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Published PDF deposited in Coventry University's Repository

**Original citation:**

Glazzard, A 2022, 'Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration: A Framework for Planning, Design and Evaluation of Programmatic Interventions', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. (in press), pp. (in press).

<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2098553>

DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2022.2098553

ISSN 1057-610X

ESSN 1521-0731

Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group

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# Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration: A Framework for Planning, Design and Evaluation of Programmatic Interventions

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## ABSTRACT

Disengagement from violent extremism and reintegration into mainstream society have been the focus of significant research over the last 15 years. However, programs to facilitate or bring about violent extremist disengagement and reintegration are under-researched, largely as a result of the opacity of these programs and difficulties in access. Understanding how and why programs work or do not work is also impeded by conceptual confusion, and by four specific problems which have been discussed in the relevant literature: insufficient attention to the context and environment surrounding programmatic interventions, lack of clarity over their intended outcomes, lack of specificity in responses, and simplistic models of causation. The paper endorses previous studies recommending the use of realist evaluation to understand disengagement and reintegration interventions, and proposes a conceptual framework derived from an extensive review of the relevant literature to support planning, design and evaluation of interventions.

## ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 28 February 2022  
Accepted 27 June 2022

How and why people disengage from violent extremist or terrorist activity has been a significant focus of research for terrorism researchers for at least fifteen years. A combination of theory development (much of which draws from mainstream psychology and criminology) and empirical studies (based on interviews or written accounts of former terrorists) has focused on the psychological mechanisms of disengagement.<sup>1</sup> Numerous studies have highlighted the conceptual issues at hand, notably the distinction between disengagement (withdrawing from violent extremist behavior) and deradicalization (withdrawing or being conditioned to withdraw from violent extremist belief).<sup>2</sup> The impact of some of this research is evident now in policy conversations and the discourse of practitioners: ‘disengagement’ is being used increasingly as a more accurate alternative to ‘deradicalization’,<sup>3</sup> while practitioners working in the field of disengagement are more realistic about what can be achieved with subjects of disengagement.

Substantial gaps remain, however. While disengagement has been recognized as a process that may happen either spontaneously, or through force of circumstances, or as a result of a programmatic intervention, interventions remain notoriously opaque, or even shielded from external, independent study.<sup>4</sup> We therefore know more about

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how individual violent extremists disengage of their own accord or through force of circumstances than we do about how they may be encouraged or influenced to do so. We also know little about what happens after a process of disengagement, when a violent extremist returns to or is resettled in a community.<sup>5</sup>

A complicating factor is the rich but discordant terminology. The preceding two paragraphs have already introduced three keywords that are important to discussing these phenomena – disengagement, reintegration and deradicalization. But there are many more that are used – sometimes precisely, sometimes indiscriminately and interchangeably – in the literature, including desistance, deprogramming, disaffiliation, demobilization and defection, plus rehabilitation, reform, reeducation, reconciliation and resilience. Some of these words are so slippery that they can mean different things to different people.<sup>6</sup>

This paper seeks to clarify some of these concepts and the relationship between them in the form of a conceptual framework that draws from realist evaluation – an approach that examines social interventions in terms of the relationship between the contexts in which they take place, the outcomes they achieve and the mechanisms used to achieve them. The framework is proposed not only to support academic discussion but also as a tool for practitioners involved in planning, designing and implementing disengagement and reintegration interventions.

## **Aims and Methods**

Drawing on realist evaluation theory and building on previous studies by Veldhuis (2012) and Gielen (2017), this paper aims to provide conceptual clarification by differentiating five dimensions of disengagement and reintegration and thereby create a more precise and accurate conceptual framework.<sup>7</sup> It synthesizes the existing literature on disengagement and reintegration to identify four problems which have led to confusion about terminology, processes and outcomes. Any studies which were not relevant to disengagement interventions, either implicitly or explicitly, were excluded. Relevant studies ( $n=52$ ) were identified by keyword searching using Google Scholar supplemented by handsearching of targeted websites, snowballing, and consultation with experts in the field. A full-text review of each study was undertaken to identify a) any findings relating to problems in conceptualizing, planning or evaluating disengagement and reintegration interventions and b) any criteria proposed for planning, designing or evaluating interventions that would solve or mitigate these problems. The analysis yielded a set of four problems, each of which was discussed in multiple studies. The realist evaluation approach proposed by Veldhuis and Gielen was identified as a promising approach to solve these problems, albeit requiring some adaptation to take account of where the standard realist evaluation approach falls short. This analysis led to the creation of a conceptual framework, which is offered as a testable prototype tool for both planning/designing and evaluating disengagement and reintegration interventions.

## **Findings**

Synthesis and analysis of the 52 studies reviewed identified four problems relating to the contexts of interventions, their intended outcomes, the specificity of their targeting, and the intervention logics or mechanisms that were presumed or intended to be employed.

### **Problem 1: Insufficient Attention to Context and Environment**

Research on disengagement has focused on how and why individuals leave terrorist groups or desist from terrorism. Most of the landmark studies address the psychology of motivation and behavior, identifying causal ('push and pull') factors such as disillusionment with leaders or organizations, changes in circumstances or opportunities, and the appeal of alternative (non-extreme) social networks.<sup>8</sup> The most substantial contributions have come from academic psychologists who are primarily interested in cognitive and behavioral processes and motivations at the individual level.<sup>9</sup> Such studies provide valuable accounts of why some individuals choose to disengage from terrorism and some do not. But by focusing on individual motivation and behavior and, in most cases, relying on interviews with former violent extremists and/or analysis of published accounts, these studies address context and environment – if at all – as variables in an individual's decision-making process. This is hardly surprising, given the reluctance of governments, international donors and implementing agencies to open up their intervention programs to research and evaluation: one systematic review found only six studies which clearly and relevantly addressed disengagement interventions, while another, which found only sixteen empirical studies encompassing preventative as well as disengagement interventions.<sup>10</sup>

However, it is also noted in passing in several studies that 'context matters' especially with respect to interventions.<sup>11</sup> Horgan, for example, notes that disengagement interventions 'will also be context-specific and necessarily nuanced both in terms of how the programs are constructed, implemented, and promoted in different countries.'<sup>12</sup> Context matters for at least two reasons. First, 'pushes' and 'pulls' are by definition extrinsic to the individual: in the case of disengagement interventions, context determines who will be subject to interventions, how the interventions can be designed to work, and what they can achieve. If, as is often assumed, radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups are context-dependent, it stands to reason that disengagement will be also. In other words, the conditions in which an intervention takes place potentially determines its outcomes: whether disengagement and reintegration can be achieved at all may be determined by the security environment (including the degree of conflict violence), the political environment, state and institutional capacity, and the level of economic development.<sup>13</sup> Second, and more importantly, the world outside the intervention and the individual beneficiary is more than mere background. Clubb et al. point out that disengagement and reintegration interventions are designed to align their populations with the "moral views of the surrounding majority (or mainstream) environment", but the environment has largely been overlooked in the literature as an object of study in favor of individual-level psychological mechanisms.<sup>14</sup> One of the few studies to directly investigate the relationship between context and outcome introduces the useful concept of the 'milieu' – the setting into which disengaged or disengaging violent extremists are inserted, and which may be sympathetic to the violent group, neutral, or strongly opposed.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, 'context' can be understood broadly and vaguely as a catch-all term. Grip and Kotajoki suggest that structural context can be distinguished from an intervention's physical and social setting. It is clear that the political system, the level of economic development, the character of society that pertains in a particular country or region and the presence or degree of civil conflict are significant influences on

what interventions aim to or can achieve. But these are very different from the proximate factors that may have a direct and immediate influence on the effectiveness of an intervention.

### **Problem 2: Lack of Clarity over Intended Outcomes**

The terminology of disengagement and reintegration outcomes is notoriously imprecise.<sup>16</sup> This is most evident in the disengagement/deradicalization debate, which continues despite the established finding from mainstream psychology that extreme attitudes do not necessarily lead to extreme behaviors.<sup>17</sup> An early contribution asserted that “deradicalization is still the more appropriate goal for programs that seek to counter Islamist extremism”;<sup>18</sup> more recent studies argue that evidence of attitudinal change may be required on public safety grounds or to satisfy the expectation of receiving communities.<sup>19</sup> However, it is far from clear what the word deradicalization actually means. Horgan notes that it is used in at least two senses to mean both actual cognitive change and programmatic interventions.<sup>20</sup> Clubb et al. observe that its range of meanings are so broad that they might include anything from a fundamental reorientation of an individual’s radical worldview to a more limited change in perspective about the ethics of violence. Moreover, ‘deradicalization’ is potentially used in three different domains: as branding, as an activity (i.e. that is focused on ideology), and as an outcome (i.e. a change of attitudes).<sup>21</sup> This debate over deradicalization links to a parallel uncertainty about ideology: if ideology is interpreted broadly to mean a fully developed system of meaning, then deradicalization requires more fundamental and ambitious attitudinal changes; if, however, it is interpreted more narrowly to mean a set of problematic values, behaviors and attitudes, then deradicalization may be more focused on changing attitudes toward violence.<sup>22</sup>

Disengagement is a largely neutral term to denote ‘walking away from terrorism’, and is a near synonym for the term ‘desistance’ that is widely used in criminology.<sup>23</sup> Achieving disengagement or desistance may not be the ultimate objective of an intervention, however. Disengagement and/or deradicalization are sometimes conceptualized as intermediate outcomes to a more permanent or sustainable role change. Here, the literature again identifies a number of near-synonyms, including reintegration (discussed further below), rehabilitation (a term from criminology where it is widely used in the context of behavior change programs in prisons), reconciliation (a term from peacebuilding, where it is usually applied at a group level to describe the process of building bridges between communities previously in conflict) and resilience (a particularly subjective and variable concept that can be applied at the individual or community level, and can mean anything from the capacity to withstand adversity to being strengthened by exposure to trauma).<sup>24</sup>

What, though, is reintegration? The literature on terrorism and violent extremism makes few attempts to conceptualize reintegration beyond rather circular statements that it involves adopting a ‘pro-social’ role and identity.<sup>25</sup> With few exceptions, most studies of violent extremist disengagement assume that reintegration occurs (if at all) as a consequence of disengagement, and leave it at that.<sup>26</sup> The field of post-conflict disengagement (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or DDR) uses the term

to mean supporting former combatants (economically, socially and politically) so as to make a successful transition into civilian life.<sup>27</sup> DDR programs, however, have been criticized for paying insufficient regard to the social dimension of reintegration: for reintegration to be both sustainable and equitable it must recognize the needs of both the former combatant and the receiving community.<sup>28</sup> Where reintegration has been examined conceptually, it is clear that the community, or what Clubb and Tapley call the milieu, is fundamental to reintegration.<sup>29</sup> Reintegration requires not only a willing former combatant or extremist but also a willing community, and as the DDR literature also demonstrates, barriers to reintegration, such as stigmatization of former extremists or resentment at their apparently favorable treatment, may be entirely beyond the scope of the intervention's beneficiary.<sup>30</sup>

These issues are more than semantic: they are fundamental to ensuring that interventions can achieve their desired outcomes. The outcomes implied by such terms as disengagement, deradicalization, reintegration are qualitatively and substantially different. They may operate with different populations and on different scales: Özerdem, for instance, distinguishes between individual-centric approaches to disengagement (restraint and rehabilitation) and those which emphasize the community (reform and reintegration), noting that reintegration by definition requires creating and strengthening community ties and other forms of social capital.<sup>31</sup> But their connections and overlaps also suggest interdependence: outcomes may be sequential or hierarchical (i.e. one outcome follows or is subordinate to another). It is often assumed that desistance/disengagement precedes reintegration, and there is certainly evidence that communities are more likely to accept individuals they perceive to have been subject to behavioral or cognitive change programs.<sup>32</sup> However, it is also conceivable that the sequence can run in the opposite direction, i.e. that immersion in a community setting can help to establish the alternative social networks that Kenney and Hwang, among others, identify as being the most significant factor in disengagement.<sup>33</sup>

Unspecified outcomes mean not only that effectiveness is impossible to measure, but also that an intervention is less likely to achieve positive results.<sup>34</sup> Some progress has, however, been made in addressing this issue conceptually. Drawing on mainstream criminology, for instance, Marsden uses the terminology of desistance (from crime) to propose a distinction between primary and secondary desistance from terrorism/violent extremism, where primary desistance is ceasing to carry out the offending activity and equivalent to disengagement in the broader literature, and secondary desistance is a change in outlook whereby an individual ceases to consider themselves to be an offender. Secondary desistance is thus broadly equivalent to deradicalization, whilst avoiding the connotation of cognitive change or ideological conditioning implied by 'deradicalization'.<sup>35</sup> Criminologists have also posed the possibility of tertiary desistance, in which the former criminal embraces a pro-social role. If society accepts the former offender, then tertiary desistance can be equated to reintegration.<sup>36</sup>

The implications of poorly specified outcomes are illustrated by an unresolved discussion over how to measure results, in particular whether recidivism, i.e. the rate at which individuals subjected to disengagement interventions return to violent extremist groups, is the most accurate and appropriate criterion for success.<sup>37</sup> Numerous programs claim success, with varying levels of plausibility, measured by extremely low

levels of recidivism.<sup>38</sup> But even if these measures are accurate (which is open to doubt, given that the programs concerned lack transparency), recidivism is a potentially unreliable yardstick as terrorist offenders tend to show low recidivism rates even when not subjected to interventions, and recidivism fails to capture the cognitive and wider behavioral changes which are often sought.<sup>39</sup> The need for more appropriate metrics is often discussed, but so far there is no consensus on what these should be.

A further complication arises in conflict or post-conflict situations, where the line between conflict protagonist and violent extremist/terrorist can be blurred. When it emerged as a field of practice in the 1990s, DDR was designed to ensure that ceasefires and peace agreements endured by preventing and discouraging the return of belligerents to the battlefield. When the armed groups who are subject to DDR interventions are of a particular (usually Islamist) ideological orientation, DDR potentially takes on a different character and draws closer to violent extremist disengagement and reintegration.<sup>40</sup> More recent instances of DDR have, by necessity, become sensitive to violent extremist conflict participation and demonstrated greater flexibility by seeking to disengage violent extremist belligerents while conflicts remain active (so-called 'third-generation DDR').<sup>41</sup> This raises the question of whether interventions to reduce violent extremist radicalization and recruitment can or should be aimed at groups rather than at individuals, at conflict participants rather than at detainees, and be focused on mitigating conflict factors rather than reducing risk at the individual level – outcomes that could be expressed by DDR's concept of 'demobilization'. Rather than being another synonym for disengagement or rehabilitation, the emergence of 'third-generation' DDR suggests that demobilization may be a valid and analytically distinct outcome.

### ***Problem 3: Lack of Specificity in Proposed Responses***

How do disengagement and reintegration programs actually work? In the disengagement literature, it is clear that the debate over 'deradicalization' versus 'disengagement' has led to a rather blunt typological framework where interventions are categorized according to whether they are ideological or behavioral.<sup>42</sup> However, despite a number of studies seeking to classify disengagement interventions, these are rarely specific about what is supposed to cause the desired change. Drawing on interviews with disengaged extremists in Australia, Barrelle synthesizes reasons given for leaving violent extremist groups into five 'domains': 'social relations' (negative relationships with extremists and positive relationships with others), 'coping' (responding to physical, psychological and social stresses and supports), 'identity' (reducing identification with the group, increasing identification with others, and self-actualization), 'ideology' (disillusionment with the violent group's ideas and the appeal of alternatives) and 'action orientation' (disillusionment with violent methods and the development of pro-social identity).<sup>43</sup> Although this is a useful descriptive framework, Koehler observes that it does not specify the psychological mechanisms at work.<sup>44</sup> In his study, Koehler synthesizes existing research to list intervention types and activities, including relocation, education, vocational training and employment support, mentoring (by professionals or former extremists), conflict management training, psychological counseling and therapy, creative activities, critical thinking training, theological/ideological debating, victim-perpetrator



dialogues, sports activities, media production, and participation in research.<sup>45</sup> However, although this is a much more fine-grained typology than simply distinguishing interventions into changing attitudes or behaviors, it remains a list of activities rather than an identification of specific mechanisms. Bjørgo and Horgan simply differentiate between types of organization running the intervention.<sup>46</sup> Rabasa et al. get closer to mechanisms by distinguishing between affective, pragmatic and normative (i.e. ideological) intervention types while suggesting that successful programs are likely to encompass all three.<sup>47</sup>

This is not simply a deficiency in the available typologies: the lack of robust and independent studies of how interventions work (and are expected to work) means that we can only rely on accounts of former extremists who have, almost without exception, left terrorist/violent extremist groups of their own accord. In the most comprehensive study of such accounts, no individual disengaged partly or wholly as a result of an intervention.<sup>48</sup> Those studies which do address actual interventions are either so methodologically weak or biased as to be unreliable, or (in the case of studies of the Serendi Center in Somalia and a prison disengagement program in Nigeria) lack the empirical data required to draw conclusions about how and why the program worked (if, indeed, it did).<sup>49</sup>

#### ***Problem 4: Overly Simplified Models of Causation***

The limitations of the ‘deradicalization versus disengagement’ debate also obscures the complexity of disengagement processes. The recognition that radicalization and recruitment are complex and multi-factorial has not been fully matched by scholarship on the opposite phenomenon, where a simplified ‘push-pull’ framing, first proposed by Bjørgo in 1997, remains influential.<sup>50</sup> However, this framing was endorsed by Horgan in 2009 but then subsequently problematized by him and several coauthors with explorations of alternative models drawn from social psychology and sociology.<sup>51</sup> In particular, Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan (2014) summarized suspected push and pull factors before examining two alternative approaches. The ‘investment model’ explains social-psychological commitment (to an organization, movement, relationship etc.) with a quasi-economic formula, in which commitment is equal to satisfaction (actual and expected) minus alternatives plus investments. Role exit theory proposes a series of phases that characterize the process of leaving a role, from initial doubts, to seeking and weighing alternatives, to a turning point prior to role exit. Altier et al. propose that the investment model (which enjoys substantial empirical validation in non-terrorism situations) helps to explain why individuals leave terrorist groups, while role exit theory (which they criticize for its linearity and its lack of empirical validation) may help explain how they leave. However, while this study valuably proposes a refinement of the ‘push-pull’ model, acknowledging the complexity and dynamism of interactions between factors, it nevertheless retains that model’s basic assumptions that an individual’s decision to leave is made on the basis of an interaction of pushes and pulls.<sup>52</sup>

Developing an accurate causal theory is not simply an academic issue but one with substantive practical implications: Veldhuis, for instance, draws on the wider criminological literature to show that interventions with clear models or theories of causation



are more likely to be effective.<sup>53</sup> What, then, do push-pull models of causation leave out that a more comprehensive model focused on interventions should include? The first is factors that are extrinsic to the intervention. These are similar and sometimes related to the context discussed above, but can be distinguished analytically because they can be viewed as being part of the causal mechanism that creates attitudinal or behavioral change in individual subjects, rather than constituting the broader environment which shapes the intervention. Extrinsic factors may include, for example, social relationships between individuals undergoing treatment and staff involved in delivery, employment opportunities which may incentivize disengagement and facilitate reintegration, and the social acceptance of disengagement and reintegration programs.<sup>54</sup> Some of these may reasonably be described as ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors but that framing does little to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic, proximal from distal, or structural from individual. Differentiating the environment in which an intervention takes place from its immediate setting thus distinguishes background from foreground, or broader contextual factors from more immediate incentives, enablers and constraints. While it is vital to acknowledge that these influences operate in complex and dynamic ways, their interaction cannot be understood or studied without distinguishing them.

The second major omission of the ‘push-pull’ model is the population, that is the cohort of individuals who are the subjects of a specific intervention. The disengagement literature repeatedly emphasizes the need to differentiate populations and avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and scholars advocating a public health approach to countering violent extremism classify interventions by population segment rather than activity type.<sup>55</sup> Specific populations discussed in the literature include women,<sup>56</sup> children,<sup>57</sup> fighters versus ‘camp followers’ and supporters,<sup>58</sup> prisoners,<sup>59</sup> refugees and internally displaced people,<sup>60</sup> and voluntary participants versus those who are coerced.<sup>61</sup> In addition, there is considerable discussion of differentiating populations by the level of security risk they present, and/or by the nature of their psycho-social and material needs.<sup>62</sup> Classifying factors into those which impel (push factors) and those which attract (pull factors) over-simplifies not only the complex interplays of different factors but also their variability between population categories.

## Discussion

Frameworks that conceptualize involvement and engagement in violent extremism have become increasingly nuanced and complex, reflecting the growing recognition that people become violent extremists for different reasons and follow different pathways, and that in each case there is likely to be a convergence of factors.<sup>63</sup> However, models and frameworks for disengagement are sometimes based on conceptualisations or typologies that differentiate between superficial characteristics such as organizational type or activities implemented. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a theoretically informed framework that acknowledges the multi-level complexity of disengagement and reintegration. However, it is important to be clear about what such a framework could achieve. A theoretical framework would theorize the causal pathways of disengagement and reintegration, to show how different factors in combination might contribute to those outcomes. A conceptual framework would analyze the phenomenon by describing its constitutive elements in order to provide greater clarity but not

theorize causality.<sup>64</sup> The analysis of the literature set out above suggests that, while understanding of individual disengagement processes is fairly advanced, understanding of how programmatic interventions may or may not work is much more limited. This suggests that developing a conceptual framework is more achievable at this point.

### ***Realist Evaluation as a Method for Understanding Interventions***

The four problems set out in the analysis above suggest, in combination, that we lack analytical tools to support interventions that a) differentiate between the dimensions of disengagement and reintegration, b) address the fundamentals of these processes rather than their superficial characteristics, c) comprehensively address factors that determine or influence outcomes, and d) account for variation in cases. In summary, the study of disengagement and reintegration interventions tends toward a search for a universal approach.<sup>65</sup> In evaluating interventions in complex social contexts, one approach that explicitly addresses complexity and variability is known as realist evaluation. Whereas the question often posed by policymakers and practitioners with responsibility for a social problem is ‘what works?’, realist evaluation counters that such a question is too general to be answerable. Instead, the appropriate questions are: what works where (in what circumstances), for whom, and how?<sup>66</sup> Whereas ‘what works?’ focuses particularly or exclusively on mechanisms – the processes that cause changes to occur – realist evaluation examines mechanisms together with outcomes (i.e. the changes the intervention seeks to achieve) and the context, defined as “the conditions in which programmes are introduced that are relevant to the operation the programme mechanisms ... to address the issues of ‘for whom’ and ‘in what circumstances’ a programme will work”.<sup>67</sup> The three dimensions are then assessed together, to derive the main output of a realist evaluation – the intervention’s ‘context-mechanism-outcome configuration.’ This builds in greater complexity than is available to more linear models by placing change as the effect of a combination of factors on different levels or in different dimensions. Realist evaluation therefore can be seen as an antidote to the tendency of policymakers to seek simple solutions to complex problems. For this reason, a realist evaluation approach has been advocated not only as means of evaluating disengagement programs but also designing them.<sup>68</sup>

Returning to the four problems discussing above, a realist evaluation approach potentially addresses each in whole or in part. What is most distinctive about the realist evaluation approach is its emphasis on context. However, this is easily misunderstood as mere background. In realist evaluation, contextual factors include those relating to geography and location, the political, social and economic environment, and more immediate physical and social factors. As Pawson and Tilley put it: “Depending on the nature of the intervention, what is contextually significant may not only relate to place but also to systems of interpersonal and social relationships, and even to biology, technology, economic conditions and so on”.<sup>69</sup> Applying this caveat to interventions aimed at violent extremism, Gielen adds: “Features of contextual significance may relate not only to a physical space (e.g. a prison) or a geographical location (e.g. Amsterdam) but also to the target audience (e.g. demographics and motivational factors of extremists), the individual capacities of key actors (e.g. the training or experience

level of the intervention provider), the interpersonal relationships between intervention providers and the extremist and the broader institutional setting (e.g. the infrastructure of the municipality)”<sup>70</sup>

The multiplicity of potential outcomes which characterizes disengagement, reintegration and similar interventions is also catered for in the realist evaluation method, which accommodates variable or disaggregated outcomes, including unintended ones, within the concept of ‘outcome patterns’, implying not a simple objective but a combination of “the intended and unintended consequences of programs, resulting from the activation of different mechanisms in different contexts”.<sup>71</sup> This helpfully moves away from a straightforward acceptance of an intervention’s stated aim or the label applied to it, and toward a more specific understanding of the full range of results and effects. For example, Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor, which is labeled as a ‘deradicalization’ program by Nigeria’s federal government, also seeks to disengage cohorts of detainees through education, vocational training and social activities, and includes strategic communications campaigns to encourage defection of Boko Haram elements.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, whether in practice it attempts to actually ‘deradicalize’, let alone succeeds in doing so, is open to doubt given that only a minority of its cohorts are believed to be active Boko Haram members, and even those are mostly judged to be low-risk.<sup>73</sup> Specific outcomes proposed in the disengagement and reintegration literature include a change in attitudes toward violence,<sup>74</sup> a move away from attitudes that dehumanize others,<sup>75</sup> and what Koehler calls ‘repluralization’, that is a tolerance of multiple and nuanced values.<sup>76</sup> Specifying actual outcomes also potentially moves discussion of disengagement and reintegration from the unproductive debate over contested key terms, such as ‘deradicalization’ or ‘resilience’ – a favored term for practitioners in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism, but one that has a broad range of meanings that is often applied with little precision.<sup>77</sup>

Pawson and Tilley’s definition of outcome patterns as the consequences of mechanisms working in specific contexts highlights the importance of distinguishing the outcome from the mechanism that created it. That distinction enables us to recast the causation hypothesis behind ‘deradicalization’ into a more precise and potentially testable form. For example, a hypothesis in the form of “cognitive mechanism *a* will in context *b* produce attitudinal change *x* and/or behavioral change *y*” provides clarity, specificity and thereby testability. Most importantly, specifying outcome patterns in this way forces an appraisal of causality that addresses the actual mechanisms of causation. In realist evaluation, ‘mechanism’ is the term for the process by which change is effected, but it is different from what Pawson and Tilley label as the *measure* (the activity or set of activities that comprise an intervention).<sup>78</sup> A single measure may employ several mechanisms, including ones not considered by designers and implementers, and may be hidden from view. Identifying the mechanism is therefore likely to require inferential reasoning which would then need to be tested empirically if the aim is to prove what was effective in an intervention.

For example, a hypothetical intervention labeled as a ‘deradicalization’ program might appear to work through ideological training, but a realist evaluation could show the actual mechanism at work to be something different, such as the beneficiaries receiving individual attention from program staff, or the social activity with other beneficiaries that accompanies the training. In addition, the realist evaluation approach

would also identify the contextual factors that condition or influence the mechanisms at work. To take an actual case, Saudi Arabia's well-known Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After-Care (PRAC) program, which uses religious training, individual and group activities and practical support for reintegration, has reportedly claimed a success rate of 80-90%.<sup>79</sup> Leaving aside important questions as to the reliability of this claim, and how success is conceptualized and measured, realist evaluation would require an assessment of how contextual factors, such as political and social structures and the social status of beneficiaries, might influence the program's results. In a country with a highly normative religious outlook, prescriptive social traditions and draconian laws to enforce compliance with social and religious norms, it is at least conceivable that the program's graduates have greater incentives to conform with the desired outcomes.<sup>80</sup> The advantage of adopting a realist evaluation approach to disengagement interventions is that it forces an appraisal of extrinsic factors in determining causality. That is not to say that extrinsic factors necessarily and by themselves determine the outcome: the 'pattern configuration' formulation suggests that the outcome is determined by a combination of context and mechanism. Such an approach may be particularly valuable in situations where there is little or no control or influence over conditions. Disengagement interventions are never undertaken under laboratory conditions, where the influence of the contextual factors can be controlled completely, but they are sometimes undertaken in settings such as well-functioning prisons where the authorities can at least influence the immediate environment of the intervention. But where there is less control – because of weak institutional capacity, security pressures, or because the intervention is being conducted outside an institution – extrinsic factors are more likely to contribute to success or failure. Realist evaluation thus has the potential to support the development of more complex and more accurate models of causation than are currently available.

### ***Limitations of Realist Evaluation in Disengagement and Reintegration Interventions***

Realist evaluation does not, however, fully answer the four problems identified in the literature. In particular, the realist evaluation category of 'context' is extremely broad. Gielen's analysis usefully breaks down context into an illustrative list of components but this list includes components that are so fundamental to disengagement interventions that they stretch the definition of 'context' so far as to potentially make the term unhelpful, if not misleading. Several categories in what realist evaluation calls 'context' are part of the intervention, including material factors such as physical settings, and intangible ones such as the interpersonal relationships that provide the social capital required by an intervention. (These can also be described as constraining or enabling factors, i.e. ones which impede or facilitate disengagement or reintegration but do not cause it.<sup>81</sup>) In particular, the 'target audience' by definition is not a contextual factor, but the specific focus of the intervention. Indeed, in other fields it is customary to place target populations at the center of analytical or evaluative frameworks as a separate category. For example, the PICO framework commonly used in systematic reviews, especially in the medical sciences, distinguishes population, intervention, comparison and outcomes.<sup>82</sup> The DDR literature also emphasizes the importance of differentiating

populations by motivations for disengagement and reintegration (e.g. financial, social or legal) and by characteristics such as seniority, role, nature of engagement in the armed group, and demographic features.<sup>83</sup>

### ***Developing a Framework***

The preceding discussion suggests that realist evaluation provides a valuable starting point for a more fine-grained framework for understanding disengagement and reintegration interventions than the more simplistic framework offered by the ‘push-pull’ framing. Whilst realist evaluation has been promoted by Veldhuis and successfully demonstrated in this area by Gielen, the discussion above suggests that it suffers from a significant limitation in its use of context as a ‘catch-all’ category for anything that does not fall into mechanism and outcome.<sup>84</sup> The solution proposed here is to adapt or refine the ‘context-mechanism-outcome’ formulation by dividing the realist category of ‘context’ into three categories: political and social context, setting, and population. Political and social context covers those factors that may affect an intervention but which are extrinsic to it. These would include political factors, such as the nature of the political system of the country or area in which the intervention is taking place (e.g. free/democratic/open or authoritarian/repressive), its level of economic development (high income, middle income, low income), its social characteristics (e.g. levels of religiosity, social conservatism versus social liberalism) and, crucially for disengagement and reintegration interventions, its level of stability.<sup>85</sup> The literature makes clear that stability at all levels – from the provision of basic security to the nature and extent of civil conflicts in the country or region – is often a significant constraint on what can be achieved.<sup>86</sup>

Setting is differentiated from context as it constitutes actual places where conditions are likely to have a direct and specific impact on the intervention. For disengagement programs, settings can be differentiated by the degree of control over the environment. Prisons obviously present the most controlled environments (although even these will differ significantly from well-run high-security establishments to open prisons or ones with low levels of security).<sup>87</sup> Numerous prison-based interventions have been documented in the last fifteen years, including notable programs in Australia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Israel and Nigeria.<sup>88</sup> Interventions may also take place following release, as with programs operated by the probation services of the Netherlands and the U.K.<sup>89</sup> Disengagement interventions may also take place in non-custodial settings that are relatively controlled, such as camps for refugees or internally displaced people, residential youth facilities like the Houri Center in Northeast Syria, or special centers for rehabilitation such as Somalia’s Serendi Center, or locations outside an institution, such as the EXIT programs for right-wing extremists in Western and Central Europe are often conducted in community settings.<sup>90</sup> Setting also subsumes some of the factors that are sometimes attributed to the actor delivering the program, such as a prison service versus an NGO.<sup>91</sup> Differentiating by setting also enables interventions aimed at reintegration to be distinguished from those that are focused on disengagement and rehabilitation, which makes sense given that the setting is as much a focus of a reintegration approach as the target population. However, the nature of the setting has not been a focus of scholarship to date, with the most substantial contribution being

Clubb and Tapley's analysis of reintegration 'milieus' which proposes three categories: the radical milieu (the world of the violent group), the antagonistic milieu (the world of those opposing the group) and the referent milieu (communities opposed to the group's violence but sharing many of its attributes and sympathies).<sup>92</sup> Individuals will rarely be purposively re-integrated into the radical milieu but this conceptualizing is important and useful for highlighting the importance of differences in community sentiment and experience and how these are likely to influence the effectiveness of an intervention.

As shown by the discussion above, population is a particularly significant dimension of disengagement and reintegration. The specification of different populations in the literature (women, children, detainees, former fighters etc.) suggests that populations can be differentiated by demographic, motivational and situational factors: sex, age, role or status in the violent extremist group, motivation for joining (e.g. coerced, paid or volunteered), and situation at the time of the intervention (e.g. detained or released). In some interventions, especially those focused on reintegration, the community may be a target population, with the desired outcome being increasing community acceptance or the social capital required to achieve reintegration. In addition, given the considerable attention paid to levels of risk and need presented by individuals, these can also be used to differentiate populations.<sup>93</sup>

Previous work on mechanisms by Rabasa et al. identified three types of intervention (affective, pragmatic and normative), which approaches mechanism, albeit from a high-level perspective. Barrelle, more comprehensively, suggested five types of intervention: ideological (broadly equivalent to 'normative'), action orientation (broadly equivalent to 'pragmatic'), plus social relations, coping and identity. Combining the two typologies suggests five mechanism types, all of which have support elsewhere in the disengagement literature. The familiar discussion over disengagement resulting from changes in beliefs suggests one category which we might label as cognitive. These might include disillusionment with leaders, strategy and tactics, or a loss of faith in the group's ideology.<sup>94</sup> Although some factors may affect the individual both emotionally and rationally, in terms of mechanisms it is important to distinguish those that work affectively from cognitive mechanisms. Affective mechanisms might include recoiling morally from acts of violence and their consequences, emotional exhaustion, and the complex effects of conflicting identities.<sup>95</sup> Given the importance of social networks extensively discussed in the literature on radicalization and disengagement, it is clearly important to include social mechanisms, including the planned provision of alternative social networks to facilitate disengagement.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, it is also clear that engagement often requires certain practical conditions to be met (e.g. proximity to a violent extremist network), and mechanisms which work by removing or restricting constraints or providing practical opportunities (such as financial incentives or employment opportunities) can be labeled as pragmatic.<sup>97</sup> Pragmatic mechanisms may be facilitative, supportive or coercive: prison-based programs, for instance, typically use rewards and sanctions to encourage desired behavior.<sup>98</sup> Finally, given the overlaps between violent extremist disengagement and DDR discussed above, it is important to include mechanisms which work to change the structural factors that may facilitate or inhibit disengagement.<sup>99</sup> Political mechanisms, which work by changing power structures, may seem somewhat distant from the individual-focused disengagement



programs that are the focus of most scholarship in this area, but they need to be included because groups like Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin are the target of some of the most mature and large-scale disengagement programs.<sup>100</sup> Looking at disengagement in the context of peace processes in South America, South-East Asia or the Western Balkans furnishes numerous examples of programs which appear to rely on political mechanisms such as amnesty and defection strategies and negotiated settlements.<sup>101</sup>

Outcomes can be differentiated by what they seek to achieve (e.g. disengagement or deradicalization or reintegration) bearing in mind that some outcomes may be unintended or counter-productive. In addition, outcomes can also be differentiated by the category of stakeholder: for example, a beneficiary government may have one set of desired outcomes for a specific intervention and a donor government may have another. However, given the uncertainty fostered by the inevitably imprecise terminology, programing good practice would suggest that the desired outcome should be specified as clearly and precisely as possible, beyond the label.<sup>102</sup> The proposed conceptual framework therefore proposes a more precise breakdown of potential outcomes, building on Marsden's categorization but broadening the categories to include interventions focused on groups and communities as well as individuals.

The proposed framework, then, contains five pillars, each comprising a set of attributes or characteristics that enables interventions to be differentiated. Given the limitations of the existing evidence base discussed above, the framework is intended to be conceptual (i.e. to clarify concepts and their relationships) rather than theoretical (i.e. to set out causality), with two potential applications. First, the framework may help to de-clutter a sub-field that is notoriously afflicted by inconclusive debates over terminology, concepts and intervention logic. Secondly, the framework has the potential to be used as a tool for planning, designing and implementing disengagement and reintegration interventions by providing a more comprehensive set of questions for assessing intervention needs, potential approaches, program design and so on (Table 1).

## Conclusion

The disengagement and reintegration of violent extremists is an urgent topic for research, and yet the study of these phenomena is still largely limited to individual decisions. Conceptual issues abound, but for understanding how disengagement and reintegration might be developed or facilitated, the greatest limitation remains the lack of empirical data from actual interventions. This is slowly improving, but the number of high-quality studies remains fairly low.<sup>103</sup>

In the absence of a strong evidence base, attempts to develop a stronger theoretical and programmatic foundation will necessarily be provisional and exploratory. The conceptual framework proposed here, built on existing scholarship on violent extremist disengagement, aims at providing clarification for practitioners and researchers. However, it has not been tested by either group of stakeholders, so if they consider it to have promise, the next step would be to use it in the way that has been suggested above – as an analytical tool for researchers, and as an aid to program design and evaluation by practitioners.



**Table 1.** Prototype framework for planning, designing and evaluating violent extremist disengagement and reintegration interventions.

Socio-political context	Setting	Target population	Mechanism	Outcome
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Political system (democratic vs authoritarian).</li> <li>2. Economic status (high, medium, low income).</li> <li>3. Social character (secular vs religious, conservative vs liberal).</li> <li>4. Degree of stability (conflict-affected/un-stable, fragile, stable).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Degree of control (e.g. secure and well-resourced institution or community setting).</li> <li>2. Nature of milieu for reintegration (radical, referent, antagonistic).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Demographic factors (age, sex, place of birth, ethnicity etc.).</li> <li>2. Situational factors (role/status in violent group; role/status in the community).</li> <li>3. Motivational factors for involvement (coerced, incentivised, volunteered; specific motives ).</li> <li>4. Degree of risk (high, medium, low).</li> <li>5. Nature of individual or community need (e.g. psycho-social support, de-stigmatization, education, employment support).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cognitive.</li> <li>2. Affective.</li> <li>3. Social.</li> <li>4. Pragmatic.</li> <li>5. Political.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Primary desistance (ceasing activity: 'dis-engagement').</li> <li>2. Secondary desistance (change in values/identity/ attitudes toward violence: 'de-radicalization').</li> <li>3. Tertiary desistance (adoption of pro-social role: individual reintegration).</li> <li>4. Community acceptance of target population).</li> <li>5. Group-level outcome (group disengagement: 'demobilization').</li> </ol>

## Notes

1. Kate Barrelle, “Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and Life after Extremism”, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 129–42; Sarah V. Marsden, “Conceptualising ‘Success’ with Those Convicted of Terrorism Offences: Aims, Methods, and Barriers to Reintegration”, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 143–65.
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3. See, for example, Chris Bosley, “Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reconciliation”, *Peaceworks* 163, United States Institute for Peace (2020); Joanne Richards, “Demobilising and Disengaging Violent Extremists: Towards a New UN Framework”, *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 6, no. 1 (2017): 14.
4. Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?”; Martine Zeuthen, *Reintegration: Disengaging Violent Extremists: A Systematic Literature Review of Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Activities* (Kingdom of the Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).
5. See, for example, Gordon Clubb, Daniel Koehler, Jonatan Schewe, Ryan O’Connor, *Selling De-Radicalisation: Managing the Media Framing of Countering Violent Extremism* (Routledge, 2021), 64–88.
6. Clubb et al., *Selling De-Radicalisation*: 19–40; Daniel Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism* (Routledge, 2017), 65–94. In general this paper prefers the neutral terms “disengagement” and “reintegration” to more contested terms such as “deradicalization” and “resilience”, and terms more suited to post-conflict peace processes such as ‘reconciliation’.
7. Tinka Veldhuis, “Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach”, ICCT Research Paper (2012); Amy-Jane Gielen, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Realist Review for Assessing What Works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 6 (2019): 1149–67.
8. Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John G. Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology”, *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 5 (2014): 647–66; Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil D. Shortland, and John G. Horgan, “Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts”, *Security Studies* 26, no. 2 (2017): 305–32; Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, and John G. Horgan, “Returning to the Fight: An Empirical Analysis of Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2019): 1–25; Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan De Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard R. Feddes, “Terrorism, Radicalization and De-Radicalization”, *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11 (2016): 79–84.
9. For example, Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism”.
10. Zeuthen, “Reintegration”; Allard R. Feddes and Marcello Gallucci, “A Literature Review on Methodology Used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions”, *Journal for Deradicalization* 5 (2015): 1–27.
11. See, for example, Mary Beth Altier, “Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration: Lessons from Over 30 Years of DDR”, Resolve Network (2021): 17.
12. Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?”: 7.
13. Altier, “Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration”.
14. Clubb et al., *Selling De-Radicalisation*: 20.

15. Gordon Clubb and Marina Tapley, "Conceptualising De-Radicalisation and Former Combatant Re-Integration in Nigeria", *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 11 (2018): 2053–68.
16. Veldhuis, "Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes".
17. Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan, "Turning Away from Terrorism".
18. Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, "Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists", RAND Corp National Security Research Division: 10.
19. Daniel Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism* (Routledge, 2017); Clubb and Tapley, "Conceptualising De-Radicalisation".
20. Horgan, "Deradicalization or Disengagement?"
21. Clubb et al., *Selling De-Radicalisation*.
22. Gordon Clubb, "De-Radicalization, Disengagement and the Attitudes-Behavior Debate," in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, ed. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Gordon Clubb and Simon Mabon (London: Sage, 2015), 258–66; Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization*.
23. Sarah V. Marsden, *Reintegrating Extremists: Deradicalisation and Desistance* (London: Springer, 2016).
24. Marsden, *Reintegrating Extremists*; Bosley, "Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reconciliation"; Barrelle, "Pro-Integration".
25. Altier, "Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration": 6.
26. A notable exception is Clubb and Tapley, "Conceptualising De-Radicalisation".
27. Altier, "Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration".
28. Alpaslan Özerdem, "A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration: 'Social Reintegration' Approach", *Conflict, Security & Development* 12 no. 1 (2012), 51–73.
29. Clubb and Tapley, "Conceptualising De-Radicalisation".
30. Altier, "Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration".
31. Özerdem, "A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration".
32. See, for example, Mara Redlich Revkin, and Kristen Kao, "No Peace Without Punishment? Reintegrating Islamic State 'Collaborators' in Iraq", *The American Journal of Comparative Law* (forthcoming 2022).
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34. James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation", RUSI Whitehall Report (2016): 2–16.
35. Marsden, *Reintegrating Extremists*.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Altier, Boyle, Shortland and Horgan, "Why They Leave".
38. Horgan and Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists?"
39. Andrew Silke, "Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners." In *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism*, ed. Andrew Silke (Routledge, 2014): 108–121; Marsden, *Reintegrating Extremists*.
40. Robert Muggah and Chris O'Donnell, "Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration", *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4, no. 1 (2015); Richards, "High Risk or Low Risk".
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44. Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization.
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47. Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”.
48. Altier et al., “Why They Leave”.
49. Khalil, James, Rory Brown, Chris Chant, Peter Olowo, and Nick Wood, “Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia”, *RUSI Whitehall Report* (2019); Atta Barkindo and Shane Bryans, “De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: Developing a Basic Prison Based De-Dadicalisation Programme”, *Journal for Deradicalisation* 7 (2016).
50. Tore Bjørgo (ed.), *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia*. Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug (1997), cited in John Horgan, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland & Max Taylor (2017), “Walking Away: The Disengagement and De-Radicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist”, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9 no. 2, 63–77.
51. See Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?” and Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism”.
52. For example, Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan comment that the investment model “elucidates why pushes and pulls may be more or less effective in precipitating disengagement at certain points during an individual’s life course as satisfaction, alternatives, and investments vary.” Similarly, Horgan et al. (“Walking Away”) traces in a single case “the varying push and pull factors that she encountered” in her journey into and out of an extremist group.
53. Veldhuis, “Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes”.
54. Khalil et al., “Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia”; Marsden, *Reintegrating Extremists*.
55. See, for example, Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization* and Stevan Weine, et al., “Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice”, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9 no. 3 (2017): 208–21.
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59. Khalil et al., “Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia”.
60. Özerdem, “A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration”.
61. Clubb and Tapley, “Conceptualising De-Radicalisation”.
62. Richards, “High Risk or Low Risk”; Emily Corner, Noémie Bouhana, and Paul Gill, “The Multifinality of Vulnerability Indicators in Lone-Actor Terrorism”, *Psychology, Crime & Law* 25, no. 2 (2019): 111–32; Altier, “Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration”.
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65. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Countering Violent Extremism with Governance Networks", *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10.6 (2016): 135–9; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Patterns of Disengagement from Violent Extremism: A Stocktaking of Current Knowledge and Implications for Counterterrorism." In *Expressions of Radicalization: Global Politics, Processes and Practices*, ed. Kristian Steiner and Andreas Önnersfors (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 273–93.
66. This conceptualisation derives from Pawson and Tilley's approach to realist (or 'realistic') evaluation. See Ray Pawson and Nick Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation* (London: Sage, 2004).
67. Pawson and Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*.
68. Veldhuis, "Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes"; Gielen, "Countering Violent Extremism".
69. Pawson and Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*.
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75. Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Countering Violent Extremism with Governance Networks".
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79. Christopher Boucek, "Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia's Special Terrorist Prisons," *Terrorism Monitor* 6, no. 2 (2008); Horgan and Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists?".
80. Marisa Porges, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Approach to Terrorist Prisoners: A model for others?" In *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism*, ed. Andrew Silke (Routledge, 2014), 169–82.
81. Enabling factors are widely discussed in public health literature, which differentiates them from predisposing and reinforcing factors. Green and Kreuter define an enabling factor as "any characteristic of the environment that facilitates action and any skill or resource required to attain a specific behaviour". See L. W. Green and M. W. Kreuter, *Health Program Planning: An Educational and Ecological Approach*. 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
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83. Altier, "Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration".
84. Veldhuis, "Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes"; Gielen, "Countering Violent Extremism".
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  99. Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen, “The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model”.
  100. Muggah and O’Donnell, “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”; Onapajo and Ozden, “Non-Military Approach against Terrorism in Nigeria”.
  101. Bjørgo and Horgan, “Conclusions”.
  102. cf. Khalil and Zeuthen, “Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction”.
  103. Zeuthen, “Reintegration”.

## Acknowledgements

The research for this article was largely conducted as part of a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellowship at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). The author wishes to thank Leanne Erdberg Steadman and Chris Bosley at USIP for their support and review of this paper, as well as a panel of international experts on violent extremist disengagement who contributed to a workshop facilitated by USIP in March 2021. The author would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who contributed valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.