

Sudan Studies

for South Sudan and Sudan

Number 69

January 2024





Front cover photograph: Coffee Pots in a souq, Sudan (Credit: Imogen Thurbon).

Contents

Editorial	1
Which Way to Peace? Ali Abdelatif M. Hussein	3
War, International Crimes, and the Breaking of the Cycle of Violence and Impunity in Sudan Lutz Oette and Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker	6
Sudanese Political Parties: The (Elusive) Quest for a National Project Ali Abdelatif M. Hussein	13
Voting out of Transition? Perspectives on the Planned National Elections in South Sudan Jan Pospisil	18
Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: Bob Wilkinson's Photographic Tribute to the People of Darfur, 1982-1986 Imogen Thurbon	33
The Greeks in Southern Sudan Antonis Chaldeos	41
The Evolution of Modern Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1924-1956: Report of the book launch at SOAS Charlotte Martin	53
Book Review	
I. G. and Morag C. Simpson , <i>Alternative Strategies for Agricultural Development in the Central Rainlands of the Sudan: with special reference to the Damazine area</i>	58

News from the Sudan Archive, Durham	62
SSSUK Notices	
Subscription Notice	65
Minutes of AGM, September 2023	66

Voting out of Transition? Perspectives on the Planned National Elections in South Sudan¹

Jan Pospisil*

Introduction

Elections in December 2024 are foreseen as the culmination of South Sudan's recovery from its civil war. Initially set out in the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS),² and reaffirmed in its 2018 revitalization (R-ARCSS),³ these elections are meant to conclude the transitional period provided by the peace agreement. However, the elections are likely to face delays, again.

Despite a 44-month transitional timeframe that had already been extended by an additional nine months, many crucial steps for conducting the elections were unmet. Consequently, in August 2022, parties to the R-ARCSS signed an agreement to extend the transition by 24 more months,⁴ aiming for elections in December 2024. Even after this extension, key preparatory measures such as conducting a population census and formulating a permanent constitution have not progressed and appear unlikely to be completed in the available time.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, South Sudan's government, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), and the dominant party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), in particular, have resolved to proceed with the elections. The SPLM has already begun its presidential nomination process, endorsing incumbent President Salva Kiir.⁵ Additionally, steps like forming a new National Electoral Commission (NEC), a Political Parties Council, and a National Constitutional Review Commission, have been initiated. Still, there remain considerable doubts about whether these elections can be conducted at all, and if so, whether they would meet democratic standards and indeed provide a way forward in the ongoing political transition without exacerbating political tensions in a dangerous way.

This article discusses these questions based on discussions with political stakeholders in South Sudan and the perceptions of the South Sudanese public on when the elections should take place, what are the necessary precondi-

¹ This article is based on a talk given by the author at the SSSUK Annual Symposium on 16th September 2023 at SOAS, London.

² <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1357>.

³ <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2112>.

⁴ <https://dr.211check.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/EARCISS-ROADMAP.pdf>.

⁵ <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/wau-kiir-welcomes-endorsement-as-splm-candidate-for-2024-polls>.

tions, what are the main risks and what parties have the best political visions for the country. In doing so, this article is drawing on a series of four opinion polls conducted between 2021 and 2023 by Detcro and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep).⁶ The polls captured the views of 13,325 people from fifteen counties across all ten states and one special administrative area, encompassing urban, rural and displacement camp environments.⁷ Respondents were asked questions about their daily experiences of safety based on indicators of everyday peace developed through qualitative research during the project's inception phase. They also shared their views on a wide range of governance and security topics.

The article will first give a brief overview of the debate on the role of elections in peace and transition processes, especially when they are meant to provide a way out of power-sharing arrangements. It will outline the public perceptions of the elections, especially regarding timing and associated risks, and will then proceed to look into the preparatory steps and the main challenges they provide. The conclusions will discuss the possible consequences of these elections on the transition process.

The Role of Elections in Peace Processes and its Reflections in the South Sudanese Context

Elections always had important roles in peacebuilding which, in itself, has always been linked to efforts of democratisation, even though the academic subfields have always been oddly separated (Call and Cook 2003). Research accounts often argue that elections can provide legitimacy to post-conflict governments, which are routinely based on power-sharing arrangements com-

⁶ David Deng, Sophia Dawkins, Christopher Oringa and Jan Pospisil. Public Perceptions of Peace in South Sudan Survey. 2020-2023 [original data on file with the author and available on request].

⁷ A convenience sample of 15 counties was selected to represent the principal regions and conflict theatres in South Sudan. The research team used an approximately self-weighting stratified random sampling approach to select households, and then individuals within households. This method centred on a randomization strategy implemented using ArcGIS and the GRID3 South Sudan Settlement Extents, Version 01.01 dataset. For each workday, enumerators began at randomly drawn map coordinates and followed a random walk guided by smartphone apps. Enumerators recorded responses using Kobo Toolbox smartphone software. See Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University and Novel-T. 2021, GRID3 South Sudan Settlement Extents, Version 01, Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development (GRID3), available at <https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-khpa-pq09>.

ing out of peace negotiations. The process of holding free and fair elections is seen as a way to establish the democratic credentials of a new regime, fostering both domestic and international recognition: *“Electoral processes in post-conflict countries are invariably a critical step in transition processes from war to re-legitimizing of the state through reference to the ballot box”* (Sisk 2013, 258)

Nonetheless, there is a strong counterargument that elections in the immediate aftermath of conflict can exacerbate divisions. Early elections might entrench existing conflicts, especially if the electoral system is not ready to guarantee the ‘free- and fair’ principles of credible election processes that are designed to promote inclusivity. The timing of elections is a critical factor in this debate. The consensus in the literature is that rushing elections is not helpful and can lead to negative results (Reilly 2003), especially if there has not been a proper demobilisation of armed actors before (Lyons 2004; Joshi 2014).

It is, of course, much better to hold elections after a civil war has ended for good and armed actors are not in a position anymore to act violently (Höglund *et al.* 2009). Given South Sudan’s no war/no peace situation – where a fragile peace at national level is underpinned by frequent subnational violence with considerable political implications (Craze and Marko 2022) – such conditions will not be given. Nonetheless, the time that the transition period has already lasted puts South Sudan in the range of those elections that have not been rushed: *“at least two years of preparation are needed in new democracies—and even then, the effect of elections is not nearly as positive as it is in established democracies”* (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 568). Elections are, in any case, only one step in a longer democracy building process and their importance in determining the formation of a political system should not be overrated.

The choice of the electoral system does play a crucial role that can support or undermine peacebuilding efforts. The South Sudanese system, as laid out in the national election act, provides for a mixed system with inclusive components targeting marginalised minority groups. At the level of the national legislative assembly – and also the state-level assemblies – the voting system is split in half between first-past-the-post and proportional representation, with the latter providing designated seats for women (35%), youth and disabled. While the probable dominance of the SPLM will certainly reduce and control diversity, the system still can be labelled inclusive and favouring transitional politics.

Finally, the role of international partners, multilateral as well as bilateral actors, will be critical in supporting and supervising the electoral effort. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has, along with the United Nations Country Team, already taken steps in organising practical support, from logistical planning to crafting the necessary legal framework. The role

of bilateral partners is more mixed. While largely in favour of not prolonging the formal transition process any further, most partners – especially the three Troika countries United States, the United Kingdom and Norway – are sceptical and reluctant to support the preparation efforts, with Japan and the European Union taking a slightly more optimistic stance. Financial means have, so far, not been pledged, which has had a significantly negative effect on the preparations for the elections given South Sudan's depleted official budget. At present, the financing situation has evolved into a waiting game, with all actors looking at one another and wondering who might move first.

Public Perceptions of Elections in South Sudan

The current transitional set-up as laid out in the roadmap agreement envisages elections for December 2024. Some elementary steps have already been undertaken, such as the passing of the National Election Amendment Act (albeit with some critical mistakes, see Geng and Biong 2023), and the formation of the reconstituted National Election Commission (NEC), the Political Parties Council (PPC) and the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC). In-depth discussions on the electoral process, necessary preparatory steps and regional lessons have been held (Cheeseman *et al.* 2023).

Nonetheless, preparations are behind schedule, especially at the logistical level. Since a proper population census appears impossible (see further below), the voter registration process is of utmost importance to ensure the credibility and legitimacy of the elections. In order for the elections to happen on time, this process should ideally start 18 months, at the latest 12 months before the scheduled date – hence, it is already delayed, mainly because of procurement challenges due to a lack of funding.

Nonetheless, in the public perception survey, respondents favoured elections to be held on time when asked when elections should happen. At the time of interviewing (April 2023), all the above-mentioned steps had not yet been completed, hence respondents could not see any tangible progress apart from the roadmap agreement. Nevertheless, as Figure 1 shows, respondents overwhelmingly want to vote in December 2024, as foreseen by the roadmap. To an extent, respondents would accept a delay of one year, but December 2024 is favoured by a majority in all surveyed counties. Three counties (Aweil Centre, Rubkona and Yirol West) show a substantial number of non-responses, which points towards challenges for the open political space conducive to conducting elections.

Importantly, the figures also clearly show that the perceived risk of election violence is not undermining the willingness of people to vote. In some counties (for instance, Gogrial West, Jur River and Renk), the demand to hold





Figure 1. 'When should elections happen?' N = 4246; Year = 2023.
(Excludes respondents who did not answer questions about election violence.)

Figure 1. Key to colour coding



elections on time is even stronger among those who see election violence as a substantial risk. An argument that election violence would deter people from voting is, therefore, not correct.

Figure 2 shows that residents of the sites for internally displaced people are particularly looking forward to elections. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents in the camps want to see elections to be held on time, in contrast to about 60% in the other settings. These results provide a substantial political




Figure 2. When should elections happen? By Environment (2023, n = 4,482).

challenge for the SPLM-IO, which has its main constituencies in these camps (Figure 9 below confirms this when looking at party popularity). For tactical reasons, the SPLM-IO currently leans towards delaying the elections, mainly citing the lack of peace agreement implementation, but of course also in the face of a probable election defeat. This stance, however, is challenged when the demand of their constituencies to vote on time is stronger than the South Sudanese average.

Survey results contradict commonly held assumptions of people being potentially overburdened with the voting process. Instead, they reveal a strong inclination towards voting among a majority of respondents from various locations. An overwhelming 90% of individuals feel prepared to cast their votes, demonstrating a surprising level of electoral readiness and awareness.

The survey also sheds light on people’s voting experiences. A notable 84% of respondents eligible to vote in 2010 participated in the elections, surpassing the 70% turnout reported by Sudan’s National Election Commission for registered voters. This suggests that the current generation has already been politically active in the last, (formerly Sudanese), election process.

Additionally, voting experience stretches to the traditional and civil realm. Half of the respondents have exercised their voting rights in traditional leadership elections, reflecting a blend of modern and customary political participation. Notably, 71% expressed willingness to vote for a political leader from a different ethnic group, signalling a progressive attitude towards ethnic diversity in political representation. Nevertheless, group voting is likely to happen. While 84% perceive voting as a matter of personal choice, a significant 38% of this group also believes that their community should vote the same way. This indicates a complex interplay between individual liberty and community influence in the voting process, as it has been also suggested in the literature (Schaffer 2000).

Can It Be Done? Risks and Preconditions

The main risk in relation to the elections is election-related violence; this is discussed nationally and internationally and confirmed by survey results. The perceived likelihood of violence among survey respondents is severe, with 61% in 2023 assessing election violence as likely or highly likely (see Figure 3). This number represents a slight improvement, however, compared to 66% in 2021. The regional results differ significantly (Figure 4). Some counties, especially Pibor, Gogrial West and Bor South, show remarkably high numbers, while others, such as Rumbek Centre and Aweil, and, to an extent, Wau and Jur River, are characterised by more optimistic expectations. However in these




Figure 3. How would you assess the risk of violence in relation to the elections?
By Year (2021-23, n = 13,317).




Figure 4. *How would you assess the risk of violence in relation to the elections?*
By Location (2023, n = 4,482).

places, a sizeable number of respondents see election violence as likely.

The issue of election-related violence underscores the importance of establishing robust security measures. Figure 5 below further highlights this challenge, while also pointing to significant concerns about the political environment. A mere one-third of survey participants feel either safe or very safe when discussing politically sensitive topics in public. Conversely, over half of the respondents express apprehension, with 17% specifically indicating a sense of extreme vulnerability in these situations.

The data also reveals notable regional disparities that align with well-established patterns. In Greater Bahr El-Ghazal, where many of the current political leaders originate, people tend to feel more at ease expressing their political views publicly. In contrast, in Greater Upper Nile and, particularly, in Greater Equatoria, there is a heightened sense of reluctance. For instance, while 45% of those in Greater Bahr El-Ghazal report feeling comfortable discussing politics openly, only 18% in Greater Equatoria share this sentiment.




Figure 5. ‘How safe do you feel speaking publicly on politically sensitive issues?’
By Region (2023, n = 4,482).

These statistics suggest that the political climate is not yet favourable for conducting elections that are both free and fair, and proper security arrangements that remain politically neutral need to be established. The current deployment of the so-called ‘Necessary Unified Forces’, built from the armed outfits of the peace agreement signatories, is one of the steps undertaken in this respect. The recruitment of additional police personnel is another planned step, however always dependent on available funding. Furthermore, the prevalent distrust in the government seems to be a significant factor contributing to the public’s hesitancy to openly criticise and engage in political discourse.

Besides working security arrangements and guaranteeing a conducive political space, conducting a census, and drafting a permanent constitution are two further, often-cited preconditions provided for by R-ARCSS and the subsequent roadmap agreement. Currently, both elements are unlikely to be implemented, due to a shortage of time and resources. Indeed, conducting a census in a country as big and weak in its transport infrastructure as South Sudan, is a formidable task. It is a task, however, of significant relevance for a first-past-the-post electoral system, where elected representatives are supposed to represent a more or less equal number of citizens in their respective constituencies.

This importance is understood and valued by the survey respondents, with, overall, close to 80% stating that they see a census as a necessary precondition

for credible elections. This figure shows remarkable distrust in the population estimates that are available and which might be used for deciding on political constituencies. In any case, with a census highly unlikely to be conducted before elections, proactive political communication on how credible elections may work without one is of utmost importance.

The most recent official population estimate, based on an assessment from 2021 and published in March 2023, was severely contested,⁸ as it heavily favoured Bahr El-Ghazal, which is considered a stronghold of the ruling SPLM. The creation of about 155 political constituencies that differ from the currently 78 counties, necessary for the first-past-the-post system, thus represents a significant political challenge, given that substantial gerrymandering is to be expected. Another related challenge is the voting of South Sudanese outside the country, especially the large refugee populations in Kenya and Uganda. How these populations should be integrated in the voting process, especially at the subnational level, is not yet clarified.

The survey participants generally show greater flexibility concerning the




Figure 6. Is a census necessary for conducting fair and credible elections?
By Displacement status (2023, n = 4,482).

adoption of a permanent constitution, as indicated in Figure 7. Contrary to the – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) – led National Constitutional Review Commission’s assertion that credible elections require a pre-established permanent constitution,⁹ a significant portion of the respondents (52% in the overall sample) believe that creating a permanent constitution should be the responsibility of a newly elected government rather than the current transitional government.

This perspective is both comprehensible and practical, considering that a

⁸ <https://www.eyeradio.org/population-estimate-data-not-suitable-for-elections-says-aruai/>

⁹ <https://www.eyeradio.org/agreement-doesnt-allow-holding-of-elections-without-permanent-constitution-ncrc-chief/>




Figure 7. *Do you think the enactment of a permanent constitution should be done by the transitional government or by a new, elected government?* (2023, $n = 4,482$).

transitional constitution already exists, which could serve as a legal foundation for elections with some essential modifications. Furthermore, the current power-sharing political landscape poses a challenge in forming committees that would adequately represent all parties for drafting a permanent constitution. Therefore, entrusting the task of constitution-making to a government that has gained legitimacy through elections seems like a reasonable approach in the current political context.

Possible Outcomes

In the absence of any polling and historical data, the outcome of the election is uncertain. Given other examples of post-independence settings, it is likely that the incumbent liberation movement in South Sudan, the SPLM, is in a favourable position to win convincingly, irrespective of its recent political track record. Indeed, the available data confirms this expectation. The Public Perceptions of Peace survey, on which this assumption is based, did not poll voting behaviour for presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections. Instead, it used the question ‘which political party has the best vision for South Sudan’ as a proxy to predict voting behaviour. The question has been asked twice (both in 2022 and 2023) with only marginally different results in a randomised survey setting, which suggests that the results are reliable.

The data in Figure 8, broken down by county, reveals interesting trends in political support. Nationally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG) comes out clearly as the leading party, securing 45% of the support in the fifteen surveyed counties. The SPLM-IO is the only other party that has a good chance of crossing the 4% threshold necessary for representation in the national parliament, although its support stands at




Figure 8. Which political party do you think has the best vision for South Sudan? (2023).

a much lower 17%. These numbers indicate that the SPLM-IO is unlikely to pose a significant challenge to the SPLM-IG at the national level. State-level results are more varied: in Unity State’s Rubkona, the SPLM-IO enjoys a majority, also the Equatorias show a highly mixed picture. In Greater Bahr El-Ghazal, unsurprisingly, the SPLM-IG appears as the clear front-runner.

In the capital city, Juba, political preferences are notably diverse, with the SPLM-IG having only a slight lead. The party shows weaker support in two counties in Equatoria – Torit and, more markedly, in Yei. Yei presents a unique scenario where 15% of respondents support the National Salvation Front (NAS), a group that remains technically illegal due to its non-participation in peace agreements. Figure 9 shows the disaggregated results by environment. Unsurprisingly, it shows the high popularity of the SPLM-IO in the IDP and PoC camps, where their core constituencies live. Outside this environment the SPLM-IO struggles mightily, with support only reaching 10% in rural and urban settings outside the camps.

Concerningly, the data also shows that the level of political frustration is high. Seventeen percent of respondents state that not a single party has a good vision for South Sudan, and another 12% are not answering the question.




Figure 9. Which political party do you think has the best vision for South Sudan?
By Environment (2023, n = 4,482).

Addressing this level of political frustration needs to be a cornerstone of the pre-election process, where all competing parties and individuals are in dire need of working on their political credibility.

Conclusion

Holding elections in a fragile political landscape such as South Sudan bears considerable risks. There is a fair chance of election violence, especially should there be rigging on a broad scale. The creation of political constituencies and the process of voter registration are likely to be contested as well. Furthermore, given the presented data on party popularity, a change of leadership at the national level is unlikely. Even without rigging, incumbent President Salva Kiir has by far the best chances of winning the presidential elections, as has his party, the SPLM, at parliamentary level.

Given this picture, it is a valid question whether holding these elections makes sense in the current environment, especially since a number of the preconditions laid out in R-ARCSS and the 2022 roadmap agreement have not been met. However, there are two important counterarguments for why these elections are still important: first, there will be political changes. The opposition has good chances of winning some of the state governorships, for instance, in Unity State. The first-past-the-post element in the parliamentary elections is also hard to control, and political surprises can happen. The reduction of the number of positions and seats at all levels also guarantees political changes. The biggest loser of seats and positions in absolute numbers, compared with the current power-sharing framework, will be the strongest party – the SPLM.

These political consequences lead to the second argument in favour of elections. Prolonging the current power-sharing framework is not likely to change anything. The often-heard argument that all preconditions need to be met and that therefore, elections need to be postponed, would be equally valid for years

to come. Peace processes are not about full implementation by the book, but about process dynamics. The South Sudanese transition is, without doubt, in the need of a dynamizing element.

Against this background, any argument for the elections to be postponed provokes the answer ‘waiting for what?’ The overwhelming majority of South Sudanese want elections to be held as confirmed by the survey data presented in this article, and this is probably strongest factor pointing to the need to hold these elections. If people want to vote, even when clearly seeing the associated risks, it is a politically but also ethically difficult argument to make that they need to wait longer because the country is just not ready.

It is unlikely that all the globally accepted conditions for free and fair elections will be met, and the environment will become more conducive. Elections will always be a ‘good enough’ exercise, associated with considerable risks such as election-related violence, rigging, and unfair politicking. This is confirmed by looking at neighbouring countries: for instance, the 2022 Kenyan national elections were the first in the country’s history without an election-related death. Holding regular elections is a challenging process in itself, and it needs to be started at some point.

References

- Call, C. T. and S. E. Cook 2003. ‘On democratization and peacebuilding’, *Global Governance* 9, 233.
- Cheeseman, N., L. Biong and E. Yakani 2023. ‘How to Not Hold Elections in South Sudan’, FES Discussion Paper. Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation South Sudan Office.
- Craze, J. and F. D. Marko 2022. ‘Death by Peace: How South Sudan’s Peace Agreement Ate the Grassroots’, *African Arguments*.
- Flores, T. E. and I. Nooruddin 2012. ‘The effect of elections on postconflict peace and reconstruction’, *The Journal of Politics* 74.2, 558-570.
- Geng Akech, J. and Luka Biong Denk Kuol 2023. ‘Operationalizing the 2023 National Elections Act: Opportunities and Challenges’, *Sudd Institute Weekly Review*, 24/10/2023, Sudd Institute.
- Höglund, K., A. K. Jarstad and M. S. Kovacs 2009. ‘The predicament of elections in war-torn societies’, *Democratization* 16.3, 530-557.
- Joshi, M. 2014. ‘Postaccord political violence, elections, and peace processes: evidence from Nepal’, *Civil Wars* 16.3, 276-299.
- Lyons, T. 2004. ‘Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration’, *Democratization* 11.3, 36-62.
- Reilly, B. 2014. ‘Post-conflict elections: Constraints and dangers’, in E. Newman and A. Schnabel (eds), *Recovering from Civil Conflict. Reconciliation, Peace*

and Development. Routledge, 118-139.

Schaffer, F. C. 2000. *Democracy in translation: Understanding politics in an unfamiliar culture*. Cornell University Press.

Sisk, T. D. 2013. 'Elections and Statebuilding After Civil War: Lurching toward legitimacy 1', in D. Chandler and T. D. Sisk (eds), *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding*. Routledge, 257-266.

*Dr Jan Pospisil is Associate Professor (Research) at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University, United Kingdom, and a co-investigator of the PeaceRep programme. He is co-responsible for the South Sudan Public Perceptions of Peace Survey. Jan has undertaken research in South(ern) Sudan since 2009.

Sudan Studies

Sudan Studies – ISSN 0952-049X – is published twice a year by the Society for the Study of the Sudans (UK). Views expressed in notes, articles and reviews published in *Sudan Studies* are not necessarily those held by the SSSUK, the Editor or the Editorial Board. Articles are published to promote discussion and further scholarship in Sudan and South Sudan studies.

All correspondence, articles and features relating to *Sudan Studies* and books for review should be addressed to:

Charlotte Martin,
Editor,
Sudan Studies,
72 Castle Road,
Colchester,
CO1 1UN
Email: sudanstudies@ssuk.org

Notes for Contributors

SSSUK welcomes notes and articles intended for publication, to be assessed by the Editorial Board. The maximum length is 5,000 words including foot-notes; longer articles may be accepted for publication in two or more parts. Short pieces are also welcome. Notes and articles should be typed in Times New Roman and single spaced and should normally be submitted as Microsoft Word files and sent to the editor as an e-mail attachment. Maps, diagrams and photographs should be of high definition and sent as separate files, with a file name corresponding directly to the figure or plate number in the text. Any bibliographies should be in Harvard style. SSSUK retains the right to edit articles for reasons of space or clarity, and consistency of style and spelling.

It is helpful to have some relevant details about the author (2-3 lines), e.g. any post held or time spent in the Sudan and interest in the topic being discussed.

Unless stated otherwise, SSSUK retains the copyright of all material published in *Sudan Studies*.

Single copies and back numbers may be obtained from the Secretary (secretary@ssuk.org) at a cost of £8 per copy plus postage.

