have been utilised on land as an essential part of the Somali piracy operation (participant 12: 2019; participant 13:

2019) and, in the case of males, this often preceded their involvement at sea, whether those involved onshore could be defined as pirates appeared to be an issue of semantics. The consensus among the organisations involved in this study is that children were engaging in pirate groups and, even if this involvement was only on land, more needed to been done to address this issue and to support their disengagement from these groups. Regardless of whether children were involved in land-based or sea-going roles, their motives for joining a pirate group[155], which are discussed in the following section, were believed to be the same and to require similar policy responses (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019).

As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, despite this, children who took on shore-based roles have generally been of secondary concern, even among some organisations involved in this research. As one IGO explained, 'for the time being…the focus is not on them' (participant 4: 2019). This is reflective of the absence of research regarding the interrelationship between piracy's land-based operations, state fragility, and the involvement of children in maritime piracy addressed within this thesis.

6.4 Why children were perceived to have engaged in pirate groups

As discussed in Chapters Two and Three[156], while the child piracy literature briefly mentions the reasons why children may have engaged in the activity, the focus has been on how to treat those apprehended for piracy at seas. As such, there is an absence of research into how child piracy and state fragility in Somalia may be interrelated, nor how the involvement of children in the crime may be better understood and addressed onshore rather than within the maritime domain. By examining whether a clear consensus existed regarding the land-based causes of child piracy among the organisations involved in this study, and what this reveals about the perceived motives of child pirates, this section seeks to address this gap and works towards answering Sub-Research Questions 3.1 and 3.2, thereby contributing to the academic discourse on piracy, and specifically child piracy. It likewise adds to the academic research into

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[155] Which will be examined in the next section
[156] See 2.5.2 and 3.5

fragile states, by examining child piracy in relation to the fragility of the Somali state and placing the issue alongside the wider literature pertaining to youth in fragile states[157].

To achieve this purpose, the organisations in this study were asked about what factors caused children to join pirate networks. As will be discussed within this section, children were found to have joined due to a variety of reasons. These issues are reflective of many of those outlined in the piracy and fragile states' literature, including the prevalence of armed groups, economic incentives, desperation and a lack of options, migration related issues, and illegal fishing[158]. Other more personal factors such as family or clan involvement were also found to be influential. Such issues did not appear to exist in isolation, rather they made up a nexus of interconnected factors. As will be discussed in the next chapter, understanding these interconnected motives is important for examining how they influenced IGO and NGO policy responses between 2009-2018.

6.4.1 Normality of being part of an armed group

As alluded to in 6.3.2, one reason why children were thought to have engaged in piracy is because of how common it is for Somali children to be part of an armed group. Not only did the majority of organisations in this study reference this (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019 participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019) but it is likewise highlighted in the evaluation report for the Youth at Risk Project, which states 'youth have always been part of the conflict in Somalia' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13). Besides piracy, young Somalis have been involved with groups including Al-Shabaab, gangs, and several militias[159] (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13-17). Consequently, an organisation involved in the delivery of land-based counter-piracy programmes described how the lack of law and order and the number of armed groups 'creates an environment that

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[157] Discussed in Chapter Three
[158] These different issues have been discussed in 2.4.2 and throughout 3.2
[159] The involvement of young people in these armed groups has been discussed previously in 5.2.1, 5.2.3 and 6.3.2

stops kids thriving and developing' (participant 4: 2019), generating a cycle[160] that has pushed child into piracy and similar armed activities.

The prevalence of arms in Somali society[161] was also considered an overriding issue by some organisations (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 8: 2019). This is because 'the gun is the most important criteria' (participant 1: 2018) and was considered a central entry requirement for pirate groups (Hersi 2014: 1; 3). Furthermore, when asked about their understanding of child pirates, IGOs with experience of working with at risk Somali youth explained that 'logically the requirement of this would be they should be carrying the guns' (participant 8: 2019) because 'a youngster is good to be carrying a gun…and to look intimidating' (participant 3: 2019).

The prevalence of guns was not an issue solely related to piracy, as in Somalia 'youth represent a significant proportion of gun holders in various armed groups' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 15). One suggested reason for this is that 'there is this same pool of young people who are just as susceptible to get recruited into violent extremism, as they are into a criminal enterprise like piracy' (participant 7: 2019). This 'pool of young people' was understood to be vulnerable because, as will be looked at in more detail shortly, they lacked either employment or family support. As such, from this perspective, the only difference between the children used by armed groups as opposed to pirates was the geographical region in which they lived and the groups operating there[162]. Piracy was considered a specific issue in Puntland, particularly around Ely[163] (participant 8: 2019), which meant 'the kids and the youth in south-central Somalia don't have a chance to join' (participant 7: 2019).

Yet, as an IGO that worked with vulnerable children across Somalia explained, some children have fled conflict areas, like south-central Somalia, to engage with criminal groups such as pirates (participant 9: 2019). It was suggested that this is potentially because engaging in armed groups, particularly Al-Shabaab, is more dangerous and

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[160] Reflective of the kind outlined in the fragile states literature and discussed in 3.2.7
[161] Previously discussed in 5.2.1
[162] Previously discussed in 5.2.3, 5.3 and 5.4
[163] As was outlined previously in 5.4

those participating are more likely to partake in extreme violence (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 13: 2019). Therefore, given the opportunity, children would choose piracy as 'it is the gentler of the two choices' (participant 7: 2019) and because engagement in Al-Shabaab 'is a one-way system' (participant 13: 2019).

However, this assumes children would engage in piracy and armed groups for similar reasons, which some organisations disputed (participant 1: 2018; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 17: 2019). Rather, they explained how those who join groups like Al-Shabaab are motivated by ideology, revenge, or peer pressure, whereas those who joined pirate groups are predominantly driven by economic motives, as will now be considered.

6.4.2 Economic incentives

One explanation for the prevalence of children involved in piracy, which reflects the links between state fragility and youth bulges[164], is that Somalia's population is predominantly made up of young people who viewed piracy as an attractive economic opportunity (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). It offered a way 'to get some cash' (participant 14: 2019), with many children viewing piracy as easy and quick money (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 9: 2019; participant 13: 2019). As research from one NGO report shows, young Somalis became susceptible to piracy recruitment when 'large amounts of cash began to pour in from activities that were assumed by young men as lucrative and profitable' (Schultze-Kraft 2018: 12). Furthermore, one IGO involved in fisheries livelihoods programmes described how the young Somalis they worked with remembered the stories of piracy missions that resulted in a ransom payment, rather than those that failed (participant 6: 2019). This suggests there was a cost-benefit analysis associated with the decision to join pirate groups[165], with one Somaliland youth organisation summarising how 'though the risks are high…sometimes you get

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[164] Discussed in 3.2.3
[165] Reflective of the kind discussed in 2.4.3 and 3.2.4

a huge…amount of money and that is the interest…behind these activities' (participant 10: 2019).

Additionally, young men were thought to be attracted to piracy because the potential economic gains made them more attractive to women (participant 1: 2019; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019), with young Somalis being told 'all the ladies and girls there are going to want to marry you' (participant 6: 2019). This suggests that women may have been attracted to pirates because of the potential financial benefits. Such a view was held by one organisation that ran programmes targeted at females and males involved in piracy, as they talked about girls being attracted to pirates because they had money and were treated like 'a rock star in town' (participant 1: 2018). When considered from this angle, the implication is that girls were not always the victims of sexual abuse[166], since some chose to join pirates.

As already mentioned[167], the supposed economic motives led some organisations to claim that children have engaged in piracy networks for different reasons than those involved in armed groups, whose motives were seen as ideological or due to peer influence (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 17: 2019). However, this might not reflect reality, since according to research carried out with young Somalis the main driver for engagement in both armed and criminal groups has been economic in nature (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 24). This includes involvement in Al-Shabaab, who were found to recruit young people by offering them an income and phone credit (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 16). Likewise, one IGO (participant 6: 2019) explained that children joined pirate groups and Al-Shabaab because both offered a salary. This reflects the claim in 6.4.1 that young people, including those below the age of eighteen, were vulnerable to recruitment into a pirate and armed group because of limited employment opportunities[168] (participant 7: 2019).

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[166] As suggested in 6.3.3

[167] See 6.4.1

[168] The issue of employment, child piracy, and its relation to other armed groups will be discussed in more detail in 6.4.3

Furthermore, according to the Youth at Risk report (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 24), the financial motives that caused young people to join any kind of armed group were linked to drug use. When it came to engagement in piracy, one organisation that worked with vulnerable children across Somalia claimed that most of those involved were drug addicts, since 'normal people would not go to the sea for robbery' (participant 8: 2019). This was likewise echoed by one local NGO, who explained that young people engaged in piracy as 'the drugs, the alcohol, the money…it was very attractive' (participant 13: 2019). This is supported by research carried out by Save the Children with young Somalis involved in piracy, as well as former pirate leaders, which found 'young and middle-aged members are given drugs for free. That is what attracts them' (Simba 2011: 33). It was likewise accepted that children spent any money they made on the stimulant khat and if they were not hooked on this before they became involved, they would be once they joined a pirate group (participant 7: 2019). Even when drugs were not considered a motivating factor, it was still perceived that children would receive them upon entering a pirate group, with one local NGO explaining how it made them easier to control, meaning pirate bosses could get them to 'do whatever it is they want' (participant 14: 2019).

Despite the perceived economic motives, there were concerns that the narratives around children joining pirate groups for the financial benefit created an unfair negative perception of them, particularly among the local community. This is because perceptions of piracy were shifting, and while pirates used to be admired, their communities had come to see them as source of shame (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019), with a belief that pirates acted out of greed resulting in the stigmatisation of those children associated with the crime (participant 7: 2019). However, the idea that children acted purely out of greed was not held by the organisations involved in this study. Rather, as will now be considered, the economic incentives to engage in piracy were thought to be interlinked to the desperate situation children faced in Somalia[169].

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[169] Outlined in 5.2

6.4.3 Desperation and lack of options

Although some children were engaged in piracy because of the economic benefits, their motives were considered more complex than to merely get rich quick. Instead, the findings mirror claims, originally discussed in Chapter Two[170], that Somali piracy is rooted in poverty and economic instability, with desperation and a lack of opportunity being cited as influential factors that pushed children into joining. This is supported by documentation produced by UNODC, which states that 'many for a lack of better opportunities, engage in piracy as a way of sustaining their lives' (2012a: 3). In particular, the societal collapse and large youth cohort created high rates of poverty and limited opportunities among young Somalis, which made them vulnerable to piracy recruitment, as 'poverty is one of the underlying…causes of anything…like this' (participant 10: 2019). Moreover, the dire situation was thought to not only push children into pirate networks, but other armed and criminal groups (participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 16: 2019). As one international NGO that worked directly with vulnerable Somali children explained 'poverty has many ugly faces and…piracy is just…one of them' (participant 11: 2019).

The lack of employment prospects for young Somalis was seen by the majority of organisations to have driven engagement into piracy, along with other illicit activities (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019, participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As one IGO explained, 'it is hard to find a job…and the unemployment rates is very high' (participant 8: 2019), while another discussed how 'youth unemployment is eighty percent' (participant 9: 2019). Moreover, because 'legitimate employment is very few and far between' (participant 3: 2019), and the only job prospects for young people in remote coastal locations were piracy-related (participant 1: 2018), there was a perceived sense of hopelessness and desperation among children who were expected to earn an income. If they did not

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[170] Section 2.4.3

engage with pirate groups in some form then they would be 'sitting idle in…the coastline villages doing nothing' (participant 12: 2019).

As such, many children may have felt they had no alternative other than joining pirate networks, or other criminal and armed groups. Indeed, one NGO that worked in both Puntland and Somaliland explained that children are 'joining these different groups because they…can't see any other option to stay alive' (participant 18: 2019). This point can be seen in different NGO documents (Abdullahi 2012: 10; 14; 29; Forcier Consulting 2014: 5; Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 20; Rashid 21: 2009; Schultze-Kraft 2018: 12; 13; Simba 2011: 7-8; 32-33), with one study finding that 'joblessness, widespread poverty and destitution accounts for 87.6% of youth engagement in piracy and other anti-social behaviours' (Simba 2011: 7). This supposed interconnection between piracy and youth unemployment is reflective of the interrelationship between youth bulges, unemployment, and state fragility, discussed in Chapter Three[171], and suggests children engage in piracy for similar reasons to those who partake in other destabilising activities in fragile states.

Along with high youth unemployment, limited educational opportunities[172] were also found to have caused children to engage in piracy (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 16: 2019). As discussed in 6.3.2, 'when the children have no schools, they are easily…recruited to piracy' (participant 10: 2019) and, as one interviewee with experience of working with piracy prisoners explained, those she interviewed told her 'educate the youth, provide them with education and they won't go into piracy' (participant 7: 2019). The relationship between lack of education and children's involvement in piracy is likewise outlined in several NGO reports (Abdullahi 2012: 14; Ali 2014: 1; Forcier Consulting 2014: 5; Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 20; 22; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3; Simba 2011: 39). However, providing children with an education was not seen to be an easy feat, as access to schooling is limited in Somalia since 'formal education has collapsed' (participant 10: 2019) and there is a

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[171] See 3.2.4
[172] This reflects findings of the fragile states' literature discussed in 3.2.5

lack of 'facilities for schools' (participant 4: 2019). The required infrastructure and system do not exist (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019) and, where they do, parents often cannot afford the school fees (participant 16: 2019). Along with a lack of schooling, an IGO that delivered alternative livelihoods programmes cited how the government failed to support out-of-school children, which further increased the probability of young Somalis turning to piracy (participant 1: 2018). When considered together, the absence of education, along with high youth unemployment, appear to have contributed to children's involvement in piracy[173].

The hierarchical structure of Somali society was thought to have added to the sense of hopelessness felt by those who were out of school and unemployed. Children did not believe their needs were taken seriously, particularly with regards to employment, which was perceived by one IGO that worked with vulnerable children across Somalia to not only have pushed them into armed and criminal groups, but to have caused high youth migration[174] (participant 5: 2019). Likewise, despite not being considered children in the Somali context, the fact that those over the age fifteen 'are not going to be in a position of authority to influence things' (participant 3: 2019) was seen by one organisation that ran several counter-piracy programmes to have impacted upon adolescent Somalis. This reflects a similar point raised in the evaluation report for the Youth at Risk Project (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13; 65). However, the report goes one step further, claiming that 'the low level of youth implication in politics and decision making in the Somali structure has encouraged the "de-socialization" of the youth and therefore contributes to lead youth towards violence' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13). Thus, implying a link between the exclusion of young Somalis and their involvement in activities like piracy[175].

Along with social exclusion, insecurity linked to underdevelopment, lack of infrastructure and the remote regions in which piracy occurs, were seen to increase children's involvement in the crime (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11:

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[173] This reflects findings of the fragile states literature discussed in 3.2.4 and 3.2.5
[174] The issue of youth migration will be discussed in more detail in the next section
[175] This reflective of findings in the fragile states' literature discussed in 3.2.6 and 3.2.7

2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As alluded to above, piracy was occurring in inaccessible areas where a lack of educational infrastructure and legitimate employment meant most job prospects were related to piracy (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019). This left children who were expected to earn an income with limited alternatives. The interrelationship between the lack of infrastructure and the involvement of young Somalis in piracy is discussed within programme documents from UNDP's Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy Project, which references the issue of accessibility in the regions where projects were targeted (UNDP 2016a: 10; UNDP 2016b: 10). Furthermore, recurring drought and famine, in conjunction with an overreliance on traditional agricultural and livestock work, was thought to have created vulnerable communities (participant 10: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 18: 2019). According to one NGO that ran pastoralist programmes, the children whose families lost livestock to drought and famine had turned to piracy 'to keep them going' (participant 15: 2019). Several NGO documents also reference interconnections between children's involvement in piracy, along with other armed activities, and issues of state fragility including weak governance, insecurity, economic instability, and continued reliance on traditional livelihoods (Abdullahi 2012: 29; Ali 2014: 3; Rashid 2009: 25; Simba 2011: 34; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 32; Yussuf 2014: 8).

Overall, 'limited opportunities' (Rashid 2009: 21), 'extreme poverty' (Abdullahi 2012: 10) and 'economic and political exclusion' (Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 6) were found to be important factors pushing children into activities like piracy. This further supports the idea that some children turned to piracy following a process of a cost-benefit analysis, similar to those outlined in both the piracy and fragile states' literature[176], as the lack of alternatives meant the potential benefits of joining pirate groups outweighed the associated risks. Taken together, these factors also appear to support this thesis' earlier claim[177] that Somali piracy requires fragility onshore to flourish, as pirate networks need ungoverned spaces on land to conduct their operations. As suggested by the research findings, the lack of infrastructure and remote locations in which piracy occurred helped to provide these spaces and the

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[176] See 2.4.3, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4
[177] Discussed in 2.4.4

conditions necessary for piracy, and the use of children within the crime, to go unchallenged. Thus, and as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, successfully countering child piracy in the long-term was thought to not only require addressing the underlying factors causing children to engage, but the wider interconnected issues of fragility that contributed to these stressors.

6.4.4 The 'cross-cutting' issues of child piracy and youth migration

A theme that emerged throughout this research is how the issues of child piracy and youth migration are, in the words of one organisation, 'cross-cutting' (participant 8: 2019). In spite of the remote locations of piracy operations, there was a perceived interconnection between child piracy and internal youth migration, with the economic benefits of piracy having enticed young Somalis to 'come all the way from poorer areas to join forces' (participant 13: 2019) and sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds having 'flooded the coastline communities' (participant 12: 2019). This was supported by a Somaliland-based organisation who explained how children left 'Somaliland to go and join these groups' (participant 10: 2019). The interconnection between internal migration and piracy is further emphasised in an NGO report (Rashid 2009: 8), which claims that most pirates were young Somalis who migrated to Ely from other parts of the country, while a report from UNODC similarly states that girls migrated from areas such as Somaliland to marry pirates (2012b: 15).

On the surface, this suggests that children migrated to piracy hotspots because of economic reasons. However, the findings suggest a more complex relationship between insecurity and fragility in different regions of Somalia and internal migration to engage in piracy. Specifically, environmental pressures and insecurity related to extremism were believed to have increased 'rural-urban migration…worsening economic conditions' (Abdullahi 2012: 29). Such migration inflated unemployment among young people, increasing the likelihood they would seek alternative economic opportunities through groups such as pirates. This is reflective of themes in the fragile states' literature[178] and suggests that increased rural-urban migration added to the

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[178] See 3.2.4

child piracy problem[179]. Furthermore, it raises questions over whether children migrated to piracy hotspots because of the promise of 'quick and easy money' (participant 13: 2019), or whether there is a more complex relationship between the insecurity and fragility in many regions of Somalia and internal migration to engage in piracy.

Another interconnection between child piracy and migration that emerged throughout this research is how piracy may have been viewed by young Somalis as an opportunity to fund an idealised lifestyle outside of the country. It was suggested that desperate young Somalis viewed piracy as 'a chance to make money and get out of Somalia' (participant 7: 2019). Increased access to social media meant they were more globalised and would often desire the type lifestyle they saw others having online. As some of those who worked on alternative livelihoods programmes summarised, 'if someone goes to the West and takes photos…with very beautiful houses and parks, then that really puts the young people out and they say how can I do that, where can I get the money?' (participant 13: 2019) , which made piracy more appealing as there was an 'incentive that this young man will come back with enough money that he can…be in a plane and go to somewhere else' (participant 1: 2018). This is part of a wider trend in which large numbers of children have been leaving Somalia, often through illegal means, leading to concerns among Somalis that they 'are losing all our young people to different things' (participant 18: 2019). This is supported by policy documents looked at for this research, as although the interconnection between piracy and migration is not expressly discussed, a link between camel theft and migration is highlighted within one alternative livelihoods to piracy report (UNDP 2016a: 10). Thus, when taken together it appears children have engaged in criminal activities, including piracy, as way to escape Somalia. It likewise suggests that increased globalisation, along with insecurity and desperation, have worked in tandem to push children into piracy, as they view this as an opportunity to raise the funds to leave Somalia and start a better life.

The link between migration and piracy was not necessarily just a male phenomenon, since girls may have chosen to become involved with pirates as it offered the potential

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[179] Given the interconnection between youth unemployment and child piracy discussed in 6.4.3

financial revenues to leave. According to one participant, when she has interviewed girls involved with pirate networks, they have told her that they did not want to marry them 'they just wanted to get paid and be able to get out of Somalia' (participant 7: 2019). If this is true, then it provides a different understanding as to why girls have joined with pirates. Although policy work has recognised that young women have migrated to marry them (UNODC 2012b: 15), it may not necessarily be through forced marriage, or because girls consider them to be a 'rock star'[180]. Rather, they may have wished to leave Somalia and becoming involved with pirates offered the money to do so. This further reinforces how girls are affiliated to pirate groups, even though they do not go out to sea.

There was also a perceived correlation between a decrease in piracy and a resulting increase in youth migration, with both being considered to be coping mechanisms addressing the same land-based pressures and insecurities, such as youth exclusion and unemployment. IGOs working directly on youth migration issues claimed the underlying factors causing young Somalis to migrate today are the same factors that previously caused their engagement in piracy (participant 5: 2019; participant 8: 2019). As piracy off the Horn of Africa has become more sporadic due to increased naval patrols, migration has become the more attractive option for Somali youth. Correspondingly an IGO with considerable experience in counter-piracy operations stated that there may have been 'a human trafficking component of piracy that was never looked into' (participant 7: 2019). If this is true, it is unsurprising that there were concerns that those who planned and profited from piracy have now turned their attention to human migration and trafficking operations (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019).

Furthermore, aside from migration, children have moved into other viable criminal groups following the decrease in piracy. According to one NGO 'when the piracy went down, the criminality on land like kidnapping became a problem' (participant 16: 2019). This is supported by research produced by NCA (Mohamed 2016: 6; 7; Yussuf 2013: 5), with one report finding that young Somalis exited pirate networks to 'otherwise engage in illegal acts like road blocks/check points to take money from passengers'

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[180] As suggested earlier in this chapter

(Yussuf 2013: 5). This suggests that although piracy is less viable, the root causes and infrastructure remain unchanged, as do the reasons why children previously engaged in the activity. It is therefore unsurprising that those involved in this research cited concerns that piracy will likely resurge if the international naval response[181] is scaled back, as the factors that pushed children to engage in piracy remain unchallenged, as does the criminal infrastructure (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). Taken together, these factors reveal a weakness in the high seas focus of the child piracy literature and the international community's predominantly naval response to the Somali piracy problem, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

6.4.5 Family and personal connections

The family were also thought to play an important role in children's participation in piracy (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 15: 2019), although this was still often tied to fragility onshore. In some instances, the parents have been incentivised by the potential economic benefits, as 'the pirate bosses who put the gangs together offer large amounts of money…or potential shares to families' (participant 3: 2019). In these cases, rather than voluntarily joining pirate networks, children have been coerced by their family or wider social networks (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 15: 2019). This was highlighted by one interviewee who explained, 'many have been innocent but forced to become crime-doers' (participant 12: 2019) while another, who worked with children in different armed groups, likened the involvement of children in piracy to the Mafia, stating that many became involved through family connections, which made it harder to leave since it 'is not easy for you to get out…unless you really flee' (participant 11: 2019). Furthermore, nomadic children have been expected to assist their parents in supporting pirates with logistical and domestic tasks[182] (participant 7: 2019). Taken together, this casts doubt over the

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[181] Discussed in 5.4
[182] As already alluded to in 6.3.3

supposed voluntary nature of child piracy cited in much of the existent child piracy literature.

Young women were considered more likely than young men to engage in pirate networks due to family or personal connections, taking on shore-based roles when 'their boys, or their cousins have gone out to sea' (participant 1: 2018). The reason for this is that culturally girls would need personal connections, whether that be a family, business, or love connections, to engage with pirates (participant 1: 2018). This understanding that females became part of pirate groups through personal connections, particularly the family, is reflective of wider societal structures, as girls have a greater sense of responsibility to their family (participant 5: 2019). This led one NGO to claim that young girls were especially vulnerable to family coercion, as for them 'it has not been easy to say no' (participant 11: 2019). The influence of personal connections and this sense of responsibility to their family suggest another reason why some girls became involved in pirate networks, beyond those discussed already.

Even when not coerced, young Somalis who 'have family connections, or…a friend who is involved' (participant 16: 2019) were considered more likely to join pirate groups. According to one interviewee involved in delivering fisheries livelihoods programmes, rather than being driven by a lack of opportunity, a child was more likely to engage in piracy 'because his family has convinced him that he will earn money from this' (participant 16: 2019). This interviewee was not alone in recognising the important role family and social connections played, as others suggested that children became involved through a connection with 'someone who works for this piracy' (participant 13: 2019). One NGO stated, 'from what we have seen it has often been through personal contacts that people have been lured into these networks' (participant 11: 2019), which was further evidenced by research carried out with young people who themselves cited how personal connections influenced their decision to join pirate groups (Rashid 2009: 23: Simba 2011: 33). This suggests that, just as children may join extremism due to peer influence[183], this could also be true in the case of piracy.

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[183] As mentioned in 6.4.2

Besides the family, clan affiliation and the hierarchical society was perceived to have influenced children's decision to engage (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 16: 2019). According to those who have conducted research into the structure of Somali pirate groups, to join a network children 'had to be affiliated in some way in terms of a clan, in the sense of geographic areas as far as sea-going operations are concerned' (participant 1: 2018). This was supported by some of those working with young Somalis, who described how children 'have to do what the elders say…because the clan…is the most important thing of their lives' (participant 16: 2019). As such, if a clan leader asked them, it was thought that a child would have no choice but to join pirates. The perception that the clans were often complicit in pushing children into piracy was further reinforced by the fact that clans would speak-out against children joining Al-Shabaab, but were 'happy to allow young people to go off to sea and be pirates' (participant 3: 2019). This raises further questions regarding whether children voluntarily engaged in piracy, as while they may have appeared to be doing so, clan coercion could have been a motivating factor. It also suggests that the push factors that caused children to engage in piracy were not always linked to state fragility, as personal relationships mattered too.

When children were not volunteered or encouraged by their family or clan to engage in piracy, their family situation was still perceived to be a contributing factor. Children from vulnerable families who did not have 'their social welfare needs met' (participant 15: 2019) were thought to have been easier to recruit (participant 10: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019). This was highlighted by a Somaliland youth organisation, who claimed 'poor families are the highest cause of…engagement' (participant 10: 2019), with pirate commanders deliberately targeting children from low-income families[184]. Not only were children from poorer families less likely to be in school, which increased their vulnerability to recruitment[185] (participant 16: 2019), most wanted 'what is best for their families' (participant 7: 2019) and may have engaged in piracy in order to financially support them.

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[184] As previously discussed 6.3.2
[185] For the reasons discussed in 6.4.3

The desire to provide their family with financial support was believed to be the overriding motive when boys from fatherless households[186] engaged in piracy. This is because the oldest son is expected to be the main breadwinner if their father is not around and 'he will be requested to start getting income as soon as possible' (participant 6: 2019). However, finding legitimate employment was difficult, due to the economic and political exclusion faced by young Somalis discussed in 6.4.3. This increased the likelihood of children experiencing periods of waithood and turning to piracy, in much the same way that youth exclusion in fragile states has been found to increase participation in violence[187]. Boys from fatherless households were likewise perceived to be at risk of engaging in piracy because the absence of their father left them with a 'lack of role models' (participant 13: 2019). As such, fatherless boys were considered more vulnerable, not only because they were expected to provide for their family, but because they viewed pirates as heroes to fill this void[188].

While children from fatherless households appear to have been at increased risk of turning to piracy, NGO research shows that piracy was responsible for creating many fatherless households, which then made children vulnerable to the kind of 'exploitation and abuse' (Mohamed 2016: 6) that pushed them into piracy, thus creating a cycle. Not only does this mirror concerns, raised within the piracy literature, that an understudied human-cost of Somali piracy is how the loss of men is impacting upon local communities[189], but it also supports this thesis earlier assertion[190] that by becoming involved in piracy children are, by extension, adding to the very fragility that made them susceptible to the crime in the first place. Furthermore, given that children turned to piracy out of desperation and to support their family, some organisations again questioned whether this could be described as voluntary (participant 12: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 17: 2019).

A lack of a family may also have contributed to children's engagement in piracy (participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 13: 2019).

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[186] And as previously alluded to in 6.3.1
[187] Discussed in 3.2.6
[188] This will be discussed in more detail in the next section
[189] See 2.4.4
[190] See 3.2.7

According to one participant involved in the repatriation of two children, one had no family to collect him upon his return and 'was…involved in piracy in the first place because he had no family connections, or community connections' (participant 7: 2019). This was not an isolated incident, as those without a family, particularly IDP and street children, were considered easy recruits for illicit activities, including piracy (participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019). This was illustrated by a local NGO, who described the children engaged in piracy as 'orphan, some have lost their family, some of them are very poor…most of them are IDPs' (participant 13: 2019), while another local organisation cited how family separation and displacement meant some children had lost 'all hope' (participant 14: 2019). Research carried out by Save the Children also suggests a link between youth engagement in piracy and the fact that 'Puntland hosts 129,000 IDPs, as well as 3,658 asylum seekers and 426 refugees' (Forcier Consulting 2014: 5). Not only is this reflective of the wider literature regarding children in fragile states[191], it likewise echoes similar findings in the wider child piracy literature and reinforces the links between internal migration due to insecurity and children's involvement in piracy outlined in the previous section.

Finally, in some instance family and clan disapproval appears to have kept children from engaging in or caused them to disengage from piracy. Such disapproval was due to the negative impact piracy has had on the younger generation and wider society, which caused local communities to declare a zero-tolerance policy to piracy[192] (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019). This was further supported by the awareness raising work carried out by IGOs and NGOs, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. However, the findings suggest that when children engaged in piracy without family or clan approval, negative community associations often led to their marginalisation upon exiting pirate groups, which may have caused them to re-engage in piracy or other criminal behaviours (Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3).

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[191] Discussed in 3.2.2
[192] This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter

In summary, the research findings suggest that state fragility on its own has not necessarily pushed children into piracy. Rather, family and personal connections have also played varied roles in children's engagement and disengagement, often working in tandem with aspects of state fragility. As such, and as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the diverse roles that personal connections and family situations have played within children's decision to engage in piracy was considered to be important for addressing their overall involvement, alongside efforts to address the contributing factors of fragility.

6.4.6 IUU fishing and the admiration of pirates

According to some of the academic and policy literature, discussed in Chapters Two and Five, Somali piracy originated as a defence against illegal fishing, before evolving to become a criminal enterprise more concerned with securing ransom pay-outs than defending waters. The findings of this thesis echo this understanding. As mentioned in 6.4.2, pirates were originally admired by the communities in which they operated. According to documentation provided by UNODC this is because they were considered '"Robin-Hood" type characters saving their country from illegal fishing'[193] (UNODC and DPA 2011: 8). The issues of illegal fishing and the narrative that pirates were protecting their waters is not only highlighted within this report, but in further policy documents (Glaser et al 2015 15; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 25) and by a significant number of organisations involved in this research, who described how IUU fishing was routinely presented as a defence for piracy (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 8: 2029; participant 9: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 18: 2019).

One organisation that worked directly in the fisheries sector described piracy as 'a shadow of illegal fishing' (participant 18: 2019), while another explained how Somalis regularly claimed 'there are no pirates here, we don't want pirates, we just defend our waters' (participant 6: 2019) and a further expressly blamed international governments for illegally fishing, causing Somalis to turn to piracy for protection (participant 8: 2019).

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[193] This mirrors similar findings in the piracy literature outlined in 2.4.2

This was perceived to have created a narrative in which pirates were in a 'war against international sea men' (participant 14: 2019), which created a 'fascination with pirates among Somali youth' (UNOCD and DPA 2011: 8) and enticed those who were easily 'lured to protect their sea waters and fishing territories' (participant 12: 2019). According to one local NGO, the rhetoric used by pirates resembled that of Al-Shabaab, with both claiming Somalia was under threat from international invasion and encouraging children to see their involvement in opposing such threats as heroic (participant 13: 2019). Consequently, it was considered unsurprising that children, many of whom lacked a male role model, viewed pirates positively[194].

However, the idea that young Somalis, and the population more generally, engaged in piracy primarily because of illegal fishing was contentious, with the NGOs considering it a more pressing problem than the IGOs did. According to one IGO that delivered fisheries programmes, while it might have been part of what motivated children to engage in piracy, illegal fishing was and continues to be a manifestation of a wider problem linked to the lack of governance and infrastructure[195] (participant 6: 2019). As such, they criticised the UN and the Somali Government for giving so much attention to this issue, since 'the real reason why piracy is happening…is not really well explained by Somali people, and this is where UN agencies are…not really addressing that' (participant 6: 2019). This does not mean that illegal fishing was not considered a problem, but there were questions around whether it was the pressing issue it was claimed to be, particularly since fish is not a staple of the Somali diet (participant 3: 2019).

NGOs on the other hand believed that pirates garnered the support of children by exploiting public anger over the international community's role in illegal fishing[196] (participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). According to a local organisation with experience of running fisheries programmes, this anger has increased following the international naval counter-piracy response, particularly as Somalis have been imprisoned for piracy but no one has been held accountable for

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[194] As already mentioned in the previous section
[195] Outlined in 6.4.3
[196] This anger was discussed in 2.4.2

illegal fishing (participant 13: 2019). Rather, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, anti-piracy responses at sea have caused illegal fishing to resurge, with NGO studies warning that this is leading to increased frustration among locals (Glaser et al 2015: 15; 22; Secure Fisheries 2015: 1; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 11; 25). Therefore, some children were thought to have turned to piracy because of 'the anger they get from this illegal fishing' (participant 18: 2019). A desire for revenge, coupled with the potential financial rewards piracy offered, were considered to work in tandem to entice them.

The disparity among IGO and NGO understandings reflects how competing narratives of underdevelopment and insecurity and illegal fishing created two different piracy accounts. There is one in which 'Somali fishermen/coastal communities, took up arms to protect their livelihoods and the "Somali coast"' (Hersi 2014: 1), and another in which 'abundant illicit arms and the overall anarchy has been the principal driving factors' (Hersi 2014: 1). Such narratives are reflective of those related to greed and grievance[197], and it is likely that a combination of both influenced children's engagement in piracy. Especially as, according to a report for UNDP's Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy Project (2016a: 10), illegal fishing caused young Somalis to engage in piracy as it contributed to the high unemployment rate, not because pirates were considered heroes defending their waters.

The link between IUU fishing and high unemployment was echoed by NGOs that delivered fisheries projects. These organisations recognised the significant impact illegal fishing was having upon Somalia's fishing industry, and how this added to the overall unemployment level causing adolescents to turn to piracy to meet this deficit (participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 18:). It was not just the level of fishing that impacted on the unemployment level; in some cases, illegal trawlers 'destroyed their nets, their equipment' (participant 14: 2019), keeping many from being able to carry out their livelihood (Ali 2014: 3; Glaser et al 2015: 24; 26; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 9; The University of Rhode Island and TAC 2015: 10; 19; 20). This meant 'the young people who are busy with fishing are normally annoyed by the

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[197] Discussed in 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 3.2.3,3.2.4 and 3.2.5

disturbance of those illegally fishing…who…are destroying the ecosystem and…are disturbing the fishing grounds and their fishing gear' (participant 18: 2019), which made it easier for pirates to recruit them.

The eradication of the fisheries sector was perceived to have repercussions even for those who were not directly involved in fishing. Those who lost livelihoods to illegal fishing migrated to urban centres, increasing the unemployment level and making it more likely that children would turn to criminal groups (participant 13: 2019). Additionally, illegal fishing has resulted in 'lost income and employment in other sectors in the supply chain upstream (i.e., fishing gear, boats and equipment, etc.) and downstream (i.e., fish processing and packaging, marketing and transport, etc.) from the fishing operation itself' (The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 12). Thus, IUU fishing did not just impact fishers, it had a detrimental impact upon job retention in several interconnected sectors. According to NGOs that delivered fisheries projects, this potential loss of livelihood through illegal fishing, along with the anger among Somalis regarding this issue, left children feeling there was no alternative but to take up arms to join pirate groups (participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019).

While IGOs did not believe that children engaged in piracy because they viewed pirates as heroes defending their waters, they did sense that children admired pirates (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019). As previously discussed[198], some IGOs considered children to be attracted to piracy because of the potential financial benefits, with boys being particularly attracted by the celebrity lifestyle and the promise of women and girls (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019). However, not everyone agreed with this, rather one interviewee (participant 7: 2019) explained that while young people admired pirates this did not necessarily contribute to their engagement. Instead, she saw illegal fishing and piracy admiration as being secondary to the insecurity within Somalia, with the lack of employment and education being the overriding issues pushing children into piracy.

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[198] See 6.4.2

Overall, it is likely that illegal fishing, along with the other issues discussed throughout this chapter, have worked together to push children into piracy. This is clearly a view held by one NGO, which described children's engagement in piracy as a 'combination of the illegal fishing…unemployment and poverty' (participant 12: 2019). Furthermore, the role of IUU fishing in the wider context of why children engage in piracy is reflective of the overall findings, discussed throughout this section, regarding the interrelationship between the factors that pushed children into piracy. As the diverse correlation between these different motives shows, and as suggested by this thesis in Chapters Two and Three[199], piracy and the use of children within the crime are part of an interrelated cycle of insecurity factors onshore. Or, to put it another way, there is a diverse nexus of underlying issues, which are impacted by and interrelated to each other, causing children to join pirate groups. Thus, by considering child piracy from its land-based context, this thesis has shown how, just as piracy is rooted in insecurity on land, so too is the involvement of children within the crime.

Given this, it is unsurprising that the organisations in this study supported calls, found within the wider piracy literature,[200] to stop addressing piracy purely on the high seas, as any long-term solution would only be secured through recognising it as land-based activity and placing it within the context of human insecurity onshore. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, to tackle child piracy in the long-term it is important to proactively address the varied root causes that have allowed piracy to flourish and caused children to become involved. Until this happens the threat of piracy will remain, and even if it does not resurge to previous levels, if this nexus of factors goes unchallenged young Somalis will likely continue to engage in other criminal activities.

6.5 Child pirates and their comparability to children used by armed groups and criminal gangs

As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, when the land-based context of child piracy is mentioned within the academic literature, it often highlights similarities between

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[199] See 2.4.4 and 3.2.7
[200] Discussed in 2.3.2 and 2.4.4

children involved in piracy and those associated with military armed groups and criminal gangs. However, rather than examining how this impacts upon understandings of child piracy and appropriate land-based responses, the literature considers whether the justice models used for children involved in armed conflict can provide guidance on the correct handling and prosecution of apprehended child pirates. This section furthers the academic debate, by speaking to this gap and considering the extent to which the IGO and NGO understandings of child pirates, discussed above, are comparable to the involvement of children in other armed and criminal groups, and whether this suggests a more holistic way of understanding the problem, thereby addressing Objective Four and its associated sub-research question. It likewise strengthens the research findings associated with Objective Two[201], by further exploring the extent to which the involvement of children in pirate networks can be compared to those involved in other security challenges in fragile states.

Previous research draws a comparison between child pirates and those used by other armed and criminal groups by highlighting how, in the regions where piracy flourishes, children are regularly used by various armed fractions[202]. The findings in this chapter support this, by evidencing how Somali children have not only been used by pirates but, depending upon the geographical region, other armed and criminal groups including clan militias, gangs, and Al-Shabaab[203]. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter Five[204], in 2018 Somalia had the highest recruitment rate of children into armed groups. As has been discussed[205], this prevalent use of children by armed groups within Somalia means their involvement in everyday violence is an accepted part of life, with child piracy appearing to be an extension of this. Not only has the everyday violence helped to create the conditions that have pushed children into piracy, it has simultaneously created a conducive environment for pirate groups to recruit children. As such, the findings mirror claims made by Holland in the wider child piracy literature that 'it was only a matter of time before Somali youth were press-ganged into piracy' (2013: 176-177). Moreover, it echoes findings from the OECD[206] into youth violence

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[201] Which was addressed in Chapter Three
[202] As discussed in 3.2.1
[203] As discussed in 6.3.2 and 6.4.1
[204] See 5.2.1
[205] See 6.3.2 and 6.4.1
[206] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

in fragile states, which explains how young people face 'a host of incentives to engage in violence, whether via formal conflict, organised crime or neighbourhood gangs' (2011a: 37).

According to previous research, children are recruited by pirate groups for the same reasons they are recruited by armed commanders and gang leaders. This is supported by the findings of this thesis since, as stated in 6.3.2, children have been a valuable assets to pirate bosses as they are plentiful, naïve, and easier to control. Not only does this reflect the stated correlation within the child piracy literature, but it mirrors why children have been found to be used by armed commanders and gang leaders within the relevant academic literature discussed in Chapter Three[207]. Similarly, according to the findings of this chapter, pirate groups and Al-Shabaab have both recruited children as they follow orders and are daring and energetic. This aligns with the findings of the wider research into child piracy and child soldiering, further evidencing similar rationales underpinning the recruitment of children into these groups.

As discussed in 6.2.3, the children involved in piracy were considered more likely to be used in support and logistical roles, rather than part of the attack team, which is not necessarily the case for those involved in armed groups and gangs. Although 'many child soldiers never fight' (Wessels: 2005: 71), and instead occupy similar support roles to child pirates, there are nevertheless plenty of children utilised as active combatants. Likewise, those involved in gangs are regularly tasked with carrying out acts of extreme violence, including murder and rape. This does not mean that those involved in piracy have not partaken in acts of violence, as their unpredictability and potential for aggression was thought to make them desirable guards for hostages[208]. However, since they typically do not go to sea, it is unlikely they would experience the same level of physical or emotional trauma as those in armed groups and gangs. Thus, it appears that just as 'what happens to child soldiers is an exaggeration of what happens to children in gangs' (Quénivet and Shah-Davis 2013: 24), what happens to

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[207] See 3.4.1 and 3.4.2
[208] As discussed in 6.3.2

child pirates may be an understated version of the experiences of children involved in these groups.

One of the biggest differences in the literature pertaining to child piracy compared to the research into child soldiers and gangs is how these different disciplines understand the involvement of girls. While female involvement is recognised within the academic literature on child soldiers and gangs, studies into child piracy have been silent on this issue. This research addresses this gap, by evidencing how the domestic and sexual roles that girls occupy in pirate groups share resemblances with other armed activities. However, while female child soldiers are utilised in domestic and sexual roles, they are also used in frontline work[209], whereas, as discussed in 6.3.3, Somali girls have not been part of the attack team. Given this, female involvement in piracy appears more aligned with the roles that girls occupy in gangs, as they are likewise mainly utilised in domestic and sexual roles[210]. Yet, much like child piracy, the specific gender dynamics of gang-life are understudied (Rodgers and Baird 2015: 14), and more research into the specific gender dimensions of these activities is needed to ascertain how similar they are.

The contributing factors that caused children to join pirate groups, outlined within the previous section, generally align with the fragile states' literature and the reasons why children choose to engage in similar destabilising activities[211]. This includes those who join armed groups and gangs, as they are likewise driven by issues such as poverty, lack of education, unemployment, marginalisation, personal connection, and family separation or breakdown. The research findings suggest that in the Somali context these vulnerabilities have not only pushed children into piracy, but into various armed and criminal groups, depending upon the geographical region in which they lived and the groups operating in that area. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this resulted in some IGOs and NGOs targeting programmes at children not just at risk of engaging in piracy but armed and criminal groups more broadly, as in most cases the motivations for joining were considered to be the same.

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[209] As discussed in 3.4.1
[210] As discussed in 3.4.2
[211] As discussed throughout Chapter Three

However, as outlined in the previous section, when it came to Al-Shabaab, opinions differed as to whether children joined for the same reason as they engaged in piracy. Some organisations cited the same drivers in both cases, suggesting children would engage in piracy over Al-Shabaab given the opportunity as it is the 'kinder' choice, while others saw piracy engagement as economically motivated, whereas involvement in Al-Shabaab was due to peer influence and ideology. Yet, it is evident that the drivers are more complex than this. There are cross-cutting motivators, with some children joining Al-Shabaab because of economic reasons, while others joined pirate groups due to family and peer influence. Moreover, as discussed in 6.4.6, when pirates spoke of IUU fishing they utilised similar rhetoric as Al-Shabaab, with both citing threats from international forces and encouraging children to see involvement in opposing these threats as heroic. Therefore, it appears that while the aims of Al-Shabaab and pirates may differ[212], the underlying reason why children have joined these groups often have not. Furthermore, if piracy is considered the 'kinder' option to Al-Shabaab, it suggests that any cost-benefit analysis related to piracy does not just weigh up the associated risks, but how these fare in relation to the risks of engaging in other armed groups.

Previous studies into child piracy have cited concerns that the same children may have moved between armed, criminal, and pirate groups but, given the predominantly high seas focus, there was limited research to corroborate this claim. Although not conclusive, the findings of this chapter suggest this might be true, given that a decrease in piracy coincided with an increase in the involvement of children in other criminal activities, including land-based kidnapping and illegal migration. The likelihood of children having swapped piracy for other criminal activities also seems probable given that, as outlined in 6.4.4, those who profited from piracy likewise swapped one illegal activity for another, meaning those involved in their syndicates could have moved with them. Moreover, piracy by its very nature was found to have increased children's engagement into various criminal activities, particularly drug use and prostitution, while the presence of Al-Shabaab has added to the land-based insecurity that pushed children into piracy. This suggests that, even if children have

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[212] As discussed in 2.4.1, pirate groups are motivated by private ends, whereas armed groups have ideological or political motives

not moved between groups, there is still a relationship between children's involvement in piracy and their involvement in other destabilising activities on land.

Overall, these findings show that children's engagement in piracy is not an isolated issue. It is part of a wider problem in which young Somalis are regularly recruited into armed and criminal groups for similar reasons, and with children joining due to the same land-based insecurity factors. Furthermore, when looked at from its land-based context, it is evident that by becoming involved in these groups children have aggravated the wider societal stressors that made them vulnerable to recruitment in the first place. The presence of Al-Shabaab has helped to create the land-based conditions that have allowed piracy to flourish and caused children to engage, while piracy is interlinked to a rise in other criminal activities that has further impacted upon the fragile situation onshore. In this sense, not only are the children involved in pirate groups comparable to those used by other groups, but sometimes their involvement is explicitly because of the presence of these other armed groups. As such, the use of children in such various armed and criminal activities in Somalia must be understood as being interconnected.

6.6 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to contribute to meeting Objective Three, by exploring how the organisations involved in this research have understood the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks. Overall, when seen from the perspective of these actors, it becomes apparent that both boys and girls under the age of eighteen have been involved with pirate groups, predominantly through land-based roles. While there are questions around whether those involved on land could strictly been defined as pirates, the land-based unit and the role of children within these structures was recognised as an essential part of the piracy operation. However, given different organisational, cultural, and international understandings of the child, the matter of whether those under the age of eighteen could be defined as children was more contentious. There were diverse opinions on whether the majority of adolescents involved in piracy should be defined as children, as per the CRC, or as young adults or youth, as per the Somali culture.

This chapter also finds that the perceptions around why young Somalis have been used by pirate groups broadly reflect the reasons why children are employed by similar groups in fragile states, which were outlined in Chapter Three[213]. In particular, children were viewed as a good business investment for pirate commanders because they were plentiful, regularly re-released when apprehended, naïve about piracy, and easily moulded into what pirate groups needed them to be. Furthermore, children were found to have engaged in pirate groups due to a variety of different but interrelated issue connected to human insecurity and personal connections onshore.

This chapter has likewise addressed Objective Four and its associated research question, by considering whether the findings reveal a wider commonality between these organisational understandings of children's involvement in piracy and how the academic literature views those involved in armed groups and gang, and whether this suggests a more holistic way of viewing the child piracy problem. As was discussed, child piracy does not appear to be an isolated issue, but is part of a wider problem in which young Somalis are engaging in armed and criminal groups for similar reasons, and perhaps moving between them. Therefore, the involvement of children in these different armed groups, including piracy, should be recognised as being interconnected.

Understanding how IGOs and NGOs perceived the issue of child piracy in Somalia, including the ages, gender, and motivating factors of those involved will be important for the next chapter, which will explore the different organisational responses to the involvement of children and young people in Somali piracy from 2009-2018. This will include examining how the perceptions and understandings relating to child piracy in Somalia, discussed in this chapter, influenced certain shore-based responses, and what the successes and limitations of these have been.

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[213] See 3.4

Chapter 7: Characteristics and Limitations of IGO and NGO Responses

7.1 Introduction

This chapter further develops the original primary research of this thesis, introduced in the previous chapter, by examining how the IGO and NGO understandings of Somali child piracy and its land-based causes[214] influenced their policy responses to this issue between 2009-2018. By considering IGO and NGO responses, including what this reveals about the perceived interconnections between land-based insecurity and the involvement of children in piracy, this chapter, in alignment with Chapter Six, works towards meeting Research Objective Three, particularly Sub-Research Question 3.1. It likewise contributes to the wider academic discussion, by speaking to the absence of research into how state fragility and human insecurity onshore relates to the involvement of children in maritime piracy, and exploring how this may be better understood and treated from its land-based context, which will be reflected on in greater detail within the proceeding Conclusion chapter.

To achieve the aims of this chapter, section 7.2 maps-out how piracy has been addressed on the broader international scale, including the perceived problems with the international naval response and certain efforts to address the causes of piracy onshore. Following on from this, section 7.3 examines how the land-based causes of child piracy in Somalia, discussed in the previous chapter, influenced the policy responses of those involved in this research from 2009-2018, including the development of youth programmes; local partnerships; awareness raising campaigns; and alternative livelihoods programmes. Throughout this section, the successes, limitations, and sustainability of these programmes is considered, leading to a discussion in section 7.4 regarding what future actions should be taken to further develop and strengthen this work. This lays the grounds for a discussion within the Conclusion regarding what future recommendations can be drawn from the findings of this research. Finally, section 7.5 summaries the main findings from this chapter.

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[214] Both of which were discussed at length in the previous chapter

7.2 How has piracy been addressed on the wider international scale

In order to create a more complete understanding of the Somali piracy problem, and the involvement of children within the crime, the organisations involved in this research were not only asked about their specific programme responses, but how these related to the wider attempts by the international community to address the issue and how this was viewed by those working in the field. While the organisations looked at for this study were involved in some capacity in the international effort to combat Somali piracy, either due to being UN bodies, local project partners, or because they received funding from international bodies[215], they nevertheless raised concerns with the way the international community had addressed this problem. The purpose of this section is to map-out what these concerns were.

As discussed in the Introduction chapter[216], it is estimated that the global cost of addressing Somali piracy in 2017 was $1.4 billion (Pigeon el al 2018: 6), with the international community responding to the problem predominately through a naval response at sea. While a selection of international and local NGOs credited this with causing an overall reduction in the crime between 2011 and 2018 (participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019), they were concerned about an overreliance on this naval response, which was viewed as a costly, unsustainable, 'quick fix' (participant 13: 2019). The main criticism was its failure to address the underlying factors that caused piracy to flourish[217], leading to concerns that piratical activity would increase if and when the naval response was scaled back (participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). As one international development organisation explained, this is 'because of the...root causes still being there' (participant 11: 2019). Similar claims can likewise be found in relevant NGO policy documents, which discuss the success of the naval response but emphasise the importance of addressing the land-based underlying causes of piracy (Ali 2014: 1-2; 4; Rashid 2009: 8; Schultze-Kraft 2018: 12).

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[215] As is outlined in 6.2.
[216] See 1.3
[217] Which reflects criticisms in the piracy literature outlined in 2.3

Similarly, several IGOs explained how most international responses were predominantly concerned with securing sea lanes, rather than addressing the underlying land-based causes of the Somali piracy problem (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019). As one UN department summarised, 'there is a lot of effort being put in prisons, convicting piracy and so on, but you have to work before this happens' (participant 6: 2019). Research provided by IGAD (Hersi 2014: 2) supports this, showing that while there was an overwhelming emphasis on piracy responses at sea, there was a failure to address the root causes onshore[218]. Local NGOs likewise criticised the international counter-piracy response for safeguarding international interests while ignoring the needs of Somalis, even though piracy had a detrimental impact on their lives (participant 10: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As one participant explained, 'piracy…it's not good for anyone' (participant 18: 2019), as it caused high mortality rates and a rise in prostitution in Somalia. Yet, the international community showed little concern for such local impacts. Thus, Somali-based NGOs believed that international actors were more concerned with piracy's impact on global trade, rather than the effect it had on the Somali community.

NGOs, particularly those who delivered projects in the fisheries sector, also explained how the international counter-piracy response at sea resulted in a resurgence of IUU fishing in Somali water (participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019), leading to frustration among locals (Glaser et al 2015: 15; 22; Secure Fisheries 2015: 1; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 11; 25). The naval presence emboldened foreign illegal fishers, who would not enter Somali waters while pirates operated freely (participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As such, anti-piracy patrols were found to have unintentionally given weight to the 'Robin Hood' narrative[219], since 'piracy has died, but illegal fishing has prospered. It has actually increased five-fold' (participant 13: 2019). Consequently, one Somali participant criticised the overall international approach to piracy, which he believed was hypocritical, as 'they only talk about the hijack of ships but, along with this, we have the risk of lives of the Somali people because the fisheries are starved by the illegal fishing' (participant 18: 2019).

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[218] This is reflective of criticisms raised within the piracy literature discussed in 2.3 and 2.3.2
[219] This was discussed in the literature looked at in 2.4.2, and by the participants in 6.4.6

Not only does this support the belief that the international community only cared about protecting their own interests, it also resulted in warnings that the naval response could end up being counterproductive, as unless illegal fishing is addressed at the international level, there is 'a real danger of the whole piracy cycle starting all over' (Secure Fisheries 2015: 1).

Not only does this show a failing within the international response to piracy, but it likewise points to a troubling failing in the child piracy literature, which does not consider how the continued presence of illegal fish trawlers in Somali waters, coupled with the detention of both child and adult pirates alike, may have pushed children into piracy. Rather, by only focusing on the legal and policy responses to those apprehended for piracy at sea, while simultaneously being silent on the issue of IUU fishing, previous research is guilty of inadvertently aggravating the child piracy problem. This is because it has fed into this narrative that the international community is only interested in holding Somalis to account.

The focus on protecting security interests at sea, while failing to address IUU fishing and insecurity onshore, led to claims that 'there is a lot more that could be done in terms of looking at that nexus between the development, humanitarian, and security' (participant 11: 2019) aspects of piracy. Organisations were critical about the absence of a coordinated effort by the international community to address the interconnection between piracy and issues of state fragility (participant 1: 2018: participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 15: 2019). As discussed in the previous chapter[220], piracy was seen as being related to 'lawlessness in Somalia' (participant 10: 2019) and the fact there was 'no infrastructure and also not enough development in the coastal settlements' (participant 2: 2018), yet there was no real collective effort to address these underlying causes at the international level. Rather, it was left up to individual organisations to do what they could to respond to these problems, often resulting in ad hoc and unsustainable responses.

One problem with these individual organisational responses, including those looked at for this research, is that many could not be run in the locations in which piracy was

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[220] As discussed in 6.4.1, 6.4.3 and 6.5

most prominent, due to issues of inaccessibility and security[221] (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 16: 2019). As such, it was suggested that to properly combat piracy, political and international bodies must work together to develop long-term programmes that address the more systemic issues of poor governance and underdevelopment[222] (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019). This point is supported by relevant organisational document, which discuss the importance of addressing insecurity and underdevelopment onshore when tackling Somali piracy (DPA 2017: 9; Hersi 2014: 2; Mohamed 2016: 3; 6; Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 7; Pedersen 2011: 1; Rashid 2009: 8; 13; Simba 2011: 5; 10; UNODC 2012b: 1).

Such criticisms, which echo those in the wider piracy literature outlined in Chapter Two[223], suggest the long-term eradication of Somali piracy is dependent on addressing the land-based insecurity that has allowed it to flourish (participant 1: 2018). Consequently[224], the failure to do so resulted in claims that piracy will likely resurge if the international naval operation is scaled back, as the root causes are still present[225] (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). Similar concerns can be seen in annual reports from the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (DPA 2017: 9; 15; DPA 2016: 8), and given how pirate groups are supressed but still operational in Somalia[226], this concern appears to be well founded.

However, when attempts were made to address the underlying land-based causes of piracy, including through some of the shore-based programmes looked at for this study, it was often through a problematic one-size fits all approach (participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019). As one participant with considerable experience of working in

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[221] This will be discussed in more detail in 7.3.4

[222] This will be discussed in more detail in 7.4

[223] See 2.4.4

[224] And as alluded to already within this section

[225] As also discussed in 6.4.4 and 6.4.6 of the previous chapter

[226] As discussed in 5.4

the region explained, 'trying to…combat any type of illicit activity…especially in Somalia, there is no way you can do it from a national level' (participant 7: 2019). Somalia does not functions as one state, regions operate autonomously, and there are different governance structures and distinct armed and criminal groups operating in each area[227] (participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019). Consequentially, those who worked with at risk Somali youth described how piracy needed to be understood as 'very much a Galkayo type of problem. It is very much concentrated in one particular state, whereas other states have other…issues they will highlight as their main driver for engagement of young people' (participant 17: 2019). This included the threat of Al-Shabaab and violent extremism in south-central Somalia and migration more broadly across Puntland. Moreover, similar concerns regarding such one-size fits all approaches are raised in some NGO programme documents (Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 7; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 15).

The regional variation in armed groups operating across Somali resulted in further concerns that anti-piracy measures on land were often indirectly targeted, with broad attempts to run programmes onshore being top-down and inappropriate for the local context (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As one local NGO explained, the international response on land was directed at the 'wrong place, wrong time, and wrong beneficiaries' (participant 13: 2019). This concern appears to have been well-founded, given that documents provided by UNODC and their partners (DPA 2016: 29-30; UNODC 2012a: 15; YOVENCO 2016: 8-9) detail anti-piracy work being carried out with youth in Somaliland, even though this is not where piracy occurred (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019). Furthermore, one Somaliland NGO explained how they received funding to run anti-piracy programmes with young people, despite having 'no experience of children who are recruited by pirates, since pirates have no foot in Somaliland' (participant 10: 2019).

Running counter-piracy programmes in Somaliland appeared to be part of a broader trend among those who delivered humanitarian projects, with organisations working in

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[227] As previously discussed in 5.3.1 and 6.5

this field explaining that Somaliland was seen as an easier place to work, even though the need is often elsewhere (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019). It is likely that such interventions did have limited success when it came to piracy, given that Somaliland children were sometimes enticed to migrate and 'go and join these groups' (participant 10: 2019). However, their overall impact was likely minimal, as there was a failure to replicate similar programmes in the areas where piracy occurred, which would have benefitted those most at risk of engaging. This highlights that while it was important to address the root causes of piracy, it was equally important that land-based anti-piracy programmes were appropriately targeted (participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As one interviewee summarised, it needed to be 'tackled holistically, environmentally, directly' (participant 13: 2019).

There were additional concerns that there was not enough focus given to the needs of women and children within most international counter-piracy responses (participant 4: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019), despite piracy making them more vulnerable to 'exploitation and abuse'[228] (Mohamed 2016: 6). The evaluation report for the Youth at Risk Project (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 36) criticises the lack of planning around the reintegration of young Somalis, who had either chosen to defect or been apprehended for piracy, adding weight to the concern that a lack of reintegration programming encouraged pirate commanders to use children within their operations[229] (participant 7: 2019). Moreover, one interviewee, who conducted research into the impact of piracy within local communities, detailed how the female Somali population were frustrated with the way piracy had been addressed, as they 'felt ignored throughout the whole process' (participant 7: 2019), particularly with regards to the interconnection between piracy and sexual abuse that left many feeling victimised[230].

This same participant discussed how counter-piracy programmes, even those carried out on land, were often skewed towards those who were likely to engage in the activity in the maritime domain rather than the shore-based operations. This was true in the case of one IGO involved in this study, who explained how, despite engaging for

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[228] As discussed in 6.4.5 of the last chapter
[229] Discussed in 6.3.2
[230] As discussed in 6.3.3

similar reasons, the children involved in piracy onshore were often excluded from their counter-piracy programmes as the focus was on those involved at sea[231] (participant 4: 2019). This disenfranchised those who engaged in piracy networks onshore, including women and children, leaving them jobless and without access to alternative livelihoods (participant 7: 2019). This supports the earlier criticism that the international response to piracy has predominantly been concerned with protecting global interests, rather than supporting the Somali population. It also adds weight to the claim, made within the previous chapter[232], that by focusing predominately on those involved in piracy in the maritime domain the international community has failed to intervene at the start of the career cycle of the young men involved.

Furthermore, although the naval response has resulted in a reduction in piracy, the failure to adequately address insecurity onshore means children have moved from pirate networks into other criminal groups[233] (participant 11: 2019; participant 16: 2019). This means, rather than helping children, the overall international response was found to have merely pushed them into activities such as land-based kidnappings (participant 16: 2019), illegal check-points, and road blocks (Mohamed 2016: 6; 7; Yussuf 2013: 5). Correspondingly, as piracy engagement has reduced, instances of youth migration and human smuggling were thought to have increased[234] (participant 5: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019). Although the fragile situation in Somalia made it difficult for organisations to obtain a clear reflection of the youth migration problem, research conducted by and on behalf of IGOs does support the idea that it has become a pressing issue in the years following piracy's decrease (Ali 2016: 7-9; 10-11; Wasuge 2018: 3; 6-7), thereby resulting in concerns that, unless measures are taken to address the underlying factors that cause children to engage in these activities, 'Puntland is on the verge of losing a whole generation' (Mohamed 2016: 7), if not to piracy, then to other criminal offences.

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[231] As discussed in the last chapter, this organisation stated 'for the time being...the focus is not on them' (participant 4: 2019)

[232] See 6.3.3

[233] This reflects similar findings to 6.4.4 and 6.5 of the previous chapter

[234] As discussed in 6.4.4 of the previous chapter

Overall, while the international counter-piracy response has resulted in a downturn in piracy, this is not because the underlying root causes have gone away. Rather, it is largely due to the international naval response, which was not considered a suitable long-term solution, as it is costly, unsustainable and does not address the land-based conditions that allow piracy to flourish. Given this, it is unsurprising that the organisations in this study supported calls, found within the wider piracy literature, to stop considering piracy as a purely maritime issue. The long-term solution requires recognising it as land-based activity and placing it within the context of human insecurity onshore. As will be looked at in the next section, this is what many of the organisations in this research sought to do on an individual level, although, as has already been alluded to, they were often hampered by many of the problems outlined within this section.

7.3 IGO and NGO responses

As discussed in previous chapters[235], by focusing predominantly on how children should be treated when they are apprehended for piracy at sea, prior research into child piracy has failed to examine how their overall engagement in these networks may have been better addressed onshore. Indeed, when the need for shore-based responses aimed at keeping children out of piracy has been mentioned in the literature pertaining to child pirates (Fritz 2012: 905-906; Holland 2013: 211-212; Whitman et al. 2012: 12), this has been in passing. This is problematic, especially considering the findings of the last chapter show that both male and female children were involved with pirate groups onshore, with boys often working their way up from land-based positions to the sea-going unit. Furthermore, children were found to be turning to piracy due to several diverse but interconnected factors rooted in insecurity onshore, which may have also caused children to engage in other armed and criminal groups when piracy was not a viable option.

Correspondingly, previous research failed to consider what could be learnt from the land-based programmes implemented by IGOs and NGOs between 2009-2018 that aimed to keep people, including children, out of piracy. By examining these

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[235] See 2.5 and 3.5

programmes, including their successes, challenges, and sustainability, this section speaks to this academic gap. Moreover, it works towards addressing Sub-Research Question 3.1, by considering how IGO and NGO understandings of child piracy and its perceived land-based causes, outlined in the previous chapter, influenced such responses. As will be examined throughout this section, these programmes were predominantly aimed at youth as opposed to children, focused on working with the local community, worked to address young Somalis naivety regarding the danger of piracy through awareness raising campaigns, and simultaneously tackled some of the perceived issues pushing children into piracy, including lack of education and high unemployment rates. As will be shown, while such programmes kept some children from engaging in piracy, they nevertheless lacked longevity and did not address the overall scale of the problem, much like the wider international responses discussed in 7.2. However, although they did not 'solve' the problem of child piracy, they did indicate a possible route forward when addressing the issue onshore.

7.3.1 Youth programmes

One of the most significant findings of this thesis is the importance of recognising how the term child is understood within the Somali context and the implication this had for the land-based responses of those involved in this research. As was discussed in Chapter Two[236], questions of age and different national understandings of childhood have been raised within the child piracy literature, but this has focused on those apprehended for piracy at sea and the 'special legal rights afforded to juveniles…at each stage of an accused pirate's interaction with law enforcement and the judiciary' (Bellish 2015: 283). As such, the focus has been on the universal jurisdiction of the crime and the different Minimum Ages of Criminal Responsibility among nations that have apprehended children during piracy operations or prosecuted them afterwards. There has been no academic discussion around how to define and speak about child piracy in the Somali context, even though this research reveals that different understandings of who constitutes a child impacted upon how programmes were developed.

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[236] See 2.5.2

Consequently, the academic literature has failed to recognise how those who worked with children in shore-based counter-piracy programmes faced similar problems as those who encountered them on the high seas, given that there was a disparity between the international and Somali understanding of the child. According to the CRC (1989: Article 1) a child is anyone below the age of eighteen, but this is not the case in Somalia. Rather, as evidenced by the findings of this research[237], in the Somali context those over the age of fifteen are not seen as children but young adults, who are expected to help support their family (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 16: 2019). Moreover, the understanding of who is a child becomes more complicated if regional and clan variations are considered, with children being seen as adults when they enter marriage, meaning in some circumstance those younger than fifteen are not deemed children either (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019). Yet, while the child piracy literature has recognised, and to some extent sought to address the disparity around different understandings of the child when it comes to arresting and prosecuting states, it has been silent on how this same issue should have been approached when developing preventative programmes onshore in Somalia.

The absence of a set definition and a lack of guidance on how to refer to and tackle child piracy from its land-based context means IGOs and NGOs were left to navigate the disparity in international norms and local perceptions when designing shore-based counter-piracy programmes. The fact that most children involved in piracy were believed to be older adolescents added further complications, especially for organisations that operate using the CRC definition of the child, as their own institutional understandings were in direct contrast to local perceptions and it was difficult to deliver targeted age-based programmes (participant 7: 2019; participant 16: 2019). As a result, and as alluded to in the previous chapter[238], most organisations adapted their programme responses to fit within the Somali context, by creating programmes that reflected how fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds, who were more likely

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[237] See 6.3.1
[238] See 6.3.1

to be involved in piracy, were not viewed as children. This resulted in the development of programmes that targeted at risk youth, aged fifteen and above (Abdullahi 2012: 7-11; Acacia Consultants Ltd. 2010: 25-27;DPA 2017: 20-21; 38-39; DPA 2016: 29-31; 70-72; FAO: 2019; Forcier Consulting 2014: 5-6; 9-10; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012; 8-10; Mohamed 2016: 4-5; 14-15; 18-20; NCA 2012: 3-6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 3; 4; 7; 9; UNDP 2016a: 3-6; UNDP 2016b: 4-5; UNODC 2012: 5; 14-15; UNODC and DPA 2011: 88; YOVENCO 2016: 8-9), as there was a crossover between childhood and youthhood[239].

In some cases, such as the Youth at Risk Project, there were still specific policies relating to the treatment of those below the age of eighteen, thereby suggesting the organisations that delivered this project still recognised a difference between those who were younger than eighteen and children under international law and those who were not (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 21; 51). Moreover, one organisation that predominately focused on protecting children's rights worked more broadly on lobbying the Government to implement policies that respected the CRC definition of the child (participant 9: 2019), further reflecting how some organisations that ran youth programmes still differentiated between those who were above and below the ages of eighteen.

While respecting the local context and adapting terminology was important for ensuring programmes had the maximum impact, the research findings suggest that targeting programmes specifically at youth may have had negative implications. As the findings of 6.4 of the previous chapter suggests, Somali children of all ages were impacted by the same fragility that caused engagement in pirate networks, such as lack of education and limited opportunities. Therefore, by limiting programmes to those who were aged fifteen or above, organisations may have missed the chance of carrying out early intervention to address the root causes that pushed children into piracy when they became older adolescents. Moreover, while the majority of those involved in piracy were believed to be closer to the age of eighteen, there were claims

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[239] As discussed by participant 11 in 6.3.1

that eleven- to fourteen-year-olds also engaged in pirate networks[240], yet their age meant they did not necessarily qualify or benefit from these youth programmes.

The difficulty of targeting programmes shows that, just as the absence of legislation or guidance on how to treat children apprehended for piracy at sea has been found to leave the maritime community ill-equipped to deal with the problem[241] (Holland 2013: 186; 190; Salomé 2016: 43; Whitman et. al 2012: 2; Whitman, Johnson and Reeves 2016: 3), similar issues played out on land with IGOs and NGOs. As this research shows, in the Somali context at least, it was not necessarily sensible to use the term 'child pirate' when running land-based counter-piracy programmes. Nor was it necessarily appropriate to target programmes solely at youth. This not only created blurred and confusing lines regarding who exactly was being spoken about, and the ages involved, but it limited who could access programmes and may unintentionally have kept support from those younger than fifteen who were involved in pirate networks.

7.3.2 Local partnerships

Given the criticism that international land-based counter-piracy responses were often top-down[242], with little understanding of the needs of the local community, it is unsurprising that, in an effort to combat this concern, some of those involved in this study, particularly international organisations, developed and ran land-based counter-piracy programmes in collaboration with the local partners[243] (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 17: 2019). According to an IGO that delivered fisheries programmes within coastal communities, this was important for developing successful projects, as 'the way you approach the stakeholders is through the communities, you go there, you present your project, you meet with elders, you meet with community leaders…you get approval and you discuss the benefits' (participant 6: 2019). This

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[240] As discussed in 6.3.1 both local NGOs working in the field of child protection (participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019) and research by Save the Children (Simba 2011: 23) suggested children between the ages of eleven and fourteen were involved in piracy

[241] As originally discussed in 2.5.2

[242] See 7.2

[243] Details of different project delivery partners can be viewed in 6.2

same IGO explained that this was important for identifying and approaching children to be involved in anti-piracy programmes, as it was the elders and the community leaders, rather than the organisation itself, who were knowledgeable about those most at risk of engaging in piracy (participant 6: 2019). The importance of working with community leaders and the wider public, especially regarding beneficiary selection, is likewise referenced within different policy documents (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 19; UNDP 2016a: 4; UNDP 2016b: 11; UNODC 2012a: 3), further highlighting the importance of this.

NGO documents similarly suggest that programmes were developed through local partnerships as this addressed 'the real needs of the beneficiaries' (Abdullahi 2012: 14) and allowed for the possibility that the local community could carry on the work once programmes came to an end, making them more sustainable (Abdullahi 2012: 28; Acacia Consultants Ltd 2010: 40-41; Mohamed 2016: 23; Pedersen 2011: 2). This was the case with one local NGO that purposefully created a community association so work could 'continue…after the project has ended' (participant 13: 2019). As such, local partnerships appeared to have had several benefits. Unlike some of the international counter-piracy responses discussed in section 7.2, they offered a sense of local ownership, avoided programmes being top-down, and tried to ensure longevity. Moreover, working with the local community meant programmes could be appropriately targeted, with local community leaders being utilised in the identification of both the beneficiaries and their underlying needs.

Furthermore, as a non-Somali interviewee with considerable experience of working in Somalia explained, it 'is a tough context to do any kind of aid or assistance in because…there is an incredible amount of distrust still between the Somali people and any foreigners' (participant 7: 2019). Given this, working with local partners was seen by some to be important as it built trust among the local community and provided protection for international organisations (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 36). Indeed, as one participant who worked for a UN department explained, it was riskier for him, as an outsider, to ask questions about who had engaged in piracy, or those most likely to do so. Therefore, his organisation worked with local community leaders and clan elders, not just because they were best placed to identify those most at risk,

but because it was safer for them to do so (participant 6: 2019). Additionally, one organisation with a long operational history in Somalia discussed the importance of working in partnership with local leaders on community projects, and explained how, when it came to their counter-piracy work 'we were very clear we are supporting what the community wanted, and our protection was the community' (participant 12: 2019).

The importance of working with local organisations and community leaders to offset complications related to Somalia's precarious security situation was likewise supported by certain programme documents (Abdullahi 2012: 17; Acacia Consultants Ltd 2010: 11). According to a report produced by Save the Children, its counter-piracy programme was deliberately run in conjunction with 'youth networks, media houses and local leaders' (Abdullahi 2012: 17) to 'save time, resources and reduced transaction costs/trade-off that would have been incurred if SCD[244] was implementing the project alone given the volatile environment in which the project operates' (Abdullahi 2012: 17). Thus, programmes were designed in partnership with locals to provide protection and so community leaders could refer young Somalis once they established trust in the organisation.

Despite these benefits, there were drawbacks to local partnerships. As the evaluation report for the Youth at Risk Project outlines, there were concerns that working with the local community created bias in the beneficiary selection process (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 4-5; 23; 45). This was supported by an organisation that worked with local leaders to identify those who would benefit most from their fisheries livelihoods programme, as they detailed how there was reluctance among community leaders to refer young Somalis affiliated to pirate groups, since it would mean admitting pirates had links to their villages (participant 6: 2019). As such, while it was safer for the local community to identify participants, and while they were best placed to identify those at risk of engaging in piracy, it was not always guaranteed that they would do so.

Correspondingly, in most cases the community leaders involved in international projects were clan elders. While this was important and often essential in building

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[244] Save the Children Denmark

community relationships, due to the prominent role clan elders play in Somali society, it was also considered problematic (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 16: 2019). As discussed in the previous chapter[245], in some instances the clan was instrumental in encouraging children to engage in piracy, and even when they were not directly involved, the clan system and hierarchical structure was linked to the disenfranchisement of young Somalis[246], which likewise contributed to the child piracy problem (participant 3: 2019; participant 16: 2019). This kept young Somalis from being part of the conversation around anti-piracy programmes, with one IGO describing how 'whenever we do something, the involvement of young people is really small' (participant 6: 2019).

Additionally, one IGO that delivered several shore-based counter-piracy projects explained that corruption linked to clannism regularly impacted upon their programmes (participant 7: 2019). This is because, to obtain permission to operate in certain areas, international organisations and funders were pressured to award contracts to those clans that were closely affiliated to the regional government, and if one organisation would not award the contract based on clan allegiances, the regional government would threaten to revoke their permission to operate there in favour of those that would. As such, deciding whether to work with the clans and clan elders as an international organisation was described as having to 'pick the best of two evils' (participant 7: 2019), as despite being part of the child piracy problem, and despite issues relating to corruption, their prominent role in Somali society made it difficult to operate and address the child piracy issue without their support.

7.3.3 Awareness raising

Along with identifying beneficiaries, many organisations worked in close partnership with members of the local community on awareness raising programmes (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019). The aim was address the naivety children had about piracy[247], while

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[245] See 6.4.5
[246] As previously discussed in 6.3.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.5
[247] Alluded to in 6.3.2

challenging the 'Robin Hood' narrative[248] and encouraging the wider community to reject pirates. As one NGO that delivered counter-piracy programmes to young Somalis explained, 'one of the most…championed parts of the programme was awareness creation and an anti-piracy campaign, whose target groups were mainly youth at risk of joining pirates…reformed pirates, and communities at large living in the coastline' (participant 12: 2019).

Most awareness raising programmes were run in partnership with religious leaders (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019), with 'progressive Imams…in coastal cities' (participant 11: 2019) discussing 'Islam and Islamic principles' (participant 11: 2019) and explaining that piracy was haram[249] (participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 11: 2019). Such religious teachings were thought to have challenged the positive public opinion of the crime, with people coming to 'fully understand and convince themselves that it is not acceptable' (participant 2: 2018). The importance of working with the local community, including religious leaders, on awareness campaigns is likewise raised within different policy and programme documents looked at for this study (Mohamed 2016: 3; 23-24; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3-7; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; Rashid 2009: 4; 15; Yussaf 2014: 3-6).

The success of religious leaders was perceived to be due to the prominent role Imams play in Somali society, as they were well placed to 'take the lead in awareness of the negative effect of piracy through mobilization' (Yusuf 2014: 3). Religious leaders are 'the most respected element of the community' (participant 12: 2019) and locals believed children would listen to them and disengage from piracy (Rashid 2009: 4; Simba 2011: 8; 34). Indeed, as one interviewee who worked with religious leaders on awareness raising programmes explained, 'the success of the Imams…having that discussion…with the young people has been…quite interesting to see' (participant 11: 2019). This mirrors similar sentiments expressed in documents produced by NCA (Acacia Consultants Ltd: 25; 26; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3; 6-7).

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[248] Discussed in 6.4.6
[249] An Arabic word meaning forbidden under Islamic law

Furthermore, religious leaders had an ideal platform to spread anti-piracy messages. Friday night sermons on piracy's negative impacts reached an estimated 650,000 people (Yussuf 2014: 4), not only targeting children but their families, who were told not to accept any money obtained through piracy (Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 5; Yussuf 2014: 4). Targeting the wider community along with children in this way helped to challenge the perception that pirates were heroes (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019), and encouraged parents to ensure they were looking after the best interests of their children (participant 8: 2019). Thus, addressing the concerns that in some cases the family may have pushed children into piracy[250].

Given the respect that Imams commanded, and the platform they had to speak out against piracy, it is unsurprising that one organisation that ran awareness raising campaigns described how 'it is at the community level and with religious elders that that effort is being most effective' (participant 3: 2019). However, despite the perceived success, there were questions about whether religious leaders were always best placed to warn children against piracy. While targeting the family through Friday night sermons helped to address the concern that some children joined pirate groups due to pressure from, or a need to support, their family, it also increased the risk that family members would see piracy as immoral and ostracise those who engaged[251], unintentionally pushing them back into criminal activities. Moreover, one participant who worked on awareness campaigns believed it would have been more effective if anti-piracy messages had come 'at the family and household level' (participant 7: 2019), particularly for nomadic children, as Imams are not embedded within these communities.

The Somali Government may have shared a similar view, since the same participant described how 'one of the angles we were instructed by…Government officials to take was to have the mothers serve as the main conduit of information to the children' (participant 7: 2019). Yet, despite documented evidence that some mothers wanted to engage in anti-piracy campaigns (UNODC 2012b: 12), they were not included in any

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[250] As mentioned in 6.4.5
[251] As mentioned in 6.4.5

official programme. Instead, because of the gendered nature of Somali society, the extent to which women were included in advocacy work was minimal. Mothers were merely encouraged to talk to their children about the negative impact of piracy, and were given tokenistic roles in awareness raising programmes, such as singing songs about the dangers of piracy (participant 7: 2019).

There was also scepticism around whether children really responded to the message that piracy is haram, or whether it was more effective, given how they were often naïve about piracy, to make them aware of the dangers instead (participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019). As such, some organisations not only worked with religious leaders on awareness raising programmes, they also carried out advocacy work to address young Somalis naivety about piracy[252]. According to one participant, 'one of the biggest pushes was to send out these messages, whether they were via radio, television, or text message…telling about pirates that had been caught or killed' (participant 7: 2019), while another discussed the importance of questioning 'what tool are you going to use to convince these boys not to go to sea…other than the fact that they are probably going to die' (participant 3: 2019). Correspondingly, a further organisation noted the need for a 'comprehensive strategy, covering…the provision of information and awareness raising of what is right and what is wrong' (participant 8: 2019) in relation to piracy.

Policy documents looked at for this study provide further evidence that awareness raising was a common strand of counter-piracy programming, with media being utilised and campaigns being run via television, radio, newspaper, and other print materials (Abdullahi 2012: 8; 28; DPA 2015: 20-22; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 4; 5-6; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; Simba 2011: 8; 37; UNDP 2016a: 9; UNODC 2012b: 5; 10; 14; 15; UNODC and DPA 2011: 8-9; Yussuf 2014: 4). These campaigns were a significant help in the awareness raising efforts as 'the message could be seen almost everywhere, on every TV station' (participant 12: 2019). Radio campaigns were the most successful at raising awareness, as '85% youth listen to the radio daily' (Simba 2011: 8). Moreover, the Friday night sermons, discussed above, were broadcast on the radio, enabling the message to reach women and children 'who don't normally

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[252] Which was outlined in 6.3.2

attend mosque thus significantly increasing the audience' (Yussuf 2014: 4). Overall, media campaigns reached millions of people, created discussions around the negative impacts of piracy and kept at risk children from engaging by educating them about the dangers and immoral nature of the crime (Abdullahi 2012: 8; 26; 34; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; Rashid 2009: 4; Yussuf 2014: 4-5).

Beside religious leaders, and to some extent Somali mothers, other community members were involved in awareness raising. One NGO that ran such programmes explained how 'some of the rehabilitated pirates have been helping us…during the campaigns' (participant 12: 2019), by making children aware of the pitfalls of piracy. Additionally, the advocacy work carried out by UNODC (2012b: 6; 14-15) was done in partnerships with different sections of society, including youth, who were occasionally tasked with taking 'the important anti-piracy message to the most remote regions where the pirates are recruited' (UNODC 2012b: 5). Similarly, reports by Save The Children highlighted an 'increased (self) youth advocacy and mobilisation effort' (Abdullahi 2012: 23), and both they and NCA attempted to include children in anti-piracy work, partnering with schools and youth organisations to run counter-piracy campaigns (Forcier Consulting 2014: 29; Simba 2011: 38; Yussuf 2012: 5). This included a 'district level inter school football tournament held to raise anti-piracy awareness' (Yussuf 2012: 5) and school lessons on the dangers of piracy (Simba 2011: 38).

Despite reaching a larger audience, working with different sections of society was problematic. As already discussed, although some mothers were best placed to keep their children from engaging in piracy, this would not have been appropriate in all cases, given the role the family played in some children's involvement, and considering family disapproval may have caused those who had left piracy to re-engage. Moreover, the gendered society meant that when mothers were involved in awareness raising it was tokenistic. Likewise, the level of influence young people and ex-pirates had in these programmes appeared to be minimal (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019), and while larger numbers of children were reached by working with schools, it is debatable how impactful this was, given that out of school children

were more at risk of piracy recruitment[253]. Thus, while it was important to work with multiple actors to raise awareness, the findings suggest IGO and NGO attempts to do so often resulted in similar issues to those encountered by the wider international community[254], in that they were poorly targeted and tokenistic.

Correspondingly, there was a failure to meaningfully engage young Somalis in both the awareness raising campaigns and wider counter-piracy work of the organisations involved in this research (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019). The hierarchical structure and clan system limited the role of young Somalis within society[255], which kept them from being part of the conversation around anti-piracy programming (participant 6: 2019). This speaks to a wider issue facing young people within fragile states as, despite being potential agents of change, they are regularly side-lined in state-building efforts[256] (Collins 2017: 15; 20; Sommers 2007: 106; 109-110; Williams 2016: 104; 107-108). This is concerning since, as discussed in Chapter Three[257], such exclusion can deepen feelings of marginalisation, thereby increasing the probability of children turning to armed or criminal groups as a result. While there was limited evidence that the failure to meaningfully engage young Somalis in counter-piracy programming increased the likelihood of children engaging in the crime in this instance[258], the failure to include them was still problematic, as it fed into and supported this wider system of exclusion.

One organisation faced further limitations relating to their advocacy work, partly due to the wide audience they were trying to reach, as their programme was targeted at all unemployed men from aged fifteen to forty (participant 7: 2019). Additionally, this organisation tried creating a counter-piracy educational curriculum to be implemented in schools within the Puntland region, with the idea being that children would be taught the dangers of joining pirates. However, staff turnover and a lengthy hiring process

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[253] As discussed in 6.4.3
[254] As discussed in 7.2
[255] As discussed in 6.4.3
[256] As discussed in 3.2.6 and 3.3
[257] See 3.3
[258] The main suggestion that this may have occurred came from The Youth at Risk evaluation report. As discussed in the last chapter, it claimed that 'the low level of youth implication in politics and decision making in the Somali structure has encouraged the "desocialization" of the youth and therefore contributes to lead youth towards violence' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 13).

meant this was never finalised (participant 7: 2019). Likewise, there had been plans to discourage children by using testimonials from those who had been apprehended for piracy, but the Somali authorities refused them access to do this, as they were concerned it would make celebrities out of piracy convicts (participant 7: 2019).

Despite these challenges, the awareness raising efforts and advocacy campaigns undertaken by those involved in this study were largely seen as a success (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019). They helped word 'spread that piracy is bad' (participant 6: 2019) and 'many communities in the coastline declared…that they are not accepting pirates at all anymore and will not marry their daughters to anyone who is pirates' (participant 12: 2019). Moreover, when evaluating programme success, different NGO documents reference changing community attitudes, with some declaring a zero-tolerance policy to piracy (Abdullahi 2012: 23-24; Acacia Consultants Ltd: iv; 7; 25; 26; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 6-7; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; 2011: 6; 36-37). This success was attributed to the fact that awareness raising changed 'the mindset of the people' and created 'big behavioural change' (participant 12: 2019). Or, as one NGO described, 'these programmes contribute to eradicate, to sweep out, you know negative aspects' (participant 10: 2019).

The changing perception among the local community was important, given the role community acceptance played in supporting piracy[259]. As the evaluation report for the Youth at Risk programme details, for piracy to flourish 'the connection between the piracy groups and the community has to be strong as the protection within the community is needed' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 16). Therefore, as the public started to view piracy as a negative rather than heroic act, it became harder for pirates to operate. Furthermore, negative associations and the increasing stigma with which pirates were viewed meant children were discouraged from engaging (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019). However, as already suggested, this may have negatively impacted upon the children who defected from pirate networks, as it increased the risk of them being rejected by their local community (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019).

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[259] Which is also discussed in the wider piracy literature discussed in 2.3

While the awareness raising work contributed to the changing community perception, it was not solely responsible for this (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). Community perceptions were changing before these awareness raising campaigns were implemented, as pirates 'inflated the market, heavily…socially, economically and…politically' (participant 13: 2019) and the locals started to associate piracy with behaviours that were harmful to the younger population, including drug use and prostitution (Ali 2014: 4; Rashid 2009: 20; Schultze-Kraft 2018: 12; 13; Simba 2011: 8). From this perspective, it was not the advocacy work of those in this study that changed local perceptions of piracy, but the significant impact piracy had on young girls and the behaviours it taught young men (participant 7: 2019). This opinion is shared by some of those interviewed, with participants explaining how 'drug, alcohol, social destruction', and the fact girls were 'used, misused, and abused' (participant 12: 2019) gave piracy a negative image. This was likewise alluded to by organisations who, while not running awareness raising campaigns themselves, were working with the community on alternative livelihoods programmes and recognised how the negative impact on Somali society changed the way piracy was perceived (participant 6: 2019; participant 8: 2019). Therefore, while awareness raising campaigns further shaped public opinion, the most meaningful change came from the grassroots level.

Yet, this raises another reason why working in partnership with local communities was important, as Somalis themselves personally experienced the negative consequences of piracy and were best placed to speak out against it. Moreover, given the concern that piracy will resurge if the situation on land does not change[260], working with the local community to identify and tackle insecurity continues to be important, as despite turning against piracy, there are concerns the situation might change, and local support for pirates might resurge, particularly as illegal fishing and high levels of unemployment within Somalia remain pressing issues. As work produced for Adeso summarises 'considering the prevailing levels of poverty in Somalia, and the lack of livelihoods opportunities, the lure of piracy is never far away' (Ali 2014: 4). As will now be looked at, many of the organisations involved in this study tried to address these

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[260] As discussed in 6.4.4, 6.4.6 and 7.2

concerns by providing alternative livelihoods programmes, often in tandem with awareness raising programmes.

7.3.4 Alternative livelihoods programmes

Given the perceived interrelationship between the involvement of children in piracy and the lack of viable alternatives[261], it is unsurprising that a major policy focus of many organisations in this study centred on alternative livelihoods programmes (participant 1: 2018; participant 2: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 5: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019). These programmes, which will be examined within this section, were designed to address high youth unemployment and in most cases were open to those at risk of engaging in Somali piracy's land and sea-going units[262], although the majority were targeted at those aged fifteen plus[263] and were therefore not accessible to all children at risk of piracy recruitment.

However, there was one exception to this, as educational programming was a prominent part of the alternative livelihoods work of several NGOs (participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019). According to one international development organisation 'making sure that you have the basics, you know, literacy and numeracy skills…has been really…important work' (participant 11: 2019), as it provided children with the basic skills for the future. Educational programmes not only incorporated teaching, they also tackled the wider issues keeping children out of school[264]. This included building schools (participant 10: 2019; participant 14: 2019), providing incentives for parents to send their children to school (participant 14: 2019), helping parents cover fees (participant 12: 2019) and supporting those not in formal education, including the creation of 'out of school

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[261] Discussed in 6.4.3

[262] However, as discussed in 7.2, participant 4 did discuss how the main focus of the programme he worked on was largely focused on those involved at sea

[263] As previously mentioned in 6.3.1

[264] Outlined in 6.4.3

groups' (participant 10: 2019). Thus ensuring those younger than fifteen at risk of piracy recruitment were supported in a culturally age appropriate way.

Aside from school programmes, vocational training was another avenue utilised as part of the alternative livelihood programmes looked at in this study. These were offered to those aged fifteen-years or above who were deemed at risk of engaging in piracy (participant 1: 2018; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019), with the aim being to 'provide them with vocational training…so they could get some skills' (participant 1: 2018), thus making them more employable. As one report summarises, programmes were designed to 'equip the youth at risk of piracy with transferable skills aimed at providing them with an alternative to criminality, reducing the risk of recidivism, encouraging entrepreneurship and fostering economic development' (DPA 2017: 38).

Vocational training was favoured as it was seen as culturally advantageous, having been a prominent form of education during the Barre regime (participant 11: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019). Both international and local organisations explained how 'reactivating some' (participant 11: 2019) of the vocational institutions presented a viable opportunity through which children, including those who were unable to access basic education, could gain the skills to secure legitimate work (participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019), reducing the risk that they would turn to piracy. Training was predominately offered in business, masonry, carpentry, tailoring, catering, sewing and electronics (Abdullahi 2012:7; 8; 18; DPA 2017: 20-21; 38-39; DPA 2016: 30; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 4; 20; 22; 54; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 4; 7; UNDP 2016b: 5; 10; YOVENCO 2016: 8-9).

Since most organisations recognised the involvement of land-based actors in piracy, including young women, several delivered programmes targeted at both males and females (participant 1: 2018; participant 9: 2019; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14). In certain cases, gender balance was important operationally, with one IGO explaining that they used 'segregation of data looking at the number of boys and the number of girls we have

reached, because we want to have what is called gender balance in all the programmes that we implement' (participant 9: 2019). Gender balance also appeared to be a crucial aspect of the vocational training run by UNPD as part of their ALP programme, with their annual report citing how 98 females and 102 male youths were targeted (UNDP 2016a: 4; 5; 10; UNDP 2016b: 8).

In certain cases girls were included in these programmes, not merely to achieve gender balance, but because it was considered vital in addressing the abuse and exploitation of girls at the hands of pirates[265]. One organisation explained how gender inclusive programmes helped challenge the exploitation of young women, by ensuring they were 'trained and…have good livelihood and financial stability' (participant 12: 2019). The importance of gender inclusive vocational training was also outlined in several programme documents (Abdullahi 2012: 2; 9; Acacia Consultants Ltd 2010: 2; 7; 51; Forcier Consulting 2014: 22; Mohamed 2016: 5; 23; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7; Thariki 2012: 4; YOVENCO 2016: 8; UNDP 2016a: 4; 5; 10; UNDP 2016b: 8; Yussuf 2014: 4). Yet, one international development organisations explained that it was not easy to reach the girls most in need of these programmes, as they often entered pirate groups through personal connections[266], which made it difficult for them to exit once they were affiliated (participant 11: 2019). Furthermore, despite gender inclusive programming, there was no specialist support addressing the sexual abuse girls may have encountered, nor was it clear whether it was only girls who experienced such exploitation[267]. As such, while gender inclusivity was important, programmes that explored and addressed the unique gendered experience of males and females may have been more appropriate.

Although programmes were labelled as 'alternative livelihoods to piracy', many were open to those at risk of engaging in armed groups more broadly[268] (participant 1: 2018; participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 15: 2019; participant 18: 2019). One local NGO explained that alternative livelihoods programmes were provided 'so

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[265] Previously outlined in 6.3.3
[266] As outlined in 6.4.5
[267] This was previously mentioned in 6.3.3, which similarly highlighted the need for a more detailed understanding of the gender dynamics of the Somali piracy problem
[268] This was also discussed in 6.5 of the previous chapter

that children can be…safe from…organised crimes including piracy, radicalisation, all that' (participant 10: 2019), while another organisation similarly described how they offered vocational training to 'what we considered to be the most vulnerable…vulnerability here being if you were getting associated with such… crimes or…with armed groups in different ways' (participant 11: 2019). Programme documents on vocational training likewise reference the inclusion of children at risk of recruitment into other armed and criminal groups (Abdullahi 2012: 11; 14; Mohamed 2016: 5). When asked about why vocational training opportunities were targeted at children at risk of recruitment into groups besides pirate networks, one organisations explained that 'while the drivers could be different' (participant 11: 2019), the solutions to help children disengage or refrain from joining were broadly the same. However, as discussed in the previous chapter[269], not everyone agreed with this, with one organisation (participant 17: 2019) claiming that extremism had little to do with livelihoods, and another (participant 16: 2019) citing personal connections as the main driver of child piracy. Therefore, while vocational training might have been appropriate for some vulnerable children, it was not necessarily appropriate for all, given the various and complex drivers that pushed children into different groups[270].

Despite delivering such programmes, some organisations cited concerns around the effectiveness of vocational training. Young Somalis faced limited employment opportunities upon completion (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019), as they entered a 'depressed economy' (participant 5: 2019), and those who found employment did not always earn enough money to live off (Abdullahi 2012: 9). Moreover, a failure to award certificates upon project completion kept several graduates from getting jobs (Abdullahi 2012: 21; Thariki 2012: 3; 20). These issues caused some children to dropout of vocational training programmes, as they 'were not satisfied' (participant 12: 2019) that they would find employment or earn an adequate income. Some even returned to piracy because they considered it the better option (participant 12: 2019), thereby adding weight to the understanding that children engaged in piracy following a cost-benefit analysis[271]. It may also be that vocational

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[269] See 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.5 and 6.5
[270] This was also suggested in 6.5 of the previous chapter
[271] As suggested by both the findings of this research discussed in 6.4.3 and the fragile states and maritime piracy literature discussed in 2.4.3, 3.2.5 and 3.2.6

training aggravated the root causes that pushed children into piracy, since, according to the fragile states literature[272], educated youths who cannot access employment often feel heightened levels of alienation and frustration (Goldstone 2002: 10; 14; Urdal 2006: 612; Urdal 2004: 4). However, there was nothing that indicated this in the research findings.

These were valid concerns and steps were taken to alleviate them. Organisations worked with young Somalis and the wider community to ensure their needs were addressed (Abdullahi 2012: 14; 15), with education and employment being 'the highest on the list for children' (participant 11: 2019), and market surveys were used to tailor programmes to meet market demands (Abdullahi 2012: 11; DPA 2017: 39; DPA 2016: 30; 71; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7; UNDP 2016a: 5; UNDP 2016b: 5). Moreover, internships and job placements were provided (DPA 2017: 39; DPA 2015: 39;42; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 22; 41; 52), while business training, toolkits, start-up grants (DPA 2017: 39; DPA 2016: 71; UNDP 2016a: 5), and 'tools for training' (participant 10: 2019) were offered, so that trainees could physically practice their trade (Norwegian Church Aid 2015a: 1; YOVENCO 2016: 8). Furthermore, one organisation used 'a marketable skills and innovation value assessment' (participant 9: 2019) to examine what skills, beyond those traditionally offered through vocational training, were desirable to the Somali business community, thereby identifying additional opportunities. Together, these responses helped provide practical experiences, tools, and the financial capital to offset the lack of employment opportunities, allowing the beneficiaries 'to stand on their own feet after' (participant 12: 2019).

Besides vocational training, some organisations worked to improve existent livelihoods opportunities and provide young people with alternative employment within traditional sectors. While this included a limited focus on the pastoralist sector (participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019; participant 15: 2019), most programmes focused on fisheries work (participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019). Fisheries programmes typically involved training young Somalis

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[272] See 3.2.6

from coastal regions who 'don't have anything and no opportunities' (participant 16: 2019), encouraging them to see fishing as a positive vocation that could provide a viable livelihood (participant 6: 2019). As one interviewee explained, his organisation had 'a really broad scope covering every aspect of fisheries as a livelihood in Somalia…and…two of them I would really say have worked to address the equation of youth and piracy together' (participant 6: 2019). This was echoed by others, who spoke about providing skills training and fishing equipment, including advanced boats, to young Somalis at risk of piracy recruitment (participant 4: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019). Providing jobs in the fisheries sector 'created another opportunity' (participant 18: 2019) for young Somalis, decreasing the likelihood that they would turn to piracy, a claim that is likewise supported in a programme document shared by Fair Fishing (Thaarup 2015: ii).

Those delivering fisheries alternative livelihoods programmes also acted to improve infrastructure onshore and taught children how to handle and process fish (participant 6: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). This included creating cold storage, landing sites, and establishing fish markets (participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019), which are likewise identified as important elements for improving fisheries production in certain programme documents (FAO: 2019; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 8; Thaarup 2015: ii; 6; Yussuf 2014: 3; 7). This was beneficial, not just for those directly involved in fishing, but those employed in related sectors as it 'created a lot of jobs at sea…a lot of jobs around the coastline, and…many jobs in the inner cities where people are frying fish, or selling in salts, or cooking in hotels' (participant 18: 2019).

Correspondingly, it helped to ensure that programmes were gender inclusive (participant 6: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participate 18: 2019), as 'more and more women (participant 16: 2019) could access culturally appropriate roles. Girls were typically the target beneficiaries of land-based fisheries work, with one organisation explaining how 'when it comes to shore…all the training we do for processing fish…is done to women' (participant 6: 2019). Girls likewise received training in 'how they can prepare fish and how they can open a business in a street kitchen selling fish' (participant 16: 2019), and were upskilled in repairing nets (participant 16: 2019;

participant 18: 2019). Moreover, the fisheries newsletter produced by FAO (2014: 3) explains how women were provided with post-catch equipment and solar power fridges to help keep fish fresh. Such measures ensured the inclusion of women, which would not have been the case had fisheries programmes focused only on sea-going roles[273].

While fisheries programmes had some positive outcomes (Thaarup 2015: iv; 21), participants, including those who delivered fisheries programmes, questioned their overall impact (participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019). One perceived problem was the validity of the fisheries sector in Somalia, especially considering the effect illegal fishing continues to have on local fishermen[274] and given that fish is not a major component of the Somali diet (participant 3: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). Training people in the use of new fishing technologies also posed a challenge, as 'when people…are not educated it is…not easy to teach them' (participant 18: 2019). Furthermore, insecurity kept one organisation from accessing the areas where they opened fishing facilities (participant 16: 2019).

The main problem however was that children were not responsive to fisheries programmes and 'there is not to many young people in the fishery' (participant 16: 2019). This was partly because technological advancements made the fisheries sector less appealing (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019), as 'there is a whole generation of young Somalis who know what is…outside of Somalia' (participant 7: 2019). Thus, children were found to be aspiring for more for their lives (participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019). Specifically, children were said to want office jobs, even though this was not a realistic opportunity for those residing in the inaccessible and remote areas where piracy flourished. Furthermore, while those delivering fisheries programmes were doing important work in rebuilding the sector, it remained the case that 'nobody wants to fish…it is hard work – it is hard labour' (participant 7: 2019). Fishing was seen 'as a low status job' (Thaarup 2015: 16), with parents acting to keep their children from entering this profession and discouraging their daughters from

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[273] This is because, as discussed in 6.3.3, in Somali culture women do not go to sea
[274] As discussed in 6.4.6 and 7.2

marrying fishermen. As such, while the fisheries offered potential alternative livelihoods, 'young people are not interested in that kind of job' (participant 6: 2019), and neither were their parents.

Beyond the fisheries sector, young Somalis were provided with additional employment opportunities in the police force. This was considered an added benefit of improving the capacity of the local law enforcement within Somalia, since it 'has enable employment for younger guys' (participant 3: 2019). One IGO that trained potential police recruits also explained how the last group included three girls, who were required to go to sea and learn how to be coxswain, which positively challenged the cultural stereotype that Somali women should not go to sea (participant 3: 2019). The possibility of encouraging children to engage with security forces, rather than pirate groups, was raised by another organisation (participant 1: 2018), although this was only in passing. While employing young Somalis in such roles may have helped divert them from piracy operations, whether this was an acceptable alternative to piracy is less clear, especially as the difficulty of determining the ages of those involved means it is possible that younger adolescents may have merely swapped one armed role for another[275].

On the whole, the alternative livelihoods programmes looked at for this study had positive impacts, with some youth setting up their own businesses, providing for their family, or getting married (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 40; 59; Thaarup 2015: iv; 21). Moreover, despite the limited job opportunities, some organisations pointed out how several of their beneficiaries had found employment (participant 10: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019). As one NGO explained, 'in terms of the technical and vocational training it has had really good results…between sixty-one and seventy-two percent of young people…have found employment' (participant 11: 2019). This included those who had previously engaged in piracy and were now working in 'socially accepted business' (participant 12: 2019). Additionally, evaluation research found that Save the Children's alternative livelihoods programme benefitted many vulnerable young Somalis (Abdullahi 2012: 8; 14 Forcier Consulting 2014: 45-

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[275] As discussed in 5.2.3 there is evidence to suggest that the Somali police force do recruit and use children within their operations

49; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7). Documents further outline how alternative livelihoods programmes, particularly vocational training, not only diverted children from piracy but improved the resilience of local communities and provided financial protection to the families of those involved (Abdullahi 2012: 21; 31; Norwegian Church Aid 2015a: 1; Oceans Beyond Piracy 2014: 7). Therefore, these programmes had wider societal benefits, besides keeping children from engaging in piracy.

Despite these positive impacts, one NGO explained that it 'certainly wouldn't say that you can…do away with piracy altogether only through that approach' (participant 11: 2019). This organisation was not alone, as several issues and limitations were identified by other participants (participant 1: 2019; participant 3: 2019; participant 4: 2019; participant 5: 2019; participant 6: 2011; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019). One issue, alluded to already, was that the success of these programmes depended on the personal circumstances of the children involved, and their reason for engaging in piracy in the first place. If a child was pressured by their family to join a pirate group, then alternative livelihoods programmes were unlikely to make a difference to their situation (participant 3: 2019).

Similarly, such programmes often struggled to reach those who needed them most. Children who joined pirate groups because of family influence found it hard to leave[276] (participant 11: 2019), and those who did risked being ostracised by their community (Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 3). This was part of a wider issue, in which negative associations with piracy, partly due to the awareness campaigns discussed in 7.3.3, detrimentally impacted upon alternative livelihoods' programmes. Local communities did not want to be associated with pirates, and therefore deliberately kept those who had been involved in piracy from accessing these programmes (participant 6: 2019). To avoid this happening, it would have been beneficial if awareness raising work also included rehabilitation support that encouraged the local community to welcome ex-pirates back.

Other concerns focused on the difficulty of implementing alternative livelihoods programmes in Somalia, with policy reports highlighting staff turnover, lack of

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[276] As discussed in 6.4.5 of the last chapter

appropriate facilities, and the security situation as the main challenges facing programme implantation (DPA 2017: 20; DPA 2016: 18; 29; DPA 2015: 16; 21; 38; Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 23; UNDP 2016a: 3; 10; UNDP 2016b: 8; 9). The latter was perceived to be a specific limitation by the participants themselves, with several interviewees (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 16: 2019) detailing the difficulty of implementing alternative livelihoods programmes in Somalia due to the security risks, even when working with local partners. As one organisation explained, 'there can still be some areas that are out of reach, even for our local partners who are implementing work on the ground. So, this can be a major challenge' (participant 9: 2019). This IGO also explained how the security situation further impacted upon the children involved in their alternative livelihoods programme, as it kept them from expanding any businesses they developed. Moreover, as already mentioned, one organisation working in the fisheries sector could not access the areas in which they opened fishing facilities. Thus, even when organisations tried to address the potential drivers of engagement into piracy, land-based insecurity often limited the success of these efforts.

Another major limitation was the disconnect between the scale of the problem and the amount of funding available (participant 1: 2018; participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 12: 2019). The sheer number of unemployed young people and the limited funding and resources, along with programme constraints due to insecurity, made it impossible for those involved in this study to address the underlying problem of youth unemployment on a large scale (Forcier Consulting 2014: 33; Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 28: Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 8-9; Thariki 2012; 3; 8). As one local organisation who received money form international funders explained, 'we have two challenges…lack of…funds and the other…is the security issue' (participant 14: 2019). Similarly, an international NGO stated 'the funding we had was limited and the magnitude of the piracy problem was very large' (participant 12: 2019), while an IGO discussed how the level of unemployment within Somalia meant they were not able to source enough funding 'to cover all the needs of the youth' (participant 9: 2019). As such, there was perceived

to be a 'trade-off between reaching more people and…the depth of the course that you will be able to give to someone' (participant 11: 2019).

Correspondingly, there were concerns over the way funds were handled, especially as most organisations received project funding from international donors[277]. One interviewee (participant 1: 2018) explained how the young Somalis he worked with were supposed to receive funding to open their own business upon completion of their alternative livelihoods training, but this did not happen, as the programme was donor driven and the money got diverted. Some organisations similarly criticised the alterative livelihoods programmes they were involved with for being more focused on pleasing donors than addressing the real issue (participant 5: 2019; participant 7: 2019). Due to this, it was suggested that while some programmes were successful and had wider societal benefits[278], this was not true in all cases. Rather, in some situations the benefit was that programmes kept children busy, diverting them from engaging in armed activities during the programme period (participant 1: 2018). Moreover, alternative livelihoods programmes were not considered a sustainable long-term solution, given that funding was limited and organisations were unable to run them indefinitely (participant 11: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 13: 2019). While in some situations the local community were able to continue the work once programmes ended[279] (Abdullahi 2012: 2; 9), this was not always feasible. Therefore, while these programmes were an important stopgap in addressing some of the underlying root causes pushing children into piracy, they offered only limited, short-term fixes for a problem that required long-term planning and investment.

There were further issues with the type of employment prospects available, with organisations providing opportunities in existent sectors, which limited what could be offered through alternative livelihoods programmes. While this no doubt helped to create more employment options and increased the number of beneficiaries reached, these were not the jobs that young Somalis aspired to. As discussed already, this is particularly true of the fisheries sector, as young people did not want to be fishers. Yet,

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[277] See 6.2
[278] As discussed already in this section
[279] As discussed in 7.3.2 in some instances working in local partnerships meant the local community could continue the work once the programme had come to an end

it was unrealistic to expect that much could be done to change this, as organisations had to be pragmatic about what they could offer given the context in which they were working. In this sense, those involved in this research were not only restricted by the number of people they could reach, but the types of jobs they could offer.

Overall, while the alternative livelihoods work undertaken by those in this research was generally positive, the impact it had on the lives of young Somalis did not offer a long-term solution. The lack of longevity, coupled with the limited reach of these programmes, did not address the scale of the problem. In some cases, children may have even returned to piracy as it still appeared the better option. Moreover, due to the security situation programmes were often restricted and, as was the case with those in the fisheries sector, were not necessarily related to jobs that children aspired to have. As will be looked at now, to address these issues those in this study identified several policy and programme areas that the international community should develop in the future if Somali children are to be diverted from engaging in piracy or similar destabilising activities.

7.4 Future responses

It was believed that addressing the underlying causes of piracy, and the involvement of children within the crime, would require a well-coordinated land-based international effort alongside the current naval approach (participant 9: 2019; participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019). As one organisation summarised, 'for prevention we need to look at the land-based causes because at the sea, well no one lives in the sea' (participant 9: 2019). Addressing the land-based causes will require 'a long-term effort' as 'it is not just going to go away in a year or two, or maybe even five' (participant 11: 2019). For this reason, one local NGO called for an extensive programme response that could be implemented across Somalia (participant 13: 2019). However, as a one-size-fits-all approach was not appropriate[280], this same organisation and one other (participant 17: 2019) suggested that programmes should be 'locally adaptable' (participant 13: 2019), so they can be altered to fit 'the local context' (participant 13: 2019). This would allow programmes to be tailored to fit the particular governance

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[280] As previously discussed in 7.2

structures and regional issues at the grassroots level (participant 4: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019).

To ensure future responses are appropriately adapted to the local context it was suggested that programmes continue to be implemented with local partners (participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019). As an international development NGO explained, the local community 'is where the solutions are going to come from and where the alternatives are going to grow from' (participant 11: 2019). Moreover, it was felt that future efforts should continue building on the awareness raising work carried out by the organisations in this study and their local partners (participant 6: 2019; participant 9: 2019), and that these should better incorporate families with children at risk of joining piracy networks or similar criminal activities. Not only do parents need to be aware of the dangers, but in some instances mothers may be best placed to explain these to their children (participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019). The importance of continuing to work within the local context and through local partners is likewise mentioned in certain NGO documents (Mohamed 2016: 24; Norwegian Church Aid 2012: 9; Pedersen 2011: 3; The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 32).

While it was considered important that work continue to be carried out at the local level, several organisations felt that, given how the situation on land has not changed[281], the international community should also work at the regional and national level to address issues of governance and insecurity (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 6: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019). As local NGOs explained, 'building a functioning Government that supports people…safeguards and fights the piracy…is one of the key things' (participant 10: 2019), and world leaders and organisations such as the UN may be best placed to help the Somali Government 'come up with effective and efficient policy that will be able to focus on the piracy' (participant 15: 2019). Similar claims can be found in documents produced by NCA (Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 7; Rashid 2009: 19), with one report stating that the international community must enact 'a comprehensive and sustained approach to governance strengthening and the fostering of state-

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[281] As outlined in 6.4.4, 6.4.6 and 7.2

societal relations' (Norwegian Church Aid 2015b: 7). Thus, while working within the local context was considered important, the value of the working at the regional and national level to address issues of Somali state fragility was also recognised.

As the research findings suggest, the lack of infrastructure and remote locations in which piracy occurred helped to provide the spaces and the conditions necessary for piracy, and the use of children within the crime, to go unchallenged. As such, and in alignment with criticisms outlined in 7.2, the importance of working to improve governance on land, while likewise investing in hard-to-reach communities, was raised by some organisations (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 9: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019). As one local NGO explained, if the root causes of piracy are to be effectively tackled in the future, 'one of the key things…is actually to improve infrastructure' (participant 13: 2019), since limited road links and lack of school buildings continue to impact upon unemployment levels and the quality of life for Somalis (participant 13: 2019; participant 14: 2019). Furthermore, it was hoped that future investment into infrastructure and employment would likewise keep children from migrating (participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019), with documentation from NCA making similar claims (Mohamed 2016: 6). It therefore appears that improving infrastructure could alleviate the concern that Somalia is losing its younger generation to both piracy and migration.

Although vocational training was the main educational programme run by those in this study, education itself was considered an important area to development, due to the lack of schooling opportunities in Somalia (participant 1: 2018; participant 3: 2019; participant 7: 2019; participant 8: 2019). One suggested method was that spatial mapping be used to identify the areas where children were most at risk of piracy recruitment, so that school could be opened in those areas (participant 7: 2019), while another was to improve education in coastal regions (participant 3: 2019). However, for some children, such as nomads and those who have been out of education for a considerable period, mainstream learning was not perceived to be a viable option (participant 1: 2018; participant 7: 2019). Therefore, programmes outside of formal education are important. One suggestion was that a government programme should be created to support out of school youth (participant 1: 2018). Yet, according to a

participant with experience of working with nomads, this is inappropriate for this community as 'they don't want an education, they want…a good herd of goats, or they want to work their way up to owning camels' (participant 7: 2019). A potential solution would be to engage nomadic children in programmes specifically related to animal husbandry and agriculture, while continuing to provide educational opportunities to sedentary children (participant 7: 2019).

Correspondingly, this same participant suggested that young Somalis should be encouraged to engage in anti-piracy work in exchange for rewards, including an educational scholarship for sedentary children and livestock for nomadic children (participant 7: 2019). While no one else suggested a rewards-based system, others did discuss the significant role that children could occupy in future counter-piracy programming, particularly through peer-to-peer work focusing on raising awareness on the negative impacts of piracy (participant 4: 2019; participant 8: 2019; participant 9: 2019), as if 'young people saw…the involvement of other youth it could definitely help a little bit' (participant 16: 2019). One avenue suggested for this is to include children 'in theatre and in drama for awareness raising' (participant 8: 2019). However, there were concerns that, due to the hierarchical structure of Somali society, children would not have much influence over any future anti-piracy work, even if they were included. Therefore, a counter view is that the best way to ensure children are involved in addressing piracy in the future is to focus on recruiting them into the police force when they are old enough (participant 3: 2019).

The need for a rehabilitation programme for those below the age of eighteen apprehended for crimes such as piracy was also identified (participant 7: 2019; participant 9: 2019). This was considered important, as the lack of rehabilitation programming within the international community's anti-piracy strategy was thought to have motivated pirate commanders to use children[282] (participant 7: 2019). It also mirrors calls within the Youth at Risk evaluation report, which states 'the international community military approach to address piracy and terror group's activities in Somalia needs to provide a solution for youth defecting from these armed groups' (Guillemois, Mohamed, Mohamed 2012: 36). Furthermore, as the prevalence of guns was found to

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[282] As discussed in 6.3.2

be a significant issue contributing to both piracy and the involvement of children in the crime[283], one organisation working directly with young people who defect from armed groups[284] discussed the need for 'some sort of youth programmes for those people who are already carrying out sort of a disarmament' (participant 1: 2018).

Organisations also highlighted importance of continuing to provide vulnerable young Somalis with viable livelihood opportunities, rather than placing them in jail. This is because 'it is not a solution to take them to jail, or to take them to court because they don't have any other option but to turn to crime and to take these opportunities' (participant 18: 2019). Moreover, 'until you have…sustainable livelihoods for people in Puntland…there will always be risks of either piracy or armed conflict' (participant 11: 2019). This was considered especially important given that recent drought and famine resulted in 'loss of livelihood…so the need…has only grown' (participant 11: 2019), meaning more children could turn to destabilising activities to fill this void. The importance of continuing to deliver onshore programmes addressing youth unemployment, which are targeted at both males and females, is similarly discussed in different programme documents (Acacia Consulting Ltd 2010: x; 38; Ali 2014: 5-6; Mohamed 2016: 24; Rashid 2009: 19).

Despite not necessarily being work that children aspire to, NGOs that delivered fisheries programmes (participant 13: 2019; participant 16: 2019; participant 18: 2019) discussed the importance of sustained investment in this area, in order to continue developing related employment opportunities. As one interviewee explained, 'expanding the fishing industry is highly needed, and this can create a lot of jobs for young people…for women, and for everyone' (participant 18: 2019), not just in fisheries, but in the wider interconnected sectors[285]. This would have the dual benefit of not only securing livelihoods, but also providing food security in times of drought and uncertainty (participant 18: 2019). The importance of future investment in the fisheries sector is likewise discussed in work produced by Adeso, which explains how to 'realize its marine fisheries potential, Somalia now, more than ever, needs a concrete contribution from the international community' (The University of Rhode

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[283] See 6.4.1
[284] Including those who defected for pirate groups
[285] As discussed in 7.3.4

Island and TACS 2015: 24). The same report calls for the international community to support the fisheries sector by 'building road infrastructure and providing ice and cold storage capabilities' (The University of Rhode Island and TACS 2015: 84).

Along with sustained investment into the fisheries sector, the need for robust measures to tackle illegal fishing in Somali waters was unsurprisingly seen as important (participant 11: 2019; participant 13: 2019; participant 18: 2019). As outlined previously within the thesis[286], 'that is still a huge problem and a huge issue and has to be regulated and dealt with if we are to combat…what it means to piracy' (participant 11: 2019). As such, there was a strong view that 'the international community has to also advocate for the Somalis and to ask the international actors to stop this illegal fishing' (participant 18: 2019). This is reflected in some organisational documents (Glaser et al 2015: xiii-xiv; 2; 27 79; 94; Securing Somali Fisheries 2015: 1), which discuss the importance of the international community taking action to curb illegal fishing to protect Somalia's fishing community. Until this happens, and illegal fishing and its wider implications have been addressed, the chance of piracy resurging remains.

Overall, it is not one single response that was perceived to be important for tackling piracy and the use of children within the crime. Rather, the research findings show that truly addressing the root cause of child piracy will require a mix of responses, with measures being put in place to protect and educate vulnerable children (participant 10: 2019; participant 12: 2019; participant 14: 2019). As one local NGO summarised, 'it is a combination of a number of things. It needs governance; and peace; it needs livelihoods and a source of income; it needs schools and child protection' (participant 10: 2019). The reason for this is 'the more you address the root causes, the more you address the real issue overall' (participant 12: 2019).

Going forward policies should be designed that support and improve the initial steps taken by the organisations involved in this study. The issues that allowed piracy to flourish and put children at risk of engaging in the crime must be addressed proactively, both on land and at sea, and this should not be done through a one-size

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[286] See 6.4.6 and 7.2

fits all approach. Rather, programmes should reflect the diversity of children in Somalia[287] and be developed in partnership with local people. Moreover, efforts should address the wider issues of weak governance, economic instability, and insecurity, which require a long-term commitment, and programmes must be developed that specifically offer support to those who have previously engaged in piracy, including a clear disarmament strategy. Unless this happens, it remains likely that piracy will resurge, or other armed and criminal groups will move in and fill the void.

7.5 Summary

This chapter, like the last, has worked towards addressing Research Objective Three. In particular, it has helped to address Sub-Research Question 3.1, by examining how the perceived land-based causes of child piracy in Somalia influenced the policy responses of IGOs and NGOs between 2009-2018. As discussed in the previous chapter, children engaged with pirate groups due to a variety of different but interrelated issues connected to human insecurity onshore. Yet, despite this, the findings show that the broad coordinated international anti-piracy response has not adequately addressed these land-based causes as, although the organisations in this study were involved in some capacity in such efforts, they raised several concerns with the way the international community has tackled this problem.

Specifically, it was found that while the use of naval forces to address piracy at sea has had some success, it has treated a symptom rather than the root of the problem, has pushed children into other destabilising activities on land, and has aggravated the problem of IUU fishing, leading to concern it could reignite community support for pirates. Furthermore, there has been no collective effort to address the underlying causes of piracy, nor the use of children within the crime, at the international level. Rather, individual organisations have been left to respond to these problems, often resulting in ad hoc and unsustainable responses. As a result, programmes were often top-down, delivered in areas where piracy was not a prevalent problem, and targeted at those either not at risk of being recruited by pirate groups, or at risk of being involved

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[287] Both in terms of the nomadic and sedentary youth and the various types of armed and criminal groups operating in the different regions

only at sea, thereby excluding women and disenfranchising most of the children involved. As such, there are real concerns that if the naval response is scaled back piracy, and the use of children within this, will resurge as the situation on land has not changed, nor have the vulnerabilities of young Somalis.

Contrastingly, when looked at on an individual level, most of the organisations involved in this study tried to counter child piracy onshore through gender inclusive programmes aimed at those at risk of engaging in piracy, whether on land or at sea. As has been discussed, such efforts were done in partnership with the local community, and focused on awareness raising and providing alternative livelihoods to piracy. However, while these programmes had some success, they were nevertheless problematic. The different understandings of who classifies as a child in the Somali context meant programmes were predominately targeted at youth, unintentionally keeping some children from accessing support, and there were drawbacks to working in partnership with the local community, particular clan elders. Furthermore, while alternative livelihoods programmes were an important stop-gap measure, they were not a sustainable long-term solution. Programmes were restricted by the type of opportunities they could offer, along with practical issues related to staff turnover, insecurity, and lack of funding.

As such, it is clear that more needs to be done if the root causes of piracy and the involvement of children within the crime are to be eradicated. There needs to be a long-term, coordinated effort by the broader international community to address the issues of state fragility and human insecurity onshore that have allowed the crime to flourish and have pushed children into engaging. Understanding why children engaged in Somali piracy, and creating land-based programmes that seek to address these issues is an important aspect of effectively tackling child piracy in both current and future counter-piracy work.

Overall, both this chapter and the last have provided the foundation for the concluding chapter, which will reiterate the core contributions made by this thesis and reflect on how the research question and objectives have been addressed. This will include re-visiting what has been discovered about the interconnections between piracy networks

and children, including how this is related to the fragility of nation states, and how IGO and NGO policy responses between 2009-2018 have sought to counter and mitigate this. The final chapter will likewise consider what recommendations can be drawn from the findings discussed within this chapter regarding how best to counter-piracy and the involvement of children within the activity going forward, while also reflecting on the research limitations and potential future areas of study.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to bring together the different research elements of this study, reiterating the core contribution of this thesis and reflecting on how the research gap, identified in the Introduction[288] and outlined in Chapters Two[289] and Three[290], has been addressed. It likewise meets the final research objective, by considering the research limitations and potential areas of future study. To achieve this purpose, section 8.2 discusses this thesis' original contribution to knowledge, reiterating the academic gap and principal research question addressed throughout this thesis, and examining what the research findings reveal about how child piracy is understood when seen from the perspective of some of the IGOs and NGOs who sought to counter the issue from its shore-based context between 2009-2018. Section 8.3 then outlines what policy recommendations can be made for addressing the child piracy problem going forward, based on the findings discussed within the previous chapter[291]. The overall limitations of this study are discussed in section 8.4, which examines how these limitations may be used to influence further areas of research. Finally, section 8.5 will bring this thesis to a close with a few concluding remarks.

8.2 Original contribution to knowledge

As discussed at length in earlier chapters[292], previous research into child piracy has failed to examine how children's involvement in Somali piracy is related to state fragility and human insecurity onshore, and there is a lack of understanding regarding how this issue may be better understood and treated from its land-based context. This includes an absence of academic knowledge surrounding what activities have been undertaken by IGOs and NGOs to help keep children from engaging in Somali piracy networks, the potential benefits of these activities, and how they could be enhanced and

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[288] See 1.4
[289] See 2.5.2
[290] See 3.5
[291] See 7.4
[292] Outlined in Chapter One sections 1.3.1 and 1.4, Chapter Two section 2.5.2 and Chapter Three section 3.5

improved. By examining how IGO and NGO actors working in Somalia understood and responded to the issue of child piracy from 2009-2018, this thesis has addressed this gap, providing a more rounded understanding of the involvement of children within the Somali piracy structure.

As will be discussed within this section, in doing so, this thesis makes three key contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it considers the issue of child piracy from a land-based perspective. Secondly, it advances the academic discourse into child piracy and maritime piracy more broadly, by providing a better understanding of the debates regarding the question of age and who is a child, evidencing the career progression of males from land-based to sea-going roles, and outlining the gender dynamics of Somali piracy. Thirdly, this research examines child piracy in relation to the fragility of nation states, thereby adding to the fragile states debate by bringing the maritime domain into this field. These three key contributions shall be explored further below.

As identified in Chapters Two[293] and Three[294], there is limited research into the issue of child piracy, and what does exist uses the UNCLOS (1982: 60-62) definition of piracy being a crime that occurs only on the high seas. As such, there is an absence of research regarding the interrelationship between state fragility and human insecurity onshore and the involvement of children in Somali piracy networks. Nor on how the use of children within piracy networks may be best understood and treated from its land-based context. Instead, previous academic studies have predominantly focused on what legal and policy responses should be used when children are apprehended for piracy on the high seas, failing to address the root causes of this issue, while simultaneously falling to recognise that piracy is a land-based as well as a maritime activity, with children fulfilling several land-based roles. Therefore, the principal research question of this thesis, and its related research objectives and sub-research questions, were developed to address this academic gap, by examining the issue of child piracy from the land-based perspectives of IGOs and NGOs, thereby making an original contribution to knowledge by providing a shore-based perspective.

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[293] See all of section 2.5
[294] This is discussed throughout this Chapter, but a summary of the main gaps in previous research can be viewed in section 3.5

This thesis addresses this gap in the literature through original qualitative research[295], examining how IGOs and NGOs working in Somalia[296] have understood the involvement of children in piracy and how this understanding influenced their specific programme and policy response between 2009-2018. By doing so, it provides a more holistic understanding of the engagement of children in piracy networks, going beyond the traditional high seas' definition to consider both the sea-going and land-based roles that children are utilised for, the shore-based drivers that facilitate their engagement in pirate groups, and how these may be proactively addressed on land. Furthermore, by looking at the shore-based context and how to address the underlying root causes of child piracy, this thesis has added to the academic research into fragile states[297], by placing the issue alongside the wider literature pertaining to youth in fragile states, originally discussed in Chapter Three.

By considering child piracy from the land-based perspective of IGOs and NGOs, this thesis contributes a better understanding regarding the ages of those involved and the inner land-based workings of pirate networks, including an appraisal of the gender dynamics involved. The key findings of this thesis, presented in Chapters Six and Seven respectively, clearly show that there is an interconnection between piracy networks and both male and female children, with those under the age of eighteen engaging in piracy through predominately land-based roles. However, as those involved are generally older adolescents, and given there are diverse definitions and understandings of the child[298], whether it is appropriate to refer to those involved as children remains a contentious issue. As such, the programmes looked at for this study were targeted, not at children per se, but at youth.

As was discussed in Chapter Six, a significant contribution of this thesis is that it has shown how the involvement of children onshore is an integral part of the Somali piracy operations, with some males experiencing a career progression from land-based to

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[295] Discussed in Chapter Four

[296] As explained in Chapters Four (4.4) and Five, Somalia was chosen as the geographic focus due to its fragile nature, interconnections to piracy, and because it has the most well-documented cases of child piracy

[297] This is discussed in more detail below

[298] Discussed in 1.2 and 6.3.1

sea-going roles. When it came to the land-based roles, there were some questions around whether the children involved could strictly be defined as pirates. However, given the pivotal role they play in the Somali piracy structure, and considering males could progress to be involved in the attack team, this was considered more an issue of semantics and most programmes did not differentiate between the children involved on land and those involved at sea. Furthermore, despite claims to the contrary in previous academic studies, when child piracy is seen from its land-based context, it is evident that girls are involved in pirate networks, albeit they are utilised in shore-based roles. As a result, many of the organisations involved in this study targeted their programmes at all children, including girls, who were at risk of engaging in piracy networks.

As alluded to already, the third contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is that it examines child piracy in relation to the fragility of nation states, thereby adding to the fragile states' discourse by bringing the issue of child piracy into this field. The research findings evidence that piracy and the use of children within the crime is interrelated to the fragile situation in Somalia. There is a diverse nexus of underlying issues, related to both state fragility and personal pressure, that are impacted by and interconnected to each other, including lack of opportunity, the desire to migrate, family connection, and IUU fishing, which were found to cause children to join pirate groups. Furthermore, the findings show that children's engagement in piracy is part of a wider problem in which young Somalis are regularly recruited into armed and criminal groups for similar reasons, with children joining due to the same land-based insecurity factors, and potentially moving between different groups. The engagement of children within these groups has, in turn, been found to aggravate the wider societal stressors that made them vulnerable to recruitment in the first place. As such, the use of children in various armed and criminal activities in Somalia are not separate issues, but are part of an interconnected problem.

This thesis has likewise examined how the issues of child piracy, and its interconnections to state fragility, have been addressed within the policy and programme responses of IGOs and NGOs between 2009-2018, an angle not considered in previous studies. As discussed in Chapter Seven, to create a more

complete understanding of the Somali piracy problem and children's involvement in the crime, the organisations involved in this research were not only asked about their specific programme responses, but how these relate to the wider attempts by the international community to address the issue and how this was viewed by those working in the field. The findings show how, despite being involved in some capacity in the international effort to combat Somali piracy[299], the organisations involved in this research were concerned with the way the broad international response had approached and addressed this problem. There was a strong belief that, although it is interconnected to fragility onshore, when the international response is seen in its entirety[300], little has been done to address the land-based root causes of piracy, nor the use of children within the crime. Rather, the international community has predominantly tried to address the Somali piracy problem at sea using naval forces, and when attempts have been made to run programmes onshore these have been improperly implemented, indirectly targeted, had negative consequences and, in some cases, been counterproductive.

Contrastingly, despite being part of the overall international response, when the organisations in this study were asked about their specific programme response, it was clear that at an individual level they recognised the importance of seeing piracy as a land-based activity and placing it within the context of human insecurity onshore. As such, many had attempted to counter child piracy by seeking to address some of the underlying root causes leading children to engage. Primarily, this was through the provision of awareness raising campaigns run in partnership with members of the local Somali community, which focused on the negative impacts of piracy, and alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes, mainly in the form of vocational training and targeted predominately at youth. In the latter case, these have often been accessible to those aged fifteen plus who are at risk of joining other armed and criminal groups besides pirates, given the similar drivers of engagement.

These programmes were found to have several benefits. Awareness raising contributed to changing community perception of pirates, with locals coming to see

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[299] As is outlined in 6.2.
[300] By which this thesis is referring to the overall international response, beyond the singular land-based responses of those involved in this study

piracy as a negative rather positive activity, some alternative livelihood programmes were gender inclusive, including those within the fisheries sector, with programmes being designed to be culturally sensitive to the fact that women do not go to sea, and alternative livelihoods programmes had helped some young people to gain employment, set up their own businesses, provide for their family, or get married. However, despite these benefits, the land-based programmes developed by IGOs and NGOs looked at in this study could not address the overall scale of the problem. This was in part because they were carried out on a small scale through individual organisations, who did not have the resource to be able to address the structural issues that continue to impact upon Somali children.

As such, the research findings support calls for a well-coordinated land-based international effort to address the issues of insecurity and economic instability that allowed Somali piracy, and the use of children within the activity, to flourish. Until this happens the threat of piracy will remain, and even if it does not resurge to previous levels, if this nexus of factors goes unchallenged young Somalis will remain vulnerable to recruitment into other armed and criminal activities. As such, and as will be discussed in more detail now, the original findings of this research have several implications for policy.

8.3 Implications for policy

Although Somali piracy has decreased and the number of children involved in the activity may currently be minimal, it is still important to examine what implications the research findings have for policy. As discussed both in Chapters Six and Seven, there are well founded concerns that Somali piracy, and the involvement of children within this, may resurge if the naval response is scaled back and that future policies should be adopted to ensure this does not happen. Furthermore, and as previously discussed in Chapter Four[301], there have been growing calls to examine what lessons can be learnt from counter-piracy efforts within Somalia and whether these 'can be exported to address the emerging piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea and other piracy hotbeds around the world' (Hodgkinson 2013: 147). Therefore, when it comes to programmes

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[301] See 4.4

that have been designed to try and keep young Somalis out of piracy, it is first important to examine how successful these have been at keeping children from engaging in piracy and similar land-based activities, and the future steps that should be taken to build on this work.

The overall research findings support the case that piracy must be treated as a land-based issue[302]. Not only is Somali piracy interlinked to insecurity and fragility onshore, but much of its operations occur on land, with multiple-actors, including children, taking on shore-based roles. This does not mean that measures to counter piracy at sea should cease, but these should be short-term and designed to support long-standing preventative efforts onshore. These measures should complement one another, with land-based programmes focusing on addressing the root causes pushing children into piracy and the reintegration of children apprehended during piracy operations, as not only would this help with disengagement but would counter the incentive pirate bosses have for recruiting children[303]. Furthermore, since young men progress to the sea-going unit from land-based positions, intervening earlier in the career cycle, by addressing the land-based drivers, would encourage disengagement before children become involved at sea.

Countering the root causes of child piracy requires addressing the multitude of interconnected factors causing children to engage, including, but not limited to, poverty, lack of education, and unemployment. However, these issues do not exist in isolation but are interrelated to wider fragility onshore. Therefore, while it is important to address the direct drivers pushing children into piracy, as IGOs and NGOs have sought to do, this cannot be done effectively without tackling the broader problems of underdevelopment and insecurity. As alluded to in Chapter Seven[304], countering child piracy in the long-term requires investment into infrastructure projects, such as building schools and providing road links to the inaccessible areas where piracy flourishes. Investing in such projects may have the added benefit of providing employment opportunities for those trained in relevant sectors and would complement vocational training programmes in the areas where the work is carried out.

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[302] Discussed in the wider maritime piracy literature outlined in 2.3.2 and 2.4.4
[303] See 6.3.2
[304] See 7.4

In conjunction to the above, steps must be taken to counter IUU fishing in Somali waters. Unless the international community shows that it is committed to tackling IUU fishing, as much as it is committed to tackling piracy, any future effort to address the latter will be at risk of failing in the long-term. However, although addressing IUU fishing is vital in mitigating against Somali piracy, it is important that future efforts do not over-estimate the role of the fisheries sector in addressing the root cause that push children into piracy. While fisheries work may provide viable employment opportunities, in both its direct and interconnected sectors, this alone is not the solution, as most children do not desire a career in fishing. Rather, future efforts must provide a wider range of employment opportunities, appropriate for the local context, including but not limited to the fisheries sector.

Where appropriate, programmes aimed at countering the land-based drivers of child piracy should be accessible for those at risk of engaging in other criminal and armed activities. The motivating factors pushing children into piracy are often interlinked to those causing engagement in other destabilising activities, including migration, militias and Al-Shabaab, with children possibly moving between these groups. Therefore, acting to remove children from piracy is not enough, since they may merely swap one destabilising activity for another[305], unless efforts are taken to counter these too. Moreover, given that different armed groups aggravate the societal stressors that make children vulnerable to piracy recruitment, creating accessible programmes may work to counteract this. In a similar vein, programmes addressing children's involvement in armed and criminal activities onshore should be accessible to those who are involved in piracy.

Given that some children join pirate groups due to influence from their family or clan, it is also important to recognise that addressing the land-based driver may not keep all children from engaging. In such cases, awareness campaigns targeting the family and wider community, like those run by IGOs and NGOs, are more appropriate. These should include educating the wider community on the importance of reintegrating

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[305] As was originally suggested in 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and as supported by the findings of this research discussed in 6.5

those children who have been involved in piracy, to avoid creating a harmful cycle of exclusion. To reach a wide audience, awareness campaigns should be done in partnership with multiple members of society, but unlike the attempts of IGOs and NGOs[306] these must be appropriately targeted and avoid being tokenistic, as failing to do so could unintentionally aggravate feelings of frustration among those involved. Moreover, while there is no clear cut answer when it comes to the problematic nature of working with the clans, organisations, and the wider intentional community, must continue to weigh up whether the benefits of such partnerships outweigh the associated costs.

Finally, it is important that programmes are culturally, age, and gender appropriate. The involvement of women in pirate networks must be recognised and responded to appropriately, building on the work of IGOs and NGOs by continuing to be gender inclusive and providing opportunities that reflect the gender dynamics of Somali society. Whether there is a need for programmes that specifically address the unique experiences of women in piracy networks, particularly concerning sexual abuse, should also be considered. Regarding age, the terms child and youth are unhelpful[307], and it might be better if such terminology were avoided when implementing programmes. The recommendation of this thesis is to refer to those 'younger than eighteen', while providing age-appropriate programmes for the different understandings of childhood within the Somali context, such as training or employment opportunities for those aged fifteen and above, while offering those younger than fifteen educational opportunities, as some NGOs have done. Such responses would be interconnected, as providing education for younger children helps to address issues of unemployment when they become older adolescents.

It becomes evident from the overall findings of this research that addressing child piracy requires measures that go beyond the maritime domain to address the diverse drivers of land-based insecurity and underdevelopment that cause children to engage. Such measures must reflect the gender dynamics of piracy operations, be accessible to those involved in similar activities, and be adaptable for the local context. Moreover,

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[306] Discussed in 7.3.3
[307] Discussed in 7.3.1

as some children engage in piracy because of personal relationships, these measures should be supplemented with awareness campaigns, like those already developed by IGOs and NGOs, to persuade the family and wider community to keep children from engaging. Unless these measures are met, children will remain vulnerable, not just to piracy recruitment but to involvement in other destabilising activities onshore.

8.4 Research limitations and areas of future research

While the findings of this study give a more holistic understanding of the diverse roles that children occupy in piracy networks, along with how their involvement is interrelated to human insecurity onshore and what can be done to mitigate against this, there are limitations to what it has been able to examine. As outlined in Chapter Four[308], for ethical and practical reasons, the research was carried out with IGOs and NGOs, meaning the findings are limited to the perceptions of these actors. It is therefore possible that carrying out the same study with different members of Somali society, including those who have been involved in piracy, may yield different results. However, as this research is set within the context that there is no one single understanding of children's involvement in piracy, rather than limiting this study, this provides an opportunity to advance the research findings. There is scope for future research to use the same methodological framework to examine how this issue is constructed by different groups, beyond IGOs and NGOs, and to consider what implications additional constructions of child piracy may have for further understanding and responding to the problem.

This study likewise only focused on the specific context of Somalia, where children are known to be engaging in piracy, and the findings are not transferable to other hot spots where piracy occurs. It is currently not clear if child piracy is an issue in other regions prone to piracy, although, as discussed in Chapter Two[309], there are some claims that children are used by pirate groups in areas such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Malacca Strait, although there has been little evidence presented to support this. Furthermore, academic literature pertaining to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea frequently references the

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[308] See 4.5.2 and 4.7
[309] See 2.5.1

involvement of desperate 'youth', 'young men', and 'young people', without qualifying what ages these terms are referring too (Barrios 2013: 3; Biziouras 2013: 118; Nincic 2010: 7; Onuoha 2013: 283-284; Whitman and Suarez 2012: 23). This suggests there could be those who are younger than eighteen engaging in piracy in other regions beyond Somalia, but they are not viewed as 'child pirates' in academic and policy research due to a similar crossover between childhood and youthhood like that discussed within this thesis. It could also be that children are utilised on land by pirate groups in other regions, but due to the high seas' perspective of previous studies[310] into child piracy, their involvement has gone undocumented.

Nevertheless safe conclusions cannot be drawn without conducting more, in-depth research into the matter. Further examination is required to assess if child piracy is a problem beyond Somalia and, if so, whether the ages of those involved has similar implications when defining and speaking about the issue. This could take the form of an in country case study, or a comparison could be made between child piracy in Somalia and whether similar issues occur in other areas where pirates operate. In either approach, the data gathering process utilised throughout this study provides a strong foundation to build on in other contexts, in order to examine how, if at all, child piracy is understood and addressed in countries and regions beyond Somalia.

There are certain findings that emerged throughout this research that would also benefit from more in-depth study. One such aspect is the gender dynamics of child piracy. While it is apparent that both genders are involved, the motives and paths that girls navigate to become involved in pirate networks are not clear, with different, and often contrasting, understandings among IGOs and NGOs. As the gender dynamics were not the primary focus of this study the research was unable to examine this in detail, nor examine the unique gendered experiences of girls and whether they would benefit from targeted programme responses. As such, there is a clear need to further investigate the gendered aspects of child piracy, and the implicit assumption that girls are the indirect victims of piracy, while boys are more complicit. There is nothing to suggest that boys cannot likewise be the indirect victims or piracy, and girls, much like boys, will probably have a variety of reasons for joining pirate groups. However, until

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[310] Discussed in 1.1, 1.2, 2.2 and 3.5

there is more research into the specific gender dynamics it is not possible to draw any firm conclusion, beyond those found to be influencing children's engagement in piracy more broadly. The recommendation is that research should be carried out that exclusively examines these gender dynamics, which will advance the findings of this study and act to counter the gender-blindness in the current child piracy and broader maritime security literature[311], both of which overlook the involvement of women within pirate networks. Furthermore, there is the potential to carry out a comparative study into the perceived comparability between female involvement in pirate networks and gangs[312], which could provide more insight into the similarities between these groups and the children used within them.

Another research finding that would benefit from closer inspection is the interconnection between child piracy and youth migration. As the research findings show, child piracy and internal and external youth migration are cross-cutting issues interconnected to the lack of opportunity and land-based insecurity outlined in Chapter Six[313]. However, as this was an emerging theme within this research, the extent to which these two activities are interlinked would benefit from a more in-depth study. There is scope for a more tailored examination regarding the extent to which children's motives for engaging in these activities are interconnected, and whether addressing the root causes of one problem will have a positive impact upon the other. Moreover, research that looks specifically at the interconnections between migration and piracy will help assess the extent to which the same criminal actors are responsible for running piracy and migration operations, including whether this indicates a more serious interconnection between pirate networks and other criminal syndicates within Somalia.

Finally, it should be noted that since the completion of the fieldwork conducted in the framework of this study in 2019, further instability has impacted upon children residing within Somalia, with the country having experienced several humanitarian emergencies. This has included renewed regional conflict, locust swarms, flooding,

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[311] Discussed in Chapter Three
[312] As mentioned in 6.5
[313] See 6.4.4

and Covid-19, all of which have increased fragility onshore. Locust swarms, armed conflict and flooding have amplified internal displacement (IOM Somalia 2020: 1; Saferworld 2020), while Covid-19 has negatively impacted upon livelihoods and resulted in country-wide school closures, leaving an estimated one million children without access to education, on top of the three million who were already out of school (Mwanjisi 2020; OCHA 2020: 1). Furthermore, Covid-19 has limited the operation of humanitarian programmes, 'with staff working from home or in restricted environments' (OCHA 2020: 1). As such, while no firm conclusions can be drawn at present, it is possible that these factors will have a detrimental impact upon IGOs' and NGOs' land-based programming, and increase the likelihood of children turning to piracy, or similar armed groups onshore. As such, the humanitarian situation requires on-going scholarly attention as it continues to unfold, to ascertain whether it increases the likelihood of children turning to piracy, or similar destabilising activities.

8.5 Concluding remarks

Overall, this thesis has examined how IGO and NGO actors understood and responded to the issue of child piracy in Somalia from 2009-2018, in order to create a more holistic understanding of the diverse roles children occupy in piracy networks and how their involvement is interrelated to human insecurity onshore. While it is understandable that previous studies have only considered the issue of child piracy from the maritime perspective, given that piracy is legally defined as a crime that occurs only on the high seas outside of any state's sovereign territory, and given that further definitions such as that of the IMB similarly only consider piracy in the maritime domain, the original contribution to knowledge within this thesis' highlights how such responses are reactive and problematic.

As has been shown, considering the issue of Somali child piracy only as a maritime issue geographically limits who classifies as a child pirate, ignoring most of the children who are used by pirate networks, as they are engaged in land-based roles. It also simultaneously genders the debate, failing to recognise the integral role that girls play onshore, resulting in gender-blind research and responses to child piracy, and piracy more broadly. It likewise fails to recognise how the activities undertaken by those who

support piracy on land are intrinsically linked to the activity in the maritime domain. Pirate attacks are planned on land, hostages are held onshore, and those children who are apprehended during piracy operations at sea will most likely have been promoted to the attack team from shore-based roles. Furthermore, children engage in piracy due to several interconnected and diverse factors, linked to state frailty and personal connections onshore. Therefore, to truly address the child piracy problem, it is imperative that it be seen from its wider shore-based context, with efforts taken to address the underlying land-based drivers.

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List of Interviews

Participant 1 – 15 December 2018

Participant 2 – 24 December 2018

Participant 3 – 11 January 2019

Participant 4 – 9 March 2019

Participant 5 - 1 April 2019

Participant 6 – 5 March 2019

Participant 7 – 13 March 2019

Participant 8 – 15 April 2019

Participant 9 - 12 March 2019

Participant 10 – 3 January 2019

Participant 11 – 29 January 2019

Participant 12 – 15 January 2019

Participant 13 – 7 June 2019

Participant 14 – 15 April 2019

Participant 15 – 15 April 2019

Participant 16 – 14 March 2019

Participant 17 – 1 March 2019 and 27 September 2019

Participant 18 – 17 April 2019

Appendices

Appendix A – Participant information sheet

A comparative case study of IGOs and NGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

You are being invited to take part in research on how NGOs and IGOs understand the involvement of children and youth in piracy networks within Somalia and how this influences the on the ground policy responses. Elizabeth Norman, PhD Researcher at Coventry University is leading this research. Before you decide to take part, it is important you understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?

The purpose of the study is to investigate the interconnections that exist between piracy networks and children/young people within different maritime zones and on land, including how this may be related to the fragility of nation states and what policy responses have been designed to counter and mitigate this.

Why have I been chosen to take part?

You are invited to participate in this study because of your experience working in the field of piracy prevention in Somalia, including the involvement of children within this/working in the field of piracy prevention in Somalia/your experience of running programmes targeted at vulnerable children and youth in Somalia [DELETE AS APPROPRIATE].

What are the benefits of taking part?

By sharing your experiences with us, you will be helping Elizabeth Norman and Coventry University to understand how NGOs and IGOs view the involvement of young people in Somali pirate networks, including the perception of what motivates them to join piracy networks and the various roles they may play within this, and how this influences organisational land-based policy responses.

By considering how NGOs and IGOs see the involvement of young people in piracy networks as a land-based issues, rather than just an issue of the high seas, this research will seek a more holistic understanding of children's involvement within piracy groups.

Are there any risks associated with taking part?

This study has been reviewed and approved through Coventry University's formal research ethics procedure. There are no significant risks associated with participation.

Do I have to take part?

No – it is entirely up to you. If you do decide to take part, please keep this Information Sheet and complete the Informed Consent Form to show that you understand your rights in relation to the research, and that you are happy to participate. Please note down your participant number (which is on the Consent Form) and provide this to the lead researcher if you seek to withdraw from the study at a later date. You are free to withdraw your information from the project data set at any time until the data are fully anonymised in our records on January 1st 2020. You should note that your data may be used in the production of formal research outputs (e.g. journal articles, conference papers, theses and reports) prior to this date and so you are advised to contact the university at the earliest opportunity should you wish to withdraw from the study. To withdraw, please contact the lead researcher (contact details are provided below). You do not need to give a reason. A decision to withdraw, or not to take part, will not affect you in any way.

What will happen if I decide to take part?

You will take part in a semi-structured interview, in which you will be asked a number of questions regarding how your organisation understands and defines the phenomenon of children and youth involved in maritime piracy, along with your more general understanding of the crime, and how this has influenced your organisation's policy responses. The interview will take place in a safe environment, preferably at the office of your organisation, at a time that is convenient to you. Ideally, we would like to audio record your responses (and will require your consent for this), so the location should be in a fairly quiet area. If we are unable to meet in person, it will be possible to arrange a Skype interview at a time that is convenient to you. The interview should take approximately an hour.

Once the interview has been transcribed you will be sent a copy, providing you with the opportunity to either expand or remove any of the points raised during the original interview.

Data Protection and Confidentiality

Your data will be processed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. All information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. Unless they are fully anonymised in our records, your data will be referred to by a unique participant number rather than by name. If you consent to being audio recorded, all recordings will be destroyed once they have been transcribed. Your data will only be viewed by the researcher/research team. All electronic data will be stored on a password-protected, encrypted USB drive that will be locked in a filing cabinet within my office, that I alone with have the key for. All paper records will transferred into a soft copy on to this encrypted USB drive, with the original hard copies being shredded after the transfer is complete. Your consent information will be kept separately from your responses to minimise risk in the event of a data breach. The lead researcher will take responsibility for data destruction and all collected data will be destroyed on the 31st October 2030 or before.

Data Protection Rights

Coventry University is a Data Controller for the information you provide. You have the right to access information held about you. Your right of access can be exercised in accordance

with the General Data Protection Regulation. You also have other rights including rights of correction, erasure, objection, and data portability. For more details, including the right to lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner's Office, please visit www.ico.org.uk. Questions, comments and requests about your personal data can also be sent to the University Data Protection Officer - enquiry.ipu@coventry.ac.uk

What will happen with the results of this study?

The results of this study may be summarised in Elizabeth Norman's thesis and may be published in articles, reports and presentations. Some, or all, of these published materials may be available on the internet. Quotes or key findings will always be made anonymous in any formal outputs unless we have your prior and explicit written permission to attribute them to you by name.

Making a Complaint
If you are unhappy with any aspect of this research, please first contact the lead researcher, Elizabeth Norman, normane2@uni.coventry.ac.uk. If you still have concerns and wish to make a formal complaint, please write to Dr Ioannis Chapsos, Research Fellow in Maritime Security, Email: ab2705@coventry.ac.uk. Or contact Professor Alpaslan Özerdem, Co-Director of the Centre for Trust, Peace & Social Relations, Tel +44 (0) 24 7765 9069; Email aa8681@coventry.ac.uk

In your letter please provide information about the research project, specify the name of the researcher and detail the nature of your complaint.

Appendix B – Participant consent form

<table>
<tr><td>Participant
No.</td></tr>
</table>

INFORMED CONSENT FORM:

A comparative case study of IGOs and NGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses

You are invited to take part in this research study for the purpose of collecting data on the interconnections that exist between piracy networks and young people within different geographic contexts, and how these may contribute towards the fragility of nation states and the policy responses designed to counter and mitigate piracy.

Before you decide to take part, you must **read the accompanying Participant Information Sheet.**

Please do not hesitate to ask questions if anything is unclear or if you would like more information about any aspect of this research. It is important that you feel able to take the necessary time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

If you are happy to participate, please confirm your consent by circling YES against each of the below statements and then signing and dating the form as participant.

1	I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions	YES	NO
2	I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my data, without giving a reason, by contacting the lead researcher and the Faculty Research Support Office at any time until the date specified in the Participant Information Sheet	YES	NO
3	I have noted down my participant number (top left of this Consent Form) which may be required by the lead researcher if I wish to withdraw from the study	YES	NO
4	I understand that all the information I provide will be held securely and treated confidentially	YES	NO

5	I am happy for the information I provide to be used (anonymously) in academic papers and other formal research outputs	YES	NO
6	I am happy for the interview to be <u>audio recorded</u>	YES	NO
7	I agree to take part in the above study	YES	NO

Thank you for your participation in this study. Your help is very much appreciated.

Participant's Name	Date	Signature
Researcher	**Date**	**Signature**

Appendix C - List of organisations involved in the research

IGOs	
FAO (The Food and Agriculture Organization)	FAO run programmes aimed at improving the fisheries sector, with a focus on providing the local population with an alternative to piracy
IGAD (The Intergovernmental Authority on Development)	IGAD, in partnership with IOC, EAC and COMESA, are running a coordinated regional response to Somali piracy, with IGAD leading on alternative Livelihoods through vocational development initiatives and advocacy against piracy, and ensuring maritime coordination mechanisms are reinforced in Somalia
IOC (Indian Ocean Commission)	IOC, in partnership with IGAD, EAC and COMESA, are running a coordinated regional response to Somali piracy, with IOC leading on an enhanced national and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions and improved regional coordination and information exchange.
UNDP (The United Nations Development Programme)	UNDP, in partnership with ILO and UNICEF, were responsible for running/funding the youth at risk project, a programme aimed to keep young Somalis from joining armed and criminal groups, including piracy.
UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund)	UNICEF, in partnership with ILO and UNDP, were responsible for running/funding the youth at risk project, a programme aimed to keep young Somalis from joining armed and criminal groups, including piracy. Aside from this, they are involved in a number of other programmes aimed at supporting vulnerable young Somalis, including but not limited to programmes aimed at addressing high youth migration.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) – advocacy campaign	UNODC have experience of running/funding programmes aimed at keeping youth out of piracy and other armed and criminal activities, including running awareness raising and alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes. Aside from this, they work more broadly on capacity building, repatriating pirates to Somalia, and working to free hostages.

NGOs	
Adeso (African Development Solutions)	Adeso runs coastal development programmes in Somalia, which includes investing in and running fisheries programmes
Danish Demining Group	The Danish Demining Group works at the communal level in Somalia, working on

	community safety planning, resilience building, engaging young people as potential agents of change and peacebuilding. They also work broadly with concepts of Children involved in Organised Armed Violence and within the Somali context this can be applied to involvement in both armed groups and piracy.
Fair Fishing	Fair Fishing aims to sustainably tackle piracy on land by investing and building in the fisheries sector and running fisheries programmes
NCA (Norwegian Church Aid)	NCA worked with the local community to run awareness raising programmes and alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes, mainly targeted at youth at risk of engaging in piracy
PASOS (Peace Action Society Organization for Somalia)	PASOS run humanitarian and educational programmes aimed at supporting vulnerable children within Somalia, including but not limited to those at risk of being recruited into armed and criminal groups, including piracy.
Save the Children	Save the Children were involved in running awareness raising campaigns in partnership with members of the local community, along with alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes for youth
YOVENCO (Youth Volunteers for Development and Environment Conservation)	YOVENCO were funded to run alternative livelihoods programmes and rehabilitation programmes for youth who were at risk, or had formerly been involved in piracy. Aside from this, they also work more broadly at the community level to support young people who are vulnerable to the effects of fragility.

Appendix D - Research participant information

Participant	Background information
Participant one	A male participant who had experience of working for two of the organisations involved in this research. He had experience of being involved in awareness raising and alternative livelihoods programmes, along with capacity building.
Participant two	A male participant working for an organisation delivering vocational and awareness raising projects aimed at keeping the general Somali public out of piracy.
Participant three	A male participant working for an organisation that ran/funded alternative livelihoods to piracy projects aimed at youth, along with assisting in capacity building projects within the maritime sector. He also had previous experience of working with those who had previously been held hostage by pirates.
Participant four	Male participant, working in partnership through his organisation with the regional and national Government on maritime capacity building and supporting programmes in areas such as the fisheries sector.
Participant five	A female participant who works for an organisation that ran/funded programmes targeted at youth involved in piracy, although her direct experience was not in this area, instead she focused more broadly on children's vulnerability in Somalia, particularly in terms of female vulnerability, along with migration and trafficking.
Participant six	A male participant who is involved in carrying out fisheries work, including running projects aimed at youth and women.
Participant seven	A female participant who was formerly involved with an IGO that assisted in the repatriation of child pirates and ran/funded alternative livelihoods to piracy projects. She also had previous experience on working on fisheries programming and has conducted research into piracy, having previously interviewed those arrested for piracy.
Participant eight	A male participant, who has previous experience of not only working for an IGO but the Government in Somaliland, running programmes aimed at supporting vulnerable youth. Although he worked for an organisation that ran programmes targeted at youth involved in piracy, his direct experience was not in this area, but focused more broadly on children's vulnerability in Somalia, with a particular focus on migration and trafficking.
Participant nine	A male participant who works for an organisation that ran/funded programmes targeted at youth involved in piracy, although his direct experience was not in this area, but focused more broadly on children's vulnerability in Somalia, with a particular focus on livelihoods work and more recently migration.
Participant ten	A male participant who works for an organisation that ran alternative livelihoods to piracy projects, along with delivering programmes more broadly focused on addressing the vulnerabilities of young people in Somalia
Participant eleven	A male participant who worked for an organisation running awareness raising and alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes, targeted mainly at youth, along with his experience in this area he also had experience of running programmes more broadly focused on addressing the vulnerabilities experienced by children living in Somalia.
Participant twelve	A male participant, who has been involved with an organisations involved in carrying out fisheries work and broader humanitarian programmes across Somalia
Participant thirteen	A male participant who worked for an organisation running awareness raising and alternative livelihoods to piracy programmes, targeted mainly at youth, along with his experience in this area he also had experience of running programmes more broadly focused on addressing the vulnerabilities experienced by children living in Somalia.

Participant fourteen	A male participant working as a social worker for an organisation focused on addressing vulnerable situation of children and youth in Somalia, including those at risk of engaging in piracy, particularly through the provision of educational outreach.
Participant fifteen	A male participant working in monitoring and evaluation for an organisation focused on addressing vulnerable situation of children and youth in Somalia, including those at risk of engaging in piracy, particularly through the provision of educational outreach.
Participant sixteen	A female participant working for an organisation addressing piracy by implementing projects within the fisheries sector.
Participant seventeen	A female participant working for an organisation working on community resilience work and working with young people who are at risk of engaging in armed and criminal groups, including but not limited to piracy.
Participant eighteen	A male participant working for an organisation addressing piracy by implementing projects within the fisheries sector.

Appendix E - Interview schedule

<u>INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANT AND/ OR THE ORGANISATION</u>
Country, IGO/NGO, role of interviewee within the organisation

<u>THE STARTING POINTS</u>

- CU researcher introduction and expertise/understanding on piracy and/or state fragility and children's roles within this.
- In your professional experience how often and in what areas do you deal with piracy/children?

<u>TOPICS OR AREAS TO BE EXPLORED</u>

<u>Professional perception of children involved in piracy</u>

1. How, if at all, do you define the term 'child pirate'?
2. In your professional role, how have you come across/witnessed children's involvement in piracy networks?
3. In your professional opinion, what motivates these children to join piracy networks?
4. How have you, as an organisation, tried to mitigate against these drivers and motivators?
5. What have been the challenges and successes of this?

<u>How and why are children used by pirate groups</u>

6. Why do you think pirate groups desire children and young people?
7. What roles are they recruited or used for?
8. Do you consider there to be any difference between children involved in roles within piracy networks on the high seas and those involved in piracy on land?
9. How is this reflected in the organisations policy responses to the phenomena of children involved in piracy?

<u>Children used by pirate networks to children used by other armed groups (eg military, gangs, etc)</u>

10. In your professional opinion what are the significant difference between children who are associated with piracy networks and other vulnerable children who are used by other armed groups?
11. How is this reflected in your organisations policy approaches to child pirates as opposed to children involved in other armed groups?

<u>Child piracy and gender (use of boys vs. use of girls)</u>

12. Do you consider child piracy to be a particularly gendered issue and if so why?
13. How does your organisation reflect the different gender dynamics of piracy within the policy responses to child pirates?

<u>How might current responses to child piracy be improved by considering it from its land-based context</u>

14. How might children and young people in Somalia be engaged in efforts to help combat piracy?
15. How, if at all, do you think the international community's response to child piracy might be improved by considering piracy as a land-based crime, as opposed to only on the high seas?

<u>QUESTIONS TO END ALL INTERVIEWS</u>

Is there anything else you would like to add relevant to the topic that could contribute to this research?
Is there anyone else you would recommend I contact regarding my work?
Are there any policy documents you can send me related to your work regarding piracy/child piracy?
Will it be ok if I email with follow up questions?

Appendix F - Interview reflection

INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANT AND/ OR THE ORGANISATION
Country, NGO/IGO, role of interviewee within the organisation

Important info on the organisation/any interesting information gained from policy/programme documents?

THE STARTING POINTS

- CU researcher introduction and expertise/understanding on piracy and/or state fragility and children's roles within this.
- In your professional experience how often and in what areas do you deal with piracy/children?

Any reflections:

TOPICS OR AREAS TO BE EXPLORED

Professional perception of children involved in piracy

16. How, if at all, do you define the term 'child pirate'?
17. In your professional role, how have you come across/witnessed children's involvement in piracy networks?
18. In your professional opinion, what motivates these children to join piracy networks?
19. How have you, as an organisation, tried to mitigate against these drivers and motivators?
20. What have been the challenges and successes of this?

Any reflections:

How and why are children used by pirate groups

21. Why do you think pirate groups desire children and young people?
22. What roles are they recruited or used for?
23. Do you consider there to be any difference between children involved in roles within piracy networks on the high seas and those involved in piracy on land?
24. How is this reflected in the organisations policy responses to the phenomena of children involved in piracy?

Any reflections:

Children used by pirate networks to children used by other armed groups (eg military, gangs, etc)

25. In your professional opinion what are the significant difference between children who are associated with piracy networks and other vulnerable children who are used by other armed groups?
26. How is this reflected in your organisations policy approaches to child pirates as opposed to children involved in other armed groups?

Any reflections:

Child piracy and gender (use of boys vs. use of girls)

27. Do you consider child piracy to be a particularly gendered issue and if so why?
28. How does your organisation reflect the different gender dynamics of piracy within the policy responses to child pirates?

Any reflections:

How might current responses to child piracy be improved by considering it from its land-based context

29. How might children and young people in Somalia be engaged in efforts to help combat piracy?
30. How, if at all, do you think the international community's response to child piracy might be improved by considering piracy as a land-based crime, as opposed to only on the high seas?

Any reflections:

QUESTIONS TO END ALL INTERVIEWS

Is there anything else you would like to add relevant to the topic that could contribute to this research?
Is there anyone else you would recommend I contact regarding my work?
Are there any policy documents you can send me related to your work regarding piracy/child piracy?
Will it be ok if I email with follow up questions?

Any reflections:

Reflections overall:

What went well?

What was a challenge?

Is there anything I should change in the interview?

Medium to High Risk Research Ethics Approval

Project Title

> **A comparative case study of IGOs and INGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses**

Record of Approval

Principal Investigator

I **request an ethics peer review** and confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in this checklist honestly.	X
I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described in this checklist. I will immediately suspend research and request new ethical approval if the project subsequently changes the information I have given in this checklist.	X
I confirm that I, and all members of my research team (if any), have read and agreed to abide by the Code of Research Ethics issued by the relevant national learned society.	X
I confirm that I, and all members of my research team (if any), have read and agreed to abide by the University's Research Ethics, Governance and Integrity Framework.	X

Name: Elizabeth Norman

....

Date: 11/06/2018 ....

Student's Supervisor (if applicable)

I have read this checklist and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this project fully and frankly. I also confirm that these issues have been discussed with the student and will continue to be reviewed in the course of supervision.

Name: Ioannis
Chapsos..

Date: 15/06/2018 ....

Reviewer (if applicable)

Date of approval by anonymous reviewer: 10/07/2018

Medium to High Risk Research Ethics Approval Checklist

Project Information

Project Ref	P72163
Full name	Elizabeth Norman
Faculty	University Research Centre
Department	Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations
Supervisor	Ioannis Chapsos
Module Code	CTPSR-PHD
EFAAF Number	
Project title	A comparative case study of IGOs and INGOs understanding of children's involvement in Somali piracy networks and how this influences their policy responses
Date(s)	30/07/2018 - 05/10/2020
Created	11/06/2018 10:29

Project Summary

This project is intended to explore how INGOs and IGOs understand the involvement of children in piracy networks within Somalia and how this influences the on the ground policy responses. This research will be conducted up to the end of September 2020 and will take the form of semi-structured interviews. It is my intention to conduct these through face to face meetings at locations outside of Somalia where possible, making this my principle method of data collection. However due to geographical, time and financial limitations I intend to conduct at least some online via Skype.

Names of Co-Investigators and their organisational affiliation (place of study/employer)	
Is the project self-funded?	YES
Who is funding the project?	CTPSR
Has the funding been confirmed?	YES

Are you required to use a Professional Code of Ethical Practice appropriate to your discipline?	NO
Have you read the Code?	NO

Project Details

What is the purpose of the project?	The principal aim of this research is to investigate the interconnections that exist between piracy networks and young people within different geographic contexts, and how these may contribute towards the fragility of nation states and the policy responses designed to counter and mitigate piracy.
	In order to achieve this aim, I have identified the following research questions to be answered:
	Is there a clear consensus regarding the land-based causes of child piracy among those who develop policy responses? Do the policies of IGO's and INGOs differ?
	What does this tell us about the wider understanding of the perceived motives of child pirates?
	What do the findings reveal about how children associated with piracy groups are viewed when they are not on the high seas but elsewhere, such as on land or in territorial waters?
	How do my finding relate to the wider understanding of children in fragile states involved in similar activities within military armed groups and gangs? Does this suggest a more holistic way of understanding the involvement of children within piracy networks?
	A full copy of my aim and objectives is attached at the end of this application.

What are the planned or desired outcomes?	The intended outcome of this research is to create a deeper understanding of how INGOs and IGOs perceive children's involvement in Somali pirate networks as being rooted in state fragility, and how this influences the on the ground policy

	responses. Correspondingly, I will analyse whether the findings of my fieldwork reveal a wider commonality between children involved in piracy networks and those involved in similar activities within military armed groups and gangs within the context of fragile states. This will further the current academic discussion regarding children's involvement in piracy networks, which has predominantly focused on the legal and policy responses from the perspective of the high seas rather than considering the issue within the context of human insecurity on shore. The hope is, that by considering how children may be involved in piracy networks on land rather than just on the high seas, this will help to create a more holistic understanding of children's involvement within piracy groups.
Explain your research design	My research design will start with a literature review, using desk based research to identify the gap in knowledge that my project is trying to fill. This will then be followed by qualitative data collection in the form of semi-structured interviews, the findings from which will form the basis of a comparative case study that considers the similarities and differences in the policy responses of both INGOs and IGOs who work with children involved in, or in danger of being recruited too, Somali piracy.

| Outline the principal methods you will use | This research will take the form of a desk based literature review and semistructured interviews conducted with a minimum of ten representatives of INGOs and IGOs, who have experience of working with children associated with piracy networks within Somalia. However, this data collection will not take place in Somalia, but will either be conducted in the international offices of the organisations I am seeking to interview or will be conducted via Skype. It is my intention to conduct the majority of these interviews in person, making face to face |

	interviews my principle method of data collection, but due to geographical, time and financial limitations I will have to conduct at least some online via Skype.
	These organisations will be recruited through my own professional connections from working within the development sector, contacts suggested to me through my supervision team and those who I have identified through my initial research. Furthermore, I intend to utilise the knowledge of my interview participants and use snowball sampling when appropriate.
	In order to recruit these participants I will make contact via my university email account, in which I will explain the purpose of my research and why I am seeking their participation within this. I will outline what will be expected of the research participants, including a copy of the participation information sheet and consent form. Once they have expressed their interest, I will then follow up with another email, explaining the process going forward, organising appropriate dates and times for the interview to take place.
	In cases where the organisations I am seeking to work with requires the permission of gatekeepers, I will identify and contact these individuals first, regardless of whether they are my intended participants or not. I will ensure that throughout the research process that I am complying with the requirements of the organisations in questions, including following their ethical guidelines and ensuring I have written consent to conducted my research within their organisation where necessary.
	Furthermore, to compare how the results of my fieldwork to the wider

	understanding of children in fragile states, particularly those involved in similar activities within military armed groups and gangs, I must undertake a critical review of the relevant academic and policy literature. I will analyse the findings of my fieldwork alongside those from this critical literature review, in order to ascertain how children involved in piracy relate to the wider understanding of children in fragile states.

Are you proposing to use an external research instrument, validated scale or follow a published research method?		NO
If yes, please give details of what you are using		
Will your research involve consulting individuals who support, or literature, websites or similar material which advocates, any of the following: terrorism, armed struggles, or political, religious or other forms of activism considered illegal under UK law?		NO
Are you dealing with Secondary Data? (e.g. sourcing info from websites, historical documents)		YES
Are you dealing with Primary Data involving people? (e.g. interviews, questionnaires, observations)		YES
Are you dealing with personal or sensitive data?		YES
Will the Personal or Sensitive data be shared with a third party?		NO
Will the Personal or Sensitive data be shared outside of the European Economic Area ("EEA")?		NO
Is the project solely desk based? (e.g. involving no laboratory, workshop or offcampus work or other activities which pose significant risks to researchers or participants)		NO
Are there any other ethical issues or risks of harm raised by the study that have not been covered by previous questions?		NO
If yes, please give further details		

DBS (Disclosure & Barring Service) formerly CRB (Criminal Records Bureau)

	Question	Yes	No
1	Does the study require DBS (Disclosure & Barring Service) checks?		X
	If YES, please give details of the serial number, date obtained and expiry date		
2	If NO, does the study involve direct contact by any member of the research team:		
	a) with children or young people under 18 years of age?		X
	b) with adults who have learning difficulties, brain injury, dementia, degenerative neurological disorders?		X
	c) with adults who are frail or physically disabled?		X
	d) with adults who are living in residential care, social care, nursing homes, re-ablement centres, hospitals or hospices?		X
	e) with adults who are in prison, remanded on bail or in custody?		X

Question		Yes	No
	If you have answered YES to any of the questions above please explain the nature of that contact and what you will be doing		

External Ethical Review

	Question	Yes	No
1	Will this study be submitted for ethical review to an external organisation? (e.g. Another University, Social Care, National Health Service, Ministry of Defence, Police Service and Probation Office)		X
	If YES, name of external organisation		
2	Will this study be reviewed using the IRAS system?		X
3	Has this study previously been reviewed by an external organisation?		X

Confidentiality, security and retention of research data

	Question	Yes	No
1	Are there any reasons why you cannot guarantee the full security and confidentiality of any personal or confidential data collected for the study?		X
	If YES, please give an explanation		
2	Is there a significant possibility that any of your participants, and associated persons, could be directly or indirectly identified in the outputs or findings from this study?		X
	If YES, please explain further why this is the case		
3	Is there a significant possibility that a specific organisation or agency or participants could have confidential information identified, as a result of the way you write up the results of the study?		X
	If YES, please explain further why this is the case		
4	Will any members of the research team retain any personal of confidential data at the end of the project, other than in fully anonymised form?		X
	If YES, please explain further why this is the case		
	Will you or any member of the team intend to make use of any confidential information, knowledge, trade secrets obtained for any other purpose than the research project?		X

5	If YES, please explain further why this is the case		
6	Will you be responsible for destroying the data after study completion?	X	
	If NO, please explain how data will be destroyed, when it will be destroyed and by whom		

Participant Information and Informed Consent

	Question	Yes	No
1	Will all the participants be fully informed BEFORE the project begins why the study is being conducted and what their participation will involve?	X	
	If NO, please explain why		
2	Will every participant be asked to give written consent to participating in the study, before it begins?	X	
	If NO, please explain how you will get consent from your participants. If not written consent, explain how you will record consent		
3	Will all participants be fully informed about what data will be collected, and what will be done with this data during and after the study?	X	
	If NO, please specify		
4	Will there be audio, video or photographic recording of participants?	X	
	Will explicit consent be sought for recording of participants?	X	
	If NO to explicit consent, please explain how you will gain consent for recording participants		
5	Will every participant understand that they have the right not to take part at any time, and/or withdraw themselves and their data from the study if they wish?	X	
	If NO, please explain why		
6	Will every participant understand that there will be no reasons required or repercussions if they withdraw or remove their data from the study?	X	
	If NO, please explain why		
7	Does the study involve deceiving, or covert observation of, participants?		X
	Will you debrief them at the earliest possible opportunity?		

	If NO to debrief them, please explain why this is necessary	

Risk of harm, potential harm and disclosure of harm

	Question	Yes	No
1	Is there any significant risk that the study may lead to physical harm to participants or researchers?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
2	Is there any significant risk that the study may lead to psychological or emotional distress to participants?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
3	Is there any risk that the study may lead to psychological or emotional distress to researchers?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
4	Is there any risk that your study may lead or result in harm to the reputation of participants, researchers, or their employees, or any associated persons or organisations?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
5	Is there a risk that the study will lead to participants to disclose evidence of previous criminal offences, or their intention to commit criminal offences?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
6	Is there a risk that the study will lead participants to disclose evidence that children or vulnerable adults are being harmed, or at risk or harm?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
7	Is there a risk that the study will lead participants to disclose evidence of serious risk of other types of harm?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will take steps to reduce or address those risks		
8	Are you aware of the CU Disclosure protocol?	X	

Payments to participants

Question	Yes	No

1	Do you intend to offer participants cash payments or any kind of inducements, or reward for taking part in your study?		X
	If YES, please explain what kind of payment you will be offering (e.g. prize draw or store vouchers)		
2	Is there any possibility that such payments or inducements will cause participants to consent to risks that they might not otherwise find acceptable?		
3	Is there any possibility that the prospect of payment or inducements will influence the data provided by participants in any way?		
4	Will you inform participants that accepting payments or inducements does not affect their right to withdraw from the study at any time?		

Capacity to give valid consent

Question		Yes	No
1	Do you propose to recruit any participants who are:		
	a) children or young people under 18 years of age?		X
	b) adults who have learning difficulties, mental health condition, brain injury, advanced dementia, degenerative neurological disorders?		X
	c) adults who are physically disabled?		X
	d) adults who are living in residential care, social care, nursing homes, re-ablement centres, hospitals or hospices?		X
	e) adults who are in prison, remanded on bail or in custody?		X
	If you answer YES to any of the questions please explain how you will overcome any challenges to gaining valid consent		
2	Do you propose to recruit any participants with possible communication difficulties, including difficulties arising from limited use of knowledge of the English language?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will overcome any challenges to gaining valid consent		
3	Do you propose to recruit any participants who may not be able to understand fully the nature of the study, research and the implications for them of participating in it or cannot provide consent themselves?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will overcome any challenges to gaining valid consent		

	Question	Yes	No
1	Do you propose to recruit any participants who are:		
	a) students or employees of Coventry University or partnering organisation(s)?		X
	If YES, please explain if there is any conflict of interest and how this will be addressed		
	b) employees/staff recruited through other businesses, voluntary or public sector organisations?	X	
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained	I will use my university email account to contact the key gatekeepers involved in the organisations I wish to work with during my research. Within this initial email I will include a copy of my research participation sheet and consent form, along with outlining the aims of my research and how I will use any data I gather. In situations where the key gatekeeper is not the right person to participate in this research project, I will still seek their permission to carry out my research, ensuring that I am complying with their ethical procedures and have their institutional approval. I will make it clear to all research participants both before and during the interview, that regardless of how they came to be part of the research process they can withdraw at any time and that the reason to cancel the interview will be kept confidential. I will also stop the interview myself if I feel the participant is uncomfortable. In addition, I have also designed a follow up debriefing letter that reiterates the purpose of the research and explains to participants they can still withdraw even though they have already been interviewed.	
	c) pupils or students recruited through educational institutions (e.g. primary schools, secondary schools, colleges)?		X

			Yes	No
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			
d)	clients/volunteers/service users recruited through voluntary public services?			X
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			
e)	participants living in residential care, social care, nursing homes, re-ablement centres hospitals or hospices?			X
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			
f)	recruited by virtue of their employment in the police or armed forces?			X
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			
g)	adults who are in prison, remanded on bail or in custody?			X
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			
h)	who may not be able to refuse to participate in the research?			X
	If YES, please explain how permission will be gained			

Online and Internet Research

Question		Yes	No
1	Will any part of your study involve collecting data by means of electronic media (e.g. the Internet, e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, online forums, etc)?		X
	If YES, please explain how you will obtain permission to collect data by this means		
2	Is there a possibility that the study will encourage children under 18 to access inappropriate websites, or correspond with people who pose risk of harm?		X
	If YES, please explain further		
3	Will the study incur any other risks that arise specifically from the use of electronic media?		X
	If YES, please explain further		
4	Will you be using survey collection software (e.g. BoS, Filemaker)?		X
	If YES, please explain which software		
	Have you taken necessary precautions for secure data management, in accordance with data protection and CU Policy?	X	

5	If NO	please explain why not	
	If YES	Specify location where data will be stored	All electronic data will be stored on an encrypted drive, while any paper information will be kept in a locked cabinet in my personal office, which I alone will have the key too. This is aligned with my data management plan, which can be found attached to this ethics application and contains more information regarding this.
		Planned disposal date	31/10/2030

If the research is funded by an external organisation, are there any requirements for storage and disposal?			X
If YES, please specify details			

Languages

	Question	Yes	No
1	Are all or some of the consent forms, information leaflets and research instruments associated with this project likely to be used in languages other than English?		X
	If YES, please specify the language[s] to be used		
2	Have some or all of the translations been undertaken by you or a member of the research team?		
	Are these translations in lay language and likely to be clearly understood by the research participants?		
	Please describe the procedures used when undertaking research instrument translation (e.g. forward and back translation), clarifying strategies for ensuring the validity and reliability or trustworthiness of the translation		
3	Have some or all of the translations been undertaken by a third party?		
	If YES, please specify the name[s] of the persons or agencies performing the translations		

Please describe the procedures used when undertaking research instrument translation (e.g. forward and back translation), clarifying strategies for ensuring the validity and reliability of the translation		

Laboratory/Workshops

	Question	Yes	No
1	Does any part of the project involve work a laboratory or workshop in which could pose risks to you, or others? researchers		X
	If YES: If you have risk assessments for laboratory or workshop activities you can refer to them here & upload them at the end, or explain in the text box how you will manage those risks		

Research with non-human vertebrates

	Question	Yes	No
1	Will any part of the project involve animal habitats or tissues or nonhuman vertebrates?		X
	If YES, please give details		
2	Does the project involve any procedure to the protected animal whilst it is still alive?		
3	Will any part of your project involve the study of animals in their natural habitat?		
	If YES, please give details		
4	Will the project involve the recording of behaviour of animals in a nonnatural setting that is outside the control of the researcher?		
	If YES, please give details		
5	Will your field work involve any direct intervention other than recording the behaviour of the animals available for observation?		
	If YES, please give details		
6	Is the species you plan to research endangered, locally rare or part of a sensitive ecosystem protected by legislation?		
	If YES, please give details		
7	Is there any significant possibility that the welfare of the target species of those sharing the local environment/habitat will be detrimentally affected?		
	If YES, please give details		
8	Is there any significant possibility that the habitat of the animals will be damaged by the project, such that their health and survival will be endangered?		
	If YES, please give details		
9	Will project work involve intervention work in a non-natural setting in relation to invertebrate species other than Octopus vulgaris?		
	If YES, please give details		

Blood Sampling / Human Tissue Analysis

	Question	Yes	No
1	Does your study involve collecting or use of human tissues or fluids? (e.g. collecting urine, saliva, blood or use of cell lines, 'dead' blood)		X
	If YES, please give details		

2	If your study involves blood samples or body fluids (e.g. urine, saliva) have you clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed (e.g. The British Association of Sport and Exercise Science Physiological Testing Guidelines (2007) or equivalent) and that they are in line with the level of risk?		
	If NO, please explain why not		
3	If your study involves human tissue other than blood and saliva, have you clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be followed (e.g. The Human Tissues Act, or equivalent) and that they are in line with level of risk?		
	If NO, please explain why not		

Travel

	Question	Yes	No
1	Does any part of the project require data collection off campus? (e.g. work in the field or community)	X	

	If YES: You must consider the potential hazards from off campus activities (e.g. working alone, time of data collection, unfamiliar or hazardous locations, using equipment, the terrain, violence or aggression from others). Outline the precautions that will be taken to manage these risks, AS A MINIMUM this must detail how researchers would summon assistance in an emergency when working off campus. For complex or high risk projects you may wish to complete and upload a separate risk assessment	I am aware of the hazards of working off campus and have identified the following as areas of concern and mitigation: Lone working and feeling isolated - Although some of my fieldwork and data collection may require me to work alone I will keep in regular contact with my supervision team, checking in with them every couple of days when I am away from campus for a prolonged period of time, which will allow me to seek help when struggling. Furthermore, if I am worried that my mental health may be affected due to this lone working I will seek support from my GP. Travel using public transport - whenever I have to travel I will plan the route ahead of time, along with having an alternative route mapped out in case any of my original travel plans fall through. My supervision team will also have copies of my travel plan and I will check in with them and confirm when I have arrived at my destination. Interviews with the public - all interviews, when conducted in person, will be done during working hours and in the offices of the organisations who are involved in my research. My supervision team will be aware of my whereabouts during this and I will let them know that I am safe.		
2	Does any part of the project involve the researcher travelling outside the UK (or to very remote UK locations)?		X	
	If YES: Please give details of where, when and how you will be travelling. For travel to high risk places you may wish to complete and upload a separate risk assessment	Although focused on Somalia my research will not take place there, but in the head offices of the organisations included in my research or via Skype. Currently, the exact locations of my fieldwork have not be confirmed but I've identified a number of organisations to approach to be involved in this study, and these are located in the		

		following countries: US, Canada, Norway, Kenya, Djibouti.		
		I will finalise travel arrangements once these organisations have been contacted and it is confirmed whether the meeting will be conducted in person or via Skype. This will include ensuring that the areas I plan to visit are considered safe by Red24 and FCO. Furthermore, I will seek advice from those who have travelled to countries that I have not previously visited, and where appropriate I will seek medical advice before travelling. I will also ensure I have appropriate medical insurance. Finally, I will make sure that I have booked accommodation in a safe area and that my supervision team have all the relevant contact details for me whilst away. If I intend to work on any locations not stated on this application, I will ask Jane Arthur to re-open my application and add these.		
3	Are all travellers aware of contact numbers for emergency assitance when away (e.g. local emergency assistance, ambulance/local hospital/police, insurance helpline [+44 (0) 2071 737797] and CU's 24/7 emergency line [+44 (0) 2476 888555])?		X	
4	Are there any travel warnings in place advising against all, or essential only travel to the destination? NOTE: Before travel to countries with 'against all travel', or 'essential only' travel warnings, staff must check with Finance to ensure insurance coverage is not affected. Undergraduate projects in high risk destinations will not be approved			X
5	Are there increased risks to health and safety related to the destination? e.g. cultural differences, civil unrest, climate, crime, health outbreaks/concerns, and travel arrangements?			X
	If YES, please specify			
6	Do all travelling members of the research team have adequate travel insurance?		X	
7	Please confirm all travelling researchers have been advised to seek medical advice regarding vaccinations, medical conditions etc, from their GP		X	